The background of the cover is a composite image. The top half shows a dense, historic town with terracotta-tiled roofs and a prominent domed church. The bottom half shows a modern city skyline with numerous skyscrapers. The text is overlaid on a semi-transparent white rectangular area in the center.

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Political Machine
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- Racialization
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Real Estate
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Regional Planning
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Siena, Italy. *See* Allegory of Good Government
SimCity
Simmel, Georg
Simulacra
Singapore
Situationist City
Skateboarding
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Social Housing
Social Movements
Social Production of Space
Social Space
Society of the Spectacle
Soja, Edward W.
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Squatter Movements
Stranger
Streetcars
Street Children
Suburbanization
Subway
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Sustainable Development
- Technoburbs
Technopoles
Tenement
Themed Environments
Tiebout Hypothesis
Time Geography
Toilets
Tokyo, Japan
Tourism
Train Station. *See* Railroad Station
Transit-Oriented Development
Transportation
Transportation Planning
- Uneven Development
Urban
Urban Agglomeration
Urban Anthropology
Urban Archaeology
Urban Climate
Urban Crisis
Urban Culture
Urban Design
Urban Ecology (Chicago School)
Urban Economics
- Urban Entertainment Destination
Urban Geography
Urban Health
Urban History
Urbanism
Urbanization
Urban Landscape. *See* Urban Morphology
Urban League
Urban Life
Urban Morphology
Urban Novel
Urban Planning
Urban Policy
Urban Politics
Urban Psychology
Urban Semiotics
Urban Sociology
Urban Space
Urban Studies
Urban System
Urban Theory
Urban Village
Utopia
- Venice, Italy
Veranda
- Walking City
Waste
Women and the City
World City
World's Fair. *See* New York World's Fair, 1939–1940
World-Systems Perspective
World Trade Center (9/11)
Wren, Sir Christopher
- Zoöpolis

Reader's Guide

The *Encyclopedia of Urban Studies* is intended for a number of different audiences, ranging from high school students and teachers who require general information about topics that we have included here to advanced scholars who require an overview of topics not directly accessible in their area of study. This suggests that there are a number of ways to approach the encyclopedia—in other words, there are a number of ways to read the entries. In the following Reader's Guide, we suggest several ways to use this encyclopedia, whether you have picked up this volume to find information about a specific subject, or you are interested in a general overview of the field of urban studies.

At the beginning level, urban studies comprises a number of subfields within the more traditional disciplines that focus some part of their study of cities and urban life, as well as professional fields that deal with these topics. In addition to the entry on Urban Studies, there are entries on the following disciplines that contribute to urban studies:

- Urban Anthropology
- Urban Economics
- Urban Geography
- Urban History
- Urban Planning
- Urban Politics
- Urban Psychology
- Urban Sociology

Disciplinary Approaches in Urban Studies

The many urban disciplines have developed important concepts to explain both urban growth (urbanization) as well as characteristic features of urban life (urbanism). The encyclopedia includes entries on concepts in several of the disciplines:

Urban Economics

- Affordable Housing
- Deindustrialization
- Developer
- Downtown Revitalization
- Ethnic Entrepreneur
- Gentrification
- Globalization
- Growth Poles

- Housing
- Land Developer
- Land Trust
- Marxism and the City
- Rent Control
- Rent Theory
- Tiebout Hypothesis
- Uneven Development
- Urban Agglomeration
- Urban Planning

Urban Geography

- City Map
- Edge City
- Exopolis
- Fourth World

Location Theory
 Los Angeles School of Urban Studies
 Megalopolis
 Metropolitan
 Metropolitan Region
 Patchwork Urbanism
 Time Geography
 Urban Morphology

Urban History

Acropolis
 Allegory of Good Government
 Almshouse
 Ancient City
 Athens
Béguinage
Caravanserai
 Cultural Heritage
 Forum
 Heritage City
 Historic City
 Marxism and the City
 Medieval Town Design
 Renaissance City
 Santiago de Compostela, Spain

Urban Politics

Community Organizing
 Governance
 Growth Machine
 Local Government
 Metropolitan Governance
 New Regionalism
 Political Machine
 Progressive City
 Public Authorities
 Public–Private Partnerships
 Regime Theory
 Regional Governance
 Social Movements

Urban Sociology

Chicago School of Urban Sociology
 Community
 Community Studies
 Factorial Ecology
Gemeinschaft and *Gesellschaft*
 Ghetto
 Human Ecology

New Urban Sociology
 Stranger
 Urban Ecology
 Urbanism

Urban Studies—Topical Areas

Architecture

Arcade
 Architecture
 Bilbao, Spain
 Bungalow
 Bunkers
 Capital City
 Discotheque
 Landscape Architecture
 Las Vegas, Nevada
 New Urbanism
 Renaissance City
 Themed Environments
 Urban Design
 Veranda

Gender and Sex

The study of gender and sex has been an important area of study in many of the urban disciplines. Many of the entries here emphasize the ways in which gender and sex create and redefine urban spaces in important ways:

Béguinage

Gay Space
 Gendered Space
 Non-Sexist City
 Public Realm
 Red-Light District
 Sex and the City
 Sex Industry
 Social Space
 Women and the City

Social Space

Fourth World
 Gay Space
 New Urbanism
 Night Space
 Non-Place Realm
 Piazza
 Public Realm

Racialization
 Social Production of Space
 Spaces of Difference
 Spaces of Flows
 Tourism
 Urban Design
 Urban Space

Sustainable Development

Community Planning
 Developer
 Downtown Revitalization
 Environmental Justice
 Environmental Policy
 Growth Management
 Housing
 Neighborhood Revitalization
 New Urbanism
 Sprawl
 Urban Planning
 Urban Village
 Waste

Urban Issues

Contemporary cities and urban regions confront a number of important issues, ranging from individual problems of poverty to societal problems of provision of adequate housing and social exclusion. While it is important not to problematize the city, the following entries discuss some of the important issues for urban studies in the twenty-first century.

Catastrophe
 Crime
 Deindustrialization
 Disability and the City
 Displacement
 Drug Economy
 Gentrification
 Globalization
 Healthy Cities
 Homelessness
 Marxism and the City
 Nuclear War
 Right to the City
 Social Exclusion
 Sprawl
 Street Children

Suburbanization
 Surveillance
 Urban Crisis
 Waste

Urban Planning

Urban planning represents a professional field that has long been associated with urban studies; a number of early urban planners, such as Patrick Geddes, were influential in the development of the field, and urban planning itself molds the urban environment where the subject matter of our field is found.

Advocacy Planning
 Annexation
 City Beautiful Movement
 City Planning
 Community Development
 Convention Centers
 Exclusionary Zoning
 Garden City
 Gender Equity Planning
 General Plan
 Growth Management
 Housing
 Planning Theory
 Themed Environment
 Tourism
 Urban Design

Urban Theory

Cinematic Urbanism
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft
 Globalization
 Marxism and the City
 Planning Theory
 Stranger
 Uneven Development
 Urban
 Urban Design
 Urbanism
 Urbanization
 Urban Planning
 Urban Semiotics
 Urban System
 Urban Theory
 World-Systems Perspective

Urban Transportation

The study of transportation is an important subfield within urban studies; the entries included here reflect the fact that transportation systems have been important in the development of cities (Streetcars, Subway) and are an important part of planning for the urban future (Transit-Oriented Development):

Airports
Buses
Hotel, Motel
Journey to Work
New York World's Fair, 1939–1940
Railroad Station
SimCity
Streetcars
Subway
Transit-Oriented Development
Transportation Planning
Walking City

Urban Culture

Cities are said to represent the greatest achievement of human civilization, the place where culture and the great traditions are created and preserved. Entries in this category include those who create culture, varieties of urban culture, and urban life and lifestyles more generally.

Bohemian
Cinema (Movie House)
City Club
City Users
Creative Class
Flâneur
Graffiti
Hip Hop
Intellectuals
Landscapes of Power
Loft Living
Metropolis
Museums
Nightlife
Parks
Photography and the City
Placemaking
Public Art

Shopping
Simulacra
Skateboarding
Society of the Spectacle
Stranger
Urban
Urban Health
Urban Life
Urban Novel

Places

While metropolitan regions and individual cities often are the focus of study in urban studies, many other studies look at specific places within the urban environment, as seen in the following entries:

Airports
Banlieue
Barrio
Bazaar
Béguinage
Caravanseraï
Convention Centers
Discotheque
Ethnic Enclave
Favela
Forum
Fourth World
Gated Community
Ghetto
Heterotopia
Metropolitan
Necropolis
Night Spaces
Piazza
Placemaking
Resort
Shopping Center
Sports Stadiums
Suburbanization
Technoburbs
Technopoles
Themed Environments
Toilets
Utopia
World Trade Center (9/11)
Zoöpolis

Cities

The encyclopedia includes entries on a number of cities. These entries include overview articles about cities in different historical periods (Renaissance City), regions of the world (Mediterranean City), and other categories that have been of importance in the development of urban studies (World City). There are also entries on specific cities (and their metropolitan regions) that are important because of their historical significance (Florence as the birthplace of the Renaissance and of Renaissance architecture and development of urban planning); examples of innovation in urban design and architecture (Bilbao); importance in the urban studies literature (London, New York City, and Tokyo are most frequently mentioned in the world city literature), and the like.

Historical Overviews

Allegory of Good Government
 Capitalist City
 Chinatowns
 Colonial City
 Divided Cities
 Global City
 Heritage City
 Historic Cities
 Ideal City
 Informational City
 Islamic City
 Mediterranean City
 Megalopolis
 Multicultural Cities
 Other Global Cities
 Primate City
 Progressive City
 Renaissance City
 Revanchist City
 Situationist City
 World City

Specific Cities

Amsterdam, the Netherlands
 Berlin, Germany
 Bilbao, Spain
 Cairo, Egypt
 Canberra, Australia
 Chicago, Illinois

Damascus, Syria
 Delhi, India
 Florence, Italy
 Hiroshima, Japan
 Hong Kong, China
 Istanbul, Turkey
 Kolkata (Calcutta), India
 Lagos, Nigeria
 Las Vegas, Nevada
 London, United Kingdom
 Los Angeles, California
 Manchester, United Kingdom
 Manila, Philippines
 Mexico City, Mexico
 Moscow, Russian Federation
 Mumbai (Bombay), India
 New York City, New York
 Paris, France
 Rome, Italy
 Santa Fe, New Mexico
 Santiago de Compostela, Spain
 São Paulo, Brazil
 Savannah, Georgia
 Shanghai, China
 Singapore
 Tokyo, Japan
 Venice, Italy

Persons

The various urban disciplines have important figures that have influenced both the early development and current work in their field, and these persons are also listed in the urban disciplines (above). But a number of important figures in urban studies, such as Jane Jacobs and Lewis Mumford, were not trained in specific academic disciplines. The encyclopedia includes important scholars from many of the urban disciplines, as well as others who have had important influence on urban studies:

Alinsky, Saul
 Alonso, William
 Benjamin, Walter
 Berry, Brian J. L.
 Castells, Manuel
 Childe, V. Gordon

Davis, Mike
de Certeau, Michel
Dickens, Charles
Downs, Anthony
Du Bois, W. E. B.
Fujita, Masahisa
Geddes, Patrick
Gottdiener, Mark
Hall, Peter
Harvey, David
Hausmann, Baron Georges-Eugène
Hawley, Amos
Isard, Walter
Jackson, Kenneth T.

Jacobs, Jane
Kracauer, Siegfried
Le Corbusier
Lefebvre, Henri
Lösch, August
Lynch, Kevin
Moses, Robert
Mumford, Lewis
Riis, Jacob
Sassen, Saskia
Sert, Josep Lluís
Simmel, Goerg
Soja, Edward W.
Wren, Sir Christopher

About the Editors

General Editor

Ray Hutchison is Professor of Sociology and Chair of Urban and Regional Studies at the University of Wisconsin, Green Bay. He received his BA from the State University of New York at Binghamton, and his MA and PhD from the University of Chicago. Dr. Hutchison was Director of the HUD–Community Development Work Study Program at UW Green Bay and currently is Director of the Hmong Studies Center. His research has been funded by the U.S. Forest Service, National Institute of Mental Health, and the University of Wisconsin System Institute on Race and Ethnicity. He teaches Introduction to Urban Studies, Urban Sociology, The City through Time and Space, and Street Gangs in Urban America. He was a founding editor of *City & Community* and is a recipient of the International Award of Merit from the Fondazione Romualdo Del Bianco in Florence.

Dr. Hutchison is Series Editor of *Research in Urban Sociology* (the forthcoming tenth volume in the series, titled *Urban Life During Wartime*, is co-edited with Sonja Prodanovic from the Institute for Architecture and Town Planning, Belgrade). He is co-author (with Mark Gottdiener) of *The New Urban Sociology* (now in the fourth edition). He is the author of more than 40 articles, book reviews, chapters, and invited contributions to books and journals, including *Social Problems*, *City & Community*, *Journal of Marriage and the Family*, *Journal of Leisure Research*, and *Leisure Sciences*, and on topics ranging from street gangs and gang graffiti, Latino communities in Chicago and Asian American communities in Wisconsin and Minnesota, urban recreation, and leisure activities of ethnic populations. Dr. Hutchison organized sessions on *The Tourist City* as part of

the 2008 Florence Festival sponsored by the Fondazione Romualdo Del Bianco, and serves as head of the planning committee for an international conference on *Everyday Life in the Segmented City* to be held in Florence in 2010.

Advisory Board

Manuel B. Aalbers, a human geographer, sociologist, and urban planner, is a researcher at the Amsterdam institute for Metropolitan and International Development Studies (AMIDSt), University of Amsterdam. From January 2007 until August 2008 he was a post-doctoral researcher at Columbia University, New York. He has been a guest researcher at the Center for Place, Culture and Politics at City University New York, the University of Milan–Bicocca, and the University of Urbino (Italy). Prior to working in academia, he was a researcher and consultant in housing and urban planning in the Netherlands and Belgium, and writer for an online music magazine.

Dr. Aalbers's main research interest is the intersection of finance, the built environment, and residents. He has published on redlining, social and financial exclusion, neighborhood decline, gentrification, the privatization of social housing, safety and security, public space, red-light districts, and the Anglo-American hegemony in academic research and writing. He is the author of a book on housing and community development in New York City and is preparing a manuscript for a book titled *Place, Exclusion and Mortgage Markets*. He is the guest editor of a special issue of the *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* (volume 33, issue 2) on mortgage markets and the financial crisis, and the book review editor of *Rooilijn*, a Dutch urban studies/planning journal.

Robert A. Beauregard is a Professor of Urban Planning in the Graduate School of Architecture, Planning, and Preservation, Columbia University. He is director of the Urban Planning Program and chair of the Doctoral Program Subcommittee on Urban Planning. He teaches courses on planning theory, urban redevelopment policy, social theory, and research design. His PhD is in city and regional planning from Cornell University and he has a degree in architecture from Rhode Island School of Design. He previously taught at The New School, University of Pittsburgh, and Rutgers University and has been a visiting professor at University of California, Los Angeles and at the Helsinki University of Technology. In addition, Beauregard is a docent professor in the Department of Social Policy at the University of Helsinki and a part-time visiting professor in the Department of Geography, King's College, London.

Beauregard's research focuses mainly on urbanization in the United States with particular attention to industrial city decline after World War II—a story told in *Voices of Decline: The Postwar Fate of U.S. Cities* (2003)—and to current urban growth and decline with specific attention to resurgent and shrinking cities. He also writes on planning theory and urban theory. His most recent book is *When America Became Suburban* (2006). Currently, Beauregard is working on a comparative study of anti-urbanism, an interpretation of planning using actor-network theory, and an essay on truth and reality in urban theory. Future projects include a compilation of essays on urban epistemology titled *Writing Urban Theory* and an investigation of the reasons why some cities prosper while others do not, which will appear as a book titled *Why Cities Endure*.

Mike Crang is a Reader in Geography at Durham University. He has been at Durham since 1994 when he completed his PhD on the heritage industry at the University of Bristol, which had a concentration on urban pictorial and oral history. Since then his work has developed from looking at consumers of heritage to cultural tourism, to tourism more generally. He has written extensively on visual consumption and photography in tourism as well as other qualitative methods. He has edited two collections on tourism as well as coediting the journal *Tourist Studies*. He serves on the editorial board of *Environment and Planning A*, *Geography Compass* and for 10 years on that of *Social and Cultural Geography*.

His work on social memory has led to thinking through time and temporality in the city, and publication of *Thinking Space* (2000). He is also interested in more abstract issues regarding time-space, action, and temporality and coedited the journal *Time & Society* from 1997 to 2006. This focus on urban rhythms, spaces, and times led him to work on the transformations of space and time through electronic technologies, both theoretically and empirically, with Singapore's "Wired City" initiative and the "digital divide" in UK cities through an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) project on "Multi-speed Cities and the Logistics of Daily Life" and is now working on the notion of a "sentient city" and the politics of new forms of locative computing. Thinking through temporality and his work on urban ruins has led to work on wastescapes as part of a large ESRC project, "The Waste of the World." In total he has written and edited nine books and more than 50 articles and chapters.

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Introduction

We live in an urban world. For the first time in human history, more than half of the world's population—some 3 billion persons—lives in urban areas. In the next two decades the number of persons living in urban areas will increase by another 2 billion persons—an amazing 60 percent increase—to 5 billion persons. The United Nations estimates that by 2030, more than two-thirds of total world population will live in urban areas. Most of this increase will take place not in Europe or in the United States, but in the megacities and newly emerging urban regions of countries in what used to be called the developing world.

These urban areas are linked in exciting and new ways that would have been unimaginable just a short time ago. We can text friends in other countries for a fraction of the cost of a long-distance telephone call, or SKYPE with family and colleagues on the other side of the world for even less. We are connected by a global economy where the life opportunities of persons in one country are dependent on capital flows of new investments from nations on the other side of the world. The mass media bring world music from Africa and the Middle East to balance the spread of hip hop and reggae. We use the Internet to make new friends in places we have never even heard of. At the beginning of the twenty-first century it is a global world, to be sure, but more than that, it is, for the very first time, an *urban world*.

The new urban world of the twenty-first century is the object of study for our field, urban Studies. There likely is no other more important area of study, for if we are to solve the very significant and growing problems of climate change and global inequality, among others, we must understand that these problems often are directly associated with the growing urban populations and cannot be solved without strategies that connect urban regions across international borders:

we know, for example, that the flow of undocumented workers from Africa to Europe is the consequence of economic disparities between these regions. Urban studies is the field of study that addresses both the growth and expansion of urban areas (urbanization) as well as the nature of and quality of urban life (urbanism)—the two most pressing areas of inquiry for the coming decades.

The specific areas of study in urban studies include subfields of the many disciplines that include the study of urban areas (such as urban anthropology, urban economics, urban geography, urban history, urban politics, urban psychology, and urban sociology), professional fields such as architecture and urban planning, and other fields such as art, literature, and photography that are situated within the built environment. Within each of these subfields and interdisciplinary areas, there are specific theories, key studies, and important figures that have influenced not just the individual discipline, but the field of urban studies more generally. Indeed, not only is the field of urban studies influenced by important work from the urban disciplines, but the disciplinary subfields themselves often share important bodies of work and even research traditions. To give but one example, the work of Henri Lefebvre has had profound influence not just in his home discipline of sociology, but in other disciplines including geography and political science—and across urban studies more generally.

In this encyclopedia, we have sought to include important work and traditions from each of the urban disciplines, but we also wanted to demonstrate the international and interdisciplinary nature of the field. To this end, we sought contributions from scholars in many different countries. Because certain areas of study have often been associated with particular countries (suburbanization in the

United States or gentrification in the United Kingdom, for example) we purposively sought authors from other countries to write these essays. And for each entry and we asked contributors to incorporate an international focus and to discuss the importance of the topic for urban studies more generally.

Rationale for Encyclopedia

Urban studies is an expansive and growing field, covering many disciplines and professional fields, each with its own schedule of conferences, journals, and publication series. While much of the important work in the field is published in the interdisciplinary urban studies journals, the volume of published work presents a challenge for researchers who wished to stay abreast of recent developments in the field. Add to this the many volumes of original research, and the increasing number of edited collections published each year, and it quickly becomes overwhelming for even advanced scholars to follow the many new lines of development. The *Encyclopedia of Urban Studies* is intended to present an overview of current work in the field and to serve as a guide for further reading in the field.

The encyclopedia will serve as an introduction to important topics in urban studies for an audience including undergraduate students, beginning graduate students of urban studies, and the related urban disciplines, a broader public that has an interest in the new urban world, and even established teachers and scholars who are exploring new areas of study. It should be noted that although the *Encyclopedia of Urban Studies* is intended to be comprehensive in its coverage of topics, it is not meant to provide comprehensive treatments of any single topic; we provide references for further reading on each topic and invite our audience to explore further the important work in our field.

Content and Organization

The encyclopedia is intended to provide comprehensive coverage of topics currently studied in urban studies. This is a difficult goal, and we recognize

that there is not unanimous consensus on what such a list would look like. This is particularly the case with urban studies, a relatively new and rapidly evolving area of study that brings together scholars and research traditions from many different disciplines and professional fields.

Our approach has been to be as comprehensive as possible, and all entries include several associated topics and cross-references. In some cases, a topic that was covered in the context of larger topic may not receive its own entry; in those cases, the smaller topic is listed with a cross-reference to the entry in which it is discussed.

To help the reader navigate the encyclopedia, a Reader's Guide is provided, organizing the content into major areas of study (the urban disciplines) and topics (such as the city and film) as well as important figures in the field. There also is an alphabetical listing of all entries for both volumes.

The content of each entry is intended to be a concise summary of the major aspects of the topic. Authors were asked to present their entries in a nontechnical manner accessible not just to academics in the field but also to a wider audience of persons interested in learning more about urban studies. Finally, each entry is intended to give readers an overview of the topic, with suggested readings that will allow readers to learn more about the literature in the area and explore selected topics in greater depth.

We have included a number of entries for individual cities, some because of historical importance (Santiago de Compostela, a world heritage conservation site, was an important medieval pilgrimage site, and the Camino de Santiago was a major trade route connecting France with the Iberian peninsula), their connection with other entries (Venice is often discussed as the preeminent tourist city, while Las Vegas has long served as a topic of discussion for urban theory), others because of their importance within urban studies (London, Paris, and Tokyo have become the three cities most identified with the literature on world cities).

How This Encyclopedia Was Created

Development of the *Encyclopedia of Urban Studies* involved many steps, from beginning work done

by a select group of scholars to writing of entries to editing the completed volumes:

Step 1—A select group of senior scholars worldwide was invited to serve on the editorial board; these individuals were selected to represent the breadth of study across disciplines and international focus of the field.

Step 2—A master list of topics for the book was created from multiple sources. First, a preliminary list of headwords was created from the indexed keywords from articles published the previous five years in major journals in the field, indexed entries in textbooks in the field, and a page-by-page search of indexed keywords from representative books in several urban studies disciplines. We also invited members on urban studies e-mail lists (including scholars in many disciplines and from many countries) to submit their suggestions for entries. The resulting list was then reviewed by the entire editorial board, and we then made a series of additions and subtractions. We also included topics that are not readily found in published sources to date but that we felt were just on the cusp of becoming mainstream, given their treatment in recent journal articles. Time will tell the extent to which we have accurately forecast the viability of these topics.

Step 3—We sought to recruit an international group of scholars from the many disciplines and professional fields that comprise urban studies. As we finalized our list of entries, members of the editorial board identified contributors for each entry, and invitations were sent to these persons. We invited authors from all career stages, ranging from established senior scholars to promising young doctoral students, as well as practitioners from many fields. In relatively few cases our invitations were declined (usually due to time commitments from senior scholars), but in these cases we often received suggestions of authors who were then invited to contribute to the encyclopedia.

Step 4—Contributors were provided with guidelines and instructions regarding the preparation of their entries.

Step 5—The editors reviewed each of the submitted draft entries in their area of study and requested revisions from the authors when necessary. Most entries were revised at least once prior to their acceptance for the encyclopedia.

Step 6—The senior editor reviewed the copyediting for all of the entries.

Ray Hutchison

Acknowledgments

The development of a project of the scale and scope of the *Encyclopedia of Urban Studies* requires the efforts of many persons over an extended period of time. The master list of entries and contributors was assembled by a group representing many fields of studies and several regions: Robert A. Beauregard (Columbia University); Mike Crang (Durham University); Nan Ellin (Arizona State University); Ray Hutchison (University of Wisconsin, Green Bay), and Carlos Reboratti (University of Buenos Aires). The actual contacts and invitations to contributors and the review of submissions for the main part of the project were handled by Robert A. Beauregard, Ray Hutchison, and Mike Crang. Manuel B. Aalbers (University of Amsterdam) joined us for the final half-year of the project to help finalize entries and contributors. Many colleagues from our wider urban studies family offered suggestions for entries and volunteered to contribute essays, although it was not possible to include all such topics and entries even in a two-volume encyclopedia.

The very experienced and talented publishing team at SAGE deserves special consideration, including

Robert Rojek (who first contacted me about the project), Sara Tauber (who worked with the project from the very beginning), Colleen Brennan and Jackie Tasch (a team of very impressive copy editors), and Tracy Buyan (who oversaw the final project). And special consideration also to Rolf Janke, publisher of SAGE Reference, who provided support for the project at several critical junctures.

In the middle stage of the project I was unable to provide full attention to the encyclopedia because of a family emergency. Bob Beauregard made a continuing and sustained contribution to the project during this period, and I owe a special acknowledgement to him for his support before, during, and after this very difficult period.

And finally, a shout out to family and friends, at the University of Wisconsin, Green Bay, at the Del Bianco Foundation in Florence, in Buffalo and Glasgow and Bologna, and especially to Dulce Reyes Hutchison and to our daughters: Heather at Georgetown, Leilani at ASPIRO, and Jessica at Red Smith, who together will inhabit the new urban world of the twenty-first century.

Ray Hutchison

A

ACROPOLIS

The term *acropolis* (Greek for “high city”) denotes the hilltop citadel that dominated the topography of many ancient Greek cities. Thanks to the frequency of rugged landscapes, cities in the ancient Greek world, from Sicily to the Black Sea, often established themselves on high ground, later expanding down the slopes to areas below. However, not all cities were located on varied terrain; those on flat land, along coasts or in plains, could not have an acropolis.

Although an acropolis would be suited first and foremost for defense, fortification was not its sole function. Such a hilltop might have been used for a variety of purposes: as a settlement with houses, even palaces, and as a religious center. Indeed, as cities expanded, adding new fortification walls to enclose larger territory, the importance of the acropolis as a place of protection often declined. The rich history of the Acropolis of Athens from ancient to modern times illustrates different functions these urban hilltops have had over the centuries.

The Athenian Acropolis

In the Late Bronze Age, the Mycenaeans fortified the hilltop. The huge blocks of their defense walls survive in a few places. A royal palace is assumed to have existed, but evidence is scanty. Circa 1200 BC, a cleft in the rock of the north slope, a vertical cavity 30 meters (98 feet) deep, was turned into a protected water supply for those inside the citadel.



Erechtheum, Acropolis of Athens

Source: Vasilis Gavrilis.

Steps were installed from the top, and a deep well was dug at the bottom. After only 25 years the lower part of this “fountain house” collapsed; the shaft was then used as a garbage dump.

By the Classical period, the Acropolis had become the main religious center of Athens. The buildings of the mid- to late fifth century BC, the high point of Athenian power, are the best known: the Parthenon (the temple of Athena Parthenos), the Erechtheion (a temple-shrine sheltering several cults), the Temple of Athena Nike, and the Propylaia, the ingenious entrance gate. In between these and other buildings, statues and other offerings left by the pious filled the hilltop. The slopes of the Acropolis were utilized for theaters (the Theater of Dionysos and, added in Roman times, the Odeion of Herodes Atticus) and a variety of shrines and monuments.

In medieval and early modern times, as the population of Athens declined, the city retreated to the Acropolis and its north slope. A church was installed inside the Parthenon; in Ottoman times, the church was replaced with a mosque. The hilltop was fortified once again. Franks converted the Propylaia into a castle; Ottomans used the Parthenon for storage of gunpowder (exploded by Venetian artillery in 1687). Modest houses densely filled the spaces between the reused Classical buildings.

In the 1830s, when Athens became the capital of newly independent Greece, the Acropolis was radically altered. The hilltop promptly became an archaeological site. Postclassical constructions were stripped away in order to expose the buildings of the fifth century BC. The Acropolis, now turned into an expression of the glory of ancient Greece, would become a symbol of the new nation. This symbolism continues today. The Athenian Acropolis is Greece’s premier tourist destination, and both by day and, floodlit, by night, the Parthenon dominates the skyline of central Athens.

Charles Gates

See also Agora; Ancient Cities; Athens, Greece; Mediterranean Cities

Further Readings

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ADVOCACY PLANNING

Advocacy planning represents a departure from scientific, objective, or rational planning, which was the dominant paradigm of the post–World War II era. It is premised upon the inclusion of the different interests involved in the planning process itself.

Advocacy planning was defined and promoted by planner and lawyer Paul Davidoff. The concept was first widely disseminated to other professional planners in Davidoff’s 1965 article in the *Journal of the American Institute of Planners*, “Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning.” Davidoff sought to provide an answer to a critical question that arose in urban planning in the late 1950s and early 1960s: “Who speaks for the poor, the disenfranchised, and the minorities?” He introduced the question “Who is the client?” into professional usage as well as “Who is the stakeholder or the constituent?” He was concerned that planning decisions significantly impacting urban neighborhoods were made with little or no representation from the residents. Because the residents of the target area of the planning process usually are neither skilled in nor knowledgeable about planning, they are unable to participate effectively in the planning decision process. They require professional representation equal to that of the official planners—those of the municipality or the land developer. Davidoff’s view was that each of the interests in the planning process needed to be served and represented by a professional planner with equal knowledge and skill. The fundamental values of advocacy planning in the planning process are those of social justice and equity.

Advocacy Planning and Its Paradigm

The advocacy planning paradigm is predicated upon the concept of pluralism in planning. Davidoff argued that the goal of the planning process is to determine which of several alternative scenarios or vision-plans will be adopted and implemented. Each respective outcome has different benefits and costs to each of the groups involved in the planning decisions. Thus there

would be no one single plan that would constitute the “right plan” for all.

The central aspect is the use of values as well as facts in making planning decisions. The process is explicitly not value neutral. The choices are driven by political and social issues rather than technical ones. Another significant point is the notion of pluralism in planning. For each planning situation a number of groups with different interests are involved. Given that situation, advocacy dictates that different planners represent competing visions of the future in the planning process. An advocate planner will represent one interest group, and other planners will represent different constituencies, including the municipal citywide perspective. This process, which joins together a geographic area, such as neighborhood, is the basis of understanding a pluralistic plan. The planner is, above all, an advocate planner serving the client groups who are unskilled and lack the appropriate knowledge for making planning decisions.

Davidoff answers his question in his article by designating as the client “the Negro and the impoverished individual.” In this situation, one planner represents one special interest group. The advocacy paradigm asserts that a professional whose skills and political status are equal to those of the representatives of the municipality or the land developer will be present and identified as the planner for the neighborhood residents. Different planners, therefore, will represent different special interests in the planning process.

Davidoff led a small group of trained planners for whom advocacy planning was a normative commitment; these planners worked in a number of communities, preparing vision-plans. Davidoff was the leading spokesperson for these neighborhood residents in both his writing and his practice. A revered and respected activist-academic in the field of modern city planning, he was an unyielding force for justice and equity in planning. Davidoff viewed the city through a pluralistic lens, while he addressed a wide range of societal problems. He challenged academics and professionals alike to find ways to promote participatory, pluralistic planning and positive social change; to overcome poverty and racism; and to reduce the many-faceted disparities in society. He implemented major contributions to the planning field as an educator, practitioner, and intellectual, and

his influence on urban planning extends to this day. His work in advocacy planning constitutes a watershed in the theory and practice of American community planning.

Advocacy and Rational Comprehensive Planning

Davidoff contrasted advocacy planning with the rational comprehensive planning process that was the dominant paradigm in the 1960s and the 1970s. A significant distinction between the two models lies in the role of values as a key element of the planning process. The critical questions are “Where do values enter the planning process?” and “Is this a valid use of values clarification?” Another critical question is “Who is the client?” The differences in the two planning models (see Table 1) are found in the definition of *client* and the role of values in decision making. The central issue is whether the planning process is an objective, scientific, and technical endeavor or a normative question.

Critique of Advocacy Planning

Those critical of advocacy planning are traditional planners who are disturbed by the notion of pluralism and the consideration of multiple interests in the planning process. Some contend that many planning issues do not have an optimal solution; this is often reflected by the work of the municipal government, often resulting in inequitable solutions whereby clients are not equally served.

Pluralism and the identification of a client or special interest group are high on the advocate planner’s list of important changes to be made rather than planning for the public as a whole. This approach is predicated on the notion of pluralism, whereby there is an acknowledgment of the number and kinds of social and political views available for inclusion into the neighborhood plan. More traditional planners find this a specious argument. Pluralism, they say, is a social myth created by those who would hide the growing economic concentration in cities and direct social and economic programs to the disadvantaged.

The advocate planner is one who is committed to the notion of pluralism in making planning decisions and does not represent central interests. He or she feels that there should be a plurality of

Table I Comparison of the Rational Comprehensive Planning and the Advocacy Planning Models

<i>Processes</i>	<i>Rational Planning</i>	<i>Advocacy Planning</i>
Assumptions	Perfect information Rational outcomes One solution is best City is a system of interrelated functions	Imperfect information Non-value-neutral decisions Pluralistic society Normative planning is rational Each group is entitled to its own planner Different outcomes benefit different interests
Client	Community as a whole Property owners	“The Negro and the impoverished” or poor, powerless, minority persons One or more interest groups
Public interest	Unitary public interest	Plural special interests
Role of planner	Advisor to political decision maker Technician	Expert advice
Locality of planning process	Municipality bureaucracy	Community-wide
Goals of paradigm	Hierarchy of goals Physical land use goals	Access, skills used for pluralistic clients Represent minority interests Citizen participation
Resource allocation	Through planning process	Redistribution of wealth and public power increases the choices for poor
Public participation	Public hearings	Coalition building
Planning methods	Comprehensive rational process Value-neutral Physical land use based	Policy techniques Rational model
Definition	Value-neutral, factual Procedural process Begin with goals Rationality and choice Decision making	Facts and values as decisions Procedural process and pluralistic society Normative planning is rational Each group has its own advocate Client centered and future oriented

Source: Marcia Feld.

plans than rather a single one in order to appropriately represent the neighborhood. The municipal government, when faced with a number of plans for one neighborhood, must select one of them. This kind of situation has led to issues of ethics and loyalty for the planners. When the municipal decision maker identifies with the one view representing the central public interest rather than select a plan from the several plans that have

been developed specifically for the different groups in the neighborhood, this attitude can lead to inside-government divisions popularly known as “guerrillas” in the bureaucracy. Representing the public interest is the traditional view of the planner’s role and has been the modus operandi of almost all planners in the United States. Some think that to change this approach by responding to the various interests rather than synthesizing

them into one public interest would not suit the U.S. urban planning field.

The second issue presented by traditional planners argues that decisions in which values are utilized jointly with factual matters are unable to be substantiated in a technical or scientific mode. This approach, rational comprehensive planning, presupposes a series of steps developed by logical sequential thinking not open to the values and loyalties of the political context by which planning decisions are actually made. Unlike the mainstream U.S. planner, the advocate planner denies that planning decisions can be value free. As Davidoff said in his article, "Solutions to questions about the share of wealth . . . to go to different classes cannot be technically derived; they must arise from social attitudes."

Advocacy Planning in the United States

Planners for Equal Opportunity

In 1964, just prior to the publication of Davidoff's watershed article, the American Planning Association held their annual meeting in Newark, New Jersey. Walter Thabit, an advocate planner in New York, with strong commitments to Davidoff, attended the association meeting and met with various groups of students, young faculty, and practitioners. Together, under his tutelage, they founded Planners for Equal Opportunity, a national network of advocate planners. Chester Hartman, an academic and a political activist, chaired it for many years. Present and involved was the architect C. Richard Hatch, who organized the Architects' Renewal Committee in Harlem. These two groups operated primarily in New York City where Walter Thabit, as an advocate planner for the Peter Cooper Square community, led the fight against the Robert Moses urban renewal proposal to wipe out 11 blocks in the Lower East Side. The Cooper Square plan, developed by Thabit and others, was designed to hold 60 percent of all housing units for low-income housing. After many years, it was selected over the Robert Moses urban renewal plan.

Planners for Equal Opportunity formally ended in 1975. Its work has been extended and continued by two sustained efforts: the Planners Network and the equity planning movement. The Planners Network, a loosely held organization of progressive planners has membership throughout the United States and is chaired by Dr. Tom Angotti

of the Hunter College Planning School. The equity planning paradigm broadens the notion of client group to all interest groups in the community, broadening the scope of the most important social equity movement in the field, advocacy.

Equity Planning Movement

The equity planning movement was created and implemented by Norman Krumholz, the city planning director for Cleveland, Ohio. Fundamentally the movement is based on an expanded definition of the client for the redistributive resource process. It is the modern response to the racial crisis in urban areas, according to June Manning Thomas and others. It provides a location for all the people who have few if any choices. Pragmatic, not ideological, decisions shape the equity planning agenda. Equity planning is about working within the municipal planning structure to give special attention to the needs of poor and vulnerable populations, who also suffer from racial and sexual discrimination. However, the work need not be limited to the confines of the typical governmental structure nor need it follow past government decisions. Urban planners can break through the bonds of previous years and develop and implement new policies that reach out to the poor and minorities in the urban place.

Suburban Action Institute

As a professional planner, Davidoff put advocacy planning into practice. He founded the Suburban Action Institute, which challenged exclusionary zoning in New Jersey. A precedent-setting case involved the township of Mount Laurel. The case stemmed from an attempt by Mount Laurel to prevent the building of 36 apartments intended for working-class Black residents in the community. In 1975, the court ruled that the township's zoning ordinance was a form of economic discrimination that favored middle- and upper-income people. It was not until 1983, however, that the court issued Mount Laurel II, which served as a companion decision by establishing a formula for providing a fair share of affordable housing. In 1985, a Mount Laurel III (of sorts) took place as the New Jersey State Legislature, acting on Mount Laurel II, established the Council on Affordable Housing. The debate on this issue continues to this day.

Global Advocacy Planning

Advocacy at the global level is a method and process of influencing decision makers and the public perceptions of concerned persons; it mobilizes community action to achieve social change. The goal is to create an enabling environment—one where laws and public policy protect and promote rights and responsibilities. The strategies include an emphasis on partnerships with nonprofit organizations and on research case studies and policy areas. The content focuses on environmental justice, public health issues such as AIDS, and public housing. Advocacy strategies are emphasized primarily in the field of architecture as well as planning and other urban development professions.

Advocacy planning's global application differs from its application in the United States in several ways: First, the geographic unit treated in Europe and the United Kingdom usually targets national and international levels of government, whereas the United States focuses on neighborhoods and local municipalities. Second, different questions are raised by international advocate planners than by U.S. advocate planners; U.S. advocate planners raise such framing issues as "Who is the client?" and "Which or whose values are considered?" International planners reference the public interest broadly. Third, U.S. advocate planners interact primarily on the ground, whereas European planners shift their methodology to planning and policy analysis techniques. The international model focuses on conceptual distinctions, which differs from the U.S. emphasis on local issues and problems.

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See also Citizen Participation; Planning Theory; Progressive City; Urban Planning

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AFFORDABLE HOUSING

The term *affordable housing* addresses the relationship between the cost of providing adequate housing and a household's ability to pay. Housing affordability is measured as a percentage of income:

Housing that consumes less than 30 to 40 percent of total household income is considered affordable. People at any income level can find affordable housing a problem, but it mostly afflicts poor and middle-class households since the private market rarely produces a sufficient amount of housing to meet their needs. As a result, governments often regulate housing and finance markets and provide subsidies to ensure that housing is affordable to households no matter their income.

In the United States, the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development has created a measure called the area median income (AMI) to determine who needs affordable housing. It is a relative measure of housing need and is calculated separately for metropolitan areas and families of different sizes. Most often, households with incomes less than 30 percent of the AMI are considered very low income, those with incomes 30 to 50 percent are low income, 50 to 80 percent are moderate income, and those above 80 percent are thought able to afford market rate housing. Because housing costs vary by locality, so also does affordability. In cities like New York City, it can reach 200 percent of the AMI.

The AMI has enabled governments to determine how many households need housing and to set guidelines for housing subsidies. Governments can provide subsidies to developers to produce additional housing units, or they can provide subsidies to individuals or building owners to make existing units affordable. Incentives for private developers include tax abatements, zoning changes, height allowances, infrastructure improvements, and financing assistance. Governments can also impose rent regulations that limit rental price increases.

In 1937 the federal government expanded its housing commitment by funding public housing construction, and in 1949 it established the goal of providing a “decent home and suitable living environment for every American family.” Between the 1930s and the 1970s, the federal government produced public housing for very-low-income groups. In the 1970s, it shifted from public production and ownership to strategies that used subsidies to make existing private housing more affordable and spur the creation of new affordable housing in weak urban markets. In the 1980s the federal government withdrew from housing production almost entirely and left affordable housing construction and management to nonprofit, community-based

organizations. New financial intermediaries—organizations that directed capital from financial markets to communities—such as the Local Initiatives Support Corporation and the Enterprise Foundation emerged to finance inner-city and rural housing construction. Federal efforts turned toward creating tax incentives. The 1986 Low Income Housing Tax Credit, which provides tax benefits to private investors, has created much of the affordable housing in the past 20 years. Little of this housing is affordable to very-low-income households without additional subsidies such as housing vouchers. Unlike the subsidies provided for public housing, which were largely permanent, the private subsidies from the 1970s and 1980s are time delimited; that is, they are designed to expire and thus significantly reduce the stock of affordable housing.

The debate about how best to provide affordable housing continues. Some argue that the increasing production of luxury housing will increase the availability of lower-income housing through a filtering process. Others argue that only vast production schemes will meet the needs of low-income communities. Who should provide the subsidies, who should be responsible for production and ownership, and who should receive these subsidies are questions that continue to be debated.

Kathe Newman

See also Fair Housing; Gentrification; Homeownership; Housing Policy; Right to the City

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AGORA

Agora, a Greek word meaning, in early times, “a gathering place” (Homer), later “marketplace,” is used in English particularly to denote the commercial and civic center of an ancient Greek city.

The Latin equivalent of agora is *forum*. The functions of the agora were much more varied than the English translations of the term might suggest. Typically located in the geographical heart of a city, on low-lying ground below the acropolis (“high city”), the agora was a place where people came together for a great range of activities: not only commercial, but also political, religious, and social. The overall layout of an agora followed no specific design. In cities of remote origins and long history, such as Athens, the agora developed gradually over centuries, its buildings and monuments placed according to the needs of a particular time. By the later Hellenistic and Roman periods, such city centers must have seemed like architectural jumbles. In newly founded cities, such as Priene (from the fourth century BC), the agora could be neatly planned, typically a rectangular plaza lined with stoas (porticoed buildings).

The ancient Greeks developed specific building types to house functions routine in the agora, such as the stoa and the *bouleuterion* (council chamber). One would also see such structures as fountain houses (where people obtained fresh water) and temples. In addition, certain activities might

take place in buildings or areas that seem generic; that is, their features do not reveal any specific purpose. Identifying what uses such buildings or spaces were put to thus becomes an archaeological puzzle.

The best known of the ancient Greek agoras is that of Athens. The reasons for this are two. First, the great majority of Greek texts known to us were written by Athenians. Books, essays, speeches, poems, plays (tragedies, comedies), and inscriptions (documents carved on stone, for the attention of the public) contain a wealth of information about the life of Athens, including its agora. Second, the Athenian Agora has been explored continuously since 1931 (except for the years of World War II and immediately after), through archaeological excavations conducted by the American School of Classical Studies at Athens. These excavations have uncovered an enormous richness of buildings, monuments, inscriptions, and objects. In addition, the findings have been well published, both for a scholarly audience and for the interested public. So important is the Athenian Agora for understanding the ancient Greek city center that the rest of this entry is devoted to it.

The Athenian Agora

The Agora is located on low ground northwest of the Acropolis, a natural hill used in Greek and Roman times as the main religious center of the city. Agora and Acropolis together formed the central focus of Athens. The territory occupied by the Agora was further defined by a hill on the west (the Kolonos Agoraios) and a small river (the Eridanos) on the north, but was open to the east. Various used in the Bronze Age and early Iron Age for housing and for burials, the Agora was first laid out as a public center in the early Archaic period, circa 600 BC. By 500 BC, vertical shafts of marble were set up at entrances to the open



Agora in Athens

Source: Vasilis Gavriliis.

area to mark the space formally. These boundary stones were inscribed, "I am the boundary of the Agora." In addition, basins for holy water (*perirhanteria*) were placed at the entrances, recalling the sacred character of certain functions. Indeed, those guilty of certain types of behavior were considered to have violated this sanctity and so could not enter the Agora: traitors, those who avoided military service or deserted, and those who mistreated their parents.

By 400 BC the character of the Agora as the civic center was well defined, thanks to the buildings erected during the previous 200 years. The Agora continued to serve as civic center through the Roman Empire, even with many changes to its buildings and monuments. During the Middle Ages, however, after devastating attacks on the city by such outsiders as Herulians (in 267) and Visigoths (395), and as political structures and socioeconomic needs veered away from Greco-Roman habits, the buildings of the Agora gradually fell into ruin. The area was transformed into a residential district, a character that would change only with the start of excavations in modern times.

Civic Buildings

During the period 600 to 400 BC, the west and south sides of the Agora were lined with major civic buildings. A look at their design and usage gives some insight into the nature of political and civic life in Athens.

The stoa was a favorite building type for public spaces such as an agora. Simple in concept, a stoa consisted of a roofed space, normally rectangular in plan, walled at the rear and on the sides, but with columns on the front. The stoa was thus a kind of portico. More complex designs might include shops at the rear, a second row of columns down the center, and even an upper story. This sheltered space could be used for many functions, official and informal. In the Athenian Agora, early stoas included the Royal Stoa (probably sixth century BC, rebuilt in the fifth century BC) and the Painted Stoa, or Stoa Poikile (475–450 BC), both located in the northwest sector. The former served as the seat of the king archon, the second-in-command of the city government. The Painted Stoa was so called after the paintings on wooden panels displayed inside, famous depictions of Athenian military prowess. Battles illustrated were both

mythical, such as against Amazons, and real, notably the Battle of Marathon (490 BC), in which the Greeks defeated the Persians. The paintings survived until the late fourth century AD, emblems of Athenian greatness on permanent public view.

Government buildings located along the west side of the Agora at the base of the hill, the Kolonos Agoraios, included two bouleuterions (an "old" one, ca. 500 BC, later replaced by a "new" one, ca. 415–406 BC), the seat of the *boule*, the council of 500 men serving for one year that enacted legislation. Each structure must have looked like a small indoor theater, with seating on three sides. With the building of the New Bouleuterion, the Old Bouleuterion was transformed into the Metroon, a shrine to the Mother of the gods, but used also for the storing of archives. Next to these two was the Tholos (ca. 470–460 BC), a round building used as the dining hall of the *prytaneis*, the executive committee of 50 men that ran the daily affairs of the city, a rotating contingent of the council of 500. Nearby stood the Monument of the Eponymous Heroes (originally ca. 425 BC; rebuilt ca. 330 BC), a key center for disseminating information to the public. This monument consisted of a long, tall, narrow base with, on top, bronze statues of the mythical heroes representing the 10 tribes into which the Athenian citizenry had been divided during the political reforms of Kleisthenes, 508–507 BC. Below the statues, notices were posted, announcing legislation that would be introduced, military conscription, court hearings, and the like.

Other civic buildings included law courts, attested from written sources but not easily identifiable among the architectural remains; a prison; and a mint. This last, originally from the late fifth century BC, was a square building that contained evidence of bronze working: slag, water basins, and many bronze coin-blanks intended to be stamped as: coins.

Religious Buildings and Monuments

Religious practices in the Athenian Agora are reflected in numerous buildings and monuments. Crossing the Agora on the diagonal, from northwest to southeast, was the Panathenaic Way, the processional route used for the most important religious festival of the Athenians, the Panathenaia, a yearly festival in honor of Athena, the city's patron goddess. The route ran from the Dipylon Gate to

the Acropolis, the center of Athena's cult. By this street, in the northwest corner of the Agora, stood the important Altar of the Twelve Gods, originally established in 521 BC, a square enclosure marked by a low wall, with an altar in the center. Here, suppliants were granted refuge. In addition, distances from Athens were measured from this point.

The grandest of the religious buildings was the Hephaisteion, a temple for both Hephaistos, god of the forge, and Athena, built on the Kolonos Agoraios. It continues to dominate the area, overlooking the Agora from the west. Built in the mid to late fifth century BC, this Doric order temple owes its excellent preservation largely to its long use as a Christian church.

Commercial Activities

A major commercial building was the South Stoa I, a long stoa that lined the south edge of the Agora. First erected in 430 to 420 BC, it was replaced in the second century BC by a complex of two stoas (Middle Stoa and South Stoa II) that together formed an enclosed rectangular space, the South Square. South Stoa I contained rooms at the rear that served as dining rooms, evidently necessary components of the businesses that operated here.

Just outside the formal boundaries of the Agora, numerous workshops were found. Trades attested include the manufacture of pottery and terracotta figurines, bronze and iron working, sculpture and other marble working, and shoemaking. Also in the area were wine shops and private houses.

Dedications by Foreign Rulers

Lastly, the interest of foreign rulers in Athens is worth noting. Although Athens lost its military and economic edge after its defeat in the Peloponnesian War in the late fifth century BC, the prestige of the city as an intellectual and cultural center continued undiminished. As a result, the city was granted handsome benefactions during Hellenistic and Roman times. One striking addition to the Agora was the Stoa of Attalos, a magnificent two-storied stoa placed along the east edge of the area, the donation of Attalos II, king of Pergamon (ruled 159–138 BC). Reconstructed in 1956, the stoa today serves as the museum for the Agora and the headquarters of the Agora excavations. Roman gifts

included a large Odeion, a covered concert hall, given by the emperor Augustus's son-in-law Agrippa in circa 16–12 BC, and a basilica (a three-aisled hall, for administrative and business matters) and a nymphaion (an elaborate fountain building), built during the reign of Hadrian (ruled AD 117–138).

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See also Acropolis; Ancient Cities; Athens, Greece

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AIRPORTS

Airports are important transportation and communication nodes in the network age. As essential hubs in the global urban fabric, they show the extent to which the traffic of digital information, people, and things depends on high-speed logistical systems. The growth in world air travel relates directly to the major developments in globalization and demonstrates the extent to which the process of modernization is being rolled out across the first world and “developing” countries. To this extent, airports provide “early warning” signals or “laboratory conditions” for the study of global networks and information flows. This is particularly evident in the post–September 11, 2001, context, which has seen the intensification of data profiling, biometrics, and other intrusive security measure being trialed and tested throughout many international air terminals in the name of passenger safety and risk management. Although airports have always been important markers in the spectacularization of technology, it is important to consider the

different ways in which technology has been implemented at the airport over the past 100 years.

The airport is one of the most significant sites of human-machine interaction in contemporary life. The airport is the site par excellence where multiple networks—both human and nonhuman, global and local—interact across multiple scales. In such a context, a new set of concerns needs to be taken into account when considering the human and cultural factors at play in everyday networks, not only those that are specifically concerned with aviation. This interaction of scale can be seen at the airport as increasingly mammoth: Airplanes interface with passengers, who are scanned and checked down to scales as minute as the irises of their eyes. Further, the ability of digital technologies to duplicate, distribute, and manipulate data has enabled networks to converge in an unprecedented fashion. “Hard” and “soft” networks (like technical infrastructure, code and information flows, the flesh of the passenger, and metal of the plane) can no longer be considered as discrete and separate.

The Birth of the Aerodrome

The modern airport evolved out of the converging operations of commercial, governmental, military, and private interests. The first structures built for air travel were largely produced in an ad hoc and unplanned manner. Runways, passenger terminals, and communication networks were constructed with little concern for logistical interconnection or future development. Initially aviation was not seen as suitable for mass transportation and was developed mainly for mail and small freight services. Due to the danger and discomfort of early planes, the transportation of human cargo was seen primarily as the preserve of a small and daring mobile elite. Passenger services were initially dependent on government policies that linked profitable mail contracts to the less profitable cargo of human passengers.

Moreover, government authorities were not keen to invest in the necessary infrastructure involved in this costly mode of transportation, and as a consequence, aviation regulation and planning was largely neglected. For this reason the growth of complex urban infrastructure around the early aerodromes quickly outstripped their original usage, and surrounding hinterland gradually became annexed as part of the growing regime of the airport. Many

cities whose major airport developed out of the first aerodrome soon found their airport’s physical capacity for expansion severely limited by the growth of suburban and exurban developments. This, coupled with a growing need for local, state, and national government regulation led to a number of crises that culminated during the immediate post-World War II period. Aided by the huge investments in aviation design and infrastructure made during war time, aviation as a mode of mass passenger transport began to boom.

As aircraft design and flight times improved, air travel became desirable and potentially profitable. In the years following World War II, urban planners and architects began envisaging a future in which air travel would facilitate new business opportunities on an international scale. Various design styles for both terminals and airports were trialed during this period. Large hall structures, satellite designs, and terminals encircling ring roads were all tried, each attempting to resolve logistical issues of getting passengers to terminal to plane, and plane to terminal to runway as seamlessly as possible.

The Airport as Mass Transportation Hub

Passenger services had always been one of the least stable sectors of aviation and remain secondary to military aviation in terms of profitability as well as research and development. Civil aviation, like telecommunications, has had vigorous competition on the profitable main routes, and airlines have had national obligations to service less-profitable regional routes. The introduction of jet aircraft such as the Boeing 707 (itself a spin-off of military aviation research) provided a major boost to the flagging civil aviation industry. Faster, quieter, more comfortable, and able to fly longer without refueling, jets began to make passenger services financially viable. The first full jet services in the early 1960s spawned a new popular vision of aviation as accessible to the “common person”—flight itself became a commodity.

Jet age airports staged this popular vision by way of their architecture, entwining capitalism and glamour in order to invoke a particularly optimistic vision of the future. Their individualistic shapes and vaulting interiors helped promote the idea that anyone could access the limitless horizons that had previously been the provenance of the rich and

powerful. The age of the jet set popularized the practice of global travel and put it up for sale as a piece of the future, as part of progress.

Airports are extremely sensitive to global, cultural, and technological developments. They are constantly upgrading, adapting for bigger planes, more traffic, increased security measures, and for the frequent flying population (for whom perpetual transit is becoming a way of life). Few of the early airports remain, either being subsumed within larger structures, such as Heathrow in London or John F. Kennedy Airport in New York, or decommissioned entirely (e.g., Tempelhof in Berlin was decommissioned in 2008).

The growth in world air travel relates directly to major developments in globalization, and is an essential part of the process of modernization that continues to advance (apparently unhindered by diminishing natural resources and associated problems of environmental degradation) across the first world and increasingly in so-called developing countries (Asia in particular). The huge amount of corresponding infrastructure required to manage the rapid movement of goods and people across large distances has led to innovations in the practice, procedure, and construction of airports and their related facilities. Many international airport terminals are built by well-known architects, such as Norman Foster, Paul Andreu, and Helmut Jahn, and are spectacular displays of a nation's ability to participate in the global economy.

Contemporary airports are a central part of the ubiquitous global networks that constitute contemporary spaces of flow. Due to their interconnected nature and the enormous loads of traffic that they process, recently built airports bear little resemblance to their jet age forebears. Modern airports—like cyberspatial networks—are designed according to a logic of procedures, exchanges, and traffic flows. Regardless of location they facilitate global procedures and follow standardized global



Hong Kong International Airport

signage using internationally agreed upon pictograms and typefaces.

Airports are first and foremost cultural nodes in a new form of global architecture based on networks. Like cyberspatial networks, airports defy traditional geography. Their architectures privilege connection, movement, and transience: They are highly procedural and operate across global and local institutions. The most recent iterations of airports resemble a convergence of shopping mall and glass tube, which regardless of the “brand name” architects (such as Paul Andreu’s Dubai airport or Norman Foster’s design for Hong Kong) all necessarily resemble each other. As modern air travelers traverse the globe, they move from one glass tube to another, taking in similar panoramic views of the tarmac procedures and airline livery while inside the terminal. With the exception of tourist shops selling local kitsch (windmill refrigerator magnets in Holland, stuffed kangaroos in Sydney, etc.), the traveler experiences a global shopping mall where Western commercial franchises sell identical electronic goods, fashions, cosmetics, and coffee. Contemporary airports render the experience of transit as a shopping experience that punctuates the intrusive surveillance systems that passengers must submit to in order to be able to fly.

New Direction in Mobility Research and Airports

In a world of constant mobility, information, and architecture convergence, bodies have quite significantly changed their relations to space. All modes of movement are increasingly subject to the same regimes of verification and control. At the airport, a complex series of discreet procedures (such as passenger and baggage processing by airline and government agencies, the turnaround of planes on the tarmac, and the management of ground and air traffic) are perfectly synchronized. Such precision is enabled by digital networks, systems of surveillance, and tracking techniques. Such synchronization and control is common in modern logistics companies, which can operate on some levels as “closed systems” within purpose-built informational networks that provide an integrated infrastructure across all operations. Such seamless integration is not possible at the airport where there is no one system that can manage and control all operations. The airport must remain for its own economic survival an open system. It necessarily needs to find ways to continually absorb new networks and their associated viral contaminations, such as monitoring people’s temperature during a SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) outbreak or adapting to procedural changes stemming from the USA PATRIOT Act.

Contemporary airports are monumental structures designed to facilitate movement and are fully integrated into metropolitan infrastructures and global social panics. For this reason these spaces (airports, information networks, highways, and ports) are becoming crucial sites of political and technological activity as the global flow of information, people, and things intensifies.

Gillian Fuller and Ross Harley

See also Architecture; Transportation; Transportation Planning

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ALINSKY, SAUL

Saul Alinsky is often referred to as the father of American community organizing, though his influence was felt mostly in the United States rather than in the rest of “America.” The civil rights movement was also important for generations of community organizers, but Alinsky was the strongest influence on neighborhood-based community organizing, which is the practice of bringing people together face to face to solve local problems and, sometimes, to change the distribution of power.

Alinsky was born in 1909 and grew up in Chicago, where the urban culture shaped his strategies of political action. As an undergraduate and then graduate student at the University of Chicago, he was greatly influenced by the criminologists there. He found himself impatient with the academics’ emphasis on studying community

change and became more interested in actually creating change.

Consequently, in the late 1930s when he was supposed to be studying juvenile delinquency in Chicago's notorious Back of the Yards neighborhood, he found himself fascinated by the struggle of the stockyards workers there to form a union. Socializing with union organizers and learning their craft, he imagined using a similar vehicle to help neighborhoods gain political power. He then set out to organize the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council, which would go on to win important improvements in city services for the neighborhood and contribute to the success of the stockyards workers' unionization struggle.

Alinsky's career took off from there as he traveled the country building neighborhood-based community organizing groups. He also wrote about his efforts, producing two important books on how to do community organizing: *Reveille for Radicals* (1969) and *Rules for Radicals* (1971). Yet, he was hardly a radical in the normal sense. Alinsky was firmly rooted in the U.S. tradition of democracy and believed that poor people could have as much influence over policy as anyone else as long as they organized effectively. He did have a reputation for promoting confrontation and conflict. His reputation once led to his immediate arrest in 1940 when he arrived in Kansas City. After numerous conversations, though, the police chief agreed to provide security for a major event organized by the Alinsky-style group there. Although he was personally confrontational, few of the community organizing efforts he spawned engaged in disruptive protest. He did, though, use an approach based on the power of numbers that posed the threat of disruption. Perhaps the most famous example of the use of such a threat was in 1964 when The Woodlawn Organization (TWO), one of the Alinsky-organized groups in Chicago, threatened to occupy all the toilets at O'Hare airport, the first ever "shit-in." In response to the threat, Chicago's Mayor Richard J. Daley quickly called a meeting with TWO to reaffirm commitments on which he had previously reneged.

Alinsky had a rigidly anti-ideological approach to community organization. One of its weaknesses is that some of the organizations he built later turned undemocratic. In fact, when he died unexpectedly in 1972, on Alinsky's agenda was returning to the Back of the Yards neighborhood to start a

new organization to overthrow the Back of the Yards Neighborhood Council, which had become racist and segregationist.

The Alinsky model of community organizing was unique. The secret to the strategy was building a neighborhood organization not one person at a time but with groups of people. He called his model an organization of organizations. When he went into a neighborhood, he looked for the churches, civic groups, garden clubs, veterans organizations, and every other entity through which people were already organized. Then he brought those organizations together, dramatically increasing the efficiency of the organizing effort.

The organization occupied a very important place in Alinsky's model. You did not organize people just to win on an issue or two and then disband. You organized in order to build an organization that could sustain itself and provide institutionalized power well into the future. The organization was the vehicle that allowed poor people to occupy a place in the political system.

The only way to build an organization of potentially ideologically diverse organizations was for the organizer to maintain a carefully honed, non-ideological stance. This produced one of the other hallmarks of the Alinsky model—"cutting" an issue. He did not go into neighborhoods with an issue already selected. Instead, he listened to what issues people cared about and then tried to organize around them. This did not stop him from stirring up people around an issue, but he was always careful to find an issue that excited them. Finding just the right issue that a group cared about, would work for, and could win was one of the geniuses of the approach. And, although Alinsky organizations had a reputation for being confrontational and conflict oriented, the goal was always for the organization to obtain a win or cut a deal with power holders. Alinsky-style organizations had a reputation to protect, so they avoided action that could be perceived as irresponsible or violent.

Perhaps the most important hallmark of the Alinsky-style organization was the development of the specialized role of community organizer. The organizer is not a leader in the Alinsky model; instead, the organizer's job is to identify potential leaders and build their skills, helping them identify issues and organize around them. A truly effective community organizer should be able to enter a community, build leadership and structure an

organization, and then leave with the organization able to sustain itself.

Alinsky has influenced a long line of community organizers and the major national community organizing networks operating today. Perhaps the most important evidence of this is the faith-based community networks that emerged out of his ideas. Alinsky established the Industrial Areas Foundation, which still exists. The Industrial Areas Foundation has become a major faith-based community organizing network. Other networks influenced directly or indirectly by him include the PICO National Network, the Direct Action & Research Training Network, and the Gamaliel Foundation.

Alinsky's influence can also be found in the major secular national community organizing networks such as the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now (ACORN) and National People's Action. These organizations, along with others, have been responsible for important neighborhood victories and astounding national policy victories such as the Community Reinvestment Act (1977) that thwarted the practice of redlining that prevented people in poor neighborhoods from obtaining conventional home loans. These organizations have been behind the push for living wage laws, antidiscrimination legislation, and citizen participation policies in many cities.

Alinsky's influence has extended even into areas one would not expect. One of Alinsky's original organizing staff members, Fred Ross, was working in Southern California in the 1950s when he was confronted by a young Latino man named César Chávez. The confrontation led to a strong working relationship and Chávez began organizing with Ross. Chávez, of course, went on to organize the United Farm Workers. Today there are thousands of Alinsky-style organizations. There are others, such as the Consensus Organizing Institute, that have created an organizing model in direct contrast to the Alinsky approach. Some organizing networks are building new political parties, such as the Working Families Party, rooted in ACORN's organizing efforts. Finally, they are empowering individuals who could never have imagined themselves leading any group or speaking in any public meeting and are now winning victories for their communities.

Randy Stoecker

See also Chicago, Illinois; Citizen Participation; Community Organizing; Right to the City

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
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ALLEGORY OF GOOD GOVERNMENT

Ambrogio Lorenzetti's frescoes on three walls of the room known as either the *Sala della Pace* (Hall of Peace, after one of the allegorical figures in the frescoes) or the *Sala dei Nove* (Hall of the Nine, the elected rulers of the city) in Siena's Palazzo Pubblico are often called the first large-scale secular murals since antiquity. They both project an ideal political landscape and document aspects of contemporary daily life.

Before the Palazzo Pubblico became the home of Siena's elected officials and councils, town meetings had been taking place everywhere from the private palaces of influential citizens to the cathedral. Having a dedicated, imposing public building on a well-organized public space staked out Siena's claim to prominence as a powerful, wealthy commune (i.e., a town ruled by elected officials responsible for the common good).

The council of the Nine ruled Siena from 1287 to 1355. Following a period of government in which the city had won its greatest, and last, victory against the Florentines (at Montasperti, 1260) and completed building its cathedral, the Nine not only built the Palazzo Pubblico and the Piazza del Campo, they also began a vast project to enlarge the duomo in rivalry with that of Florence (aborted with the devastation of the black death in 1348). The Nine were proportionally related to the three districts of the city: The *Terzi* ("thirds") of *Città, San Martino*, and *Camollia* corresponded to the three legs of the Y, which defined the city's plan, spread across the



Ambrogio Lorenzetti's fourteenth-century fresco, *The Allegory of Good Government*, at Palazzo Pubblico in Siena, Italy

top of three intersecting ridges. Their intersection in a slightly depressed space would become the bowl-like Piazza del Campo when the decision was made in 1288 (work beginning in 1298) to shape it along with the new town hall; the fan-shaped plan of the piazza was reinforced by the brick paving (divided into nine triangular wedges), which slopes down toward the town hall. At the intersection of the two upper legs of the Y, the Palazzo was a hinge between the city center on the north side and the *contado*, or countryside, on the south; a top floor loggia on the south side looks out to the landscape below and beyond. The prominent bell tower, which rises vertiginously from the corner of the palazzo, was begun in the same year as Lorenzetti's frescoes. The cathedral, perched nearby on the highest point in town, had been effectively brought to completion 30 years before the piazza project was begun.

The frescoed allegories of Good and Bad Government were painted in 1338–1339. While the frescoes offer glimpses of what daily life looked like in Siena, they more tellingly convey the Sienese government's sense of itself, its mission, and its effects on town and country. As such they can be read as a visual treatise on the proper

relationships of power, people, and environment in fourteenth-century Italy.

Content

The allegories of Good and Bad Government are found on the *piano nobile* (second floor) of the Palazzo Pubblico. Located on the south side of the building—that is, away from the Piazza del Campo and toward the countryside—the *Sala dei Nove* is accessed principally from the doorway on its east wall, which gives onto the main gathering space of the Palazzo, the *Sala del Mappamondo*. So called because of the large globe and circular map of the heavens that were displayed on the west wall, the *Sala del Mappamondo* was the chamber where the town council met and where its decisions were ratified. On the wall opposite the door to the *Sala dei Nove* Simone Martini had painted earlier in the century a large fresco of the *Maestà*, the Madonna and Child enthroned, surrounded by saints and wrapped by an admonitory inscription directing those in the room charged with governing to embrace Wisdom. This image looked toward the room with Lorenzetti's fresco cycle and provided a sacred corollary to his ostensibly secular allegories.

The allegories of Good and Bad Government wrap three walls of their room; the fourth wall, on the south side, is unfrescoed and has a window opening out to the landscape beyond (and the town market below). Good Government occupies the north and east walls, Bad Government the west, so that entering the *Sala dei Nove* the visitor is confronted with the image of Bad Government and Its Effects. This scene of decay and devastation presided over by a demonic image of the tyrannical ruler provides a stark contrast to Martini's Madonna.

Good Government and Its Effects

Lorenzetti's frescoes show the virtues and vices of two kinds of government and their effects: The message is that what makes a good or bad government ultimately depends on the society each creates and supports, and what we know about this society we can read in its public realm. It should be noted that there is a complex interweaving of secular and Christian iconography in the frescoes, just as the contemporary public realm was overlaid with a sacred reading and the church with a civic dimension.

On the north wall, Good Government presides over personifications of the moral and theological Virtues. The ruler of the good city in fact represents the Common Good (*Bene Comune*). While occupying a commanding position in the fresco and the room, *Bene Comune* actually draws his authority from the citizens of Siena. He is, in fact, off-center on his wall, balanced with one of two figures representing Justice. It is here—at the left side of the north wall—that the reading of the allegory begins (aided by the inscriptions that Lorenzetti provides over each figure).

Enthroned Justice is presided over by Wisdom (*Sapientia*), suspending a large balance whose scales Justice helps support; each scale contains an angelic figure who metes out two distinct kinds of justice: distributive and commutative. From the structure of the balance two ropes (or cords) also descend to the figure of Concord (*Concordia*) seated below Justice; she rests a musical instrument on her lap and grasps the two cords with her left hand, binding them together and passing them onto a group of 24 citizens arrayed in pairs in procession toward *Bene Comune*. They pass the cord up to this embodiment of Good Government, where it tethers the

base of the scepter he wields in his right hand. At his feet are the two mythical founders of Siena, infants suckling a she-wolf (like Rome's Romulus and Remus). Above his head are the three Theological Virtues: Faith, Charity, and Hope. Arrayed to his left and right, respectively, and on the same bench upon which he sits, are Peace, Fortitude, Prudence, and Magnanimity, Temperance, Justice (again). Below these last three on the right are soldiers in the colors of Siena (black and white, like *Bene Comune's* robes) and their prisoners.

Justice guided by Wisdom creates Concord, who provides the authority for the Common Good to rule with Virtue. The proof would be available to us in both the persons of the Nine ruling this evidently well-governed city (which we would have seen outside in the Piazza del Campo and throughout the city), and in the adjacent fresco of Good Government's effects. Beginning in the northeast corner, the fresco of the effects shows a densely built hill town, where a striped marble campanile and a dome announces that the city depicted is Siena itself. The buildings of the town are varied in style and type; all are in good repair, and indeed builders are at work on the rooftop of one in the middle. Painted more than half a century before Brunelleschi's recovery of linear perspective, medieval conventions still obtain: Lacking a consistent horizon line and vanishing points, the apparent jumble of buildings suggests not disorder but healthy variety. A city wall near the middle of the fresco separates town from the rural countryside to the right. Inside the wall and below the buildings a wide variety of urban activity is taking place: From left to right, a noble wedding party processes on horseback toward the allegories on the north wall, bankers and jewelers ply their trades, a group of eight women dance, a cobbler tends a customer, a teacher teaches, and near the gate *contadini* bring fruits, vegetables, and livestock to sell at market. The dancing women are more allegorical than actual (dancing in the street was illegal in Siena at the time): They restate the theme of concord from the allegory, as they hand in hand weave a figure ∞ , symbolizing eternity.

Over the gate *Securitas* flies toward the countryside holding a miniature gallows with a hanged criminal and bearing an inscription (in Tuscan) that declares in the just, well-governed city, people

are also safe to travel in the countryside without fear. Communes like Siena often controlled large areas of the *contado*, which they depended on for agriculture, trade, and access to wider markets. All these functions are shown taking place in Lorenzetti's rural landscape. An actual window on the south wall looks out onto the cultivated fields beyond, linking the painted and the real.

Bad Government and Its Effects

If peace and justice are the operative conditions of the good city, violence and fear are the conditions in its opposite. In the fresco of *Bad Government and Its Effects* on the west wall, evil Tyranny presides over a collection of Vices (antipodes of the Virtues) and Fear, who are behind the disarray and decay of the buildings, the violence in the streets and incessant war in the countryside. Justice is bound at the feet of Tyranny; there is no figure of Concordia. Buildings decay or display wanton regard for the planning restrictions Siena had enacted. Swords and daggers are drawn, and disorderly mercenaries roam the streets and countryside, meaning no work is done in either. In these centuries of constant warfare, the images depicted here would have been familiar to the people of Siena.

David Mayernik

See also Florence, Italy; Medieval Town Design; Rome, Italy

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ALMSHOUSES

Boston (ca. 1685), Philadelphia, and New York (the 1730s) were the first cities in the United States to establish almshouses (also called poorhouses). Almshouses were initially supported with a combination of poor taxes and private donations and originally intended to temporarily house community members who were of good character but who were "unfortunate" and who had no family to support them: the poor, the elderly, abandoned or illegitimate children, the injured, or the insane or mentally defective. Almshouses supplemented, and occasionally replaced, the older "outdoor" relief system of payments in cash or goods to relatives of the afflicted or to community members who offered to take responsibility for paupers' support. In some areas (e.g., New York City's outlying counties, and in parts of New Jersey), overseers alternated between outdoor relief and housing the poor in rented or purchased residences, depending on how many folk were in need of care and how much money the town had to spend. Private aid from religious organizations or charitable organizations existed alongside institution-based aid, but focused on particular categories of need (e.g., their own congregations, widows, orphans, prostitutes).

Almshouses played a range of important roles in the social, economic, and political lives of both urban and rural communities. In addition to aiding the poor, poorhouses provided jobs for many of the working poor who would otherwise have been dependent on poor relief. The institutions worked to lower their operating costs by selling manufactured goods and by exchanging goods and produce with local residents. As public institutions, almshouses served as foci for debates over the use of public funds, the conduct of local elections, responses to crises such as epidemics, and other issues of concern to the public.

Urbanization and industrialization in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century Europe and North America were accompanied by universal problems of population dislocation, economic instability, and increasing tension between administrators, the public, and the poor over entitlement to relief. While the establishment of the British workhouse system in the 1830s was of considerable interest to administrators in the United States, and British manuals for providing residential institutions with adequate plumbing and ventilation were certainly consulted, U.S. poorhouses did not generally employ British or other non-American institutions as models. Instead, poor relief exhibited significant regional variation, and administrators adapted government regulations to local conditions and individual cases as they saw fit.

Between the mid-eighteenth century and the 1830s, most American cities adopted an institution-based system of poor relief in order to more efficiently spend and account for public funds (which now included regular appropriations for poor relief) and for more effective supervision of the poor. Poverty was a matter of increasing concern in both urban and rural areas as the numbers of applicants for relief grew and expenditures on relief increased in spite of local officials' efforts to take responsibility only for poor folk who lived in their communities. Real increases in poverty were accompanied by widespread public perception that the ranks of the poor were increasingly composed of the "vicious" poor, who did not deserve the support to which paupers of good character were entitled.

The first half of the nineteenth century saw a growing faith in institutions as solutions to a wide variety of social problems including mental illness, criminal behavior, and poverty; institutions set out to reform the characters and behaviors of their inmates by providing appropriate housing, constructive activity, and moral guidance. An institution-based system would remain the model for social welfare in the United States for the rest of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth, when by mid-century, poorhouses either closed or shifted to housing a variety of state-funded social service programs.

Monique Bourque

See also Homelessness; Housing

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ALONSO, WILLIAM

William Alonso (1933–1999)—architect, regional scientist, urban planner, demographer, and regional policy analyst—developed the first and enduring model of metropolitan land use decision making and urban rent determination and went on to a distinguished career as an urban theorist, demographer, and policy advisor. Alonso came to the United States from Argentina in 1941 at the age of 14 when his distinguished philologist father fled the repression of the Perón regime to take up a position at Harvard University.

Early on, Alonso was a theorist relying upon deductive reasoning and empirical analysis to explore urban spatial form. He was the first PhD graduate of the University of Pennsylvania's pioneering regional science department and a founding member of the Regional Science Association. As a young professor in city and regional planning at University of California, Berkeley, he initiated, with others, the social science revolution in urban planning that addressed larger issues of urban evolution and policy with tools from economics, political science, and sociology. Alonso's interdisciplinary background was a tremendous strength, and he became a leading demographer in the 1970s as director of the Center for Population Studies at Harvard University, where he headed an extraordinary academic review of the U.S. Census that resulted in significant changes. He became a prominent theorist of European urban system

change following the formation of the European Union and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

Alonso's seminal work is *Location and Land Use*, in which he improved on Johann Heinrich von Thünen's early nineteenth-century zone theory of agricultural land use and rents, adapting it radically for a metropolitan setting. He sought to understand why higher-income households in twentieth-century United States chose to live farther from the city center, whereas in Europe and his native Argentina they favored the core. Part of his larger argument was a location model in which the household's utility is a positive function of land space consumed and dollars spent on a composite good (all goods other than land) and a negative function of commuting distance to work in the core. A budget constraint reflects the unit price of the composite good, a price for land that varies with distance to work, and the monetary cost of commuting, a function of commuting distance. He inferred that higher-income American families favored larger lots and housing size and were willing to incur greater time and money costs of commuting as a result. He predicted bid-rent curves (how much rent people will pay for residential land given its distance from a specified point) that decline with distance from the core. In his first foray into policy, he speculated on the implication of his and other historical and structural urban form theories for urban renewal.

Although he continued to use microeconomic and macroeconomic theories in influential intermetropolitan explorations of the economics of urban size, migration flows, urban disamenities, and longer-term development trajectories, Alonso pioneered the leavening of regional science with behavioral theory and methods in the social sciences. Two widely read collections that he coedited with John Friedmann showcased an eclectic approach that encompassed location theory and abstract urban modeling along with growth pole and other applied theories. His own elegant statement, "From Alfred Weber to Max: The Shifting Style of Regional Policy," did much to ensure that regional science would remain a field open to different disciplines and committed to policy analysis as well as theorizing.

As director of the Center for Population Studies at Harvard University from 1976 on, Alonso dramatically broadened the field of demography beyond mechanistic population forecasting by emphasizing the importance of social science theories of fertility behavior and interregional migration as important determinants of differential

urban growth rates. More importantly, he launched a remarkable multiyear interdisciplinary study of the U.S. Population Census and its anachronisms, resulting in the book *The Politics of Numbers* (with Paul Starr) and prompting important improvements in future census content, process, and reporting.

Bitten by the policy bug at an early age, Alonso spent his final decade anticipating new pressures and changes in the European system of cities following the demise of the Soviet Union and the quickening pace of European economic integration. In several papers he predicted greater polarization in Europe as the largest cities jockeyed for position, with some specializing in trade, finance, and governance. He paid attention to the periphery and its problems, accurately predicting the key role that continued regional policy would play in building union-wide solidarity. Over his 40-year career, Alonso served on several panels of the National Academy of Sciences and as a consultant to the United Nations, the World Bank, the European Commission, the U.S. Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, and Housing and Urban Development, and 16 national governments beyond the United States. His many and diverse contributions were celebrated in a special issue of the *International Regional Science Review* in 2001.

Ann Markusen

See also Housing; Journey to Work; Location Theory; Urban Economics

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AMSTERDAM, THE NETHERLANDS

Amsterdam is the capital of the Netherlands, and with 750,000 inhabitants it is also its largest city.

The city is part of the Randstad metropolitan area, which covers most of the west portion of the country and accommodates roughly half of the country's 16.5 million inhabitants. Randstad also includes the second- and third-largest cities, Rotterdam and The Hague.

The city of Amsterdam developed on a dam in the Amstel River at the end of the twelfth century. The period 1585 to 1672, the Golden Age, was the heyday of Amsterdam's commercial success. At the time Amsterdam was the staple market of the world. During this period the characteristic Amsterdam cityscape developed; the 1613 and 1663 urban expansions with concentric canals still determine the city's characteristic appearance. The year 1672 brought disaster for the Dutch Republic with the French and English attacking simultaneously: The Golden Age had come to an end. Nevertheless, Amsterdam managed to consolidate its prosperity during the period 1672 to 1795 (the Silver Age) in spite of the predicament the Republic found itself in. The city remained a major staple market and managed to retain its position as the financial center of Europe. The large number of dwellings built in the Golden and Silver Ages reflect the city's prosperity.



Modern Amsterdam demonstrating the merging of canals and traffic thoroughfares

Source: Karen Wiley.

In 1795 the government of the patrician oligarchies was overthrown and the old Republic ceased to exist. Soon the French occupied the country. During the period 1795 to 1813, Amsterdam suffered badly from an economic recession. Many houses were vacant and some even collapsed for lack of maintenance. The period 1813 to 1920 is marked by economic recovery and, from 1870 onward, by expansion. The increasing wealth brought about a rapid population growth. This development was primarily the result of the Industrial Revolution, which triggered a New Golden Age. Large, often poorly built working-class neighborhoods were built. The period 1920 to 1940 was a time of economic recession. Therefore it is all the more remarkable that the so-called Ring 20–40 compares favorably to the nineteenth-century jerry-building. This was also the period of large-scale damage to the historical city center; canals were filled in and new traffic breakthroughs were realized. During the postwar period the population of the city proper grew only modestly, but the metropolitan area increased dramatically. Moreover, Amsterdam acquired an international reputation, both culturally and economically.

Many tourists are attracted by the museums that are now renowned far outside the Netherlands (such as the Van Gogh Museum, Rijksmuseum, and Stedelijk Museum), and because of its canals and architecture the city center is very popular—the historical wealth of this part of the city is still tangible. At least as important is the liberal image of Amsterdam, which, for tourists, is mainly connected to the city's red-light district and its policies on the use of soft drugs. These cultural features make tourism an important source of income. However, the main thrust of the city's income comes from commercial services (banking and insurance companies), trade, and

distribution (the national airport Schiphol is located very close to Amsterdam, and the city also has a large seaport). The city has a highly educated workforce, partly due to the presence of two large research universities and various colleges. Amsterdam has never had a uniform industrial profile. To the contrary, the Dutch capital has always been characterized by a relatively strong financial sector, the presence of cultural industries, tourism, and other consumption-related sections of the economy. Amsterdam has a strong postindustrial economic and employment structure.

In this entry, two themes are highlighted: Amsterdam as a migrant city and the city's progressive potential.

A Migrant City

Amsterdam has seen immigration for centuries. When the city was a thriving center of global trade in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, it naturally received large flows of immigrants. In the years following World War II, Amsterdam's immigrant population has vastly grown. The share of people from ethnic minority groups is high (including the estimates for undocumented migrants, about 50 percent) and the ethnic variety is impressive: Amsterdam houses about 177 different nationalities, more than any other city in the world.

While Amsterdam is a city with poor immigrant groups, it is not a city where the spatial distribution of people and housing quality is simply a function of income and class. Amsterdam's ethnic groups are not extremely segregated, which is probably because Amsterdam is a mixed city with respect to housing types and because the social housing sector is not marginalized. This large social housing sector is highly regulated: The main criteria for housing allocation and residential differentiation in Amsterdam are income and household composition. The more-than-significant state intervention in the Amsterdam housing market has three major directions: a large amount of social housing; regulation in housing assignment by a variety of rules, until very recently even involving properties outside the social housing stock; and, quite significant, rent subsidies. The Moroccans are the only group showing a steady rise in concentrations in the least popular areas of the city. However, these concentrations are nowhere near ghettos; there is not even one area that consists of more than 50 percent Moroccans.

Many areas of the city are, however, minority-majority neighborhoods, but this is not very surprising, as the city itself is almost a minority-majority city.

Yet migration does pose some serious challenges to the city. Anti-migration and anti-Islam sentiments are becoming more and more common throughout the Netherlands. In many ways, some districts in the west of the city (collectively known as *Westelijke Tuinsteden* or "New West") have become not only the real battleground but even more so the symbolic battleground of the multicultural city and the discourse of failing immigrant integration. Ironically, the most ethnically diverse part of the city, De Bijlmer district, not long ago the most infamous housing estate in the country and formerly known as "the closest thing to a ghetto in the Netherlands," is now often cited as an example of successful integration. Ethnic diversity is often celebrated in De Bijlmer, not just by the communications bureau of the city district but also by many residents, and this is showcased by (multi)ethnic festivals. But discourse and reality are often two different things: For many people in De Bijlmer, in particular for a substantial group of undocumented immigrants, it remains an area full of insecurities and uncertainties; likewise, the western part of the city is not as problematic as many seem to suggest.

Progressive Policies

Amsterdam is known for its progressive policies and practices regarding squatting, drug use, prostitution, sexuality, housing, urban planning, and sustainable development. It is also known as one of the world's "Gay Capitals." Three of these themes are discussed briefly in this entry.

1. *Housing, planning, and squatting.* Housing and urban planning in Amsterdam seem more progressive than in many other cities, although the city has clearly lost its edge over several other cities. Many policies are no longer radically different from those in many Nordic and German cities. And even though the city's share of social housing is still among the highest in the world, two large programs are contributing significantly to a decrease in the availability of social rented housing. One is a program to sell social-rented units to their tenants and is, in some ways, comparable to the United

Kingdom's "right to buy" program, although tenants can buy their home only *if* the landlord offers to sell it to them. The second is a program aimed at the renewal of postwar neighborhoods: Many dwellings are demolished and replaced by private-sector housing. In addition, squatting is also becoming less easy and less accepted than it once was. The national government is discussing a ban on squatting, and although the city of Amsterdam does not support such a ban, relations between squatters and authorities have become more and more hostile.

2. *Drugs.* The main aim of the drug policy in the Netherlands is to protect the health of individual users, the people around them, and society as a whole. Priority is given to vulnerable groups. Active policies on care and prevention are being pursued to reduce the demand for drugs. Regulations on drugs are laid down in the Opium Act. The Opium Act draws a distinction between hard drugs (e.g., heroin, cocaine, and ecstasy [also known as XTC or MDMA]), which are considered to pose an unacceptable hazard to health, and soft drugs (e.g., hashish and marijuana), which constitute a far less serious hazard. Importing and exporting drugs are the most serious offenses under the provisions of the Opium Act. The possession of drugs is an offense, but the possession of a small quantity of soft drugs for personal use is not criminalized. In addition, anyone found in possession of less than 0.5 gram of hard drugs will generally not be prosecuted, though the police will confiscate the drugs and consult a care agency. The city center of Amsterdam is dotted with so-called coffee shops, where soft drugs can be bought and consumed. National government recently forced the city to close a number of them because they are considered to be too close to schools. Surprisingly to many non-Dutch, drug use in the Netherlands, both soft and hard, is lower than in many other countries. For example, more than twice as many Americans regularly use marijuana or cocaine. Drug use is higher in Amsterdam than most other parts of the country, but this is probably true for most big cities.

3. *Prostitution.* As is the case with drugs, Amsterdam's lenient stance on prostitution seems to have risen as a special case at the intersection of national policies and local yet international tourism. In the Netherlands, prostitution was legalized in 2000. However, this does not mean prostitution is

left completely to the free market; for example, brothel licensing is used to control illegal immigration. Registered prostitutes are taxed, which allows for legal action against nonlicensed prostitutes offering their services. Contrary to the impressions of many foreigners, Dutch citizens, in general, do not support or encourage prostitution and sexual commerce. Nonetheless, in the Netherlands, prostitution is much more accepted as a social fact than it is elsewhere. Chrisje Brants speaks of "regulated tolerance": Even before legislation, it involved "self-regulation, enforced if necessary through administrative rules, but always with the criminal law as a threat in the background," although "it is not an offence to make use of the services of a prostitute" or to offer services as a prostitute. Because of the unique situation in the Netherlands, Amsterdam's major red-light district, De Wallen, is not tied just to notions of danger, immorality, drugs, and crime but also to tolerance, excitement, and freedom—making De Wallen one of Amsterdam's major tourist attractions. The commodification of sex is not very hidden in the De Wallen. Unlike other red-light districts, De Wallen is not visited just by heterosexual men looking for sexual pleasure. The crowd on the streets includes locals passing through on a walk as well as by couples, women, homosexual men, business associates, and families with grandparents and children in tow. Both physically and socially, the area is not very strongly separated from its surroundings, and borders appear relatively porous: The occasional sex shop can be found on the adjacent streets among cultural institutions, respectable cafes, child care facilities, and residential housing (often located above the window brothels and the sex shops). Recently, the city of Amsterdam, and in particular the large social-democratic party, has started a campaign to significantly limit the red-light district in size. It could be argued that the city is undertaking a deliberate promotion of gentrification.

An Ordinary, Progressive City

Amsterdam is a significant place in urban studies, not just because of its historical significance and the resulting architectural heritage but also because it is often seen as an example of an almost utopian city with the most progressive policies in the world. Susan Fainstein, in her essay in the book *Understanding Amsterdam*, describes Amsterdam as "the just city." Although Amsterdam will still look

more progressive than many of its counterparts on the other side of the Atlantic, Amsterdam is no longer the radically progressive city that it seemed in the 1970s. In fact, several other European cities now have as much progressive potential as Amsterdam. Nonetheless, Amsterdam remains significant as both an “ordinary city” and a “progressive city.” Within Europe, Amsterdam is also a forerunner in becoming a minority–majority city with all its dynamics, opportunities, and tensions that brings about.

Manuel B. Aalbers

See also Gay Space; Gentrification; Historic Cities; Multicultural Cities; Red-Light District; Sex Industry; Social Housing; Squatter Movements; Tourism

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ANCIENT CITIES

The earliest cities developed within a broad transformation of human society called the “urban revolution.” Simpler agricultural societies grew into complex, urban states independently in at least six parts of the world. The first large-scale complex societies, often referred to as “pristine states,” developed in Mesopotamia, Egypt, the Indus Valley, North China, the Andes, and Mesoamerica. This entry covers ancient cities starting with the pristine states and ending prior to the Classical period in the Mediterranean and prior to European conquest in other parts of the world.

Early Urban Traditions

Cities within major world regions typically shared key principles of form and function, allowing them to be grouped into urban traditions. The following sections describe eight of the best documented early urban traditions.

Mesopotamia

The earliest large urban settlement was Tell Brak in the dry farming zone of northern Mesopotamia. During the Uruk period (3800–3100 BC) this city consisted of a central zone of public architecture surrounded by sprawling suburban settlement over 1 square kilometer in extent. At the end of this period, the site declined and the focus of urban development shifted to southern Mesopotamia. At the start of the Early Dynastic period (2900–2300 BC), the southern Mesopotamian site of Uruk grew explosively from a small town to a compact walled city of some 400 hectares (4 square kilometers). At the same time, nearby rural villages were abandoned, suggesting that people were moved forcibly into the city. This urban growth was part of a cultural explosion that saw the spread of cities and city-states across the Euphrates plain, the development of cuneiform writing, and a series of economic, religious, and cultural innovations.

Over the following millennia, the Near East witnessed several cycles in which periods of city-state organization (such as the Early Dynastic period) with numerous small interacting cities alternated with periods of political centralization

dominated by large imperial capitals. Some of the most impressive cities of the ancient world were imperial capitals in the first and second millennia BC, such as Babylon, Nineveh, and Persepolis.

Egypt

Because archaeologists have failed to find large cities in Egypt prior to Akhenaten's capital at Amarna in the New Kingdom period (1350 BC), Egypt has sometimes been contrasted to Mesopotamia as a "civilization without cities." This label masks a distinctive form of urbanism, however. While it is possible that flooding by the Nile River destroyed earlier large capitals, it appears more likely that the Egyptians forged a form of dispersed urbanism characterized by smaller, more specialized urban settlements. Walled towns served as local administrative centers, large temples were built in religious compounds, and the temples were maintained by special settlements of workers and priests. Laborers for major construction projects were housed in walled villages. This pattern originated during the Old Kingdom period (2700–2100 BC) when the Egyptian state and associated institutions, such as kingship and hieroglyphic writing, were first consolidated. Egypt did not lack cities; rather its urban systems were structured differently from the more familiar form of Mesopotamian cities.

Indus Valley

A distinctive tradition of cities developed around 2300 BC in the valley of the Indus River in Pakistan and western India. The best known cities are Mohenjo-daro and Harappa. Each was composed of two parts: a large raised platform with public architecture on the west and dense residential zones on the east. Houses were serviced by a sophisticated system of drains, pipes, and ditches; this level of sanitary engineering was not matched until the Roman period two millennia later. Public architecture at these sites is enigmatic. The citadels support likely storage structures, but there are no obvious temples or royal palaces. A large open tank at Mohenjo-daro, known as the "Great Bath," was probably used for some kind of ritual bathing or purification rites. The basic patterns of urban architecture and layout are duplicated at a series of smaller sites, including walled towns and a port facility with a dock and warehouses. The

undeciphered script of the Indus Valley civilization may hold clues to this fascinating and enigmatic urban society.

North China

China was the home to the longest-lasting non-Western urban tradition. Urban settlements were first founded in the Erlitou period (2100–1800 BC) and expanded greatly in the following Shang period (1800–1100 BC). Many early cities were walled, but Anyang, the most extensively excavated city, lacked a wall. In spectacular royal tombs at Anyang, kings were accompanied by sacrificed retainers, whole chariots with oxen, and rich offerings. A tradition of bronze ritual vessels exhibits impressive technological and aesthetic sophistication. Unlike cities in most early urban traditions, Anyang presents no surviving large stone buildings; public buildings were constructed of timber on low earth platforms. Chinese writing was perfected in the Shang period, and numerous ritual texts survive on bronze vessels and on carved bones. Principles established in these early urban centers, such as city walls and orientation to the cardinal directions, were later incorporated into the long-lasting tradition of imperial capitals, an especially well documented form of non-Western urbanism.

The Andes

The Andean culture area included a variety of localized urban subtraditions. Impressive planned ceremonial complexes first appeared on the coast of Peru in the second millennium BC. These sites share key architectural features (e.g., a U-shaped form and sunken circular courtyards), but their residential areas have not been well studied. Specialists debate both their urban status and whether their builders were the rulers of states, or chiefs of smaller-scale societies. Politics based in the large and impressive highland cities of Wari and Tiwanaku dominated the Andes between AD 500 and 900. The most powerful polity to develop in the Andes was the Inka empire (AD 1400–1530). Inka kings used city-building as an imperial strategy, and cities with distinctive Inka masonry and urban forms were built across large parts of the Andes to administer the empire.

Mesoamerica

Like the Andes, Mesoamerica (central Mexico to Honduras) was the setting for a number of regional subtraditions of urbanism, starting around the time of Christ. Most spectacular are the Classic period (AD 200–900) Maya cities of the tropical lowland jungle; the best studied cities are Tikal, Copán, Palenque, and Caracol. These consisted of planned civic centers with impressive stone pyramids, palaces, and ballcourts, surrounded by sprawling, unplanned residential zones. Newly deciphered hieroglyphic texts on public stone monuments tell the stories of petty kings and their military and ceremonial deeds. Around AD 900, Maya civilization collapsed and the cities were overgrown by jungle vegetation. Other well studied Mesoamerican urban cultures include the Olmec, Zapotec, and Aztec, all of which built small cities that followed the Maya pattern of planned civic zones coupled with unplanned residential areas. The largest Mesoamerican cities were in central Mexico: Teotihuacan (AD 100–600) and the Aztec imperial capital Tenochtitlan (AD 1300–1519); each had over 100,000 inhabitants.

Southeast Asia

The largest city ever built—in areal extent—was the great Khmer imperial capital of Angkor (AD 800–1300), whose maximal extent was larger than 1,000 square kilometers. The temple compound of Angkor Wat (82 hectares in area) was only one of many monumental complexes, along with palaces and reservoirs, all carefully built and arranged following cosmological and mythological principles. Like the Maya cities, the ceremonial core was surrounded by low-density informal housing, and much of the city was devoted to intensive agricultural cultivation. The Khmer urban tradition began much earlier than Angkor, however, and over the centuries, kings and architects worked out distinctive canons of urban planning and architectural style that drew on both the Hindu and Buddhist religions. Southeast Asia was also home to a tradition of commerce-based coastal port cities.

Sub-Saharan Africa

Several urban subtraditions flourished in sub-Saharan Africa prior to European conquest. In West Africa, the city of Jenné-Jeno (AD 450–1100)

combined extensive craft production and exchange systems with modest public architecture. The Yoruba cities (AD 1400–1900) were also busy commercial centers without large public buildings; warfare was rampant and these cities were surrounded by defensive walls. In eastern Africa, Great Zimbabwe was an impressive inland city (AD 1100–1400) with a large elliptical walled compound; its expansion resulted from an active system of inland–coastal commerce. At the coastal end of that relationship, Swahili settlements grew into busy port cities that maintained their independence until Portuguese conquest in AD 1500.

Conceptual Approaches

Two contrasting definitions of the terms *city* and *urban* are used by archaeologists. The demographic definition, based on the concepts of Louis Wirth, identifies cities as large, dense settlements with social heterogeneity. Many ancient cities had only modest populations, however (often under 5,000 persons), and thus are too small to qualify as “urban” from this perspective. The alternative functional approach defines a city as a settlement that contains activities and institutions that affect a wider hinterland. The most common of these “urban functions” existed in the realm of politics or administration, economics, and religion. The functional definition allows for different types of cities, both within and between urban traditions.

The concept of the “urban revolution,” first identified by V. Gordon Childe (1892–1957), describes a series of social changes that brought about the development of the earliest cities and states in each of the six regions of pristine urbanism. These changes (such as the origin of social classes and the production of an agricultural surplus) provided the social context for the earliest cities. Once class-structured state societies took hold in a region, individual cities rose and fell in response to a variety of forces.

Patterns of Variation

Archaeologists in the eighteenth century began their programs of fieldwork in the Near East at urban sites because that was where they found the biggest monuments and the richest offerings. Today this approach continues in some areas, but most archaeologists take a more analytical approach to

ancient urban sites. In this newer perspective, conceptual models are applied to the archaeological remains of early cities in order to learn about them as human settlements. The most common conceptual approach derives from political economy. Archaeologists look to agricultural production and demography as important factors in urban dynamics. Craft production and long-distance exchange are major topics of urban research today. Ancient state-level economies varied enormously, and economic processes and institutions affected urban form and dynamics. For example, cities under state-controlled noncommercial redistributive economies (e.g., Inka and Egypt) had more standardized plans and state storage facilities, whereas cities in areas with commercialized economies (e.g., Sumerian and Swahili) were typically smaller with less standardization in layout.

Political form and the dynamics of power are also major topics of archaeological research on ancient cities. Rulers used urban architecture to communicate messages about power, wealth, legitimacy, and other ideological themes. Accordingly, the capitals of city-states (e.g., Sumerian and Aztec) were small cities with relatively modest public architecture, whereas imperial capitals were larger in size and far more “monumental” in their cityscapes. The civic centers of ancient capitals were almost always carefully planned, following local rules and canons. Residential zones, on the other hand, were most commonly shaped by generative, bottom-up processes instead of central planning.

In the past two decades, the focus on economics and politics has been supplemented by a newer focus on the social characteristics of the urban population. Excavations of houses, workshops, and residential zones are now common, and urban households, neighborhoods, and social variation have become major topics of research. Archaeologists borrow models from urban geography to investigate the social dynamics of cities, including topics such as wealth and inequality, power and control, urban social identities, and spatial practices. Another tradition of research emphasizes the religious dimensions of early cities, including cosmological models of city layout and the symbolism of temples. It is known from historical documents that in some ancient traditions cities were highly sacred places and rulers deliberately aligned their capitals with the cosmos (e.g., China, India, and

Southeast Asia), whereas cities in other traditions (e.g., Sumerian, Swahili) show far less evidence of such sacralization.

In comparison with modern cities, ancient cities were more strongly constrained by their environmental setting. Limitations in transport technology and organizational capacity required that food and other bulky resources come from close to the city. As a result, agricultural productivity and resource distribution played large roles in determining the locations and population levels of most ancient cities. Imperial Rome, with its seagoing fleets and advanced imperial and commercial grain procurement systems, was one of the first cities to outgrow the constraints of its local environmental context by importing food from North Africa.

Although most ancient cities had much smaller ecological footprints than Rome, many or perhaps most of them were responsible for serious environmental degradation. Archaeologists have documented agricultural overintensification and its ensuing negative effects on soils in the vicinity of many ancient cities. Nearly all ancient urban societies engaged in deforestation, often with disastrous consequences for soils and the water table. In temperate latitudes forests were cut down for firewood and construction materials. The most wood-hungry pyrotechnology-based industries were metallurgy and the production of cement and plaster from limestone. In tropical forest settings, forests were cleared for agricultural production.

Most ancient cities were ultimately destroyed or abandoned. Some, like Teotihuacan or Uruk, flourished for many centuries, whereas others, such as Akhenaten’s capital Amarna and most Inka cities, were abandoned shortly after they were founded. These differences in longevity, which might be considered reflections of ancient urban sustainability, remain poorly understood. Because the dynamics of urban change typically require razing old buildings to construct new ones, cities with long lives are much more difficult for archaeologists to study. The most difficult ancient cities to excavate are those that have continued to thrive into modern times, such as Damascus, Beijing, Rome, London, and Mexico City. Although their archaeological resources present numerous problems for modern heritage conservation and planning, these cities do provide settings where large numbers of people can learn about ancient cities and urban lifeways.

In summary, the most striking result of archaeological fieldwork on ancient urban sites around the world is the recognition of a high level of variation among ancient cities. Each urban tradition exhibited its own distinctive forms and styles of architecture and layout, and cities in each tradition bore the marks of regional patterns of economy, politics, religion, and social organization. High levels of variation often existed within urban traditions as well. The two best documented ancient urban traditions—Mesopotamia and Mesoamerica—each included small city-state capitals, huge imperial capitals, port cities, industrial towns, and cultural centers. As archaeologists continue to excavate and analyze ancient cities, these patterns of variation are becoming clearer. It is increasingly possible to compare ancient, historical, and modern cities in order to uncover the broad patterning of similarities and differences in urban settlements across space and time.

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See also Acropolis; Agora; Athens, Greece; Childe, V. Gordon; Rome, Italy; Urban Archaeology

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ANNEXATION

Annexation is a procedure that enables a city to grow by expanding its boundaries to include neighboring territory. It is closely related to the idea of consolidation, a process that enables two or more cities to merge into one larger government. Virtually every major American city has grown either through annexation or consolidation.

Annexation has had a long history in the United States. In the nineteenth century, annexation and consolidation produced America's largest cities. New York, Chicago, Boston, and Philadelphia—along with many others—grew enormously. New York City expanded from approximately 44 to 300 square miles, and Chicago from 10 to 185 square miles. Boston grew to almost 30 times its original size. Philadelphia increased even more dramatically: from 2 to 130 square miles. Although suburbanization greatly enlarged the geographic reach of their metropolitan regions, annexation in major Eastern and Midwestern cities ended in the nineteenth century. But annexation continues elsewhere in the United States. Between 1950 and 1990, David Rusk reports, more than 80 percent of the nation's central cities grew by 10 percent or more. Important examples include Houston, Memphis, Oklahoma City, Jacksonville, Phoenix, and San Jose. And there are many others. The major cities of the twentieth century in the South and West, like the major Eastern and Midwestern cities of the nineteenth century, have thus grown by annexation.

There are two ways to understand why some cities in the United States continue to annex adjacent territory and others do not. One is that the arguments for and against annexation have a different impact in different parts of the country. The other is that the legal structure that empowers cities to annex neighboring territory differs from place to place.

Consider first the arguments for and against annexation. Many annexations have been fueled by the idea that size matters. Civic pride and boosterism have fostered expansion as cities have competed with each other to be one of America's largest cities. Often, this expansion has been supported by the business community. Land speculation and the desire to create an efficient geographic area for the delivery of city services have played a

role as well. But the notion that size matters has also been embraced by opponents of annexation. Many residents of small communities like their connection to small city governments. Land speculators sometimes prefer working with smaller governments, and those interested in city services can also find advantages in them.

These traditional pro and con arguments now take place in the context of large-scale suburban sprawl. Opponents of suburban sprawl, and of the political fragmentation that generates it, frequently favor making annexation easy. Supporters of metropolitan fragmentation—or, as they are more likely to put it, people who favor offering potential residents a wide choice of communities to live in—oppose it. Current annexation debates also take place in metropolitan areas that are characterized by wide disparities between neighboring jurisdictions in terms of income, race, and ethnicity. The greater these disparities, the more likely it is that annexation will be fiercely contested.

The way in which these arguments for and against annexation are resolved is significantly affected by the different legal structures for annexation established by state law. Some states (such as Texas) have adopted rules that foster annexation and others (such as Massachusetts) have adopted rules that inhibit it. Many people assume that a territory cannot be annexed over the objection of its residents. But that is only one of the possible legal structures for annexation decisions. The state legislature can enlarge a city's territory on its own without a vote either of the expanding city or of the territory to be annexed. The state legislature can also authorize local elections. Yet these elections can be organized in different ways. Residents of both the annexing city and the annexed territory can be entitled to vote on the annexation proposal, but their votes can be counted either together, in one ballot box, or separately, with a majority required in each of the two jurisdictions. The dual ballot box option empowers the territory sought to be annexed to veto the annexation, whereas the single ballot box option (assuming that the annexing city has a larger population) makes annexation easier to accomplish. Some states organize annexation by empowering only the residents of the annexing city or its city council to approve annexation. Under this scheme, no vote at all takes place in the annexed territory. Other states do the opposite: They enable the

residents of the annexed territory to vote but deny the vote to residents of the annexing city. Like the choice between a single and dual ballot box, these alternative structures can foster or inhibit annexation.

States clearly have the freedom to organize annexation in any of these ways. All of the voting procedures—along with the power of the state legislature to make the decision itself—have been upheld as constitutional. The leading U.S. Supreme Court case, decided in 1907, is *Hunter v. Pittsburgh*. That case upheld the single ballot box procedure. It allowed Pittsburgh to annex neighboring Allegheny over the objection made by Allegheny's residents that permitting the annexation, after a majority of Allegheny's residents voted against it, would deprive them of protected property rights.

The justification for such a combined ballot box is majority rule. A decision has to be made about how best to govern an expanding metropolitan region. If a majority of the combined territory favors an annexation, a minority, often a small minority, should not be able to stand in its way. The justification for the dual ballot box, however, can also be framed as a vindication of majority rule. In this case, the majorities of the two areas are considerably separately, not together. It is thought to be unfair, from this point of view, for a territory to be absorbed into another government structure over the objections of a majority of its residents.

The state government's selection from the list of possible legal structures can have a considerable effect on whether annexation takes place. It is easier to annex a territory if it cannot veto the proposal. Nevertheless, one should not assume that the choice of procedure always dictates the result. The initial annexation that enlarged Boston in the nineteenth century was a result simply of state legislation. Later, the law changed to require the consent of the annexed territory. Yet that consent was forthcoming from many suburbs, ending only with Brookline's rejection of annexation in 1874. Similarly, the annexations in Los Angeles from 1909 to 1915 took place after a majority in both the annexing and annexed territories supported the city's growth. Moreover, allowing the annexing city to decide the issue by itself also does not determine the result. The population of the annexing city can decide that the annexation is not in that city's best interest.

Determining whether a jurisdiction "consents" to an annexation is sometimes complex. Although

the growth of Los Angeles was approved by its suburbs, their consent was generated by enormous pressure to get access to water. The consolidation of the city of New York in the late nineteenth century illustrates the opposite phenomenon. The decision to create the enlarged city of New York was made by the state legislature. But the legislature had previously sought to determine the attitudes of the affected jurisdictions by authorizing a nonbinding, advisory vote to be held in each area. All of the areas voted in favor of the consolidation, although the most important city, Brooklyn, did so only by the narrowest of margins (64,744 for, 64,467 against). Given the closeness of that vote, the state legislature did not immediately create the new city. Negotiations were undertaken to determine the appropriate process for writing the new city charter, and only after these negotiations had progressed did the state legislature, notwithstanding the objection of Brooklyn's mayor, approve the consolidation in 1898.

Many people concerned about the racial and class segregation of metropolitan areas support annexation as a solution. David Rusk made a forceful argument for this position in his book *Cities without Suburbs* by outlining the virtues of what he calls "elastic cities." These days, however, annexation will not solve the problems generated by metropolitan fragmentation. Metropolitan areas have simply grown too big. Indeed, the history of annexation demonstrates that city expansion has never adequately captured the entire regional population for long. Those concerned about metropolitan growth are thus exploring alternative solutions to metropolitan fragmentation ranging from regional government to urban growth boundaries to modifying the legal structure of school financing and exclusionary zoning.

Still, at least in some parts of the United States, annexation continues—as do the attempts to resist it. Sometimes annexation fights occur, pitting one possible annexing city against another, with each seeking to absorb a small but valuable portion of land into its borders. Even when annexations do not take place, the legal rules that make annexation easy or difficult can substantially affect interlocal relations. If central cities could annex their suburbs easily, the suburbs might well have an incentive to be more open to negotiations with the central city about issues such as revenue sharing. The suburbs might well think that revenue sharing is a better choice than annexation if both alternatives are

available; they might oppose revenue sharing, on the other hand, if annexation were not an option. The arguments for and against annexation, and the alternative legal structures that enable or restrict it, thus continue to affect the future of cities in the United States.

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See also Local Government; Patchwork Urbanism; Regional Governance; Suburbanization

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APARTHEID

Apartheid refers to a formal, legally defined systematic attempt by a White supremacy government in the mid-twentieth century to organize all aspects of economic, social, cultural, and political life along racially defined lines with a view to promoting an ideology of separateness between race groups in South Africa. It had a particularly virulent expression in urban areas where the greatest likelihood of race mixing and "contamination" was likely to occur. In the contemporary era of rising intraurban and interurban inequality and segregation in many cities of the world as asymmetrical economic globalization impacts on city-building, the ideal and practice of urban apartheid in South Africa has become a powerful metaphor and precedent for understanding the dangers of unchecked urban inequality based on various forms of discrimination. This entry first explains the colonial origins of formal apartheid as introduced in 1948, in order to contextualize the key tenets of the system when it became enshrined in various pieces of legislation until its formal demise

in 1994. Particular attention is devoted to the workings of urban apartheid.

Colonial Roots of Apartheid

From the outset of urbanization in South Africa, the colonial state engaged in deliberate policy interventions to establish residential segregation between indigenous Black Africans and Whites. After the abolishment of slavery in 1834, there was a considerable influx of Blacks into colonial towns. In response, the first form of separate settlement—a “location” for Blacks isolated from the town—was introduced in Port Elizabeth by the London Missionary Society. This would become the basic template for a “separate location” policy for the next 100 years, cementing racial segregation into the fabric of urban space from the outset of urbanization.

The Natives Land Act of 1913 was the first legislative attempt to give legal effect to divisions between White and Black groups. The Natives Land Act designated that Africans could own land only inside so-called Native Reserves, which amounted to 8.9 million hectares (less than 13 percent of the total land area of the Union). In terms of the act, Black Africans could not purchase land outside the designated reserves except for the Cape Province where their number was low, dating back to demographic patterns in precolonial times.

The most important legislative intervention in terms of urban segregation was the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923. It required municipalities to establish separate locations for Black Africans and to ensure the effective regulation of migration to towns. Even though there was some reluctance on the part of certain municipalities to establish separate locations because of the expense involved, urban historians agree that by 1948 when formal apartheid arrived on the scene, the system of physically separate African locations was firmly in place throughout much of the country. The blatant acts of segregation and movement regulation that stemmed from this act were further complemented by a range of covert urban reforms in the domains of public health, housing, and planning, which may have done even more to ensure thoroughgoing racial segregation in all domains of life. However, the system was not totally successful because the volumes of migration simply overwhelmed state capacity, which produced a patchwork of settlement in the ideal

image of the segregationist ambition of the Union government of the time.

Apartheid Era

So it came to be that against this partially successful system of urban segregation, the National Party with its ideology and political program of apartheid (separateness), came to power in 1948, ushering in the era of the search for total racial segregation on the back of an overt agenda of White supremacy but couched in a pseudoegalitarian ideology that spoke of separate but “equal” development. These ambitions were spectacularly successful because the colonial era had thoroughly prepared the territory for racialized urban segregation. In other words, apartheid urban policies from 1948 to 1994 were spectacularly successful because it represented a *continuity* with what had gone before for.

The three central pillars of the apartheid government’s urban segregation program were the Group Areas Act of 1950; the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953; and the regulation of African movement into cities and towns through “influx control” policies that stemmed from the Bantu Urban Areas Act of 1954. All three of these measures were premised on the Population Registration Act of 1950, which provided for the compulsory classification of everyone into distinct racial groups: White, African, and Colored (which initially included Indians).

The Group Areas Act aimed to achieve the *total* residential segregation of people on the basis of racial groups. Practically, urban areas would be zoned into residential and business areas but with an unambiguous racial label. Anyone who resided in the area from a different racial group would be forcibly removed to a “group area” where they ostensibly belonged. Significantly, planning and planners played a central role in the designation of areas into group areas to facilitate the race-based spatial grid that delineated residential and commercial areas. Planning was central because group areas had to be delimited and segregated through a panoply of urban land-use measures such as buffer strips, transport routes, access points, green field areas, and so forth. The Group Areas Act must be considered and understood in relation to the government’s larger conception of the “place” of Africans in South Africa. In a sense there was no such place. Africans were deemed to belong to a

number of ethnic “nations” that had their *own* territories (Homelands) inside the reserve areas designated by the Land Act of 1913.

The Separate Amenities Act was the pivotal instrument to ensure social segregation through the provision of separate and unequal municipal and public facilities—parks, swimming pools, rest-rooms, restaurants, and so on. Since different race groups had to use segregated schools and hospitals, the possibilities of chance encounters between groups grew fewer and fewer, counteracting the very essence of urban propinquity that normally underpins periods of urbanization and gives rise to cosmopolitanism. Of course, since Black labor was reserved for all the menial tasks of White economic and social reproduction, there was constant inter-race interaction but always on a profoundly unequal footing.

Influx control regulations required all Africans in South African territories to carry a pass book, which was an identity document that proved the person had employment and a residential dwelling for the duration of the employment in the so-called White city. These had to be obtained at labor bureaus inside the Homeland territories. Africans anywhere in South African territories without this document were deemed illegal and could summarily be deported back to their so-called Homeland territory even if they were born and raised in urban areas. In other words, Africans were not meant to belong inside “South African” towns and cities but merely sojourned through them as temporary migrant laborers. Indeed, many Africans were displaced, giving rise to what Colin Murray has called “displaced urbanization” in his description of South Africa’s rural slums. Nevertheless, influx control measures consistently failed to acknowledge the presence of large numbers of Africans who lived and worked in urban areas, invariably in horribly overcrowded conditions. This was because the state did not invest in housing provision since that would have represented an acknowledgment of their right to live and work in the city.

Furthermore, despite the engrained precursor of separatism that served as the foundation for formal apartheid, it took the apartheid government the better part of a decade to gear up its administrative capacity to implement the Group Areas Act. Thus, from the 1960s onward a wave of

forced removals and rezoning set in, leading to massive and violent resettlement processes of Coloreds, Indians, and Africans. As a consequence, Coloreds and Indians were resettled on small and peripheral locations in urban areas, and Africans were relentlessly deported to Homelands or allowed to settle on overcrowded squatter settlements on the periphery of the towns and cities. Whites were granted access to the most profitable and convenient tracts of land along with extremely high levels of municipal services, which further enhanced the economic value of their properties. Municipal services for Whites were cross-subsidized by Blacks through property taxes and the rates account because all commercial and industrial areas were deemed as White group areas even if they were adjacent to or inside so-called Black group areas. In these senses, the apartheid system ensured that racial segregation was closely intertwined with the perpetuation of economic inequality.

In the post-apartheid era since 1994, urban apartheid has proven stubbornly resilient. In fact, because of the policy decision not to intervene in the functioning of land markets, the government’s laudable investments to address the desperate living conditions of the Black majority have backfired. Specifically, formal urban segregation is now abolished but the public housing program of the government, which has delivered 2.5 million housing units between 1994 and 2008, has arguably made South African cities even more segregated because the only land available for this program is on the periphery of the city, far flung from economic, cultural, public, and mobility opportunities that urban living should offer. In other words, South Africa now confronts the problem of class-based, economic segregation, which happens to coincide with racial cleavages given the history of the country.

Edgar Pieterse

See also Divided Cities; Multicultural Cities; Social Exclusion

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ARCADE

It is the arcades of early twentieth-century Paris that are the most familiar to scholars in urban studies because of the work of critical theorist Walter Benjamin and surrealist writers such as Louis Aragon and André Breton. This entry, however, focuses on the arcades of London.

Arcades arguably originated in London in the sixteenth century as the sites of financial exchange and trade. Adopting a spatial arrangement from Italian mercantile cities where the financial exchange of bankers took place in arcaded courtyards, the Royal Exchange, built in 1568, consisted of a two-story gallery around an open courtyard. In 1609 a rival, the New Exchange, was built farther west in the Strand, internalizing the courtyard and placing an arcaded walk around the outside, two rows of shops and a central corridor on the ground floor, and three rows of shops on the upper floor. The New Exchange and those that followed, such as the Exeter Change

(1676) and the Middle Exchange, were located to the west of the city, their intended customers initially the nobility traveling west from their residences.

By siting trade internally and rationalizing the layout of booths, these commodity exchanges sanitized and regulated the market place, making it acceptable to a new bourgeois class, providing fancy goods—perfumes and clothes rather than the food products of traditional markets. The bazaar, a multistory building containing shopping stalls or counters, as well as picture galleries, indoor gardens, and menageries, by using a name that evoked the exotic qualities of the merchandise, took the process of commodification one stage further. Under the management of one proprietor, counters were rented out to retailers of different trades, attracting customers to a wider variety of commodities—dresses, accessories, millinery.

Precedents for English arcades also came from France, from the Jardins du Palais Royal (1781–1786), a quadrangle with an arcaded ground floor and shops along one side, described as the prototype of the prerevolutionary Parisian arcade, a meeting place for wealthy society prerevolution and post-revolution, converted into shops. The first arcades, places of transition as well as exchange, such as the Galleries du Bois, the Passage Feydeau (1791), and the Passage du Caire (1797–1799), followed shortly afterward. The first two arcades constructed during the early decades of the nineteenth century in London were the Royal Opera Arcade (1815–1817), designed by John Nash and G. S. Repton, and the Burlington Arcade (1818–1819), designed by Samuel Ware. A third London arcade, the Lowther Arcade, was also part of an urban improvement scheme around Trafalgar Square. The London arcades were part of plans to promote the fashionable and wealthy residential areas of the west around Piccadilly, Bond Street, Oxford Street, and Regent Street as a zone of luxury commodity consumption.

The Burlington Arcade was built for Lord Cavendish, the owner of Burlington House, to create a private realm, protected from the street, for an elite class of shopper. Arcades were represented as safe environments, usually under the management of one proprietor, physically secure with safety features, such as guards and lockable gates. Designed along strict and rational grids, with no hidden spaces or secret activities, these buildings

promoted order and control. From the outset, entry to the arcade was moderated; members of Lord Cavendish's ex-military regiment were employed as beadles to guard entry to the arcade and to enforce certain regulations. These governed opening and closing times (the arcade closed at 8 p.m. and was locked at night); the kind of movement that could take place in the arcade (this excluded running, pushing a pram, and carrying bulky packages or open umbrellas); and the noise level in the arcade (there was to be no whistling, singing, or playing of musical instruments). In contrast to the surrounding unruly city, associated with danger and threat, emphasis was placed on order and control. The status of the arcade was clearly indicated to passersby at the point of entry, the threshold with the street, where the presence of the beadles and the colonnaded screens indicated a transition from the unruly and public to the ordered and private.

The district immediately surrounding the arcade at the beginning of the nineteenth century was described as a "morning lounge" for wealthy young men. The streets in the vicinity housed a large number of male venues, such as the clubs of St. James's Street and Pall Mall, and provided lodgings for single men of the nobility, gentry, and professional classes. As such, the location provided a concentration of wealthy male customers, and the district played an important part in the commerce of female prostitution. A number of high-class brothels were located in King's Place nearby, and at night the streets of St. James's, Pall Mall, Piccadilly, and the Haymarket formed a circuit notorious for streetwalkers.

As a consequence of this position, the Burlington Arcade was specifically mentioned in contemporary men's magazines as a pleasure resort and a place to pick up pretty women. It was at the threshold between street and arcade, where decisions were enacted by the beadles concerning who could and who could not enter the arcade. Men and women could be excluded on grounds of class, but prostitutes presented a particular threat, for they might "dress up" as respectable women and pass by the beadles or alternatively bribe them. The presence of prostitutes and possible confusion of them with respectable women meant that at certain times of day, specifically between 3 p.m. and 5 p.m., respectable women would not enter the Burlington Arcade.

The Burlington Arcade was described by various primary sources as an "agreeable promenade," "walk or piazza," "long and commodious archway," and "covered passage." As symmetrical streets and sky-lit spaces, arcades gave access to the interior of blocks, provided semipublic routes through private property, and allowed ways of organizing retail trade. The spatial layout of the arcades exploited possibilities opened up by divorcing the point of sale from the place of production. Shops could be smaller, allowing narrow strips of unusable urban land to be economically developed. The building of the Burlington Arcade utilized a narrow strip of land alongside Burlington House and made it commercially viable. Samuel Ware's early designs, based on the Exeter Change, described two entrances, four double rows of shops, and three open, intervening spaces. But as built, retail opportunities were increased by including unbroke rows of enclosed shops down each side, providing not only a space of static consumption, but also a space of transition, a place for a promenade.

The successful selling and buying of goods requires the right kind of environment, a seductive and convincing atmosphere, and a consistency between the type of goods on sale and the design of the shop. For the Burlington Arcade to succeed as a space for luxury consumption, the design of the shops required careful consideration. Shops selling high-class goods were distinguished by having workshops either off-site or located in distinct and separate areas. This separation of production and consumption allowed the shops in the arcade to be unusually shallow in their design.

The original purpose of the Burlington Arcade was to provide employment for women, and in the early- and mid-nineteenth century many of the shops of the arcade were occupied and owned by women. Each shop was designed as a discrete and self-contained unit, with a ground floor, a basement, and upper chambers, all accessed via a staircase. The upper chambers of the shops were considered sites of prostitution and featured in tales of early-nineteenth-century London, such as George Smeeton's *Doings in London*. While millinery shops were represented as fronts for brothels and scenes of seduction, the upper chambers of bonnet shops in the Burlington Arcade were described in fiction and by contemporary commentators such as Bracebridge Hemming as the sites of sex and of prostitution.

The precise relation of the staircase, shop, and upper chamber remains unclear from existing accounts. It is likely these upper chambers were connected internally; certainly originally the architect favored renting out the upper floors to the shop tenants, and plans from 1818 show shops with internal staircases only. However, plans of 1815 also exist that show staircases positioned between the shop units, prioritizing the likelihood of external renting opportunities. The terminology used to describe the upper floor accommodation in Samuel Ware's design further confuses readers: The chambers are described variously as "sleeping apartments," "dormitories," and "suites of rooms." But given the separation of the upper chambers from the shops, it is certainly possible that these rooms were used for prostitution, either by the shopgirls themselves or hired out by prostitutes or clients.

Through their design and materials, shop fronts advertise business, represent social status, and attract customers. Luxury commodities require external display and so the shape of windows, as well as the type and amount of glass deployed, was a prime requirement in the Burlington Arcade. The design of the shops maximized display and enhanced viewing possibilities by adopting shallow depths, wide frontages, and bow windows. The use of large sheets of plate glass, a modern and very expensive material in the early nineteenth century, added to the perception of the arcade as a luxury zone. Its spatial qualities—reflective, transparent, and at times opaque—allowed a number of tensions to emerge between inside and outside.

As a transparent material, glass allowed an opportunity for presenting and protecting commodities. Close visual inspection of shop windows by passersby was enhanced by the arcade's narrow width, and the transparent glass created a close, though intangible, proximity between inside and outside: Commodities could be seen but not touched. As a reflecting material, as well as allowing a look through to the contents of the shop interior, the glass acted as a mirror for consumers to view themselves and other passersby.

The connection of arcades with the sexual availability of women, ornamentation, and deceit was reinforced through their origin as a foreign building type. Their precedent—the Galleries du Palais Royale in Paris—was the gathering place for libertines

before and during the Revolution. The presence of prostitutes in the arcades was complemented by the commercial activities of gambling, drinking, and jewelry selling in the shops. The use of the Parisian precedent, providing flats above shops, in John Nash's designs for the arcaded Quadrant Colonnade section of Regent Street increased the association of arcades and colonnades with "foreign" and therefore suspicious attitudes. Some of these lodgings were rented out to performers at the Italian Opera House in the same district, who were often French, Italian, or German. The mixture of foreign building types and people at a time when France and England were political rivals was perceived as a sign of immorality. Prostitutes were considered to be French, while conversely, the French women living in the vicinity were thought to be prostitutes. The connection made between places selling ornamental luxury commodities and prostitution may be explained then by the French example of the Galleries du Palais Royale.

In the 1830s, arcades and colonnades were synonymous with prostitution. New plans for colonnades around the Italian Opera House in the urban vicinity of the Burlington Arcade were rejected on those grounds. It was the architectural form itself that was believed to be the sole determinant in establishing the use of colonnades or arcades by prostitutes. John Nash thought that some of the problems could be avoided by including minor adjustments to the overall design, such as making the columns round. By mid-century, as opposition to new proposals for arcades and colonnaded spaces was still made on the grounds of discouraging prostitution, a conscious attempt was made to promote arcades as sites of domesticity rather than adult pleasure zones. For example, by the 1860s the character of the shops in the Lowther Arcade, built in the early 1800s, had changed and the arcade became known as a place with a family atmosphere that specialized in children's toys.

Jane Rendell

See also Benjamin, Walter; *Flâneur*; London, United Kingdom; Sex Industry; Shopping

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ARCHITECTURE

Architecture refers both to those parts of the built environment that are designed by architects and the collective designation of the profession. This basic definition is complicated by a number of factors, not least of which is the fact that the types of buildings that can "properly" be considered architecture is of significant controversy and struggle, as is the right of designers to be recognized as architects. These significant questions are assessed in this entry against the backdrop of architecture's complex and contingent social production. Indeed, it is architecture's social foundation—rather than its existence either an object or as a formal practice—that leads social scientists to seek to reveal the many "external" social constraints that impinge on architectural production. Arguably urban studies scholars are uniquely well placed in this regard, as the frameworks that underpin urban studies research encourage those scholars to situate architecture relative to the broader urban process and to recognize the contested nature of the political economies of cities, of which architecture is an important component.

The Study of Architecture as Practice

One of the distinctive elements of architecture as a profession is the reliance on clients for the resources—including land and other capital—necessary for its practice. At one level this client dependency can be explained by the inherently expensive endeavor of the design and realization of buildings, but this connection must also be understood in light of the desire of the powerful to materialize their status in urban space. Studies of the architectural profession have frequently sought to develop this theme through revealing the extent to which architects' reliance on commissions from dominant political and economic actors conditions—and is subsequently legitimated through—their practice. This has been a particularly major concern in the urban studies tradition, where research on the political economy of architectural practice is among the most successful of social science contributions on the subject, not least because such studies can be situated in established "sociology of the professions" frameworks. By and large such research suggests that, in spite of the aforementioned dependence on capitalists and states for commissions and other resources, architects frequently reveal a highly ambiguous relationship with such social forces. In interviews and discussions of their practice, architects tend toward emphasis of their role in the production of socially meaningful buildings that connect to place, identities, and broader social values at the expense of a foregrounding of the interconnections between architecture and the states and capitalist enterprises that commission it. Commenting on this tension, the architectural theorist Diane Ghirardo suggests that positioning architecture within an aesthetic frame serves to divert attention away from the politics of architecture, including its symbiotic relationship with economic and political elites and their projects.

Research that situates architectural practice within particular urban contexts, political regimes, and capitalist models problematizes architecture's claims to autonomy from these processes; the profession's position somewhere between an art, primarily concerned with aesthetics and the creation of socially meaningful forms and spaces, and as a primarily functional response to material issues, such as shelter, is an important consideration in this regard. American sociologist Robert Gutman's

classic study *Architectural Practice: A Critical View* is informed by the notion that architecture's unique "natural market" is for those landmark, monumental buildings that claim to reflect major civilizational values. Gutman claims that the struggle for such commissions—always limited in number and so creating competition between architects and a subsequent hierarchy of professionals—exists in the context of architects' attempts to retain distinction from other related design professionals, which is crucial to architecture's continued monopoly over this sphere of activity. Indeed, the question of architects' self-definition is significant here, with the emergence of the profession bound up with the capacity of renaissance architects to frame their work as a design practice separate from that of construction; the role of drawing is a significant part of this story, as it allows a form other than the finished building that can be understood as the intellectual property of architects. (Ongoing conceptions of the "architect as artist" must be understood against this backdrop.)

A related concern of studies on architecture has been to draw attention to the functions of social reproduction and social closure performed by the architectural field, understood in reference to both those internal struggles for symbolic capital (between architects and firms) and the desire for distinction (from other designers) that characterizes the architectural field, the very definition of which is a fundamental site of these conflicts. The partial, unrepresentative nature of the architectural profession in terms of class, gender, and ethnicity has also been a significant focus of social science attention and provides the context for ethnographic studies into the culture of architectural practice, which has made valuable contributions to the understanding of architects' socialization into particular offices and into the profession more generally, including their positioning of themselves relative to their colleagues and the profession's hierarchy more generally.

The Social Production of Architecture: Power and Form

Major architectural projects in cities the world over are testament to the widespread desire of socially dominant individuals and organizations to materialize their power in urban space. While

the exact nature of architects' relationship with the politically and economically powerful varies as markedly across time and space as does the actual form that architecture takes, the durable nature of the relationship frames much critical inquiry on architecture. Revealing what Kim Dovey has called a "silent complicity" of architecture with dominant social groups has been a major preoccupation of urbanists, who largely have sought to challenge the aforementioned illusion of architecture as an autonomous, artistic practice concerned solely with form-making and disconnected from politics and the capitalist process. From this perspective architecture should not be considered as a neutral or free-floating cultural form but rather as a social practice that expresses the close relationship between architects and the agendas of the politically and economically powerful. From this perspective such "complicities" are reflected clearly in urban space, with architecture always and everywhere an inherently political—and thus contested—practice.

The eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, a period in which architects and their architecture were incorporated into state projects, illustrate something of the ways in which the built environment is positioned relative to political discourse. Architecture was one space in which emerging nation-states and the architects they commissioned sought to communicate a wide range of values and principles to mass publics. Major architectural projects were often commissioned explicitly to reflect the values and achievements of emerging states, which used cultural artifacts and space to emphasize their distinction from other nation-states and to develop a cultural association with some preceding national regimes. This context saw the emergence of national styles of architecture as an important part of a wider repertoire of cultural forms—including flags, currency, anthems, art, and national dress—which was developed and mobilized with the explicit aim of "inventing" national cultural traditions. In many national contexts there existed explicit architectural and political debates concerning the discovery of a "suitable" style for landmark public buildings. Architectural styles associated with previous regimes—such as Roman, Gothic, and Greek designs—had taken on stylized qualities and crucially had come to be read as cultural codes loaded with meaning, representing values that emerging

states wanted to align themselves with. A contemporary example that mirrors these earlier strategies can be found in the European Union's (EU's) cultural construction of discourses of belonging around a European cultural identity, which draws heavily on architecture and space in an attempt to give form to the EU's often ambiguous postnational themes, such as "Unity in Diversity." The *Brussels, Capital of Europe* report is a clear expression of the contested project to identify existing, or construct new, buildings and spaces that can meaningfully be connected to the social and cultural components of the EU's political project.

From a broadly speaking social constructivist perspective, such social meanings are not derived from anything inherent in the aesthetic of the style, but rather they emerge through a range of contingent historical associations; it is not so much architecture's ability to reveal or capture identities accurately that is of concern but rather the role of architects and their designs in contributing to the social construction of discourses of belonging associated with cities, states, and other communities. Framing architecture as a politicized social process invites research into the capacity of the architect to manage the interpretation of their buildings in the face of any number of different interpretations from users, critics, or other publics. In *The Interpretation of Architecture*, Juan Pablo Bonta draws attention to the process of "collective plagiarism" between architects and critics that underpins the emergence of orthodoxies of aesthetic judgment on particular styles at any one time. Bonta's work reminds us that while the interpretation of architecture varies across time and space, and is always subject to challenges, certain individuals and institutions within the architectural field have greater capacity than others to shape the meanings attached to buildings and spaces. In doing so Bonta foregrounds power, in his analysis, into the social construction of architectural meaning; certainly a sense of who has the capacity to define the parameters of the architectural field, a boundary contested not only by architects, but also those commissioning buildings, influential critics, and other buildings professions, is crucial to understanding the social construction of the discourses that legitimate and consecrate both particular styles and buildings, and architects.

This is an especially interesting approach given that high-profile architects are increasingly active in disseminating interpretations of their own work in the public sphere. Such architects, operating at a rarefied level of a profession consistently revealed by studies to be socially unrepresentative in terms of gender, class, and ethnicity, must be highly reflexive when attempting to situate their work relative to social identities, as the danger of privileging one identity discourse—either in the form of the building through particular symbols and motifs or in what is said about the design—is a constant threat. The competition is crucial in this regard, as it is the stage at which drawings and models (increasingly computer-generated ones) and other representations of buildings are presented in response to a tender, or contract bid. Crucially, the competition requires architects to situate their design relative to social identities and values. Accordingly, the competition is an inherently normative endeavor in which architects are required to project a vision of possible futures onto particular social spaces.

Architecture, Iconicity, and Selling Places

Questioning architecture's social meaning relative to political-economic projects is crucial in understanding the role of the built environment in contemporary regeneration strategies. As well as being a prominent component of how urban spaces are used to generate surplus value, architecture is also a central component of the active construction of symbolic "brands" that position postindustrial urban centers as attractive places to visit and to invest. The incorporation of landmark architectural projects into regeneration strategies has been rejuvenated since the 1996 opening of the Bilbao Guggenheim Museum, a Frank Gehry-designed building that is by now an oft-cited reference point in research literature on the rebranding of cities. So-called iconic architecture has come to be viewed by boosterist agencies as a way of reviving the fortunes of cities, with architects commissioned to design bombastic, glassy buildings to serve as instantly recognizable symbols that will attract media and public attention sufficient to improve the image of urban centers. Such architecture is designed to offer both spectacular, distinctive façades and to house the "out-of-the ordinary"



The modern architecture of Vancouver: iconic high-rise glass condominiums

Source: Karen Wiley.

experiences that are attractive to an international class of tourists.

While maybe or maybe not physically dominating the surrounding landscape, icons are explicitly positioned relative to a visual consumer, considered either as the visitor standing in front of the building or, more likely, the viewer of an image of the architecture in the printed press, on television, or on film. Accordingly, a successful iconic building necessarily develops a strong association with place through an instantly recognizable form designed to be both distinctive and widely disseminated. It has also been observed that the emergence of a distinct aesthetic and language of “icons” reveals the aforementioned resonance between the architectural field and the desire of footloose globalized capitalist interests to give material form to their status and to extract surplus value from city spaces.

Recent research has sought to link the emergence of icons with the consolidation of a transnational elite of “starchitects,” high-profile architects whose globally oriented business models and prominence in public discourse situate them as a mobile, global elite whose capacity to define transnational spaces—such as parliament buildings, airports, galleries, major shopping developments, and sports stadiums—makes them much in demand. As suggested earlier, close links to place

making are, in one reading at least, definitive of architecture’s remit. Certainly how far architecture is, or is perceived to be, “rooted” in place has been one of the defining issues for architecture since its inception, and how meaningfully architect-designed buildings and spaces connect to local communities’ visions of place is explored by a number of urbanists who call for a reforging of architecture’s relationship to place.

Such calls echo the stance of critical regionalism, a popular refrain in architectural theory and, to a lesser extent, in practice in the 1980s and early 1990s. Critical regionalism was a reaction against the standardizing, “placeless” architecture associated with the high modernism of the international style, typified by skyscrapers in major financial centers. In seeking to defend the distinctive elements of place against the standardizing elements of capitalist process, this group of theorists was crucial to the emergence of vernacular architecture that sought to rejuvenate the relationship between the built environment and place through sensitivity to social and environment context, including for example a use of local material and styles, topographical integration of building, and the associated rejection of technocratic development and the domination of instrumentalized, profit-driven design and building technique. The potential of architecture as a resistant cultural form is an

important question in this context. Critical regionalism's defense of cultural particularism and use of appropriate technology in the face of perceived homogenization was particularly resonant in the context of postmodernism.

The architectural discourse of postmodernism served to reinvigorate discussion of architecture's social meaning, not least by opening up the potential for multiple readings of buildings and spaces, and by celebrating a plurality of stylistic traditions and incorporating "nonpedigreed" architecture into existing canons. In general terms, postmodern perspectives were underpinned by a commitment that architecture should become a more "opened" discourse and practice, with the spaces created by architecture reflecting a plurality of social standpoints and supporting a range of different ways of being in the city, generally emphasizing democratic rights to public space. The notion of multiple readings, crucial for postmodernism in general terms, rendered the architects' reading of the symbolism in their building as just one among many, which opened the way for playful architecture that challenged the relationship between signifier and signified (and architect and user). Accordingly, postmodernism sought to challenge elitist conceptions of architecture—as profession and social practice—that had been dominant in modernism, including the capacity of the architect to offer definitive "truths" about the correct use and interpretation of urban spaces. Critical scholars engaged with the postmodern debate sought to demonstrate the superficial nature of much of postmodern architecture's promise for new "open" spaces by drawing attention to the synergies between postmodern discourse—albeit as one that unquestionably did disrupt previously deeply held values and practices within architecture—and the recasting of long-standing compliances with the economically powerful.

A major challenge for urban researchers is to both maintain a sense of architects' position as a cultural elite working in definite urban political economies, while at the same time engaging with architecture's status as a socially resonant form that is loaded with social meaning. In other words, although overwhelmingly conceived and funded by dominant political and economic actors, the built forms of architecture become meaningful to

users and other citizens as markers of urban space and as reflections of a diverse range of social realities. At the same time, a primary focus on architecture's capacity to support diverse social meanings can often be at the expense of a deeper critique of the unequal power relations that underpin the social production of architecture. It is this ambiguous backdrop that means—far from being an unproblematic reflection of societal values—architecture reflects many of the tensions between elite and non-elite visions of urban space.

Paul Jones

See also Gendered Space; Landscapes of Power; Other Cities; Placemaking; Racialization; Urban Design; Urban Semiotics

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ASIAN CITIES

Asia extends from the Ural Mountains and Turkey eastward to the Pacific Ocean and includes the major island states along the western Pacific Rim. Asian cities are diverse in many major characteristics. The colonial era, particularly from the early nineteenth to the mid-twentieth century, produced a few common features among some larger cities. Decolonization, beginning in the 1940s, created new states and imprinted on the larger urban areas. The partition of the Indian subcontinent and the creation of Muslim Pakistan and Bangladesh had an impact on the cities. In Pacific Asia the emergence of socialist states in China, Vietnam, and elsewhere shaped distinctive urban land-use patterns. By the late twentieth century the escalating economic development of Asia had increased the recognizable international features of the majority of Asia's cities and accelerated the emergence of several giant megacities.

Asian Cities in History

Prior to World War II there was little analysis in the English language of Asian cities. However, throughout history, travelers regularly published descriptions of Asia's towns and cities. Marco Polo, the thirteenth-century Venetian trader, wrote of the Mongolian and Chinese towns he visited, though there is some dispute whether his story is told firsthand or is based on accounts by other travelers. He claimed to have visited Khanbaliq, present-day Beijing, the home of the Kublai Khan and capital of the Yuan Dynasty. Italo Cavallo has written a modern fictionalized account of Polo's journey.

Max Weber's writings in the first half of the twentieth century compared and contrasted the Occidental and the "Asiatic," or "Oriental," city, focusing mainly on China, India, and Japan. The sociologist Gideon Sjoberg drew extensively on Indian and Chinese urban histories in his conceptualization of the "preindustrial city." However, in general, Asian cities were marginal to the study of the evolving twentieth-century city.

The number of published analytical writings about Asian cities increased significantly in the

mid-twentieth century. The demise of colonialism and the emergence of new independent nations, including India, Pakistan, Indonesia, and Vietnam, saw an expansion of Western interest in Asian cities. Independence coincided with an escalation in the pace of urbanization, especially through the migration of rural residents to the emerging capital cities and the centers of commerce and trade.

The Dutch sociologist William Wertheim edited nineteenth-century Dutch writings on the Indonesian town, revealing the poor conditions of the cities, with their wealthy colonial enclaves and the wretched village housing of the native Javanese. Another growing source of writings on Asian cities was Asian regional geography texts. Authors such as J. E. Spencer included descriptive chapters on the populations and economies of Asian cities.

Historians writing about the emergence of cities in Asia began to emphasize the deep historical roots of some of Asia's cities. Anthony Reid drew attention to the significant urban history of Asia, highlighting a long urban tradition in a region that was generally seen as agriculture oriented, because of the interest in the wet rice cultivation systems. A distinction existed between Asia's "sacred" cities and "market" cities. Sacred cities such as Kyoto and Yogyakarta were shaped by rulers and their cosmological beliefs. Market cities, including Singapore, Shanghai, and Kolkata, were a product of their locations on major trade routes and hosted a cosmopolitan population of merchants and traders.

Contemporary Asian Cities

Around two thirds of the world's population live in Asia, which encompasses the two most populous nations, China and India. Both have well in excess of 1 billion inhabitants. Four other countries, Indonesia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Japan, have populations of over 100 million.

Rapid decolonization and the establishment of independent states followed the end of World War II. Attention turned to the formation of new states trying to meet the challenges of recovering from the colonial experience and building new societies, economies, and political infrastructure. The process of urbanization and the challenges of the cities became an increasing focus. By the last quarter of the twentieth century, the escalating integration of

many parts of Asia into the world economy meant that contemporary aspects of globalization became a dominant thread in urban scholarship. In parallel, postcolonial approaches and themes emerged as Asian writers became more prominent in exploring the features of Asian cities.

Urbanization

Urbanization is an outcome of rural–urban migration, fertility levels in cities, and boundary changes as cities grow and encroach upon the surrounding rural areas. Asian nations have urbanized at different rates. Singapore is an urban city-state, and the entire population of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region is urban. In general, the more economically developed nations have over half their populations living in cities. These include the Pacific Asian countries of Japan, the Republic of Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Mongolia, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines. Iran and Turkey also have more residents in urban than rural areas.

Less than half the people in China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand, Timor Leste (East Timor), and Vietnam live in urban areas. Similarly, cities account for under half the populations of Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.

The emergence of the Communist regime in Russia in 1917 influenced the shape and functions of Russian cities. Communist and socialist ideas spread throughout the Asian region from the 1930s onward. Socialist regimes were established in China in 1949, and later in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos, and had a great impact on cities.

Asia’s socialist regimes tried to slow the rates of urbanization in the period until economic reforms commenced in earnest in the early 1990s. By enforcing permit arrangements for moving to cities, such as the *hukou* in China, and controlling urban labor and housing markets and access to subsidized food, countries such as China and Vietnam slowed rural–urban migration to rates well below those of neighboring countries with market economies. However, the process was diluted when they embraced economic reform and entered into the

global economy, and the rate of rural–urban migration has increased in recent years.

Asia has hosted the growth of over half of the world’s megacities, or cities with populations of 10 million or more. In 2005 Tokyo, Osaka-Kobe, Mumbai, Delhi, Kolkata, Shanghai, Beijing, Jakarta, Dhaka, Karachi, and Manila comprised over half of the world’s 20 megacities. It is no coincidence that the megacities are located in countries with large populations: Japan, India, China, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan, and the Philippines.

There are several other large Asian cities that extend across formal urban boundaries and are, in effect, also of megacity size, including Istanbul, Bangkok, and Chongqing. Terry McGee has analyzed the growth of *desakota*, or extended metropolitan regions in which large cities effectively encompass and urbanize rural settlements around the periphery of the city, creating distinctive urban regions of considerable significance.

The Economy

Asian economies span a significant range. Japan, Singapore, and Brunei are in the high-income range. The two Koreas, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines, and a handful of western Asian countries (including Turkey, Iran, and Kazakhstan) are in the World Bank’s middle-income band. The remainder, including the largest countries of China, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, are low-income countries. The major cities have overall higher levels of income than do the rural areas, and higher proportions of middle- and upper-income earners. This results in urban–rural disparities, such as striking contrasts between the thriving cosmopolitan center of modern Shanghai and the impoverished rural regions of western China.

With relatively few exceptions, Asian economies in the 1950s struggled to develop and bring benefits to people in both rural areas and the cities. Many countries sought to establish new industries, initially based on models intending to replace imports with home-produced goods. Industries were encouraged to establish themselves in the major cities where infrastructure and a potential labor force were located. This strategy of industrialization faltered, and countries such as Singapore shifted their

orientation toward export-oriented industrialization. Contemporary industrial development has, in most instances, leapfrogged from inner-city locations to the areas around the major cities.

Industrialization absorbed only a small proportion of the available labor force in cities in Asia's less economically developed countries. The vast majority of migrants to the city work in the "informal sector," in microenterprises providing cheap goods and services. Metropolitan authorities frequently sought to suppress microenterprises, viewing them as inefficient and disruptive to the city. Others have pressed for more positive policy interventions, pointing out the need to provide employment for growing numbers of city workers and the low cost of the services microenterprises provide. At the instigation of the Bangladeshi economist Mohammad Yunus and the support of organizations such as the Grameen Bank, and more recently the Asian Development Bank, policies promoting the availability of low-cost finance for microenterprises have become more common.

A number of world cities are developing in Asia. High-order services in finance, management, law, and architecture support the location of head offices of significant global companies, giving them an important role in the global economy. Tokyo, Hong Kong, and Singapore are prime examples of Asian world cities. Seoul is the next level down. The third tier of world cities includes Jakarta, Osaka, Taipei, Bangkok, Beijing, Kuala Lumpur, Manila, and Shanghai.

All of the Asian world cities are located in Pacific Asia. No south or west Asian city features in the list. The major cities of the Indian subcontinent have not yet acquired sufficient world city functions, because they are situated in economies with limited global links. The consistent rates of economic growth in India mean that Delhi, Mumbai, and possibly Bangalore will be the most likely to achieve world city status within a decade.

Asian cities are developing strategies to strengthen their engagement in information industries. With the slowdown in the information technology economy in the United States, many Indian information technology workers returned to India, and especially to Bangalore, where they played a key role in stimulating the industry. Bangalore is regarded as a center of high-tech industry in India and is diversifying into biotechnology and nanotechnology

industries. Kuala Lumpur is now connected to the "multimedia supercorridor," which extends south of the city to the Kuala Lumpur International Airport in Sepang.

Society and Environment

Islam is the main religion of many large Asian countries, including Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, and Indonesia. Some Middle East urbanists highlight the historical and contemporary influence of Islam on the evolution of the city and attribute the problems of contemporary Islamic cities to the negative impact of colonialism. Critics such as Yasser Elsheshtawy reject this "narrative of loss" and highlight the significance of globalization in shaping modern cities.

Assertive postcolonial voices on Asia's cities have become prominent. Turkish Nobel Prize winner Orhan Pamuk has written autobiographically about Istanbul, drawing inspiration from its long history as the center of the Ottoman Empire. Its pivotal location on the strategic Bosphorus Strait provides the backdrop for the juxtaposition within the contemporary city of evolving modernity and a fading past. His family history provides a framework around which Istanbul's story is told.

Suketu Mehta's outstanding writing on Mumbai, the giant Indian city, explores the city's history and its underbelly. Through extended biographical profiles of criminal "black-collar workers," poets, and makers of popular culture, he fashions an eclectic picture of this sprawling metropolis.

The social characteristics of Asian cities are varied. Most cities have high proportions of the young. Singaporean and Japanese cities, in contrast, have aging populations. Youth in the cities are increasingly free of traditional constraints. They are vulnerable to the scourge of Western cities, the pockets of youth-centered urban drug cultures. However, the opportunities for progression through school and into university study have increased at a faster rate than have populations. A small but significant proportion of students go abroad to the United States and Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia to attend university and acquire the skills they hope will ensure them a place in the global knowledge economy. The Chinese and Korean governments have led the

way by strengthening local universities. Singapore has also attracted significant foreign universities to establish small campuses and research centers in the city in order to build local skills and attract foreign students to Singapore.

Urban housing issues have attracted much attention. Migration-driven urbanization meant cities absorbed large numbers of rural workers and their families. Spontaneous shantytowns and squatter settlements appeared across many Asian cities. Residents generally built their own houses, often from secondhand or scavenged materials, and seldom had security over land. There has been some softening of attitudes toward settlements in the past few decades.

The escalating economic growth within Pacific Asia has seen the expansion of urban megaprojects that are transforming the cities in China, Japan, and Singapore. New middle- and high-income housing developments are generally intrinsic parts of new complexes of offices catering to the financial, services, and high-tech industries. Transport developments featuring extensive freeways and rail developments have become common. The magnetically levitating train that connects Pudong Airport with Shanghai at speeds of around 430 kilometers (267 miles) per hour is an eye-catching example of new forms of urban transport servicing Asian cities.

Environmental issues are a significant concern throughout most of the Asian region. The environmental risk transition spotlights the changing relationship between people and the environment as cities develop and incomes rise. "Traditional" environmental risks decline over time, but "modern" environmental risks increase. Asian cities cluster in three locations across the model. In the most disadvantaged Asian cities the problems center on water quality and management. The most significant risk to human well-being is the lack of access to clean water for human consumption. The low-lying delta cities of Bangladesh have the added risks of frequent flooding caused by either rainfall in the upper reaches of the Ganges River or tidal and storm surges through the Bay of Bengal.

Planning and Management

Building urban management and planning frameworks has been challenged by the size and

rapid growth of Asia's principal cities, in addition to which so many are located in poor countries with limited financial and human resources. The problems being confronted range from the 2004 tsunami's devastation of cities in coastal regions of Sumatra and Sri Lanka, to the need to preserve Hanoi's architectural heritage in a period of rapid growth in urban investment. Looking forward, Asian urban planners will be at the cutting edge of urban change, as Shanghai's growth continues and the major cities along the Pacific Asian coast connect together into extensive mega urban regions. As Asia's urban population grows and the region's economies, particularly those of China and India, rapidly expand, the Asian city will attract greater world attention.

Dean Forbes

See also Hong Kong, China; Islamic City; Kolkata (Calcutta), India; Manila, Philippines; Megalopolis; Mumbai (Bombay), India; Delhi, India; Shanghai, China; Singapore; Squatter Movements; Tokyo, Japan; World City

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ATHENS, GREECE

Athens, the capital of modern Hellas (Greece), treaded a discontinuous itinerary reaching over six millennia, of which the classical period of the ancient city-state has time and again inspired the collective memory of Western cities. Athens stands



Parthenon at the Acropolis in Athens

Source: Vasilis Gavriliis.

between Occident and Orient and is considered a “theatre of memory,” combining ancient and modern, original and copy, informal and postmodern, tourism and romantic traveling, and involving personalities from Gustav Flaubert and Sigmund Freud to Simone de Beauvoir and Jacques Derrida. However, between today’s city of 3,187,734 inhabitants (Greater Athens 2001, 29 percent of the Greek population) or 3,761,810 if the broader Attica region is included, and the ancient city-state of the fourth century BC, there is a series of major discontinuities and interesting contrasts. As expected, there are certain constants in the landscape of cities in the same location: The multinucleated urban geography is centered on Athens and its port, Piraeus, and connected by Long Walls and then the railway, enclosed in the basin (*lekanopedio*) bounded by the Hymettus, Pendeli, Parnitha, and Aigaleo mountains and interspersed by seven hills, encircled by a multitude of other towns in the Attica region, *Demoi*, already since antiquity. These were all gradually connected and merged into one single agglomeration by the fast urbanization

waves of the twentieth century. Given the discontinuity of urban history, this entry uses a snapshot approach to the several metamorphoses of the city by “visiting” briefly four important periods during which Athens has become a prototype for urban geography: the ancient city-state, the artificial nineteenth-century capital city, the interwar prototype of Mediterranean fast urbanization, and the post-Olympic entrepreneurial city.

Classical Athens, Acropolis, and Agora

The first traces of life in Athens date from the fourth millennium BC, the late Neolithic period, but the cultural density of ancient or classical Athens has never been paralleled. The celebrated myth of the contest between the goddess Athena and god Poseidon for the patronage of the city, had Athena win and give the city-state her name and the sacred olive as a symbol. The Parthenon temple on the sacred rock of the Acropolis was dedicated to Athena, goddess of wisdom, with her large central statue inside and the evocative representations

of myths and processions in her honor in the Parthenon marble friezes. It was the major monument of a city-state that rose to hegemony for a mere 100 years, but still, it became a model for European—and indeed global—culture: language, political institutions, philosophy, drama, art, and architecture. This eternal “city of memory” inspired European geographical imaginations and reproduced global prototypes not only in archaeology or philosophy or cultural studies but in several fields, including urban studies.

After the sixth century BC, following a first wave of flowering of Greek culture in Ionian cities and especially Miletus in Asia Minor, classical Athens rose from a sea of tyranny, first defeating the Assyrians and then expelling its tyrant, Hippias, in 510 BC. Its short-lived civilization (510–404 BC) offered many of the advances and concepts of today’s European culture and global institutional discourse: Citizenship from “city” (*polis* from *polis*), the person participating in public life, in contradistinction from *idiotis*, the private person and the etymology for idiot, as in Marx’s “rural idiocy”; *polis*, policy, politics, *politismos*, that is, civilization; *theatron*, with “view” as its etymology; tragedy, comedy, philosophy, history; *geography* is a Greek word, too, though a later one, of the Hellenistic period (second century BC). The main thrust of classical culture was not commerce and material production but the quest for knowledge, advances in sexuality and politics—generally, reason, culture, and investigation rather than religion.

In the realm of politics, Athens offered the word, the theory, and the practice of *demokratia*, “democracy.” The etymology comes from *demos/demoi*, local communities surrounding the city-state. According to Aristotle, the union or community (*koinonia*) of *Demoi* was the full *polis*—a society, a community, and a state. The words *polis/politeia/politis* (i.e., city/citizenship/citizen) have a common root and denote urbanism in a positive light. This legitimizes the introduction of “citizenship” on multiple spatial levels, as we do today, using it in connection with the urban, the national, and now the European level—despite its etymology based on the *city*. Planning also centered on the city by definition—*polis/poleodomia* (i.e., city/town planning)—and classical architecture contributed the Doric and Ionian orders, while later

the Corinthian order emerged in Corinth. The harmonic rules for building were perfected in the Acropolis temples, especially the Parthenon, built by Ictinos and Callicrates in the age of Pericles and inaugurated in 432 BC. Hippodamus from Miletus introduced the “hippodamian system” of urban design there and also in Piraeus and Rhodes: A checkerboard of equality engraved on the urban landscape represented democracy on the ground and in effect introduced modern urban design.

The ancient city-state was centered on the *agora*, the *forum*, the urban public space where direct democracy and citizenship were concretized (*civitas, politeia*). Ideas and policies were debated here in the citizens’ assembly without any censorship. Decisions were made by all eligible “citizens” rather than just their representatives, and every man (but no women) participated, irrespective of income, property, or rank. Leaders were elected to office only to carry out the people’s will. Pericles was not a ruler but the city’s leading citizen, who was elected annually. The *agora* was much more than physical space (*urbs*: Latin) or a “speakers’ corner” or an open space for strolling. It literally meant “marketplace,” where commerce was centered, but it was actually a complex space of mixed uses and intense social interaction. In the *agora*, the Acropolis, and the city at large, the interpenetration of nature and culture was harmonized in classical architecture by the in-between space of the colonnade, the *stoa*, a pathway of columns open to the outside but also connected with the inside through the roof of the relevant building bordered by the *stoa*.

This was the landscape in which classical civilizations developed. Citizenship and participation in a real, natural city were considered as a precondition of civilization and the essence of democracy. However, among the three claims of citizenship in modernity, the city-states of antiquity respected two: the right to voice, to express (democratization); and the right to human flourishing; but *not* the right to difference. In this, classical Athens was a weak democracy in many senses. Citizenship was bounded by gender, territoriality, and social exclusion—of women, slaves, and “barbarians,” or noncitizens. It was actually this exclusion of the “others” from citizenship and the army that constituted the main weakness of the Athenian democracy and its

difference from both the Macedonian period and the Roman Empire. Rome established a decentralized administrative mechanism and a multicultural army and respected local cultures. Emperor Hadrian lived in Athens occasionally and constructed Hadrian's gate, the library by the Roman Forum in the city center, and an admirable aqueduct, which was revived in the nineteenth century and relieved water shortages in Athens for a while. In classical Athens, by contrast, the social exclusion of noncitizens would soon backfire, as citizens became vulnerable to attacks by noncitizens during the Peloponnesian wars. After flowering for a mere century, Athens surrendered to the Spartans by 404 BC, the Long Walls to Piraeus were demolished, and democracy was shattered by the regime of the 30 tyrants.

Neoclassical Athens

Athens followed Aegina and Nafplion as the capital of Hellas after independence from Ottoman rule (according to the 1830 London Protocol) and has been one of the most successful experiments of creation of an artificial capital on a global scale. In 1834 it was declared the capital of the new Greek Kingdom, was rebuilt with modern urban design and neoclassical architecture, and metamorphosed from a deserted village of 12,000 inhabitants during the last years of Ottoman rule, into a bustling city of 242,000 inhabitants at the turn of the twentieth century (1907). The creation of the new capital was successful, despite negative forecasts and an interesting debate about the rivalry between Athens—then a village—and cosmopolitan Constantinople as symbols of Hellenism.

Urban colonization of the Greek territory via urban planning started in Athens through Bavarian planning by royalty, their architects, and planning teams. The physical process of building a capital with neoclassical architecture was also an intellectual itinerary in the fragments of history that would constitute a coherent narrative, or perhaps rather iconography, forging national identity by connecting the present with antiquity and its material manifestation in classical architecture. The core of the city obtained its celebrated iconic neoclassical "Athenian trilogy"—university, academy, library—as well as other monumental buildings, generously funded by the "great national donors." These were

affluent diaspora Greeks located throughout places of "unredeemed" Hellenism, who sponsored conspicuous monuments and public buildings.

One main reason for legitimation of Bavarian design on the level of the local societies was the echo of classical Hellas. Neoclassical architecture returned to the birthplace of classicism via European cities and became crucial in the process of construction of a new national Greek identity. Athens was mostly built by Bavarians, but the buildings were "naturalized" by the inhabitants and the modern Greek nation, because of their familiar classical forms. This has facilitated the reception of European design trends imported especially by Bavarians and, even more important, has undermined colonial domination, despite the character of nineteenth-century Athens as a colonial city.

A second reason for legitimation of Bavarian planning was its departure from irregular Ottoman or Mediterranean models. An interesting aspiration was the recovery of Hellenism through the "de-turkization" of Greek towns via regular plans in the tradition of the "hippodamian" system, yet another classical heritage. However, orthogonal grids, straight streets, and regular town squares were rarely realized. The Athens plan has been revised more than 3,000 times, due to pressures from local landowners. Citizens have objected to the methods of implementation of the plans they themselves had asked for and criticized planners who constructed a virtual city, the unreal landscape represented on blueprints, which has been exciting and at times menacing—as, for example, in the momentary risk of having the Acropolis incorporated in the royal palace as a *décor*, in accordance with Schinkel's plan drawn by a man who never visited Athens.

Neoclassicism, "de-turkization," and cosmopolitanism were all aspects of an underlying Greek "dualism," wherein modernity was underplayed in urban cultural discourse, overshadowed by debates over cosmopolitanism versus tradition or nationalism, which also cut through language, creating bilingualism. Alternating acceptance of, and resistance to, Westernization has been the main contradiction in the past—at present, Europeanization has put all this to rest. Power plays were stirred by the "protective powers," who intervened in several spheres, from political

life to archaeological excavations and the plundering of Hellas's past. The Acropolis remained a contested monument of collective memory with unceasing conflicts over "property" and appropriation. The Parthenon marbles—all pediments, friezes, metopes, and even more—were smuggled to England in 1805 by Lord Elgin and are now standing at the British Museum.

Conspicuous neoclassical monuments and civic architecture in the midst of unpaved streets and rudimentary infrastructure revealed the contradictions of urban development. The monumentalization of Athens and the revival of the Olympic Games in 1896 came up three years after the national bankruptcy in 1893 and just before a humiliating defeat in 1897 by the Ottoman Empire. As in other nineteenth-century cities, pomp and monumentalization in Athens in the midst of decline counteracted it on the symbolic level.

Interwar Athens

Interwar Athens during the 1920s and the 1930s became a prototype of Mediterranean rapid urbanization after the arrival of refugees from Asia Minor in 1922, and since then it has been restructured to a major agglomeration and a typical Mediterranean metropolitan center growing by urbanization without industrialization. Informal work and informal housing, *afthereta*, built on the urban periphery by migrants and the poor on land where it was illegal to build, became one of the major issues (if not the dominant one) in public policy (non)responses and urban social movements. From 1922 until the 1970s, urban poverty went in parallel with precarious owner-occupation in illegal self-built shacks, which improved as the family income grew. These were finally controlled by the dictatorial government (1967–1974) by force (demolitions) and consent (legalizations). Meanwhile, it had solved the housing problem for many internal migrants, workers, and the poor.

First the refugee arrival and then rural–urban migrants to Athens have established the basic axes of spatial segregation since the 1920s: Inside/outside the official city plan was a duality also echoed in inner city/outskirts, but also east/west of the agglomeration, concentrating middle/working classes, respectively. Spontaneous urban development

and social segregation created a cityscape antithetical to the Anglo-American one, that is, an inverse-Burgess model. Already in the 1920s a southwest–northeast axis emerged in the Athens agglomeration, defining the contrast between the elegant architecture of bourgeois buildings proliferating around the center and the sector to the northeast, on the one hand, and the shacks and lack of adequate urban infrastructure, especially along the western ring of the city, on the other.

A central feature of the mode of housing production in bourgeois and popular suburbs was "self-building" (*aftostegasi*), under the responsibility and the supervision of each family. The inner city, by contrast, was built to be very compact by middle- and upper-class land plot owners and entrepreneurs in a piecemeal manner: Multistory apartment buildings, *polykatoikies*, were produced by a system of exchange arrangements (*antiparochi*) on land provided by the landowning family in exchange for some flats. The overheated construction sector and speculation on land demolished pieces of neoclassical architecture and urban heritage and erased several layers of urban history. Only the "Athenian trilogy" stood in the center, and of course the sacred rock of the Acropolis remained a focal point for the city in the midst of increasing urban densities.

In 1933 Athens became the cradle of modernism, hosting the pioneers of modernity in architecture and town planning, which was discursively established with the Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne ([CIAM]; International Congress of Modern Architecture) manifesto: *The Charter of Athens*, written by Le Corbusier and his colleagues, was drafted during the CIAM conference in Athens. Modern architects also admired the Acropolis and the archaeological sites. These were landscaped after the war and remained the object of clashing narratives and power conflicts over property and appropriation, as in the nineteenth century. The Acropolis has been as much a European, or rather global, construction as a Greek monument, and it became the symbol of appropriation and conquest of the city itself. The Germans flew the Swastika flag on the Acropolis when they occupied Athens, and the same flag was taken down and destroyed in a notorious act of resistance by Manolis Glezos and Apostolos Santas on May 31, 1941.

Independence from German occupation followed three years later, on October 12, 1944. A bloody civil war followed, starting with the bloody Sunday of December 3, 1944, in Athens, when a large popular demonstration faced governmental and allied forces' assault and gunfire. The civil war then raged in the mountains, and urban guerilla clashes went on in the narrow city streets of Athens and Piraeus refugee quarters, where in the 1930s an important labor movement had emerged and in the 1940s an underground resistance movement erupted. Since the period of German occupation, Athens had become a refuge from retaliations in rural Hellas, and politically induced internal migration formed the first post-war wave of massive urbanization toward Athens. In the years that followed, rural-to-urban migration escalated and increased the Greater Athens population from 453,042 in 1920 to 1,124,109 in 1940, 1,852,709 in 1961 and as high as 3,016,457 in 1981, when the capital concentrated about one third of the Greek population. After Greece's accession to the European Union in 1981, internal migration to Athens slowed, and by the 1990s it had stabilized.

Post-Olympic Entrepreneurial Athens

Post-Olympic and entrepreneurial Athens for the last decade at the turn of the new millennium—a decade starting around the 1996 unsuccessful bid for the “Golden Olympics” and culminating during the 2004 Olympics—belongs to an era of European urban development where neoliberal governance and globalization stir and reproduce urban competition. Athens has remained a tourist city recovering from a major slump during the 1990s. The postmodern collage in its landscape and society predominated long before there was such a label, until the present when the city has seen several foreign migrant quarters while adopting entrepreneurial city marketing (on occasion of mega-events) and postmodern iconic architecture. Its sprawling landscape stretched to an ecological footprint, reaching up to the Evinos River in Fokida, as far as 500 kilometers (310 miles) to the northwest of Athens. Before this conduit for the transportation of water to Athens was completed in 2001, there was a succession of infrastructural works: the Marathon dam, built 1926

to 1931 in Attica; the Yliki Lake pumping station, built 1957 to 1958 in Beotia; and the dam and reservoir constructed in the Mornos Lake in Fokida, in the 1980s. The commodification of nature created by a thirsty growing city is well illustrated by the enormous expansion of its ecological footprint.

The inner city prides itself of iconic architecture built on occasions of major international events, especially the 2004 Olympics. Calatrava's stadium faces the Acropolis with the audacity of postmodernism, following the much-criticized volume of the modernist Hilton Hotel, built in the 1960s. The literature on mega-events now includes Athens as the host of the Olympics “returning to their birthplace” just over a century after their revival in the same city. The dual focus of cities in similar occasions—planned revival of local heritage for visibility on the one hand, and global references in cosmopolitan architecture and innovative design, on the other—has gravitated toward the latter in the case of Athens. The city was “globalized” by structures built by celebrity architects in various locations, as well as new transport infrastructure: the international airport, the ring motorway of *Attiki odos*, the Athens metro, and an extended suburban railway system expanding to Corinth and later to Kiato. This infrastructure has been constructed in the context of a new model of urban governance in the entrepreneurial city, which is now Athens, through public–private partnerships.

The mega-event created a new set of urban dynamics and a new wave of urban sprawl. Illegal urban sprawl continued in Attica, though by different social classes. Increasing population and industry followed new infrastructure created in anticipation of the 2004 Olympics. Attica has been gradually merged with the Athens basin into one major agglomeration, bustling with businesses in mixed-use areas around the new international airport, as well as socially segregated communities, second residences turned to main ones, and leapfrog developments. Many urbanized areas, however, lacked water runoff and sewage systems. Illegal building continued in a new speculative—rather than popular—guise, cooperatives created settlements, and highways leading out of the compact city were surrounded by sprawling activities and created surface sealing at the expense of traditional vineyards

in Attica, that have been there since antiquity. Changes in the landscape are thus destroying a lot of “nature,” wherever the ecological footprint of Athens reaches.

Culture, by contrast, has been protected—though not that of all epochs, as Athens grew by construction through destruction of its neoclassical heritage. In European imaginations, or even global ones, Athens is the standard of civilization in the abstract sense, but only on the basis of antiquity. The Acropolis has remained a global symbol, perceived in different ways through space-time. The overwhelming presence of the Parthenon as an icon of European civilization and American republicanism, has lasted since the Renaissance in Europe and since Thomas Jefferson’s cities, built in classical and Hellenistic styles and accompanied by the discourse for democracy and equality in the United States. Today’s city, by contrast, is not considered up to the standards of European modernity. And indeed Athens has destroyed many layers of history that rendered it a “theatre of memory,” according to Mike Crang and Penny Travlou, or in effect a “city,” but has been living its own history, retaining a postmodern collage in its landscape of spontaneous urbanization and informality, which solved problems of homelessness and unemployment, even if temporarily, before new foreign migrant waves transformed the city of the new millennium.

Lila Leontidou

See also Acropolis; Agora; Mediterranean Cities; Other Cities

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B

BACK-TO-THE-CITY MOVEMENT

Popularized in academia by Shirley Bradway Laska and Daphne Spain in the title of their widely referenced book *Back to the City: Issues in Neighborhood Renovation* (1980), the term *back to the city* became one of the keywords of the 1980s and 1990s literature on neighborhood revitalization and gentrification in the United States. It refers to households moving back to urban neighborhoods after many years of suburban life. The term focuses more on people and their preferences rather than on neighborhoods or the housing market. Of particular interest are newly formed families or young couples, many of whose parents had left cities decades earlier, returning to the city from the suburbs.

In many instances, though, rather than people literally returning, what occurred was that urban neighborhoods became viable alternatives to the suburbs and places of choice for certain types of households. More and more people seemingly preferred to live close to work, spend time outside the home, have easy access to cultural amenities and events, acknowledge the character of urban neighborhoods by investing in old buildings, and live in socially mixed communities. Promoters of this trend argued, in effect, that the assets of urban living outweighed the conveniences of suburban living. Moreover, they pointed to the costs of suburban life, including commuting to the city for work but also low-density development and social isolation.

The overall extent and significance of the back-to-the-city movement in the residential decisions of households have been points of controversy in the literature. Furthermore, the argument is criticized on the basis that the underlying explanation relies mainly on empirical findings based on demographic changes and preference patterns; that is, it focuses too much on the consumption side of urban neighborhood revitalization. Such an approach is criticized for ignoring the economic and political dynamics that led to the production of those neighborhoods as well as the role played by various actors, such as developers and local government. The counterargument has been that the emergence of these new consumers of urban life represents a profound change in the labor market and the lifestyle trends of young professionals. Thus, the back-to-the-city movement is a spatial reflection of new residential choices that people make in response to emerging social, political, and economic conditions and, thus, an indicator of future urban prosperity.

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See also Downtown Revitalization; Gentrification

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BANLIEUE

The *banlieue* refers to the area surrounding a French city, commonly used in reference to Paris. The word *faubourg* also means “lying outside the city,” but now it commonly refers to areas in central Paris that were incorporated early into the city. There is an implicit tendency to compare the banlieues with the American suburbs, but there are important differences. In the United States the word *suburb* carries a positive connotation associated with private property, middle-class ease, low-density population, and an overall high quality of life. In contrast, the immediate connotation of the French *banlieue* and its inhabitants, the *banlieue-sards*, is one of overcrowded public housing, people of color, new immigrants, and crime. It is something closer to the stereotype of the ghetto in the United States; what is common to the French banlieue and the American ghetto are the aspects of categorical inequality, exclusion from the labor market, and social boundaries resulting in residential segregation. Today, the word *banlieue* carries a negative connotation; yet this hardly approximates the complex history and social reality of these spaces.

History of the Banlieue

The importance of the banlieue can be fully understood only in a historical perspective and in relation to the city to which it is a periphery. Like many medieval cities, Paris was a walled city for defensive purposes. As the city grew, new walls were constructed, totaling six. In the years preceding the French Revolution a new wall was built, but this time it was built mainly for taxation purposes. The wall demarcated Paris proper. Its doors included custom posts, and everyone entering or leaving with commercial goods had to pay a tax or right of passage called the *octroi*. This physical barrier to free trade and mobility—*mur d’octroi*—created a real boundary between those living inside (*intra-muros*) and those living outside (*extra-muros*), which had economic consequences for trade and production. Consequently the cost of living was lower outside Paris than inside, resulting in an early division between a large fraction of the labor force settling in the banlieue and consumers,

visitors, financiers, and administrators living inside the city walls.

In the ancient regime, the Parisian banlieue contained vast open areas where the nobility of Paris and Versailles went to spend time surrounded by nature. This taste was acquired by many *arrivistes* of the French bourgeoisie and the petite bourgeoisie, who would go to the green banlieue during the weekends as a sign of distinction, as told in short stories by Guy de Maupassant and depicted by Jean Renoir in his celebrated film *Une Partie de Campagne* (1936). But as more people built houses in these idyllic lands, the banlieues were quickly transformed from forests into suburban and then urban areas. The remaining forests of Vincennes and the Bois de Boulogne are protected and have been annexed by the city.

After the French Revolution of 1789, the Constitutional Assembly decreed the limits of Paris to be a circle with a circumference determined by a radius of three leagues (*lieues*) around the center, which was set at Notre Dame Cathedral. In 1841, the politician Adolphe Thiers ordered the construction of a new set of walls and custom tower to be surrounded by a zone where it was forbidden to build. In 1860 the city was expanded by Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann, and taxes continued to be levied. In this expansion Paris officially engulfed *l’ancienne banlieue*, which included the communes of Batignolle, Belleville, Bercy, Passy, la Villette, and other neighboring areas. The Paris octroi was instituted in these communes. This forced many industries to move out of the new city borders for fiscal reasons; many workers followed. The most developed and industrialized external communes also charged octroi to raise funds for local infrastructure and spending, whereas poorer banlieues did not in order to give tax incentives to attract industry and population. The octroi of Paris and its surrounding metropolitan area was not abolished until 1943, during the German occupation, when it was substituted with a sales tax.

As the density of Paris increased, the city looked to the banlieue to locate its new cemeteries and public parks. In 1887 a large building was constructed—a *dépôt de mendicité*—to house Parisian mental patients, homeless, vagabonds, and aged people and to imprison women in the exterior commune of Nanterre. In 1897 this building was turned into a hospital. Today this building offers

shelter to the very poor of the region and to newly arrived immigrants.

Continuous Need for Housing

The Paris region has always been the destiny of many internal and international migrants. Female workers from the provinces, Spain, and then Africa would live in servant apartments, *chambres de bonnes*, atop bourgeois buildings in western Paris, while the high cost of living and the limited housing in Paris forced members of the working class to move to the eastern end of the city (formerly the industrial area) and to its banlieues. Industrialization led to a large rural-to-urban migration.

The painter, architect, and urbanist Charles-Édouard Jeanneret, also called Le Corbusier (1887–1965), published the influential books *Towards a New Architecture* (1923) and *The Radiant City* (1935), in which he sketched and proposed planned, rational, and utopian residential complexes formed by many large housing projects. His work would influence the construction of public housing and large public works in Brasília, the new capital of Brazil; Co-op City in New York; the Robert Taylor Homes in Chicago; and the many cities built in banlieues throughout France that house thousands of people in areas that offer very little employment and industry, in contrast to the area of La Defense, in a banlieue west of Paris, which in 2008 provided 150,000 jobs but housed only 20,000 residents. The project of La Defense was launched in 1958 in order to make Paris the capital of Europe and to attract transnational corporations. The plan succeeded in the latter, but it failed to reproduce the mixed use and busy public areas that are found in downtown Paris.

Following a public scandal about the *mal lotis*—people who had acquired and built in new lots in the banlieue that lacked any public services like water, roads, electricity, or gas—in 1914 the socialist politician Henri Sellier (1883–1943) pushed for the creation of *habitations à bon marché* (HBM), affordable housing. A number of HBMs are built around the city in the area where the Thiers wall was laid. Between 1921 and 1939 the HBM administration built garden-cities (*cités-jardin*) inspired by the British urbanist Ebenezer Howard. In 1935 the architect and urbanist Maurice Rotival introduced the term *grandes ensembles*, which corresponds to

“the projects” in the United States, to refer to a set of large public housing buildings to house multiple families that share common areas. Among the most famous HBMs is *La Cité de la Muette* in Drancy, built between 1931 and 1935, which was used as a Jewish internment camp during the German occupation, leading to the death of over 67,000 deportees.

At the end of World War II, *îlots insalubres*, slums in the construction-free zone around the Thiers wall, were replaced with modernist housing projects. After Algeria’s independence in 1962 and the migration to France of *pied noirs* (White colonists), Jewish people formerly living in Algeria, and *harkis* (Muslims who had fought on the French side), the French state decided to house the new arrivals in projects in remote banlieues of Paris, Marseille, and Lyon.

In 1964 there was a public scandal surrounding the *bidonville de Champigny*, a slum that housed more than 10,000 Portuguese in conditions of extreme poverty an hour away from the luxuries of Paris. Many Algerians lived in similar conditions. To appease public opinion the Debré law was passed to improve the conditions of the migrant workers explicitly to prevent them from leaving and thus hindering the reconstruction and growth of France from 1945 to 1975, a period that came to be known as *Les Trente Glorieuses* or “The Glorious Thirty.” Provisional housing was provided for Maghrebi workers. The SONACOTRA was created in 1956 in order to provide more formal housing to these new immigrants from Algeria and their families.

Although the state opposed the creation of ghettos, the political opposition from the richest quarters inside and outside Paris pushed for the concentration of immigrants in certain distant and poor banlieues. This has resulted in a durable inequality due to the lack of access to quality education and good jobs. This is why many inhabitants of these stereotypical areas of the banlieues live off unemployment and other social benefits. In order to address these inequities, special education zones (*zones d’éducation prioritaire*) were created in 1981 to dedicate more funds to education in certain “sensitive areas.”

The rise of the welfare state along with the increasing cost of living in Paris led to the construction of subsidized public housing (*habitations*

à loyer modéré). French workers from Paris and the province lived there first, but there was an eventual involuntary conversion to relative majorities of immigrant workers, many from former colonies, despite the fact that laws stand against the concentration of more than 15 percent of a given group in order to explicitly prevent the creation of urban ghettos such as those in the United States, something deeply feared and disdained by the French. Originally, the heavy concentration of the French working class, many coming from other regions of France and Europe, led to the appearance in certain banlieues of the so-called red banlieue, where the communist and socialist mayors were often elected. According to some hypotheses this hegemony changed after the Communist Party failed to incorporate the large arrival of new immigrants into its local agenda and thus lacked their complete support. What the French failed to see is that social networks, unemployment, and solidarity bring underrepresented groups together to survive strong labor market discrimination, spatial segregation, and social exclusion.

Borders of Distinction and Exclusion

In 1943 the idea of the *boulevard périphérique*, an expressway around the city, was conceived with the explicit purpose of making sure that the boundary between Paris and the growing banlieue would be clearly drawn. In 1954 the project was launched and built along HBMs in the zone formerly reserved for the Thiers wall.

Many French banlieues still give testimony to their past as old provincial villages that have been engulfed by the growing metropolitan area and thus share many a common element: train station, public square, church, city hall, stores, restaurants, private houses, and *cités* close by, with buses going farther inside into the banlieue and with green areas not far from reach. Day-to-day experiences of the banlieuesards often contrast sharply with the stereotypes held by many Parisians. The movie *La Haine* (Hatred), directed by Mathieu Kassovitz, presents a powerful metaphor but an exaggerated representation of life in the banlieue. It draws attention to the issue of police violence and broad discrimination, but it helps to reproduce the negative stereotype. *L'Esquive* (in its English version, *Games of Love and Chance*) of Abdellatif Kechiche does a

much better job of portraying the everyday life of young banlieuesards.

In 1947 Jean-François Gravier published *Paris et le désert français* (*Paris and the French Desert*), in which he blamed Paris for devouring all the resources, talent, and wealth from the whole country and, one could add, the French colonies. This centralization of power, influence, and resources will end in the symbolic desertification of the whole of France unless something is done to build industry in the provinces and to decentralize public functions and priorities. Even Haussmann was concerned about a luxuries center surrounded by a proletariat ring of workers that it could not house. Thus, more than talking about the poverty and lack of the banlieue, one has to talk about the overconcentration of wealth in western Paris and the continuous gentrification of the city. As many French thinkers have warned, France in the twenty-first century risks becoming a city museum for 2 million of its richest inhabitants and to the millions of tourists who visit it every year, oblivious to the backstage that is the banlieue, which they perhaps see only as they pass through it from the airport to their hotels.

Among other things, the work of sociologist Loïc Wacquant stresses the diversity among the different French banlieues. This is something important to keep in mind given the differences between western banlieues, which include areas like La Defense, Bois Colombes, or Neuilly (where current French President Nicolas Sarkozy was mayor for many years), and stigmatized and heavily populated *cités*, such as La Courneuve or Sarcelles.

The lived space and experiences of the *franciliens* (Parisians and banlieuesards, inhabiting the *Île de France*) goes beyond obsolete political and administrative boundaries. In the end the banlieues are an integral part of Paris because much of its work and daily life are done in the backstage of the banlieue without which the Parisian front-stage could not hold. Thus one cannot talk about the Parisian banlieue without talking about Paris, and in the same way one cannot talk seriously about Paris without taking its banlieues into account; the same holds for other major Francophone cities.

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See also *Favela*; Ghetto; Paris, France

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BARCELONA, SPAIN

Located in the region of Catalonia in northeast Spain, Barcelona is the second largest city in Spain, with a population of around 1,600,000 in 100 square kilometers. Largely as a result of the regeneration processes of the 1980s that culminated in the 1992 Olympic Games, Barcelona has become renowned internationally for its postindustrial urban restructuring planning. Indeed, the “Barcelona model” of regeneration is often held to be exemplary in repositioning the city in the global economy and balancing economic outputs with sociocultural goals.

Industrialization and Expansion

The actual urban morphology of Barcelona is based strongly on its transformation and expansion toward a modern city in the mid-nineteenth century. In this period, Barcelona suffered from three basic problems. First, though industrialization and demographic growth were already taking place in the first half of the century, the city was constrained within its medieval walls until 1860. Second, despite becoming the industrial center of Spain, it lacked any political influence on state politics. And third, industrialization and growth were accomplished through local capital, but there was not a strong and consolidated financial industry. These problems reflected directly on how the city developed. Almost any attempt to improve the city and create the conditions for fixing capital flows in town has necessarily implied resorting to attracting nation-state government support and

capital through events. Thus, the evolution of the city is linked to big events (e.g., the Universal Exposition of 1888 or the International Exposition of 1929) or aborted ones (Popular Olympics of 1936, Expo of 1982). These events were usually catalyzers for developing broader planning projects (e.g., Cerdà, 1860; Macià, 1932; General Metropolitan Plan, 1976). In this sense, it is no wonder that contemporary city councils have been using events such as the Olympics and the Forum 2004 for the same purposes.

Modern Urban Development

Barcelona's urban development has been characterized primarily by three moments: (1) the approval in 1860 of the Cerdà Plan to guide the expansion of the city outside its medieval walls, (2) the chaotic urban and economic growth during the years of Spanish dictatorship, and (3) the Olympic-led regeneration once democracy had returned.

The Cerdà Plan

The first stages of Barcelona's modern development began with the implementation of the Cerdà Plan, beginning in 1860. This was a plan that conceived the city as a reticular grid based on three modern, functional, and pioneering principles: hygienism, circulation, and planning growth outside the city borders. Although the plan contained many progressive ideas for the time it was envisioned, some of them disappeared in the construction of *l'Eixample* (the neighborhood around Barcelona's Old Town) as a result of the pressures of speculative real estate. Yet, this grid and the Cerdà Plan are the bases of Barcelona's twentieth-century urbanism.

Franco Dictatorship and Porciolismo

The second key moment for Barcelona's urbanism came with the arrival of a fascist regime in 1939. After a long postwar and international isolation that ended in the 1950s, the collapse of the Spanish state was avoided by the first and possibly last successful International Monetary Fund structural adjustment plan (1957–1959). This adjustment was followed by years of disordered growth for Spain, where Barcelona was one of the main



Las Ramblas—a pedestrian mall—and surrounding Barcelona

Source: Ralf Roletschek.

industrial poles. Industrialization, immigration (from other parts of Spain), and automobiles become the cornerstones of Barcelona development and policy. This model of urbanization was called *Porciolismo*, after José María Porcioles, the mayor of Barcelona from 1957 to 1973. Porcioles's reign gave shape to three basic characteristics: First, the growth pattern of the city matched the anarchic capitalism of that period, which was based on the rapid industrialization. The new factories were producing low-quality manufactured goods for the domestic market through labor-intensive processes. The city was transformed through chaotic sprawl and destruction, high-rise housing, and expressways to accommodate the factories and the labor force and to allow the flow of commodities and commuters. Second, this constructionist fervor characterized the city elites, property developers who became wealthy through

a combination of land purchasing and high-density building. The final characteristic was its metropolitan conception. These processes started in the city but quickly spread to the goal of building *la Gran Barcelona*.

Franco Opposition and Neighborhood Movements

However, the particular form of urbanism that represented *Porciolismo* sowed the seeds for change. The speculative construction of Barcelona was critical in creating and being the instrument of opposition to the fascist regime at the local level. The opposition to the Franco government was mainly urban and consolidated during the 1960s, first in the universities and then in the workplace and neighborhoods. The opposition was formed by different clandestine organizations that included

political parties (left wing, nationalistic, or both), unionism, and neighborhood movements. From this mix, contestation took several forms and produced what would be the future democratic leaders of Barcelona and Catalonia. Though these leaders were mostly but not exclusively university academics and middle-class men, there were strong working-class movements as well.

Neighborhood associations have been important players in Barcelona's urban politics since the 1970s. They began forming in the late 1960s and eventually connected with labor and political movements, which included the help of critical urbanists and architects. During the early 1970s, opposition to the Franco regime and neighborhood associations wisely used the opportunities and forms of the reform of the planning tools of the city to set a more rational and less speculation-friendly spatial ordering. Yet, the crucial moment was with the presentation of the General Metropolitan Plan (GMP) in 1974. Its inception was a response to the anarchic growth model of *Porciolismo*: the saturation and collapse of greater Barcelona. Opposition movements, mostly neighborhood associations, and a new generation of urbanists and activists recently graduated from university were involved in the planning effort, as some became civil servants. Financial capital holders and developers in the city interpreted the first draft of the GMP as a socialist plan completely against their interests. For two years they attempted to change it, using direct influence on the political system (in fact, the key political figures were among them), media lobbying, and legal procedures. However, their lobby clashed with the FAVB (Federació d'Associacions de Veïns i Veïnes de Barcelona), who used nonviolent means to fight speculation, private transport, and breaches by developers. The final approbation came in 1976 (after Franco's death). It was the first partial victory for changing the layout of the city. The final GMP put, if not a stop, then a break to high-density speculation in the city, opened spaces for the construction of infrastructure in the neighborhoods built during the 1960s, and rationalized the industrial space in the metropolitan area

Post-Franco Years

Two years after the death of Franco in 1975, the first democratic elections were held and a

commission was created to write a new Spanish constitution, which was approved in 1978. Spain was attempting to relocate itself in Europe, both economically and politically, and to consolidate democracy. Democracy was threatened on February 23, 1981, with a failed coup d'état. Integration into the European Economic Community came in 1986. In sum, the central administration had to modernize the country and show it internationally. In this context, the 1980s were a period of intensive devolution of the nation-state. If Barcelona and Catalonia had historically difficult relations with Spain and its central government, this antagonistic relationship was renewed with nation-state devolution to regional governments. On the one hand, the regional government was dominated from the first elections in 1980 until 2003 by a Right-nationalistic coalition. On the other hand, the city council had been dominated since the first elections by a coalition of left-wing parties. Tensions were apparent in 1987, when the Catalan regional government abolished the left-dominated Metropolitan Corporation of Barcelona (in a move similar to Thatcher's dismantling of the Greater London Authority). Thus, to implement any major project, the city council had to deal with both administrations, which had different agendas and were suspicious of the city for different reasons.

Olympic Games: A Strategy for Urban Renewal

In these circumstances, Barcelona not only has had to handle the transformation from an industrial to a postindustrial city, but importantly to fit itself into this conflictive scenario. A first step taken in the late 1970s and early 1980s was also characterized by small-scale (relatively inexpensive) interventions in the city, including demolition of old dwellings, "sponged" reurbanization (small public spaces in high-density areas), and social housing. But that was not enough to redefine the city in better terms, and the city council's strategy led as well to a particular politics of engagement in the city. Hosting the Olympic Games was a strategy for regenerating Barcelona through the support of the central and regional government. It is within this framework of interscalar conflict and with the aim of implementing and improving the GMP that the Olympics took form. Nevertheless,

the Olympic Games were not a new idea. The first attempt to bring the Olympic Games to Barcelona was during the Second Republic, when the city lost its bid against Berlin. Before launching the second bid, the support of the International Olympic Committee president, Juan Antonio Samaranch, was obtained, and the strategy fit with other interests, such as the willingness of the Spanish socialist government to show how modern Spain had become and the aim of the nationalist regional government to promote the Catalan identity internationally. Its primary goal was different from the 1980s Olympic Games: neither national promotion (Moscow 1980 and Seoul 1988) nor private profit (Los Angeles 1984). It was an investment tool to change the city, a strategy later claimed by other cities organizing bids for mega-events.

From this framework, the strategy can be considered entrepreneurial: branding the city internationally, attracting investment and tourism, and relocating the city in the European hierarchy of cities. The strategy was also successful in engaging with different levels of government, the private sector, and the citizens, but with important qualitative differences from the entrepreneurialism that predominated the 1980s in Europe and North America. First, it not only “built to boost,” but there was a clear idea of what the city wanted, taking into account social issues, the long-term perspective, and even development in the city, with the spread of Olympic projects all over the city. Second, there was a partnership structure, but with strong public leadership, controlling the private sector. And last, the city council led the whole project, imposing its criteria on the other administrations. The outcomes were mostly positive, bringing a more social democratic approach to entrepreneurialism.

In sum, after the Olympics, Barcelona became an international model for urban regeneration, and the post-Olympic scenario in Barcelona was shaped by the successful repositioning of Barcelona as one of the most admired and visited cities in Europe. This success resulted in the return of local, national, and foreign capital back into the city, making corporate interests a major force in pressing and shaping the city council’s agenda. Furthermore, the early 1990s corresponded with the locking in of neoliberalism in Spanish politics through the application of the Maastricht Treaty

and its stability pact. This, together with the financialization of the economy, the liberalization of labor markets, the privatization of public enterprises, and the return of centralized planning and spending centered in Madrid, have all added pressure for rethinking a new strategy for Barcelona.

The outcome of these processes has been to enhance the competitive position of Barcelona through supply-side economic policies, market competition, and the abandonment of redistributive concerns. In this context, Barcelona has relied on new strategies and discourses that attempt to reposition Barcelona within the flow of the global economy. These are organized along a threefold strategy involving a cultural strategic plan, a cultural mega-event, and the creation of digital neighborhoods in order to insert the city into the upper levels of the international division of labor and the hierarchy of global cities (or at least not to lose its position) and to produce a new consensus over the Barcelona model able to construct a territorial alliance involving public and private actors engaging with supralocal sources of investment and support. The mega-event in mind was the Universal Forum of Cultures 2004, an event “to promote the global consciousness and the exchange of theories, opinions, experiences and feelings around globalization,” organized around three axes: cultural diversity, sustainable development, and conditions for peace. The city’s long-term goal is to redevelop the northern part of the waterfront, renamed Diagonal Mar and located between Poblenou and the River Besós. Complementing this event, the city council has been replanning several working-class and former manufacturing areas such as la Maquinista, Zona Franca, and Poblenou as new digital quarters. At the moment, the only consolidated area is in Poblenou, between Diagonal Mar and the Olympic Village; the strategy of regeneration has taken the form of a digital quarter. The aim of the project, named 22@bcn, is to transform Poblenou into the industrial district of the new economy, with special relevance for the informational and communication technologies, and cultural (mainly audiovisual) and research and development activities as well.

However, this later stage of Barcelona regeneration has increasingly been put into question, as a change of direction from the trajectory set from the Cerdà Plan to the Olympic regeneration, fragmenting the modernist grid of Barcelona. On the one hand, in

the past decade, economic, cultural, and migratory changes have substantially altered the life and identity of the city (e.g., the percentage of foreign residents rose from 1.9 percent in 1996 to 15.6 percent of the total population in 2007), presenting new challenges to planning institutions. On the other hand, more local and foreign voices, of urban social movements and academics, have been more focused on branding the city, attracting investment, and dealing with the effects of gentrification.

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See also Mediterranean Cities; Urban Planning

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BARRIO

Barrio is a conventional term for Latina/o communities. They have been fundamental to cities since the mid-1800s and were influenced by racism and segregation in relation to residential patterns in U.S. cities. Barrios are also significant in relation to Latina/o culture and identity.

Important physical characteristics of barrios are related to sustainable environmental features, including mixed density, mixed uses (especially commercial uses in residential areas), live-work spaces, public transportation, walking, and recycling. Barrios

are also noted for being a cultural community that exhibits the importance of social networks.

Prior to the late twentieth century, key urban problems in relation to structural underdevelopment were a lack of affordable housing, local economic development, and the acute failure of government to address urban amenities, including streets, sewers, gas, and lighting.

Barrios are also a zone of conflict with planning and urban policy elites. These problems include a lack of inclusionary planning, racism and elitism within urban policy, neighborhood destruction related to highway corridors, redevelopment and private sector development, gentrification, and land speculation.

Barrio formation is an example of how cultural transformations within working-class constituencies help them to recapture space in their own vision; it is also an example of the essential role of cultural practices in defining places and the importance of their symbolic representations irrespective of ownership patterns or attempts at social control.

Initial Era of Barrio Formation

Barrios during the initial period of urbanism in the early twentieth century were generally located in ethnically specified, segregated sections of towns and cities. *Colonias* were characterized by declining housing conditions; poor internal roads (in reality, dirt streets); and limited or no basic infrastructure in relation to water, sanitation, and flood control. Ethnic spatial separation was impacted by natural barriers or features of the built environment, including rivers, railroad tracks, and agricultural buffer zones. Latinas/os also resided in small agricultural encampments on the periphery of cities and towns. They constituted a renter class, with limited land ownership patterns through the mid-twentieth century.

Numerous colonias developed adjacent to local employment centers, railroad yards, manufacturing districts, and in agriculture zones, on the urban fringe. These "livable spaces" ranged from substandard homes, to tents, to shantytowns constructed from a potpourri of local materials. The conditions of these urban residential zones established the negative characterizations of Latinas/os in urban space. Locked into substandard, deteriorating conditions, the barrio was viewed as a repository of

marginalized families with limited desire for improving their lifestyle. Regressive ethnic stereotypes reinforced situating Latina/o culture as a legitimation for the evolution of systemic residential apartheid and social repression.

Two typologies of barrios evolved during this period. Barrios in close proximity to civic centers, which were enclosed by rapid urbanization, experienced improvements in basic infrastructure associated with the conventional extension of urban systems. San Antonio, Denver, Phoenix, and El Paso typify this type of barrio-city relationship. Streets, sewers, water, and electricity were generally provided in these barrios. Although the quality and maintenance suffered from disparity in the allocation of government resources, the provision of these services was necessary in relation to the economy of the city.

Conversely, barrios located on the periphery of urban zones or in outlying semirural areas lacked most basic urban amenities. While labor was essential to the local economy, segregated residential zones governed spatial patterns. Many barrios exhibited dirt streets well into the 1960s. Cities in the South Rio Grande Valley, and other cities along the *frontera*, are prominent examples of this type of neglect. Colonias in these areas relied on remedial septic systems, water delivery, wood and propane for cooking and heating, haphazard electrical service, and informal trash collection. Flood control, street curbs, and connections with local sewer systems did not occur until well after World War II. This acute lack of urban infrastructure was especially problematic in mid-size and small cities in which the structural condition of the barrio was not deemed essential. This legacy of deficient infrastructure continued to characterize numerous barrios into the 1990s, especially in Texas. In numerous barrios, even in major cities, there are some residential streets without curbs and sidewalks. This is a legacy of discrimination in public works policy that began during the initial era of urban growth.

East Los Angeles, California

During the late 1910s and early 1920s, the increasing demand for industrial labor changed the urban character of cities. For example, one of Los Angeles's earliest urban barrios was centered along Mateo and Seventh Streets, which is currently in a

major manufacturing zone east of the civic center. This demand for manufacturing space resulted in the eventual deconstruction of numerous barrios in the Southwest.

In this instance, the evolution of the most significant urban barrio in the United States, East Los Angeles, provides a perspective on this type of urban transition. The initial Chicana/o households migrating east of the Los Angeles River was related to being forced out of Sonora Town (now Chinatown) and the industrial center, into the Belvedere barrio. Another barrio, Joyo Maravilla, was established farther east. This community was east of Boyle Heights, which during the early 1920s exhibited a resistance to Chicana/o mobility. Demands for improved housing opportunities led to increased Latina/o migration into this area. Thus, the initial cultural transition of the East Los Angeles barrio was followed by a tradition of urban ethnic ascendancy that characterizes urban expansion in this society. By the early 1930s, the influx of Chicanas/os had a significant impact on the cultural dynamics of this community. Within 20 years (1920–1940) East Los Angeles became the largest barrio in the United States. Since that period it has evolved into the most substantial minority urban enclave in U.S. history: a conurban zone that Valle and Torres label as the “Greater Eastside.” This zone of cultural influence extends over 20 miles east of downtown and is approximately 1,000 square miles.

Post-1970s and the Evolution of the Modern Barrio

The spatial limitations of barrios historically turned them into dense, overcrowded social and physical environments. Prior to 1960, population growth rates severely tested the geographic confines of barrio space. However, social sanctions reinforced by racism in real estate practices could not be sustained during the rapid population expansion related to Latina/o household growth rates. The initial working-class suburban migration, not distant in historic terms from the traditional barrio, was a response to this demographic transformation. Older neighborhoods directly adjacent to barrios were the first zones that Latina/os pioneered.

East Los Angeles, due to its immense size, was the precursor for the dynamic urbanization occurring in

other cities. Adjacent neighborhoods were merged into significant zones of Latina/o cultural dominance. The reach of the barrio surged throughout regions of the Southwest, creating a new period of barrio urbanism.

By the late 1970s, three types of patterns emerged: (1) traditional barrios surging into adjacent neighborhoods; (2) cities and regions that evolved into a system of intermittent Latina/o dominated zones, working-class suburbs, and inner city; and (3) the duality of a traditional barrio disjointed from middle-class Latinas/os migrating suburbia, older or new locations. This often resulted in the acceleration of economic decline in traditional barrios. Whereas the Los Angeles basin exhibits all three typologies, other cities formed dissimilar spatial relationships. El Paso is an example of the first scenario: El Segundo Barrio continued to expand into adjacent zones, creating a totally controlled Chicana/o urban zone. Phoenix, Denver, and Sacramento have evolved into the second topology in which selected suburban communities have experienced significant multiethnic integration, while other adjacent zones have remained predominately European American. Tucson, San Jose, and San Diego exhibit the third type of relationship in which suburban migration has created a spatial and social distance from the traditional barrio. Logan Heights in San Diego is isolated from suburban patterns north of the central city, and Tucson, mainly because Viejo Barrio was destroyed, led to a pattern of distinct barrio zones.

The Twenty-First-Century Barrio

Barrios remain in crisis. Affordable housing is a Latina/o urban crisis in the Southwest. Environmental pollution and land use conflicts increasingly place barrios at risk in relation to public health. Economic revitalization, job generation, and small business stability are problematic in urban barrios. This is a legacy in which barrios were systemically denied capital reinvestment. Uneven development has left barrios in a permanent status of deterioration, social dysfunction, limited economic opportunity, and political marginalization. Planning is now confronted with an era of bilingualism and bicultural practices to ensure active minority participation in land use policy. In particular, demands

for bilingualism and inclusion have forced urban elites to increase public information in relation to urban policy. Exclusionary practices such as censorship of information, sequestering Housing and Urban Development regulations, ignoring environmental issues, and blatant racism are gradually subsiding. Barrio residents have begun to demand a quality of life for lower-income residents. Simultaneously, barrio urbanism has expanded into virtually all major urban centers in the United States.

David Diaz

See also Favela; Ghetto; Los Angeles, California

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BAZAAR

Originally referring to a vaguely defined "oriental" market, the bazaar, as an institution and a space, has for many centuries exercised its attraction upon observers from all over the world. A sensorially and semiotically overloaded space and a point of encounter of various influences, actors, artefacts, and symbols, the bazaar is commonly presented in most travel guides, novels, and reportages (and often in scholarly work too) as the epitome of Middle Eastern (and Asian) societies; as the arena where visitors can capture the most picturesque and "authentic" impressions of the "culture" of such areas. An originally localized space and notion, the bazaar has therefore become a constitutive part of translocal fantasies as well as an example of Western exoticizing and orientalist representations of the world.



Hats on display at a bazaar outside of Topkapi, Turkey

Source: Jill Buyan.

Among scholars, the bazaar has captured the attention of individuals from different disciplinary environments. In earlier scholarship it was approached primarily in terms of economic behavior, hence becoming a field of encounter primarily between economists, historians, and anthropologists. Later on, however, it was identified as a key arena for understanding societal issues at large. In scholarly work, thus, the bazaar has two main connotations. On the one hand, it signifies a particular space and place of exchange (that some authors have proposed as the ideal precursor of the fairs, the world exhibition, and the contemporary department stores); on the other hand, it refers to an economic system (originally denoting the peasant markets) opposed to the competitive “Western” markets. In the past few decades the bazaar has also become a popular metaphor for addressing various aspects of late modern societies. Carrying along its original orientalist connotations, the bazaar is today a recurrent term and notion (in scholarly as well as public discourse) for addressing the contemporary hybrid, multifaceted, globally interconnected, and digitalized world.

After a brief introduction presenting the origins of the term, this entry will outline a number of passages and notions that have characterized research on the bazaar. Divided in three sections focusing first on the

bazaar as an economic system, second as a space of convergence, and finally as a metaphor, the entry does not, however, aim at offering a thorough chronological account of the history of scientific research in this field. Rather, it suggests some critical insights into the main visions, interpretations, and turns that have characterized its presence within the social and humanistic sciences.

The Term

A term of Persian origins connoting a market or a marketplace, the term *bazaar* has, across the centuries, spread to different parts of the world. Eastward it has been adopted in south and southeast Asia (in India, in particular, it came to connote also a single shop or stall). Westward, it has reached Arabic, Turkish, and European languages alike. Whereas some of these languages have adopted it literally, in many European countries the term *bazaar* has become synonymous with the “oriental marketplace” at large and been used to indicate chaotic, disorderly, and irrational places of exchange, where an array of objects and ideas could be found. Generically, however, the bazaar is also often used to address marketplaces (often open aired and indigenious) in most areas of the world.

The Bazaar as an Economic System

In the past 50 years, two main approaches have dominated the work of scholars interested in the study of the bazaar as an economic system. Whereas older accounts presented the bazaar almost as the precursor or prototype of the modern capitalist competitive market, more recent ones have addressed it as an arena so deeply entrenched in its own sociocultural context as to appear totally outside of modern economic analysis. Among the most influential scholars representing the latter (and more recent) approach to the bazaar is anthropologist Richard G. Fox. In his work on a market town in North India, Fox presented the bazaar as a place of the irrational. Describing it as

an activity and a system based on the simultaneous presence of lack of specialization and overspecialization, and on the disorderly overlapping of services and products, Fox promoted a vision of the bazaar as the prototypical counterexample of Western capitalist markets. In a similar manner, anthropologist Clifford Geertz looked upon the bazaar as a bizarre milieu and phenomenon. Its defining traits as a system were, according to him, the heterogeneity of products, the continuous price bargaining, and the stable ties of clientship. Clearly challenging the logic of the Western market, the bazaar was for Geertz characterized by poor and maldistributed information (about the products and their production) and thus by a form of “known” ignorance. The constant search for, and protection of, knowledge and information (i.e., attempts at reducing this ignorance) were, according to him, the leading social activities taking place within the bazaar. Neither a simple mirror of nonmarket economies nor of industrial markets, the bazaar was a distinctive system of social relationships.

While being later on accused of having produced, as Fanselow has suggested, yet another exoticizing account of a non-Western phenomenon, Geertz contributed to the enlargement of the scientific approaches on the bazaar. Focusing on the social act of being in that particular space, and linking this aspect with his main theoretical concerns about anthropology as an interpretative enterprise, Geertz, in his article on bazaar economy, presented the act of being in the bazaar as an advanced art centered around individuals’ capacity for combining the signs that filled the space surrounding them. Geertz’s work on the Moroccan bazaar of Sefrou marked a shift in the approaches to the bazaar. No longer just an arena for economic exchange, the bazaar was also a place to capture the spirit of a society; the ideal locus for studying heterogeneous social relations.

The Bazaar as a Space of Convergence

In tune with Geertz, much scholarly work in the social sciences has approached the bazaar as a space from which to gather insights about wider social, cultural, and historical issues. Not just the delimited locus of economic exchanges, the bazaar has been addressed as a microcosm in which economics merge with other aspects of social life,

such as ritual, religiosity, and politics. The bazaar, scholars such as Anand Yang have suggested, is an ideal setting for approaching the merging of individuals’ lived experiences and larger narratives defined by contexts such as the market and the state. Historians devoted to the study of colonial India, among others, have approached the bazaar as a privileged scene of contention and a site of production of communal identities. Defined by the encounter of opposed categories, such as center and periphery, public and private, foreign and local, the bazaar, it has been suggested, has represented for India (and the parallel could be drawn for other countries as well) a vivid expression of the larger processes investing the nation.

Such an approach, focusing on the bazaar as a space of confluence for various influences, interests, and agendas, characterizes also much work on the contemporary bazaars. The bazaar has in fact recently been looked upon as the ideal arena to approach questions relating to the staging and creation of ethnic identities; to gender and class positionings; to questions of visibility and aesthetics; and to social actors’ interpretations of the “public.” It has attracted the attention of those scholars working on the public display and commoditization of culture and on the cultural politics of representation (an area in which the contributions of geographers and tourism researchers have been extensive) as well as those interested in the relation between subjectivity, identity, and space, that is, in the modalities through which individuals shape their lives through the space surrounding them.

The bazaar, however, is also a valid location for approaching questions of travel, movement, and flows of meanings and signs across territorial borders. Similar to Marc Augé’s “non-places,” the bazaar is, in a sense, a passage; a (spatially and temporally) suspended “heterotopic” arena witnessing to the fast overlapping of messages, people, and artefacts. With its overload of sensorial (in particular visual) stimuli, the bazaar highlights also the pivotal role played by imagination and fantasy in everyday life. An expression of a trans-local public sphere defined by encounter, exchange, and merging, the bazaar blurs the borders between local and global, tradition and modernity, past and present, thus interrogating the conventionally oversimplified correspondence between culture and space. Moreover, it also contributes in questioning

conventional assumptions about the novelty of globalization. The most historically renowned bazaars have, in fact, been touched by major trade routes for centuries and have always grown under the influence of a translocal scenario. Hence, the latest globalizing trends may have simply added new artefacts, messages, people, and a new speed of movement but not qualitatively generated a new phenomenon altogether. Looking upon the bazaar in the contemporary world as a space of convergence thus raises central issues regarding globalization and the cultural logics of late modernity.

The Bazaar as a Metaphor for the Contemporary World

Already in the 1970s Clifford Geertz noted how, from being a purely descriptive term, the bazaar had also turned into an analytic concept. Recently, within the social sciences (and within public discourse too), another turn has taken place whereby the bazaar has been translated into a metaphor for addressing a variety of phenomena belonging to the contemporary world. A perspective informed by orientalist and exoticizing notions as well as by postmodern theoretical insights, the bazaar has become a symbol for the disorderly, hybrid, fragmented, multifaceted, and commercialized organization of social life in late modernity.

One connotation of such metaphorical usage presents the bazaar as a term and a notion useful for addressing the late modern city. Intended as an arena of multiplicity, trade, and movement, the bazaar has been used for epitomizing the borderzone, undefined, and at times dangerous and illegal character of the urban world. As the ultimate space of Otherness, the bazaar sums up, in such approaches, the notions of a universe made up of unstable roles (of part-time work, semi-illegal occupations, etc.) that runs parallel to the open official market.

On a more abstract level the bazaar has also recently been used to address the spaces of digitalized, virtual reality. In his analysis of the developments of the open source software model, Eric Raymond, inspired by poststructuralist thinkers such as Michel Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, opts for the bazaar as the key metaphor for addressing the new, open, nonlinear, flexible models of software developments able to host differing agendas and approaches. Stretching Raymond's approach farther, Benoît Demil and Xavier Lecocq have chosen the same

metaphor for describing new models of (bazaar) governance inspired by the open licenses model. It is with no surprise that the bazaar is also one of the most used terms in commercial and noncommercial web spaces (such as Internet shops and data banks).

The metaphorical presence of the "bazaar" in the discourse surrounding digital networks and virtual spaces once again reminds us of the evocative potential of such a notion. It also highlights its associations to notions of anarchic freedom, deterritorialization, and individualism expressed in a number of works (coming mainly from the field of cultural studies) devoted to issues of identity and subjectivity in late modernity. In tune with the postmodern interest for the deterritorialized subject, the bazaar represents here a creative enterprise. A liminal zone of subject creation, it provides the individual with an interstitial (and hence uncontrolled) space for the negotiation of identity.

Given these latter metaphorical dimensions, the bazaar, as a term and a notion, could be approached alongside that chain of terms (*hybridity, nomadism, etc.*) that, since postcolonial times, have gone through an inversion of connotation. Once terms of discrimination and oppression, such words and notions have become positive symbols of renewal. Adopted by several scholars, public administrators, artists, and commentators, these terms express (and perhaps help celebrate) the openness and fluidity of the contemporary (Western but not exclusively) world. It may be worth adding that, in fact, the bazaar is a much deployed metaphor and inspiration for many public events and festivals devoted to promote integration and intercultural dialogue in contemporary Europe.

Hence, from being a place of decay (as in E. M. Forster's novel *Passage to India*), the bazaar, in contemporary industrialized societies, has become synonymous with encounter and dialogue across borders and with openness, individuality, and freedom. Informed by orientalist fantasies identifying it with an exotic, prototypical space of Otherness, the bazaar stands, in the contemporary West in particular, as one of the charming epitomes of cultural diversity. And, from being a counterexample of the organized and rational Western markets, it has today become an often uncritically approached hymn to creativity. Parallel to such celebratory tones, in fact, in many regions of the world today, the bazaar (as a proper physical space) has become a security

issue. Due to its uncontrollable and chaotic character, the bazaar is today the selected location for acts of terrorism and dissidence, a phenomenon that should make scholars reflect upon the varying and context-specific associations that this term may give rise to.

A traveling term, the bazaar, in its metaphorical usage, brings to the surface wider questions of cultural politics of representation. Offering precious insights into wider social and cultural changes, a critical analysis of its “metaphorical history” within Western academia can open the field also for considerations about the potential reproduction of popular orientalist and exoticizing notions (with their annexed power gaps) within academic work and discourse.

Paolo Favero

See also Islamic City; Public Realm; Shopping

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BÉGUINAGE

A *béguinage* denotes a community of béguines (French: *béguines*, from Latin: *beguinae*), or lay Catholic women living together religiously without taking permanent monastic vows; the term may also refer to the physical and social space that the community occupied in a city or town, usually marked by a wall, a moat, or both, and comprising a chapel, several residences where béguines lived alone or with few companions, a few larger buildings for common life, a hospital for poor and elderly members of the community, and various service buildings like a bakery or farm. Originating in the high Middle Ages, some of the larger béguinages survived well into the modern age, leaving their mark on the cityscape of various Belgian and Dutch cities. Thirteen béguinages that have been preserved in Flanders, the northern part of Belgium, were placed on UNESCO’s World Heritage List of sites “of worldwide significance” in 1998. After a brief introduction to the historical origins of the béguine movement, this entry examines two types of béguinages (“convent” and “court”) and their divergent history; it will also discuss current research on béguinages in urban studies.

Béguines

Béguines are first mentioned as “religious women” (*mulieres religiosae* in the original Latin) in early thirteenth-century sources of the Low Countries, the Rhineland, and northern France. They lived alone or in small informal groups and were devoted to the care of the poor and the sick (including lepers), to teaching, and to the promotion of a penitential lifestyle, without, however, joining a recognized monastic order. Despite the multiple legends surrounding their origins—some of which were taken as historical fact in the scholarly literature until recently—the movement did not have a single founder but arose from a variety of similar local initiatives in cities of Liège and Brabant, now eastern and central Belgium. These initiatives were led by women, usually single but in rare cases living in



Béguinage Amsterdam in its renovated state

a “chaste marriage.” They received help from a few male clerics who were inspired by new thought on pastoral theology developed around the turn of the century at the University of Paris and who publicized their efforts, ultimately securing Church backing in the form of episcopal charters of protection and occasional papal support. Béguines never formed a single religious order but congregated locally to form independent béguinages that acquired and rented out property to individual women, elected their own superiors, and by the end of the thirteenth century also adopted local rules or statutes to regulate internal life. At that time, the movement had spread to a large area of continental northern Europe, from Marseilles in southern France to the Baltic coast. The *beatae* of Spain and the *pinzochere* or *bizzoche* of Italy were comparable to béguines but usually formed smaller communities more closely associated with recognized religious orders such as the Third Order of St. Francis.

Types and History of Béguine Communities

In most parts of northwestern Europe, béguines lived in single-residence communities known as “convents,” each headed by its own “mistress” and dependent on parish clergy or monasteries, especially those

of friars, for their religious services. In Belgium and the Netherlands, however, the béguinage often took the form of a walled compound for several hundreds of women in which béguine church, hospital, and residences were laid out in a grid or arranged around a central open square. These became de facto single-sex neighborhoods governed by béguines, supervised by the local clergy for their religious observances, and supervised by the secular, urban authorities for their charitable work. St. Catherine’s of Mechelen, Belgium, possibly the largest of these “court beguinages” (Dutch: *begijnhoven*; Latin: *curtes beguinarum*), counted more than 1,500 béguines in the early sixteenth century.

“Court” béguinages, more influential and of lasting importance to many cities in the Low Countries, grew through a combination of push and pull factors that reflect the ambivalent position of such women in medieval urban society. Unlike nuns, who took solemn religious vows governing their life until death and were strictly cloistered and could not hold property individually, béguines were required only to promise obedience to their superior (“the grand mistress”) and chastity for the duration of their stay in the béguinage, which they could leave at will; in most cases they were expected to provide for their own living, either through their labor or on the basis of rent income. Under these circumstances it was imperative that béguines freely exercised a profession within the béguinage or outside it, unhindered by strict rules of enclosure. Béguines are mentioned in the sources as nurses, teachers, merchants, but most often as workers in the textile industry, as spinsters or carders of wool, as weavers of linen and sometimes of woolen cloth. Many if not all of these tasks demanded a relatively free flow of people and goods between béguinages and the city. It was precisely because of their economic services that city authorities in the Low Countries collaborated with béguines to acquire large expanses of urban territory on the city’s outskirts for the establishment of a béguinage. Evidently béguines delivered the right kind of inexpensive

labor force crucial to the burgeoning textile industries of these cities, providing help for elderly female workers and other social services as well. It is no accident that many béguinages were founded on low-lying, infertile lands, which in earlier times might have garnered marginal agricultural use but served no real function in the expanding urban economies of the high Middle Ages. Converting that land into a large béguinage giving shelter to numerous female workers, always paid less than males, made economic sense, not only in the early thirteenth century, when the textile industry was booming in the large urban centers of Bruges and Ghent, but sometimes in later centuries too. Béguinages indeed proved to be powerful devices to attract young women from the countryside eager to make a living in the city but in need of support and protection, as medieval cities were dangerous places for them.

The informal religious life “in the world” therefore offered opportunities for single women but also presented challenges. From the very beginning, the more conservative elements in the church and society regarded béguines with suspicion, expressed by the name given to these women, *beguina*, a pejorative term derived from the root *begg-*, which means “to mumble or pray indistinctly”; hence, *beguina* stood for a lay woman whose devotion was uncertain. Gathering such women in the single, quasi-monastic enclosures of court béguinages helped allay these misgivings. While it surely coincided with the women’s own desire for greater seclusion to practice their penitential life and attend services in privacy, it also facilitated monitoring of béguine behavior and detecting possible heretical activity, which seemed all the more pressing after the 1230s, when intellectually gifted béguines developed an interest in mystical approaches to religious enlightenment, began to interpret scripture, and expressed their opinions in writing. Tensions increased around 1300, at a time when an economic downturn threatened employment for many béguines and weakened public support. Marguerite Porete, a béguine from Valenciennes who, in her *Mirror of Simple Souls*, advanced forms of mysticism that appeared to bypass ecclesiastical mediation, was condemned by a Parisian Inquisition and died at the stake in 1310. In the next few decades, bishops and other church authorities carefully investigated the orthodoxy of béguines in their

lands. Many small “convents,” lacking powerful patrons, were closed or died out because they lost financial support. The great court béguinages survived only through making concessions. Greater limits were placed on the women’s ability to leave their béguinage, even for work in town. They were to adopt a suitable, nun-like habit that clearly distinguished them from ordinary citizens. In this form, the movement gained a second efflorescence during the Counterreformation (1575–1700). It lost its appeal in the second half of the twentieth century; the last béguine died in Belgium in 2008.

Béguines and Urban Studies

Béguines occupied a unique place in medieval and early modern urban society, straddling the divide between the secular and the religious. Historical research has long concentrated on their charitable institutions, well documented, and on their spirituality, dominated by major writers like Hadewijch (thirteenth century), Marguerite Porete (d. 1310), and Mechtild of Magdeburg (ca. 1208–1282). The study of the social, cultural, and economic integration of béguinages in the urban environment is now under way, informed by modern scholarship on gender, art, and urban space. They suggest a socially diverse membership, with lower- and middle-class groups in the majority and a significant contribution of rural women. By all accounts, gender factored strongly in both the support that the movement gained from city populations—for the economic reasons outlined earlier—and the skepticism displayed by church authorities. Current research now investigates, among other issues, if and how the religious art produced by and for béguinages reflects their unique position, to what extent béguinages may be called religious spaces, and indeed the concept of semi-religiosity (a term coined by historians to describe the béguines’ halfway status) itself. Since the closure of court béguinages in the late twentieth century, local city governments in Belgium and the Netherlands have stimulated projects to renovate their buildings and properly reincorporate them into the urban fabric. These have sometimes included extensive archaeological and art historical study of the monumental remains, for instance at the béguinage of Sint-Truiden, Belgium, where the church from the late thirteenth and

fourteenth centuries has preserved a remarkable program of wall paintings.

Walter Simons

See also Bruges, Belgium; Gendered Space; Historic Cities; Women and the City

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BENJAMIN, WALTER

The German–Jewish writer Walter Benjamin (1892–1940) is now widely regarded as one of the

most original and insightful cultural theorists of the twentieth century. An associate of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research (the Frankfurt School), and close friend of the critical theorist Theodor Adorno, the Judaic scholar Gershom Scholem, and the playwright Bertolt Brecht, Benjamin developed a highly idiosyncratic critical and redemptive theoretical approach to cultural phenomena drawn from, and interweaving in complex and enigmatic ways, Marxism, Judaic mysticism and messianism, and modernism (in particular, surrealism). Principally a literary theorist, his attention was nevertheless drawn to an extremely diverse range of cultural forms, media, and practices: film and photography; architecture, monuments, and urban space; commodities and fashions; and children's toys and fairytales. The significance of his characteristically fragmentary and disparate writings on the theme of the city is now increasingly recognized by urban theorists and scholars. Although they articulated no systematic or totalizing theory of the modern metropolis as such, Benjamin's texts nevertheless provide a rich and suggestive series of concepts and insights for the critical analysis of metropolitan architecture and consumer capitalism in the nineteenth century; of urban experience and memory; and of the cinematic, photographic, and literary representation of the cityscape.

Essays on the Urban Experience

During the mid- to late 1920s Benjamin wrote a series of impressionistic essays under the rubric of “thought images” (*Denkbilder*), sketching the cities he visited and explored: Naples (1924–1925), Moscow (1926–1927), Weimar (1928), Marseilles (1928–1929), San Gimignano (1929), and a piece on Bergen titled “North Sea” (1930). Deliberately eschewing theoretical specification and elaboration, these journalistic pen portraits were intended to capture and juxtapose vivid images of the concrete lived reality of these contrasting urban settings, foregrounding in this way their colorful street scenes (markets, vendors, swindlers, milling crowds, traffic and tramcars); their differing architectural and spatial configurations (buildings, stalls, streets, squares, interiors); and their myriad experiences (sensory inundation, disorientation, shock, eroticism, intoxication).

Published in 1928, Benjamin's *One-Way Street* (*Einbahnstrasse*) is a collection of aphorisms and

witticisms influenced by the surrealist vision of the contemporary city as an intoxicating and seductive dreamscape of secret potentialities. Taking the architecture and nomenclature of the city as an organizing principle, the book comprises a series of penetrating observations about the possibilities of personal, individual, and collective experience in contemporary Berlin, Paris, and elsewhere (Riga, for instance, home of his then-lover). Benjamin's own intensely contradictory responses to the contemporary metropolis and urban culture find expression in these fragments: On the one hand, the city is a site of fascination and stimulation, of sexual encounters and intrigue, of inspiration, creativity, and cosmopolitanism; on the other, it is a locus of ruthless capitalist exploitation, of alienation and the diminution of human faculties, of bourgeois snobbery, egoism, and narrow self-interest.

Two cities preoccupied Benjamin: Berlin, the city of his birth and his home until the Nazi seizure of power; and Paris, the city for which he had a particular predilection and where he was to live in exile from 1933 until his suicide in 1940 when attempts to escape from occupied France failed.

Berlin Writings

Appropriately, Benjamin's various Berlin writings are bound up with the theme of childhood, albeit in rather different ways. Between 1927 and 1933 Benjamin wrote and delivered some 84 radio broadcasts for Berliner Rundfunk and Südwestdeutsche Rundfunk in Frankfurt am Main. Mainly written for children's programs, these narratives, stories, and histories frequently took as their theme particular places or settings in Berlin, or aspects of the capital's life and literature. Factories, tenement buildings, toy shops, old marketplaces, and the distinctive Berlin accent—all these became subject matter for Benjamin's scripts. In 1932, the imminent prospect of exile led Benjamin to compose two series of reflections upon his native city: *Berlin Chronicle* and *A Berlin Childhood around 1900*. Benjamin was at pains to deny the purely autobiographical character of these two texts, emphasizing instead the elusive, Proustian character of memory itself and, above all, the status of his recollections as memories both of and in the metropolis. Hence, he claimed, the Berlin essays were less concerned with tracing and narrating the life of an individual than with recalling particular spaces and moments of a city one was about

to leave for the last time, with redeeming images of the Berlin cityscape seen at "last sight."

Paris Writings and the Arcades Project

Benjamin understood his *One-way Street* collection as his first genuine engagement with Paris. From 1927 onward, and once again inspired and informed by the surrealism of Louis Aragon and André Breton, Benjamin began work on a study of the city's shopping arcades, glass and iron constructions from the early nineteenth century, which had fallen into neglect and disrepair by Benjamin's time. Originally conceived in collaboration with his friend Franz Hessel as a short essay on the remaining ruinous Parisian arcades in the present, the "Arcades Project" (*Passagenarbeit*) expanded in terms of material gathered and scope to become a panoramic critical historical exploration of the structural and experiential transformation of Paris occurring principally, but not exclusively, during the Second Empire.

Benjamin regarded nineteenth-century Paris as the capital of capital, as the preeminent site of new forms of spectacle, enchantment, and phantasmagoria, phenomena that he understood as modern manifestations and reactivation of mythic domination. Benjamin's attempt to unmask capitalist ideology and mystification came to focus on two key material aspects: the commodity form as fetish and the ostentatious new architecture of the city (boulevards, railway stations, world exhibitions, as well as the arcades) as fantastical "dream-houses." In exposing both the utopian and illusory character of these, Benjamin hoped to "disenchant" the cityscape, to stimulate a revolutionary collective awakening from the complacent dream-sleep of the recent past.

Although the Arcades Project came to be Benjamin's central preoccupation during the 1930s, it remained unfinished, indeed unwritten, at the time of his tragic death. First published in German as volume five of Benjamin's collected writings in 1982, and first translated into English in 1999, Benjamin's magnum opus, and his most sustained and substantial piece of writing on the city, comprises numerous sketches and drafts and hundreds of pages of notes and quotations, grouped into folders or convoluted under headings and identified by a complex system of numbers and color codes. In this incomplete, incompletable form, the Arcades Project remains today as one of the most enigmatic and provocative studies of the modern city.

Writings on Film and Baudelaire

During the 1930s, the ill-fated Arcades Project formed the sun that gave life to, and around which circulated, a plethora of much shorter studies. Two of these are of particular relevance for urban theory: Benjamin's famous 1935–1936 essay "The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility" and his essays (1938–1940) on the nineteenth-century Parisian poet Charles Baudelaire.

The "Work of Art" essay constitutes Benjamin's most sustained and coherent discussion of the new medium of film, and as such, articulated most explicitly an idea that finds more indistinct and undeveloped expression in a number of Benjamin's writings: the "elective affinity" between film as the quintessential new mass medium and the city as the definitive modern environment. For Benjamin, film was a privileged medium for capturing the flux and dynamism of the cityscape, for penetrating deeply into its obscure crevices, for illuminating its dark and hidden secrets, and, above all, for bringing the city's own revolutionary energies and tendencies to the point of critical tension and explosion.

Benjamin's studies of Baudelaire emerged from, and were intended to provide a model in miniature of, the wider Arcades Project. For Benjamin, Baudelaire was the first true poet of the modern metropolis, a melancholy figure who sought to give voice to the novel and traumatic urban experiences of his time. Baudelaire demanded a new aesthetic of the fleeting present, *modernité*, one that insisted upon the representation of the contemporary as the vital subject matter of the genuine modern artist. His own poetry drew upon the vernacular of Paris to evoke the shock encounter with the milling urban crowd, the bohemian life of the boulevards, the fate of the artwork turned commodity, the destitution of the outcasts of the city—heroic figures like *flâneurs*, prostitutes, rag-pickers, and, of course, poets. Of these, the figure of the *flâneur*, the aloof and aimless stroller in the city, and a self-image not only of Baudelaire but also of Benjamin, has become a key motif for writers and urban theorists today.

Indeed, Benjamin's critical studies in metropolitan experience and representation are now essential reading for scholars and students of the modern city.

Graeme Gilloch

See also Arcade; Berlin, Germany; Paris, France

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BERLIN, GERMANY

Berlin today is the "capital of memory." Six different political systems have left their imprints in public spaces: the kingdom of Prussia from the eighteenth century, the imperial German Reich (1871–1918), the first democratic system (1918–1933), the Nazi period (1933–1945), the communist period in East Berlin (comprising the old city center), and the most recent democratic period after 1990 (often referred to as the Berlin Republic).

Divided Berlin

In all these diverse contexts, Berlin was assigned the central position of state capital. During the so-called Third Reich, the Nazi regime made far-reaching plans for transforming Berlin into a city that would match their vision of a "world capital Germania." Keys to these urban development plans were the monumental buildings planned by the architect Albert Speer of whose work few traces remain. At the end of World War II and the beginning of the cold war, Berlin was divided into four sectors, each of which was under the control of one of the four Allied powers (the United States, France, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union), corresponding to the Allied control of Germany as a whole. Due to Berlin's geographical location within Germany, it became a space of shared Allied control surrounded by Soviet-controlled territory. When the United States,

France, and Great Britain joined the administration of the parts under their control in 1948, the Soviet Union responded with the blocking of ground access to West Berlin. This situation led to the famous airlift that provided West Berlin with basic supplies between June 1948 and May 1949. While ground access was reestablished afterward, the rift between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union continued to deepen and led to the building of the Berlin wall in 1961, which was dismantled in 1989.

Due to its unique post-World War II history, Berlin holds a position that is quite unlike that of any other city within the Federal Republic of Germany. Until 1990, the city was divided into two parts that were governed by two opposed political systems: the West, belonging to the Federal Republic of Germany; and the East, serving as the capital of the German Democratic Republic (GDR). In 1990, Berlin became the capital of a reunited Germany. Many streets in the former East have been renamed, and many new monuments devoted to the victims of National Socialism have been erected in order to both bear witness to the terrorist regimes and commemorate instances of resistance against them. It is this constant presence of history that makes the city unique.

Postreunification Effects

Housing and Land Redevelopment

Since reunification, not only have the economic and political spheres undergone tremendous changes, but also the housing situation of various districts has changed dramatically. Furthermore, the social composition of many neighborhoods has been transformed as a result of recent migratory movements into and out of the city.

As of 2008, the city of Berlin has 3.4 million inhabitants living in an area of approximately 889 square kilometers (552 square miles). Sixty-three percent of the population lives in the former western part of the city. Following the radical political collapse of the GDR in 1989 and the reunification of both parts of the city in 1990, far-reaching economic, social, and spatial transformation processes have affected the city as a whole.

The former eastern part has faced particular challenges: Here, virtually all conditions for urban development changed in the early 1990s.

These changes encompass the redistribution of property, new planning laws, new players, new investors (private investors, the federal government, the federal state, the borough administrations, and citizen interest groups), and new planning concepts. Those city quarters that had formerly been situated in the vicinity of the wall and had therefore either been neglected or cleared during GDR times now found themselves at the very heart of Berlin's reconstruction and modernization efforts. Furthermore, the center of former East Berlin is partly under redevelopment according to a master plan (*Planwerk Innenstadt*) that aims at reconstructing the spatial structure of a European city. This structure is posited as a contrast to the modernist concepts underlying communist planning, which had led to the removal of much of the old housing stock and to a fundamental redesign of spatial patterns. Wide streets are determined to be narrowed again, and new buildings should be constructed along the further vanishing line.

The present transformation of East Berlin can be captured by the label "marketization." It is therefore diametrically opposed to the development it underwent between 1949 and 1989. This development was characterized by a process of "demarketization" or "decommodification," which was triggered by the transition from capitalism to socialism. Starting in 1989, the reintroduction of a market economy, including private ownership, manifested itself in the reconstitution of private property, achieved either through property restitution to former owners or by means of land and property sales to new investors. This radically changed control structures and led to new socio-spatial patterns.

Land prices as well as rents under newly formulated rent agreements increased significantly immediately after unification took place. The political decision to move the seat of the federal government of Germany back to Berlin in 1991 led to a boom in real estate investment in West Berlin. However, by the year 2000 it had become clear that Berlin was not on track to regain its dominant position in the German urban system and that the expected strong growth of population would not come into effect. Accordingly, rents stagnated and land prices declined. The overall level of rents in Berlin today remains lower than that of economically vibrant German cities like Munich and much lower than

levels in London or Paris. As a result, both young people and “creatives” (two groups that often overlap) are attracted to the supply of cheap space and the low cost of living in a city that is rapidly establishing its position as a cultural metropolis.

Economics and Employment

The economic changes that took place between 1992 and 1997 are particularly noticeable in the manufacturing industries, where more than one third of the 270,000 jobs have disappeared. It was not until 2006 that an increase could be observed. As a consequence of this dramatic reduction in jobs, there was a continuous rise in unemployment during the 1990s. In East Berlin, unemployment rose from 12.2 percent in 1991 to 16.5 percent in 1997 while the unemployment rate for Berlin as a whole exceeded 15 percent. This is considerably higher than the average rate for Germany and the rates for most of the cities in western Germany.

The decreasing number of jobs made access to the labor market ever more difficult both for the unemployed and for new migrant groups from abroad, leading to a constant increase in long-term unemployment. Migrants who were recruited in the 1960s to work specifically in the manufacturing sector (a sector that has been in rapid decline since the early 1990s) constitute one of the groups who suffer most from this development.

The relocation of the national government from Bonn to Berlin did not fundamentally alter the situation on the labor market. Due to contracts between the national and the state governments, there are still more civil servants working with national institutions in Bonn than in Berlin. However, the demand for both high-skilled and low-skilled service workers has been growing rapidly since then, while the middle segment is declining. Far away from positioning itself as a global hub in the global economy, Berlin is today characterized by a polarizing employment structure.

Sociospatial Patterns

This is further reflected in changing sociospatial patterns. Two different types of hot spots for poverty and unemployment exist within Berlin’s urban structure: on the one hand the former working-class

neighborhoods north and south of the city center (i.e., Wedding, Kreuzberg, and Neukölln), and on the other hand the big housing estates at the periphery of both East and West Berlin. Measuring changes in neighborhoods according to their share of unemployment and poverty exposes a process of polarization of sociospatial segregation. The most privileged areas are those that held a similarly privileged position in prewar times: the low density areas in the southwestern and southeastern parts of the city and the upper-class neighborhoods in central locations of West Berlin (Charlottenburg, Wilmersdorf).

Although city planners under the communist regime tried to forge socially diverse living quarters in the newly constructed prefabricated housing estates (*Plattenbauten*), social segregation still occurred: The neglected old housing stock in inner-city areas was predominantly inhabited by citizens whom the political authorities viewed as disloyal and who were thus marginalized. These areas, however, were attractive to artists and young people who exercised political dissent and at times succeeded in creating an alternative milieu. Immediately after unification, when freedom of movement across the former border to West Germany had been restored, many students and creative youth filled these vacant structures with new types of activities. Furthermore, many families, especially those with higher education, moved from the periphery to the newly renovated old housing stock. They served as pioneers in a classical cycle of gentrification in neighborhoods in Mitte, Prenzlauer Berg, and Friedrichshain, which today host the “creative class.” As long as the Berlin government could control the renewal process by means of restrictions and sponsorship, the demands of modernization and the needs of old tenants were both taken into account and balanced. However, the post-Fordist withdrawal of state intervention, which was at least partially due to the financial crisis of the city, led to a situation in which the process of renovation and modernization is now controlled by market powers. As a result, low-income households are increasingly forced to leave popular living quarters and move to disadvantaged parts of the city.

Whereas the small remaining parts of the famous Berlin wall have become popular tourist destinations, most of the wall has been torn down;

thus opening up space in central urban locations that have been reconstructed and now feature office buildings and prestigious hotels. In contrast to this, the previously mentioned rapid and fundamental process of deindustrialization that went hand in hand with the development of a new service economy has left many sites and buildings in other locations underused or even vacant. This provides space for low-budget initiatives that manifest in an abundance of galleries, bars, theaters, and small start-ups, which in turn give rise to the widely shared perception of Berlin as an open, vital, and innovative place. Many stakeholders hope that this creative milieu, together with Berlin's increasingly multicultural identity, will eventually be transformed into new economic growth. To what extent the diverse groups inhabiting Berlin will be included in this new development remains an open question. At this point in time, the formerly divided city has become a fragmented one—administratively unified but socially divided along new border lines.

Hartmut Häußermann

See also Benjamin, Walter; Capital City; Other Cities; Simmel, Georg

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BERRY, BRIAN J. L.

One of geography's most productive scholars, Brian Berry has played an enormously influential role in urban and economic geography, primarily as the steadfast defender of traditional quantitative modeling. Not without reason, Gordon Clark argues that "Brian Berry is perhaps the most important of a handful of people who transformed human geography over the second half of the twentieth century."

Born in 1934 to working-class parents in England (both of whom left school at age 14), Berry defied the confines of the British class system to rise to the top-most tiers of academia. He completed a BS in economics at the London School of Economics in 1955, where he was exposed to historical geography and introduced to the quantitative modeling of spatial phenomena. Immediately thereafter, he traveled to the University of Washington in Seattle just as the geography program there initiated the quantitative revolution in American geography. Berry thus formed both part of the "British invasion" of influential geographers in the 1960s and one of the famous "space cadets," along with Duane Marble, William Bunge, Michael Dacey, Arthur Getis, Richard Morrill, John Nystuen, and Walter Tobler, arguably the discipline's most successful and famous single cohort of students.

Three years later, armed with a PhD—at age 22—he began the first of a long list of academic positions at prestigious institutions, including the University of Chicago (1958–1976), where he was the Irving Harris Professor of Urban Geography, chair of the Department of Geography, and director of the Center for Urban Studies. From 1976 to

1981, he taught at Harvard University, where he served as the Frank Backus Williams Professor of City and Regional Planning, chair of the PhD program in urban planning, director of the Laboratory for Computer Graphics and Spatial Analysis, professor of sociology, and as a faculty fellow of the Harvard Institute for International Development. From 1981 to 1986 he served as Dean of the School of Urban Public Affairs at Carnegie Mellon University in Pittsburgh. Beginning in 1986 he taught at the University of Texas, Dallas, where, in 1991, he became the Lloyd Viel Berkner Regental Professor of Political Economy and, in 2006, dean of the School of Social Sciences. He is the recipient of numerous awards and medals. In 1968, he received the Association of American Geographers' Meritorious Contributions Award. In 1975, he became the first geographer and youngest social scientist ever elected to the National Academy of Sciences. In 1977–1978, he served as president of the Association of American Geographers. He was elected a fellow of the American Association for the Advancement of Science in 1987, awarded the Victoria Medal from the Royal Geographical Society in 1988, and made a fellow of the British Academy in 1989. He also served as a founding coeditor and editor in chief of the journal *Urban Geography* from 1980 to 2006.

Berry's publication record—including in toto more than 500 books, articles, and other publications—has earned him enormous recognition as one of geography's most fecund scholars. He followed Fred K. Schaefer's famous critique of "exceptionalist" geography in advocating for a discipline that was self-consciously nomothetic in outlook and positivist in epistemology, thus emphasizing the need for general laws of explanation, quantitative methods, and rigorous empirical testing of hypotheses. Throughout his long career, he subscribed to a paradigm that privileged the abstract over the concrete, deduction over induction, and the universal over the specific. Drawing on a Cartesian view of space, Berry emphasized the use of models as a means to simplify and shed light on the bewildering complexity of the world. He was instrumental in the adoption of multivariate statistics in the discipline. His early papers stressed the applicability of central place models of urban systems and detailed studies of retail shopping patterns. Subsequent work on market centers and

retailing was very influential in geography and business and economics. He also delved into the rank-size distributions of cities, hierarchical diffusion processes, and the impacts of transportation systems. In addition, Berry had a long-standing interest in urban morphology and urban problems such as inner-city poverty. Over time, Berry's works came to be characterized by increasing conceptual sophistication and a sustained concern for the role of public policy. In doing so, he abandoned much of the earlier emphasis on simplified models in exchange for rigorous empirical and statistical analyses.

Berry's later career focused on the dynamics of regional development in different national contexts. He conducted extensive work in India, Australia, Indonesia, and other countries. Comparative analyses of urbanization bridged these national contexts. Urban trends in the United States received considerable attention as well, including the question of counterurbanization and the specific development patterns of Chicago. A persistent theme was the relation of demographic shifts and migration to regional change. This phase of his career was characterized by a mounting interest in issues of globalization, particularly the ways in which multinational corporations intersected with state policies to shape urban growth around the world. In the 1990s, Berry turned his focus to the role of long wave cycles, or Kondratief waves, and their relation to regional development and political relations. Subsequent work viewed utopian communities as attempts to escape the maelstrom of change and turmoil associated with the periodic restructuring brought about by long waves.

As the embodiment of positivism and the quantitative revolution, Berry's intellectual position came under mounting criticism from the 1980s onward. A newer generation of geographers attuned to political economy and social theory began increasingly to question the relevance of abstract, ahistorical models and the unrealistic neo-classical logic of utility maximization. This schism was exemplified in a famous debate between Brian Berry and the Marxist geographer David Harvey. As a result of academic geography's shift to political economy, Berry appeared, to many observers, as increasingly conservative and disconnected from the field. Never one to give up, Berry is known to this day for the enthusiasm and commitment with

which he advocates his views, and whatever philosophical differences some geographers may have with him, he remains widely respected.

Barney Warf

See also Urban Geography; Urban System; Urban Theory

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BILBAO, SPAIN

Bilbao seems to have gone global overnight. A peripheral city in Western Europe with an old industrial tradition but largely unknown to most people outside Spain, Bilbao came to the attention of commentators worldwide thanks to the opening of a branch of the Guggenheim Museum in 1997—a project widely acclaimed as a resounding success, turning the city into a destination for global pilgrimage. Millions have visited the city to

contemplate the art and admire the titanium building that wraps the museum, a work hailed as architect Frank O. Gehry's masterpiece. According to outsiders, the museum triggered the city's revitalization. After 20 years of decline, Bilbao's good economic performance since 1994 was attributed uncritically to the Guggenheim "miracle." New claims were made about the role of spectacular architecture and the arts in urban renewal and globalization, with urban officials worldwide seriously considering bidding for a Guggenheim for their own cities. Bilbao became synonymous with the Guggenheim, and many cities around the world wanted to imitate the Basque capital's success and become instantly "global."

Historical Development

A city's fortunes, however, go beyond the reach of a cultural artifact, regardless of how successful and "global" it may be. Bilbao was already a globalizing city shortly after its foundation in 1300—the King of Castile chartered the city as a node in the networks of trade between Castile and the world. As the place from which Castilian wool and Basque iron were exported to Europe, the city played a key role in the European subsystem of trade. Basque merchants were present and active in the major world cities at the time. Bilbao's development during the following centuries shows an expanding city struggling to preserve its commercial freedoms vis-à-vis the Spanish state. For much of its history, the city has been a frontier town between Spain, Europe, and America, adapting its commercial relations to the ebb and flow of world markets and the success or failure of centralizing efforts from Madrid. Whereas for most of the Fordist period Bilbao was gradually integrated into the Spanish economy, the current phase of globalization, together with the high degree of political autonomy for the Basque Country, is again taking the city on a path to globalization.

Bilbao's industrialization in the late nineteenth century gave rise to its modern business elite, which grew out of the mining business and diversified investments in other sectors and other regions in Spain, exemplifying the *Spanishness* of Basque capitalism. At the same time, foreign economic relations continued at a good pace in Bilbao. Exports of local iron, in particular, reached unprecedented

levels as the city became the main supplier for Great Britain during the latter's imperial apogee prior to World War I. Structural adjustments in the Basque industry and the consolidation of liberalization and centralization policies undertaken by the various Spanish governments during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, however, meant that Bilbao's industry was much more geared to producing and selling in a protected Spanish market than competing in foreign arenas. Following the abolition of the Basque privilege to import goods duty-free, the city became fully integrated into the Spanish economy. In historical terms, Fordist Bilbao was an era of deglobalization for the city, especially the period from 1936 to 1973. Through its port, Bilbao continued to serve as a node in trade between Spain and the world, but uneven development within Spain helped Basque industrialists to execute a strategy of industrial expansion, which strengthened the structural ties between the city and the nation-state. These were the times when Bilbao's per capita income was the highest of all Spanish cities.

The decades of 1970 and 1980 represented the crisis of the Fordist model and the transformation of Bilbao into a "postindustrial" economy through restructuring and tertiarization. The political atmosphere in the Basque Country (marked by attempts by local nationalist elites to gain power quotas during the Spanish transition to democracy and by Basque nationalist ETA's violent fight for independence) and the overall industrial policy implemented by the then socialist government in Madrid greatly influenced the fate of Bilbao's steel manufacturing and shipbuilding industries. Because local plants were not adapted to the environment of lower industrial demand and had to be downsized or closed, the global restructuring of these sectors also contributed to Bilbao's decay. The specific ways in which restructuring took place, however, were matters of political choice at the national and regional levels. Ironically, Bilbao's strengths—Fordist industrial power, entrepreneurship, and linkages to the world system—made the city particularly vulnerable to world trends.

Local and regional authorities were slow to react to the changing economic framework and circumstances, and Bilbao essentially became a Rustbelt city, but one with great autonomous power and state support that—unlike most Rustbelt cities elsewhere—would give it the resources and control to overcome a crisis situation. Starting in

the late 1980s, and determined to reposition Bilbao as a rising metropolis among global cities, the local authorities developed an ambitious revitalization plan similar to other struggling urban economies in the United States and Europe. The critical, most visible piece of this plan became the Guggenheim Museum, projected to be built in an area called Abandoibarra, which became the urban megaproject in post-Fordist Bilbao.

Abandoibarra: The Urban Megaproject

Abandoibarra—a piece of industrial land in downtown Bilbao being transformed into a new central business district—exemplifies the global aspirations of the *new* Bilbao. Abandoibarra shows the contrast between the city's globalization via revitalization plans and the "selling the city" strategy reflected in the planners' global rhetoric, on the one hand, and the organizational and political obstacles present in local urban planning development and implementation on the other. The potential of the project to become Bilbao's territorial link to the global economy has not yet been realized. Abandoibarra remains a global project in its aims but, in practice, is one of only local reach and impact, with foreign investment playing little significant role in the redevelopment of this downtown waterfront area. The role of Bilbao Ría 2000 (an urban development corporation) in the development of Abandoibarra as manager of the project was significant, and the many project modifications implemented over time demonstrate that the global ambitions of the local elites often have to face internal strife and obstacles that might ultimately slow down or immobilize global megaprojects. In view of Abandoibarra's fate, one is led to think that, because it has influenced contemporary urban planning's organizational and managerial tools, globalization has acquired a relatively new dimension in recent times, with megaprojects representing the physical manifestation of urban elites' entrepreneurialism and global aspirations.

The Guggenheim Museum Bilbao

All in all, however, it is the Guggenheim project that has put Bilbao on the map and the enterprise that represents the latest of Bilbao's globalization efforts. The motives of Basque political leaders in bringing the museum to Bilbao, after a negotiation process in



Frank Gehry's Guggenheim Museum Bilbao in Spain

Source: Andreas Praefcke.

which coincidences played an important role, were not shaped primarily by “cultural” concerns, but, instead, are better explained by two factors, one global and one domestic: (1) recognition of the need for regional image change and urban regeneration in Bilbao under conditions of contemporary globalization—which in practice meant participating in a global venture for spectacular architecture, and (2) the long historical desire on the part of the Basque Nationalist Party leaders for political emancipation from Spain, reflected in this case in the realm of cultural politics. In this way, the Guggenheim project was not an isolated case of urban boosterism. Instead it is the latest and most successful example of how Basque leaders, in the only subnational government in Europe with exclusive powers to levy taxes, have managed to bypass Madrid and conduct their own independent international affairs. The project’s political overtones are clear, but its economic dimension is also important. Although

the museum has been hailed by the international press as the icon that has turned Bilbao’s economy around, the evidence leads us to question the strategy’s long-term feasibility and shows that an urban economy the size of Bilbao’s cannot rely simply on a museum for economic development. Nonetheless, as a state project fully funded with public money, the Bilbao Guggenheim will remain an urban icon independent of financial pressures. One of the lessons of Bilbao’s Guggenheim Museum is that, because it has the power of *rescaling* the significance of specific buildings and the cities where they are built, iconic, spectacular architecture—driven, in this case, by the ambitions of entrepreneurial politicians and cultural managers rather than transnational corporations—plays a fundamental role in the worldwide deployment of contemporary globalization and the creation of large-scale social spaces representing capitalism’s transnational strategies.

In Bilbao, the museum became a spectacular worldwide image campaign due not only to a possibly irreplicable building, but also to local, contextual economic and political conditions. Far from being the trigger for and prime mover of revitalization, the museum postdated it. So far it has not generated substantial foreign investment in the Basque city, let alone had sizable positive consequences in the job market. Bilbao's relatively good economic performance in recent years, which so many in the media attribute to the Guggenheim, began prior to its opening and was due to both a reasonable regional economic policy developed by the Basque government and the positive phase of a long economic cycle, which came to an end in 2001 and seemed to rebound by 2004. Continued media attention preserves the Bilbao effect, but if tourist attendance to Bilbao starts to decrease (no one can guarantee that it will keep its current levels) and the architecture world begins to privilege alternative aesthetics in design and building, the star of Bilbao might begin to dim. The real consequences for the Basque city, however, would be relatively limited, just as the impact of the Guggenheim success was in the first place. Cities are complexly determined formations, and a spectacular media event, even projected on a worldwide scale, is not enough to shift their fortunes.

If spectacular architecture does not suffice in turning a struggling urban economy around, how can cities and regions successfully implement globalization policies that bring economic benefit to citizens? Here is where the recent economic globalization of the city-region in the Basque Country, as it is clearly seen in patterns of transnational finance and foreign trade, plays a prominent role. The pillars of this recent Basque move toward globalization show themes that were already present in the golden years of industrial Bilbao: industrialization based on exports and the reach of the local financial bourgeoisie and its banks. This recent globalization, therefore, is hardly a new phenomenon in Bilbao (except, perhaps, for its scale, scope, and complexity), but rather a new cycle in a centuries-old tendency by the city to join global circuits in the world system.

Contemporary Economic Globalization

Bilbao's contemporary international role and the city-region's new economic globalization are based on the power of its regional foreign trade, which has found a main partner in the European Union,

with export figures tripling between 1994 and 2004. Part of this foreign trade, which, *inter alia*, reveals the Basque Country's strength as a high-tech manufacturing region, is channeled through the port of Bilbao—a port managed by the Spanish government's agencies and one that continues to serve its ancient function of linking large segments of the Spanish economy with the world. Bilbao's international role is also based on the flow of transnational banking deployed by the city's global bank, Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria, mainly in Latin America. These three important dimensions of contemporary Basque economic power (trade globalization, global connectivity via Bilbao's port, and financial globalization) demonstrate that present-day Basque globalization is based on traditional regional strengths that fostered local links with global circuits in past historical periods, thus questioning the alleged radical newness of globalization's current phase. Thus, as evidence of historical continuity and a reminder that globalization is but a partial factor in a city's development, Bilbao's international role is a product of both the region's dependency on global trade and financial networks and the intricate relationships of the region with the nation-state.

Gerardo del Cerro Santamaría

See also Architecture

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BOHEMIAN

In Europe, the term *bohemian* began as an ethnic designation and evolved into a general epithet meaning gypsy or beggar. During the middle decades of the nineteenth century in Paris, the term was adopted as a way to describe the growing class of disaffected young artists and intellectuals populating the garrets and cafés of the burgeoning metropolis. This usage retained some of the pejorative connotations left over from earlier applications, with many condemning these new bohemians as a morally dubious and parasitic bunch, though the mantle was soon adopted by many adherents as a point of pride. Since then the term has proven both durable and portable and is used to refer to the spaces and lifestyles of artists, intellectuals, and aesthetes in a host of European and North American cities. Bohemian, then, describes both a distinctive set of cultural affectations and also the distinctive urban districts in which adherents congregate. As both a historical phenomenon and in its present-day incarnations, bohemia has become an important topic in urban studies.

The Parisian Prototype

While cities throughout history have played a role as incubators of cultural innovation, in the nineteenth century new ideas about the nature of the artist and his or her relation to the city began to be

elaborated. This was particularly true in Paris, a city that Walter Benjamin calls "the capital of the nineteenth century" and a central site of the cultural innovations that would constitute European modernism. Drawing on the freshly minted example of the Romantic poets, artists began to be thought of not as skilled crafts people, integrated into the social system, but as exalted and often tortured geniuses, liable to be alienated from a society unable to grasp the contents of their sensitive souls. What Parisians such as the poet Charles Baudelaire and the painter Édouard Manet added to the Romantic paradigm was a distinctively urban vision, both in terms of the works of art they produced and the lifestyles that they adopted.

By the mid-nineteenth century, Paris was flooded with adherents to this design for urban living. This overabundance of intellectual and creative fervor in Paris can be attributed to the general tumult of the period—the spatial revolution spurring the spectacular growth of the great city and the political and economic upheavals transforming the nature of social class relations. Bohemians blurred the boundaries in an emergent society, evincing the commitment to cultural distinction of the fading aristocracy, the individualism of the ascendant bourgeoisie, and the hedonism and licentiousness of the urban *demi-monde*. Perhaps because so many were frustrated applicants to the professions, overeducated and undernourished within the new urban economy, bohemians became known for their fierce antipathy toward the bourgeoisie (which in this case refers to both the entrepreneurial and the professional class in Paris) and ethics of instrumental labor.

In *Un Prince de la Bohème* (*A Prince of Bohemia*), Honoré de Balzac used the term to refer to "the vagrant students of the Latin Quarter," describing bohemia as a way-station through which talented youth pass on the way to more legitimate and remunerative occupational pursuits. The notion of bohemia as the "El Dorado of youth" has remained durable since then, although subsequent observers have tended to reject its depiction as merely a rite of passage preceding bourgeois respectability. In the latter 1840s, Henri Murger, himself an exemplary practitioner of the lifestyle, produced a collection of vignettes concerning a cénacle of Latin Quarter artists that would be collected as *Scènes de la Vie de Bohème* (*Scenes from the Bohemian Life*, 1848). His accounts were extremely popular, resulting in a

well-received stage adaptation and eventually serving as the source material for Giacomo Puccini's opera *La Bohème*. From these romanticized works one may glean many enduring ideals of the bohemian lifestyle: the vaunted bonhomie, the balance of hedonism and self-sacrifice, the rejection of bourgeois values of instrumentality and security, and the primacy of *art pour l'art* (art for art's sake).

By the end of the nineteenth century, the hillside village of Montmartre began to displace the Latin Quarter as Paris's bohemian center of gravity. Montmartre was particularly notable for the lively café and cabaret nightlife found there, frequented by both bohemian participants and slumming members of the bourgeoisie. The presence of such exotic nocturnal diversions, serving as platforms upon which bohemians would enact their often spectacular lifestyle innovations, has become an especially important feature of the bohemian district in subsequent iterations.

The American Bohemian

In the early decades of the twentieth century, New York's Greenwich Village would emerge as the United States' own bohemian center, drawing on the European example and incorporating European expatriates such as Marcel Duchamp and Mina Loy. In Greenwich Village, an ethnic working-class section of lower Manhattan, avant-garde artists and writers mingled with political radicals, including John Reed, Max Eastman, and Emma Goldman. Among the distinguishing features of the Greenwich Village bohemia was the new attention to feminist politics and the expansive role played by women such as Edna St. Vincent Millay, Djuna Barnes, and Margaret Anderson within the milieu. Uptown, the segregated African American district of Harlem was simultaneously experiencing a cultural flowering, demonstrating that bohemia was not solely the property of Whites.

After World War II, a new bohemian style known as "beat" came to the fore. The term is credited to Jack Kerouac, whose novel *On the Road* is the most prominent example of beat literature, in which he described himself and his friends as a "beat generation," similar to the "lost generation" of post-World War I writers such as F. Scott Fitzgerald, Ernest Hemingway, and Gertrude Stein. Other prominent beat writers include Allen Ginsberg, Lawrence Lipton, and William S. Burroughs. As

with prior bohemian movements, these artists and affiliated lifestyle adherents favored particular urban districts, including North Beach in San Francisco, Venice Beach in Los Angeles, and Greenwich Village in New York.

While Parisian bohemians rejected the emergent conventions of bourgeois utilitarianism, members of the beat generation pitched themselves against the blandness of postwar consumer society, especially as represented by the middle-class suburbs and their presumed conformism. The beats were inspired by cultural innovations that they gleaned as coming from the African American community, especially jazz. In 1959, Norman Mailer penned a manifesto of beat bohemianism that he titled "The White Negro," advocating that White hipsters take their cultural cues from urban Blacks, whose experience he viewed as an authentic alternative to that of the suburban White square, "trapped in the totalitarian tissues of American life, doomed willy nilly to conform if one is to succeed."

Though beat is mainly regarded as a literary movement, in an account of the Greenwich Village beat scene in 1960, the sociologist Ned Polsky noted that the scene was crowded with participants who lacked literary ambition and were best distinguished by fondness for jazz and deep antipathy to gainful employment. These adherents came to be known by the generally pejorative designation *beatniks* and were identified by a presumed affinity for goatees, berets, and bongo drums.

Bohemia Since the 1960s

An examination of the Parisian prototype, the Greenwich Village bohemia, and the beat movement of the postwar decades reveals both evident continuity in the bohemian lifestyle and the ways in which it takes particular forms depending on distinctive historical periods and urban locales. Trends in the last half of the twentieth century further illustrate this point.

The explosion of the youth counterculture during the 1960s marked a new turn in the articulation of bohemian lifestyles. The 1960s hippies continued to be associated with the urban milieu, most particularly San Francisco in the United States. There were clear lines of descent connecting the new counterculture with their beat predecessors; *On the Road* was required reading for

countercultural youth, beat icon Neal Cassidy served as the driver of Ken Kesey's famous day-glo bus, and Ginsberg was a sort of elder statesman for the movement. What was new in the 1960s was the evident increase in the scale of new bohemian movements and the connections between these subcultures and a new left politics organized around sexual and gender identities, race, and opposition to the Vietnam War. Also evident in the 1960s was the growing link between the bohemian counterculture and commercialized popular culture, especially music, despite the antimaterialist rhetoric adopted by many hippies.

Since the 1960s, bohemian enclaves have become more frequent features of both large and mid-sized cities throughout the United States and Europe, even as urban economies have undergone dramatic changes. From the 1970s to the present, new bohemian districts have sprung up in cities and districts such as New York's East Village, Los Angeles's Silver Lake, Chicago's Wicker Park, Atlanta's Five Points, and many others. The lifestyles articulated in these districts evince qualities recognizably of a piece with their bohemian predecessors, though they have also come to play a new and expanded role in the cultural, and especially the economic, lives of the cities that host them.

Led by the pioneering work of the sociologist Sharon Zukin, scholars have paid increasing attention to the role of the arts and bohemianism in the urban economy. While manufacturing declines as a core component of urban economies, the "symbolic economy" of knowledge work and cultural production has become vital to urban fortunes. Under these circumstances bohemian districts become seedbeds of residential gentrification, amenities for highly educated workers who favor funky and offbeat entertainment scenes, incubators of enterprise in media and marketing, and sources of input for culture industries like music, film, and television. Particularly influenced by the contributions of Richard Florida, an enthusiastic promoter of the "creative class" and its essential role in urban prosperity, policymakers have begun to actively seek out and nurture bohemian scenes, increasingly seen not just as quirky bits of local color but as hard economic assets.

Richard Lloyd

See also New York City, New York; Paris, France

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BOMBAY, INDIA

See Mumbai (Bombay), India

BRASÍLIA, BRAZIL

Brasília, the capital of Brazil, was founded on April 21, 1960. The city is considered a symbol of architectural modernism for its aesthetic qualities, functionality, centralized urban planning, landscaping with regional flora, autochthonous culture, and economic organization. Inspired by the ideas of Le Corbusier, Brasília represents an attempt at erecting a new "modern" city disconnected from Latin American colonialism, slavery, underdevelopment, and dictatorships. However, Brasília also experiences tensions between strict planning and creative initiatives, militarism and democracy, open space and public manifestations, political representation and corruption, as well as social injustice and the emergence of new urban cultures.

Epic History

In official accounts the history of Brasília begins on April 21, 1960. However, its epic origins go back to the alleged "discovery" of Brazil by the Portuguese on April 21, 1500. Salvador had been the capital city of Brazil since the sixteenth

century, but in 1789 a group of rebels planned the independence of Brazil and envisioned moving the Brazilian capital to Ouro Preto. This attempt failed. However, when Napoleon invaded Portugal the Portuguese king fled to Brazil with the support of the British Empire, and Rio de Janeiro became the capital of the United Kingdom of Brazil and Portugal in 1808. Soon after, in 1809, British Prime Minister William Pitt announced that a new capital would be built in the center of Brazil and be called Nova Lisboa.

With the Brazilian independence from Portugal on September 7, 1822, the idea of a capital cleansed of colonialism remained, but with a new name: Brasília. Already in 1823, a document titled “Memoir on the Need and Means of Building a New Capital in the Interior of Brazil” was presented in Parliament. In 1834, the viscount of Porto Seguro indicated the Amazon River Basin as the most appropriate location for such an enterprise. This proposal was disregarded for decades until rumors circulated in 1883 about a dream by the Catholic priest Dom Bosco in which a site between parallels 15 and 20 would become the “promised land of milk and honey, of unconceivable wealth.”

In 1889, exactly 100 years after the failed rebellion of 1789, a military-supported revolution transformed Brazil from a monarchy to a republic. Older plans were renewed and a commission was established by the Constitutional Assembly in 1892 to define the future location of Brasília. After a series of studies, the cornerstone was erected on September 7, 1922, marking the centenary of independence from Portugal. In 1953, a federal commission was created by President Getúlio Vargas to study the technical aspects involved in the building of the new capital. In 1956 the newly elected president, Juscelino Kubitschek, promised to build the new city in five years and name it Brasília. The plan gained support and on April 21, 1960, Kubitschek was installed in the new capital city.

The Modernist City

Brasília was seen as a latent dream made possible by its politicians, intellectuals, artists, and engineers, who shared the ideals of modernism.

Many intellectuals, such as Caio Prado Jr. and Sergio Buarque de Hollanda, provided the discourse that fit facts neatly into a nation-building process. While Mario de Andrade and Oswald de

Andrade led the artistic front of the Brazilian modernist movement, which declared the need for cultural independence, Mario Pedrosa criticized the mere repetition of European models and saw Brasília as an authentic political and cultural monument that should reorient history.

President Juscelino Kubitschek became a political national hero who promised to create 50 years of development in just five years. Brasília was the symbol of his achievement. Lucio Costa, Oscar Niemeyer, and Burle Marx brought together their expertise in urban planning, architecture, and landscaping and became internationally recognized for their planning of Brasília according to Le Corbusier’s modernism. Lucio Costa had worked with Le Corbusier in Rio de Janeiro in the planning of federal buildings. Oscar Niemeyer had worked with Kubitschek in the city of Belo Horizonte (planned in 1897, it is the capital of the state of Minas Gerais). Burle Marx used Brazilian plants in landscaping, based on species he had found in the Botanical Garden of Berlin in the 1920s.

Urban Reality

The Lucio Costa pilot plan proposed for Brasília was based on the intersection of two main axes in the form of an airplane, with two lines cutting across the city and intersecting at the center of power in Brazil. At the intersection are the government buildings, public services, the cathedral, and the “Square of the Three Powers,” with its famous two towers and two inverted bowls at their center. Along the north-south axis, residential complexes, parks, and shopping areas were built. Streets and avenues follow a precise grid with “super-blocks” (*superquadras*).

Such a strict approach to urban planning was later related to militarism. The city was de facto built only after the military coup d’état in 1964. Under military dictatorship, construction provided room for a new political bureaucracy, attracting a new population of workers who were segregated in “satellite” areas and settling landless people who had been invading federal lands.

From a sociological point of view, this strict urban organization brought about not only new social actors and economic development but also corruption, lack of sensitivity to the needs of the people, segregation, and an aura of military security. All these elements gave the impression that politicians in Brasília were detached from reality,

abstracted from the real problems of other Brazilian regions. However, oppositional groups formed despite censorship and persecution. The process toward democracy turned Brasília into a center for many political manifestations. The military regime finally lost its power after 1984.

With time, Brasília became less a dream and more of a real city with a variety of social and urban issues. Researchers noticed that social life had disappeared in its residential areas, which were separated from commercial areas, while parks were lacking trees, and pedestrians found it difficult to walk—especially because of the hot weather, the distance between buildings, and the primacy given to cars. Different linguistic, cultural, and social patterns became stratified, thus creating a social structure that was supposed to have been overcome by modernist urban planning.

City Life

Brasília, was planned as something unique, representing the eruption of a new “modern” time and space disconnected from older events. In its modernity, Brasília was supposed to mark a definitive break from previous historical moments in Brazil and Latin America. However, it remained embedded in the political climate of the region. It became a symbol of totalitarianism during the times of militarism in Latin America, and then a center for democratic activity as different groups used its open spaces for public demonstrations and their struggle for democracy.

New public and democratic initiatives shaped Brasília at the end of the twentieth century. The central city spaces were used by both activist groups, such as the Central Worker’s Union and the Landless Movement in their efforts toward better wages and agrarian reform, and traditional lobbyists, such as the Union of Rural Landowners. Traditional, conservative, progressive, and post-modern religious groups gained more visibility, including not only the Liberation Theology movement, but also the Charismatic Movement within the Catholic Church, the powerful political coalition of Evangelicals, as well as New Age groups that chose Brasília as their center. Moreover, with these changes an active underground city life emerged. Women’s groups, workers, students, and environmental activists, as well as young artists, musicians, and followers of new religions began to use public spaces and urban niches for their expressions.

These groups also shaped Brazilian democracy, bringing people from the periphery to the center stage of national politics. With the founding of the Worker’s Party in 1980, a new movement in Brazilian politics was inaugurated, which reached its peak with the election of Luis Inácio “Lula” da Silva as president in 2002, thus bringing to Brasília a former steelworker to occupy the center of political power.

Brasília in the Twenty-First Century

Brasília was originally seen as establishing a new time and space in Latin America. It became a symbol of modern architecture, urban planning, radicalized centralism, and militarism. Then, with democracy, alternative cultures and forms of living began to emerge and change the urban landscape. Thus, in the twenty-first century Brasília looks more like a real city, more diverse and less centralized, still a symbol of modernism, but now conscious of its internal tensions.

Amos Nascimento

See also Le Corbusier; São Paulo, Brazil; Urban Planning

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BROADACRE CITY

In April 1935, at an industrial arts exposition held in Rockefeller Center, New York City, Frank Lloyd Wright unveiled a detailed scale model of

his ideal community: Broadacre City. As a critic of centralized urban development that characterized pre-World War II urban America, Wright believed that the large cities of his time dehumanized values, robbed people of their individuality, and jeopardized their democratic yearning. People would reap the full benefits of the machine age only by returning to the land.

This entry starts with a review of Wright's philosophy of Broadacre City, continues with an outline of its central design features, identifies some limitations of the concept and how Broadacre City compares to other utopian forms of the times, and offers a prospective role for Broadacre City in shaping the American exurban landscape.

Philosophical Foundations

Through Broadacre City, Wright expressed his principles of urban decentralization, economic self-sufficiency, and individualism. The traditional city, with its masses of buildings, was replaced by small houses dotting the rural landscape. In Broadacre City, the built environment would be distributed over open countryside and would be organically constructed to harmonize with natural surroundings. Each lot would be inwardly oriented, thereby promoting a domestic, family-oriented lifestyle where every person would be at least a part-time farmer. Indeed, the notion of individualism was a crucial element of Wright's vision of Broadacre City. He owed much of this vision to the Jeffersonian ideal of rural self-reliance.

Broadacre City would provide for the universal ownership of land and a society of individual proprietors. There would be no rent, landlords, or tenants, and no private ownership of land. Everyone would have the skills and knowledge to be a part-time farmer, mechanic, and intellectual—much as Jefferson was. Goods would flow directly from the producer to the consumer with no intermediary. Industry in Broadacre City would be privately or cooperatively owned. Local government would be the only local public administrative group within the city. Like modern conservative economists, the sole purpose of national government would be the regulation of natural resources, the provision of national defense, and the compilation of information.

Despite Wright's penchant for communal ownership, however, his "democratic decentralization" would allow every person to own at least one acre

of land in Broadacre City. The resulting urban pattern would greatly decentralize population and replace the city's concentration of wealth and power with a society where the means of production would be widely held.

Design Features

Broadacre City was publicly displayed in print media and in a showing of a model from 1934 to 1935. The version of his plan published in *Architectural Record* in 1935 is conceptualized in Figure 1.

Broadacre City would cover an area of 4 square miles or 2,560 acres and would support a population of approximately 5,000 people living in 1,400 homes. Each person regardless of age would be provided at least 1 acre of land. The typical residential lot configuration would be 165 feet by 264 feet, or precisely 1 acre. The lot would allow for a garden or small farm next to the house. Families would also live in small apartments, single-family cottages, worker quarters above shops, or larger hillside houses. Scattered throughout would be a dozen or so 15-floor towers, each with 33 apartments. Everyone would be within walking distance of work, and vehicular transportation would be used primarily to travel between cities.

Among the small farms would be factories, schools, stores, professional buildings, hospital, cultural centers, and other institutions. The local government buildings would be in a single high-rise building by a lake, but it would not be the focus of the community. A single freeway and railroad system would provide access to other Broadacre Cities.

Using the modern rule of thumb for a family-oriented household size of three, the population base of Broadacre City would be about 4,200 people. The density is slightly more than 1,000 people per square mile, which is comparable to that of the nation's most densely populated state, New Jersey, or roughly equivalent to the population density of Kansas City, Missouri. Broadacre City would clearly qualify as an urban place according to the U.S. Census. In effect, Broadacre City would be an oasis of settlement set in a rural landscape.

Limitations and Relation to Garden Cities and the Neighborhood Unit

The population base of Wright's Broadacre City is the same as Clarence Perry's Neighborhood Unit




Figure 1 Stylized Adaptation of Frank Lloyd Wright's Planning Scheme for Broadacre City

Source: Adapted by Arthur C. Nelson. Figure by Nicole Sitko. Used with permission.

and, later, Clarence Stein's designs for Radburn, New Jersey. Perry and Stein viewed their communities as building blocks within a larger urban framework.

In contrast, Broadacre City is an isolated community; this is its principal shortcoming. With such a small population base, most residential services such as shopping, medical care, specialized repair, higher education, and vocational training cannot be supported. The modern "neighborhood" scale shopping center cannot survive. The threshold required to support a general medical practitioner is not achieved. Residents of such an isolated community would resort to mail-order shopping, commuting to urban centers, or doing without.

To function, Broadacre City must be connected economically, socially, and, to some extent, physically to urban centers. It follows that Broadacre City must be planned and designed to play a definitive role in a metropolitan region while serving its principal function of an exurban neighborhood.

Some if not many of the limitations of Broadacre City can be overcome by allowing for a larger population base but holding to its planning and design themes. One is Ebenezer Howard's "Garden City" in which about 90 percent of the 32,000 residents would live on slightly less than 2 square miles but itself be part of a master planned community of about 10 square miles of land. Fast-forward a century, however, and we find that with smaller families than during Howard's time, the Garden City population falls to about 16,000, assuming no more homes than Howard envisioned—a reasonable assumption since house sizes have also increased in the meantime. Garden City is thus about four times more populous but only about two-thirds more densely developed than Broadacre City.

Following Howard, a network of Broadacre Cities within a metropolitan region could create the critical mass of population and employment to function in modern times. Howard's Garden City concept envisioned six garden cities of 32,000, each, surrounding a Social City of 58,000 for a total population base of 250,000. Of course the actual population is reduced by about half. Great Britain's largest new town, Milton Keynes, is based loosely on this model, but it is designed to attain the larger population base assuming smaller household sizes. Similar to Howard's scheme, all communities within Milton Keynes are connected by roads (but not rail) to each other and to its center. With 250,000 residents, virtually all economic, social,

political, and personal service functions of a city are available. A Broadacre City version of Social City would look vastly different, however, taking on Wright's characteristics of low-density development dominated by single-family detached homes instead of pockets of higher-density modules.

Application to the American Twenty-First-Century Landscape

Since Wright's death in 1959, many of his Broadacre City ideas have come to be realized but not in the form he advanced. Extensive freeway networks crisscross the countryside, and expansive suburbanization consumes vast areas of land at low densities. Much of the built environment is now characterized more as "exurban" sprawl than suburban sprawl. Such community services such as fire and police protection, new road construction, water and sewer, and garbage collection are much more expensive to provide in exurbia than in alternative development patterns, such as Broadacre City. Could the continued exurbanization of America be managed better through Broadacre City?

Perhaps up to a quarter of American households live in exurban areas. These are areas where population density (less than 1,000 persons per square mile) falls below that able to support important public utilities. Providing transportation and urban services across large areas of low-density development is very costly. Uncoordinated exurban sprawl may weaken the economic efficiencies associated with urban agglomeration and undermine the socioeconomic well-being of both the city and country. Broadacre City may be a solution to the management of exurban development in America.

Arthur C. Nelson

See also Suburbanization; Urban Planning

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BRUGES, BELGIUM

Now a small provincial capital of the federal state of Belgium, Bruges is significant for urban history both for its status as a medieval commercial center and for its rebirth as a destination for modern tourists. From the tenth century, Bruges emerged first as the residence and governmental center of the counts of Flanders, then as a seaport and trading center for materials that supplied the Flemish cloth industry, and then for the finished product itself. By the fourteenth century, the city succeeded in making itself the sine qua non of northern trade for nearly two centuries before reverting to a secondary market and production center thereafter. Bruges reached its economic nadir in the nineteenth century, with little industry and a chronically impoverished populace. Bruges was discovered by devotees of European romanticism, whose fondness for all things medieval transformed the rundown city of neglected old buildings into an outdoor museum visited by multitudes of tourists.

The powerful counts of Flanders of the central Middle Ages established Bruges as a part of their economic and political development of the *pagus Flandrensis*, the heart of a realm that at its greatest extent stretched as far south as Picardy and west to Boulogne and Dunkirk. An important network of fairs was one of their initiatives, as was an ambitious program of land reclamation along the coasts near Bruges. Bruges thus became a significant center of transportation and exchange before 1200, as well as a minor center of cloth production. But nothing could have predicted Bruges's rise to the status of the first commercial center of northern Europe,

which it achieved around 1300. This was due in part to the decline of the Champagne fairs and a shift to seaborne freight. This trend accelerated during the near-continuous war conditions that prevailed across France after 1337 (Hundred Years' War), which expanded the resident merchant communities in Bruges, especially the English, Italians, Spaniards, and Hanseatics. With committal grants of extensive legal privileges and efficient means of legal redress guaranteed by the local Bruges government, the city became a good place to do business.

At the intersection of important industries and flourishing trade, Bruges became the first northern capital of banking and finance, which gave the city considerable importance even as its trade declined after 1480. Based upon a payment and credit system developed by native money changers and hostellers, Bruges integrated the various communities of foreign merchants into a far-reaching network of foreign and domestic exchange through bills of exchange, book transfers, commission sales, and credit operations. In the course of the fifteenth century, this financial community acquired a formal meeting place around a public square named for a prominent commercial hostel, and the "place de la Bourse" was born. Until supplanted by its near neighbor and erstwhile commercial satellite, Antwerp, which built its own bourse in 1531, Bruges was a more important commercial center than either Paris or London.

From the sixteenth to eighteenth century, Bruges declined but did not cease being an important urban center of the southern Low Countries. A significant Spanish merchant colony remained through the sixteenth century, and in the seventeenth century there was a modest Renaissance in the city's importance as a shipping center with the construction of new canals and the development of Ostend as a major port with frequent ferry service to England. But it was not until Bruges had endured the waves of adversity stemming from the French Revolution and Napoleonic era, the brief incorporation into the Dutch state, and the Belgian revolution of 1830 that a new direction for the city was developed.

While some Belgian cities, notably Ghent, industrialized, the Bruges economy slowly reoriented itself toward attracting foreign visitors and residents in search of an authentic experience of the Middle Ages. Despite many changes through

the years, Bruges had maintained its "medieval" appearance, largely avoiding the massive destruction of old neighborhoods so common in other European cities. Attracted by the city's architecture, as well as its nearness to home and relative cheapness, a significant English colony developed. Numbering as many as 1,200 permanent residents by around 1870 and hundreds more summer and occasional visitors, the English established schools and orphanages and drew many converts to Roman Catholicism from among their compatriots, who came to Flanders in search of the medieval roots of their religion. Simultaneously, Bruges's canals and quaint squares and neighborhoods attracted artists who sought to capture the city's Romantic allure on canvas. The literary expression of this was Georges Rodenbach's 1892 novel, *Bruges-la-morte*, the story of a grief-stricken widower who takes refuge in Bruges, only to become obsessed with a ballet dancer who resembles his late wife.

The efforts of artists, visitors, and long-term English residents, especially art historian W. H. James Weale and art collector John Steinmetz, contributed to a movement to preserve Bruges's medieval patrimony while constructing new buildings in harmony with the medieval past of the city. Thus "neogothic" became the sometimes controversial answer to all new construction in the city, leading to, among many examples, the present post office building on the central square, which replaced an eighteenth-century classical style building on the same site. Much like London with its arts and crafts movement, Bruges became a center of architecture, design, and crafts that sought to restore the aesthetic and craftsmanship of the Middle Ages to modern construction. Efforts at historic preservation, meanwhile, led to the establishment of an important historical society (Société d'Emulation), a society for the preservation of Christian art (Guild of St. Thomas and St. Luke), and many others.

The international exposition of 1902 dedicated to the fifteenth-century artists known collectively as the Flemish Primitives marks the high point of this new direction for Bruges as both tourist and artistic city. Bringing together works from such artists as Jan van Eyck, Rogier van der Weyden, Hugo van der Goes, Hans Memling, Dirk Bouts, and Gerard David—many of them little known at the time—the



Bruges is well known for its historic architecture and canals that comprise the heart of the city.

Source: Karen Wiley.

exposition was a sensation. There were tens of thousands of visitors to Bruges, with other exhibits following in Paris, Düsseldorf, and London. Thereafter, Bruges has sought to construct a string of notable museums, as well as to resurrect and refurbish medieval costumed processions and reenactments, and to sponsor an annual festival of early music. The success of this cultural program was sealed by the European Union's declaration of Bruges as one of the two cultural capitals for the year 2002.

James M. Murray

See also Medieval Town Design; Tourism

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BUENOS AIRES, ARGENTINA

The city of Buenos Aires, capital of the Republic of Argentina, was founded in 1580 by Spanish conquistador Juan de Garay, following a failed attempt by earlier colonizers to create a settlement on the same grounds in 1536. The city is seated on

the banks of the River Plate estuary, a strategic gateway location that profoundly contributed to its demographic and economic expansion. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the Greater Buenos Aires metropolitan area, host to a population of more than 13 million, was among the world's 10 largest urban agglomerations. The metropolitan region, however, is made up of separate politico-administrative units. The central area, known as the Autonomous City of Buenos Aires and populated by almost 3 million inhabitants, is governed by an autonomous city government whose prerogatives and responsibilities are analogous to those of an Argentine province. This central district is encircled by two metropolitan rings composed of 24 municipalities with limited administrative powers and placed under the authority of the Buenos Aires provincial government. Mirroring most of its Latin American counterparts, the Argentine capital's urban area commands a disproportionate share of the country's human resources and economic activity, with one third of the national population concentrated on just 8 percent of the territory and a contribution to national gross domestic product of almost 50 percent.

A European City in Latin America

Buenos Aires does not resemble Latin American megacities on all counts. Its particular socioeconomic profile, combined with the specific route followed by Argentina's national politics, has crafted a complex and singular urban development path that set Buenos Aires apart from the region's other capital cities. The promotion of Buenos Aires as the country's capital in 1881 stimulated the modernization of its port facilities and the development of the railway network, connecting the city with its resource-rich hinterland. The remarkable commercial expansion that ensued contributed to the acceleration of national economic growth, propelling Argentina at the beginning of the twentieth century to the status of a rich and developed nation. Economic expansion was also fueled by successive waves of European migration to Buenos Aires, most notably between 1880 and 1910. By the mid-1940s, the population of the city's central area had already reached its current size of 3 million residents, and the inner

metropolitan ring had started to swell with a population approaching 2 million.

In contrast to other Latin American nations, the indigenous population was wiped out to such an extent during the colonization era that there remained virtually no natives in Argentina, except for a few enclaves in the northern territories. The European origins of Buenos Aires's demographic profile thus exerted a strong influence on the city's territorial development, providing it with a physical landscape notably different from that found in other Latin America cities. Even the Spanish colonial architecture originally found in the central neighborhoods was quickly replaced by higher-rise and modernist buildings modeled after the European architectural precepts of French and Italian urbanists.

Urban Development Without Plans

Buenos Aires's European architectural principles were never accompanied or underpinned by comprehensive planning practices. The capital's development always suffered from a chronic lack of urban planning, the absence of which induced symptoms that were to become more manifest as the city expanded. Broad urban master plans for Buenos Aires—including one formulated by Le Corbusier in 1929—were never implemented. The failure of urban planning efforts is explained by Buenos Aires's uncomfortable status within Argentina's political system. The economic primacy of the city over the rest of the country and the attendant territorial disequilibria were permanently perceived as a threat by national authoritarian and democratic regimes alike. The federal state was thus careful to keep the city under control by denying it all forms of political and administrative autonomy. As a result, public policies aimed at shaping and ordering Buenos Aires's future never developed, leaving the city without a proper urban agenda. Within the overall context of decentralization reforms implemented by most Latin American countries in the 1990s, the revision of Argentina's National Constitution in 1994 marked a significant turn in the city's history. For the first time, Buenos Aires was granted political autonomy and the right to democratically elect its mayor, who was previously handpicked by the president. In 1996 the city was accordingly renamed *Ciudad*

Autónoma de Buenos Aires (Autonomous City of Buenos Aires) and was henceforth governed under the auspices of a city constitution.

A Widening Socioterritorial Divide

The city's newfound capacity to preside over its own urban future is particularly significant in light of the socioterritorial transformations provoked by the neoliberal policy formulation embraced by Argentina since the early 1990s. Along with institutional deregulation and financial liberalization, economic globalization has provided a framework amenable to large capital investments whose locational selectivity has created territorial imbalances between different parts of the urban map. Throughout the twentieth century, Argentina's comparatively advanced level of economic development combined with Peronist redistributive policies have ensured a relatively homogeneous pattern of socioterritorial development in Buenos Aires. This pattern was reminiscent of the European compact city rather than the North American model of diffusion and fragmentation observed in other Latin American metropolises. Yet since the early 1990s, deindustrialization and rising unemployment, generally sensed as by-products of structural adjustment policies, have entailed the pauperization and shrinking of Buenos Aires's large urban middle class, which had until then constituted the city's most distinctive feature among its regional peers.

These trends have found their spatial echo in territorial fragmentation and segregation. Fragmentation characterizes the central area in which privileged islands of luxury housing, shopping, and entertainment have emerged, whereas segregation refers to the spectacular expansion of gated communities in the metropolitan region. Previously existing territorial imbalances, most conspicuously between the city's affluent northern neighborhoods and deprived southern areas, have sharpened with the social polarization flowing from the new economic conditions. To make matters worse, Argentina's economic crisis in December 2001 threw countless city households into unemployment and poverty.

With respect to urban infrastructure and public services, in the first half of the twentieth century their quality in Buenos Aires compared favorably

with those of the world's most advanced metropolises. Following Argentina's economic decline during the second half of the century, the construction and maintenance of urban facilities ceased to keep pace with territorial expansion, leading to infrastructural breakdown and a crisis in the provision of urban services in the 1980s. The absence of an interjurisdictional entity capable of overseeing and coordinating policies at the metropolitan level, together with the lack of economic resources for public investment, paralyzed any action that might have been taken in this domain in the years following Argentina's return to democracy in 1983. In the early 1990s, the new government of President Carlos Menem embarked on a policy of privatization of selected basic public services as part of the package of neoliberal reforms advocated by multilateral financial institutions. The quality and coverage of urban services now operated by foreign multinationals improved, although at a consumer cost that has become ever more prohibitive for an increasingly impoverished population.

Buenos Aires in the Twenty-First Century

In parallel with the global trend toward megaprojects of urban regeneration and rehabilitation of old industrial districts, the 1990s witnessed important physical transformations in the central district. The revival of the old Puerto Madero riverfront and the derelict Abasto neighborhood provide spectacular examples of such grand schemes. Yet these targeted interventions on selected portions of the city, for all their underlying symbolic power, offer very little by way of an answer to the city's most pressing problems. Traffic congestion, high levels of noise and air pollution, as well as an inefficient water drainage infrastructure are among the many issues that need to be addressed. Finally, the growth of the city's slum settlements has accelerated considerably since the early 1990s, most markedly within the city center, where it was previously believed that numbers had stabilized and would even start decreasing.

Whereas the Autonomous City's new institutional framework provides grounds for hope, solving Buenos Aires's urban problems will require more than a mere change in formal institutions. If the Argentine capital is to acquire the capacity to guide and craft its own future in the twenty-first

century, a new mind-set with regard to the planning and management of urban matters is to emerge and be nurtured. The municipality has consequently chosen to open policy-making processes to greater public participation, for instance, through the creation of popular platforms of strategic planning and participatory budgeting. It is expected that these mechanisms will help pave the way toward more inclusive and balanced urban development in Buenos Aires.

Laurence Crot

See also Globalization; Urban Crisis; Urban Policy

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BUNGALOW

The bungalow has been described as the single form of residential architecture common to all continents. It is a single-story building with a moderately sloped roof, set in a landscaped, spacious urban or peri-urban plot, and occupied by a nuclear family. It is generally interpreted in relation to modern capitalist industrial expansion and its effect on settlement patterns and built forms, as expressed originally in British India. Discussions of the bungalow have therefore focused on tracing its origins, evolution, and sociospatial impact.

Etymology

Bungalow derives from the Hindi, Mahrati, or Gujurati *bangla*, meaning "of or belonging to Bengal." The term was used by Indians and Europeans in India during the seventeenth century.

It was anglicized during the eighteenth century, with the standard English spelling first recorded in 1784. The term was documented in England in 1788, but it was still identified as linguistically Indian. By the mid-nineteenth century, it was fully incorporated into the English language. "Bungalow" is found in at least 10 European languages. It was first recorded in Australia in 1876 and in North America in 1880. Scholars argue that the bungalow was popularized in West Africa in the 1890s. Thus, the etymology of *bungalow* suggests a timeline and geography of cultural diffusion. Yet, most scholars agree that the term *built form* and associations have not always been coterminous. Proposing a single origin and course of development for the bungalow might therefore be unproductive.

The Bungalow in India

According to Anthony King, a tropical dwelling type for European use emerged in British India by the late eighteenth century. It incorporated features from four sources: a local Bengali house form, the non-Bengali Indian appellation "bungalow," the adaptation of said form and nomenclature by European settlers, and the further development of the veranda under Portuguese influence. A desire to separate British and Indian bodies and modes of living lay at the core of the bungalow's development. The resulting form, a large central room surrounded by smaller rooms and a veranda, translated colonial ideology into the fabric of home life. Deep verandas protected an inner sanctum from excessive heat and allowed for greater control of interactions with "natives." Its efficacy was enhanced by placing the building at the center of a large garden segregated from Indian settlements. Thus the Anglo-Indian bungalow-compound was associated with protosuburban settings like military cantonments, "civil lines," and hill stations. Two overlapping architectural expressions of the bungalow were in place in the nineteenth century: a sprawling single-story structure under a pitched roof that referred directly to Bengali prototypes and a one- to two-story flat-roofed villa influenced by neoclassical architecture in England. For a few lucky Indians, inhabiting a bungalow was a sign of assimilation into the colonial order. By the twentieth century,

the colonial bungalow was reintegrated into Indian culture, where it described any detached single-family dwelling.

William J. Glover and Swati Chattopadhyay have complicated this view of the bungalow-compound. Glover shows that the bungalow was an idealized site for the enactment of upper-middle-class British values, whose attainability was compromised by the building's unfamiliar materiality. As Chattopadhyay has shown for Calcutta (Kolkata), the boundaries between the "White town" of Europeans and the "Black town" of Indians were blurry, with various classes of Europeans living in Indian-built bungalows in close proximity to locals. Indeed, the bungalow was so unstable discursively that a countermetropolitan femininity flourished under its auspices. In a sense then, the bungalow served as a prop for British colonial authority.

Bungalows, Leisure, and Suburbanization

India was part of the global system of capitalist expansion whose most important node was Britain. By the mid-nineteenth century, a surplus of capital had accumulated in Britain. Railways and their associated urban developments were an important outlet for this surplus, as was the growing market for leisure activities and products. The image of leisurely colonial life disseminated through publications coincided with the desires of wealthy classes and produced the physically isolated seaside bungalow. From the seaside bungalow emerged the suburban bungalow, a permanent and populist form made possible through the popularization of automobiles. The bungalow in Britain was eventually demonized because of its effects on the pristine countryside.

Bungalows in Britain, North America, and Australia owe their existence to similar forces. From the 1880s, a globally mobile network of architects and builders ensured that the "bungalow idea" was adopted for bourgeois seaside houses in the eastern United States. Though they incorporated some of the stereotypical elements of the Anglo-Indian type, these bungalows adhered more closely to the bungalow's social function than to its form. Bungalows became more popular at the end of the century when the middle class adopted an Arcadian ideology whose ultimate expression was the craftsman bungalow.

A smaller, permanent, developer-built version of the bungalow became standard first in American streetcar suburbs and then in automobile suburbs. California, with its seemingly infinite supply of cheap land, available private capital, prevailing anticomunitarian ideology, and willingness to experiment with new transportation technologies, offered an ideal setting for the full development of the suburban bungalow between 1905 and 1930. The California bungalow formed the basis of a national type repeated with minor variations throughout the country alongside its large-scale complement, the suburb. Bungalow-led suburbanization, however, consolidated the segregation of racial and ethnic minorities in the inner city in ways that recall the bungalow's colonial origins.

In Australia, fewer social, cultural, and political constraints allowed for the widespread adoption of the bungalow by British settlers, many of whom had experience from other parts of the empire. A free market economy, relatively homogeneous population, and even greater access to land meant that the single-family, detached dwelling was viable for a large proportion of the European population. Since the colony was integrated into the global capitalist system, fluctuations in capital and subsequent shifts in social preoccupations led to the construction of vacation bungalows in the 1870s and California-style bungalow suburbs in the 1910s.

Previous analyses of the bungalow in Africa have relied on incomplete knowledge of the continent's material and social histories. Anthony King, for example, explains the bungalow as a European residential form imported from India at the end of the nineteenth century to provide shelter for a new crop of British colonial administrators. By stimulating urbanization, the bungalow became a tool and later a symptom of Westernization.

Advances in Africanist archaeology, however, confirm that urban living was not anomalous in Africa before the nineteenth century. Tarikhu Farrar and others have shown that complex, dense, organized settlements were typical of precolonial West Africa. Furthermore, elements of the bungalow existed both independently and in combination. European presence on the West African coast from the fifteenth century offered ample opportunity for a two-way cultural exchange that included these forms, as Jay Edwards has shown.

The specific social, cultural, and economic functions of the Anglo-Indian bungalow imported to the British African colonies, and their subsequent appropriation by postcolonial elites, arguably distinguished it from existing African “house and veranda” types. However, some of these functions, like the use of verandas as a social space and as a means to control interior building temperatures, were common to both West African and Anglo-Indian examples.

Other colonial authorities in Africa also used the bungalow. From the 1820s, the Swiss-German Basel Missionary Society used a similar building type in the Gold Coast as part of a comprehensive proselytization policy. In 1895 German colonial administrators identified the Anglo-Indian bungalow as the building type best suited for European use in East Africa.

Theories of the development of the bungalow in colonial contexts share a common disregard for the continued development of the “original” bungalow form, arguing that the postcolonial elite’s use of the building type owes more to European influence than anything else. Future work on the topic might investigate the coexistence of “original” and “imposed” forms in order to achieve a more holistic understanding.

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See also Colonial City; Suburbanization; Veranda

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BUNKERS

There is an increasing interest, in urban studies, sociology, and archaeology, in military bunkers. The concept informed Paul Virilio’s *Bunker Archaeology* (1994), for instance, and has been significant for the Brutalist tradition of European architects, including Le Corbusier. European cultural sociology has also expanded its themes and theorizing within particular militarized landscapes and bunkered urban locations, as has contemporary British archaeology.

Military bunkers, then, are a key component of the urban condition, if not always consciously acknowledged as such. Nevertheless, the concept has been reframed regarding the increasingly synchronized themes of postmodernity, war, and the emerging interests of the new subject of combat archaeology. The well-known characteristics of postmodern war—the worldwide scope of militarism, information warfare, unmanned aerial vehicles, compulsory or intentional urban mobility and confinement, nomadic terrorists, unstable patterns of military deployment, and so on—have fundamentally changed the everyday experience and symbolic associations of military bunkers. Consequently, the supposed certainties of modern urban identity, confidently situated beyond the particularities of military bunkers, which typically house an underground shelter of reinforced concrete with an incline and embrasures for artillery above ground, are increasingly disturbed and relocated. A useful approach is to conceive of military bunkers as military spaces, for military spaces such as military bunkers are fields of military action. Military bunkers, accordingly, are military spaces to which the potentiality for military action has been assigned. Hence, military bunkers establish a sense of militarized and civilianized urban identities through various communicative and physically destructive relationships, such as what is meant by the “home front” or where the home front is located.

Postmodern critics argue that the link between military spaces and military bunkers—which, in the modern period, physically positioned military–urban affairs, social behavior, cultural rites, and archaeological customs—has disappeared in contemporary societies. Virilio, for example, discussing the currently prevailing “orbitalization” of militarization and information, suggests that urban meaning has vanished from military bunkers, and thus from the city, which has itself disappeared and dispersed in the postmodernized logic of militarized spaces of orbitalization. This corroborates Mike Gane’s belief that Virilio’s allegiance to the concept of military bunkers as involving genuine inertia and a feeling of imprisonment adds up to little more than an unresolved dilemma or a plea for a new kind of resistance that has no means. Alternatively, Gane proposes a model of urban living influenced by Jean Baudrillard’s analyses of simulation founded on spaces subject to reversibility.

Yet John Schofield asserts that sensitivity to military bunkers can offer an essential anchor in material culture and a stable approach to modern warfare. He perceives military bunkers as archaeological sites and theoretical objects that can extend the methodologies of contemporary archaeology. Challenging established archaeological principles, Schofield travels beyond recent conflict to an accelerated field of research that deals simultaneously with historical events, material remains, heritage, and human catastrophe. Such an intense combination evokes a global awareness of political events, military actions, and military bunkers. Schofield’s investigation into these issues in theoretical terms and in essays on military culture and archaeological literatures, history, and anthropology gracefully combine sociological discussion and concrete case studies of military bunkers as heritage management practice.

John Armitage

See also Urban Archaeology; Urban Semiotics

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BUSES

Buses are often seen as a cheap, dirty, inconvenient, and unreliable mode of transport, used only by those who have no other option. Yet Transport for London estimates that around 6 million bus journeys are made in London every day, with buses the fastest-growing mode of transport in the city. While light rail or metro systems typically exist only in the largest cities or in cities that have experienced extended periods of socialist government, bus riding is a feature of urban life globally and has been for some time: Early bus services were horse drawn, with the first proliferation of “omnibuses” occurring in European cities in the 1830s. Bus links remain important to residents in marginal communities, *banlieues*, suburbs, or slums, representing connections to city centers and providing opportunities for employment. Their very banality, however, as a taken-for-granted aspect of everyday life, has meant that they have often escaped the attention of urban researchers. Despite this, buses are vital parts of urban infrastructure, can expose inequalities in urban governance, and can reveal the practices involved in everyday urban mobilities.

Buses as Urban Infrastructure

Buses represent the cheapest form of urban transport infrastructure development for cities. They cost the least to instigate and maintain, and they are able to collect fares from a far greater number of locations than is their major current competitor, light rail. Despite this, they tend to be less popular than larger infrastructural projects among city governments. This is partially due to their disadvantages: They tend to have lower capacities, can be more uncomfortable, and are more susceptible to disruption from roadwork and traffic problems than are other forms of public transportation. They also have a negative image that contributes to their avoidance by some city governments, who find that

flagship metro or light rail projects bring greater external capital investment. In some cities, however, bus rapid transport systems (BRTSs) have been developed as a central part of transport infrastructure. These BRTSs integrate services, amenities, computing and information technologies, and dedicated roadways to produce a fast and frequent service. Due to the comparatively low up-front costs, these are most extensive in, but not limited to, the Global South. The BRTS in Curitiba, Brazil, is viewed as one of the biggest successes, being used by around 70 percent of commuters. It makes use of local minibuses to connect passengers to larger-capacity, high-speed central routes with dedicated road lanes. Bus companies operate independently but are regulated and supported by the city. Stops are fully wheelchair accessible and contain facilities to allow passengers to purchase tickets, as well as public telephones and conveniences. BRTSs, however, require extensive planning, meaning that transposing certain examples of best practice without regard to contextual issues can result in poorly implemented schemes in some cities. The BRTS currently under development in Delhi has been heavily criticized during its trial period because of the ecological damage involved in its construction, as well as poor planning, which has reduced road space for car users and which has placed bus stops between busy lanes of traffic. Broadly, it seems that city governments often require the autonomy of those in South America to produce successful bus rapid transit schemes, something unavailable to many Asian cities.

The ownership of buses can be indicative of local government attitudes toward public control of urban amenities. Bus company ownership varies from state monopolies to privately owned but publicly regulated services to privately owned enterprises. Although private ownership might provide more efficient and effective bus services as loss-making routes are dropped, government operation of buses can reflect the belief that social welfare requires certain services irrespective of their ability to make profit and that markets are not always adequately robust to ensure that suitable bus services are provided. In a review of the liberalization of bus services in various cities in the Global North and South, D. A. C. Manuder and T. C. Mbara found no overall pattern of better performance between private and state-owned bus services,

suggesting that contextual influences are more important than ownership. In many Western cities, buses are privately operated but publicly regulated, leading to struggles over planning and service integration that can reveal the power relations between private and state parties in cities.

Buses and Social Inequalities

Due to their relatively low cost, bus services are typically used by the urban poor and can often act as indicators of the inequalities of a city. In many cities in the United States, passengers are drawn mainly from the poorer Black communities and are also predominantly female, typically using buses for daily shopping or to travel to employment in central urban areas. Where bus provision is inadequate, inequalities along gender, ethnic, and class lines can be increased. This creates a politics of mobility in which access to and provision of bus services alter the life opportunities of city residents. Sikivu Hutchinson explores these issues in Los Angeles with one of the few extended analyses of the experiences of bus travel in a Western city. Los Angeles is famous as a city built around automobility, with infrastructure developed around freeways and light rail. As with other cities with such street design, this lends itself to one-way trips between central and suburban areas, rather than the triangular mobility patterns that bus services cater to. Buses are run by private companies whose services are not integrated, with return or transfer tickets not available. This has reduced the mobility of the urban poor, aiding the decline of downtown in favor of urban sprawl. Activist groups such as the Bus Riders Union have argued that this amounts to racial discrimination, favoring the transport of the White majority over that of the Latina/o and Black populations. These divisions in transport provision have contributed to the fragmented nature of postmodern Los Angeles.

Buses in Urban Studies Research

Despite these various roles in urban life, buses have generally remained absent from urban researchers' work, outside of the specialized field of transport studies. Research into urban transport has traditionally looked at large infrastructural projects, such as the development of freeways,

suburban road systems, and light rail networks, rather than at the more mundane and less visible networks of bus travel. Indeed, it is only in recent years as part of a wider trend in social science toward studies of “mobilities” that urban studies has taken people’s daily transport practices seriously. Mobilities research focuses on the embodied practices of movement, from practices of car use to the challenges faced by transnational migrants. This is inspired both by theoretical engagement with poststructuralist philosophers such as Giles Deleuze and Michel de Certeau and by an understanding of the empirical increase in global mobility in recent times. Even within this literature, however, there has been a focus toward driving or walking practices over bus journeys.

The mobilities research that has focused on bus routes has emphasized that buses rarely form a visible part of the urban spaces through which they travel. Rather, they pass through unnoticed, traveling along the pavement as cars speed by. Whereas some researchers define the internal space of the bus as a “non-place” that fills the time traveling between places, Renee Human describes the variety of practices that are involved in the production of the space of the bus. She discusses, for example, the very regular patterns that passengers follow when positioning themselves on the bus, spreading themselves out as much as possible. Human also identifies differing practices of communication between passengers on the bus, varying from discussions of travel logistics to more in-depth conversations between regular riders. In this understanding of bus-riding mobilities, riding the bus involves a series of learned practices that may be indicative both of community formation and, when less-experienced passengers use the bus, of the social divisions within a city.


Buses, then, play a series of roles in cities, from high-speed BRTSs, which can move commuters around a city efficiently, to low-cost transport options for the urban poor. They often indicate the attitude of city governments toward the structural inequalities of urban space and infrastructure, whether this is through the level of state support and regulation of bus companies or through the patterns of transportation investment. Their negative image can make buses less attractive to cities than metro or light rail links, but they can provide better value for the money. The practices of bus riding can reveal some of the microsociologies of urban navigation and the embodiment of social divisions and inequalities within a city.

Robert Shaw

See also Journey to Work; Local Government; Streetcars; Subway; Transportation; Transportation Planning

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CAIRO, EGYPT

Cairo, or Al-Qahira (the Victorious), the Egyptian capital, is the core of a vast metropolitan area (Greater Cairo). In 2004, the city of Cairo, colloquially also referred to as Misr (as is the country), or lovingly as Um Al-Dunya (mother of the world), was estimated to have about 7.6 million inhabitants. The Greater Cairo region, one of the world's most densely populated urban regions, has almost 17 million residents. Greater Cairo includes the city of Cairo (on the east bank of the Nile) with its historic quarters around Fatimid Cairo and Old/Coptic Cairo; older popular quarters like Husainiyah, Shoubra, and Bulaq; colonial quarters like Heliopolis (Misr El Gedida), Zamalek, and Maadi; and postcolonial modernist developments like Medinet Nasr. In between are numerous newer low-income neighborhoods like Zawiya Al-Hamra, Sharabiya, and Manshiet Nasr. Greater Cairo includes the city of Giza on the west bank of the Nile. The last available population estimate (1996) lists Giza's population as 2.2 million. Considering Giza's recent phenomenal growth, the current figure is likely to be over 3 million. Giza includes its old core on the Nile, colonial neighborhoods (Doqqi, Sharia Al-Haram), older middle- to low-income quarters (Al-Agouza, Doqqi Al-Balad), postcolonial modernist middle-class developments (Muhandessin), and areas of low-income public housing (Munib). Interspersed in this cityscape are several older villages that were engulfed by the city (Mit Oqba, Huttia).

Surrounding this core cityscape is a vast and dense expanse of newer neighborhoods that have been built by their residents largely without official permits. Millions of residents live in these neighborhoods (e.g., Embaba, Dar As-Salaam, Matariya), often built around former villages. Greater Cairo also includes the cities of Shourbra Al-Khayma (Qalubiya Governorate) to the north and Helwan (Giza Governorate) to the south.

Long History

Over the millennia, Cairo's urban development followed a vague layering or mosaic pattern, where new additions were constructed not at the expense of existing quarters but adjacent to them. This pattern still underlies much of Cairo's cityscape, which is a mosaic of elements from different historical eras displaying vastly varying styles and spatial conceptualizations that produced a multitude of spatial forms and social and cultural practices.

On the Nile, where Giza and Misr Al-Qadimah are today, there has been, for millennia, a river crossing point. A small settlement developed by this small port on the east bank. Under Roman occupation, this settlement ("Babylon") was fortified. With the rise of Christianity in Egypt, Babylon was slowly surrounded by churches and developed into today's Misr Al-Qadimah (Old/Coptic Cairo). Some of its old churches still exist. Cairo's oldest synagogue, built in AD 882 (site of the Cairo Geniza), is located on the eastern edge of this quarter. When the Muslim forces under Amr Ibn Al-Aas

conquered and settled in Egypt in AD 641, they built their first mosque (the first in Africa), the Amr Ibn Al-Aas Mosque, immediately north of Misr Al-Qadimah. Muslim troops then built the city of Fustat as an expansion to the existing town. Fustat became the capital of the province of Egypt. Arab rulers and dynasties that followed continued the city's northward expansion. The Tulunids under Ahmad Ibn Tulun built the splendid Ibn Tulun Mosque (AD 879), which once more moved the town center north. In AD 969, the Fatimid rulers started building the walled city of Al-Qahirah north of the existing city. The Fatimid mosque and university of Al-Azhar (AD 972) came to be the oldest university in the world and remains a central institution of Muslim learning. The Ayyubids under Salah al-Din added the citadel above the city (AD 1182) to the east and further fortified the city. Under the Fatimids, Ayyubids, and the Mamluks (1250–1517), Cairo was a vibrant merchant city and the site of magnificent palaces, mosques, and large trading yards. In the fourteenth century Cairo had around 500,000 residents and was one of the largest cities in the world, larger than its European contemporaries.

The discovery of the sea route around the Cape of Good Hope to India in 1498 harmed Cairo's role as a trading city, when goods started to bypass the eastern Mediterranean. Cairo's expansion slowed down as it became a more regional center. Nonetheless, the city slowly started to spill over the Fatimid walls and the older quarters. By the eighteenth century, many craftsmen had left the increasingly crowded city and had moved their shops north, beyond the gate of Bab El-Futuh, to the quarter of Husainiyah. Others moved south to Sayida Zeinab. Similarly, the area around a small lake immediately west of the walled city, which had been used for summer homes, turned into a permanent quarter, Ezbekiya. By the late eighteenth century, the lake's waterfront was lined with splendid mansions of wealthy merchants. Finally, the small port town of Bulaq west of the city on the Nile was a thriving merchants and crafts town.

European Conquest, Modernity, Colonialism

In 1798, Napoleon Bonaparte invaded Egypt. Bombing its way into Alexandria, his army defeated

the Egyptian forces by the village of Embaba, then crossed the Nile at Giza and conquered Cairo. The French army confiscated the lakefront mansions in Ezbekiya to set up their quarters. Although the French occupation lasted for only three years and as such was fairly inconsequential, it ushered in some transformations. After some years of local strife, Muhammad Ali, an Albanian officer who had been fighting for the Ottoman forces sent to defeat the French, was successful in gaining control over the country in 1805. To prevent further European attacks in a political climate of aggressive imperialism, he designed projects of forceful modernization to make Egypt an equal to the European powers. Muhammad Ali (ruled 1805–1848) did not use an urban master plan but changed specific elements of Cairo's physical and political structure. Cutting main thoroughfares through dense urban quarters (Sharia Muhammad Ali), setting up new institutions (governmental printing press in Bulaq, hospital and medical school of Qasr Al-Aini), and introducing new styles (using European architects), he implanted vague seeds of a modern city while keeping much of the existing cityscape intact.

In later decades of the nineteenth century, Muhammad Ali's descendants, in particular Khedive Ismail (ruled 1863–1879), intensified Cairo's modernization. Inspired by the architecture of Paris, Ismail set out to create his "Paris on the Nile." Using the time-honored method of expansion just outside the city, he designed the tract of land between Ezbekiya and the Nile front south of Bulaq to become "Ismailiyah," his modern city. A street grid was laid out and regulations formulated that all construction there had to be modern. The Qasr El-Nil Bridge across the Nile was opened in 1872, initiating Giza's integration into Cairo's cityscape. European powers deposed Ismail in 1879, and only three years later, in 1882, Egypt was invaded by the British. The British long-term high commissioner in Egypt, Lord Cromer (1883–1907), who ruled Egypt with an iron fist, had no comprehensive urban vision but acted solely with a view to increasing political power and economic profits. For Cairo this meant that developers and speculators were free to do as they pleased. Within a larger context of global economic boom and colonial speculation, Cairo witnessed an unprecedented economic and construction boom.

Infrastructural projects like bridges across the Nile and a new tramway (1896, Ataba to Abassiya) accommodated the construction frenzy as more distant lands were opened up for construction. Heliopolis, Garden City (guided by Ebenezer Howard's model), and Maadi were created as suburbs for the colonial elite. Lower-class foreign residents (craftsmen, shopkeepers) swelled the population of the neighborhood of Shoubra, north of Cairo's main train station. Middle-level colonial bureaucrats moved to new apartment buildings on the Nile island of Zamalek. The new national university (today's Cairo University), planned and constructed by the emerging anticolonial nationalist movement, settled on agricultural land in Giza in 1914. Many members of the emerging Egyptian professional elite settled in the 1920s and 1930s in the new neighborhoods north of the university.

In the first decades of the twentieth century, Cairo's modern infrastructure was rapidly extended to serve the colonial quarters and the outposts of an emerging global touristscape. The nascent tramway system was extended in 1900 to connect downtown Cairo to the Pyramids to allow for a comfortable ride for the local elite and tourists, and yet older quarters and villages (on the west bank) had no water, electricity, or phone lines. The Mena House Hotel, located at the foot of the Cheops pyramids, had a swimming pool in 1906, but there were still some households in 2006 in older Giza quarters without their own water tap.

Postcolonial Metropolis

After Egypt's full independence from British rule in 1955 to 1956, the government under Gamal Abdel Nasser (1954–1970) embarked on a course of rapid modernization and industrialization. His populist politics included the construction of vast tracts of public housing in Cairo and Giza. The quarter of Muhandessin was designed for bureaucrats and functionaries. Medinat Nasr was similarly designed for army officers and private construction. The downtown Mugamma, a megasize administration and public service building located at the southern end of the central square of Midan Al-Tahrir, and the TV building on the Nile in Bulaq best symbolize Nasserist popular architecture and projects. Political (1967 Six Day War) and economic problems and the sudden death of Nasser in 1970 ended this

populist phase. President Anwar Al-Sadat quickly ushered in a new era of economic liberalization and capitalist global integration. Cairo's face changed. Tourism increased, and the number of international five-star hotels increased along with it. Import and export businesses started to flourish, many of whose proceeds were invested in local real estate and construction. These developments are best symbolized in the dramatic changes in Muhandessin. Many Nasserist villas or small apartment buildings were replaced by apartment towers that were 20 or more stories high. Sadat's assassination in 1981 brought Hosni Mubarak to power; Mubarak continued Sadat's policies. Real estate speculation boomed, yet little housing was built for low-income groups. The economic liberalization of the 1970s had allowed growing numbers of Egyptians to migrate to the oil-rich countries of the Arab Gulf. When they returned with their remittances, many started to construct "informal" housing on the city's outskirts on agricultural land. Since the late 1970s, older quarters and villages, like Dar As-Salaam or Bulaq Al-Dakrou, have thus grown into densely populated urban quarters that today house millions of residents. Built without permits, these quarters were provided with public services only after they filled up. These quarters continue to grow.

In the early 1990s the government put considerable tracts of desert land surrounding the metropolitan area up for sale. This triggered a speculation and construction frenzy in the process of which the area of Greater Cairo (or the area to be built up) quintupled. Gated communities and other upscale developments started mushrooming, in particular around the planned desert city of 6th of October west of Giza, but also in the Muqattam area east of the city. Lower-middle-class condominiums were built in the quarter of Sheikh Zayed west of the Pyramids. Private clubs, amusement parks, and ever more glitzy malls were built at a rapid rate. Cairo's neoliberal face of the early twenty-first century is a new one: a high-density core (34,000 square kilometers in the city of Cairo) interspersed with fortresses of leisure and consumption (malls, hotels) and a lower-density "suburban" ring where the elite and new middle class enjoy larger spaces, greenery, malls, less-polluted air, and the relative absence of the poor. However, 6th of October

City already includes a growing number of lower-class residential areas.

Urban Spaces

Urban lives and cultures in Cairo, like elsewhere, take on many forms and expressions, which are constituted by dynamics of historical context, class, gender, age, urban regions, and religion or religiosity. The following illustrates four spatial, social, and cultural contexts to provide impressions of this vast cultural cityscape.

Midan Tahrir (Liberation Square), the former Midan Ismailiyah, the heart of Khedive Ismail's modern Cairo, still marks the core of Cairo. The recent history of this square represents many transformations in the larger cityscape. In the early 1980s Midan Tahrir was an immensely busy traffic node that included Cairo's central bus station. A small bridges system allowed pedestrians to traverse parts of the square above the busy streets and intersections. Bordered by the Egyptian Museum to the north, the Nile Hilton to the west, and the ubiquitous Mugamma building to the south, the square symbolized the political and economic complexity of Cairo, indeed Egypt, while simultaneously it was in the firm grip of the masses who maneuvered the square to ride buses, conduct bureaucratic works, and shop. Starting from the late 1980s the square saw a frenzy of construction, spatial change, and experiments done largely with the aim of getting the masses off the streets and indeed ultimately off the square. For most of the 1980s, Midan Tahrir was an ever-shifting construction site as the long-awaited Cairo subway was built. Simultaneously, the bus station was moved and removed, split up and resplit. The final solution was that several smaller terminals were set up in the vicinity of the square that now require passengers to walk longer distances for connecting buses. As Islamic militants in the early 1990s started to attack tourist locations, the parking lot in front of the Egyptian Museum became a security issue. In this context, lower-class citizens no longer were simply a crowded mass but a security issue; their spatiality became politicized. The experience of Midan Tahrir symbolizes two dynamics: the city's attempt to organize and control transportation and the lesson that ultimately it is impossible to control large public spaces and the masses that

inhabit them. Along with other factors, this lesson triggered the government's decision to relocate the museum, a central element in Cairo's touristscape, to the more controllable outskirts of Cairo, where the Grand Egyptian Museum is currently under construction for \$350 million.

El Tayibin (an ethnographic pseudonym) is a small, low-income enclave in the middle of a centrally located upper-middle-class neighborhood. Once an agricultural village, El Tayibin was engulfed by the colonial city decades ago. The community consists of an assortment of older village-style housing and newer, very small apartment buildings located on alleys too narrow for vehicular traffic. The residents, many of whom are descendants of the earlier peasant residents, are part of Cairo's vast lower class. Men engage in a variety of jobs, including car mechanics, itinerant vendors, lower-level civil servants, janitors, taxi drivers, newspaper vendors, and public sector workers. Many younger, unmarried women work low-paid industrial or sales jobs to assemble costly dowries that include refrigerators, semiautomatic washers, and stoves, among other items. Once married, most women stop working, as their meager salaries do not add much to the family budget, considering the expenses of transportation, clothes, and child care. Yet many women contribute much to the household's finances, or they stretch resources by providing services to others (sewing, haircutting, beauty services, child care). Some women keep chickens, ducks, geese, or goats. For some this is a way to provide meat for their families; for others this is a source of extra income if they sell eggs or animals for meat. The alleys of El Tayibin from early in the morning to late at night are full of people and activities as residents, like in similar communities, negotiate their lives and needs in the context of limited resources and space.

The CityStars Mall, located in the supersized Stars Centre entertainment complex, is a recent addition (2005) to Cairo's glamorous mall scene. Located in Medinat Nasr, the mall includes 550 stores of local, regional, and global brands, an indoor theme park, and a 16-screen movie theater. For those weary of the crowd, dust, and noise of the city, the mall even includes a bazaar (Khan el-Khalili) section, which offers high-price arts, kitsch, and Egyptiana. Numerous food courts include local ("Fuul Tank"), regional (Fattoush, Lebanese),

and global (McDonald's, Monchow Wok) fare. Beano's Coffee Shop serves coffee in beautifully designed local, "Fathi Mahmoud," porcelain and provides a globalized coffee shop flair, replete with newspapers and laptops. The mall's inner court, which at the ground floor boasts a huge round fountain with a large palm tree, is held up by stylized pharaonic columns that reach to the sixth floor. As one showcase of new Middle Eastern or Muslim consumerism, CityStars offers a wide variety of fashions, including upscale modest Islamic women's fashions such as local dresses (gallabiya), Gulf-style abayahs, and South Asian shalwar-qameez outfits.

Suq El-Talat, or the Tuesday market, takes place every Tuesday, starting early in the morning in the midst of public housing in Giza. The market is very old and indeed predates the public housing. Located south of the hospital of Um Al-Masriyyin, Suq El-Talat offers a large variety of affordable food and household goods. One can enter the market from different sides as it literally spills from its center around the apartment blocks into neighboring streets. Entering from Salah Salim Street, one encounters sellers of plates and other kitchen ware made from crude recycled plastic. Farther down is a seller with manually manufactured sieves and strainers. There are vendors with cart loads of industrially produced cheap kitchen ware. Farther down are female vendors, some of whom come at dawn from surrounding agricultural areas. They sell rice, eggs, vegetables, or homemade cheeses. One woman who has been shopping here for decades noted: "I always buy my rice from one woman from the Fayoum, her rice and the prices are good and I have known her for a long time." Taking a left turn at one point gets the shopper to an area where women sell live chickens, ducks, geese, and pigeons. One can carry one's merchandise home alive, or sellers will slaughter the animal on the spot. Turning back (south) farther along the apartment blocks, there are fabric stands (for clothes, furniture, curtains). There is nothing that one needs to start and maintain a household that is not available at reasonable rates at this market.

Global Metropolis

Over the millennia, the (Greater) Cairo region has always been part of various, often overlapping

political, economic, cultural, and social networks. Whether as part of the extensive medieval trade network that linked the entire Old World, as a colonial capital, or as an emerging global city, Cairo has always been a center with multiple, often far-reaching connections. Over the millennia, ties intensified at times and faded at other times. Situated as an important crossroad between Europe, Africa, and Asia, and in another context between Islam, Christianity, and Judaism, Cairo has long played an important role as a center for Arabs and Muslims, and because of its cosmopolitan nature it has also been a point of economic, cultural, and religious exchange and tolerance. For the past 200 years, in the context of colonialism, modernization, and globalization, Cairo has entered yet another phase of intense links and ties—this time, however, not as a central power but starting from the nineteenth century as a colonial capital and in the postcolonial era as a regional center. In recent years, as political and economic dynamics are in dramatic flux, Cairo's regional and global roles are once more threatened, this time by a regional newcomer and urban novice: Dubai.

Petra Kuppinger

See also Colonial City; Islamic City; Shopping Center

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CALCUTTA, INDIA

See Kolkata (Calcutta), India

CANBERRA, AUSTRALIA

Canberra is Australia's only inland capital city and the seat of its national government. The city celebrates its centenary in 2013. It is one of the major planned cities of the twentieth century and represents an exceptional open air museum of modernist planning, architecture, and landscape architecture ideas. It is the product less of one plan than of many plans, which have shaped its physical growth through distinctive phases of development. Canberra has grown from scratch to a planned suburban city of 330,000 with a diversified economy, major cultural institutions, and a high quality of life. While Canberra is still a place apart to many average Australians, the reality is an increasing convergence with other Australian cities in economic, social, and planning terms.

Site of the Australian National Government

The federation of the six former British colonies in 1901 demanded a seat of government. To reconcile the ambitions of the two largest cities, Sydney and Melbourne, a compromise was written into the Australian Constitution providing for a commonwealth territory, not less than 100 square miles (258 square kilometers) but at least 100 miles (160 kilometers) from Sydney. In the interim, Melbourne would provide a temporary home for the new federal government. In 1908 the site of Canberra was chosen, and three years later the government reoccupied an area of nearly 2,400 square kilometers in southern New South Wales to be retained in public ownership. The leasehold administration of the Australian Capital Territory has facilitated overall control of city planning and

development. Derived from a local Aboriginal word meaning "meeting place," the new city's name was made official on March 12, 1913—now celebrated as Canberra Day.

The Griffins' Winning Design

The Congress of Engineers, Architects, Surveyors, and Members of Allied Professions, held during the commonwealth celebrations in May 1901, was the first major opportunity for professionals to discuss design issues. The idea of an international city design competition emerged as the ideal way to attract the best plan in the world. The competition, announced by the commonwealth government in April 1911, was nonetheless dogged by controversy. A total of 137 plans submitted for judging by early 1912 provided a kaleidoscopic overview of best-practice global planning cultures on the eve of World War I. The winning entry was Design No. 29 by Walter Burley Griffin and Marion Mahony Griffin. Both were former protégés of Frank Lloyd Wright, based in Chicago.

The brilliantly presented axial-polycentric design of the Griffins mixed City Beautiful and Garden City influences with more exotic eastern and ancient inspirations in a highly original landscape composition for a low-rise streetcar city of 75,000 organized around central ornamental waters. Unlike fortified ancient cities, the hilltops were largely kept free of development. After winning the competition, Walter Griffin was invited to Australia, but the government substituted a plan concocted from various competition entries before sanity prevailed and Griffin returned in 1914 as Federal Capital Director of Design and Construction. He endured an unhappy tenure, with progress stymied by the financial stringencies of World War I and the opposition of public servants. A major government inquiry exonerated Griffin, but he left the project in 1921 and spent the rest of his time in Australia in private practice as an architect and town planner.

City Planning Post-Griffin

After Griffin's departure, the Federal Capital Advisory Committee consolidated his start but retreated to a cost-saving strategy of "utilitarian development and economy." Canberra was reconceptualized through

extensive tree planting and suburban style planning into a “garden town” while some departures from Griffin’s recommendations for the allocation of land uses and placement of buildings were set in motion. With less than 100 houses by 1924, the pace of development had to quicken if the federal parliament was to meet in the national capital within the three years stipulated by the government. The gazettal of Griffin’s scheme as a road plan in 1925 paid lip service to the richness of his planning vision but nonetheless established the geometric framework for later planning—notably the central “parliamentary triangle.” The same year a new Federal Capital Commission was appointed. This was a powerful body with ample financing, a large number of staff, and full corporate control over planning, construction, maintenance, and general administration. It achieved the goal of opening the first (albeit temporary) parliament house in 1927. The wider nation was still skeptical about the concept of a remote but indulged “bush capital” for privileged politicians and elite public servants, an antagonism that remains.

After the job was done, the commission was disbanded and Canberra’s population declined with the onset of the Great Depression. From 1930 until the late 1950s the planning and administration of Canberra was divided among several federal ministries including Home Affairs and Works. A city administrator provided a semblance of coordination alongside the National Capital Planning and Development Committee. Critics still complained about “a good sheep station spoiled.” There were few new major public buildings, the Australian War Memorial (1941) being a notable exception; it is now one of Australia’s major domestic tourist attractions. The city had a diffuse garden suburb character, but even this was threatened by severe housing shortages as it became established as a national center for military operations during World War II.

The National Capital Development Commission

Political embarrassment at the state of the city led to a crucial 1955 inquiry by a Senate committee. The major recommendation was to create a single central authority with sufficient finance and power to carry out a balanced, long-term program of

urban development. The resultant National Capital Development Commission (NCDC), guided initially by advice from British planning authority William Holford, transformed Canberra from a small garden town into Australia’s largest non-coastal city and a planned metropolis of international significance. Population growth was fueled by a major relocation program of public servants from Melbourne in the 1960s, Canberra’s so-called golden era.

The NCDC was effectively a new town corporation with extraordinary powers buttressed by public land ownership. For the first time since the early Griffin period, Canberra again became a national center for planning innovation. By the 1970s the city was also the exemplar of a national policy of planned urban decentralization. Planning was dominated by a technocratic physical approach that worked efficiently while the NCDC’s major brief was the production of a standardized urban environment. The key strategic document was *Tomorrow’s Canberra* (1970), whose analytical rationale came from a major land use and transportation study undertaken by American consultants Alan Vorhees and Associates. The desired urban structure of metropolitan Canberra was a Y-plan articulated as a series of discrete communities of 50,000 to 100,000 residents with nodal town centers and linked by an internal public transportation spine and peripheral freeways. This schema laid the blueprint for the new suburban towns of Woden, Belconnen, Tuggeranong, and Gungahlin and remains evident today.

Since the 1960s, landmark elements in the planned landscape came to fruition, from major national buildings such as the National Library, the High Court, and the National (Art) Gallery, to a metropolitan hierarchy of commercial retail nodes to the damming of the Molonglo River to create the centerpiece, Lake Burley Griffin. The high point was the new Parliament House designed by Mitchell, Giurgola, and Thorp and opened to celebrate the Australian bicentennial of European settlement in 1988.

By then winds of change were evident. The NCDC’s corporate planning approach was seen at odds with moves toward greater community participation, with a Legislative Assembly already having been established in 1974. Pursuing an economically rationalist ideology, the federal government was

keen to divest itself further of massive investment responsibilities. A series of administrative and efficiency reviews laid the foundations for self-government, and the NCDC was disbanded in 1989. Associated with the thrust toward smaller government was a climate of deregulation, which, in Canberra's case, saw greater discretion accorded market forces in the development process, a trend that has intensified. Planning and development control was split between the small National Capital Authority responsible for the main parliamentary and other designated national areas, and a territory planning authority, a cross between a state and local government agency. The National Capital Plan (which first came into effect in 1990) provides the overarching legal framework for planning and development, complemented by the Territory Plan providing for "the people of the Territory."

Contemporary Canberra

Since the late 1980s, when the city headed past the quarter million population mark, it has begun to confront many of the same housing, land use, transport, and environmental management problems faced by the established cities: car dependency and traffic congestion; demands for more multiunit dwellings and urban infill; accommodating and caring for an aging population; redevelopment of brownfields precincts; coping with environmental hazards, including bush fires; climate change; and historic preservation. Strategic planning emphasizes archetypal sustainable city planning objectives such as full employment, a healthy community, compactness, a responsive transport system, and respect for the natural environment. A federally funded "Griffin Legacy" study (2004) identified urban design opportunities in the spirit of historic planning proposals, but concerns have been raised by the private sector at prospects for overdevelopment and lack of community consultation by a vigilant and well-informed electorate.

Canberra has a highly mobile population, predicted to grow to 400,000 by 2050. Its dual planning systems endure, but under increasing scrutiny within a political climate geared to planning deregulation and following a change of government at the federal level in late 2007. A 2008 commonwealth government inquiry into the National Capital

Authority made a series of recommendations aimed at securing more integrated and holistic governance but reaffirmed the national commitment to the city. Although development pressures and the process of "normalization" evident since the 1980s have eroded the city's iconic status as a product of enlightened public planning, Canberra remains unique for historical, political, and geographic reasons and well deserving of consideration for UNESCO World Heritage listing.

Robert Freestone

See also Capital City; City Beautiful Movement; Urban Planning

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CAPITAL CITY

From ancient Athens and Rome to Beijing and Tenochtitlan, the capital city was a national or imperial command center. Face-to-face contacts were essential in consultation and decision making or as sources of history where written texts were nonexistent, as in the realms of the Incas and Aztecs. The capital city also offered an overwhelming demonstration of the superiority of the gods. Athens focused on the Parthenon, Rome on its Forum, and the pre-Columbian capitals

boasted enormous temples and pyramids in their city centers. Thus, the capital city provided legitimacy to worldly rulers and their expansionist policies.


It is remarkable to notice that all four capital cities (Athens, Rome, Beijing, and Tenochtitlan) have continued their role until this very day, although the last one is now better known as Mexico City, the world's second largest agglomeration. Obviously they were flexible enough to adapt to the requirements of the modern state.

Premodern Capital Cityscapes

The two functions of the premodern seats of government were revived in Europe's seventeenth century when power was sanctioned by the

Christian churches, added to which came the role of the capital as the visible demonstration of national grandeur. Absolutist regimes dominated the continent, with the capital as the visible apex of the urban hierarchy. Both its size and splendor depended on the national tax-extracting capacity. The consuming power of the court, nobility, and clergy entertained a vast army of service providers, from luxury craftsmen to porters and servants. Thus, 8 out of Europe's 10 largest cities were parasitic court capitals. They filled no economic function remotely consistent with their size.

These court capitals were rivals in ostentatious display. Their urban design made abundant use of the discovery of the perspective. Streets were not conceived primarily as traffic arteries but as a



Mannheim around 1800

Source: Andrews, J. Ca. 1776. "A Plan of the City of Mannheim [Mannheim]." In *Plans of the Principal Cities in the World*. London: John Stockdale. Copper engraved Plate XXII with decorative title. Sheet size 255 mm × 350 mm, plate size 185 mm × 275 mm.

Table I Europe's 10 Largest Cities in 1750
(population × 1,000)

1.	London	676
2.	Paris	560
3.	Naples	324
4.	Amsterdam	219
5.	Lisbon	213
6.	Vienna	169
7.	Moscow	161
8.	Venice	158
9.	Rome	157
10.	St. Petersburg	138

scenography offering broad vistas on statues, noble palaces, or impressive art galleries. Their flanks were kept sober and stern so as to not distract the eyes of the visitor from the monument in the distance. Classicist architecture, with its emphasis on symmetry and proportion, was ideally suited for that aim. The resulting cityscape impressed people as truly monumental. The orthogonal layout testified to the ruler's will imposed on what previously was an irregular agrarian parcellation. The land was brought into his hands by expropriation and extortion.

Saint Petersburg

No other capital demonstrated its ruler's superiority as newly founded Saint Petersburg in Russia did. But opposite to Versailles or Caserta, the royal alternatives to Paris and Naples that were also created ex nihilo, Czar Peter the Great founded a veritable capital. Although its location was extremely peripheral and its marshy soil and harsh climate were serious disadvantages, all these things were secondary to the czar's wish to open a window to the West, and thus to progress and civilization. Enormous squares and parade grounds in its center testified to his disdain for the costs of urban land reclaimed at great expense. The volume and design of his palaces, built in natural stone that had to be hauled over hundreds of miles, were unmatched elsewhere in Europe. But even miniature capitals like Mannheim or Nancy developed the language of urban display and grandeur that became the almost universal vocabulary of power in following ages.

Amsterdam and Venice

Two cities did not fit the absolutist trend. The size of Amsterdam and Venice was consistent with their economic function. Politics hardly played a role. Venice was a city-state, whereas Amsterdam dominated the Dutch Republic (1648–1795) commercially and financially, without, however, claiming the title of capital, which would have been of little value in this extremely federalist state with its weak central government.

Both cities had to be drained constantly by a network of canals. This required urban planning, resulting in the unique system of waterways that is typical of them. But individual building patrons were left free to display their design preferences. Opposite to the court capitals, top-down aesthetic control was unthought of. It resulted in townscapes that were valued as *picturesque*, in which residences were conceived as individual statements of the owners, differing from the neighbors in building materials, volume, and design, and yet not producing a chaotic environment.

Paris

However much admired, no one in the nineteenth century saw the picturesque as a suitable carrier for a capital city. For this, one needed the elaboration of the proven techniques of the baroque era adapted to the needs of the age. Nowhere was such exercise more convincing than in the *grands travaux* of Baron Haussmann in Paris (1853–1870). He transformed the *goût du roi* into the *goût bourgeois* and thus brought the taste of absolutism to the broader public.

The visual impact of Paris's new townscape was considerable. The many new states founded in nineteenth-century Europe were eager to impress foreign visitors and their own citizens alike as worthy members of the European community. One way to gain respect was to develop the national capital into the icon and the showcase of the nation, highlighting statues of the heroes of science, industry, culture, and the battlefield. The "special effects" to manipulate the eyes of the visitor to these carriers of national pride were copied from Paris. Haussmann's influence was also felt outside Europe. From Buenos Aires to Cairo we find the traces of this townscape of power, but it was certainly not universal.

Berlin

Federal states did not offer favorable conditions for emulating such townscapes. Its members resisted contributing to the grandeur of the capital, always suspected of usurping more power to the detriment of local states. This was the case in Germany, indisputably continental Europe's most powerful state since its unification in 1871. However successful, the country was a federation of kings, princes, and citizens of the free cities. They were brought together under the banner of the Second Reich but jealously guarded their local prerogatives. They refused spending their taxpayers' money on the embellishment of its new *Reichshauptstadt* Berlin. What splendor the city offered dated back to its role as the capital of absolutist Prussia. Even authoritarian Emperor Wilhelm II did not succeed in harnessing parliament into generous funding of its new capital.

What further added to Berlin's unimpressive image was dominant laissez-faire rule. Political liberalism emphasized a thin state, providing barriers against arbitrary spending. Embellishment schemes should be funded by local, not national, taxes. Compulsory purchase was rare and circumscribed by detailed procedures. Thus, laissez-faire liberalism was just as powerful an obstacle to massive urban intervention and embellishment as London illustrated. Foreigners visiting the capital of the world's wealthiest and most powerful nation were perplexed by the chaotic free market townscape of its central areas, with its cacophony of styles, each building trying to shout down its neighbor. Commerce, not the state, ruled supreme in the city.

Washington, D.C.

But the twin forces of federalism and laissez-faire did not prevent the young American republic from creating an impressive capital. Its grid plan was devised by L'Enfant (1791), an enlightened French architect, but it attained true glory in 1902 with the upgrading of the Washington, D.C., National Mall under supervision of Daniel Burnham, who had just returned from a study trip to the leading capitals of Europe. Funding was a minor problem now that the United States was beginning its ascendancy as an international power that required a truly awe-inspiring capital. It became one of the more

convincing statements of the City Beautiful, in which Old World precedents were domesticated by a less assertive indigenous monumentalism.

Totalitarianism and the Capital City

The World War I experience muted enthusiasm for the capital as a carrier of national superiority. But not for long. The triumph of totalitarian rule in Europe became manifest in the reshaping of the capital into an overwhelming demonstration of power. Mussolini's interventions in Rome had no other motive than to point Italians to the continuity between the Roman Empire and the fascist state. He carefully excavated the Via dei Fori Imperiali so as to confront his countrymen with the remnants of Roman triumph. In the near distance they stood eye to eye with modern translations of *Romanità* (the Roman world) as conceived by Mussolini's court architect Marcello Piacentini, with their stern, uncompromising facades clad in marble, the undisputed symbol of beauty and durity. In his plans for the transformation of Berlin into *Germania*, the new capital of the Third Reich, Hitler's favorite architect, Albert Speer, stretched axiality and symmetry to oversized dimensions to accommodate mass manifestations in which millions of uniformed Germans paraded for their Führer. Joseph Stalin's proposals for the radical restructuring of Moscow served similar aims, although here a major concern was to eliminate as many cathedrals and churches as possible, eradicating the memory of what, until 1917, had been the capital of the Russian Orthodox Church. Here, Boris Iofán developed an eclecticist rhetoric that suited Stalin's preference for socialist realism.

Triumphant urbanism continued its fatal attraction on totalitarian rulers well after 1945, as is illustrated by Ceaușescu's presidential palace in Bucharest and Mao's Tiananmen Square in Peking. In both cases, planning by clearance provided the space needed for these megalomaniacal projects.

The Modern Developing Capital City

Many postcolonial, nontotalitarian states considered such vocabulary of the Grand Manner old-fashioned and no longer capable of expressing their nation's orientation on the future. Thus, India's president Jawaharlal Nehru rejected both

triumphalist monumentalism and a return to “indigenous” vernacular as suitable architectural carriers for the Punjab’s new capital, Chandigarh. Modernist architecture, with its rejection of the past and a functionalist town plan in which aesthetics ceased to play a role, brought the message home of a progressive young nation that identified with looking ahead, not back. In 1950 Nehru offered Le Corbusier the chance of a lifetime to finally demonstrate what his paper plans meant in reality.

The results were stunning. Chandigarh became the Mecca of modernism, where functionalism reigned triumphant. Le Corbusier removed the dependence of urban form on natural features. Despite the almost complete absence of car ownership, work and residential spaces were rigidly separated over great distances. Marginal markets and bazaars were zoned out. Huge concrete volumes such as the assembly hall and other public buildings stood isolated in the low-density Punjabi capital.

The example of Chandigarh proved particularly attractive to developing countries. In 1956, Oscar Niemeyer and Lúcio Costa, who both had worked with Le Corbusier, set out to design Brasília, which was to replace overcrowded Rio de Janeiro as the capital of the largest nation-state of Latin America. They produced a dazzling collage of futuristic structures in a scattered townscape that once again negated past styles or a genius loci. As a mission statement of Brazil’s orientation on times to come, widely publicized Brasília was a success. As a city, however, it suffered from the same problems as the new capitals implanted in Africa and Asia. It was far removed from the everyday needs of the majority of the people. Shantytowns and *favelas* continued to spring back up each time they were bulldozed away. Illegal street markets, hawkers, and beggars disturbed sanitized utopia.

The Changing Role of the Capital City

In the 1990s many felt that the role of the nation-state and thus of its capital was diminishing in an increasingly globalizing world. The main exceptions were emerging states, such as Bosnia, for whom the capital was the icon of newly gained independence. But in long-established, stable states, the symbolic value of the capital as solidified

national pride no longer played a role. The broad boulevards and magnificent panoramas that were part of the nineteenth-century special effects to highlight statues and monuments have lost their political and educational meaning. Generally speaking, the symmetrical layout correlates with “despotism,” German sociologist Georg Simmel wrote around 1900. Such associations are lost on the contemporary tourist. He cherishes monumental Saint Petersburg for its sheer urban beauty. That ancient Rome was unearthed and displayed as a tool to imbue Mussolini’s subjects with a profound feeling of *Romanità* is irrelevant for the visitor who is overwhelmed by the “capital of antiquity.” And whether he interprets London’s chaotic townscape as the logical outcome of a liberal laissez-faire order, as Simmel suggested, is doubtful. Washington, D.C., may occasionally serve as the patriotic shrine of the nation, but it just as often serves as a metaphor for fat government. To arouse feelings of national pride and to create a collective national identity, two major goals in the recent past, other techniques are used that are considered more powerful. Film, television, and the Internet create special effects that are more convincing than the built environment.

If size is an indicator of a city’s significance, the European capital still dominates all other urban settlements in that continent, with one exception, Saint Petersburg, which was a capital until 1918.

Table 2 Europe’s 10 Largest Cities in 2008

Rank	City	Country	Population
1	Moskva (Moscow)	Russia	8,297,000
2	London	UK	7,074,000
3	St. Petersburg	Russia	4,678,000
4	Berlin	Germany	3,387,000
5	Madrid	Spain	2,824,000
6	Roma	Italy	2,649,000
7	Kiev	Ukraine	2,590,000
8	Paris	France	2,152,000
9	Bucuresti (Bucharest)	Romania	2,016,000
10	Budapest	Hungary	1,825,000

Even on a global scale, 5 of the 10 world's largest cities are national capitals (see Table 2). But as in Europe, whether their current size is a reflection of their political function is doubtful. What these megacities share is a heavy emphasis on financial and commercial services, be they informal or not, followed by the media industries.

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See also Berlin, Germany; Haussmann, Baron Georges-Eugène; Le Corbusier; Paris, France; Simmel, Georg; Urban Planning

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CAPITALIST CITY

The historical development of the capitalist city is a key theme in urban studies and, in many respects, also in the broader social sciences. Capitalism and urbanization are indeed among the leading forces in the evolution of contemporary societies. Although cities existed well before the advent of industrial capitalism, this latter and its subsequent postindustrial (or post-Fordist) version have provided the basic framework for the development of contemporary forms of urbanization. This entry illustrates how the relationship between capitalism and urbanization has evolved over time through the lens of the ways in which

urban scholars have theorized and analyzed this relationship. It does so as follows: The first section is dedicated to the discovery of industrializing cities as a laboratory of nascent manufacturing capitalism and related social phenomena and behaviors; the second section reviews the main passages of the theoretical elaboration that was produced in the 1970s around the capitalism-urbanization nexus; and the third section refers to the legacy of this theoretical work in light of the more recent reshaping of a neoliberal and globalized capitalist city.

The Nascent Capitalist City: The Urban Space as a Living Laboratory of Capitalism

Since the publication of *The Condition of the Working Class in England* in 1844 by Friedrich Engels, the modern urban phenomenon has been intimately linked to capitalism as a mode of production and social reproduction. In that book the young Engels famously described industrializing English cities such as Manchester, London, and Sheffield as unique laboratories of nascent manufacturing capitalism. The newly built working-class neighborhoods showed conditions of social alienation and deprivation that were typical of developing capitalist societies. In first-generation capitalist cities, the social divisions of capitalism were paradigmatically translated on a spatial level: The advent of capitalist urbanization had led to a simultaneous process of decomposition of the old city center and of sociospatial segregation between the lower classes and the upper classes. The making of the capitalist city was characterized, on the whole, by the coexistence of antinomic phenomena of order and disorder, of dissolution of the previous forms of spatial organization, and of creation of a fragmented urban environment.

Engels's pioneering work has been a crucial source of inspiration in subsequent streams of research on the capitalist city: most notably, the sociobehavioralist literature investigating the capitalist city as a laboratory of social hardship that gave rise to the so-called Chicago School from the 1920s onward; more recently, in the 1970s, the scholarship that theorized and widely discussed the relationship between capitalism and the urban process, inaugurating the influential tradition of Marxist urban studies. Similar to what

Manchester meant for Engels, Chicago was approached by twentieth-century urban sociologists as a paradigmatic example of the contemporary capitalist city. The rapid and massive population growth that had taken place in the city of Chicago during the last decades of the nineteenth century had shed light on a number of social problems and related deviant behaviors such as deprivation, poor living conditions, alcoholism, and homicides, which were associated with the rise of capitalism. The members of the Chicago School empirically investigated these phenomena and linked their rise and characteristics to the specific environmental conditions of the urban areas in which they appeared and developed. Urban social problems were thus described by Chicago urban scholars in terms of environment and human ecology rather than social structure and the capitalist mode of production. In this context, not only the crucial relationship between capitalism and the city but also related issues such as the role played by the state and other political agencies in the evolutionary paths of capitalist urbanization remained overlooked and undertheorized. The capitalist city was approached merely as a spatial context in which social problems had to be investigated and analyzed (starting from the assumption that the environment of large industrial cities intensifies such problems) rather than as an object of study itself and thus as an ontologically autonomous social entity.

Albeit strongly questioned in more recent times, as shown later in this entry, the empiricist orientation in urban studies has survived over the years, in part as a reaction to the critiques of the more theoretically engaged urban scholars and in part as a consequence of a specific demand for applied research coming from the social policy sphere. In the 1980s the “empiricist” position was explicitly defended by sociologist Peter Saunders, who contended that investigation of urban social issues ought not to entail approaching the capitalist city as an independent social entity. In more recent times, the tradition of more conventional social inquiry on the capitalist city has been continued by those (not only sociologists but also epidemiologists and other public health scholars) concerned with issues relating to the capitalist urban environment but not necessarily interested in providing a critical interpretation of the capitalist city as such.

The Mature Capitalist City: Theorizing the Capitalism–Urbanization Nexus

The Marxist interpretation and critique of the capitalist city gained ground since the early 1970s when a rising generation of radical urban scholars based particularly in France and other western European countries (in contrast to the predominantly Anglo-American origin of classical urban sociology), led by Manuel Castells and the other founders of the so-called new urban sociology, spelled out their dissatisfaction with the empiricist approach of the existing urban scholarship.

The historical context in which emerging ideas and research directions about the capitalist city appeared and took shape is particularly relevant. At the time, capitalist cities in the West and beyond were experiencing the formation of new urban social movements and related urban struggles along with, particularly in the United States, the surge of ethnoracial riots in the deprived and segregated neighborhoods of the larger cities. This exceptional sociohistorical context provided emerging Marxist urban scholars with the moral and political justification for the advocacy of a more politically engaged and theoretically informed urban social science. In his now classic book on the “urban question,” Manuel Castells was the first scholar to systematically engage with a theoretical explanation of the urban-capitalist process. Drawing on Althusserian structuralist Marxism, Castells suggested looking at the urbanization process in terms of relationship between society and space, whose form is determined by the contingent organization of the means of production and the reproduction of the labor force. Elaborating on this conceptual framework, Castells identified four basic elements of a capitalist urban structure: (1) production, which takes the form of the spatial outcomes deriving from the social process of reproduction of the fixed capital; (2) consumption, represented by the spatial outcomes arising from the social process of reproduction of the labor force; (3) exchange, which appears as a spatial manifestation of the transfers between production and consumption; and finally (4) management, that is, the institutional process (in the form of urban planning schemes and regulations) coordinating the relationships among the former three elements of the urban structure. In the subsequent

years, while coming to terms with the dogmatism of his previous structuralist-Marxist approach, Castells completed his theoretical trajectory by interpreting urban social change in the capitalist city as the result of the mobilization of grassroots movements demanding access to social services in times in which the fiscal base of the city government was eroded by the shrinkage of the welfare state.

Whereas Castells understood the capitalist city primarily as a site of social reproduction, the other major contributor to the theorization of the capitalist city, geographer David Harvey, laid the greatest emphasis on the role of finance and particularly of land rent as engines of urban growth and socio-spatial transformation. As in the work of Castells and the other French urban Marxists of the 1970s, the work of Harvey on the capitalist city was deeply influenced by the specific sociohistorical context in which his theories were grounded. The highly segregated city of Baltimore and, more generally, the socially and racially unequal access to housing markets and finance in the United States drew the attention of Harvey and his colleagues and students since the early 1970s. In his theoretical endeavor, Harvey applied the Marxian theory of accumulation to the study of the urban process under capitalism. In his view, the capitalist city grows as a consequence of investment in the built environment, which follows the rhythms of capitalist accumulation (given by the periodic devaluations of fixed capital) and at the same time is limited by the physical and economic lifetime of the elements within the built environment itself. Uneven sociospatial development is the result of this cyclical evolution of capitalist societies at varying geographical scales, including that of the city. Within the urban spatiality the housing sector is managed and exploited by the ruling classes as a “contracyclical” regulator of the wider accumulation process, as happened during the golden age of post-war capitalism or in recent times with the more ephemeral flourishing of global financial capitalism.

The Globalized Capitalist City: Urban Development as a Politics of Scale

The work of the first neo-Marxist urban scholars produced a number of important strands of research on the capitalist city: most notably, the Marxian literature on gentrification, which shares with

Harvey’s work a fundamental concern with the structural dynamics of capitalist urbanization; then the more recent theoretical reevaluation of geographical scale within the context of globalization for which Castells’s classic book has represented a “lightning rod,” as an important contributor to this literature has written; finally the studies on the politics of urban development in an era of neoliberalism. These interrelated strands of research and their sub-fields, albeit variously accused of spatial fetishism, theoreticism, and economic determinism, have widely occupied the mind of scholars concerned with the formulation of a critical stance on the capitalist city in the past two decades, reviving the tradition and the influence of Marxian urban studies.

Whereas the rise of Marxian urbanism took place in times of insurgent social struggles and the crisis of Fordist capitalism and related fiscal crises at the urban level, the shaping of an increasingly globalized world has strongly influenced this more recent body of work on the capitalist city. Previous theorization of “rent gap” as a dynamic of capitalist exploitation of the changing value of urban space, while tracing back to the late 1970s, has been actualized and reconnected to the forces of globalization and neoliberalism that in recent years have triggered processes of gentrification, “social mix,” and selective neighborhood change in a number of cities worldwide. More generally, the whole Marxist framework of urban analysis, centered on notions of residential differentiation and segmented class structure, has proven to be a fertile repertoire of theoretical tools for the understanding of the crucial role played by capitalist cities in the contemporary remaking of economic-political space under conditions of globalization.

Similarly, critical scholars of the city have revitalized Marxist theorizations, particularly of philosopher Henry Lefebvre, of geographical scales as strategic though long-neglected dimensions of capitalist accumulation. Geographical scales are not understood as pregiven spatial entities but as heterogeneous social formations produced through a complex set of discursive processes, sociopolitical struggles, and economic strategies. In this context the influential work on global and world cities has highlighted the strategic role of the urban spatiality in the development of capitalist globalization and in the mobilizing of different sources and sites of economic regulation.

The attention devoted to the shifting forms of regulation and governance of the globalized capitalist city reconnects the literatures on the spatialities of neoliberalism and globalization to the studies exploring the evolution of urban politics in post-Fordist societies. The “new urban politics” literature that developed since the early 1980s with reference to the U.S. city was concerned primarily with strategies and dynamics of local economic development on the urban level, including those related to the revitalization of downtowns, to the pursuit of large-scale projects, and to the confrontation between opposing coalitions struggling over the entrepreneurialization of urban governance. This literature made a fundamental contribution to the formulation of a political economy of place and helped to explain the novel forms of multiscale intercapitalist competition for which the global capitalist city represents a crucial arena of investigation. The ongoing credit crunch and the structural crisis of global financial capitalism in which the housing sector and finance have played a central role provide further evidence of the long-term and strategic interconnectedness of capitalist accumulation and the urban process.

Ugo Rossi

See also Castells, Manuel; Chicago, Illinois; Chicago School of Urban Sociology; Gentrification; Global City; Harvey, David; Manchester, United Kingdom; Marxism and the City; New Urban Sociology; Revanchist City

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CARAVANSERAI

The Persian word *karawan* refers to a group of merchants, pilgrims, soldiers, or other persons traveling together, often over extended distances; the animal most often used for the caravan routes across the Middle East and Arabian desert was the camel, whereas donkeys and horses were used for caravans through the mountains along the Silk Road. The size of the caravan depended upon many factors, including the availability of pack animals, relative security of the route traveled, and volume of trade and commerce. The largest recorded caravans for the pilgrimage from Cairo and Damascus to Mecca numbered more than 10,000 camels. Other important caravan routes flourished through the 1800s, when railroad and road transport led to their decline. The great salt caravans from the Saharan desert to Timbuktu included 20,000 camels as late as 1908, and some pilgrim caravans continued even later because of the status accorded to travel to the religious shrine by traditional method and route.


The *caravanserai* (combining the Persian *karawan* and *sarayi*, meaning dwelling or enclosed court; in Turkish, *kervansaray*, or *caravanserai*) were the public shelters for merchants, pilgrims, and other travelers in the Middle East. The caravanserai served as the traditional road inns of the Muslim world, providing shelter and protection for the traveler and for the merchant’s goods. A

distinction is made between the highway khan (with short-term lodging for both commercial travelers and their transport animals, thus the caravanserai) and the urban khan (a lodging house, warehouse, and trading center). A substantial gateway, large enough to allow passage of a camel with loaded bags on each side, provides access to the central court, an open area large enough to contain 300 to 400 camels. Two-story buildings surrounded the rectangular courtyard, with an arcaded corridor creating a permeable space between the courtyard and the interior. The introverted spatial conception corresponds to the protective nature of the institution and its sheltering function, which is achieved by arranging the rooms along the second floor for travelers facing the open courtyard, while the windowless walls facing the outside space create a protected fortress-like appearance. After the mosque, the caravanserai is the most common building type dated to the medieval Moslem world, and in the present day they include world heritage sites as well as examples of adaptive reuse: Several are now modern hotels.

The caravanserai were spread along the major land routes in the Muslim world at regular intervals with the intervening distances ordered by the speed of caravan travel by camels, donkeys, mules, and loaded horses. Because this speed and distance did not change for millennia, the caravanserai may be linked to the routes of the advancement of armies of Alexander the Great, then to the Romans and Byzantines, and even more so to Seljuk Turks following their conquest of Byzantium. The Ottoman Empire (ruled in direct lineage 1077–1407) stretched from the Mediterranean to the Black

Sea, crossed by overland roads. The famous Silk Road from China to Europe and related legends of Venetian Marco Polo's travel were also part of the caravanserai.

Located one day's travel time (about every 30 kilometers) along the major trade routes, the caravanserai completed the communication network of the Ottoman economy and gave shelter to persons on pilgrimages across the empire. It was considered a pious duty to provide for the endowment of caravanserai for pilgrims. Over time the caravanserai acted as growth poles, and market towns would develop adjacent to them. In places where the regional conditions and population gravitation were suitable, permanent trade bazaars would develop, and charitable institutions—the *vaquf*, an essential element of urbanity for the Muslim town—were established. In addition to the bazaar, or market center, the *vaquf* would



Caravanseri of Mehmed Pasa Sokolovic in Belgrade. Detail of the map of Belgrade by Gump, end of the seventeenth/early eighteenth century.

Source: Serbian National Library.

normally include buildings with specific religious (mosque), education (madrasah), and charitable functions such as the public kitchen (imaret).

Ibu Batutah, the famous Arab traveler of the fourteenth century who journeyed from his home in Morocco to India and China and back, noted caravanserais along the route from Baghdad to Mecca, founded in the eighth century by the wife of Hārūn al-Rashīd, the fifth Abbasid caliph. The Seljuk sultan 'Alā' al-Dīn Kayqubād (1220–1237), renowned for the rich architectural legacy and court culture that flourished under his reign, constructed many caravanserais along roads linking the Anatolian capital to important trade routes. At the peak advance of the Ottoman Empire under Süleyman the Magnificent (1520–1566), a number of subcapitals emerged, including Bursa in Asia and Edirne in Europe. Both cities had remarkable vaqufs with mosques, bazaars, madrasahs, imarets, and the caravanserais to accommodate traders, pilgrims, and an increasing number of visitors. The Sokollu Mehmed Pasha Complex on the main highway between the two Ottoman capitals of Istanbul and Edirne included a caravansera, bathhouse, mosque, madrasah, and market streets built in 1549 by the architect Sinan (and extended as a palace with private apartments for the sultan's use in 1569).

Whereas some of these caravanserais remain protected in full architectural grandeur, many in the Balkans and in the East were destroyed, and memory of these urban institutions remains only in old documents, maps, and contemporary records. Many surviving caravanserais have important architectural merit, with construction following the Saracenic style, and elaborate decoration on the gateway structures. Some historic caravanserais have been preserved as tourist sites (such as the caravansera of Sa'd al-Saltaneh in Qazvin [Iran] and Khan al-Umdan in Acre) while others have been converted into hotels for the contemporary traveler (including the caravansera of Shah Abbas in Sfahan). The Rustem Pasa caravansera in Edirne, partially destroyed in an earthquake, was reconstructed for modern use as a tourist hotel, although this adaptive reuse was judged unsuccessful due to limitations in the earlier design. In 2007 the director of the Cultural Heritage, Handcrafts, and Tourism department in Kerman Province (Iran) announced plans to convert the historic Vakil caravansera, built by Mohammad Ismaeil Kahn Vakil-ol Molk, ruler of Kerman in the seventeenth century, to a

five-star hotel featuring rooms decorated to represent different historical periods in Iranian history. Modern hotels across the Middle East sometimes replicate the basic design features of the original, as have resort hotels in other regions of the world.

Milan Prodanovic

See also Bazaar; Islamic City

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CASTELLS, MANUEL

Manuel Castells, born in 1942, is a distinguished representative of the late-twentieth-century progressive European intellectual. Of Catalan origin, having fled the Franco dictatorship, he was trained as a professional sociologist in France and taught for more than a decade at the University of Paris (Nanterre) between the 1960s and the 1970s, with more short-term academic appointments in pre-Pinochet Chile and in Montreal, Quebec. In the late 1970s, Castells moved to the United States, where he is still a professor of communication, technology, and sociology at the University of Southern California, after having taught city and regional planning at the University of California at Berkeley from 1979 to 1993, where he is now professor emeritus. In recent years he also obtained a research professorship in his native country at the Open University of Catalonia.

What is typical of Manuel Castells, as a late-twentieth-century intellectual whose perspectives

were influenced by the political upheaval of 1968, is his active engagement in progressive politics and his fascination with the then-rising urban–social movements. At the same time, a specific feature of Castells’s intellectual pathway lies in his characteristic cosmopolitan profile, a trait that has deeply influenced his vantage point and that at the time was not common among European academics. Castells is thus simultaneously a typically progressive European intellectual and a precursor of the cosmopolitan academic that nowadays has become increasingly widespread within the context of the globalization of academic labor markets.

Likewise, Manuel Castells’s contribution to the field of urban studies has been path-breaking as well as temporally ephemeral. In fact, on the one hand, he is generally recognized in the field as one of the founders of what came to be known the “new urban sociology” from the 1970s onward. On the other hand, his belonging and concrete affiliation to the scholarly and institutional field of urban studies, with its set of specialized publications, conferences, and organized academic communities, has vanished in the years of his professional and scientific maturity, when Castells engaged in his most challenging intellectual endeavor: the trilogy on the network society and the age of information. In these more recent years, while occasionally applying his ideas and empirical findings on the network society to urban issues and problems (mainly on the occasion of invited lectures and papers), Castells has abandoned the field of urban studies, which gave him early notoriety and intellectual fame albeit within more limited audiences and readerships compared to those that have become acquainted with his subsequent work on the information age.

This entry explores the stages of Manuel Castells’s intellectual trajectory in which his main field of investigation and concern was the urban phenomenon: particularly, his initial attempt to provide a systematic theory of the urban process under capitalism; then, his subsequent revision of his own departing theoretical hypotheses, with a consideration of social movements and technology as fundamental agents of urban and societal change.

The Encounter Between Structuralist Marxism and Urban Theory

At the beginning of his career Manuel Castells dedicated himself to the elaboration of a Marxist

approach to the study of urban and social issues, which was deeply influenced by the rereading of Marxian thought offered by the Althusserian school in the late 1960s and beyond. The debt to Althusserian philosophy was evident in Castells’s influential book on the “urban question,” originally written in French and then translated into English and many other languages, and was later repeatedly acknowledged in interviews and personal memories. French philosopher Louis Althusser famously theorized the ways in which the complex social whole is overdetermined by specific “structures in dominance,” namely, by economic practice under capitalism. The dominant instance represented by the economic sphere determines the way in which capitalist society is ultimately organized within all its spheres and aspects and the way in which contradictions between forces and relations of production are arranged in time and space.

Castells applied Althusserian philosophy of society and capitalism to the urban realm, which he theorized in terms of structure whose shape and organization are determined by the combination of different “systems of practice”: the economic, the political-institutional (or juridical), and the ideological. In light of this conceptual framework, Castells argued that in the capitalist city the economic system is organized around relations between the labor force, the means of production, and non-labor, and of related relations of property (the appropriation of the product) and of “real appropriation” (the technological working process), whose combination is shaped by the dialectic among (a) *production* (resulting in goods and information generated by industries and offices), (b) *consumption* (measuring the individual and collective appropriation of the product), and the derived element of (c) *exchange* (notably commerce and other spatialized transferences such as interurban circulation and what he called the sociological problematic of transportation). In Castells’s view, only consumption is functionally specific to the urban phenomenon, as he demonstrated in his explanation of urban crisis. On the whole, the three elements of the economic system are regulated by the politico-institutional instance through the double movement of integration–repression at an urban and suburban level and through that of “domination–regulation,” both enacted by the state apparatus. This latter was an important aspect in Castells’s theorization of urban capitalism. Castells, indeed,

viewed the state as a strategic actor and a crucial source of power, exercised through urban planning on a spatial level and through the institutionalization of social conflict on a political–societal level.

Castells's structuralism was thus an interpretation that, while recognizing the primacy of the economic instance, attributed an important role to the state as a guarantor of the capitalist process of development and social reproduction. Unlike another influential urban-Marxist line of interpretation in the 1970s and beyond such as that of David Harvey, who explained the crisis of urban capitalism as a crisis of capital accumulation, Castells argued that the decline of the postwar pattern of urban development arose out of the increasing difficulty of keeping the basic mechanisms for accomplishing the provision of urban services functioning efficiently in such basic realms as housing, transportation, education, and health care. Put briefly, Castells understood the urban crisis of the mid- and late 1970s as a failure of the state in managing a crisis of collective consumption, that is, of the distinctive element of the urban process. The state, indeed, received pressure both from the grassroots, in the form of social movements and from the business sector, and this twofold demand ultimately induced a fiscal crisis for local governments in large inner cities in the United States: According to Castells, this happened because, on the one hand, corporate capital needed to build directional centers requiring service workers and facilities downtown; on the other hand, the state had to provide welfare and public services to the large underemployed and unemployed populations in the inner cities. The “urban question” in the mid-1970s was particularly epitomized in the United States by this crucial contradiction between corporate needs, rising social demands, and the budget constraints of the state in a market-led economy.

Beyond Structuralism: Grassroots Movements and Technology as Agents of Urban and Social Change

After the large theoretical endeavor of *The Urban Question*, in 1983 Castells published a book on urban social movements that reported the findings of urban research conducted internationally since the early 1970s. The last chapter of *The Urban Question* had concluded by noting the scarce attention paid by social scientists, including Marxists, to research on urban social movements

and, in doing so, underlined the explanatory power of everyday social struggles to disrupt the rationality of the technocratic city. *The City and the Grassroots* was conceived, therefore, as an ambitious attempt at filling that void by entering the real world of urban grassroots movements in capitalist cities. Although researched in the same years as the previous book, *The City and the Grassroots* came out in times of growing disillusionment over the need for a comprehensive theory of social processes, most notably one centered on the primacy of the economic over the social and the spatial, and was announced by the author as an intellectual project sharply departing from the theoretical hypotheses spelled out in *The Urban Question*. The final result was a book presenting mainly empirical material in the form of powerfully narrated case studies, anticipated by a short conceptual introduction and supported by a long concluding section dedicated to the research design. The book aimed at providing a comparative account of urban social movements in different geographical and historical contexts, showing the simultaneous concern for the expansion of collective consumption, the assertion and defense of cultural identity, and the search for political organization that drives urban protest movements in capitalist societies. Although the book disappointed those who expected another major contribution to Marxist urban theory (and probably the book's subtitle “a cross-cultural theory” was largely responsible for these frustrated expectations), its influence has been, in many respects, even stronger than that of the *The Urban Question*. Indeed, the book contributed fundamentally to the development of the lively and still expanding field of research on urban social movements, while also clearly inspiring subsequent work of Castells on identity-based social movements in the information age.

The abandonment of structuralism, therefore, entailed a new relationship between theory and empirical analysis that has since accompanied Castells in the remainder of his career: Theory was now intimately blended with the observation and discussion of social phenomena, rather than the other way around as it was in *The Urban Question*. This way of proceeding—a typical case-study research methodology in many ways—also informed his last contribution to urban scholarship: that on the informational and technological city in the 1980s and the early 1990s.

When Castells started to conduct research on this subject in the early 1980s, human history had not yet been revolutionized by the advent of the Internet and the related electronic means of communication, cultural exchange, and trading. Even so, in the 1980s Castells, like a growing number of social scientists at that time, was already aware of the fundamental importance of the new information technologies in shaping the evolution of human societies and particularly that of cities and regions. In fact, cities and especially large metropolitan areas were in the front line of the “service economy” process of expansion: Even the booming computer industry in the so-called American Sunbelt appeared to be persistently dependent on the old established base of headquarters and corporate services in major U.S. cities such as New York, Chicago, San Francisco, and Los Angeles. At the same time, however, while noticing how the cores of the dominant metropolitan areas preserved their function as location for most of the command and control centers of the economy, Castells also emphasized the process of regional decentralization and suburbanization of information and office activities linked to second-rank business services and to producer services of what he called the “new industrial space.” The lower land prices and office rents and the linkage with residential suburbanization were the most important factors lying behind the preferences for a suburban site over the traditional downtown location in the service sector.

In his account of the process of technoeconomic restructuring and its related spatial manifestations, consistent with his persistent commitment to a critical urban sociology, Castells was particularly concerned with the changes in the urban social structure, proposing an interpretation of urban and social change centered on notions of social polarization and economic dualism, which, a few years later, became popular and widely discussed in the early debate over the globalizing city. Drawing also on a large research program on the informal economy conducted in collaboration with economic sociologist Alejandro Portes, Castells described the occupational structure of large cities in the United States as a “complex pattern” combining the creation of new, highly paid jobs in advanced services and high-technology sectors; the destruction of mid-level jobs in old manufacturing; the gradual shrinkage of protected

jobs in the public sector; and the proliferation of new, low-paid jobs in services, in downgraded manufacturing, and, most particularly, within the expanding informal and criminal economies. The increasing polarization and segmentation of the local labor markets, Castells argued, produced a highly differentiated labor force displaying distinct lifestyles in terms of household structures, inter-gender family relationships, and uses of the urban space. Far from aiming at providing a schematic representation of the urban realm, Castells’s dual city thesis intended to make sense of the multifaceted social realities that took shape from the overlapping of structural dualism and sociospatial polarization in postmanufacturing capitalist cities.

In these early studies dealing with the informational city that inspired Castells’s subsequent major research effort on the network society, the structuralist mode of thinking that still informed his interpretation of urban and social issues was mitigated by an increasing awareness of the complex character of human societies, irreducible to dialectical relations of cause–effect and to a purely rationalist understanding of social change. The overcoming of structuralism became even clearer in his subsequent work on world technopoles, coauthored with geographer Peter Hall. Cities and regions were described in this book not only as sites of economic restructuring and technological innovation, but also as emerging “economic actors” whose strength lies in their ability to adapt to the changing conditions of the global economy and in their response capacity to promote development projects, negotiate with multinational firms, and foster the growth of medium and small-sized firms, as well as in their long-term attitude to compete with each other in becoming places of greater innovation and efficiency. What is noteworthy in the work on technopoles is the cross-national research approach that Castells and Hall developed. While other authors at that time were publishing single-case study research on successful technological cities, this remarkable book provided a truly global picture of the rise of technopoles located in different regions of the world: from the celebrated cases of endogenous entrepreneurial spin-off in Silicon Valley, California, and in greater Boston, Massachusetts, to less known examples of planned science cities in Siberia, Japan, and Korea, where the state played a major role in the development trajectory.

Conclusion

According to Castells, in an essay written in 2000 as his own contribution to *The Castells Reader on Cities and Social Theory*, the advent of an information age has radically changed the “urban question,” as this was dealt with both by Chicago sociologists and by the new urban sociologists of the 1970s, including himself. While the former gave prominence to the building of a unified urban culture through a process of social integration and the latter investigated the ways in which the state responds to urban struggles over collective consumption, the urban question is now articulated—in Castells’s view—around the fundamental tension between the city as a “space of flows” and as a “space of places.” The space of flows links up immaterially separate locations in an interactive network that connects activities and people in distinct geographical entities. The space of places, on the other hand, organizes experience and agency around the confines of locality. The issue of social integration, which was at the core of the foundational reflections on urban societies at the time of the Chicago School, should be now approached—Castells suggests—by urban scholars so as to understand the multiple ways in which the spaces of flows are folded into the spaces of places through material infrastructures, technical devices, and everyday practices of communication and exchange, the latter either at a distance or in the form of face-to-face interactions.

These reflections powerfully resonate with contemporary key debates over the resurgence or dismissal of scalar approaches, the meaning of sociospatial relations in an age of globalization, and the values of territoriality and positionality in a persistently socially and spatially uneven world, which have animated the intersected disciplines of urban sociology, critical geography, and urban and regional studies in recent years. Even though Castells has not directly taken part in these more recent debates, he is still widely recognized as a leading intellectual authority by contemporary urban and regional scholars and other sociospatial scientists, well beyond the judgment about the present relevance of his “classic” theorization of the urban question. Despite the “specters” of structuralism in urban theory that Castells inevitably evokes, he is one of the most influential scholars

and public intellectuals to have emerged in the field of critical urban studies over the past four decades or so.

Ugo Rossi

See also Capitalist City; Citizen Participation; City Planning; Global City; Globalization; Harvey, David; Informational City; Local Government; Marxism and the City; New Urban Sociology; Social Movements; Technopoles; Urban Sociology; Urban Theory

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CATASTROPHE

Worldwide, cities face increasing risk of catastrophes. The Indian Ocean tsunami of 2004, with more than 240,000 deaths, and Hurricane Katrina of 2005, considered the most costly disaster in U.S. history at over \$200 billion, captured world attention. Most of these losses were sustained in urban areas with high concentrations of people and property located in extremely low-lying hazardous areas. These devastating events are likely precursors to more frequent and severe catastrophes to strike cities in the foreseeable future.

Catastrophic events can be conceptualized according to their source. Some events result from largely uncontrollable forces of nature such as earthquakes, hurricanes, and tsunamis. Other events are caused by combinations of natural forces and human action. For example, dredging and filling in wetlands for urban development often results in loss of the capacity of watersheds to store stormwater runoff, which increases the risk of flooding for downstream communities. Still other catastrophes result from deliberate human will like terrorism, arson, and armed conflicts.

Catastrophic events can be slow-onset, multi-episodic events or rapid-onset, single episodic events. Slow-onset catastrophes result from clusters of traumatic episodes (e.g., protracted drought due to long-term absence of precipitation, large-scale abandonment of inner cities due to prolonged divestment in built environments or recurring crime). Rapid-onset events include terrorist attack, hurricane landfall, and earthquakes.

Catastrophes need to be distinguished from disasters when considering the rising global environmental risk to cities. Both *catastrophe* and *disaster* refer to crisis events of sufficient enormity to cause disruption to infrastructure (sewer, water, electricity, and roads), local economies, housing, and everyday functioning of cities. Yet, a clear distinction exists between them that must be understood when assessing the risk to cities. Several dimensions of these crises help us to make the distinction. First, there is the scale of destruction.

Most or all of a city's built environment is heavily impacted in a catastrophe, but only partial destruction occurs in a disaster. The damage in New Orleans from Hurricane Katrina was catastrophic, as 80 percent of the city was flooded. The 1902 volcanic eruption of Mount Pelée buried the entire city of St. Pierre on the island of Martinique in the Caribbean. Nearly 30,000 residents perished, and only one man survived: a prisoner in solitary confinement. In contrast, disasters strike only parts of a city. The Mexico City earthquake of 1985, considered a major disaster, caused destruction of only 2 percent of the residential housing stock. The damage caused by the attack on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, was confined to only a few city blocks in lower Manhattan.

Second, there is the degree of accessibility of aid. Aid for emergency response and recovery is much more problematic in a catastrophe compared to a disaster. An entire region of communities is devastated and unable to contribute to the need for personnel, supplies, and communication. In a disaster there is usually only one major target for the convergence of assistance, but in a catastrophe many nearby localities are targets and often compete to gain the attention of external aid donors. After Katrina, the devastated cities in southern Mississippi (Biloxi, Gulfport, Pass Christian) could have anticipated a flow of assistance from the major metropolitan city, New Orleans, but the catastrophic conditions throughout the region precluded this possibility.

Third, there is the severity of disruption of everyday lives. Daily activities of a city are severely affected in a catastrophe but not in a disaster. Most if not all places of work, recreation, worship, and education are completely shut down, and lifeline infrastructure systems that supply electricity, water, communication and transportation services are severely disrupted for months or even years. Even in major disasters, no such massive disruption of community life occurs even if particular neighborhoods are devastated. In the 1985 Mexico City earthquake, life in many contiguous areas went on almost normally. This was also the case following the Loma Prieta earthquake of 1989 when the San Francisco Bay region experienced the collapse of the Oakland expressway and the closure of the San Francisco Bay Bridge. These incidents did not cause a major disruption of the regional transportation

system, as commuters were able to commute to work as usual because most of the system remained intact. Most cities can cope with disaster events through emergency response systems, but they are ill prepared to deal with the sheer scale of devastation associated with catastrophes.

Risk to Cities

Rather than originating from unexpected events, catastrophes are a predictable result of interactions among several major global forces: (1) rapid urbanization, (2) growth in extremely hazardous locations, (3) growing inequities in social vulnerability, and (4) global climate change. The accelerating rate of urbanization has caused greater concentrations of people and property that can increase risk if hazards are not anticipated and addressed. Global statistics for urban growth indicate that in 2000 more than 50 percent of the world's population lived in urban settlements. By 2020, 90 percent of the population growth in developing countries will be urban. Although cities comprise only 1 percent of the earth's land area, they concentrate more than half of the world's population and the majority of its physical capital, including buildings and infrastructure. Frequently, growth occurs too rapidly to allow cities to keep pace in expanding the capacity of their hazard mitigation programs. These programs include proactive land use planning to steer new development away from hazard areas, building codes to strengthen new and existing buildings to withstand hazardous forces (wind, floods, and seismic shaking), and resilient infrastructure systems that serve as critical lifelines for stricken populations. Istanbul, Turkey, which is highly vulnerable to earthquakes, exemplifies a city in which the rate of growth far exceeds its ability to effectively mitigate the risks. This city grew from 1 million people in the 1950s to about 10 million today, a tenfold increase in half a century. Yet, by 1999 only 20 schools out of 1,783 schools and 2 hospitals out of 308 hospitals in Istanbul have been retrofitted.

Second, cities are growing in perilous geographic locations such as gently sloping floodplains, coastal shorelines, and uplifted precipices along seismic faults. These places confer benefits that attract development (e.g., buildable lands, strategic sites for transportation, scenic amenities).

In the United States, the number of people residing in earthquake- and hurricane-prone regions is growing rapidly. Over the past several decades, the population growth rate along the hurricane- and storm-prone U.S. coast is more than double the national growth rate. Worldwide, 11 of the 15 largest cities in 2000 were highly exposed to one or more natural hazards, including coastal storms, earthquakes, and volcanoes. Beijing, Los Angeles, Mexico City, and Tokyo sit astride active seismic faults, while Bombay (Mumbai), New York, and Shanghai are vulnerable to coastal storms, and Jakarta and Tokyo are in close proximity to active volcanoes.

Third, deep inequities in social vulnerability result in wide variations in how catastrophes affect different populations. Whereas physical vulnerability emphasizes the location, frequency, and magnitude of hazardous forces and the resiliency of the built environment to withstand such forces, social vulnerability centers on characteristics of social groups that affect their ability to cope with and rebound from a catastrophe or disaster. Several factors comprise the social vulnerability of populations including socioeconomic status, gender, race/ethnicity, and age. Differences in these factors result in a system of stratification of wealth, power, and status. In the United States, this has caused social inequities in fiscal and human resources between older core areas of cities and wealthier suburban areas. Spatial differences, in turn, result in uneven distribution of exposure and vulnerability to catastrophic events and access to aid for planning and recovery. The Hurricane Katrina catastrophe in New Orleans laid bare these inequities. Inner-city New Orleans had the highest social vulnerability of all the impacted coastal jurisdictions along the Gulf Coast. Displaced low-income minority populations were left behind at the New Orleans convention center and elsewhere because they did not have access to vehicles to evacuate, while suburban residents with automobiles were able to flee the destruction.

Dissimilarities in social vulnerability can also be observed between cities in developed and developing countries. Inhabitants and businesses in cities of developed countries can afford new construction and the retrofitting of existing structures to disaster-resistant building standards, mapping of hazard locations, widespread insurance to cover losses, and investment in structurally strengthened

lifelines (i.e., roadways for evacuation; water, sewer, and electrical utilities; and communication systems). In developing countries, poverty makes many people more vulnerable to hazards and less able to recover from them. Impoverished city governments lack the resources to plan for future disasters, while most, if not all, of their capacity is directed at providing basic services. Waves of migrants crowd into existing houses, often substandard, or put up cheap shelters wherever they can, frequently on land left empty because it is extremely hazardous. In Quito, the capital of Ecuador, many flimsy houses perch on the sides of hills, where they are vulnerable to landslides caused by earthquakes or volcanic eruptions. Substandard construction puts impoverished neighborhoods at extreme risk to tropical storms in Bombay, floods in São Paulo, and earthquakes in Guatemala City.

Lastly, global warming has increased the prospects for catastrophes in cities. Although the connection between global climate change and gaseous emissions from urban-industrial regions is a controversial topic, there is no question that global warming is occurring. Global warming raises the temperature of sea water, which acts like fuel for hurricanes and typhoons. The strike range of these tropical storms could increasingly extend into non-tropical coastal cities. New York City, the most populous city in the United States, is now the American city at second highest risk for potential total economic loss from a major hurricane, preceded only by the Miami–Fort Lauderdale area in Florida. Global warming is causing sea level rise along coastlines to increase 1 to 1½ feet or more per century. The numerous consequences of sea level rise, including higher storm surge and tsunami wave heights, increased beach erosion, and ultimately the loss of low-lying coastal areas and coastal wetlands, increase the vulnerability of many coastal cities. Global warming also raises the chances of tipping many cities and metropolitan regions into drought and full-blown water shortage crises. Warmer, dryer land and vegetation caused by higher climate temperatures also increase the likelihood of wildfires that threaten urban areas.

Resilient Cities

In light of the available evidence, the threat of catastrophic events to cities is apparent and rising. Cities

often contain all the ingredients for catastrophic losses: growth of concentrated settlement patterns in hazardous locations, urban poverty and increased vulnerability of disadvantaged groups, and heightened exposure to the forces associated with global warming.

The creation of resilient cities has become a prominent goal. Resiliency is the ability of a city to anticipate and mitigate hazards, contain the effects of a crisis event, and recover in ways that minimize social disruption and mitigate risks from future events. Four challenges establish a framework for action to enable cities to move from response and recovery to proactively enhancing their resiliency,

First, cities should develop hazard mitigation plans. A well-conceived plan identifies hazard areas where new development should not take place and potential sites free of hazards that can serve as relocation zones for existing development when hazardous areas sustain damage. Where hazard areas have significant cultural or economic advantages for redevelopment that cannot be forgone, a mitigation plan should include provisions that guide development (or redevelopment after disasters) to the least hazardous parts of building sites and modify construction and site design practices so that vulnerability is minimized.

Second, cities should support meaningful citizen participation in planning for resiliency. When citizens are exposed to the more resilient alternatives for dealing with catastrophes, they are more likely to mobilize and insist that elected officials attend to the impending threat. Active citizens who are deeply involved in planning and understand the forces that increase risk are more likely to be committed to seeing a mitigation plan through to implementation.

Third, external aid delivery organizations (both public and private) treat disaster-stricken people as participants in the recovery process, rather than helpless, poor victims. Specific approaches need to be employed in which those with a stake in recovery planning can develop a bottom-up ability to take collective action. External aid delivery programs that take a bottom-up approach enable local people to have greater access to extra-community institutions that expand resources potentially available to the community. Moreover, issues of local concern have a greater chance of being communicated to external authorities. In

contrast, top-down aid delivery denies grassroots-level involvement in response to local needs, disconnects and weakens bonding social capital, and thus degrades local resilience.

Fourth, hazard mitigation plans should include “moralistic possibilities” and not solely “actuarial probabilities” in anticipation of catastrophes. Public officials and engineers in charge of mitigation planning reason like actuaries, building to a standard designed to protect only most of the people most of the time. However, given the heightened risk of catastrophes, officials must start from the premise that there are some harms that all citizens must be protected from, whatever the cost. Any anticipatory action must defend a foundational moral intuition: All lives are worthy of protection at the highest standard. That is how the British reasoned when they built the River Thames barrier and how the Dutch reasoned when they built their flood control and land use planning system.

In sum, creation of a resilient city requires proactive planning for protecting and restoring a city’s physical fabric. Just as critical are efforts to build a city’s social fabric—a process that fundamentally entails connecting and strengthening social networks often on a grassroots level, neighborhood by neighborhood.

Philip R. Berke

See also Citizen Participation; Hiroshima, Japan; Istanbul, Turkey

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CHICAGO, ILLINOIS

Within half a century of its founding in 1833, Chicago, Illinois, became the second largest city in the United States, thanks to its location at the hub of the nation’s growing railroad network. A center of manufacturing and commerce, Chicago attracted millions of transnational and American migrants during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As an exporter of products and ideas, Chicago influenced how Americans lived, and it served as an exemplar for those who thought about what a city was. Toward the end of the twentieth century, however, Los Angeles’s automobile-oriented population outstripped Chicago’s, dropped the “second city” to third in rank, and replaced it as the paradigm of urban form.

Chicago’s Origins

Modern Chicago originated at the mouth of the Chicago River. The flat and marshy site was periodically occupied in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by Miami, Potawatomi, Ottawa, and Ojibwa people. The Potawatomi who dominated the region in the late eighteenth century used the local waterways as transportation routes for French fur trade. The possibilities of commerce attracted American settlers to the north bank of the river in the 1780s. Amid a series of treaties, through which the federal government ultimately secured the region for American settlement and expelled the native population, the U.S. Army established Fort Dearborn on the river’s south bank in 1803. The last Potawatomi moved west after the 1833 Treaty of Chicago left the region open to permanent White settlement. Chicago incorporated as a town that year, becoming a city four years later. The city’s first residents quickly became enmeshed in a frenzied real estate trade. The possibility of easy wealth lured fortune seekers, who increased the city’s 1840 population to 4,470 people.

Growth and Conflict

Many midwestern U.S. cities in the nineteenth century experienced dramatic real estate speculation that caused swift growth until the bubble burst. But Chicago became the largest city in the nation’s

interior because it served as the center point for shipping between the East and the West. The initial promise of Chicago's central location was suggested by the construction of the Illinois and Michigan Canal (1848). The canal linked the Mississippi River and the Great Lakes, enabling goods to move from New Orleans to the Atlantic Ocean entirely by water routes. Entrepreneurs responded by founding the Chicago Board of Trade, which made the city a major commodities and futures clearinghouse. The significance of the canal's opening, however, was immediately dwarfed by the first trip of the Galena and Chicago Union Railroad later that year. The continent's newly built rail lines from the East and the West soon converged in Chicago, making the city indispensable to international commerce.

The chance to find work and get rich through Chicago's real estate, commercial, and employment opportunities drew tens of thousands of north-eastern U.S. and European migrants, especially from Germany and Ireland. Cyrus McCormick, for example, decided that Chicago was the right place from which to manufacture and market his reaper; he established a company that eventually became the world's largest maker of grain harvesting equipment. As Chicago's population swelled, city government moved to provide infrastructure and services to secure local health and welfare. The construction of an elaborate water and sewer system enabled the city to annex surrounding communities that could not afford to provide these services independently, dramatically increasing Chicago's size. The park system, developed over the course of the nineteenth century, helped direct settlement patterns and boost local real estate values. By the time the Great Fire of October 8–9, 1871, devastated the city's downtown and North Side and drew international aid, Chicago's population had reached approximately 300,000.

Although the fire left a third of the city temporarily homeless, it left intact the essentials of Chicago's industrial base. Chicagoans immediately began rebuilding the city, and undeterred migrants continued to arrive over the next several decades. Immigrants from southern and eastern Europe—notably but not exclusively Italians, Poles, and Jews—joined Chicago's already heterogeneous population mix. Almost every nationality group migrating to the United States had representatives

in Chicago. Although Chicago is often seen as a series of distinct ethnic enclaves, most immigrants lived side by side with neighbors with whom they did not share immediate language or cultural roots. By 1890, Chicago's population of more than a million surpassed Philadelphia's, making it the second largest city in the United States; 10 years later, Chicago had almost 1.7 million residents.

Most new Chicagoans were members of the working class, toiling in small homes or one of the growing numbers of large industrial concerns. In addition to continuing to serve as a transshipment point for Midwestern products such as grain and lumber around the continent, Chicago increasingly became home to enterprises that produced, packaged, or otherwise transformed goods before selling them elsewhere, taking advantage of the city's location in the railroad network. The 1865 opening of the Union Stock Yard signaled Chicago's ascension over Cincinnati as the leading meatpacking city in the nation. Montgomery Ward and Sears, Roebuck and Company, the nation's two largest mail-order catalog companies, established their headquarters in Chicago. George Pullman established the Pullman Palace Car Company—and a much-vaunted model town for his employees to live in—in a southern suburb later annexed into Chicago. Manufacturers of iron and steel built enormous factory complexes on the city's far South Side and in neighboring suburbs. In 1916, poet Carl Sandburg memorialized Chicago as the “city of the big shoulders,” a tribute to the muscularity of its denizens' labor.

The breadth of opportunities for work did not mean that laboring Chicagoans were comfortably employed. Poor wages, dangerous work conditions, and fierce competition for jobs fostered an active labor movement; between the end of the Civil War and 1919, Chicago's workers participated in at least six waves of strikes. Business owners resisted union organizing, helping turn the Pinkerton National Detective Agency into the nation's leading private strikebreaker. Labor disputes frequently turned violent. On May 4, 1886, a rally advocating for the eight-hour work day turned the Haymarket site into an international icon. An unknown bomb-thrower killed a police officer, drawing a violent response from police. Ultimately, eight anarchists were convicted of murder on flimsy evidence. In the “Memorial Day Massacre” of May 1937, ten participants in a strike on Republic

Steel were killed by police. One response to the plight of working-class Chicagoans was Hull House, the most famous of the nation's settlement houses. Established in 1889 by Jane Addams and Ellen Gates Starr, it served the cultural and material needs of the poor, particularly immigrants.

Not all of Chicago's conflicts were based in work. Beginning in the 1910s, large numbers of southern African Americans began the "Great Migration" to northern urban centers; Chicago was a prime destination. White Chicagoans saw Black migrants as unwelcome neighbors and competitors for scarce jobs. Although prior to the twentieth century the city's small Black population lived intermingled among Whites, soon African Americans found few housing opportunities outside the jealously guarded boundaries of the South Side ghetto. Blacks who violated the strict segregation of housing, such as banker Jesse Binga, were threatened with violence and sometimes attacked. In July 1919, hostilities between Whites and Blacks exploded into a race riot that killed 38 Chicagoans.

Despite its internal conflicts, Chicago's boosters marketed the city to the world as a paragon. Most famously, in 1893 the city hosted the World's Columbian Exposition, a celebration of American progress, in the South Side's Jackson Park. Daniel Burnham, the fair's director, divided the grounds into two parts: the ornate, neoclassically styled "White City" and the Midway. The temporary structures of the White City displayed the achievements of American civilization, while the exotic and seedy Midway showcased the world's indigenous people and the Ferris Wheel, invented as the fair's answer to the Eiffel Tower. Through planning the fair, Burnham developed the foundation of the City Beautiful movement and the modern profession of city planning. Burnham went on to write plans for several American and international cities, including Chicago in 1909. The Burnham Plan, while never fully executed, remains the cornerstone of the city's redevelopment efforts in the twenty-first century.

The Chicago Schools

Chicago's contributions to the world extended beyond manufactured goods. It also exported ideas and practices developed locally. Many of Chicago's contributions to American intellectual life, particularly in the analysis of cities, were based at the University of Chicago, founded in Hyde Park in

1892. Under the leadership of Robert Park and Ernest Burgess, the university's sociology department pioneered what came to be called the "Chicago School of Sociology." Treating the city as their personal research laboratory, the department's faculty and graduate students developed an ecological model of urban life. Cities could be divided into distinct "natural areas" with characteristics that sustained themselves over time, even as their populations shifted. Especially influential was Burgess's schematic of the city as a series of concentric circles, with the downtown "Loop" at the center, and surrounding zones differentiated by class and function. For much of the twentieth century, American urbanists could not untangle themselves from the Chicago School's basic assumptions. The Chicago School of Economics, although focused on the free market rather than cities, was similarly significant.

Chicago's built environment is testimony to the innovative practices and designs of the first and second Chicago Schools of Architecture. From the late nineteenth century onward, Chicago architects experimented with skyscraper design. The downtown Loop is dotted with dozens of their landmark buildings. The structure of Dankmar Adler's Auditorium Building (1888), for example, stands upon a raft that allows it to float on the Loop's marshy ground. William LeBaron Jenney pushed Chicago architects away from designing load-bearing walls toward using iron and steel construction. Their post-World War II successors designed buildings that derived their beauty from structure rather than ornament. The Prairie School of architecture, with its emphasis on residential building, originated in Chicago with Louis Sullivan and Frank Lloyd Wright and radiated around the world.

World War II and the Postwar Period

Chicago's demographics held steady through the Great Depression, but significant changes occurred during and after World War II. Hundreds of thousands of Americans, many of them southern African Americans, migrated to the city, drawn by manufacturing jobs created by the war effort. The city's housing supply was grossly inadequate for the needs of the new residents, forcing people to live in makeshift cubicles or subdivided apartments, or to double and triple up with family and strangers. When the end of war production made building materials available again, population concentrations

in the metropolitan area shifted dramatically. New single-family houses, constructed on the mostly undeveloped northwest and southwest sides, made it possible for the city's White population to spread out. White Chicagoans also moved outward to newly incorporated and developing suburbs. Some men used automobiles to commute to jobs that remained within the city, but increasingly commercial and manufacturing enterprises kept suburbanites outside the city for work as well.

African Americans, however, continued to live and work within Chicago's boundaries. Neither the South Side's Bronzeville area nor the small West Side settlement could contain the sheer numbers of new migrants. As African Americans sought new housing opportunities in blocks adjacent to ones already established as areas of Black residence, Whites responded first by resisting their arrival—sometimes violently—and then by leaving. In addition, public authorities used federal urban renewal monies to clear out dilapidated Black neighborhoods and build high-rise public housing. Although Chicago Housing Authority staff aspired to use public housing to promote racial integration, city officials and White citizens blocked these attempts, leaving Chicago as racially segregated as it had been prior to the Second Great Migration. Chicago's segregation was much studied by social scientists, who used it as a model for explaining racial settlement patterns around the nation.

Like other northern cities, Chicago suffered from postwar deindustrialization, as steel, meatpacking, catalog, and other companies closed their plants, changed the character of their operations, and suburbanized. Nonetheless, the city's downtown remained a center of commercial activity embodied by the increasing numbers of skyscrapers

constructed after 1955. Modernist architects led by Ludwig Mies van der Rohe and the firm of Skidmore, Owings and Merrill contributed designs such as the John Hancock Center (1969) and Sears Tower (1974)—which was the world's tallest building until the completion of the Petronas Towers in Kuala Lumpur in 1998. Mayor Richard J. Daley (1955–1976) carefully managed the postwar redevelopment process, brokering some land deals personally. Daley, operating on the theory that revitalization would spread outward from a strong center, focused on preserving the vitality of the downtown. By contrast, Mayor Harold Washington (1983–1987), the city's first African American mayor, spared some money and attention for renewing infrastructure and services to the city's residential neighborhoods.



A huge steel sculpture of a Puerto Rican flag stands at the gateway to Chicago's primary Puerto Rican barrio, which is part of the Humboldt Park neighborhood.

Source: Eric Mathiasen.

Chicago in the Twenty-First Century

Between 1960 and 2000, Chicago suffered a population loss of some 600,000 people, suggesting that it was in decline like other Rustbelt cities. In 1990, Los Angeles surpassed Chicago's falling population, displacing Chicago from its century-old status as the nation's second largest city. The Los Angeles School of Sociology, which emphasized a multi-nodal view of metropolitan areas, also challenged the supremacy of the Chicago School's downtown-centered approach to understanding urban space.

Nonetheless, Chicago remained a vital part of the metropolitan region and the United States in the twenty-first century. Mayor Richard M. Daley (1989–) paid special attention to maintaining Chicago as an international tourist destination, consolidating the lakefront park and museum campus and launching a bid for the city to host the 2016 Olympics. Large numbers of Latina/o and Asian migrants revitalized commerce in older neighborhoods on the city's North and West Sides. The city finally sent its first president to the White House in 2009, when former community organizer Barack Obama was inaugurated the country's first African American president. Although Chicago is no longer growing as it had in the boom years of the late nineteenth century, it continues to muscle its "big shoulders" around the world.

Amanda I. Seligman

See also Alinsky, Saul; Chicago School of Urban Sociology; City Beautiful Movement; City Planning; Community Organizing; Ghetto; Housing Policy; Local Government; Multicultural Cities; Neighborhood Revitalization; Parks; Political Machine; Racialization; Redlining; Restrictive Covenant; Sewer; Shopping; Suburbanization; Subway; Tenement; Tourism; Transportation; Urban Crisis; Urban Ecology (Chicago School); Urban History; Urban Planning

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CHICAGO SCHOOL OF URBAN SOCIOLOGY

The Chicago School of Urban Sociology refers to work of faculty and graduate students from the University of Chicago during the period 1915 to 1945 and, more directly, to the work of students who studied under Robert Park and Ernest Burgess during those years. This small group of scholars—the full-time faculty in the department of sociology never numbered more than six persons—developed a new theoretical model and research methodology using the city of Chicago as a social laboratory in a conscious effort to create a distinctive field of study within the social sciences (the title of Park and Burgess's 1921 textbook was *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*). The Chicago School defined the contours of urban sociology for much of the twentieth century, most clearly in the contributions of urban ecology and applied research within the urban environment, and continues to influence urban studies in the United States and beyond (note the many references to the Chicago School and to individual scholars associated with the Chicago School in many entries in this encyclopedia).

Origins and Founders

The origin of the Chicago School of Urban Sociology—the first such department in the United

States—is intimately associated with that of the university itself, which was founded in 1890 as a research university modeled after Johns Hopkins University and Clark University. The Chicago School of the period discussed here is represented by three generations of faculty. Albion Small (founder of the department), W. I. Thomas, Charles R. Henderson, Graham Taylor, and George E. Vincent comprised the founding generation. The second included Small, Thomas, Burgess, Ellsworth Faris, and Park. It was this group that trained the graduate students who would write what Mary Jo Deegan has called the “Chicago School Studies.” The third generation included Park, Burgess, Louis Wirth, and William Ogburn. This group of faculty would remain intact until Park retired from the university in 1934.

Although it is common to date the origin of urban sociology at Chicago with Park’s arrival in 1914 and his subsequent work with Burgess, the idea of the city as a laboratory for social research came much earlier. Henderson applied for research funds for a systematic study of the city in the first decade of the twentieth century, and a 1902 description of the graduate program published in the *American Journal of Sociology* stated that

the city of Chicago is one of the most complete social laboratories in the world. While the elements of sociology may be studied in smaller communities . . . the most serious problems of modern society are presented by the great cities, and must be studied as they are encountered in concrete form in large populations. No city in the world presents a wider variety of typical social problems than Chicago.

The overlooked figure in the founding of the Chicago School is Thomas, whom Small recruited from the University of Tennessee. Trained in anthropology, Thomas arrived at Chicago with an extensive publication record. In 1912 Thomas was invited to attend the International Conference on the Negro at Tuskegee Institute, organized by Park in his capacity as personal secretary to Booker T. Washington. Park and Thomas corresponded regularly over the next year, and Thomas invited Park to come to the University of Chicago to teach (although there was no guarantee of a full-time teaching position). Burgess, Park, and Wirth shared a common intellectual approach influenced by William James, John Dewey, and George Herbert

Mead (Park and Thomas studied with James, Burgess and Thomas with Mead, and Park with Dewey). Thomas was dismissed from the university in 1918 following a scandal over his involvement with the pacifist groups opposing U.S. involvement in World War I. The classic study of immigration, *Old World Traits Transplanted*, published in 1921 with Park as first author, was largely written by Thomas; Park later wrote that Thomas’s work formed the foundation for the department.

Research Methods and Topics

The sociology faculty pioneered empirical research using a variety of methods, ranging from ethnography (Park) to the use of the personal document (Thomas). Park’s observations of the city were borrowed from the natural sciences: Competition and segregation led to formation of *natural areas*, each with separate and distinct *moral order*. The city was “a mosaic of little worlds that touch but do not interpenetrate.” Burgess’s model for the growth of the city showed a central business district surrounded by concentric zones labeled the zone in transition, the zone of workingmen’s homes, the residential zone, and the commuter zone. Roderick McKenzie expanded the basic model of human ecology in his later study of the metropolitan community.

The extensive research and publication program of the Chicago School was supported by more than \$600,000 from the Laura Spellman Rockefeller Memorial Fund from 1924 to 1934. The research was carried out under the auspices of Local Community Research Committee, an interdisciplinary group that included faculty and graduate students from sociology, political science (Charles Merriam), and anthropology (Robert Redfield). Graduate students mapped local community areas and studied the spatial organization of juvenile delinquency, family disorganization, and cultural life in the city. The resulting studies represent a diverse array of studies broadly organized around the themes of urban institutions (the hotel, taxi dance hall), social disorganization (juvenile delinquency, the homeless man), and natural areas themselves. Among the notable Chicago School studies are Frederick Thrasher, *The Gang* (1926); Louis Wirth, *The Ghetto* (1928); Harvey W. Zorbaugh, *The Gold Coast and the Slum* (1929); Clifford S. Shaw, *The Jackroller* (1930); E. Franklin Frazier, *The Negro Family in Chicago* (1932); Paul




Figure 1 Growth of the City—Urban Areas

Source: Adapted from Ernest W. Burgess. 1925. "The Growth of the City: An Introduction to a Research Project." In Robert E. Park and Ernest W. Burgess, *The City*, page 55. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

G. Cressey, *The Taxi-Dance Hall* (1932); and Walter C. Reckless, *Vice in Chicago* (1933).

The Chicago School dominated urban sociology and sociology more generally in the first half of the twentieth century. By 1950 some 200 students had completed graduate study at the University of Chicago. Many were instrumental in establishing graduate programs in sociology across the country, and more than half of the presidents of the American Sociological Association were faculty or students at Chicago. The *American Journal of Sociology*, started by Small in 1895, was the official journal of the American Sociological Association from 1906 to 1935. The dominance of the Chicago School also generated antagonism,

and a "minor rebellion" at the annual conference in 1935 would result in the founding of a new journal, the *American Sociological Review*, which published its first volume in 1936.

Critical Opposition

Early critiques of the Chicago School included Missa Alihan's (1938) extensive critique of human ecology (Park wrote that "on the whole" the criticisms were correct), and Maurice Davie (1938) reanalyzed data from Clifford Shaw's *Delinquency Areas* (1929) and showed that delinquency was associated with areas of physical deterioration and high immigrant populations—and not in the concentric zone model

used in the Chicago studies. Burgess's concentric zones were soon replaced by a variety of models showing multiple nuclei and eventually the decentralized, polycentered city. Still, urban ecology remains the dominant model and method among urban sociologists in the United States, in no small part because of the extensive funding opportunities for demographic and census research.

Chicago sociology, and the Chicago sociologists, was also criticized for the lack of critical engagement with contemporary social and political issues, and it is striking that labor history, housing conditions, and the like did not figure more importantly in their work. But Thomas and Wirth were involved in the pacifist movement that arose during World War I, and Wirth would later serve as host of the University of Chicago roundtable discussions broadcast on NBC radio network from 1938 until his death. Charles S. Johnson, Park's student and later president of Fisk University, was the author of the report by the Chicago Race Commission on the deadly race riots in 1919. Another of Park's students, Ernest T. Hiller, completed a dissertation that was published as *The Strike* in 1928. But the Chicago School focus on the natural history of urban neighborhoods left out an institutional analysis of the possible causes of these problems, all the more striking because of the involvement of many students and faculty in social movements and struggles of the day.

Deegan has argued that the contribution of women associated with the Hull House settlement was marginalized by Park and other male faculty. Jane Addams's Hull House had conducted early community studies, including the influential *Hull House Maps and Papers: A Presentation of Nationalities and Wages in a Congested District of Chicago* (1895). Edith Abbott was a part-time instructor in the department, and Addams had been offered a part-time position. Many of the Chicago faculty were involved with Hull House and other social reform movements: Graham Taylor was one of the early members of the department. Burgess noted that systematic urban research at Chicago began with the Hull House, and many of the early graduate students used the settlement houses to assist their research (several, including Thrasher and Wirth, had early training as social workers). In 1908 the School of Civics and Philanthropy (later the School of Social Service Administration) was started at the Chicago Commons under the

leadership of Graham Taylor, and in 1920 the school was moved to the University of Chicago.

Legacy

Some have argued for a second (or even third) Chicago School, although there has not been the systematic and ongoing study of urban neighborhoods that characterize the earlier work. Still, the influence of the classic studies may be seen in several community studies directed by Morris Janowitz and Gerald Suttles in the 1970s and 1980s, and in the continuing urban ethnographies of Elijah Anderson and Mitch Duneier. William Julius Wilson's work on poverty neighborhoods in 1980–1995 once again made use of the city as a social laboratory, including a sustained program of training for graduate students, but Wilson would leave for Harvard University before this research agenda was completed. The Chicago School of Urban Sociology has not had lasting influence of work of the department.

Although the focus here is on the Chicago School of Urban Sociology, there are claims to various other Chicago schools in architecture, crime and delinquency, ethnic studies, political science, symbolic interaction, and other fields. The more general use of the city as a social laboratory across the disciplines is summarized in *The University and the City: A Centennial View of the University of Chicago: The Urban Laboratory* (1992).

The Chicago School would seem not to have stood up well against the claim of the Los Angeles School that whereas Chicago was the model for the industrial city of the twentieth century, Los Angeles is the model for the postindustrial city of the twenty-first century. First presented in the introduction to a 1986 special issue of the journal *Society and Space*, in which Allen Scott and Edward Soja referred to Los Angeles as the "capital of the twentieth century," edited volumes titled *The City: Los Angeles and Urban Theory at the End of the Twentieth Century* (1996) and *From Chicago to LA: Making Sense of Urban Theory* (2001) directly challenged the work of the Chicago School (*The City* is the title of a volume edited by Burgess, Park, and McKenzie in 1925). This has largely been a one-sided fight, as the subjects of the attack are long gone from the scene, and few have stepped up to defend the Chicago School. It is worth noting that while the recent scholarship has

been self-styled as the Los Angeles School of Urban Studies, the Chicago School of Urban Sociology was just one of many such research programs that used the city as a laboratory.

Ray Hutchison

See also Chicago, Illinois; Human Ecology; Los Angeles School of Urban Studies; New Urban Sociology; Urban Sociology; Urban Theory

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contribution to scholarly understanding of the earliest cities. Childe's career began with excavations and publications on European prehistory in the 1920s. In the 1930s he turned to synthesis on a larger scale. Until this time, the conceptual approach of archaeologists was focused rather narrowly on chronology and technology. Childe was the first to apply explicit and theoretically grounded social interpretations to archaeological data, producing novel (and influential) syntheses of prehistory. Using a Marxist approach, Childe identified two fundamental social transformations in the human past: the neolithic revolution and the urban revolution. The first signaled the initial adoption of agriculture and a sedentary lifestyle, and the second the appearance of the earliest class-structured state societies. These two transitions occurred independently in several parts of the world, but Childe's publications emphasized the Near East, the scene of their earliest manifestations.

Childe initially described the neolithic and urban revolutions in his 1936 book, *Man Makes Himself*. He went on to discuss the two models in other books for the public and in technical archaeological articles. They were quickly adopted, debated, and expanded by other archaeologists, and they formed the basis for most subsequent archaeological thinking on these transformations. Although contemporary models are quite different from Childe's original formulations, there is general agreement that he correctly identified the most far-reaching social transformations prior to the Industrial Revolution, as well as some of the major processes involved in those changes.

V. Gordon Childe's model of the urban revolution was presented in its clearest form as a 10-point scheme in an influential article in *Town Planning Review* in 1950. It is important to note that "urban revolution" was a label for the broad transformation or evolution of nonhierarchical societies into state-level societies. The appearance of cities was an important part of the model, but this was not a model of urban origins narrowly conceived. Childe's presentation of the urban revolution model in the 1950 paper took the form of a list of 10 characteristics that set the earliest states apart from their earlier ancestors. They can be paraphrased as follows:

1. Large population and large settlements (cities)
2. Full-time specialization and advanced division of labor
3. Production of an agricultural surplus to fund government and a differentiated society

CHILDE, V. GORDON

V. Gordon Childe (1892–1957) was the most influential archaeologist of the twentieth century. His model of "the urban revolution" was a major

4. Monumental public architecture
5. A ruling class
6. Writing
7. Exact and predictive sciences (arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, calendars)
8. Sophisticated art styles
9. Long-distance trade
10. The state

Some writers have called this is a simple checklist that lacks consideration of social and historical processes. Most archaeologists, however, see the dynamic and functional aspects of the model as implicit in Childe's discussion, and they are treated more fully in his other works. In fact, Childe's model forms the basis for virtually all subsequent theorizing of the rise of the earliest states and cities. In today's complex systems models of state origins, Childe's factor numbers 1, 2, 3, 5, and 10 are still regarded as crucial processes involved in the urban revolution.

Michael E. Smith

See also Ancient Cities; Mumford, Lewis

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CHINATOWNS

Chinatowns are spaces within a city that represent a culture distinct from the majority culture of the host society. They are a global phenomenon historically founded in major urban areas, conceived of as housing large communities of overseas Chinese immigrants. Although popularly known in many North American and European cities, they are as common in cities in every region, particularly in Southeast Asia, Australia, and South America.

Kay Anderson has described Chinatown as a concept that, like race, belongs to "White" European

cultural traditions. As such, Chinatown is seen as a social construction that reflects the perceptions of White Europeans based on racial classification of the Chinese. This classification system serves to differentiate self and other, and creates insiders and outsiders. The resulting categories further create different kinds of places and imaginations within the urban landscape. While the creation of this classification of a single Chinese identity, or "Chineseness," is not solely the result of Western imperialism, there is a sense of a shared characterization put forth by both the Chinese community and the European society. According to Rey Chow, Chinatowns are also landscapes produced through Chinese diasporas, which tend to reproduce upon themselves imaginations and identities created by the effects of Western imperialism and cultural hegemony. The creation of "Chineseness" and prevalent images in the landscapes of Chinatown that appear in the West are mutually created by both the Chinese and the Europeans, oriental and occidental, insider and outsider.

The significance of these joint insider–outsider productions of essentialized identities of people and places is that Chinatowns are geographical imaginations. While these imaginations are often based on imaginary concepts of what China is like, it is more often a representation—and, arguably, a homogenization, of migrant Chinese culture.

In the mid-nineteenth century, cities like Vancouver, British Columbia, and San Francisco, California, attracted a massive immigration of cheap Chinese labor due to railway building and mining developments. The large Chinese communities eventually settled in discrete parts of the cities, creating Chinatowns. In many parts of Southeast Asia, Chinese immigration occurred as early as the seventeenth century, as merchants and traders dominated the economic landscape of growing maritime cities such as Bangkok, Manila, and Singapore. This would eventually burgeon into large migrant working communities with the advent of European colonization in the region. The rapidly developing cities attracted unskilled laborers from the southern regions of China. Initially, the overseas Chinese were commonly thought of as sojourners, transient labor with the intention of returning to China. However, most of the migrant workers settled at their destinations and carved out sections of the cities for themselves.

Chinatowns are imagined to be reproductions of the same place all over the world. In spite of a



Chinatown in London's West End

Source: Karen Wiley.

common cultural background and source nationality, Chinatowns are predicated upon similar identities and reactions to the other, but have essential differences, based on their geographical localities. The major factors of these differences are the communities' initial migration motives and their interactions with their host societies. Differing migration motives have resulted in the divergent natures of the Chinatowns in Southeast Asia compared with those in North America. Many of the Chinese settlers in Southeast Asia set up and ran businesses, forming a large upper-middle class. The effect of this in cities like Rangoon and Kuala Lumpur has

created an image of the Chinese as wealthy and of Chinatown as an expensive neighborhood. This is not the case in North America, where the overwhelming majority of the original Chinese settlers were hired as cheap labor, who would contribute to the resulting image of Chinatown as run-down parts of the city with low rent.

Differing interactions with host societies can be seen in the assimilation of the Chinese into the local communities. This has happened at a high rate, for many different reasons, in many of the Southeast Asian cities like Singapore, Ho Chi Minh City, and Bangkok. The Chinese in Bangkok are deeply involved in Thai politics. In the case of Singapore, the ethnic Chinese make up the majority population, prompting state-led claims of "racial harmony." However, in the cities of North America, Australia, and the United Kingdom, the Chinese were seen as "unassimilable foreigners." Chinatown developed as a defensive strategy as the host society endeavored to separate "us" from "them," and the Chinese insulated themselves out of unfamiliarity and fear. This has created a tension that still exists, but in Canadian and Australian

cities today, the presence of the Chinese is a marker of "multiculturalism." Although this appears to bring similarity to separate and distinct Chinatowns, the underlying power and social relations between the Chinese and host communities demonstrate very localized and regional differences.

Location

Although initially located in the inner city as a result of age and urban history, Chinatowns are undergoing a process of suburbanization. The increasing occurrence of Chinese enclaves outside

of downtown cores is indicative of the growing social mobility of the ethnic Chinese population. In Toronto, large Chinese communities in the suburbs of Markham and Richmond Hill have paved the way for “new” Chinatowns. These are centered on large shopping malls that provide culturally specific goods and services and serve a largely Asian audience. The goods and services are not only Chinese in nature, source, or manufacture, but also include Japanese, Korean, and Thai, among others.

Sites of Difference

The movement of Chinese communities to the outskirts of cities indicates the changing nature of Chinatowns in general. Their internal demographics also are changing: Chinatowns are increasingly populated by other East and Southeast Asian immigrants as many of the older ethnic Chinese have moved away to wealthier sections of the city. Chinatowns are sites of difference. Ethnic enclaves represent difference in the nature of race, ethnicity, nationality, and social and migrant status. The development of Chinatown is markedly different from that of other ethnic enclaves given the nature of the communities’ initial migration and settlement. Particular to the Chinese is the male-dominated society of the early migrant force, caused by the nature of their work: railway building and mining. The great imbalance in sex ratio in the cities of particularly Canada and the United States resulted in a greatly differing social structure.

The marked difference between the suburban and downtown Chinatowns is in their representation of socioeconomic difference. As downtown Chinatowns are associated with perceptions of poverty, marginalization, and the earlier ethnic community, suburban Chinatowns are disassociated from this image and usually represent communities that have achieved not only a higher economic status but also a certain level of residency and citizenship. Related to this, downtown Chinatowns are further typified as the receiving locales for new immigrants. In many North American cities now, the new immigrants to Chinatown are not only Chinese, but encompass other East and Southeast Asian nationalities in growing proportion.

As racial and ethnic sites of difference within the city, Chinatowns are often delineated by a markedly different demographic in comparison with the

rest of their urban settings. However, the idea that only Chinese people live in Chinatown is a contrived one. Cities are intrinsically places of intense diversity, and even enclaves like Chinatowns can be no different. The movement of Chinese communities to the outskirts of cities indicates the changing nature of Chinatowns. Internal demographics are changing; Chinatowns are increasingly populated by other East and Southeast Asian immigrants as many of the older ethnic Chinese have moved away to wealthier sections of the city.

Common Imagery

The image of Chinatown is commonly likened to a “combat zone,” “red-light district,” or African American “ghetto”—districts of crime and social problems. Another common perception is the image of an exotic foreign enclave. Chinatowns are often imagined as places of vice, owing to the concentration of gambling dens and opium parlors in the early days. The rundown, ghetto imagery of the Chinese neighborhoods is also related to the low levels of hygiene and high incidences of illness. This was, in many cases, due to the development of the enclaves on undesirable land, usually on low-lying, flood-prone, marshy sections of the city. Further, the close conditions that many of the Chinese lived in contributed to the transmission of many sicknesses. These imaginations are reinforced by fictitious re-creations in the media, for example, in the film noir *Chinatown* with its psychological mystery plot, despite the fact the film is about public corruption in Los Angeles, and not about Chinatown at all.

These popular imaginations are often overlooked in occurrences of Chinatowns outside of the West—in major cities like Bangkok in Thailand and Nagasaki in Japan, for example; as well as in the reality that such Chinatowns are often simply places of businesses dominated by the Chinese. Further examples include Vancouver’s Chinatown, managed by a Business Improvement Association, and the Singapore Tourism Board, which oversees the development of Chinatown with the Chinatown Business Association. The contrast between the oft-imagined seedy underworld and the actuality of business- and tourism-oriented Chinatowns is due largely to the lingering effects of the sensationalized journalistic reporting that burgeoned in the late nineteenth century.

In many places, the forms, formats, and functions of Chinatowns are changing. Chinatowns have developed in stages. From the early days of low-priced immigrant housing and cultural-specific business, to the abandonment and incorporation of other ethnic groups, many Chinatowns are now experiencing gentrification, as cities—realizing the value inherent in heritage and cultural tourism—rebuild, enhance, and preserve the Chinese cultures that once dominated the place. While the culturally and nationally specific placename of “Chinatown” remains, the particular character of overseas Chinese culture has decreased. In cities such as Singapore, this reduction has been rectified through heritage preservation, gentrification, and, some would argue, Disneyfication. This has resulted in a sterile parody of what was once a complex and multilayered cultural landscape.

Main Texts and Existing Literature

Research on Chinatowns was brought into the forefront with both David Chuenyan Lai’s book *Chinatowns: Towns Within Cities in Canada* (1988) and Kay Anderson’s *Vancouver’s Chinatown: Racial Discourse in Canada, 1875–1980* (1991). Peter Kwong’s *The New Chinatown* (1988); Min Zhou’s *Chinatown: The Socioeconomic Potential of an Urban Enclave* (1992); Jan Lin’s *Reconstructing Chinatown: Ethnic Enclave, Global Change* (1998)—all three use New York’s Chinatown as case studies. Gregor Benton and Frank Pieke’s edited book *The Chinese in Europe* (1998) and Flemming Christiansen’s *Chinatown, Europe* (2003) are also fundamental texts about Chinatowns. The situation of these studies in North America and Europe indicates conspicuously the lack of Chinatown-related studies outside of the western hemisphere.

Studies of Chinatown are commonly contextualized within the cultural, the urban, and the economic. There are two pertinent trends in the existing literature. The first is that much of the literature approaches Chinatowns from a racial and/or ethnic perspective, frequently in the context of migration, and the second is that almost all of it focuses on Chinatowns in Europe or in North America. Little has been written about Chinatowns beyond their appearance in the western hemisphere, particularly in Asia. There are also a few

studies on the urban development (often in terms of gentrification or tourism) and economics of Chinatown (generally concerning business relations and Sino-global networks). Much has been written about ethnic enclaves in general, and Chinatowns in particular, in Western cities, from the point of view of racial discourse, issues of transnationalism and Chinese diaspora, urban spaces and city planning, and as economic networks facilitating the social mobility of immigrants in a foreign society.

Much less has been said about Chinatown as an ethnic enclave in the “Orient,” in the form of left-over bordered racial communities in once colonized, postcolonial cities such as those in Southeast Asia, for example, in Singapore or Manila. Much of the existing literature in the Asian context focuses on the Chinese diaspora (e.g., Michael Charney et al. and Elizabeth Sinn); and Brenda Yeoh and Lily Kong have situated studies on Chinatown in Singapore on the topic of landscape and landscape meanings, demonstrating that spaces of difference in Asian societies are uniquely constructed and maintained. From a cultural approach, Katharyne Mitchell has explained that much of the research on “ethnictowns” like Chinatown, Koreatown, and Japantown have studied either the development of the ethnic community itself or the structural forces of racism and European hegemony that shaped these communities. The existing research has focused on the factors and histories leading to the creation and growth of the enclave and grappled with the transnational effects on culture and how urban centers deal with the beginnings of multiethnicity.

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See also Ethnic Enclave; Ethnic Entrepreneurship; Global City; Racialization

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CHRISTOPHER WREN, PLAN OF LONDON

Sir Christopher Wren's plan for London after the Great Fire of 1666 (Figure 1), preserved in two drawings (All Souls I. 7 and 101), constitutes his only, and never implemented, work of urban design. Presented to the king just five days after the fire had ended, Wren's design was to solve the deplorable problems, recognized for decades, that had developed within the medieval city as the result of drastic social changes. Furthermore, he proposed to do so in a new way. Disasters had occurred in cities before, wiping clean large areas—in the case of the Great Fire, it destroyed two thirds of the city's rundown, crowded, and unsanitary fabric. But instead of rebuilding the city as it had been before, Wren presented a new idea—to create a completely new design of streets and buildings on the original site.

At least six new plans for London were produced during the weeks following the fire: first by Wren, then by his close friends John Evelyn and

Robert Hooke, followed by the city surveyor Robert Mills (now lost), the surveyor and map-maker Richard Newcourt, and Captain Valentine Knight. Hooke's and Newcourt's proposals for a grid of straight streets creating uniform blocks over the destroyed area, with no regard to what had been lost or what had survived, were derived from ideal city designs found in Italian architectural treatises and from new towns recently constructed on the continent. Wren's and Evelyn's proposals for wide diagonal and radiating avenues coming together as *triviums* or *rond-points*, where major urban spaces or buildings are placed, were inspired by the Rome of Sixtus V (1580s), by the new *places* of Paris created under Henry IV (1605–1610), and the gardens of André Le Nôtre (1650s–1660s). Rather than ideal, as shown by the discourse titled *Londinium Redivivum* attached by Evelyn to his plan, he and Wren were very much concerned about the earlier conditions. Using the available but inaccurate maps of the city as base plans—Newcourt's of 1658 (Wren) and Hollar's of 1666 (Evelyn)—they generally maintained the location of major streets, joining them into surviving streets and gates. Major monuments, including St. Paul's, the Exchange, the Custom House, as well as many of the churches remained in their original locations.

Wren's plan, a sensitive adaptation of continental ideas to the original pattern of the destroyed city, was seriously considered at the House of Commons soon after the fire and as late as February 1667. To make the plan feasible, it proposed that all the ground be purchased by the city and placed in trust while the new streets were laid out. Then individual sites would be sold, giving preference to former owners. In the end, however, many factors stood in the way—lack of money, the cumbersome legislative process, and suspicious property owners. The lack of an accurate and detailed survey and map meant that Wren's design could not be finalized and implemented immediately—haste was essential to prevent the migration of inhabitants and their business. In fact, it took more than five years after the Rebuilding Act was passed in late March 1667 for Hooke to complete the survey of the ruins and properties, as well as the negotiations with owners over "lost ground." This slow and difficult process made reconstructing the original fabric the only option. There were, however, a few

major changes—the widening of major streets; the creation of two new north–south streets, King and Queen; and the establishing of new, off-street market spaces—all ideas initially proposed by Wren and Evelyn.

Although Wren’s plan for London was never implemented, it was disseminated through numerous engravings beginning in 1724 and continuing through the eighteenth century, including a French version in 1758. Thus, as a visionary project, Wren’s 1666 plan for London may have had an important influence on the designs of capital cities, including L’Enfant’s Washington, D.C. (1791), and Haussmann’s Paris (1853–1870).

Lydia M. Soo

See also Haussmann, Baron Georges-Eugène; London, United Kingdom; Paris, France; Urban Planning; Wren, Sir Christopher

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CINEMA (MOVIE HOUSE)

A cinema or movie house is a public site where motion pictures are exhibited to a paying public. Movie house architecture, audience composition, and filmic entertainment have changed dramatically since the first storefront theaters were opened in the earliest years of the twentieth century. However, in almost all of its manifestations, the cinema has been a vital element of urban life. The cinema can be viewed as a portal for understanding the various developmental cadences of urban

centers, as well as the pursuits of leisure for working- and middle-class city dwellers during the twentieth century.

Film was the first mediated popular entertainment. From a local perspective, the development of the motion picture projector enabled films to be exhibited to large groups of people who were often strangers to one another. They sat together in one room or hall and watched either a portion of a film or an entire motion picture simultaneously. From a national perspective, the mass distribution of motion pictures created the conditions for audiences across a large geographic region, or even an entire country, to view the same motion picture nearly simultaneously. These conditions helped to create an urban identity, constructed around the pursuit of leisure and visual entertainment.

As both cities and the movie industry changed and grew, so did the movie houses that projected motion pictures. During the first few years of the twentieth century, for example, when the motion picture industry was still in its infancy, motion pictures were not projected in movie houses at all. They were exhibited in vaudeville theaters, as only part of the evening’s entertainment, or they were exhibited in storefronts; entrepreneurs purchased motion picture projectors, chairs, and makeshift screens and opened for business. As the motion picture industry matured and as films grew more sophisticated and longer in length, the movie house in its earliest manifestation was born.

Nickelodeon

The nickelodeon was a gathering place for urban immigrants and the working class and the first successful expression of the movie house. It was the predominant movie house form from approximately 1905 to 1917. Generally situated in working-class neighborhoods, on side streets where rent was cheap, but in close proximity to popular shopping areas, the nickelodeon served as a gathering place for the working class. On the way home from work, factory workers would congregate at the nickelodeon, and women, children, and entire families used the nickelodeon as a way to enjoy public life. The humble conditions of the inexpensive movie house frequently paralleled the realities of working-class life. While the quality of both the

films and the movie houses was generally poor, the movies were well enjoyed by patrons. The nickelodeon provided an inexpensive public space for newly arrived immigrants and other working-class urban dwellers. The burgeoning urban middle class, particularly in the United States, found both the films and the nickelodeons to be unacceptably vulgar and crude.

The Movie Palace

The movie palace (picture palace) is an urban phenomenon. Its development and popularity coincided with the maturity of both the motion picture industry and the twentieth-century city. While various expressions of the nickelodeon appeared in rural areas and small towns, movie palaces were so large in scale that only populated urban areas could accommodate them. Although in general, picture palaces were built only during the second decade of the twentieth century, they were the predominant movie theater form until the mid-twentieth century.

The construction and opening of a picture palace, often the most expensive and opulent structure in a city center, marked the moment when a city and its inhabitants had “arrived.” Representing the pinnacle of urban development during the boom years of the 1920s, the movie palace was a symbol of cosmopolitanism and sophistication.

Located in prime downtown locations, the theaters were generally situated next to a trolley or streetcar stop and were close to restaurants and department stores, enabling city dwellers to spend their leisure hours and their disposable income in high-traffic commercial areas.

With the arrival in 1915 of multireel films that told compelling narratives using cinematic language, the middle class began to accept film as a form of pleasurable and appropriate public entertainment. The picture palace design was meant to impress and dazzle the middle class, as well as to assure them they were in a reputable public space. Usually built with 2,000 to 5,000 seats or more, the theaters were designed to sell thousands of tickets each day. The picture palace was consciously designed to assure cinema’s new audience that motion picture entertainment was held to the highest standards. All working-class signifiers were eliminated, and a brigade of ushers assured audiences that appropriate behavior was enforced.

Elaborate architectural details often simulated designs of European palaces, Far East temples, and castles from other exotic locales, fostering an atmosphere of high culture. Most movie palaces in the United States were segregated spaces with upper balconies reserved primarily for African Americans.

Picture palaces lost their audiences due to desegregation, the decline of the urban center, suburbanization, the popularity of television, and the rise of the suburban and drive-in theaters during the late 1950s and 1960s. The theaters fell into disrepair, and many were demolished, as a result of feverish urban renewal. Some survived by showing pornographic and exploitation films. During the 1970s, when the historic preservation movement began to burgeon, picture palaces remaining in city centers were often the first buildings to be considered for restoration.

Neighborhood Movie Houses

Neighborhood movie houses were built for suburbanites who moved away from city centers during the 1950s and 1960s. Dramatically different in scale from the picture palace, the neighborhood theater seated several hundred patrons, had minimal décor, and frequently had two screens. The grandeur of the movie palace was no longer necessary or appropriate: Architectural elements featuring streamlined modern designs were de rigueur and middle-class suburbanites needed no assurances that cinema was an appropriate form of entertainment. The development of the academic study of cinema in the 1970s coincided with some neighborhood theaters being transformed into art houses and exhibiting non-Hollywood and foreign films, particularly in large cities and university towns. The neighborhood theater had to compete with the drive-in theater, which was situated in or near the suburbs and was usually located on a huge parcel of undeveloped land.

Mall Cinema

The neighborhood movie house moved into the suburban mall when mall development proliferated in the 1960s and 1970s. Malls helped further shift the purchasing power and the awareness of the middle class away from the city center. Mall

cinemas shared characteristics with the neighborhood movie houses; they were architecturally uninspired and seemed to be designed only to move large amounts of people through them. Yet, in one way they resembled the movie palace; they were situated in high-traffic areas designed to accommodate middle-class consumers. As malls grew, so too did their theaters. Multiple-screen movie theaters offered patrons more cinematic choices and generated more ticket sales for theater owners. The blockbuster film born in the mid-1970s (e.g., *The Exorcist* and *Jaws*) found its home in the mall cinema.

The Multiplex

The multiplex (cineplex) is a cinema with many screens, often as many as 20. The movie industry began to suffer in the 1990s as a result of shifting patterns of middle-class leisure, a multitude of choices for in-home entertainment, and a lull in dynamic movie making. So to improve ticket sales, theater owners looked back to the tactics of picture palace designers and built theaters designed to impress consumers. Although most multiplex designs are not nearly as extravagant as the picture palace, they do incorporate massive murals, architectural designs that suggest a sense of the past, eye-catching lighting, IMAX, entertainment areas for children, cafés with gourmet foods, and places for repose. As urban centers were renovated, lessened of crime, and commercialized in the 1990s, multiplexes became a standard feature of city life once again. However, the multiplex is at home in suburbia as well.

The Boutique

The most recent manifestation of the movie house is the cinema boutique. It is usually a one- or two-screen theater located in a dense urban center. The boutique is part of a movement of new urban living in which creative professionals (who can afford it) live and play near where they work. Often in a renovated building, the boutique first appeared in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Its popularity is, in part, a response to the mass appeal of the cineplex and the blockbuster film. The boutique suggests a sense of refinement, exclusion, and high culture by way of its exhibition of independent and foreign

films, small environs, stylish design, and gourmet offerings.

Janna Jones

See also Cinematic Urbanism; City and Film; Shopping Center

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CINEMATIC URBANISM

Cinematic urbanism reflects the increasing interdependence of the processes of image and spatial production in the general frame of the symbolic economy. It is an emerging field of study capturing—in the relation among movement, image, and the city—one essential aspect of modernity, as well as epitomizing the present shift toward any possible postmodernity. There are more ways to understand this term in the current critical discourse, which represent, however, different vantage points from which to observe general processes affecting the urban world. In the main view, cinematic urbanism is a way to analyze the urban environment through the cinematic sphere and to assess how films contribute to the formation of the urban identity. It also can be seen as a way to explore the “imaginary” of emotional geographies, as if to travel toward an urban world plastered with images. From another perspective, cinematic urbanism can be understood as a way to look at the structural transformation of the urban

environment endorsed by the pervasiveness of cinematic devices in the information age, analyzing how moving images are increasingly populating spaces and surfaces of contemporary cities and how urban design is increasingly turning into a logistics of perception.

The etymology of the word cinematic is in the Greek verb *kinein*, to move. The essence of the cinematic urbanism is indeed in such relations as movement/image and space/velocity. In this sense, if the premodern urban condition has been one characterized by settlement, intimacy, and a sense of belonging to place and community, modernity has represented a shift toward mobility, crossing, anonymity, and otherness. Modern city, from being the walled, defended site of staying, becomes an attractor of flows, a node in a dynamic system of trajectories, characterized by complex codification of access procedures and sensorial overstimulation. Far before the invention of cinema, it has been the experience of traveling, the view from the train passing through, to modify the perception of landscape and the relation with places. It prefigures annihilation of distance and time compression, along with dominance of the visual perception as the ultimate urban experience. Perhaps the first to clearly capture this passage was Charles Baudelaire, singing the “transitory, the fleeting and the contingent” of urban life, praising the experience of the anonymity in the crowd, picturing the urban café as the screen through which to look at the spectacle of the city. In the same era, Georges-Eugène Baron Haussmann was opening up—through demolition—the visual domination of the urban space as an essential means of managing power. Since then, modernity and visuality have been concepts developing parallel with one another.

“Just as water, gas and electricity are brought into our houses from far off to satisfy our needs in response to a minimal effort, so we shall be supplied with visual or auditory images, which will appear and disappear at a simple movements of the hand, hardly more than a sign,” said Paul Valéry, quoted by Walter Benjamin in “The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction”; the view of Benjamin is probably the most influential in anticipating the figures of a cinematic urbanism, with his monumental project about Parisian passages, its theorization of the *flânerie* as a lens to capture modernity, and its capacity to preview the

effects of cinema in changing the perceived space of citizens. “The film corresponds to profound changes in the apperceptive apparatus—changes that are experienced on an individual scale by the man in the street in big-city traffic, on a historical scale by every present-day citizen,” states Benjamin in the same piece.

More recent is the work of such thinkers as Jean Baudrillard and Paul Virilio. In a frequently quoted passage of *America*, Baudrillard notes, “The American city seems to have stepped right out of the movies” and “[t]o grasp its secrets, you should not, then, begin with the city and move inwards towards the screen; you should begin with the screen and move outwards towards the city.” If Baudrillard’s intention is to depict the inherently cinematic nature of the American city, in opposition to the nature of the historical European city, globalization processes are in a way making this observation appropriate in every context. But it is probably Virilio, with his attention to phenomena as time compression, the diffusion of visual technologies and interest in *dromology* (the science of velocity), who has developed one of the most influential sets of analytical tools for the emerging cinematic urbanism. In Virilio’s work, the development of visualizing technologies produces visibility without confrontation, in which the traditional vis-à-vis streets disappears, giving way to the single temporality of an instantaneous diffusion. “With the interfaçade of monitors and control screens, *elsewhere* begins here, and vice versa,” he wrote in *L’espace critique*, describing the incoming *overexposed* contemporary city. The idea of cinematic urbanism as a product of postmodernity can be retraced as well in the classical and controversial work *Learning from Las Vegas*, by Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, and Steven Izenour. Here, the Las Vegas strip is interpreted as a new paradigm for the urban, where billboards, signs, and buildings act as signs, are designed according to the aim of capturing the attention of the driver, stressing the relation between visuality and velocity.

A Cinematic Epistemology of the City

The profound, constitutive relationship between cinema and city is the topic of a range of recent studies, as in Nezer AlSayyad’s attempt to retrace a history of urban modernity “from reel to real.” In this

kind of analysis, film studies are employed as significant contributions to the knowledge of the urban world. Paris, Berlin, and New York are among the most exemplary cinematic cities, cities whose role stands out from being merely frequent backgrounds of film action, whose identities have been continuously molded by cinematic narratives. If Paris has assumed such a role even before the advent of cinema as a mass medium, Berlin is probably the first metropolis to become the sole protagonist, as in Walter Ruttmann's *Symphonie der Großstadt* (1927), a film wherein the modern rhythm of the city is captured as a harmonic choreography, producing mixed feelings of fascination, disquiet, and uncanniness. Similarly inspired by the urban rhythm, but with a peculiar attention to the gaze of the camera itself, at its social and political reflex on the production of place, is the almost contemporary Dziga Vertov's *The Man with the Movie Camera* (1929), set in Odessa. With a similar gaze on the urban as a fascinating, unceasing, harmonic process, with either critical or empathic, dubious or enchanted participation, films such as Charlie Chaplin's *Modern Times*, Fritz Lang's *Metropolis*, or Jacques Tati's *Playtime* are essential to the general understanding of modernism, urbanization, and their consequences for the everyday. Ridley Scott's *Blade Runner* or Terry Gilliam's *Brazil*, Jean-Luc Godard's *Alphaville*, or John Carpenter's *Escape From New York* represent essential views on possible urban dystopias and a critique of the urban future.

Screenscapes

If the role that more and more cities have in cinema is unquestionable, not enough has been stressed about the symmetrical undergoing process: that is, that moving images are increasingly becoming a constitutive element of the urban landscape. It is a colonization operated by the cinematic realm on the lived space of the everyday but as well, vice versa, as production and consumption increasingly merge in the postmodern condition, and everybody incessantly contributes, consciously or not, to the proliferation of images. Such a process is fostering a relationship with the environment, as well as among individuals, intensively mediated through moving images and managed by digital devices. Pictures, projections, *movies* multiply in public as well as in private space: a process rendering the difference

between the public and private realms a biased and ineffectual one, redefining, in the meantime, the concept of public space itself.

The cinematic experience is no longer a sacral moment, separated from the ordinary and daily life; rather, it is liberated from the constraints of dedicated space, extracted from the *camera obscura* of theatrical venues or from domestic living rooms dedicated to television rituals; it pops up in the urban fabric through all possible surfaces. Parallel to the exponential evolution of information technologies, fostering communication tools and practices to permeate all sectors of human activity, the representational world of images is gaining a hegemonic role in the everyday realm of citizens. Carried both inside and on the external frame of public transports, broadcast through myriad constantly smaller, more mobile, and connectible personal devices, in the personal screens of computers, cell phones, and consoles, set in the programmable surfaces of new architectures, images pervasively inhabit the city: Images build up a parallel meta-urbanity, engendering what is alternatively referred to as augmented reality.

From this standpoint, the cinematic city is eventually the result of three intertwined processes, affecting urbanization at a global scale:

1. The progressive fluidization and mobilization of human behavior in connection to the increased mobility of goods, people, and money
2. The overwhelming production of images and data constituting the dominant form of production in the urban contemporary landscape
3. The increasing mediation of interpersonal relationships through technological devices and institutional protocols

Such processes engender epistemological spaces that can be alternatively analyzed as space of flows, space of exposure, or mediated space. Furthermore, they represent the three constitutive dimensions of contemporary public space:

1. The inherently horizontal dimension of mobility, producing an interpretation of public space specifically as transport infrastructure, articulated as a system of roads, squares, open spaces, airports, and railways

2. The essentially vertical articulation of semantic surfaces, that is, the representational space where symbolic productions are displayed, distributed, and exposed to the public, including not only shop windows and billboards, signage and architectural facades, galleries, and cultural centers but also, and increasingly so, screens of computers, televisions, and PDAs (personal digital assistants)
3. A networked dimension, that is, the mediated space of information communication technologies; linking together both the former dimensions, it has the extensivity of the first combined with the parametric temporality of the second. In this last perspective, public space becomes essentially *interface*. It has no inherently spatial nature, but instead is strictly dependent on the material presence and performativity of wires, cables, antennas, chips, encoders and decoders, magnetic supports, and data storage devices.

The urban production process in the global system is increasingly distributed in delocalized networks, but it emerges from production to consumption through the vertical articulation of surfaces that represent the predominant aspect of the contemporary global city, determining an urban palimpsest experienced as a succession of frames. Programmed flows of images represent the core of the urban experience. The screen becomes the main morphological element in a city where to be visible is as important as what is actually done inside architecture, if not more. Persistence succeeds existence in the essential urban ontology.

Such conditions are determining the emergence of what can be analyzed as a vertical urbanism, urbanism in which the semantic use of vertical urban surfaces is overcoming the horizontal logistic use of spaces in engendering value and rent. Urban design moves from fields to frames: Land's logistic use of horizontal surfaces loses relevance with respect to the semantic use of vertical surfaces. If, in the past, the design of the city has been basically drawing plans from an aerial point of view, distributing functions through the physical space in a primarily horizontal articulation, now we face the emergence of a discipline aimed at organizing the visual perception of the citizen. Citizenship tends to be understood as spectatorship flattened into audience, a vision that in

many respects recalls not only Guy Debord's arguments in *The Society of Spectacle* (1967) but also a phenomenon recognized by David Harvey as an effect of the flexible accumulation regime.

Spatial transformation processes are increasingly influenced by the necessity to capture the potential attention of citizens/spectators, determining what has also been depicted as an attention economy, connected more and more with the distribution of information through digital networks. It is not a coincidence if, among the most important players in the urban new economies, we find today corporations of the entertainment and media sectors, which deploy an aggressive attitude toward monopolizing control of urban surfaces and exploiting their communication potential, and that often extend their interests to sectors such as mobility, retail, urban furniture. Their strategies are easily inscribed in the entrepreneurial transformation of urban government, significantly contributing to a neoliberalist urbanism focused on private-public partnership and remarkably unbalanced toward speculative attitudes.

Image Production

As a matter of fact, the process of image production assumes a fundamental role in the urban economies, redirecting capital toward specific spatial transformation, redefining the architectural consistency of the city, or reshaping citizens' everyday experience through intensive mediation of personal interchanges. It is a form of production that implies a massive use of tools and techniques derived from media and the entertainment industry, redirected to engender and exploit value from the urban location. Image production stands out as the complex production-consumption chain reshaping the urban experience of citizens as an essentially visual one; engendering a metropolis where the space of exposure becomes the structured embodiment of public space, designed to optimize the exposition of city users to the spectacle of goods, being impressed, entertained, directed by flows of commodified images. The management of imagery is therefore more or less evident at the core of the main phenomena affecting the contemporary urban world and in many terms inhabiting current disciplinary discourse. *Urban*

renewal programs, urban marketing, gentrification, Disneyfication, festivalization, mass tourism, cultural heritage, cultural economy, and creative city are all current locutions describing social phenomena, structural adjustments, or transformations of the urban economy strictly related to image production forms. They speak of building, changing, or preserving the image of the city. To renew the image of a place is the first step toward financial investment and physical transformation. The new creative class, invoked as a panacea for revitalizing declining cities, is one composed mainly of image professionals. This brings tools and techniques initially refined by visual arts and media industries to assume a relevant role in the design and management of urban space, in combination with the traditional tools of disciplines as planning, architecture, marketing, and policy making. The entertainment industry and spatial production increasingly share a similar attitude. Film production in itself becomes a model for spatial production, where the development of fictional narratives is the framework for the realization and consolidation of actual processes of urban restructuring. Set and light design, graphic design, digital rendering, and script writing are contributing to the redefinition of urban design as a discipline dedicated to managing the visual perception of the city.

Urban landscape is no longer divisible from its mediascape.

Lorenzo Tripodi

See also Benjamin, Walter; City and Film; Harvey, David; Las Vegas, Nevada; Urban Semiotics

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CITIZEN PARTICIPATION

Citizen participation encompasses efforts to engage the citizenry in a community's decision making. Starting with the voting process in a representative democracy, government administrators expand the citizen involvement by using public hearings and debates, referenda, collaborative forums, and electronic media. The widespread enthusiasm for more citizen participation rests on the belief that an engaged citizenry will produce government policy that is closer to the preferences of the public.

Over three decades of academic theory have focused on the superiority of decision making that engages citizens. A participatory process can educate the public and, conversely, the process can assist government decision makers in determining when policies are unpopular with the public. In addition, participatory forums and other processes enable citizens to build their skills at civic leadership as well as gain access to government officials. This gives them an empowering "voice" beyond the ballot box.

Table I Advantages of Citizen Participation in Government Decision Making

	<i>Advantages to Citizen Participants</i>	<i>Advantages to Government</i>
Decision process	Education (learn from and inform government representatives) Persuade and enlighten government Gain skills for activist citizenship	Education (learn from and inform citizens) Persuade citizens; build trust and allay anxiety or hostility Build strategic alliances Gain legitimacy of decisions
Outcomes	Break gridlock; achieve outcomes Gain some control over policy process Better policy and implementation decisions	Break gridlock; achieve outcomes Avoid litigation costs Better policy and implementation decisions

Source: Irvin, Renee, and John Stansbury. "Citizen Participation in Decision Making: Is It Worth the Effort?" *Public Administration Review* 64 (January/February 2004): 55–65. Reprinted with permission of Wiley-Blackwell.

Sherry Arnstein described a ladder of participation that illustrates the ascending forms of engagement, from nonparticipation (manipulation and therapy) to tokenism (informing, consultation, placation), and finally citizen power (partnership, delegated power, and citizen control). Many participatory strategies utilized by governments, such as public hearings, fall in the "consultation" or "informing" range of the participation ladder. Working groups such as watershed councils and other citizen advisory forums can achieve results beyond "placation," to a true shaping of government initiatives.

The gains from a more participatory process need to be weighed against potential costs. First, a participatory process will be time consuming for government representatives and citizens alike. Second, individuals taking part in a participatory process may not be representative of the public. In fact, they tend to come from the highest socioeconomic groups in a community. Consequently, interest groups or engaged individuals may mold the decision making in their interest rather than in the public interest.

At the very least, government decision making requires a keen awareness of public sentiment on current issues and proposed policy issues. Participatory processes must be carefully designed to solicit and act upon citizen recommendations for improvements in policy making.

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See also Advocacy Planning; Community Organizing; Governance; Urban Planning; Urban Politics

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CITIZENSHIP

Citizenship is a complex (political, legal, social, and cultural but perhaps also sexual, aesthetic, and ethical) institution of domination *and* empowerment that governs both *who* citizens (insiders), subjects (strangers, outsiders), and objects (aliens) are and *how* these figures are to govern themselves and each other in a given body politic. The essential difference between citizenship and membership is that whereas the latter governs conduct *within* social groups, citizenship is about conduct *across* social groups that constitute a body politic. Being a citizen almost always means not only being an insider but also one who has mastered appropriate modes and forms of conduct of being

an insider. This creates a figure in the sense of both a *person* (law) and an *image* (norm). For subjects and abjects, becoming a citizen means either adopting modes and forms of being an insider (assimilation, integration, incorporation) or challenging these modes and forms and thereby transforming them (identification, differentiation, recognition). Just what constitutes citizenship and its appropriate modes and forms of conduct are always objects of struggle among citizens, subjects, and abjects with claims to citizenship as justice. It is through these claims to citizenship as justice that it becomes a site of rights and obligations. These claims and the combination of rights and obligations that define it work themselves out differently in different sites and produce different figures. Thus, *sites* (cities, empires, nations, states), *figures* (citizens, subjects, abjects), and *substances* (rights, obligations, duties) can be said to be the elements of citizenship that constitute a body politic.

Sites of Citizenship

The ancient Greeks have been given the distinction of inventing citizenship roughly around the eighth century BC by producing a new image of the city: *polis*. Until then, the city was governed by god-kings and after that, the citizens. It appears that cities in ancient kingdoms, states, and empires did not develop citizenship precisely because they were “despotic” regimes of government. But the ancient Greeks did not see much conflict between despotic regimes of government and citizenship. The three forms of governing the city as identified by Greek thought—oligarchy, aristocracy, and democracy—already assumed the existence of the citizen. Nonetheless, what happened in that originary moment? The answer, ironically, has much to do with what we are struggling over right now. At that originary moment, it seems that a new figure entered onto the stage of history, who was male and a warrior and owned property (not the least of which were the means of warfare). That figure became the dominant image. Those who were not male and did not own property—such as women, slaves, peasants, merchants, craftsmen, and sailors—found themselves thrown into being, or had become, the others of that figure as subjects and abjects. The figure of the citizen involved the

right to govern his city (belonging) and bequeath that right to his son (blood). By governing himself by the laws of his city, he also governed the strangers, outsiders, and aliens of the city. We already recognize in this figure attributes (property, warriorship, masculinity) that were reproduced time and again as conditions of citizenship and yet worked themselves out differently in different sites. The site of polis would remain as the originary site through which citizenship has been reinvented through the centuries. The issues that polis articulated, such as the relationship between citizenship and forms of government, subjects, and abjects and rights and responsibilities of citizenship would, time and again, be repeated, albeit producing different sites, figures, and substances of citizenship. It is now impossible to conceive citizenship without orienting ourselves to that original site of history, polis, and its figure of the citizen.

The Roman figure of the citizen worked itself out through different sites. When fully articulated, being a Roman citizen was above all being a member of an empire that was beyond the city. The site of citizenship, it seems, extended beyond the city. Yet, it is clear that while Romans invented a new site for citizenship, it was articulated through the city. “Being Roman” nicely captures that duality: being of Rome and its empire. What that meant is that while being male, warrior, and property owner were still the elements that constituted a Roman citizen, dominating its other figures—such as strangers (women, plebeians, clients, slaves), outsiders (merchants, foreigners), and aliens (barbarians)—he was still essentially Roman precisely because he was of Rome. Being Roman was simultaneously an imperial and civic identity, but it eventually became an imperial identity by the famous declaration in AD 212. The empire as the site of citizenship and its graded characteristics were the contested claims upon which citizenship developed. We will perhaps always debate whether the fall of the empire was because of that aspiration to, or necessity of, universal citizenship.

The emergence of new sites of citizenship after the disintegration of the Roman Empire is among the most fascinating episodes. Much has been written about the rebirth of the city during the eleventh and twelfth centuries in Europe. The invention of the charter as the founding instrument of the city

as a body politic (and corporate) and the emergence of the new figure of the citizen who embodies not a warrior but a peaceable merchant or artisan of the medieval commune, has given us a new originary moment, not disconnected from Athens and Rome yet with a new inflection. Perhaps the new site of citizenship was now best represented by Florence, though, of course, there were regional differences throughout Europe. Between the twelfth and fifteenth centuries thousands of cities were founded as bodies politic and corporate with varied relationships of autonomy and autocephaly (administrative independence) from the “surrounding” lordships, kingships, and incipient states. For the emerging European citizenship, its site was definitely the city but more through belonging than blood. The famous residency requirement of a year and one day before one could become a citizen (a burgher) is one of the telling clauses of the charter that founded the city. Just how these scattered and heterogeneous patchwork worlds of contested sovereignties, autonomies, and class of burghers (hence the origin of the word *bourgeois*) were transformed into the world of states will always remain debatable. But the city was undeniably still at the center of the development of the state rather than the state being the city writ large. The transformation from the fifteenth to the eighteenth century was, if you like, from Florence to Paris. If Florence represented that world of contested sovereignties, Paris embodied a new figure, a new scale of citizenship. Though its self-image aspired to become even wider, behind that aspiration stood the figure of a dominant group: the bourgeois, male, and Christian citizen.

Then there is the episode of what Hannah Arendt called the conquest of the state by the nation when the state was defined as the territory of a people constituted along not just bourgeois, Christian, and male properties but cultural and ethnic properties. What Arendt meant by this conquest is that if the state was a body politic (Arendt called it an artifact) that enabled negotiation of differences among various social groups as their claims to citizenship, nationality instituted the domination of a group over others as immutable. It was then that citizenship was reconfigured as nationality. While the difference between citizenship and nationality ought to be as profound as

that between citizen and subject or abject, it rapidly became and remains still an accepted, if not given, association or synonymy.

The three attributes of citizenship (masculinity, warriorship, property) persisted well into the scales of the state and nation-state. The medieval commune was perhaps a departure during the twelfth to fifteenth centuries in Europe when being a warrior was not associated with being a citizen, but of being of the city (even if a citizen did not dwell in the city). Yet, being a citizen still involved owning property and being male. Perhaps then the most significant divergence occurred in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries when citizenship became associated with nationality and was understood as belonging to the state rather than the city. The state was seen as the city, and nation as the citizen, writ large. It was then that the principles of *jus sanguinis* (by blood) and *jus soli* (by territory) were rearticulated through the state and reinscribed in the nation.

Figures of Citizenship

If each site articulated the figure of the citizen rather differently, and if the state constituted a qualitatively different scale of citizenship, what explains the ostensible unity of “citizenship” to the point that we talk about it rather than different institutions or designations? The answer, in part, lies in the fact that every dominant group in the occident reinscribed and reinvested itself in that originary figure of the citizen as the foundation of its symbolic and imaginary occidentality. It also lies in the fact that the originary attributes of citizenship—property, war, and masculinity—remained foundational and differentiated citizens from subjects (strangers, outsiders) and abjects (aliens).

But the future may well interpret the twentieth century as having recast the foundational elements of citizenship: It was in that century that property was no longer tied to citizenship, women became at least formal if not substantive claimants upon it, and the nature of war and warriorship were fundamentally altered by being fought by special kinds of mercenaries and technological weaponry. Moreover, it was in that century that the universal figure of the citizen was shown to have represented the attributes of a particular occidental social group:

Christian, heterosexual, male, White, and adult. Does this mean the end of citizenship? Judging by the seemingly inexorable rise of another figure of being—the consumer—in the second half of the twentieth century, it certainly appears as though citizenship had come to some kind of an end. Perhaps, just as Roman citizenship ceased to be a functional institution at the moment of its declaration of universality in AD 212, the twentieth century had consummated the gradual expansion of civil rights in the eighteenth, political rights in the nineteenth, and social rights in the twentieth century, as suggested by T. H. Marshall.

Yet, while we have witnessed the recasting of the fundamental elements of citizenship (property, warriorship, masculinity) and the emergence of a counter figure, we have also observed the emergence of a new figure of the citizen that was much less constituted by what it possessed than by what it ostensibly lacked: strangers, outsiders, and aliens had become claimants to citizenship. Perhaps those new historical narratives that are now being told about citizenship indicate this transformation. They make citizenship appear less a bastion of property, warriorship, and masculinity, let alone occidentality, and more about the struggles of redistribution and recognition by those who had been its strangers, outsiders, and aliens.

Substances of Citizenship

The substance of citizenship is the relationship between rights and responsibilities and the virtues that constitute that relationship. Each site (and scale) and figure of citizenship configures a series of rights and responsibilities appropriate to their relational strengths. If the figure of citizenship is dominant in a given site for landed property, warriorship, and masculinity, then those who “lack” these properties will become dominated. Their claims to citizenship will address injustices to which their dominated status gives rise. While not a zero-sum game, substances of citizenship are relationships that reflect dominant sites and figures of citizenship. It would have been inconceivable to imagine claiming rights for disabled subjects or refugee subjects in either the Greek polis or the Roman civitas. Similarly, it would be inconceivable today to institute a parliament of

warriors. The relationships between and among sites, scales, and figures of citizenship are not zero-sum games either. It is flawed to think that citizenship was once a city phenomenon and that it was eclipsed by the state and then the nation, and then perhaps the world. These sites articulate through each other rather than eclipse each other. They also stretch and permeate each other. Rather than being nestled and concatenated, the sites of citizenship are tentacular and amorphous and bleed into each other. It is these intersections between different sites (and scales) that produce different figures and substances of citizenship.

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See also Athens, Greece; Social Exclusion; Stranger; Urban Politics

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CITY AND FILM

The invention of motion pictures in the final decade of the nineteenth century is a milestone in the development of modern urban society and culture. Arguably the most significant cultural form of the twentieth century, film introduced new representations of the urban environment. Its images and narratives of the metropolis joined the productions of the visual arts and literature to generate many of the century's most significant ideologies and cultural myths. Yet if the metropolis was prominent in film, the reverse was equally the case. Cinema sparked new urban social behaviors, especially practices of leisure and consumption, that led women, young people, and members of varied ethnic and racial communities to reconceive their identities. Film exhibition transformed urban neighborhoods as cinema theaters appeared, disappeared, and relocated across metropolitan regions and mimicked more general processes of urbanization, decline, and redevelopment.

Drawing upon the medium of photography popularized after the invention of the Daguerreotype process in 1839, as well as older media such as painting, line engraving, literature, music, and theater, the cinema was the most successful of the many nineteenth-century popular entertainments, such as the diorama and the panorama, which sought to create a realistic image of the external world. Like other contemporaneous technologies such as photography, the railroad, the sewing machine, and the wind-up pocket watch, it introduced industrialization into the everyday lives of city dwellers and decisively altered their experiences of space and time.

By bringing distant objects nearer, magnifying the invisible, slowing down or speeding up actions, juxtaposing images through editing, or being able to endlessly repeat a single process, the cinema generated new possibilities of urban perception that in turn promoted new physical forms of the built environment, new social relations, and new aesthetic ideals. Trading upon the popularity of newspapers, mass-produced books, and photographic images in the nineteenth century, the silent cinema was quickly heralded as a "universal language" capable of fostering a world community. Film genres such as the melodrama, newsreels depicting

topical events, and images of urban landmarks traveled rapidly across national boundaries and established film as the first true cultural form of globalization. Cinema made the planet seem smaller, more akin to a single global city, as heterogeneous audiences in far flung locations now felt that they were visiting the same places, consuming the same stories, and pining for the same movie idols.

Representing motion far more effectively and realistically than earlier devices, such as the zoetrope, film excelled at depicting the passage of time and seemed uniquely suited to represent the temporal dimension of city life, as in *The Crazy Ray* by René Clair in 1925, which suggested what would happen if all movement in Paris were to be stopped. Poet Charles Baudelaire's nineteenth-century aesthetic credo of preserving the fleeting and the evanescent found in it an ideal vehicle. Whether depicting the latest clothing fashions or urban neighborhoods on the verge of destruction, the cinema has fascinated most serious commentators, since its invention, for its remarkable ability to record—and hence preserve for future viewers—the urban here and now.

Thoroughly aligned with the rationalization of labor, the body, and cultural production understood as defining traits of modernity, the film medium nonetheless belies generalizations about its supposedly monolithic identity and effects. Decried for allegedly instilling homogeneous behavior and attitudes, cinema simultaneously created possibilities for local receptions and interpretations, oppositional public cultures and varied subcultures, that challenge conformism. Assertions about its effects upon public morality, mental and physical health, political consciousness, social identity, and urban violence therefore must be examined within specific contexts rather than accepted as universally valid truisms.

Silent Film and Its Audience

From the moment of the first public film exhibitions in 1895, more or less simultaneously in Paris, Berlin, and New York, film coincided with rapid population growth and increasing core density in most world metropolises. The first widely trumpeted public film projection by Auguste Lumière of his *Cinématographe* took place on December 28, 1895, in the Salon Indien of the Grand Café in

Paris. Throughout much of its early history, film was exhibited in music halls, cafés, vaudeville theaters, and fairs that were often socially off limits to middle-class audiences.

Early films recorded public spaces such as streets, train stations, and world exhibitions and consequently remain key sources of visual information about the nineteenth-century metropolis. A significant early film genre was the so-called *actualité* that presented current events such as parades, visits by heads of state, and inaugurations and became the basis for later newsreels. Filmmakers such as the magician Georges Méliès opted for a controlled interior environment over the street or the workplace (epitomized in the Lumière short, *Workers Leaving the Factory*) and initiated the studio filmmaking still dominant today. Many studios created fastidiously designed artificial streets, and even today relatively few narrative fiction films utilize actual cities as locations for more than a few scenes filmed by second-unit crews.

The lack of reliable evidence necessitates that film historians proceed with caution when making claims about the social composition of early cinema audiences. Nonetheless, most scholars of early film agree that women, children, and recent immigrants to the metropolis were disproportionately present at early film screenings, especially those held at storefront “nickelodeons,” which sprang up in the United States around 1905. Film proved a significant means of inculcating the responsibilities of citizenship and what, for many recent emigrants from rural settings, must have appeared often bewildering urban codes of behavior. Movie houses became an inviting environment accessible to viewers on the bottom rungs of the social ladder whose subversive potential did not escape notice by the guardians of public virtue. Feared as breeding grounds for licentiousness, political contestation, and the spread of disease, they were heavily policed and the films shown within them were subject to censorship.

The introduction of the sound film in 1927, associated with Al Jolson’s performance in *The Jazz Singer* (Alan Crosland), connected cinema with both the spoken language and music of varied ethnic and social groups in the city. Gangster films such as *The Public Enemy* (William Wellman, 1931) and *Little Caesar* (Mervyn Leroy, 1931) proved especially popular in the 1930s and presented the conflicting

attitudes toward legal authority and property in Depression-era cities such as Chicago. Musicals of the 1940s and 1950s frequently appropriated urban subject matter, perhaps most famously in *42nd Street* (Lloyd Bacon, 1933), a celebration of the New York neighborhood whose characters walked up walls but provided little insight into the urban area’s real problems and challenges.

Film and the Early Modern Metropolis

Filmmakers explored the vitality of the metropolis from the earliest days of the cinematic medium. D. W. Griffith’s *The Musketeers of Pig Alley* (1912) took urban criminal gangs as its theme. Harold Lloyd’s performance in *Safety Last* (Fred C. Newmeyer and Sam Taylor, 1923) and King Vidor’s *The Crowd* (1921) explored the implications of leisure in the city and suggest how the logic of Fordism, the dynamic cycle of industrial production and consumption, had thoroughly permeated silent cinema, by then a respectable form of middle-class entertainment. In the early 1920s the genre of the city symphony emerged, taking the dynamism of the large city as its explicit theme. Films such as *Manhatta* (Charles Sheeler and Paul Strand, 1921) and *Berlin: Symphony of a Great City* (Walther Ruttmann, 1927) presented a cross-section of the speed mechanization and the social heterogeneity of the city. Generally avoiding staged action and filming people without their conscious awareness, these films, exemplified by the Russian experimental *The Man with a Movie Camera* (Dziga Vertov, 1929), critically engaged with political and economic realities of life in an industrialized city. They count among the earliest examples of urban documentary cinema, later developed by filmmakers such as Jean Rouch (*Chronicle of a Summer*, 1961). This documentary aesthetic proved especially influential for filmmakers in the developing world concerned with documenting life in the colonial metropolis, such as Senegal’s Ousmane Sembene’s *Black Girl* (1967) and Brazil’s Glauber Rocha’s *Land in Anguish* (1967).

Cultural critics such as Walter Benjamin and Siegfried Kracauer, writing in Europe in the 1920s and 1930s, were struck by the affinities between film and the metropolis. Benjamin compared film to the impact of assembly lines on the consciousness of workers and understood its representation of urban

shock as a decisive element in training modern sense perception. Kracauer praised the female white-collar workers who attended film screenings for their ability to glean practical wisdom about urban life from the cinema. Both writers deeply admired the films of Charlie Chaplin, such as *Modern Times* (1936), for their comic yet ultimately deadly serious portrait of the human body at the mercy of urban technological society. In Kracauer's *Theory of Film: Redemption of Physical Reality* (1960), he developed an account of film as uniquely suited to recording quotidian urban realities.

Cinema also played a significant role in the promotion of new urban schemes by municipal authorities and planning organizations. In films such as *Die Stadt von Morgen—Ein Film vom Städtebau* (Maximilian von Goldbeck and Erich Kotzer) and *Architecture Today* (Pierre Chenal, 1931), proponents of the modern movement in architecture criticized the density and unhealthy conditions of traditional cities and proposed alternatives ranging from apartment towers to greenbelt towns. Shown to much acclaim at the 1939 World's Fair, *The City* (Ralph Steiner and Willard Van Dyke, 1939) epitomized this tendency. Its evocation of the values of a small New England town and depiction of the modern metropolis as chaotic and unhealthy suggests a transformation in the cinematic image of the city, now tinged with anxiety, indicative of a shift from early to late modernity.

Film and the Late Modern Metropolis

The American film noir cycle of the 1940s and 1950s is the most noticeable expression of the trend away from earlier optimistic treatments of the metropolis. At once a reworking of earlier depictions of urban violence and perversion associated with Weimar German films such as *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari* (Robert Wine, 1919), *The Street* (Karl Grune, 1923), *Dr. Mabuse, the Gambler* (Fritz Lang, 1922), and *M* (Fritz Lang, 1931), the film noir presented a conspicuously downbeat vision of the American city, populated by losers and innocent bystanders trapped in deadening routines in a dark and treacherous environment.

Classic examples of film noir include *Double Indemnity* (Billy Wilder, 1944), *The Naked City* (Jules Dassin, 1948), and *The Asphalt Jungle* (John Huston, 1949). Produced as urban renewal initiatives

were eradicating many downtown neighborhoods, film noir evinced a nostalgia for older urban forms, elevated subway tracks, and decrepit industrial districts whose impending demise rendered them fascinating. The neo-noir movement of the 1970s and 1980s presented an idealized version of a mythical 1930s Los Angeles in *Chinatown* (Roman Polanski, 1974) and a dystopian pastiche of earlier cultural styles and ethnicities in *Blade Runner* (Ridley Scott, 1982).

Negotiating the eradication of older urban forms and the arrival of new forms of the built environment, as well as the anxieties accompanying these changes, became a defining issue for the postwar cinema in a way it had not been for earlier film. Fear of communism and the hostility of many Americans during cold war America of the late 1940s and 1950s to any form of public housing found its most vociferous expression in the adaptation of Ayn Rand's *The Fountainhead* (King Vidor, 1949), a defense of the skyscraper as a symbol of masculine individualism. A rejection of studio filmmaking and the recent fascist past, the film movement Italian neorealism featured actual urban locations in *Rome, Open City* (Roberto Rossellini, 1945) to convey a democratic humanism.

French New Wave filmmakers investigated the impact of urbanization on the young in films such as *Paris Belongs to Us* (Jacques Rivette, 1960) and *Les bonnes femmes* (Claude Chabrol, 1960). The modern postwar urban cityscape was explored by Jean-Luc Godard in *Alphaville* (1965) and *Two or Three Things I Know about Her* (1966) and later taken up by German Wim Wenders in *The American Friend* (1977). American cities appeared ambivalently portrayed in films such as *Taxi Driver* (Martin Scorsese, 1976) and *The Conversation* (Francis Coppola, 1974), and *Death Wish* (Michael Winner, 1974), which gave voice to anxieties about crime, police ineffectiveness, surveillance, and corporate corruption during the post-Watergate era.

Beginning in the 1960s a new generation of urban filmmakers emerged. Their work treated racial and ethnic groups largely denied access to filmmaking in the past. Shirley Clarke directed *The Cool World* (1964) and Melvin van Peebles made his notorious *Sweet Sweetback's Baadasssss Song* (1971), the first blacksploitation film, that commenced its run in Detroit and soon took other

inner-city theaters by storm. Later filmmakers such as Chantal Akerman, Spike Lee, Charles Burnett, Wayne Wang, and Hanif Kureishi presented new and original visions of cities such as New York, London, San Francisco, and Los Angeles, inflected by the perspectives and experiences of women, African Americans, Asian Americans, and Pakistanis. Iranian director Abbas Kiarostami explored the cityscape of Tehran in the film *A Taste of Cherry* (1997), and Hong Kong-based filmmaker Wong Kar Wai presented his city's unique urban environment in *Chung King Express* (1994). Suburban settings in films by Todd Haynes (*Far from Heaven*, 2002) and Todd Solondz (*Storytelling*, 2001) suggested that the conflicts of social identity in modern life could develop away from the concentrated metropolis.

Film Exhibition and the City

The flowering of the feature-length narrative film following the success of D. W. Griffith's *The Birth of a Nation* (1914) led to the proliferation of movie theaters and entertainment districts such as New York's Times Square, London's Piccadilly, and Berlin's Kurfurstendamm. Unlike early nickelodeon screenings, which were shown in a continuous loop, feature films had specific show times that required spectators to coordinate their viewing with theater schedules. A centrifugal movement of the American population to the suburbs after 1945 shifted the locus of first-run exhibition away from the urban center. Competition from television further siphoned away ticket sales from movie houses located in the metropolitan core, as drive-in theaters and theaters located in malls prospered. Many once-lucrative downtown movie theaters shut their doors or became exhibitors of pornography, now increasingly regulated by zoning laws and redevelopment guidelines that regulated where the sex industry could operate. Before the introduction of the VCR and the home video revolution of the 1970s, the promise of erotic content, whether in art films such as *I Am Curious Yellow* (Vilgot Sjöman, 1967) or more explicit sex films such as *Deep Throat* (Gerard Damiano, 1972), generated ticket sales for many urban cinemas.

The tension between film as a mass cultural form and a medium for artistic expression became

evident in postwar exhibition practices and locations. Art films, especially those from Europe, captured the attention of American audiences in the 1950s and 1960s and were exhibited in neighborhoods such as New York's Upper East Side and Boston's Cambridge, to the detriment of districts such as Times Square. Avant-garde films or those with controversial political content, long exhibited in small film societies and on university campuses, attained their own alternative venues, such as New York's Anthology Film Archives, or were shown as midnight movies in commercial cinemas. Teenage cults such as the late-night screenings of *The Rocky Horror Picture Show* (Jim Sharman, 1975), whose fans dress as characters in the campy spectacle, issue a reminder that urban film spectatorship often was more about participating in a ritual and a sense of belonging than about actually watching a film.

Cinema and Its Urban Future

In the early twenty-first century, the urban future of cinema appears uncertain. The proliferation of the DVD and home entertainment systems, satellite and cable delivery of films, and suburban multiplexes has attenuated the traditional connection between cinema viewing and the metropolitan movie theater. While no contemporary urban redevelopment scheme appears complete without a multiplex cinema, these are typically located in shopping malls, which have eclipsed the conventional public space of the street and transformed the film-viewing experience into a privatized cultural transaction, increasingly indistinguishable from shopping.

The near extinction of the small independent cinema and its replacement by a multiplex, more likely than not to employ digital projection in lieu of actual 35-millimeter film prints, has homogenized the theatrical exhibition audience, typically at the expense of attracting older film viewers. Today, urban multiplexes have become key sites of leisure and consumption for young people, a fact long recognized by the Hollywood studios. In an age of films often dominated by action and special effects, scholars debate whether the notion of a national cinema is still coherent, or if in fact films have lost such specificity by becoming ever more attuned to a generic global audience. Yet the recent

international success of *Crash* (Paul Haggis, 2004) and *Caché* (Michael Haneke, 2005), both of which prominently treat ethnic and racial conflict, suggests that audiences still respond to films that explore topical urban themes.

Despite the overwhelming dominance of Hollywood films in the global market, smaller national cinemas continue to flourish and to produce films that treat local urban cultures.

As nations such as China, Russia, and Turkey develop further economically and create larger domestic audiences, their cinemas will likely realize more films treating the city and metropolitan life and receive greater notice by foreign viewers. Although some mode of theatrical exhibition will likely survive in large cities, it may well become the exception rather than the rule for film viewing that it was for most of the twentieth century. Yet continued technological developments and the often homogenizing tendencies of globalization seem unlikely to eradicate the prominence of the city in cinema and cinema in the city as hallmarks of a still incomplete modernity.

Edward Dimendberg

See also Benjamin, Walter; Cinema (Movie House); Cinematic Urbanism; Kracauer, Siegfried; *Metropolis*; Urban Semiotics

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CITY BEAUTIFUL MOVEMENT

The City Beautiful movement rose in late nineteenth-century America as a reformist attempt by the ruling elites to solve the urban crisis that was plaguing big cities across the country during the Industrial Revolution of the late nineteenth century and particularly during the economic depression of 1893 to 1897. With its emphasis on comprehensive, large-scale planning, the City Beautiful movement would set the standards for modern city planning.

The vanishing of the agrarian society, coupled with the increasing processes of immigration and urbanization, had led to a drastic rise of the population in urban areas across the country. From 1860 to 1910 the American population as a whole had increased from 31.4 million to 91.9 million, and 46 percent of Americans lived in urban areas, as manufacturing jobs in the city industry replaced agriculture jobs in the countryside. In the same time period, the number of American cities with over 100,000 residents rose from 8 to 50, while in 1910 several cities had a population exceeding the 1 million mark.

The striking concentration of poverty in core urban areas created dangerous sanitary conditions, phenomena of congestion and overcrowding in tenements, while at the same time the improvement of transportation systems spurred the unrelenting outmigration of the upper classes to the suburbs and the countryside. The massive migration of families to the city in search of opportunity in the rising industry led to a climate of social unrest, labor struggles, and ethnic conflicts.

Overcrowding, blight, and crime became major concerns for the elite classes, who lived in fear for their own safety. In 1890 Jacob Riis reported about the living conditions in the tenements of New York City:

[T]hree-fourths of its [New York's] people live in the tenements, and the nineteenth-century drift

of the population to the cities is sending ever-increasing multitudes to crowd them. We know now that there is no way out; that the system that was the evil offspring of public neglect and private greed has come to stay, a storm-center forever of our civilization.

Riis's writings, a dramatic documentation of poverty and disenfranchisement in dense urban settlements, were interpreted as a strong call for social reform.

The City Beautiful movement rose as a response by the ruling elites to these concerns. The reformist and paternalistic goal of the movement (which mobilized architects, planners, and social reformers) was to bring social order and control to the city through an improved, orderly, and beautified urban environment: A new city would lead to a new harmonious sense of community and belonging for all citizens, thus removing the causes of social conflicts. According to Julie K. Rose, the underlying assumption of the movement was "the idea that beauty could act as an effective social control device."

In major industrial cities, the growing phenomenon of labor upheaval had resulted in legislatures damping down labor movements, systematic state repression, and violent confrontations between police and labor protesters. The Haymarket Affair in Chicago (May 1886), which had begun as a peaceful rally in support of striking workers, resulted in the death of several protesters, police officers, and civilians. The highly controversial trial that followed brought the capital executions of four, presumably innocent, anarchists. Following the example of the 1851 Universal Exhibition in London's Crystal Palace—which was strongly encouraged by the British government to counter the spread of political radicalism and to celebrate the global expansion of the British Empire—Chicago's Columbian Exposition of 1893 was championed by the city's political and economic elites with the aim of cementing a badly divided society and of rescuing the city's reputation after the worldwide publicity and outcry over the Haymarket trial.

The World's Columbian Exposition in Chicago (also known as the Chicago World's Fair) was the first large-scale display of the principles of the City Beautiful movement. The "White City," under

head planner Daniel Burnham, was a model for an idealized, utopian, harmonious urban environment unknown to most American city dwellers of the time: It featured monumental buildings (all of uniform cornice height, all painted white, all generously decorated) orderly articulated among green spaces, wide canals, and reflective pools, and a picturesque lagoon designed by Frederick Law Olmsted, Sr. Its stylistic vocabulary was the neoclassicism of the Parisian *École de Beaux-Arts*, the leading international school of architecture that, from the 1870s to the 1930s, instructed artists and architects from all over the world in the teachings of harmony through the use of a historicist repertoire, and in the art of large-scale planning—as in Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann's redesign of Paris during the reign of Napoleon III. Several American architects who studied at the *École des Beaux-Arts*, such as Richard Morris Hunt, George Post, and Daniel Burnham, imported these aesthetic ideals to America for the occasion of the Chicago World's Fair.

The Columbian Exposition was the first materialization of a utopian city, unknown to most Americans. According to historian Roy Lubove, the fair "created new ideals and standards by which to measure the quality of urban life." In this ideal city, the more than 27 million visitors could see what their lives could be like in a crime- and poverty-free, orderly and magnificent urban setting. The popular reaction of the time was overwhelmingly positive, and the grandeur of the White City set the standards for several City Beautiful plans across the country and abroad.

In the following years, the leading proponent of the movement, Daniel Burnham, flanked by leading planners, architects, and designers of the time, directed the general plans for Washington, D.C. (in 1902), for Cleveland (in 1903), for San Francisco (in 1905), and finally for Chicago (in 1909); the Chicago plan is still considered one of the most consistent and magnificent endeavors of the City Beautiful movement.

The Built Legacy of the City Beautiful Movement

Burnham was quoted as saying, "Make no little plans, they have no magic to stir men's blood. . . . Make big plans . . . remembering that a noble,

logical diagram once recorded will never die, but long after we are gone will be a living thing asserting itself with ever growing consistency." All of his plans were indeed the materialization of his own philosophy.

Even if not all City Beautiful plans were consistently brought to completion, their built legacy of grand parks, public squares, panoramic boulevards, and prominent civic buildings would forever change the shape of major American cities. The arrangements and transformations adopted by Burnham, and the legacy of grandeur and order these plans impressed on the urban fabric, are still widely appreciated by the public.

Burnham, together with Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. and Frederick Law Olmsted, Sr., was also a major advocate of parks and green spaces integrated in the urban fabric. According to Burnham, public parks would provide a healthy outlet for those citizens stuck in the misery and congestion of the tenements; the parks would enrich their lives through recreation and entertainment and through a salutary contact with nature: "Fifty years ago," Burnham explained, "before population had become dense in certain parts of the city, people could live without parks, but we of today cannot." Parks and public spaces would thereby contribute to cementing together different social strata of the population.

Following in the footsteps of his father, Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr.'s work massively contributed to advancing landscape architecture to an honorable status in city planning. His work was directly inspired by what he saw as the harmonious integration of parks, avenues, and residential areas typical of European cities. In his view, replicating the European model would provide American cities, severely lacking in recreational and public space, with a much needed antidote to their congestion and density and, in his own words, to "the restraining and confining conditions of the town, which compel us to walk circumspectly, watchfully, jealously, which compel us to look closely upon others without sympathy." In 1902 he joined the McMillan Commission (together with Burnham, architect Charles F. McKim, and sculptor Augustus St. Gaudens) and redesigned the Mall area of the Capitol in Washington, D.C., in a successful attempt to bring to completion what had remained unfinished in the 1791 plan of Pierre L'Enfant.

The movement's built legacy is still universally appreciated and enjoyed by citizens and visitors alike. Monumental squares and parks, as well as grand boulevards, prominent civic centers, museums, and most university campuses are a product of this movement.

The emphasis on intra- or extra-urban transportation planning was also a distinctive feature of City Beautiful endeavors. Grand public boulevards, malls, and parkways were designed as scenic corridors, while rail stations connecting urban areas with outer villages (such as Union Station in Washington, D.C., by Burnham) were designed in magnificent proportions as monumental gates to the city.

The Burnham plan for Chicago, although uncompleted, created an impressive network of grand parks, boulevards, bridges, and civic buildings and fully redesigned the lakefront area as a public space. The recent landscaping of the lakefront and the design of Millennium Park embody the spirit of the unfinished plan by Burnham.

In Washington, D.C., the McMillan plan sought to emulate the grandeur of European capitals such as Paris and Rome and brought to completion the vision of L'Enfant. It insulated the federal government area from the rest of the city, creating a monumental core featuring white marble federal buildings designed in the Beaux Arts style, a vast public mall, and a series of public gardens.

Downtown Cleveland, Ohio, has inherited an impressive array of City Beautiful buildings and public space: Massive prominent buildings of similar height, scale, and proportion, each featuring slightly different historicist revival vocabularies, were placed around a central mall area. The mall and civic center, the University Circle buildings, the Cleveland Museum of Art, and Case Western Reserve University are still widely appreciated.

The Columbia University campus in New York City, built between 1891 and 1913 by McKim, William Rutherford Mead, and Stanford White, was conceived as a miniature version of the World's Columbian Exposition of Chicago. John Russell Pope's 1919 plan for Yale University in New Haven, Connecticut, was another distinctive endeavor of the movement.

However, City Beautiful plans reached far beyond the U.S. borders: After American troops had invaded Manila in 1898 and waged war with the Spaniards and Filipinos, the new colonial

government planned to transform the city of Manila into a grand capital on the model of Washington, D.C. In 1904 it was again Burnham who conceived a plan for Manila, which he envisioned as a garden city featuring a blend of tropical landscapes, grand panoramic axes, and eclectic colonial architecture. The plan called for a linear mall, bordered by monumental government buildings, which was to connect the Bay of Manila with a capitol building; a series of panoramic roads was to radiate from the national mall. Although the Burnham plan of Manila was never fully implemented, the city's underlying road network still follows the directions set forth by Burnham.

The utopian city envisioned by the architects of the Chicago Columbian Exposition was also a major inspiration for Walter Burley Griffin's plan for Canberra, the Australian capital founded in 1908. The 1911 to 1912 international competition for Canberra gave architects and reformist planners the opportunity to design a brand-new city from scratch. Most competition entries displayed their commitment to the teachings of the City Beautiful movement. The winning entry by Griffin bore the hallmarks of the movement, calling for a harmonious blend between natural landscape and grand architectural design, with residential settlements sporting a mix of Georgian and Mediterranean stylistic repertoire (arches, balconies, tile roofs, and terracotta decorations) and pleasant gardens articulated around lakes and water. The plan for Canberra remained largely unaccomplished: After construction eventually got under way in the 1920s, later the Great Depression and World War II halted building.

The Cultural Legacy of the City Beautiful Movement

By the early 1920s the popularity of the movement declined as the new international style of modernism imposed a focus on pragmatism over aesthetic and on technological innovation and functionality over beauty and decoration.

Yet, with its emphasis on comprehensive, large-scale planning, the City Beautiful movement has left a long lasting mark in the urban fabric of major American cities and has set the standards for modern and rational city planning. According to historian Lubove, its most valuable legacy was the ideal it embodied of the "city as a work of art."

Especially in recent times, elements of the City Beautiful movement's idea have been reappraised and brought back to center stage in the planning debates about car-free cities, smart growth, transit-oriented development, and new towns—attempts to counteract the shapelessness of modernist urban planning and to restore human scale, livability, and pedestrian friendliness in the urban fabric. The historicism and neotraditionalism of planning movements such as the new urbanism are particularly indebted to the legacy of the City Beautiful. New urbanism owes its formal roots to the City Beautiful, adopting its emphasis on the arrangement of civic architecture, plazas, landscaped parks, and public spaces around carefully designed axes and grids. The City Beautiful's long-lasting cultural legacy is also evident in the popular favor that classicist repertoires, vernacular architecture, and historic revivals have encountered in recent times, as the success of neotraditionalist design movements has shown.

The City Beautiful movement has moreover deeply influenced the planning of spaces of leisure and entertainment: the Coney Island of the early 1930s (with its magnificent revivals of vernacular architecture) and the theme parks of today (with their carefully designed sceneries and their historicist revivals) are strongly indebted to the City Beautiful movement and particularly to Burnham's White City. Stephen Mills has argued that today's Disneyland originated from the earliest Victorian world's fairs, in particular the Chicago Fair and the Centennial Exposition of 1876 in Philadelphia. Again with regard to the Columbian Exposition, Pierre De Angelis has contended that contemporary theme parks continue the tradition of a large-scale "urban control zone" by adhering to two key strategies developed at the White City: "embracing a uniform and harmonious architectural style which suggests consensus and contentment, and crafting a simulation of the world which is idealized and stripped bare of any significant risk, conflict or controversy."

The emphasis on order over vitality and on rigid aesthetic rules over the spontaneity and authenticity of the urban setting is probably one of the less convincing elements of City Beautiful ideals. Yet, what City Beautiful architects and planners have accomplished in their grand plans—the built legacy

of civic buildings and public spaces, of parks and boulevards—has proven largely beneficial to entire communities up to our day and is still universally appreciated.

Alessandro Busà

See also Architecture; Chicago, Illinois; General Plan; Haussmann, Baron Georges-Eugène; Historic Cities; Ideal City; New Urbanism; Paris, France; Riis, Jacob; Urban Planning; Utopia

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CITY CLUB

Men seeking to reform city governments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States founded organizations they called city clubs. These clubs were typical Progressive-era reform organizations that were seeking to diminish the influence of party politics in municipal governments. City club members generally believed that the personal corruption and fiscal irresponsibility of many party politicians and their followers had fostered serious economic, political, and social problems. The stated purpose of these organizations was to foster a sense of civic engagement that would promote honest and efficient administration of city affairs through nonpartisan political action. City clubs originated in eastern and midwestern cities, including Philadelphia, New York City, Chicago, Boston, and Cleveland. Western cities such as Portland and Denver followed this practice. Many of these clubs, espousing the same goals, still exist. Newer clubs, such as the one founded in Seattle in 1981, have kept the tradition alive.

Early in their history, membership in city clubs was all male, with women often not even allowed to participate as guest speakers. Membership was also largely comprised of middle-class, White businessmen and professionals. Clubs enforced their exclusivity through membership rules that carefully controlled admission even though the clubs publicized themselves as open to men from every walk of life. The rigid gender segregation of city clubs was relaxed over time, but by the second decade of the century, women had responded to their exclusion by organizing their own women’s city clubs. A key difference between the male and female clubs was in how they perceived their purposes. The women’s city clubs generally stressed the fostering of a collective social responsibility for solving municipal issues, whereas clubs of men spoke about wanting more civic engagement among men who were otherwise disaffected from municipal affairs.

City clubs worked through civic committees that investigated specific urban issues such as tax reform, public education, transportation, parks and playgrounds, municipal services such as police, fire, and garbage collection, city planning, and labor. These committees made monthly and annual reports to the club at large. Regularly scheduled luncheon meetings featured invited speakers who addressed the members on pressing urban issues. City clubs generally published bulletins and newsletters in which they publicized their meetings and discussions and presented the club's position on important municipal concerns. City clubs of this type described themselves as dedicated as much to informing city residents of the state of municipal affairs as to effecting actual reforms or recommending particular candidates for municipal offices. While obviously class and gender bound, the early city clubs expressed optimism that once urban residents were better informed of city affairs, they would elect honest and efficient municipal officials who would serve the best interests of the community rather than the interests of political parties. Dedication to fostering civic engagement and political responsibility distinguishes these city clubs from other clubs that may use the name but are actually businessmen's private social clubs.

Maureen A. Flanagan

See also Gendered Space; Progressive City; Public-Private Partnerships; Women and the City

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Babylon and many such maps on paper from an early period in China and Japan. The classical Greeks were chiefly known for their maps of the whole world. But the Romans produced remarkable stone plans of such cities as Orange and Rome itself, often setting them up in public places.

All of these ancient plans were more or less planimetric, showing the city as if from directly overhead. In early modern Europe, inspired to some degree by the city plans found in some versions of the *Geography* of Claudius Ptolemy, town plans began to multiply, offering three main types. Particularly in Italy, plans of the classical type became common in the sixteenth century. They were joined, then, by two new types: the "profile" and the bird's-eye view. The profile, analogous to the marine "landfall," showed the city as it would appear to a person approaching it on the ground, while the bird's-eye view showed it from a high oblique angle (and involved some ingenious imaginary constructions).

Many such plans were produced in the first great age of copper-engraving, in the sixteenth century, and at the end of that century many city plans were collected together into the *Civitates Orbis Terrarum* (Cities of the World), published by Georg Braun and Franz Hogenberg in Cologne between 1595 and 1617. Like the contemporary atlas of Abraham Ortelius, the work of Braun and Hogenberg relied on a large number of contributors to provide images drawn, eventually, from much of the world.

These images might adopt any of the three types described earlier. As time went by, the profile became less common, as did the bird's-eye view. Clearly, from the point of view of city planning, a planimetric view offered the greatest possibility for precision. However, profiles and bird's-eye views have never fallen completely out of use. Modern skyscraper cities are often shown as profiles, and bird's-eye views, often with the main buildings shown in an exaggerated way, have proved one of the best ways of introducing a city to tourists.

In the age of computer mapping, city images are of course generally planimetric. The possibility of overlaying a great many variables—streets, electrical conduits, schools, sewers, crime sites, and so on—offers the modern city planner possibilities of analysis that are full of potential.

David Buisseret

CITY MAP

Cities began to be mapped almost as soon as they appeared. We have stone city maps from ancient

See also Urban Geography; Urban Planning; Urban Semiotics

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CITY OF MEMORY

Cities and their relationship to memory have been the subject of analysis by authors and scholars in psychology, history, critical theory, philosophy, and architectural theory. This rich body of work has elaborated on several relevant issues, here briefly summarized: the persistence of the past in the city of the present, the metaphor of the city as a palimpsest, and the dialectic of cities and memory—that is, their relationship of dependence, denial, selection, or manipulation of memory.

The persistence of traces of the past in the city of the present is investigated in fragments of Walter Benjamin's work on the Parisian arcades; in these writings he codifies an aesthetic of the City of Memory through the metaphor of archaeological layering: "Each street is a vertiginous experience. The street conducts the *flâneur* into a vanished time"; thus the city is "an epic book through and through, a process of memorizing while strolling around." The city is described as a labyrinthine archaeological landscape in which traces of lives, customs, and events already extinguished still survive. Walking through the streets of Paris, he contends, the multiple layers of history unfold before our very eyes.

In the introduction to *The Architecture of the City*, Aldo Rossi poetically describes the city as an open-air archive of collective and personal memories:

Architecture, attesting to the tastes and attitudes of generations, to public events and private tragedies, to new and old facts, is the fixed stage for

human events [. . .] One need only look at the layers of the city that archaeologists show us; they appear as a primordial and eternal fabric of life, an immutable pattern.

Recalling the images of disemboweled houses of European cities after the bombings of World War II, he too compares the city of the present to an archaeological landscape marked by the traces of past events, by personal memories as well as epic events.

The metaphor of the palimpsest has been paramount in the literature about cities and memory. According to its Greek etymology, the term *palimpsest* refers to papyruses or parchments whose ink was scraped off and written on again, with the earlier writing incompletely erased and still visible beneath the surface. Freud was the first to use the metaphor of the Roman palimpsest to describe the structure of the human unconscious in his psychoanalytic research. In *Civilization and Its Discontents*, Freud recognized a similarity between the layered construction of cities, made of gradual additions and erasures, and the human psyche: "Suppose that Rome is not a human habitation but a psychical entity with a similarly long and copious past—an entity, that is to say, in which nothing that has once come into existence will have passed away and all the earlier phases of development continue to exist alongside the latest one."

Also José Muñoz Millanes compares the city to a palimpsest on which time leaves its indelible mark. Its built environment "comes to be the testimony *par excellence* of daily life, because in its fixity the vicissitudes of humankind are registered throughout time."

Freud's metaphor of the Roman palimpsest has proven particularly useful in the analysis of a city's relationship to memory. Classical Rome, medieval Rome, renaissance Rome, baroque Rome, eighteenth-century Rome, postunification Rome, fascist Rome, and reconstruction Rome are all present in today's Rome, overlapped together in a multilayered urban ensemble.

An aesthetic of contrasts and overlapping is the paradigm of the City of Memory. Its multilayered character, made of centuries of additions and subtractions, allows for a reading of the city as a composite of innumerable stories. As the permanence of the past in the present form of the city may

manifest itself through sharp contrasts and a disorienting chaos, the urban fabric of Rome shows how these contrasts can be reconciled as parts of a harmonious picture.

An important account of the relationship between time and urban space is Lewis Mumford's conception of the city as both a spatial and temporal container. In *The Culture of Cities*, he writes: "Cities are a product of time. They are the molds in which men's lifetimes have cooled and congealed." He contends that not only monuments and buildings but also fragments of long-gone social behaviors, customs, and traditions may survive in the urban environment of the contemporary city.

The Dialectic of City and Memory

The way cities dialogue with their memory casts a light on the way they relate to their other temporal dimensions: One city's interpretation of its past is inextricably connected to the city's way of envisioning its future, because memory is not a mere transcript of past events but rather a mechanism of interpretation and selection.

Kevin Lynch analyzes the way in which the past is able to influence present and future meanings. According to Lynch, the urban space contains not only physical traces of old morphologies of the city but also crystallizations of meanings that will influence its future. The dialogue that a city establishes with its past is essential to the construction of the city's own identity. As Lynch observes, the city constructs its urban identity through the use of memory: that is, by manipulating its past through a process of selection.

In urban politics, strategies of identity making through a manipulation of the city's collective memory (in city marketing, placemaking, spectacularization, and festivalization efforts) are paramount; such strategies focus on highlighting chosen moments of the history of the city while removing less marketable or unfavored ones. The erasure of memory can be accomplished by means of mere neglect or, in some cases, by physically removing its apparent signs. This has been the case in most east European cities after the fall of the communist regimes, where buildings have been demolished, streets renamed, and monuments removed. Yet, politics of manipulation of memory can also be

carried forward by means of new developments or reconstruction of long-gone buildings and structures: In many cases around the world, buildings whose former existence carried a positive symbolic meaning or embodied a particularly marketable time of the history of the city have been rebuilt *ex novo*.

This issue has been brought up by several authors, including Brian Ladd in his study of Berlin. Pointing to the mistreatment that the Berlin municipality has granted to the built legacy of the communist era after the fall of the Berlin wall, Ladd observes that the way in which urban politics negotiate the physical legacy of their past casts a light on a collective identity. In Berlin the reinvention of a manipulated, purified past goes alongside the idealization of a wishful future. And the way Berlin has negotiated its haunted past and its painful memories is through a double strategy of removal and reinvention of memory.

By privileging selected elements of the past while disregarding unwelcome ones, most post-modern redevelopments of historical sites (from the festival marketplaces to the theme parks, from the renovated historic downtowns to the so-called theaters of memory) deliver a sugarcoated and stereotyped version of history whose objectivity is highly questionable and whose main purpose is to reinvent the image of the city as a more marketable one, thus catering to the lust for nostalgia of citizens and tourists alike.

In his work on the "politics of memory," Andreas Huyssen analyzes the key role of memory in current urban politics. By focusing on the different ways of monumentalizing the past in three cities that have undergone major shocks (Berlin, New York, and Buenos Aires), he concludes that in contemporary societies the celebration of memory has become a global obsession.

A similar conclusion is drawn by Mark Crinson. In his *Urban Memory: History and Amnesia in the Modern City*, he reflects on cities in the postindustrial era and on their frantic search for identity through a pervasive engagement with the past. The same cities that, a few decades ago, were sites of futurist experimentation and centers of forward-looking modernist culture are now reinventing their images as theaters of memory. The spread of movements for historic preservation, the monumentalization of the past, the burgeoning of strategies of

commemoration, musealization, and festivalization, all indicate a revolution in a city's approach to memory.

More on "City of Memory"

"City and Memory" is one of 11 categories of cities illustrated in Italo Calvino's book *The Invisible Cities*. In Calvino's book, each of the five imaginary Cities of Memory (Diomira, Isidora, Zaira, Zora, Maurilia) has established a different relationship with its past. Calvino focuses on the massive influence of the past in shaping the present city, explaining the different degrees in which the past may influence the present city: Whereas the city of Maurilia isn't capable of any connection to its memories, Zora is doomed to extinction because it isn't able to leave its past behind. In Zora, the past is a trap that prevents the city from evolving and from being alive.

"City of Memory" is the name of an online narrative cartography created by City Lore, Inc. (a New York City-based organization sponsored by the National Endowment for the Arts and the Rockefeller Foundation), devoted to the documentation and representation of urban folk culture in the city of New York. The website showcases an interactive geographical map of New York City on which New Yorkers' personal stories and memories come to life through open contributions.

"Città della Memoria" (City of Memory) is the title of a cycle of discussions organized by Cesare De Seta, Guido Martinotti, and Massimo Morisi, which took place in Florence in June 2008. The main topics of the debates were the relationship of dependence of great historical cities to their past and memories, the commodification of memory, and the phenomenon of festivalization of the public space in historic downtowns.

The City of Collective Memory is a book by Christine Boyer that describes the ways cities represent themselves and their relationship to their past and future. Boyer analyzes models of self-representation used to construct a selective reading of the city.

Alexandria: City of Memory is the title of a book that revives what author Michael Haag calls "the heydays of cosmopolitan Alexandria" between World Wars I and II. He investigates the complex history of the city through anecdotes and biographies

of three great writers in whose work the city figured prominently: Constantine Cavafy, E. M. Forster, and Lawrence Durrell. Haag describes a city filled with memories and secrets, a multilayered, labyrinthine, and fascinating palimpsest whose rich multiethnic texture would later be destroyed by what the author calls former Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser's "puritanical socialism."

Alessandro Busà

See also Architecture; Benjamin, Walter; Berlin, Germany; Lynch, Kevin; Mumford, Lewis; Rome, Italy; Urban Archaeology; Urban Politics; Urban Semiotics

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CITY PLANNING

City planning is a continuous, public process that guides how complex issues such as the provision of infrastructure and the maintenance of an affordable housing stock are balanced with limited community resources. It is the means of creating and maintaining a desirable environment that promotes the health, safety, and well-being of community residents. Using professional planners as guides, communities identify a common vision and collective set of goals for their future. Citizens, with the assistance of planners, decide how their community can be improved today and in the future. Once a community's vision and goals have been determined, city planning provides overall guidance and direction for growth, development, and redevelopment, frequently over a 20-year time period.

American cities have always had some form of planning, dating back to colonial settlements. By the mid-1800s, with rapid growth due to industrialization, cities had evolved into places of severe pollution, filthy streets, and epidemic diseases. A reform movement focused on the improvement of sanitary conditions and housing and ultimately led the U.S. Supreme Court to establish the validity of "police power," allowing communities to legally safeguard the public health, safety, and welfare. Today, city planning deals not only with the physical but also with the social and economic development of metropolitan regions, small towns, and neighborhoods.

The comprehensive or master plan is the document that guides overall growth and development within a community based on a commonly held vision for the future. It is anchored in a planning process that involves several key steps. First, planners gather background data for analysis and interpretation in order to project current and future trends and solicit input from residents and business owners. This leads to alternative scenarios for future growth and development and, eventually, to a plan. Once the plan is formulated and accepted by the governing body, planners work

with public agencies and the private sector to carry out the recommended courses of action outlined in the planning document. Planners use implementation tools such as zoning, subdivision regulations, and capital improvements plans that guide how public improvements can be financed. The timing and financing of public improvements ensure the wise and efficient use of public funds for future development and redevelopment.

City planning often involves creating plans for specific geographic areas within the city, such as a neighborhood, district, or transportation or retail corridors. Particularly in large cities, it is easier to create a plan for a portion of the city than for the city as a whole. These area plans differ from a comprehensive plan because of the limited geographic area, the narrower focus, and the greater level of detail. The most typical area plans are for neighborhoods, downtowns, industrial or commercial areas, airports, historic districts, and sensitive environmental sites. Whereas the role of the planner remains the same, typically these area plans have much greater public input because citizens can understand the direct correlation between the planning process and what they will be living with in the near and distant future.

Cities typically have agencies and departments—economic development, housing, transportation, recreation, and open space—that deal directly with different elements of a plan. These elements are directly affected by emerging opportunities. For example, the national as well as local economies have changed from economies based on natural resource extraction and manufacturing to those in which services and information providers are dominant. This shift has created new employment opportunities and business location decisions. Industries were once located near natural resources used in production in order to save on transportation costs. Today, firms are attracted to cities where there is a skilled labor force and a perceived quality of urban life that attracts future qualified employees.

A typical element addressed in the comprehensive plan is housing, the largest consumer of land in communities and a major contributor to overall economic activity. Some of the earliest planning efforts of the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries addressed housing through regulations to ensure direct access to light and air for housing

units. Today planners are concerned with such issues as housing affordability and whether or not there is an adequate supply to meet demand. Just as in the comprehensive planning process, planners start by gathering and analyzing data in detail specific to housing. Beyond looking at population and projected population, planners also concern themselves with housing condition, costs, projected new housing starts, household size and income, and vacancy rates. While typically government does not provide housing, zoning and subdivision regulations can directly affect housing supply, including the availability of multifamily housing. Government provision of streets, sewers, water delivery and treatment, and other public facilities and services is planned to encourage development in areas where growth is desired.

Because of the current complexity of cities, planners must deal with land use codes, review development plans, evaluate annexation proposals, encourage infill and sustainable development, set development guidelines and standards, and carry out numerous other tasks that guide development. There are a number of legal means of implementing plans. Based on comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances and subdivision regulations are tools for encouraging growth in some areas and not others. Zoning ordinances divide land uses into zones and regulate land use activity specific to each zone. Subdivision regulations deal with the division of land and the location, design, and installation of infrastructure to service the activities located there. Site reviews done by planners on a site-by-site basis ensure that development conforms to zoning and subdivision regulations and that there is adequate parking, buffering, and landscaping on the site for the particular use. As cities have evolved, the legal tools have become increasingly sophisticated to meet the demands of different land uses. If special environmental or historic sites need protection, overlay zones with greater restrictions may be put into place. Today, cities are seeking more and varied means of controlling growth through such legal tools as infill incentives, transfer of development rights, planned area development, and impact fees.

Another key aspect of city planning is protection of the environment. As cities and towns have expanded into the urban fringe, planners and residents alike are

committed to saving open space, protecting wildlife and watersheds, and promoting rural trails and pedestrian and bicycle pathways. Under “smart growth” practices, the comprehensive planning process identifies natural areas and open space, recognizing the importance of balance between the natural and the built environment. A related tool is that of “sustainable” development, which recognizes the need to promote conservation in building practice, including green building, urban water-harvesting techniques, and compact development to encourage use of alternative modes of transportation such as bus, light rail, and bicycle travel.

City planning is vital to ensure that communities make rational choices for their future. The roles that residents and business owners take in the process are key to making decisions that enhance the quality of life for all. Public decision makers are guided by planning and the use of legal tools to obtain the growth, development, and redevelopment desired by community members. As Paul Farmer, executive director and chief executive officer of the American Planning Association, stated in 2005 to the U.S. Government’s House Transportation and Infrastructure Subcommittees on Water Resources and Environment, and Economic Development, Public Buildings and Emergency Management, “Planning is, at its core, about managing change in a way that engages citizens, reflects their vision, and results in increased value. . . . Planners have historically been at the forefront of designing places and standards that ensure safety while bolstering vitality and a sense of community.”

Barbara Becker

See also General Plan; Planning Theory; Urban Planning; Urban Policy

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CITY USERS

City user is a fancy label applied to an analytically based concept, elaborated for two reasons: (1) The inadequacy of the traditional urban analysis, largely based on resident populations, to cope with the accrued mobility of urban areas, and (2) the increased difficulty in explaining urban dynamics based on concepts requiring strong assumptions of collective rationality like all class-based analyses. Thus in 1993 I proposed to reintroduce the concept of populations in urban analysis.

Populations and Collective Rationality

Urban structures, in which we walk or ride every day, are already deeply different from the urban images we have in our mind and in our hearts. Thus there is urgency for a profound reconceptualization of the intellectual and empirical tools we need for the study of urban social facts and processes. It would be naive to pretend to lay down a new theory of urban development, and I do not propose to offer one. But I would like to suggest an effort to analyze urban change, evading the straight-jacket of strict social ecological thinking and class analysis, based on the simple concept of population—namely, an aggregate of individuals defined by one or more simple traits—without any strong assumption about their rational collective behavior. This is contrary to the kind of theoretical assumptions we need in order to analyze classes, movements, groups, or organizations. To give an example of both the simplicity of definition and

empirical power of the concept of population, it is sufficient to look at current patterns of urban migration from the third worlds to the developed ones. Migration flows are composed of individuals and households responding to personal circumstance; the effects of these aggregate decisions are far reaching precisely because they are a loose sum of individual actions.

Four Urban Populations

Based on these cursory considerations I propose to represent schematically various types of urban morphologies by using a simple combination of *four populations* differentiating out in successive phases; measurement of these variables is conceptually neat, and labels are needed only for discursive purposes.

	<i>Live</i>	<i>Work</i>	<i>Consume</i>
A. Inhabitants	Y	Y/N	Y
B. Commuters	N	Y	(Y)
C. City users	N	N	Y
D. Metropolitan business persons	N	Y	Y

From the Traditional City to the First-Generation Metropolis

In the traditional town, on which all the current thinking about urban life is still largely molded, the inhabitants, or the population living in the city, coincided with the population working in the city. The Industrial Revolution did not greatly affect this situation, because production of goods in the secondary sector requires mostly the shifting of raw materials, manufactured goods, and financial assets, while workers and entrepreneurs remain largely concentrated in urban areas.

The early metropolitan development that took place in the United States from the 1920s, and after World War II in Europe, can be essentially seen as a growing differentiation of two populations: the inhabitants and the workers. One can think of this early metropolitan development as two circles progressively separating one from the

other while they both grow in diameter, as in a Venn diagram. While a sizeable portion of the diagram remains overlapping, the two circles come increasingly apart. Commuting is the consequence of this process. All in all, however, early metropolitanization coexisted with the traditional urban structure to a fair degree.

City Users and the Second-Generation Metropolis

Some of the same factors that contributed to the first-generation metropolis, however, contributed to a further differentiation. The increased mobility of people, combined with the availability of greater income and leisure, allowed the differentiation of a third population in our diagram, the city users, namely, a population composed of persons moving to a city in order to use its private and public services: from shopping, to movies, to museums, to restaurants. This is a swelling population that has increasing effects on the structure of cities and actually uses them in a rather uncontrolled way. There are cities that have a very small population of inhabitants, a slightly larger population of commuters, but a vast population of city users. Venice, Italy, is the extreme case, but many other cities of the world experience phenomena of this kind. Contrary to commuters, city users make use of the public areas of the city, more often than not in a rather barbaric way. It is not surprising that at the beginning of 1990 the mayor of West Berlin declared that he was not worried about disposing of *Der Mauer* "because tourists will take it away." East Berliners seem more organized: They have apparently created a corporation to sell chunks of the Berlin wall, but whether by sale or by theft, the result is the same: A dramatically important piece of the built environment is being used. In practical fact, city users have given body to the famous prophecy of Marx and Engels that the Chinese wall would be destroyed by "the heavy artillery of the soft prices of merchandise."

The size of this city user population is growing, but it is difficult to assess precisely because all collective cognitive apparatus is geared to a traditional city that is undergoing a profound mutation, and statistics still deal mainly with inhabitants, to a smaller degree with commuters, but practically in no way with users. If we want to perceive these

new trends systematically, we have to look to entirely new sources of information. Every year large airport systems handle a transient population numerically equivalent not to the inhabitants of any of the world metropolises, but to entire nations like Italy or the United Kingdom.

Huge traffic clogs in central cities occur not only in the regular commuting hours—to a degree foreseeable and resolvable with public transportation systems—but also during shopping sprees, and in coincidence with great symbolic leisure moments. In Italy by far the most consistent boost to urban development in recent years came from the world soccer championship of 1990. And competition for the hosting the Olympic games or the EXPOs witnesses the increasing crucial importance attached to the city user population by local elites. Sociologically the population of users is difficult to define, for the very lack of statistics just deprecated. An educated guess would assess it as being fairly differentiated, from hinterlands kids roaming and cruising on evenings and weekends, to middle-class tourists and shoppers of all ages, to special groups like soccer fans or concert and exhibition goers. It is very different from the city we are accustomed to deal with in popular and scientific terms and could be defined as the second-generation (or mature) metropolis.

Metropolitan Businesspersons and Global Cities

A fourth metropolitan population is differentiating out. This is a small but very specialized population of metropolitan businesspersons. These are persons who go into central cities to do business and establish professional contacts: businesspeople and professionals visiting their customers, convention goers, consultants, and international managers. This fourth population, relatively small but growing, is characterized by having a considerable availability of both private and corporate money. They typically stay for a few days and sometimes for more extended periods, but they are not a permanent population. They spend part of the time doing business and part of the time using the city, at relatively high levels of consumption. This is a population of expert urbanites; these individuals tend to know their way around, be selective in their shopping and hotel and restaurant use, as

well as in the use of top cultural amenities, such as concerts, exhibitions, museums, but also saunas and gyms. Increasingly business and top-level tourism go together. Both the city users and the metropolitan businesspersons are a product of the service industry; whereas secondary-type industries shift goods, services in large part require the shifting of people.

Positing of these four populations does not imply that more traditional class relations and conflicts have disappeared, but there is little doubt that they are undergoing deep transformations that undermine some of the classical socioecological factors of urban class conflict. The strength of the industrial urban proletariat was to a large degree, as it has been noted repeatedly since Marx, a function of its territorial organization. Working-class districts reinforced and projected on the urban plane, so to speak, the class solidarity created in the factory, while the organization of traditional working-class parties and movements relied heavily on the urban ecological niches in which subcultural factors created an extraordinary synergy of economic, social, and political interactions. Much of the lore about industrial cities and early metropolitan areas is centered on these essential components of the urban landscape that tend to wane in the present-day metropolis. In purely numerical terms, the inhabitants are probably the most disfavored of the four populations by the overall dynamic. All in all, then, the traditional class cleavages and solidarities, while by all means still existing and perceivable, give way to new cleavages and group realignments. This analysis receives additional insights in the frame of Anthony Giddens's concept of disembedding as a trait constituent of what he calls "radical modernity." One of the leads suggested by the concept of disembedding points to the analysis of the social consequences of the information and communication technologies.

Guido Martinotti

See also Shopping; Tourism

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COLONIAL CITY

The human appropriation of resources—whether they be land, raw materials, or labor—is by nature a colonial act and, in this respect, urban settlement may be considered inherently colonial. However, here, the colonial city is defined by two parameters: the city as a nucleus of human settlement dependent on, yet separated from, the agricultural hinterland; and the colonial, which is the domination of a minority population over indigenous peoples (who are usually ethnically, racially, or religiously distinct from their colonizers). Whereas many colonial cities were products of nineteenth-century European domination over non-Western lands, the phenomenon of colonial urbanism has a longer trajectory.

Definitions and Features

The words *colony* and *culture* share a common Latin stem—*colere*—that is, to cultivate. *Colonia* was the term used to indicate a public settlement of Roman citizens in a hostile or newly conquered country where settlers, while retaining their Roman citizenship, received land and acted as a garrison for the Roman Empire. The words *colony* and *plantation* were sometimes used interchangeably. Indeed, the Colonial Office of the British Empire was originally called the Board of Plantations. In its early usage in the sixteenth century, the word *plantation* simply referred to settling people; however, it later came to denote a New World mode of production based on the exploitation of slave labor for the production of agricultural staples for a metropolitan market. The cities that grew out of colonization were based on social segregation and political dominance. Colonial cities served as physical expressions of dominance in which the relationships between the dominator and the

dominated were clear, and are often characterized by the physical segregation of their ethnic, social, religious, and cultural constituencies. The terms *periphery* (referring to the territory that is colonized) and *metropole* (referring to the imperial center of power) indicate the geographically separate but ideologically related components of colonial urbanism.

Due to the asymmetry of power between the colonized and the colonizers, the colonial project may be defined as a power struggle oscillating between dominance and dependence, and often the morphological layout of the cities reflected this equation. For example, many colonial cities followed a dual-city model with sharp segregation between the urban realms of the colonizer and the colonized. French colonial cities of Morocco such as Fez, Rabat, and Casablanca were marked by the distinction between a European town and “traditional” or native city.

Colonial cities often served as the very apparatus through which domination was maintained over this subject population. Motivated by religious, cultural, or economic ideologies, colonial cities functioned as the environments through which religious or cultural conversion and economic exploitation occurred. For example, colonial cities such as Bombay, Singapore, Kingston, and Rio de Janeiro grew around the ports that serviced the surplus extraction of resources and labor from the colonies to the metropole.

Colonial cities often displayed social diversity, with various racial, cultural, and religious groups organized into a rigid stratification system. This social hierarchy was composed of a ruling elite (colonial settlers), the colonized indigenous population, and an intervening group intermediate in status and power. For example, in Calcutta, British colonists deliberately cultivated a segment of the indigenous elite, who served as intermediaries between the colonizers and the colonized. These elites often lived in grand spaces that were comparable to those of the dominant population and exercised considerable control over their urban environment.

History and Geography

The task of identifying the earliest colonial city is complicated by the limits of archaeology. Therefore,

while we know that the sea-based Minoan empire (3000–2200 BC) with its capital at Knossos colonized large tracts of Egypt and Mesopotamia, little evidence regarding the colonies themselves remains from which to glean their colonial nature.

Archaeology, however, has provided some evidence regarding the urbanizing tendencies of the ancient and classical empires such as Egypt and Greece. For example, between 1500 and 1100 BC, the Egyptian Empire established a vast network of colonial cities in the Nubian Nile Valley. The design of these colonial towns was fairly uniform, with a square or rectangular layout enclosed with thick mud-brick walls. Excavations at New Kingdom towns such as Amara West and Sesebi have shown that streets, at least initially, were laid out along the lines of a grid. At the center of each town was a large stone temple, surrounded by storerooms for goods and domestic residences. The Grecian Empire emerged in the late fifth century as an alliance between 300 tribute-paying cities along the Aegean coast. Miletus (in modern Turkey) stands out as the most famous of these and followed Hippodamus’s plan for an “ideal” city, where the citizenry would be divided into three classes: artisans, farmers, and soldiers. Urban land would be demarcated as sacred, public, or private and at the center of the city were replicas of the agora (public commons) and the stoa (marketplace) of Athens.

In the postclassical era the Roman Empire provided paradigmatic colonial cities whose grid form evoked the formal organization of the metropole. Following the Roman conquest of Damascus (first century BC) the city was reorganized around an east–west axis (decamanus) and a north–south axis (castrum). Colonnaded streets and a forum further consolidated it as a city of the Roman Empire. Colonial cities also emerged from the Islamic Empire in various parts of North Africa, the Middle East, and the Fertile Crescent. Starting in the late seventh century, Arab invaders to the Nile valley set up garrison towns for their troops. These temporary military camps became the urban kernels around which mosques, commercial markets, and residential quarters grew, eventually turning into a permanent city. Early towns settled by the Arab invaders such as Kufah were arranged around a system of gridded streets that demarcated specific areas for the various tribes that served the colonial

army. Colonial cities appear in the Americas around AD 1200, when the Aztecs established the city of Tenochtitlán (present-day Mexico City). By the fifteenth century, owing mainly to the military prowess of the Aztecs, Tenochtitlán served as the center of the Aztec alliance—a confederation of towns from which it received tribute. On the eve of the Spanish conquest, the city was so densely populated (approximately 9 million persons) that the Aztec ruler tried to pressure the “colonies” to increase their tributes to Tenochtitlán, which in turn caused several rebellions. The fourteenth century also saw the rise of the Inca Empire, with its capital at Cuzco (in modern-day Peru). This empire was renowned for its large public works, such as road networks, irrigation systems, and so on. Incan towns such as Chan-Chan and Huanuco Pampa were organized around large plazas from where the Inca himself presided over state ceremonies.

The sixteenth to the late nineteenth century, or the early modern period, was marked by the rise of European powers such as Spain, Portugal, and the Netherlands. The Iberian colonization of the Americas has been understood through the motivation of the colonizers to convert the indigenous population in a religious and cultural sense in an attempt to wipe out existing native cultures. Thus the North American cities of San Francisco and San Diego grew around the religious institution of a Catholic mission that provided the first change from a largely agrarian economy to an urban one. The Dutch colonial city of Zeelandia off the southwest coast of China, established as a trading port in 1624, proved to be one of the most profitable and strategic ports for the Dutch East India Company.

Modern imperialism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was marked by the rise of empires such as France, Britain, and Italy. The rise of modern industrial capitalism was the primary catalyst for this phase of colonialism, and the success of the Industrial Revolution in Europe was entrenched in the surplus extraction of resources from the peripheries of North Africa, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. During this period colonial administrators and planners used the colonized peripheries for various sociospatial experiments. Colonial urban planners saw the colonies as a *tabula rasa* (blank slate) onto which they were free to impose their utopian urban ideals—visions that

would have been impossible to implement in the metropolises of Paris or London. Thus, the professionalization of urban planning in Europe should be viewed as deeply rooted in the colonial experience.

Theoretical Frameworks

Contemporary understanding of the colonial city owes much to Edward Said’s path-breaking book *Orientalism*, which argued that colonialism was based on the epistemological and ontological production of difference between the colonizer and the colonized. Thus, a key element of the process of colonialism was the representation of the native population as powerless, organizationally backward, traditionally rooted (and therefore stagnant), and culturally inferior to the dominant population. Inspired by Said’s argument, urban historians and theorists began to look upon colonial cities as the laboratories where this difference was produced and the primary apparatus through which control and domination over the colonized was ensured. These scholars theorized the colonial city through various approaches.

The paradigm of modernization (Rostow) claims that colonial cities were divided into two types of spaces: modern (representative of the dominant population of colonizers) and a preindustrial or traditional city (representative of the native subject population). The space of the modern city is arranged around an industrialized economy and therefore has components such as ports, post offices, and commercial centers, whereas the native space continues to be organized around traditional bazaars based on a workshop system of production. Based on a linear notion of urban development, this paradigm proposes the colonial city as gradually shedding its traditional modes of production and growing into a Western-style capitalist economy.

The colonial city has also been understood as contact between distinct cultures (King) and the physical form that arose out of the imposition of a nonindigenous cultural system on the colonized landscape. This framework of understanding the colonial city assumes that the cultures of the colonizer and colonized were mutually exclusive, and the colonial city is predominantly the result of the contact between these two distinct cultures. In other words, this theoretical framework argues

that the form of the colonial city was a direct result of the culture of colonial domination.

A political economy approach (Wallerstein) situates the colonial city within larger economic systems of production and consumption where the urbanization of the third world periphery was based on an unequal exchange of goods and labor with the first world core, and colonial cities were deliberately created to facilitate European capitalist expansion. This theoretical framework was expanded upon by dependency theorists (Frank) who further argued that the core-periphery model of development also replicated itself within the third world, where, once established, colonial cities then developed a dominant relation with the agricultural hinterland, which in turn led to uneven development within the colonies themselves. As it drew labor, raw materials, and agricultural resources from the hinterland, the development of the colonial city went hand in hand with the underdevelopment of the city (through slums, squatters, and tenements) as well as of the rural countryside.

In recent years, urban historians and theorists have looked more closely at colonial cities as the site of indigenous agency (Yeoh), suggesting that the colonized population was more than simply passive recipients of the visions and schemes of the colonizers, but rather exercised agency in the construction of colonial cities through everyday use and negotiations with the dominant population. The end result of the colonial city was thus a compromised version of the ideal schemes as imagined by the colonizer and incorporated a whole host of elements that catered to the indigenous population.

Form and Function

The primary motivations of the colonial project often manifested themselves in the physical formal arrangements of the colonial city. The following paragraphs list some examples of nineteenth- and twentieth-century colonial urbanism.

Racial segregation was a primary preoccupation of colonial planners and administrators. Cities such as Fez (Morocco) and Algiers (Algeria) were designed with distinct quarters for the indigenous population and European colonizers. The two sections of these dual cities were separated by a *cordon sanitaire*—an open green zone—that served as a hygienic as well as symbolic division between the

racially distinct areas. Motivated by the medical profession's racial explanation of epidemics and contagious disease, European colonizers justified the cordon sanitaire as vital to the protection of their own health and lives. Colonial racial anxieties were thus manifested as urban apartheid.

Colonial cities were also used as the symbolic devices through which imperial power was represented and displayed. In 1911, when Delhi was proclaimed as the capital of the British Empire in India, a new city was built to house the administrative center of the empire. New Delhi was built adjacent to Shahjahanabad—a city that had been the seat of the Mughal Empire for over 200 years. In building New Delhi, British administrators sought, through visual elements and architectural styles, to represent the British Empire as the rightful successors to the Mughal Empire that they had recently abrogated. Similarly Addis Ababa (in modern-day Ethiopia) became a capital of the Italian empire in 1936. The new capital city, as envisioned by Benito Mussolini, would achieve two interrelated goals: (1) It would establish strict segregation between Black natives and White colonizers, and (2) it would represent the Italian empire as comparable in strength and domination to its French and British counterparts.

A crucial element in the culture of colonialism was the notion of the colonizers as the rightful “proprietors” or “guardians” of the colonized. This paternalistic attitude often manifested itself in the management of indigenous heritage by the colonial authorities. For example, during the late phase of French colonization of North Africa, the colonial authorities took on the mandate of preserving the “native” city in its traditional, picturesque, urban form. In cities like Casablanca and Marrakesh, modern urban amenities such as plumbing, sewage, and street lighting were restricted to the European sections of the town. This strategy denied the indigenous population access to modernity by freezing them into the role of tradition as defined by the colonizers.

The colonial project entailed the movement of large populations of human labor and the subsequent need for housing them in cities. In the late nineteenth century the British colony of Trinidad received 144,000 indentured laborers (mostly Indian males) who were housed in barracks.

Constructed from the cheapest materials, the barracks were essentially warehouses with several rooms (often beds) in a row with shared facilities, which offered very little in the way of privacy for the individuals. Barrack housing was also common in South Africa and was most famously used by the De Beers diamond company in their mining towns (such as Kimberly) to house their convict labor. Here the barracks were arranged around a courtyard and functioned as a closed compound, where the activities of the inmates were monitored as in a prison camp.

Continuing Legacies and New Empires

Does a colonial city stop being colonial when the colonizers leave? The processes and apparatuses put into place during the colonial era did not simply disappear at the moment of decolonization, and several cities continue to be shaped by the legacies of colonialism. The vacuum of power left behind by the departing colonizers was quickly filled by local elites while the urban poor filled the same roles and occupied the shantytowns that were once the realm of the colonized indigene. Urban segregation continues to define many cities with a colonial legacy—albeit along the lines of class and wealth as opposed to race. The legacy of colonialism is also complicated by the fact that there comes a point at which the formerly colonized people cease to perceive their history as colonial and begin to absorb colonial heritage into their postcolonial narratives of national identity. This is apparent in a case like Mexico, where Spanish colonial architecture has now been co-opted as Mexican vernacular heritage.

Globalization has radically altered the form of empire, and as imperial technologies change so do colonial urban forms. A good example is that of Guantánamo Bay: A piece of land occupied by the Americans following the Cuban Spanish American War of 1898, it is a self-sufficient U.S. naval base that is a geographic, legal, and political state of exception. A place where neither the U.S. Constitution nor international law holds sway, Guantánamo has been the site of incarceration for over 700 men from 40 countries starting in early 2002. Labeled as enemy combatants by the U.S. government (rather than prisoners of war), the inmates are neither protected by the Geneva Conventions nor have

access to legal representation that alien prisoners on U.S. soil would normally receive. The inhumane conditions of shackled inmates trapped in small isolated cells and under constant surveillance are reminiscent of early penal colonies of the British Empire in the Caribbean or internment camps built by the United States during World War II to segregate Japanese Americans from the general population.

If indeed the colonial city is defined by the urban manifestation of dominance by a minority population over indigenes, then closer attention must be paid to contemporary imperialism, which manifests itself not in the normative spaces of urbanism but rather in the spaces of exclusion, incarceration, and torture. These may well be the colonial cities of the present as well as the future.

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See also Capital City; New Delhi, India; Social Exclusion; Urban Planning; World-Systems Perspective

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COMMON INTEREST DEVELOPMENT

Common interest developments (CIDs) go by several names, including residential community associations and common interest communities. They can include many types of housing ranging from detached single-family homes or townhouses in a planned unit development to apartment units in a condominium or cooperative. They may be gated—that is, surrounded by walls or fences restricting access—or not gated.

The distinguishing feature of a CID is common property ownership. In addition to an individual interest in a house or an apartment, each property owner holds a shared interest in a common asset such as the streets, parks, or recreational facilities of a large, master-planned community or the stairways and hallways of a high-rise apartment building.

Each homeowner is automatically a member of a homeowners association that manages the common areas and enforces community-wide deed restrictions known as conditions, covenants, and restrictions (CCRs). Drafted by the land developer, CCRs are servitudes or contracts that “run with the land” and bind all future homebuyers. Amendments to CCRs typically require a two-thirds vote of homeowners. The association’s elected board of directors can adopt operating rules on its own or by a simple majority vote.

As private membership organizations, homeowners associations can exercise greater control

than municipalities over resident land use and behavior. Common restrictions include limits on exterior paint colors, lawn maintenance, and architectural design as well as “lifestyle” constraints on pet ownership and sign posting. CCRs also authorize the homeowners association to levy assessments for collective services such as snow removal, garbage collection, street cleaning and lighting, and security. Assessments are backed by the power to place liens on delinquent properties and, ultimately, to foreclose without judicial approval. Because their activities resemble those of traditional local government, CIDs are often called “private governments.”

Over the past 40 years, these private governments have proliferated. In the early 1960s, there were fewer than 500 CIDs in the United States. In 2006, there were an estimated 286,000 of them representing 17 percent of the housing stock. Although some of the largest and best-known CIDs are in the East (e.g., Columbia, Maryland, and Reston, Virginia), their growth has been concentrated in the Sunbelt region. In California, for example, CIDs include roughly one quarter of the housing stock and 60 percent of current housing starts. Planned developments alone represent more than 40 percent of new single-family home sales.

Several commentators have referred to the growth of CIDs as a “quiet revolution.” Viewpoints differ on whether this is positive or negative. Proponents argue that CIDs protect homeowners from declining neighborhood quality and promote efficiency in the delivery of local public goods. Critics argue that CIDs overly restrict individual freedoms and harm nonmembers by exacerbating residential segregation and undermining public support for local taxes and spending.

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See also Condominium; Gated Community; Homeowners Associations; Tiebout Hypothesis

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COMMUNITY

The concept of community has appeared regularly throughout urban studies and is generally employed in reference to all aspects of the social life of cities, including population size, demographic distribution, and neighborhood composition. Traditionally used by anthropologists, sociologists, geographers, and urban planners to signify a set of social relationships operating within a specific boundary, location, or territory, community is arguably one of the most contested concepts used in the study of the city and society. Many of these usages are either actual or ideal in description, and it is often difficult to separate analytical from normative usages of the term.

Although conventionally evoked to describe the characteristics of a specific locality or area, the idea of community has also been used in far more ideological terms as a means by which to substantiate a particular identity (e.g., lesbian community) or to further a specific political project (e.g., community-based grassroots activism). Recent definitions of community have tended to depict it more in social and political terms rather than as a distinctly spatial structure.

Defining Community

Notwithstanding the fact that community has been notoriously difficult to define in any concise and uncontested manner, four broad approaches can be identified. The first approach conceives of community as a set of social relations occurring within a distinctly spatialized and geographical setting. Within the disciplinary fields of anthropology, sociology, geography, rural studies, and community studies more generally, there exists a rich body of work that has focused upon the form and function of specific communities in this sense of the term.

A second approach conceptualizes community as the outcome of a particular mode of social interaction among individuals or social groups. Premised upon varying degrees of consensus and conflict, this more sociological approach essentially views community to be the product of ongoing negotiation between social actors.

Community has been used in a third sense to describe a particular type of social relationship

between the individual and society. This perspective is perhaps closest to a commonsense interpretation of community, as it evokes the notion of community as a search for belonging and desire for group membership.

The fourth approach looks at how the foundational nature of community has been decisively altered by innovations in the use of communications and computer technology. According to this view, developments in communicative and virtual technology have fundamentally undermined more traditional conceptualizations of community and radically altered the means by which individuals and social groups generate bonds of attachment. Rather than defining community in terms of geographical or spatial proximity, communities in this sense are virtual and cyber-based.

Classical Formulations of Community

Various conceptualized throughout classical social theory as threatened with dissolution by the advent of modernity, the concept of community has proven to be a resilient and recurrent trope in both theoretical and practical analysis. Writing in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, European classical sociologists such as Ferdinand Tönnies and Émile Durkheim expressed concern regarding the breakdown of traditional social bonds and sources of moral cohesion. The dynamic effects of industrialism, demographic growth, immigration, and rapid urbanization were seen as combining to produce a fundamental rupture between the traditional social formations of folk society and those of modern urban society. In this view, the obligatory ties of duty and responsibility toward the community that were characteristic of premodern society were being replaced by social formations based on mutual differentiation and contractually based social relations.

Tönnies suggested that forms of communal association based upon family, kinship group, and spatial proximity (*Gemeinschaft*) were yielding to forms of societal association premised upon impersonal and contractual relationships (*Gesellschaft*). This view essentially suggested the realization of community to be incompatible within the institutional complexity of modern society. According to Tönnies, the transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* entailed a fundamental sociopsychological shift in human

consciousness. Whereas traditional forms of human association had produced organic communities of social and moral cohesion, the sheer complexity of modern society has led to the irreparable fragmentation of communal and social bonds. The transition from relatively close-knit and proximal spatial configurations to the large-scale dispersal of population aggregates within urban settings was seen by Tönnies to fundamentally challenge the very existence of community as traditionally conceived.

Although sharing a concern with Tönnies regarding the disintegrative effects of social change, Durkheim argued that the type of group solidarity produced in complex urbanized societies could also form the basis for the emergence of new forms of communal life. A key question in this regard was how a sense of collective morality could be maintained amid the increasing differentiation and complexity of modern society. The answer proposed by Durkheim initially seems contradictory. On the one hand, an increase in occupational specialization and the development of complex social arrangements has meant that traditional ways of life have declined, thereby creating pervasive feelings of social and moral disintegration. Durkheim referred to this condition of social discord as “anomie.” Conditions of anomie arise when sudden and disruptive changes occur in social structure. Rather than lament this state of affairs, however, Durkheim suggested that new forms of solidarity and community could grow from the institutional bases of modern society. Although Durkheim remains vague as to what precise shape these communal forms may take, his emphasis upon the nature of collective morality, social cohesion, and the differentiation of modern life was to exercise a significant influence upon subsequent theories of community.

Such conceptualizations of community often held it to be synonymous with an attachment to locality. In this view, urbanization was gradually transforming the *Gemeinschaft* of intimate communal relations into the *Gesellschaft* of instrumentally conceived and bureaucratized mass society. If society is conceived as the locus of the lifeworld, situated between the twin institutional pillars of state and economy, community represented a bounded spatiality in which cohesive social mores could be embedded. This suggests community to be, in essence, a value term. Despite the many ways

in which community has been defined, attention should be directed to the fact that many such descriptions posit a certain type of community as the normative ideal. In this sense, debates on community have been bedeviled by conceptual and methodological disagreement as to where the boundaries of community could or should be drawn. Although differing in terms of theoretical analysis, the classical theorists held the decline of community to be of the most profound consequence with regard to the effects on collective morality and social life.

More recent discussions in social theory have reformulated these dynamics in terms of the interconnections between the local and the global. Given the extent to which the forces of globalization have intruded upon the lifeworld of the local context, the study of community as a bounded entity has undoubtedly lost much of the legitimacy it once held. A prominent example of this has been the decline of community studies as a clearly recognizable field of study. Traditionally a strength of Anglo-American anthropology and sociology, the transformation of industrial and workforce relations has revealed how the study of any particular community must now by necessity take account of an encompassing context of globalization. Indeed, even to assume the existence of community is to risk the accusation of adhering to a reactionary and conservative interpretation of contemporary social and political relations.

Although classical social theory presented the decline of community as a critique of Western industrialism and urbanization, such appraisals have been of less salient concern in the global South. Indeed, if the transformative dynamism of industrialism in Western society was implicitly juxtaposed with the perceived stasis of the non-Western world, such considerations are indicative of an ethnocentric bias informing classical theories of community. Critiques of industrialism and urbanization outside of the Western tradition, thus, often eschew discussion on the decline of community in favor of critical engagement with the effects of global and economic growth. Ranging from South Africa to Manila to Sydney, community-based grassroots activism and resistance to globalization and capitalist expansion have been of more urgent concern. Typically focusing on determinants of employment, health, poverty, and demographic

change, theorizations of community outside of the Anglo-American tradition have been far more applied in nature.

Community and the City

A concern with the effects of urbanization and demographic change in the city has been central to urban studies throughout the twentieth century. The Chicago School of Urban Sociology proposed a vision of urban study in which the city was revealed as a composite “mosaic of little worlds.” While inheriting from the European theorists a concern with the disintegrative effects of modern society, Chicago School research also emphasized the means by which community found expression in large urbanized settings. Ethnographic explorations of everything from particular social groups, neighborhood locales, and occupational niches (e.g., gangs, street corners, taxi-cab drivers, and many others) revealed distinct sociocultural enclaves of communal sentiment worthy of further investigation.

Central to the Chicago School analysis of urban growth and development was the employment of a human ecology perspective in which the city was seen to develop and expand organically due to ongoing waves of immigrant invasion and succession. Although much criticized by subsequent scholars for making vast generalizations regarding processes of urban development deemed specific to northeastern U.S. cities, the ecological framework nonetheless remained a dominant paradigm in U.S. urban studies of urban planning and development until the 1960s. A key insight of Chicago School scholarship was the recognition that dynamics occurring at the local and community level had significant impact upon the overall structure of the city.

Arising out of the Chicago School approach, the study of subcultures in the city challenged the prevailing determinism in urban sociology by advocating that the heterogeneity of city life, and associated dynamics of urban growth, led to the development of recognizable subcultural enclaves characterized by the presence of distinct class and ethnic communities. Emphasizing the means by which community was realized in complex urban settings, this perspective fundamentally challenged the theory of social anomie as proposed by the

European social theorists. Furthermore, the emergence of such thriving ethnic and immigrant neighborhoods seemed to directly contradict the guiding thesis of Chicago School sociologists that such groups would eventually assimilate and blend with their host society.

Notwithstanding the legacy and influence of the Chicago School, urban scholars have continued to contest the form and function of community in city life. Signaling a shift from anthropologically inclined studies of urban life to political economy perspectives, many critically and Marxist oriented scholars have argued that the rise of global capitalism has proven detrimental to the realization of community in contemporary urban settings. Arguing that the hegemony of global capitalism has led to the displacement of community in city life, such perspectives suggest community to be antithetical to the logic of a capitalist and neoliberal world order.

Many such discussions have been conducted within the context of debates on gentrification and urban regeneration. Indeed, visions of urban planning and renewal often evoke the semantics of community as being of central importance to the revival and rejuvenation of dilapidated urban areas. In this regard, renewal initiatives are seen as breeding new life into stagnant and dilapidated urban areas that would otherwise fall into a state of even greater disrepair. Often described as involving the relocation of middle-class professionals from suburban neighborhoods back into central urban areas, practices of gentrification are thereby seen as displacing working-class populations, ethnic minority residents, bohemian lifestyles, and economically stagnant business enterprises from their long-standing communities. In addition, the declining analytical salience of the Chicago School approach has been further undermined by its lack of applicability to the developmental logic of cities in the global South.

The growing strength of critical perspectives on community and urban life has been paralleled by an emphasis upon the intensification of ethnoracial practices of marginalization. For example, sociologist Loïc Wacquant has argued that an institutionalized system of urban exclusion has led to the American ghetto becoming an “impossible community” within the contemporary civic order. Accordingly, racialized segregation, systemic discrimination, declining

social capital networks, the withdrawal of social services, and pervasive stigmatization have all combined to prevent the emergence of community in poverty stricken areas of the city. The rise of gated communities and fortified urban enclaves (ranging from São Paulo to Los Angeles) has only served to exacerbate this discrepancy in social-economic and psychological division through the production of mere simulacra of community. Indeed, the idea of community as a gated or defensive enclosure intuitively contradicts the positive connotations that often accompany the inclusion of the notion of community in planning and policy discourse.

International migration has also fundamentally altered the constitution of community in the contemporary global city. Characterized by the maintenance of transnational personal and economic networks, contemporary immigrant communities avail of the communicative and technological innovations of globalization to forge links between homeland and host country. In a study of West African street vendors in New York, Paul Stoller and Jasmin McConatha demonstrate how religious and ethnic affiliation form the basis of the maintenance of the transnational spaces that increasingly typify community diasporas in the contemporary city. Furthermore, revitalized “ethnic enclaves” (e.g., Chinese and Korean communities) have adapted to the morphology of cultural and economic globalization to become dynamic transnational communities and catalysts of urban growth.

The Revival of Community

Three broad trends can be discerned when considering the utility of the concept of community in contemporary urban studies. A first trend is contained in communitarian debates regarding civic engagement. If identification with a particular community is dependent upon the cultivation of a sense of belonging, the revival of civic associations and local community networks are deemed essential. Such imperatives as the maintenance of social capital networks, public participation in decision making, the ongoing provision of goods and services, and the facilitation of economic activity and growth all resonate with the emphasis placed upon community in communitarian thought.

Combining an emphasis on the importance of community with a stress on citizenship, the communitarian position is most clearly understood when conceived of as a position that challenges the liberal emphasis placed upon individual autonomy and achievement of personal fulfillment. The perceived decline of a culture of volunteerism, coupled with an increasingly atomized urban order, has led many communitarian scholars to lament the passing of a strong sense of civic engagement. Influential political scientist Robert Putnam has suggested that the decline in the strength of social capital networks can be reversed by investment in community building civic initiatives and increased levels of democratic participation. Such community building imperatives, however, often posit an idealized rather than actualized model of civic cooperation and thereby fail to empower marginalized social groups. As a result, the communitarian position has been subject to considerable criticism with regard to what is perceived as a limited, nostalgic, and somewhat retrogressive interpretation of what constitutes community. It is in this sense that critics of the concept have cited its frequently ideological usage and tendency to depict the changing nature of community in modern urban life in strictly pathological terms. Notwithstanding these criticisms, communitarian thought continues to exercise significant influence upon government policy and community development initiatives.

A second trend suggests that the nature of community has become a far more voluntaristic means of social engagement as individuals come together on the basis of similarity of ideas, taste, lifestyle, and niche interest. In this view, community is heavily circumscribed by the nature of the particular identity or interest pursuit, and characterized by relatively fluid and transient criteria of membership. Accordingly, community members come and go as levels of commitment wane and differ. The political implications of this can be seen in social movements that evoke the semantics of community as a rallying call. Although such social movements can be either liberatory or conservative in their stated aim, the sheer abstractness and complexity of contemporary society often compels individuals and groups to seek solidarity and membership in such voluntaristic collectivities. When considering that these new forms of communities are certainly not as cohesive or obligatory as those

formed by kin and clan, the question remains of whether employing the term *community* is even applicable in these instances.

Thirdly, the dis-embedding of community from local sites of social interaction, due to developments in media and communicative technology, has decisively altered the means by which community is constituted. In this view, community has become less dependent upon face-to-face forms of social interaction and more upon virtual networks of connectivity. Accordingly, the emergence of new communicative technologies, such as the proliferation of personal and professional social networking sites on the Internet, offer immense potential with regard to the fostering of social bonds across lines of both distance and difference. Although debates continue as to the actual rather than potential degree of democratization such innovations facilitate, the growing predominance of virtual networking supports the thesis that spatial and residential proximity are no longer defining prerequisites for the constitution of community.

Undoubtedly, innovations in virtual technology have greatly facilitated the expression of new forms of community and group membership. Although care is needed to avoid the conflation of the idea of connectivity with that of community, the type of attachments formed in virtual networks can, if they are not communities in themselves, certainly provide the basis for them. In this regard, the claim that virtual communities exist in parallel expression with grounded communities is a highly plausible one. While such a claim collapses the distinction between real and imagined communities, a key point of contention involves a questioning of the degree of obligation and commitment such communities seemingly require. If face-to-face interaction and residential location are no longer the primary determinants of community belonging, the episodic nature of virtual communities is indicative of their highly personalized and compartmentalized nature.

Rather than being rendered obsolete by the transformative impact of the effects of globalization, the importance of community in urban studies today arguably lies in the achievement of newly emergent forms of belonging. Sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has suggested that much contemporary scholarship has demonstrated a veritable “lust” for community in this regard. As the global economy becomes

increasingly dependent upon the transnational flow of people, capital, goods, and services, the changing face of international mobilities and virtual technologies continues to fundamentally reconfigure the form and function of community in everyday life.

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See also Chicago School of Urban Sociology; Community Development; Community Studies; Gated Community; *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*; Human Ecology

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COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT

Community development refers to a wide variety of practices that enable communities to rebuild their housing, local economies, and social fabric. It can be conducted in poor rural communities to improve agricultural practices and poor urban communities to rebuild deteriorated housing. It can also occur in small towns around downtown revitalization. Community development can even provide residents with access to computer technology and is frequently used in crime-ridden communities to reestablish social relationships.

Community development is sometimes confused with economic development. Economic development, though, is not necessarily community based and may be controlled by large corporations or governments. A government- or corporation-imposed development plan is not considered community development. Both the United Nations 50 years ago and the Community Development Society today specify that involvement of community members in diagnosing problems and developing solutions to them is crucial to successful community development.

There is also international variation in the use of the term. Whereas in the United States, community development has been referred to as “sticks and bricks”—the practice of refurbishing decayed central city properties—in the rest of the world it can easily refer to rebuilding social relationships among neighbors or even advocating for social change through the practice of community organizing.

International History

Much of the international emphasis of community development has been on communities in the third world. Large international organizations such as the World Health Organization or the World Bank are often considered community development organizations. But they do not meet the requirement of community participation and control. However, a number of practitioners working for large governmental or nongovernmental organizations did practice community development in the post-World War II era. Community development was integrally connected to the green revolution of the time, which attempted to establish new forms of high-yield agriculture in third world nations.

Community workers of the time promoted the practice of involving and empowering grassroots community members. Some worked against the official policies of their government or organization to conduct community development. These practitioners left behind new attitudes and hope and provided the groundwork for the modern sustainable development movement in the third world. Upon returning to the United States or Europe, they ushered in a new emphasis on grassroots participation at home.

Perhaps because of the variety of conditions that community workers found across the third world, the multiplicity of needs and issues in any one place, and the presence of community workers from nations that provided a stronger social safety net than the United States, community development in the third world focused on housing, rural agricultural development, urban commercial and human-scale industrial development, and community organizing, often together. In the United States, community work is compartmentalized into separate and specialized organizations.

Community Development in the United States

The historical origins of community development in the United States are uncertain. The early 1900s settlement house movement is one starting point, in which upper-class women established agencies in central city immigrant communities to combat a lack of city services, discrimination, and unhygienic conditions. The most famous of such settlement houses was Hull House, established by Jane Addams and Ellen Gates Starr. Another trend of about the same time was the Extension Service of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, often connected to land-grant colleges and universities, which helped farm families to be more successful and achieve a higher quality of life.

Community development experienced its greatest transition in the 1960s and 1970s with the rise of the community development corporation (CDC). From its origins in the Bedford-Stuyvesant neighborhood of New York City in 1967, the CDC movement has grown to the point that nearly all medium and large U.S. cities now have at least one CDC. In many cases, CDC growth was fueled by the philanthropic funders' increasing distaste for the more political community organizing groups and their desire to fund organizations that had

more of a social service mission. The original CDCs addressed a wide range of problems in neighborhoods, but most CDCs found their greatest successes later in building housing and redeveloping commercial buildings. CDCs today are primarily specialized nonprofit organizations governed by a board of directors who may or may not represent the neighborhood in which the CDC operates.

Methods of Community Development

The community development process often starts with the diagnosis of an undesirable community condition. Where factories, middle-class residents, and the commercial base have departed, this is often difficult. The diagnosis needs to fully incorporate the conditions of the community and offer some hope that improvements can be made. A variety of methods are used in the diagnostic process, ranging under the headings of SWOT (strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, threats) analysis, rapid rural appraisal (and a variant called participatory rural appraisal), needs assessments, and asset assessments. Although varying in focus, all concentrate on helping residents identify what is happening in their community so that they can develop plans for changing those conditions that are deemed undesirable.

Once the diagnosis has been completed, a strategy for change is developed. This involves community planning and can range from broad-based “visioning” of what a community might look like in the future to concrete planning around a specific issue or place. The challenge is to identify and bring together stakeholders such as landlords and tenants, workers and business owners, or government officials and members of excluded communities who may have antagonistic goals.

The next step is to implement the program that has been developed through the first two stages. Gaining community participation and involvement is part of the program. Doing so prevents the further disempowerment of disinvested communities through intervention programs that are top-down and treat community members as clients rather than as people with talents and wisdom.

The final step in effective community development is evaluation, though it is misleading to think of evaluation as occurring at the end of a program. Good evaluation actually begins at the diagnostic stage, as people define an issue, work to understand the issue, and then design an

intervention. A good intervention plan will include methods for determining how well the intervention is working. Such evaluation can improve the success of the intervention.

Community Development Intermediaries

Although the emphasis is on grassroots involvement and control, many community development efforts require a high level of skill and a large amount of capital. A large number of CDCs are small, nonprofit organizations with only a few staff and have boards made up partly or wholly of residents from the neighborhoods they serve. Such organizations often lack expertise in real estate, insurance, contracting, finance, and the other technical areas crucial to successful community development.

This is where community development intermediaries play a role. Intermediaries provide technical assistance and capital for community development organizations to undertake complex and comprehensive community development tasks. Organizations such as the Development Training Institute and the Local Initiatives Support Corporation have been created to improve the success of community-level community development organizations in the United States, though they are sometimes seen as controlling rather than facilitating community processes. Internationally there are numerous organizations providing technical assistance within nations and international organizations, such as the Institute of Development Studies in Sussex, England.

Major Trends

One of the trends in community development has been a shift from “deficits” to “assets.” Promoted by the Asset-Based Community Development Institute, this emphasis is controversial. Supporters argue that focusing on community needs makes poor communities appear helpless and incompetent. Opponents argue that a focus on assets mystifies or ignores processes of exploitation and oppression that keep down communities. Another recent trend is the refocusing of CDCs on community organizing. After being criticized for becoming overly professionalized and separated from the communities they were charged with redeveloping, CDCs in the 1990s looked for new ways to involve residents in developing their own communities. While they

called this practice “community organizing,” it was more often a form of resident participation rather than a process of forming an independent, resident-led community organization. The most developed of these programs is the Ricanne Hadrian Initiative for Community Organizing sponsored by the Massachusetts Association of CDCs.

The comprehensive community initiative is another innovation. The idea of solving multiple community problems simultaneously has never left the field of community development, even when it became clear that the CDC was not an effective vehicle for dealing with crime, housing, jobs, education, and all the other issues affecting marginalized communities. In its most recent form, comprehensive community development now involves a coalition of community organizations coordinating their efforts on a single neighborhood.

Faith-based community development is another recently popular approach. Church-sponsored community development organizations, most commonly CDCs, have long been a part of the community development scene in the urban United States. But they became politically significant with the establishment of a special funding stream under the George W. Bush administration. Their community development strategies are similar to those of secular CDCs.

The final trend worthy of note is the community informatics movement. As computers and the Internet have become more and more important in daily life, the recognition of the consequences of not having access to such technology has grown. The field of community informatics focuses on information and communication technology as a form of community development.

Through these different trends, community development is broadening its perspective and diversity of practices in the United States and the world. More U.S.-style community organizing is being incorporated into community development practices in developing countries, and more grassroots participation in “bricks and sticks” community development is happening in the United States. In the coming decades, as the world grows yet smaller, we will likely see a more globalized community development practice where successes and tools are more readily shared and adapted across borders and cultures.

Randy Stoecker

See also Community Organizing; Housing Policy; Neighborhood Revitalization; Public–Private Partnerships

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COMMUNITY GARDEN

Community gardening is an urban social phenomenon that arose in the United States and Canada in the 1970s as a form of grassroots reinvestment by local communities. A series of fiscal depressions in the 1960s and 1970s led to widespread disinvestment in many inner-city neighborhoods. City services such as garbage collection, street repair, and maintenance of public spaces were often nonexistent in poverty-stricken areas. Landlords found it increasingly profitable to let buildings deteriorate or to actively burn structures down for insurance monies, leaving many neighborhoods with numerous vacant lots. Coupled with national trends of middle-class flight to suburban developments and broad shifts in the economy away from a manufacturing-based workforce, the resulting social landscape was of high unemployment rates in rapidly depopulating neighborhoods already blighted with derelict buildings and rubble-strewn vacant lots. Urban decay left communities feeling isolated and powerless in physical and social ghettos. The first community gardens were planted when local residents began cleaning up vacant lots for community use.

Gardens varied widely based on local needs. Gardens were used to educate schoolchildren, run voter registration drives, feed the homeless, and rehabilitate drug addicts. Larger gardens were often divided into sections containing everything from ornamental ponds and vegetable boxes to performance stages and basketball courts. In general, gardens provided sites of community solidarity, multigenerational cooperation, safe play spaces for children, environmental education, food production, cultural heritage, and informal public gathering spaces. The resulting proliferation of community gardens closely paralleled a national trend toward grassroots urban activism. Cities began promoting community gardening efforts by legalizing existing gardens and issuing temporary leases to new gardens sited on city-owned land.

Beginning in the 1980s, large numbers of community gardens sited on public land were cleared to make way for new development. In part due to increasing land values, municipal governments began selling off community garden lots for housing and business projects. Gardeners responded through public protests, petitions to city governments, and pleas through the popular media. A politicized community gardening movement coalesced through calls for local solidarity and empowerment in many cities, aided in part by support from environmental and antigentrification groups. Recent academic work on community gardens has focused heavily on the discourse and meaning of contested public space, the right to the city of marginalized social groups, and the strategies used by both local communities and the state to define and control community-run public spaces.



A community garden in Portland, Oregon

Source: Teresa Herlinger.

See also Community Organizing; Gentrification; Neighborhood Revitalization; Right to the City

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COMMUNITY ORGANIZING

Community organizing is the practice of bringing people together, face to face, to solve local problems and, sometimes, change the distribution of

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power. The practice is associated mostly with Saul Alinsky, but the civil rights movement of the 1950s and 1960s in the United States also organized people on a local basis.

Community organizing usually begins with a trained community organizer entering a community that has been excluded from power, from which investment has been withdrawn, or both. The organizer talks to residents, often by utilizing a practice called door-knocking, where he or she literally goes door to door asking about residents' concerns. Once the organizer has identified the concerns about which people feel strongly, he or she will call meetings so that residents can develop actions to address their problems. The early meetings often involve just a few people and are of the scale of a block or house meeting. In other cases, the organizer works not just with individuals but also with existing community organizations to build an "organization of organizations."

Once the residents' group decides on an issue to address, the organizer helps them to form an organization and develop strategies. The strategies may involve doing a "quick hit" to achieve an "easy win," for example, engaging in a public action to obtain a minor concession from business or government. Historically, the easy win was for a poor community to have a stop sign placed at a dangerous street intersection. Today, there are many kinds of easy wins, such as convincing the city to clean up a vacant lot or putting speed bumps on a busy residential street. Sometimes the strategies include larger confrontations and protest, though many community organizations successfully solve problems with negotiation alone. Along with winning on issues, a major goal of community organizing is to help residents build a stable community organization that will allow them ongoing influence over the government and corporate policies that affect them.

In contrast to social action, one of the distinguishing features of community organizing is that it brings residents together to choose an issue, rather than having someone choose an issue and then organize residents around it. Effective community organizations thereby maintain flexibility for tackling any community issue, whether it be a dispute between two neighbors or a campaign against a global corporation. The drawback of this approach is that some community organizations, because they are not based in a strong political ideology, can become racist, homophobic, or otherwise antidemocratic.

From the early days of Saul Alinsky's community organizing in the 1930s and the civil rights movement in the 1950s, thousands of small community-based organizations and a number of important national community organizing networks have evolved. The original national community organizing network was Alinsky's Industrial Areas Foundation. It has become a major faith-based entity focused on organizing church congregations. Others include the PICO National Network, the Direct Action and Research Training network, and the Gamaliel Foundation. Secular national community organizing networks include the Association of Community Organizations for Reform Now and National People's Action. Community organizing has also gone global with community organizing networks and training centers now in existence on every continent.

Community organizing has permeated the culture to the point that thousands of rural and community organizations have sprung up without a trained community organizer starting them. Perhaps one of the most famous was the Love Canal Homeowners Association, which brought Lois Gibbs to prominence as she went from being "just a housewife" to a leader in the environmental justice movement. She and her neighbors successfully struggled to have the state government acknowledge that they were living on a toxic dump. Most of these groups go unrecognized except in their local settings. There, they build community identity, empower their members, and impact local policies.

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See also Alinsky, Saul; Citizen Participation; Urban Politics

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COMMUNITY STUDIES

Community studies is an academic field concerned with the study of community and the characteristics of particular localities. A key focus of many programs of community study is the effects of social change upon the form and function of social life within such specific settings. Unlike more theoretically oriented research on the concept of community, the field of community studies employs the methodological tools of the social sciences as a means by which to describe, contextualize, and investigate the sociocultural and psychological dynamics that affect everyday life in the community.

Research conducted on community in this sense is often directly concerned with the effects on social and economic life of such variables as family, youth, health, leisure, gender, employment, immigration, education, crime, poverty, and inequality. As such, community studies is often closely linked with policy implementation and analysis.

The Origins and Development of Community Studies

The predominately Anglo-American tradition of community studies has been primarily concerned with the holistic analysis of the social organization and institutional structure of three distinct settings: small towns, rural areas, and working-class districts. Although definitional tensions continue to plague the precise meaning of the term *community*, the interdisciplinary field of community studies has generally assumed the mandate of investigating patterns of social groupings or population aggregates contained within a particular setting. The field has its origins in three complementary approaches.

First, the study of population growth and demographic change by social surveyors, statisticians, and social reformists working in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was a notable precursor of what later became known as the community study. Although focusing largely upon issues of health and sanitation in overcrowded and impoverished urban conglomerates, implicit within such investigations was an emphasis on the effects of social change and modernization upon the social and moral order of community life.

Second, many of the investigative and methodological approaches utilized within community

studies have also been influenced by the classificatory schemas of cultural anthropology, particularly in regard to how such variables as employment, family, kinship, political structure, and patterns of religious belief contribute to the stability of the social order and the maintenance of a functionally integrated society. Although later criticism sought to reveal the complicity of anthropological theory and method with colonialism, the fundamental focus placed upon the everyday dynamics of community life served as a point of commonality between classical anthropological studies, traditionally conducted in distant locales, and the application of such approaches in Western societies.

Third, the founding fathers of sociology were concerned with the decline of traditional social relations amid the transformation from folk society to urban society. Fearing that traditional ways of life and communal relations were being threatened with dissolution by the increasing heterogeneity and sheer social complexity resulting from the combined forces of industrialism and urbanization, classical social theory sought to explore the effects of social change upon community life and mechanisms of social integration. Building upon the legacy of these three traditions, community studies subsequently emerged as an independent focus of study in its own right to occupy a central role in sociology, anthropology, social geography, urban studies, and social policy programs.

Although primarily concerned with empirically demonstrating the transition from a rural to a predominantly urban society, early work on community exhibited a strong continuity with the concerns of classical social theory: namely, the transition from an agrarian to an industrial-based urban economy, the shift from folk to mass society, and the general tendency to dichotomize the nature of community and society in terms of tradition and modernity, respectively. Whereas traditional society was seen as the repository of the bounded, harmonious, and homogenous community, modern society was seen in far more heterogeneous and differentiated terms. It is in this sense that critics of community studies have suggested that the notion of community employed at the heart of community studies is an outmoded one and unsuited to the often antagonistic nature of community life in its contemporary manifestations. Despite this discrediting, the semantics of community continue to be regularly evoked in a wide range of disciplinary fields.

Engagement with the community study was perceived as being all the more difficult by urban scholars when considering the growth of individualism, the decline of traditional social bonds of attachment, an increasingly specialized and migratory occupational structure, and the socially debilitating effects of urban sprawl and suburbanization. It was largely due to these reasons that the institutional strength of community studies began to decline significantly during the 1970s. The popularity of Marxist approaches to social organization, coupled with an increased recognition of the often conflict-ridden nature of community life, entailed that any approach that centered upon the functional differentiation of social roles and institutions was perceived as methodologically and conceptually suspect.

Community studies thus lost much of the scientific legitimacy it had previously held and became relegated to the investigation of subcultures conducted within the subdisciplinary areas of social anthropology, cultural studies, and human geography. Although the concept of community continued to be regularly evoked in academic, popular, and policy discourse, considerable skepticism was directed toward any research endeavor that aimed at rendering an account of community in any holistic sense. Rather than focusing upon the types of attachments that bind the individual to a community in a strictly localized sense, analysis had shifted to address the nature of transnational and global attachments. In this view, the community study as traditionally conceived came to be seen as inherently limited and parochial with regard to its analytical scope and interpretative potential.

Two useful introductions to the field of community studies are Colin Bell and Howard Newby's *Community Studies: An Introduction to the Study of the Local Community*, and Maurice Stein's *Eclipse of Community: An Interpretation of American Studies*. Abandoning efforts to pin down the meaning of community with any degree of definitional precision, Bell and Newby suggested that attempts to define community should rather be decided upon by practitioners working in the field. Critical of whether the tradition of community studies could offer any systematic and cumulative knowledge of the nature of social life in human communities, their analysis nevertheless offered a useful and comparative overview of the terrain of

community studies in the American and European traditions. Focusing specifically upon the American tradition, Stein presents a similar disciplinary overview in the form of a methodological primer on how to analyze and conduct a community study. Although the implicit aim of both texts was to reinvigorate the increasing analytical sterility of the tradition, many scholars have deemed the wide-ranging effects of social and economic transformation as having dealt a fatal blow to the very existence of community studies as a viable field of study. In this sense, community studies as an autonomous field of study no longer exercises the same degree of influence and appeal it once had. Remaining predominantly interdisciplinary in tone, and continuing to focus on specific areas of practical concern, community studies in both British and American contexts has become integrally linked with planning, policy, and local government initiatives.

Community Studies in the American Tradition

From its origins in the ethos of social reformism in the early twentieth century, the community studies tradition in the American context has its origins in the Chicago School of Urban Sociology. Influenced by the methods and techniques of anthropological inquiry, central to the investigations of the Chicago School scholars was an exploration of the means by which the territorial expansion of the city was affected by the forces of industrialization and urbanization. Dramatic increases in the rate of immigration and of the ethnic composition of the city were seen as fundamentally altering the social and moral order of the city. Although predominantly concerned with explicating the disintegrative effects of metropolitan growth upon social life, the Chicago School scholars also explored the means by which community was maintained in the context of the city.

In contrast to prevailing views on the alienating effects of large-scale urbanization, increased population growth, and the rise of suburbia, the research mandate of the Chicago School became focused upon how the emergence of distinct subcultural milieus served as a means by which social groups could adapt to metropolitan life. What the Chicago School scholars found was that the city was composed of a multitude of lifeworlds based upon a

range of class, ethnic, and identity attachments. In this sense, the pioneering work of the Chicago School paved the way for a thriving field of community studies in the American social sciences.

Building upon the influence of the Chicago School, a classic work of community study in American scholarship is *Middletown: A Study in American Culture* by Robert Lynd and Helen Lynd. Initially setting out to investigate patterns of religious belief in an unnamed American city given the pseudonym of Middletown (later identified as Muncie, Indiana), the Lynds found that their focus inevitably led to a much wider exploration of the means by which community life was sustained. Although the Lynds did not begin their study with any highly developed hypothesis or with the aim of substantiating any particular thesis, their work is typical of its time in that it focused upon how social institutions contributed to the functioning of the wider community.

Studies such as *Middletown* presented small town America as a relatively homogenous entity with a clearly defined pattern of social organization and cultural outlook. Many subsequent studies adopted a similarly holistic perspective in focusing upon how the nature and workings of family and community operated as self-functioning social systems. Although such studies presented a view of small town America as a relatively stable and culturally homogenous environment, later criticism sought to reveal the implicit downplaying of conflicting and oppositional voices in the community. For example, a subsequent follow-up to the *Middletown* study found it to be a far from unified community and riddled with social divisions obscured by the methodological approach adopted in the original analysis. In this sense, the archetypical American community study of the mid-twentieth century often stood accused of utilizing a conservative and analytically limited approach to the study of community life.

Although the growing utilization of critical perspectives signaled a decline in the influence of community studies as a field of institutional strength, the publication of notable studies continued to periodically reaffirm the tradition. Gerald Suttles's *The Social Order of the Slum: Ethnicity and Territory in the Inner City* and Carol Stack's *All Our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community* are two such exemplars. Evoking the

spirit of the Chicago School tradition, such studies sought to illustrate the means by which disadvantaged populations constituted community-based forms of reciprocity and mutual dependency.

Working-Class Communities in Britain

Early investigations on the importance of public hygiene and health among working-class communities in Britain led to the development of programs of community study in which systematic knowledge of towns and cities was sought as a means to understand and alleviate problems associated with urbanization. A particularly strong tradition of community studies emerged during the era of economic change that followed World War II and what was perceived to be a widening gap between government policy and the concerns of the working classes.

Whereas community studies of the mid-twentieth-century American context focused upon factors related to immigration and the diffusion of population aggregates toward suburban and regional areas, the orientation of the British social sciences ensured that social class came to be seen as a key determinant of many programs of community study. These studies were focused predominantly upon practical rather than theoretical issues, and research findings were often closely linked with policy analysis. Central to such studies were investigations of the distinct social, economic, and political conditions among people who shared a similar experience within a given locality. Commensurate with the approach taken by the community studies tradition in the American context, working-class communities were seen as homogenous and close-knit embodiments of the spirit of community due to the perceived similarity of lifestyle and standard of living.

Founded in 1954, the pioneering Institute of Community Studies was a research center specifically focused upon the investigation of life in British communities. A study of the London working-class district of Bethnal Green was perhaps the most famous work that emerged from this era. Blending a social anthropological perspective with a sociocultural analysis, the publication of *Family and Kinship in East London* signaled a decisive move away from more statistic-laden studies in favor of more ethnographically minded descriptions of community life.

A primary aim of the Bethnal Green study was a focus upon how patterns of working-class family and community organization became transformed by the interventions of urban planners and welfare agencies engaged with the revitalization of what was perceived as a dilapidated area in East London.

Although the Bethnal Green area was depicted as the epitome of working-class life and as embodying the ethos of communal solidarity, such working-class community studies were later subjected to significant criticism for the extent to which neighborhood antagonisms and internal community conflict were obscured from the analysis. Focusing upon the coalescence of community and employment, many studies of working-class areas tended to emphasize how certain industries became the fulcrum point for the development of a local community. Critics accused such studies of perpetuating an inherently romanticized depiction of working-class life and as containing an implicit legitimation of the class system. Indeed, it is perhaps a significant irony of the community studies tradition that the field achieved its greatest degree of prominence at precisely that time when many such working-class communities were beginning to fragment as a result of the wider effects of socio-economic and industrial change.

In addition to the study of community life in metropolitan settings, a number of investigations were also conducted outside of the major metropolitan regions. A classic study of this era is Norman Dennis's *Coal Is Our Life: An Analysis of a Yorkshire Mining Community*. Offering an exploration of family and labor relations in coal mining communities, such studies investigated the effects of industrial and economic change upon community life in British rural areas. Presenting a view of family and community life as predominately mediated by the centrality of the mining industry, these studies were later criticized for presenting a world hermetically sealed against the wider effects of Western industrial economies.

Indeed, the decline of the coal mining industry in Britain came to epitomize the loss of the type of foundational occupational identity that was seen as holding such working-class communities together. Without the protective framework of an integrated community and occupational structure, community life came to be seen as increasingly episodic and fragmented. In place of the communal solidarity,

traditionalism, and spirit of collectivism deemed central to the constitution of working-class life, the effects of industrial change, coupled with initiatives of urban renewal and population relocation, did much to challenge and undermine the disciplinary strength of community studies. It is largely in these terms that the field of community studies encountered significant criticism for its conceptual and methodological limitations with regard to its failure in accounting for the global ramifications of social and industrial change. Notwithstanding these criticisms, such studies arguably offer valuable insight into a unique period of social history in British rural areas.

Other investigations of community life in rural areas tended to present the nature of community as an unchanging repository of tradition and custom. For example, Conrad M. Arensberg and S. T. Kimball's *Family and Community in Ireland*, an influential study conducted in western Ireland, presented rural life as unchanging and seemingly resistant to social change. Although such works inspired a substantial body of similar work by social geographers and social anthropologists, they also encountered significant criticism due to the emphasis placed upon community depicted as a functioning totality to the exclusion of conflicting and repressive elements of community life. In place of the emphasis upon homogeneity, continuity, and tradition, community life was revealed to be a far more kaleidoscopic entity and one mediated by a wide variety of external factors.

The Future of Community Studies

Notwithstanding the cumulative strength of the criticisms directed toward community studies, many scholars have continued to defend the field against accusations of redundancy by emphasizing how such study provides detailed analysis of the social, cultural, and psychological effects of embedded social relations. Often employing an ethnographic perspective augmented by statistical data, many such works focus substantively upon the effects of health, employment, youth, crime, racism, immigration, ethnicity, gender, identity, sexuality, environment, urban planning, and the effects of policy initiatives upon life in particular areas. In this sense, the community studies tradition remains an active and engaging field.

Furthermore, research conducted by theorists more accepting of the argument regarding the declining significance of place and locality has led to an exploration of the inherently socially constructed nature of community. Accordingly, community is seen as something that is symbolically constituted around particular beliefs and forms of social practice such as festivals, identity parades, and neighborhood gatherings. In this view, community becomes something that is interpreted in many different ways and subject to an ongoing process of redefinition and negotiation.

Notwithstanding the definitional and methodological dilemmas surrounding the employment of the concept of community, the frequency and salience of its habitual usage has ensured its continual relevance to urban and community studies.

Alan Gerard Bourke

See also Chicago School of Urban Sociology; Community; Gans, Herbert; Urban Anthropology; Urban Sociology

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CONDOMINIUM

A condominium is a form of housing in which property is both owned in common and individually owned. It can take various forms, from apartment-style structures, townhouses, and even fully detached housing communities. Apartment units or flats within the structure are individually owned, whereas other areas such as hallways, stairs, and lobbies, and amenities like swimming pools and tennis courts are common property shared by those who reside in the building complex. Community members, generally in a homeowners association, elect a board of directors who manage the common areas of the property.

Purchasing a condominium is similar to buying a house. A mortgage is paid to the bank, and a deed is signed. The difference lies with the space that is being bought. The owner of a condominium is purchasing only the space within the unit, not the structure itself or the property surrounding the structure.

There are advantages and disadvantages to owning a condominium. For retired individuals and the younger generation who are unable to afford a starter home, condominiums offer affordability and stability. A condominium can be less expensive than a single-family (detached) house, while the owner is still able to build equity and has ownership rights. There is also less responsibility in owning a condominium than owning a free-standing home. Households are provided with the same maintenance and repair services that one would find with a rental unit. Owners do not have to worry about shoveling snow, raking leaves, or making repairs outside the home.

There are also disadvantages. In addition to paying a mortgage, owners must pay monthly maintenance fees, which are used to manage the building and its public spaces. Condominium owners also face restrictions. Because space that exists

outside the unit is shared, an individual owner cannot alter the appearance of those spaces. Moreover, the individual owner cannot paint hallways or plant flowers that are inconsistent with the appearance of the property.

Many condominiums are former apartment buildings that have been converted by developers or building owners. In cities where rent stabilization and rent control laws protect rental apartments, landlords cannot increase rents except as mandated by law. Owners who feel restricted by rent stabilization and control laws often convert apartments to condominiums in order to increase profits. The conversion of apartments to condominiums is indicative of a trend that further segregates the rich from the poor. With more and more apartments being converted, there is less affordable rental housing available for low-income families.

Cooperative housing or co-ops are not the same as condominium housing. Co-op units are not owned; they are corporations with a board of directors and with tenants acting as shareholders. Tenants do not sign a deed but rather purchase shares of the corporation, which includes the lease of a unit. There is no real estate mortgage involved with a co-op building. A loan from the bank is used to purchase shares and the number of shares owned is based on the size of unit. Like condominium owners, co-op tenants pay monthly maintenance fees and cannot make any changes to common areas. As a form of housing, condominiums are a compromise between renting an apartment and owning a house.

Nadia A. Mian

See also Common Interest Development; Housing

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CONSTANTINOPLE

See Istanbul, Turkey

CONVENTION CENTERS

Places for large-scale public assembly have long been a part of cities—from public halls and fairgrounds to stadia and opera houses. Although private venues such as Chicago's International Amphitheater (home to five national political conventions through 1968) often housed major conventions, the twentieth century saw a substantial expansion of new public convention facilities. The City Beautiful movement and the promotion of large civic centers provided a locus for the development of buildings such as San Francisco's Civic Auditorium, Kansas City's Municipal Auditorium, St. Louis's Kiel Auditorium and Cleveland's Public Auditorium.

The great burst of convention center development came after World War II, with the advent of the federal urban renewal program and the local initiatives aimed at downtown revitalization and development. Cities sought to revive downtowns surrounded by slum neighborhoods and respond to competition from outlying suburban retail development. A new convention center was viewed as a veritable lifesaver that promised to lure hundreds of thousands of visitors to fill hotel rooms and spur the development of new hotels and retail development with the ready availability of inexpensive land cleared under the urban renewal program's aegis.

Chicago's privately owned amphitheater was effectively replaced in 1960 by the McCormick Place convention center on the lakefront south of the downtown "Loop." Other major cities sought their own share of the national and regional convention trade with new public structures. New York City's Coliseum was developed by Robert Moses in 1956 on a Columbus Circle site cleared under urban renewal. Cleveland's new convention center was finally approved by the city's voters in 1960, after two failed attempts, and constructed in part under the civic center mall. Boston's Hynes Auditorium was developed adjacent to the new mixed use Prudential Center on a former rail yard,

and St. Louis acquired a site on the northern end of the downtown core, long mapped for slum clearance, for the development of its new Cervantes Convention Center, which opened in 1976.

From the 1970s, convention center construction was often linked to larger local efforts to implement tourism and visitor-based economic development efforts. Cities like Atlanta, Baltimore, Cleveland, Milwaukee, and St. Louis often paired convention facilities with new hotels, downtown retail malls, festival marketplaces, aquariums, stadiums, and entertainment districts. These projects, many built with federal government grant funds, sought to both bolster downtown core areas and spur new tourist-oriented private investment through the creation of tourist zones.

The convention center development boom has expanded in recent years, propelled by a combination of political, economic, and fiscal forces. One national count found 193 major exhibit halls in 1986 with a total of 32.5 million square feet of exhibit hall space. At the top of the list stood Chicago's McCormick Place, expanded to a total of 1.87 million square feet. By 1996, the number of major halls stood at 254 with a total of 49.1 million square feet of space.

Convention center exhibit space in the United States reached 66.8 million square feet in 2006—a 106 percent increase from 1986—at 313 centers. The growth reflects two parallel trends. The largest centers have consistently expanded, with the argument that ever-growing events demand more space. Chicago's latest McCormick Place expansion would bring it to 2.7 million square feet in 2007 at a cost of \$850 million while New York City is undertaking a massive expansion of its Jacob K. Javits Convention Center, and the Las Vegas Convention Center, with 2 million square feet of space, is being expanded and revamped.

Small and medium-sized communities have also sought to gain the purported economic benefits of convention visitors by developing new or expanded facilities. Communities such as Hartford, Connecticut; Springfield, Massachusetts; Virginia Beach, Virginia; Raleigh, North Carolina; Columbia, South Carolina; Shreveport, Louisiana; McAllen, Texas; Schaumburg, Illinois; Fort Wayne, Indiana; Erie, Pennsylvania; St. Charles, Missouri; Branson, Missouri; Santa Fe, New Mexico; Omaha, Nebraska; Spokane, Washington; Tacoma, Washington; and

Anchorage, Alaska, have all built new convention facilities.

The contemporary convention center development reflects a substantive change in the politics and finance of public investment. Most of the convention venues built during the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s were funded by city governments using general obligation bonds. New convention centers have commonly been financed with debt backed by taxes on visitors and tourists, such as hotel, rental car, and restaurant meal taxes. The Washington Convention Center, in the nation's capital, was developed in 2003 by the Washington Convention Center Authority and financed by dedicated taxes on hotel rooms and restaurant meals in the District of Columbia. Revenues from taxes on all local hotel rooms, car rentals, and visitor attractions now provide places like Las Vegas, Orlando, New Orleans, and Boston with substantial streams of funding for regular investment in additional center expansions and improvement.

The boom in convention center development has also been sustained by the notion of a consistently expanding convention and tradeshow market. This image of growing demand has sustained the argument that communities must expand their convention facilities or lose out to competitors. In a 1994 study of a potential expansion of San Francisco's Moscone Center, Economics Research Associates examined the performance of the Tradeshow Week 200—the 200 largest conventions and trade shows—in terms of exhibit space used each year. The firm found that these events showed consistent and strong growth over the years and forecast that large events would continue to grow for the foreseeable future, requiring ever more space.

The actual attendance of the 200 major convention and tradeshow events has not grown in accord with the historical observations of the consulting firms, or in line with the growth in convention centers and exhibit space. Average event attendance did grow by some 20 percent from 1985 to 1994, but there was no consistent growth during the 1990s, and convention attendance was dampened by the recession of 2000 and the terrorist events of September 11, 2001. Average attendance at major events fell to 20,753 in 2002 with some recovery to 21,670 for 2005—equal to the 1995 average.

The development of major convention centers in new markets such as Las Vegas and Orlando

has also resulted in a dramatic shift in the location of major events. In 1991, Chicago's McCormick Place hosted 28 of the Tradeshaw Week 200 meetings, but by 2005 that figure had dropped to 15 events with 532,000. New York has seen its count of 200 events fall from 30 in 1991 to 16 for 2005. Las Vegas won out over competing cities, increasing from 22 major events in 1991 to 44 events in 2005, encompassing 34 percent of the total exhibit space used by all Tradeshaw Week 200 events.

The combination of no real growth in convention attendance, major supply expansion, and a shift to newer communities has made convention centers far less consistently productive public investments than often assumed, yielding quite modest actual economic impact. Feasibility studies for New York City's Jacob Javits Convention Center had forecast that it would house about 1 million convention attendees per year, each of whom would stay and spend money in the city for three to four days.

Actual delegate attendance at the Javits Center at first exceeded those forecasts, with a peak of 1.9 million in 1990. In the face of the competitive market, delegate attendance fell to 962,000 for 2004. A recent consultant study found that the Javits Center yielded just 660,000 annual hotel room nights from out-of-town visitors—a fraction of the 2 to 3 million annual hotel room nights forecast by the studies in the 1970s, or about 3 percent of the city's total annual hotel room demand recently.

Convention facilities in other nations have developed in a different manner from those in the United States. In Europe and Asia, large exhibition halls or trade fairs, often privately owned, are typically located at the edge of the urban area. These exhibition halls, such as Germany's Messe Hanover (5.3 million square feet) and Messe Munich (4.7 million) or Italy's Fiero Milan, dwarf the largest American counterparts. Within historic urban core areas, specialized congress or conference centers of far smaller size, such as the Palais de Congrès in Paris or London's Queen Elizabeth II Conference Centre, provide auditoriums and rooms to accommodate traditional meetings.

Heywood Sanders

See also Growth Machine; Sports Stadiums; Tourism; Urban Design; Urban Planning

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CREATIVE CLASS

The *creative class* refers to people who share a common interest in, and ability to create, meaningful new forms of economic activity. It is comprised of two groups: the supercreative core and creative professionals. The supercreative core group consists of those employed in fields such as science and engineering, high technology, research, the arts, and design. Its members produce innovations that can be readily applied and broadly used, such as designing a piece of software or writing a musical composition. The second group, creative professionals, includes workers in knowledge-based professions such as financial services, health care, law, and business management. By relying on extensive knowledge, these professionals engage in creative problem solving and seek innovative solutions.

Creative workers generate economic growth through developing technological innovations, advancing scientific thinking, and increasing knowledge. Therefore, a high concentration of the creative class is thought to be linked to the economic growth of a city. One estimate is that the creative class accounts for roughly 30 percent of the U.S. workforce, or about 40 million workers. Only one third of the workforce, they earn roughly 50 percent of all the wages and salaries. The creative class also possesses nearly 70 percent of all discretionary income, more than double that of workers in manufacturing and services combined.

In 1998, the term *creative class* was developed by social scientist Richard Florida in a study that found that high-technology professionals—typically

young and mobile—make location decisions based on lifestyle interests rather than employment. Florida claimed that members of the creative class are drawn to vibrant cities that possess a variety of cultural and recreational experiences. His conclusions were mirrored by work on the location patterns of gays. High-technology workers and gays seemed to be attracted to the same locales. In subsequent research, Florida created the Bohemian Index, which measures the density of artists, writers, and performers in a region. His Creative Class Index attests to a city's concentration of creative workers.

Although the creative class is primarily influenced by an area's quality of life, the availability of employment still remains an important factor in choosing a place to live. More important, though, are community assets such as lifestyle diversity, entertainment, and environmental quality. A diverse cultural and demographic population reflects an open and tolerant community, and an active and informal street life provides for new experiences. A nightlife that offers a wide array of options is also important. As a result, cultural amenities and professional sports complexes are perceived to be less of a draw than vibrant entertainment and nightlife destinations. The promotion of environmental sustainability and access to outdoor recreational activities such as bike paths and public parks are additional attractions. To entice the creative class to relocate, city and regional economic development strategies focus on improving the local quality of life and, in some cases, passing progressive social and environmental legislation.

The values of creative class members signal a shift away from economic security toward ideals that reflect individual expression. Individuality and self-statement are prized over actions that reinforce group identity. Demonstrating merit, exhibited by ambition and hard work, is another important value. Diversity is also an ideal but seems to be interpreted as seeking an environment that accepts nonconformity rather than one that addresses racial and gender inequalities.

Consequently, the creative class is viewed as being indifferent to the economic and social disparities between them and the working poor. In fact, income disparities between the creative class and those employed in the manufacturing and service

sectors often lead to issues of housing affordability, uneven development, and sprawl. Class division may also be reinforced as the number of low-wage workers in the retail and entertainment sectors increases to meet the leisure needs of the creative class. As a result, political polarization may occur as these groups become divided over economic rewards and social status.

To attract the creative class, cities are encouraged to implement initiatives to strengthen the three T's of economic growth: technology, talent, and tolerance. Technology plays a vital role by providing opportunities to further knowledge. Talent reflects the number of people who actually have creative occupations as opposed to educational levels. Tolerance is also critical. Cities should strive to be open and diverse in terms of ethnicity, race, and sexual orientation. Universities are also an inducement through their ability to advance and distribute knowledge. Based on these elements, creative cities in the United States include San Francisco, Boston, Seattle, Washington, D.C., and Dallas. Members of the creative class are attracted to them because they promote creative thinking and the expression of identity.

Critics have argued that there is no causal link between the presence of the creative class and economic growth. Instead, high technology, high human capital, and increased immigration are better predictors of growth. Moreover, a creative class approach to economic growth focuses the urban development agenda on the lifestyle interests of an elite class rather than addressing the city's social problems. Yet, city governments continue to pursue the creative class. Channeling creativity and changing culture, though, are daunting goals. And, although the creative class may be attracted to cultural amenities and a rich social life, they still require employment to remain in place.

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See also Bohemian; Gay Space; Technopoles; Tourism

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CRIME

The concept of crime is used to refer to patterns of behaviors that violate the values, norms, and laws of the society in which they take place. The study of the definition, correlates, and consequences of crime has a long tradition in social sciences, and in this entry, consistent with the aim of the encyclopedia, the focus is on the understanding of the link between urbanism and crime, looking at the central perspectives that explain crime rates and victimization, as well as the consequences of crime in globalized urban society.

Definition

The definition of crime implies that unlawful behavior is socially defined, and there is variation between societies (e.g., in Korea adultery is a crime, whereas in most Western countries it is not; in some countries gambling is legal, and in others it is a crime). In addition, criminal behavior should come to the notice of, and be processed through, an administrative system or enforcement agency. Law enforcement is dependent on social resources that are allocated and on political priorities of each society; accordingly, enforcement is directed to certain activities and not to others. Thus, crime rates are affected more by law enforcement and less by the true figures of crime.

How do researchers learn about criminal behavior? Criminologists use three principal sources to study criminal behavior. The first is official police reports, data that are regularly collected by police agencies as part of their daily activities, recorded according to standard definitions of crime based on the criminal law, and include information about the crime that was reported to the police or was discovered by the police. Official police reports are available through time and location, facilitating the

comparison of trends through the years and the increases or declines of crime and its different types at the city, county, and state levels. One major disadvantage of this data source is that crimes are not always reported to the police, resulting in an underestimation of the real crime figures. A second source is victimization surveys that inquire from a large representative sample of the population the extent that respondents have been a victim of a crime during a fixed period of time. Victimization surveys provide more information than official reports, as crimes that have not been reported to the police are more likely to appear in the victimization survey. In addition, the survey gathers information on the social and demographic characteristics of the victim, thus facilitating the understanding of the nature of the crime, the characteristics of the place in which it took place, and the characteristics of the interaction between offender and victim. The third method of studying crime is conducting self-report studies. In surveys, individuals report on their involvement in the perpetration of a crime. This method allows for the collection of data on the characteristics of offenders and their social surroundings.

History of Scholarship Linking Urbanism and Crime

One of the early arguments that raised the possibility for a link between urban life and crime can be found in the writings of Émile Durkheim (1951), who argued that rapid social change was associated with a breakdown of informal and formal social control, an increase in nonnormative behavior, and crime. At the beginning of the twentieth century, populations of cities started growing rapidly in Western countries; people moved to the city, attracted by rapid industrialization and lack of employment in agricultural areas. Cities were going through rapid social change from relatively small settlements to growing urban landscapes with increases in population size, ethnic heterogeneity, and density.

In the 1920s Clifford R. Shaw conducted one of the first studies on the spatial distribution of police data on juvenile delinquency in the city of Chicago and found that the distribution is not random. The central findings of the study were that (1) delinquency was more likely to be concentrated in old

neighborhoods that were located close to the commercial and industrial center; (2) the lower the median income, the median rental, and the percentage of homeownership were in an area, the higher was the rate of juvenile delinquency; and (3) the rate of juvenile delinquency was associated with higher concentrations of immigrants and African Americans.

In 1969, Shaw and Henry McKay concluded that delinquency is closely associated with the process of urban change. In areas going through a process of population change, when a low-income population is replacing more established groups, social control declines, a subculture of crime develops, and urban crime is more concentrated.

Over the years a number of critiques on this work were raised. They relied on official police records that may be biased to overreporting crime in low-income neighborhoods, and it was unclear whether the disruption of social control, called social disorganization, was the result of social heterogeneity or of a delinquent subculture that takes advantage of crime opportunities in the city center located nearby.

In the late 1980s Robert Sampson and Casey Groves developed a research agenda to further investigate the process of social disorganization. Their reformulation of social disorganization theory focused on ethnic heterogeneity, low level of homeownership, and percentage of single-headed families. The aforementioned negative community features are perceived as having deleterious consequences for community social organization, increasing the likelihood that neighbors will be strangers and diminishing and restricting the development of informal community ties. From this work, a new concept—collective efficacy—has been used to describe the differential ability of neighborhoods to realize common values.

Victimization and Fear of Crime

A second line of study was directed to the understanding of crime victimization in the urban context. According to the routine activities approach, crimes occur when motivated offenders encounter suitable targets in the absence of capable guardianship. Changes in the social organization of society decreased capable guardianship and increased target suitability. Nowadays, people spend less and

less time at home; thus their households and the goods contained therein are subjected to less and less guardianship. Robert F. Meier and Terance D. Miethe have attempted to make more explicit the concept of opportunity and maintain that two factors, in addition to capable guardianship and target attractiveness, can be identified. The first is proximity to crime or the physical distance between the areas where potential targets reside and areas where large populations of potential offenders reside. The second is exposure to crime and is indicative of the visibility or accessibility to crime. This model suggests a “structural choice theory of victimization,” as proximity and exposure should be considered as structural factors because they predispose households and individuals to different levels of risk. Each of these models suggests that certain areas within cities may be more susceptible to crime—and also accepts the general idea that crime is more prevalent in urban areas.

Urban dwellers are aware of crime risks and tend to express fear of crime. Fear of crime has been defined as a negative emotional reaction to crime or the symbols associated with crime, and studies have been directed to explain the genesis of this emotional reaction. Albert Hunter and Terry Baumer had proposed in 1982 that community decline gives rise to social and physical incivilities and crime. Social incivilities are signs of lack of adherence to norms of public behavior and include public drinking, drunkenness, or drug use. Physical incivilities include graffiti, litter, vacant houses, and abandoned cars. Residents perceiving more clues to the underlying level of disorder in their immediate environment feel more vulnerable and thus more fearful.

A salient effect of fear of crime is the development of exclusionary mechanisms that aim to support trust and personal security by excluding the other, whose behavior is perceived as a public concern. *Urban surveillance* refers to the use of technological tools to monitor and record the regular movement of populations and individuals in the city. As individuals go about their daily routines (driving to work, shopping, walking the streets, etc.), their movements are being recorded and stored. Originally, closed caption television cameras (CCTVs) and electronic cards were installed in cities as part of the technological infrastructure to monitor and regulate traffic. With time, an

increasing reason for the expansion in their installation from street corners to additional public spaces such as shopping strips and entertainment areas is urbanites' uneasiness and fear of crime. The city is characterized by high-mobility, social and cultural diversity that increases the likelihood of encountering strangers who differ in their behavior from ours. Meeting the different other is perceived as a risk, and many cities are managing potential risks through the installation of CCTVs. Urban surveillance influences our public behaviors: Knowing that our presence, behaviors, and faces are being recorded is an inducement to self-control. Surveillance devices installed originally to improve transportation systems are also being used for coercive purposes, becoming more and more part of the crime-fighting equation. Police departments are using these data to identify suspects and track their movements, thereby supporting crime-solving efforts.

The fear of crime has led to the development of gated communities in many countries. *Gated communities* are residential areas with restricted access designed to privatize normally public spaces. Containing controlled entrances and walls and fences, gated communities create a border for in-group members, excluding access to out-group members. These residential areas are spreading in different countries and are reported in increasing numbers in the United States, Argentina, Brazil, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia. In each country they are slightly different, but the common theme is to exclude other ethnic, national, and cultural groups from certain residential areas. In the literature, four different types of gated communities have been described:

1. *Lifestyle communities* provide separation for leisure activities and the amenities that are part of community life. This type includes retirement and leisure communities that are designed for residents who engage in a wide variety of activities close to their own homes.
2. *Elite and upper-middle-class communities* are primarily occupied by the rich and wealthy. These communities focus on exclusion according to social status and on image and security. They are becoming common not only in developed countries like the United States and the United Kingdom, but also in

less-developed countries like Mexico, Brazil, and Argentina.

3. *Security zone communities* differ from the other types in that they are not the result of urban planning but of the activities of their residents. Residents mark the neighborhood boundaries and restrict access to traffic and individuals that are perceived as bringing crime to the community.
4. *Foreign gated communities* are a new type of gated community that is associated with economic globalization that has created a demand for foreign workers in culturally homogenous and traditional countries. These are communities that are built to allow foreign workers to continue their lifestyle and at the same time separate them from the host society. These are common in Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and recently in China.

Urban crime and the perception of urban insecurity have been reflected in attempts to formulate exclusionary policies, increasing urban surveillance and the separation of the wealthy from other urban residents.

Consequences of Globalization

Global processes have facilitated human trafficking. Since the fall of the former Soviet Union, women from impoverished countries of the eastern block have joined the sex industry in Western Europe, the Middle East, and North America. It is estimated that women from these countries are in prostitution in more than 50 countries. In cities in these countries, street prostitution has increased, sex districts have developed, and land use has changed from residential to sex-related commercial activities (sex shops, massage parlors, and bars). In Southeast Asia the development of the tourist industry combined with rural impoverishment and rapid migration to the cities led to the development of a sex tourist industry and the development of urban sex districts. Street prostitution takes over the street and turns urban communities into unsafe places as women are harassed, drug trafficking increases, and health problems abound.

Crime and enforcement have other impacts upon urban neighborhoods. Enforcement of various drug

laws as part of the War on Drugs has led to massive increase in the prison system in the United States, such that the country has the highest rates of incarceration in the world. A majority of persons serving prison time for drug offenses are from minority communities, and the expansion of the War on Drugs has led to an absence of young men from these neighborhoods and the disenfranchisement of many adults (in most U.S. states, persons convicted of a felony are not entitled to vote). Incarceration reduces the employability of ex-offender young males, contributing to high rates of unemployment in disadvantaged communities. High incarceration rates have effects on families and family structure. The disproportionate incarceration of males compared to females leads to a reduction in the number of males available for marriage, contributing to higher rates of female-headed families and welfare dependency in disadvantaged neighborhoods, reinforcing a cycle of poverty.

City and crime are closely linked and often mutually reinforcing. Some of the sources of crime rates are the result of neighborhoods' social disorganization and lack of collective efficacy. At the same time the perception of crime has urban implications, increasing the perception of fear and uneasiness and the willingness of the middle and upper classes to close themselves inside gated neighborhoods. Global trade of drugs and individuals reinforce social disorganization at the local level.

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See also Chicago School of Urban Sociology; Gated Community; Sex and the City; Sex Industry

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CULTURAL HERITAGE

Heritage is that which is handed down from the past; it is what a people have inherited from their ancestors. Particular to a time and a place, cultural heritage expresses the cumulative knowledge and experience of generations, affirming and enriching cultural identities. As a repository of human knowledge, and a record of human achievement, cultural heritage is often considered to be the legacy not only of a community or a nation but of humankind.

Cultural heritage is commonly comprised of historic monuments, museums, archaeological sites, and masterpieces of art and architecture. More broadly conceived, it includes the natural environment, flora and fauna, and natural features and water systems specific to a place and a time, as well as a broad variety of material things and immaterial practices such as inherited physical artifacts, monuments, buildings, and places. Tangible heritage can be moveable as in small objects and artifacts, or immovable such as buildings, streets, and settlements. Intangible heritage refers to traditions, myths, religion, beliefs, practices, knowledge, and language. Heritage transmits the memory of human societies through forms of expression and thereby binds material objects to the immaterial dimensions that lend them meaning.

What survives from the past is irreplaceable. As a legacy, a storehouse of knowledge, and an identity of a time, a place, and a people, heritage should be respected and maintained and passed to

future generations. Modern interest in heritage was founded on a sense of history as a narrative of progress and a romantic nostalgia for the past. Other motivations for conservation included a respect for past achievements and a desire to learn from the past.

Value of Cultural Heritage

Cultural heritage was once defined as the structures or artifacts (such as the Parthenon in Athens) that expressed the highest attainment of a civilization. Increasingly, groups of buildings and parts of the city in which the site is located and the beliefs and practices that give meaning to the place are considered part of a cultural landscape and thus valuable heritage as, for instance, with the palaces and temples of Lhasa in Tibet. From single monuments, protection for cultural heritage has expanded to include historic districts and territories. In addition, preservation efforts have moved from concentrating solely on the structures of the powerful and wealthy to an appreciation of their interconnectedness to the vernacular fabric in which they are situated. Gardens, open spaces, streets, festivals, folk music and dance, and religious and artistic practices are the connective tissue that binds the built world into an organic whole. Even the remains of mines and mining settlements have achieved heritage status in recent years in the United Kingdom and in Japan. Of course, not everything that has been or should be inherited from the past can be preserved. A society faced with the burden of caretaking heritage has to decide what heritage is to be retained.

The value of cultural heritage is in the significance that society attaches to it. Hence, the worth of cultural heritage is socially constructed. People imbue the physical structures or spaces with cultural meanings, and religious traditions are often at the root of these meanings. The Richtersveld cultural landscape in South Africa, home of the semi-nomadic Nama people, is significant not for any grand monuments but for reflecting seasonal patterns that may have persisted for over two millennia. The Nama oral traditions mark places and the attributes of their landscape rich with spiritual meanings. Heritage structures and sites mean different things to different people, and their interpretation is often contested by different ethnic,

religious, or national groups. The old city of Jerusalem is a striking example of the disputes among several meanings and groups.

Cultural heritage can become an icon for a community, a city, or a nation and, as such, can be a tool for political or ethnic assertion. War-time crimes have historically focused on the destruction of targeted cultural property. In recent years, the bombing of the fourth-century statues of Buddha by the Taliban in Bamiyan, Afghanistan, or the devastation of significant parts of Dubrovnik in Croatia during the Balkan wars demonstrate the symbolic power of cultural heritage. Preservation then becomes an effort at preserving cultural uniqueness as well as cultural identity.

Histories of war and contestation, such as the heritage of European colonial rule in Asia and Africa, are often problematic in the celebration of nationhood and national narratives. The cultural heritage of apartheid, the holocaust, and genocide cannot be ignored because they are distasteful reminders of conflict and aggression, nor can they be represented only from the perspective of the rulers or the perpetrators. The Genbaku Dome in Hiroshima in Japan, the site of the first atomic bomb explosion in a city, is also an expression of hope for world peace.

Rise of Institutionalized Protection

The modern conservation movement found its first expression in eighteenth-century Europe with an emphasis on Greek and Roman antiquities. It collected historical works of art and artifacts and placed them in museums. Gradually, this led to government control of designated sites and the establishment of norms and legislation for the care and administration of selected heritage properties. The idea of protecting cultural heritage came to the forefront during the nineteenth century with the rise of the nation-state, the losses due to frequent wars, and rapid industrialization. Eugène Viollet-le-Duc, John Ruskin, and William Morris were among the intellectuals who influenced the preservation of heritage. In North America, historic preservation began as a philanthropic effort by elite groups such as the Mt. Vernon Ladies Association, which in 1859 consisted of well-to-do, Anglo-Saxon women. Since then, in North America and in Western Europe, preservation has

grown from being the effort of a few upper-class antiquarians to a broad movement with community support to preserve urban districts and streets as well as historic cities and towns. In the United States, community-led efforts for preservation (such as the National Trust for Historic Preservation's program for rejuvenating Main Streets) have focused on self-reliance and economic revitalization of traditional commercial districts rather than large-scale rebuilding by corporate commercial interests.

Generally, heritage preservation has been the responsibility of the state. The Athens Charter of 1931 for the Restoration of Historic Monuments, adopted by the first International Congress of Architects and Technicians of Historic Monuments, institutionalized this notion. Placing the responsibility of cultural heritage on the government has led to the privileging of national narratives of culture and history that support the government's legitimacy.

Bound up with cultural heritage and its conservation are notions of loss and destruction. The second half of the twentieth century saw a massive destruction of heritage. Wars, urban development, large-scale agriculture, mining, natural and environmental disasters, looting, unsustainable tourism, and poor tourism management have all been responsible for the destruction of cultural heritage. The extensive loss of heritage in many Western European cities at the end of World War II created a keen awareness of safeguarding what remained. As newly emergent nations gained independence from European colonial rule, the idea of preserving cultural heritage took on new significance and demanded new fiscal, legal, and administrative instruments and partnerships.

One of these new instruments is the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), established as an inter-governmental organization in 1945. Although its initial objective was to protect cultural property during conflict and war, UNESCO developed international charters and conventions for the preservation of world heritage with the idea of preserving cultural heritage that expressed the achievement of humankind globally. The Convention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage was adopted in 1972. It provides a global mechanism for identifying and protecting important

sites. Today there are 878 World Heritage sites in 185 countries. Of these, more than 250 are towns or historic centers and many more are monuments located in urban contexts. In the past few decades, other international organizations such as International Council on Monuments and Sites, International Center for the Study of Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property, the Getty Foundation, and UN Development Program have contributed significantly to the recognition of cultural heritage.

Heritage, Tourism, and Development

Protecting cultural heritage has generally been pitted against development and change. A central dilemma has been to preserve what is valuable while contending with, or even encouraging, modernization and development in the face of globalization. London's changing skyline and commitment to make room for new commercial towers while retaining significant heritage structures is evidence of this struggle to make London a global city while keeping key historical elements as identifiers of place and history. This brings into focus questions about the costs and benefits of preservation efforts. First, whose heritage is being preserved? Second, what are the short- and long-term economic and social costs and benefits of preservation and who bears them? Third, what are the consequences of protecting cultural heritage for urban development? These questions are of paramount importance in countries with high rates of urbanization. Faced with the pressures of rapid urban growth (as, e.g., in the Kathmandu Valley in Nepal), inadequate infrastructure, and debilitating social inequities, governments ignore the neglect and destruction of cultural heritage or are unable to control it. This problem is especially sharp where local development needs have conflicted with the global good of heritage conservation. Along these lines, UNESCO and other international organizations, as well as national and local governments and nongovernmental organizations, recognize the potential of cultural heritage to be a tool for poverty reduction and local economic development. The strategy for the sustainable redevelopment of both the historic city of Zamość in Poland and the twelfth-century towns of the Hoysala heritage

region in India have emphasized the importance of sustainable local economic development.

Global tourism to heritage sites and cities, at times excessive and insensitive, has exacerbated the conflicts between global cultures and local beliefs and practices. Venice, one of the most popular destinations, attracts more than 20 million tourists a year from around the world, but has lost its own culture and local population. The flow of capital, the demands of tourists for familiar modern amenities, and the environmental externalities of tourism have distorted the value of heritage and destroyed the fragile systems that nurtured it. In Siem Reap in Cambodia, seat of the Angkor Vat, hotels are said to have depleted the groundwater reserves while the dominance of a few large multinational companies operating with imported staff or exploiting the labor of local women and youth has reduced economic benefits for residents. Tourism can introduce or accelerate social change and revive folk arts but also exacerbate commodification. The pressure to retain every aspect of its heritage has stymied development and marginalized the needs of local residents in many places.

Cultural Politics of Heritage

Where cities are competing globally for investments and tourism, cultural richness can become a significant selling point. Cultural heritage has become a way of branding cities and making them interesting and significant. Whereas cities such as Vienna, Prague, and Barcelona have long been known as cultural centers, others such as Rio de Janeiro, Buenos Aires, and Singapore have made efforts in recent years to reconnect with their histories. Uniqueness and character command attention; cities with heritage have what some scholars call designer quality. Such market pressures have led cities to invent cultural practices and exaggerate or essentialize heritage.

The conflicts between contemporary cultures and historical authenticity are everywhere. The debate ranges between those who would like to protect heritage sites in their entirety, wishing to recreate their original context, and those who see change as reflecting multiple layers of history and culture. Furthermore, the concern for an imageable and consumable identity has resulted in the creation of structures, settings, and rituals that mimic a sanitized and aesthetic past. In cities

such as Santa Fe in New Mexico, Annapolis in Maryland, and Charleston in South Carolina, critics regard efforts to capture only the delectable and delightful in heritage settings as caricatures of cultural heritage, not as repositories of knowledge.

Global politics is reflected in institutional mechanisms for managing cultural heritage. Colonial powers once assumed stewardship of cultural heritage, as for instance, the French in Morocco or the British in India. In so doing, they imposed historical narratives and national identities on the colonized nations. The views of local people were entirely disregarded. In the postcolonial era, although many nations have made efforts to redress the colonial prejudices and reinscribe nationalist histories, political imbalance has persisted in the global selection of cultural heritage and the charters and conventions that govern them as well as in the relationships between the state and local community over the ownership, interpretation, and management of heritage. Although philanthropists and the wealthy elite pioneered the protection of heritage in Europe and North America, since the late nineteenth century the responsibility for protecting historic buildings and works of art has been placed on public institutions. This has raised questions of ownership and access to heritage. The idea that the inheritors and local communities have a stewardship of the sites and a voice in their management is gradually becoming more current.

Inclusiveness, Equity, and Sustainability

Social and economic change and the inclusion of private property under heritage have resulted in multiple stakeholders and shared responsibility. The inclusion of stakeholder participation ranges from encouraging private investments in the revitalization and adaptive reuse of historic neighborhoods and buildings such as the industrial neighborhoods and waterfront warehouses of many North American cities, to the strengthening of heritage values and identification of meaningful roles for marginalized people. Inherent in these partnerships with stakeholders is the idea of balancing the value of preserving heritage with the needs of current use or finding a value for heritage within contemporary economic, social, and political frameworks. Many of the historic centers of Latin American towns, such as Salvador in Brazil, struggle to balance the present



A plaza near the Teatro Nacional in the Casco Antiguo World Heritage Site in Panama City. The main building in the photo is beautifully restored and has a popular restaurant on the ground floor. The trees are located in the plaza, while to the left of the main building the walls of an unrestored building are visible. To the left of the scene in the photo are buildings in various states of disrepair. The area contains stark contrasts between the homes of those wealthy enough to fully restore the historic buildings and those who occupy buildings that, until the Heritage designation, were cheap and often undesirable buildings that were poorly maintained.

Source: Eric Mathiasen.

needs of their poor and marginalized residents with the colonial identity of the town and the demands of a tourist destination.

Large-scale development, real-estate interests, and tourism-led aestheticization of culture have threatened to erode the fragile and intangible heritage of indigenous peoples. Ambiguities about authenticity are further complicated by histories of aggression. In recent years, many see a need to make reparations for past aggressions and respect the spirit of plurality and diversity that cultural heritage represents. A bottom-up approach in contrast to the top-down one of the past has created a heightened awareness of the importance of community and stakeholder participation. Various governmental agencies, private investors, nongovernmental organizations, local citizens, and international aid agencies have a stake in the management of cultural heritage. The policies that emerge from such a participatory process are cooperative rather than hierarchical. Emphasizing diversity in culture and inclusiveness in access and management of heritage enables the voices of local and indigenous peoples to be heard.

Today, there is a greater awareness of the value of sites sacred to indigenous peoples. Although international conventions and many national policies have addressed gender biases and recognized the heritage of marginalized peoples, new inequities have emerged. Cultural heritage has increasingly become part of culture-led redevelopment of urban areas for improved economic returns and increased competitiveness between cities. Consequently a bias exists for the aspects of inheritance that are easily commodified. Critics have faulted places such as South

Street Seaport in New York and Penang in Malaysia for redeveloping in a way that markets the most consumable aspects of heritage with a view to improving economic returns.

There is a growing awareness of the need to judiciously use and protect resources with a view to sustainability. Inherent in the idea of sustainability is development and change: the idea of making careful use of resources and finding ways to replenish and enrich in protecting for the future. In similar ways, conservation of heritage does not mean a return to a premodern past but negotiation of identities and forms of the past with the future through sustainable development.

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See also Heritage City; Historic Cities; Public Realm; Santa Fe, New Mexico; Urban Culture

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CYBURBIA

Cyburbia broadly refers to the study of how new information and communication technologies (ICT), also called new media and computer-mediated communication, such as the Internet and mobile phones, influence community and social interactions at the neighborhood level. This approach is distinct from traditional urban studies, which privilege face-to-face relationships, and studies of virtual community, which distinguish between the virtual and the real. Instead, this approach recognizes that the physical and the

virtual geographies of community overlap and are intertwined in the maintenance and formation of everyday social relations in the urban setting.

Urban Studies and Technological Change

Interest in how technological change influences everyday urban interactions has its origins at least as early as the Chicago School of Urban Sociology. This early work was a reaction to the ways in which changes in urban transportation and communication technology, such as public transportation, the automobile, and the telephone, transformed the social and physical organization of the city. Researchers such as Robert Park and Ernest Burgess noted that while new communication technologies expanded opportunities for social interaction, the increased mobility offered by technologies like the telephone was argued to be responsible for the deterioration of local community and social relationships. Concerns over the impact of new technologies on social relationships endured through the twentieth century, focusing primarily on the introduction of the telephone and the television, and have extended into the twenty-first century with the growth of the Internet and related technologies.

ICTs and Social Networks

The study of how new ICTs influence social relationships in the urban environment has been explored as part of a larger debate related to how, or if, social networks have been transformed as a result of the Internet. This research has broadly focused on the question: Is the Internet replacing social contact, either in person or through other forms of communication? The conclusion of this body of research is that the Internet, in particular e-mail use, has become an important and integrated part of people's everyday life. It supports interaction with preexisting strong social ties as well as more extensive social ties. There is little indication that Internet use substitutes for other forms of contact, such as telephone calls or face-to-face encounters. Instead, the evidence suggests that those who are in frequent contact with members of their personal network by e-mail are also in frequent contact in person and through other media. Similarly, e-mail users tend to have more social ties than nonusers. Although some have argued that e-mail communication, or any form of

computer-mediated communication, is inferior to in-person contact, there is only a slight difference in how people rate the quality of online interactions in comparison with face-to-face and telephone conversations. There is little doubt that new media can be used in the exchange of aid and support. However, despite the ubiquity of Internet use, in-person and telephone contact remain the dominant modes of connectivity when people communicate with their closest ties.

While Internet use does not appear to reduce the number of contacts or frequency of communication, it is less clear how it influences the composition of personal networks and where people maintain their networks. Related to the question of whether the Internet substitutes for other means of social contact is the question of whether new media shift the maintenance of personal networks out of the public and into private spheres of interaction.

Robert Putnam documented extensive evidence demonstrating that, starting in the 1970s, Americans have gradually spent less and less time with members of their social networks. A similar pattern of declining social capital has been found in other countries, such as Australia and Britain. These studies suggest that people have been exchanging public participation for private interactions; people are increasingly likely to socialize in small groups in private homes rather than with large groups in public spaces. Although the Internet and other new media originated too recently to be responsible for the trends observed by Putnam and others, there is some evidence that new media facilitate privatism. Research by Miller McPherson, Lynn Smith-Lovin, and Matthew Brashears on the size and composition of people's core "discussion networks," identified a decline in the number of people with whom the average person discusses important matters, as well as a shift away from public participation toward networks found in the private sphere of the home. Although McPherson and his colleagues do not directly link Internet use to changes in social networks, the time period they studied overlaps with the rise of the Internet. This finding is also consistent with existing observations that link home-based media use, including television and the telephone, to increased privatism. Increased home centeredness comes at the expense of interaction in traditional public and neighborhood spaces, spaces that have traditionally provided exposure to diverse people as well as new cultural

and political information. If opportunities for interaction with those beyond the private sphere decline, so do opportunities for exposure to diverse social networks and resources.

In an attempt to directly examine the circumstances under which the Internet does or does not encourage privatism, a number of studies have examined the role of Internet use in different urban settings, such as neighborhoods.

ICTs and Neighborhoods

Netville

The Netville study was one of the first studies to specifically test the impact of new information and communication technologies on social relationships at the neighborhood level. The Netville experiment was an attempt to provide future levels of Internet connectivity and services to a typical middle-class suburban neighborhood that was located outside of Toronto, Ontario, Canada. Residents who moved to the community were promised free broadband Internet access, online music services, online health services, and a variety of communication tools, such as a videophone, instant messaging, multimedia chat rooms, and a neighborhood e-mail discussion list. However, unanticipated problems in the deployment of the technology left almost half of the community residents without any kind of Internet connectivity at all. A researcher, Keith Hampton, moved into the community and spent two years interviewing community residents and conducting an ethnography that compared "wired" and "nonwired" residents.

The results of the Netville study suggested that despite the common characterization of the Internet as a global media that facilitates distant connections, it can also afford very local interactions. When wired residents were compared with non-wired neighbors, those who received access to Netville's technology were more involved with their community: They recognized three times as many neighbors, talked to twice as many, visited 50 percent more in person, and called them on the telephone four times as often. Although those with the technology had more ties and more frequent interactions in person and over the telephone, it was relatively weak, not strong, intimate ties that were formed as a result of the services. Consistent with Mark Granovetter's theory of weak ties, the

large number of weak neighborhood-based ties was found to support residents' ability to organize collectively when dealing with local issues and concerns. Counter to concerns that the Internet encouraged privatism, the Netville study found that Internet use facilitated greater involvement within the parochial realm. However, the Netville study was one case study, and at its conclusion, the generalizability of the findings was not clear.

e-Neighbors

The e-Neighbors study attempted to clarify the contexts under which Internet technologies facilitate interaction at the neighborhood level. Data for the e-Neighbors project were collected by Hampton through a series of three annual surveys administered to the adult residents of four Boston, Massachusetts, neighborhoods. The neighborhoods were selected to be socioeconomically similar: They were all middle class but contrasted in terms of housing type. Each neighborhood consisted of 100 to 200 homes. Two of the four neighborhoods were suburban communities, one was an apartment building, and the fourth was a gated community. Three of the four neighborhoods were given access to a series of simple Internet services: a neighborhood e-mail discussion list and a neighborhood website. The fourth neighborhood, the second suburban site, served as a control group. To maintain the ideal of a natural research setting, participants were not given a computer, Internet access, or any training.

Of the three experimental neighborhoods in the e-Neighbors study, only the suburban neighborhood widely adopted the e-mail list intervention, and none of the communities extensively used a neighborhood website. The apartment building had the lowest use of the provided services. Even though the apartment building had the youngest and most technologically savvy population of the four field sites, it was also the least conducive to social tie formation; it had the lowest levels of residential stability, fewest cohabitating couples, fewest children, lowest home ownership, little preexisting sense of community, and a low sense of community obligation. This contrasted strongly with the suburban neighborhood, where residents frequently used the neighborhood e-mail list to discuss local services, local politics, local issues, and for collective action. Unlike the residents of the apartment

building, the residents of the suburban community were residentially stable, most were married or cohabitating, and they were in the midst of their child-rearing years. Most suburban residents actively wanted more contact with their neighbors. When the residents of the suburban experimental community were compared with the control group, those residents who actively participated in the neighborhood e-mail list experienced an average increase in the size of their neighborhood networks of four new ties per year. As with the Netville study, the new neighborhood ties formed as a result of the intervention were relatively weak.

The e-Neighbors study also found that Internet use, in general, was increasingly embedded into neighborhood networks. In particular, those who were early adopters of the Internet were found to know more neighbors over time, whereas those with less experience using the Internet were found to have local networks that shrank over time. In addition, the longer a person had been using the Internet, the more neighbors he or she was in contact with by e-mail.

The e-Neighbors study concluded that those who live in neighborhoods with a preexisting context that supports the formation of local social ties (such as low residential mobility and the presence of children), and those with high levels of Internet penetration, are the most likely to benefit from the Internet. In these situations the Internet does not privatize. Instead, as the Internet becomes increasingly pervasive, it may be an antidote to privatism, affording the formation of networks at the neighborhood level. In addition, evidence that e-mail exchanged between neighbors often includes ordinary political discussion, debates about civic duties, and collective action suggested that use of the Internet in the parochial realm may lead to broader political participation and more deliberative democracy. However, the finding that only those neighborhoods that are already well positioned, in terms of Internet access and existing social capital, benefit from the Internet, suggests that there is the potential for a widening of a social capital divide between the haves and the have-nots.

i-Neighbors

Case studies from Australia, Canada, Israel, the United Kingdom, and the United States have

explored the influence of everyday Internet use on social relations at the neighborhood level. However, there have been few studies of how ICTs are used locally at a more generalizable level.

In contrast to the experimental nature of Netville and e-Neighbors, where communities were chosen ahead of time and given the technology by researchers, the i-Neighbors project run by Hampton examines how the Internet is adopted and used in the maintenance of neighborhood relationships across thousands of neighborhoods within a number of countries.

Findings from the i-Neighbors project are consistent with the results of the experimental Netville and e-Neighbors studies. The Internet is most likely to facilitate the formation and maintenance of local social ties in neighborhood contexts that are already conducive to local tie formation, such as new neighborhoods, suburban areas, and areas with higher income and low residential mobility. However, unlike previous studies, the i-Neighbors study also found that the Internet undermines contextual influences that inhibit tie formation and collective action in neighborhoods with concentrated disadvantage. The i-Neighbors study found that a disproportionately high number of “truly disadvantaged” neighborhoods, low-income neighborhoods high in racial segregation and unemployment, were successfully using the Internet to build local social ties, discuss local issues, and act collectively to address local problems. This suggests that the Internet not only reduces privatism through engagement at the neighborhood level but provides new opportunities for social and political involvement that were previously inaccessible to those embedded in an ecological context of concentrated disadvantage.

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See also Chicago School of Urban Sociology; Community Studies; Urban Studies

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DAMASCUS, SYRIA

Capital of the Arab Republic of Syria, Damascus claims to be the oldest continuously inhabited city in the world (although recent excavations in Aleppo, Syria's other major city, might shift this claim). In its long history it has been the center of the Aramaean region, one of the 10 cities of the Roman Decapolis and the capital of the first (and vast) Islamic empire created by the Umayyads (between 661 and 750) as well as the center of Greater Syria (Bilād ash-Shām دمشاق دالاب, made up of present-day Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, and Jordan). The city still has an incredible architectural heritage, including remains from antiquity, one of the oldest mosques in the Islamic world (the Umayyad mosque built 706–715), and over 8,000 intact commercial buildings and private houses dating from the Ottoman period (1516–1918). In 1979 UNESCO made Damascus a site of World Cultural Heritage, a heritage that a 2001 UN report believes to be at risk.

As Mark Twain extolled in *The Innocents Abroad*,

To Damascus, years are only moments, decades are only flitting trifles of time. She measures time, not by days and months and years, but by the empires she has seen rise, and prosper and crumble to ruin. She is a type of immortality. . . . Damascus has seen all that has ever occurred on earth, and still she lives. She has looked upon the

dry bones of a thousand empires, and will see the tombs of a thousand more before she dies. Although another claims the name, old Damascus is by right the Eternal City.

In Arabic دمشاق دمشاق (Dimashq ash-Shām) is usually shortened to either Dimashq دمشاق or ash-Shām دمشاق (also the colloquial term for the whole of Syria and/or the “north”). The English name Damascus is thought to come from the Greek Δαμασκόσ, via Latin, which in turn originated from the Aramaic קשמרד Darmešeq, (a well-watered place), although it is likely the name predates the Aramaic era.

Damascus is located about 80 kilometers inland from the eastern Mediterranean coast and 680 meters above sea level in the fertile Ghouta (قطوعا al-gūta) oasis sheltered by the Anti-Lebanon mountain range. The temperate climate and abundant supply of water from the nearby Barada River certainly would have encouraged early settlement; Aram Damascus was established there in 1100 BC by the Aramaeans, Semitic nomads from Arabia, who built a complex water distribution system of canals and tunnels (later improved by the Romans and the Umayyads). The settlement became a sought-after prize among the region's empire builders until the Roman ruler Pompey incorporated Damascus into the 10 cities of the Decapolis in 64 BC, fusing the Greek and Aramaean foundations into a new city layout measuring approximately 1500 by 750 meters, surrounded by a city wall. Roman Damascus was an important city in

early Christian history—the “road to Damascus” is the site of St. Paul’s conversion to Christianity in the New Testament (Acts 9:11). The street called Straight (referred to in the story of his conversion), also known as the Via Recta, was the *cardo* (main street) of Roman Damascus.

In 661 Damascus became the capital of the Umayyad Empire, the first Muslim dynasty, which at its height stretched from India to Spain. One of the greatest buildings remaining from this period of history is the Umayyad Mosque, built between 709 and 715 on the site of a Byzantine church dedicated to John the Baptist (itself built on a Roman temple to Jupiter that had previously been an Aramaean temple to the storm and rain god Hadad). The mosque, often described as the first monumental work of architecture in Islamic history, was designed to resemble the organizational spaces of the house of the Prophet in Medina and is also a reinterpretation of late antique tradition.

Damascus’s strategic location—on the growing trade route between Europe and China and the hajj pilgrimage route to Mecca—has undoubtedly shaped its focus on both the mercantile and spiritual. The city gradually changed from a Greco-Roman city with a grid of straight streets to an Islamic city with narrow, winding streets where most residents lived inside *harat* closed off at night by heavy wooden gates. During Salah al-Din’s rule in the twelfth century, Damascus acquired its reputation as a city for seekers of academic excellence. While returning from his pilgrimage to Mecca in 1184, Islamic scholar, poet, geographer, and traveler Ibn Jubayr is credited with saying, “If there is paradise on Earth, it is without a doubt Damascus. If it is in the heavens, Damascus is such that it rivals it in glory.”

It was also during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries that Damascus began to attract more attention in Europe, particularly for its manufacturing skills and high-quality products. Damascus became synonymous with high-quality steel (patterned steel is still referred to as damascened) and luxurious fabric (damask refers to the patterned Byzantine and Chinese silks that started to become more widely available in Europe).

In 1516, after a period of relative obscurity as a Mamluk provincial capital, Damascus entered a period of 400 years as an Ottoman city (except for a brief occupation by Ibrahim Pasha of Egypt from

1832 to 1840). Architecture flourished, in particular *bayt arabis*, a Syrian strain of Ottoman grand merchant houses built around open courtyards, as well as mosques (Damascus is said to have over 1,000 mosques) and madrasahs (Islamic schools). In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Ottoman state and society adopted European ideas, and a “Europeanized” residential quarter appeared on the road between al-Merjeh (the meadow) and Salihyye (a district that grew around the shrine of Sheikh Muhi al-Din ibn Arabi). Ideas of nationalism also began to flourish, but a brief period of independence during the Arab Revolt in 1918 was quickly replaced by French mandate rule in 1920. In 1925 the Druze revolt in the Hauran spread to Damascus, and the French responded by bombing and shelling a whole quarter of the Old City, which was later fenced off with barbed wire. A new road was built outside the walls and the city’s commercial and administrative center also shifted northward toward this area, so that Salihyye began to merge with other villages on the slopes of Mount Qasioun to form new districts often named after their first refugee residents such as al-Akrad (Kurdish soldiers) and al-Muhajirin (the migrants).

Syria gained independence in 1946 and Damascus is now the capital of the Syrian Arab Republic, a parliamentary state dominated by the secular Ba’ath Party and currently headed by Bashar al-Assad (the son of Hafez al-Assad, who was its previous president for more than 30 years). The city’s estimated population of 4.5 million people is still expanding as a result of the influx of migrants and refugees. (In 1955 thousands of Palestinian refugees moved into the new district of Yarmouk, and in the early twenty-first century it is estimated that more than 3 million Iraqis are now in Syria, many in Damascus.) In general the northern end of the city is more affluent (in particular the western Mezze district, the Barada valley in Dumar, and on the slopes of the mountains at Berze), while poorer areas (often built without official approval) have developed mostly in the south. The shrunken Ghouta oasis is now heavily polluted because of the city’s traffic, industry, and sewage.

Two thirds of the city’s population is Sunni with the rest made up of Shi’ites, Ismailis, and Alawites, some Druze (though most live to the

southwest of the city), and a significant Christian minority (about 11 percent) of Maronites, Catholics, Greeks, Armenians, and Assyrian Orthodox. A very small Jewish community remains in the Old City.

While Damascus is still rich in Classical and Islamic monuments, it is the amount of surviving domestic Islamic architecture (in particular the *bayt arabis*) that makes Damascus (and Aleppo) so unique. Approximately half of the 16,832 houses listed in the Ottoman 1900 yearbook were still remaining in 2001, according to the UN report by Stefan Weber of the Aga Khan University in the United Kingdom. However, Weber warns that Syrian administrations and others assume the city's status as a World Cultural Heritage site covers only the area within the city walls, when it refers to the whole city. This oversight has led to minimal (or nonexistent) protection for extramural areas, where twelfth-century homes are being replaced with multistory concrete buildings.

Continued strained relations with the United States (including accusations by the Bush administration in 2005 that Syria is part of the "axis of evil") have led to limited Western investment in the city. However, the Old City, at least, has no shortage of willing investors from Syria itself and elsewhere in the Arab world, in particular the Gulf and newly resident Iraqis.

Applications for restoration licenses have increased tenfold in recent years, and the number of "renovated" cafes and restaurants had risen from approximately 5 in 1998 to more than 100 by April 2007. Luxury boutique hotels and nightclubs (now about 10) soon followed. The Old City's famous markets have also been the focus of speculation. In 2006, Kuwaiti prince Majed Al Sabah proclaimed the street called Straight to be the next Bond Street when he opened his luxury designer store Villa Moda in a restored house there amid a flurry of attention from the world's fashion media.

Although this development is mostly welcomed, there is concern about the general quality of the work carried out, and Weber's report calls for a training and planning center to help investors in this work.

Jessica Jacobs

See also Historic Cities; Islamic City

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DAVIS, MIKE

Mike Davis (1946–) is a prolific Marxist labor historian whose renown stems from a memorably trenchant, provocative mix of scholarship and reportage on urban issues, especially those concerning Los Angeles. Davis labels himself a "writer-activist," "former meat cutter and long-distance truck driver," and "Marxist-environmentalist"; his perspective on American cities is consciously that of someone who grew up in a southern California marked by deindustrialization, suburbanization, and racism. Alongside these working-class credentials stand prestigious MacArthur and Getty fellowships, two books—*City of Quartz* (1990) and *Ecology of Fear* (1998)—on the *Los Angeles Times* bestsellers list simultaneously, and celebrity status within and outside of academia.

Davis has directed much of his analysis and critique of urban conditions toward the detrimental effects of economic restructuring and welfare state shrinkage for the urban working class. Nevertheless,

he has an expansive understanding of the forces affecting cities. Davis tackles such core urban issues as land uses, crime control, and ethnic politics, but also less obvious topics that range from pandemics to avocado farming. Throughout, Davis insists on the class-based, materialist core of Marxist analysis, although a non-orthodox version that replaces the proletarian revolution with pessimistic scenarios for workers and the poor and grants spatial relations some independence from the economy. Although Davis was among the academics who conceived of the Los Angeles School of Urban Studies (and reportedly was the first to use that name, in *City of Quartz*), his attachment to economic structure and uneasy relationship with postmodernism leaves him somewhat outside the school as it has evolved.

Davis began a PhD at the University of California at Los Angeles, then left for Britain and worked during the 1980s for the socialist journal *New Left Review*. His intellectual influences include key thinkers such as the Marxist historian Perry Anderson and the critical theorist Herbert Marcuse. While in Britain, Davis published his most theoretical book, *Prisoners of the American Dream* (1986). It is an account of the party system's abandonment of the working class in light of a White, suburban, middle-class electoral majority—ultimately, the Ronald Reagan coalition—along with organized labor's hostility to African Americans, women, and immigrants.

In the late 1980s, Davis returned to the United States and turned his attention to the ills of Los Angeles and the widespread erosion of central cities. Davis's best-known and academically most celebrated book is *City of Quartz* (1990), now an urban studies "classic." Davis makes a scathing, sweeping, and historically grounded indictment of the control of Los Angeles by business and political leaders, property developers foremost among them. He highlights the mobilization of the police state against, especially, young minority males, homeless people, and illegal immigrants—among the compelling images in *City of Quartz* is that of "Fortress L.A." Although affluent White homeowners and international investors increasingly competed for power with the traditional local elites, all shared an interest in fortifying Los Angeles against perceived threats coming from lower-class "others."

City of Quartz appeared in paperback in 1992, the year of the Rodney King rebellion in Los Angeles. Among Davis's most angry and captivating works is an informal coda to *City of Quartz* (and to *Prisoners of the American Dream*), "Who Killed Los Angeles?" There, Davis detailed the "federalized and federally driven"—heavily militarized—strategies that were already used in antidrug, antigang, and anti-immigrant efforts but that were perfected in reaction to the breakdown of law and order. At the same time, the bipartisan consensus in California and in Washington against spending for public employment and services "figuratively burned down the city a second time."

In several pieces collected in *In Praise of Barbarians* (2007), Davis shows that this governing experiment was both employed and abandoned in federal, state, and local responses to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina. New Orleans, like Los Angeles, has been denied the resources sufficient even to address its predisaster needs, let alone to rebuild its economic, social, and physical infrastructure. Ironically, however, in New Orleans, the federal government and military were glaringly passive, to tragic effect. And unlike Los Angeles, which epitomizes the cities being recreated through Latina/o (and Asian) immigration, as Davis argues in *Magical Urbanism* (2000), an evacuated New Orleans is being "deliberately murdered" by public- and private-sector efforts to remake it as a wealthier, whiter city.

Davis is fascinated with the disjunction between the "sunshine" image of Los Angeles purveyed by the recording, film, and tourism industries and the "noir" reality of its social and environmental conditions elaborated in grimmer, yet popular, genres of film and literature. This theme unifies *Ecology of Fear* (1998), the beginning of a continuing exploration into why and how capitalist-inspired human settlement patterns have intervened in natural phenomena. Davis views southern California as defined by fear of the wild, whether in nature or society. His core, most contentious argument is that much of the real danger—filtered as it is by popular culture, political discourse, and the news—has resulted from development patterns that are ignorant of the workings of the ecosystem. Critically, "malice towards the landscape" includes animus toward cities and city dwellers. Davis's

characterization of the areas affected by the 2007 wildfires as “pink stucco death valleys full of bored teenagers and desperate housewives” typifies his assessment of southern California’s class and spatial structure.

Ecology of Fear contributes to Davis’s overall argument about the global and historical relationships among capitalism, urbanization, and epic human disasters. His shift in focus beyond North America came with *Late Victorian Holocausts* (2001), a mammoth examination of the “making of the Third World” in the last half of the nineteenth century. Using scientific studies for evidence, Davis charges colonial forces with exploiting El Niño–caused droughts and famines for economic and political expansion (much as contemporary developers in southern California enjoy the opportunities presented by natural disasters). *The Monster at Our Door* (2005) traces the avian influenza threat to globalization and the “superurbanization” of poverty, while *Buda’s Wagon* (2007) identifies the car bomb—“the hot rod of the apocalypse”—as the first indigenously urban form of guerilla warfare. In *Planet of Slums* (2006), Davis returns specifically to cities, tying the late twentieth-century explosion in the size and expanse of slums to the structural adjustment regime of marketization and privatization. The importance of these five books lies in Davis’s argument that two eras of economic and geographic restructuring serving the interests of capital have not only wrought social and ecological havoc in the third world, but inadvertently brought political and biological terror to the West.

Davis’s best work often appears as topical pieces in left and mainstream periodicals, and he publishes and is interviewed widely online. He excels as a commentator on contemporary events: elections and labor politics as well as natural disasters and terrorist attacks. Davis’s writing contains strong narrative elements, and his appeal to academic and public audiences rests, in large part, on his ability to tell absorbing tales of cities, people, and events even while employing sometimes-impenetrable turns of phrase. He uses photographs to communicate wit and anger.

One result of the entrance of Davis’s work into the public sphere is controversy. From the Right, he has been excoriated as hysterical, given to concocting

facts, and an academic elite in working-class garb. *Ecology of Fear* instigated furious responses and denunciations from conservative commentators nationally, the Los Angeles business community, and some California scholars. At issue were the tone of the book—that is, Davis’s diagnosis of the cause of California natural disasters and his apocalyptic predictions for the future—and the veracity of his evidence. From the Left, Davis is treated as a hero and defended from what are considered smear campaigns. He is portrayed as prophetic and a meticulous chronicler of the havoc wrought by capitalism. Nonetheless, even some urban scholars who are disposed toward Davis’s general point of view regarding the vast problems of cities have objected that he is unnecessarily apocalyptic and insufficiently attentive to the importance of culture and gender.

In sum, Mike Davis’s appeal lies in his ability to cross the boundary between the academy and the world of what he calls “the honest working class.” He has energized the field of urban studies and, by fashioning a complex explanation of urban conditions in California and globally, has made himself an object of both praise and condemnation.

Judith A. Garber

See also Los Angeles, California; Los Angeles School of Urban Studies; Urban Theory

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DE CERTEAU, MICHEL

Michel de Certeau (1925–1986) has become one of the oft-cited theorists of everyday urban life. This entry gives a brief outline of his work, his theoretical background, and the key concepts taken from his work into urban studies and sets those concepts in the context of some of the limits created by this appropriation. The key theoretical tradition is one of a theory of practice that stresses how objects and happenings exceed people's conceptualizations of them. With this, his work has been picked up for, first, how it points to a critique of urban ideologies, and especially those of planning and rationalism; second, as offering an account of life that exceeds notions of planned space in terms of a model active practice transforming spaces through, third, a sense of local "tactics" that, fourth, form part of urban consumption practices.

Theoretical Background

Michel de Certeau's background as an ordained Jesuit priest working on their archives and a member of Jacques Lacan's *l'école Freudienne* from its start to finish, whose most sustained work was on the spiritual possessions of medieval Loudun and popular religious mysticism, hardly seems like obvious origins for theorizing urban affairs. De Certeau underwent something of a personal revelation through the events in Paris in 1968 and moved his later scholarship onto more topical urban matters. Through his work on urban matters, he became known as the champion of the common folk, of a street-level social theory. It is in this guise that de Certeau has become a darling to some, as a counterpoint to stratospheric theory, and villain for others, as an example of taking micro theory too far.

His most cited essay, "Walking in the City," opens with what is now an anachronistic evocation of urban theory and its desire for an orderly view of what he calls the "concept city":

Seeing Manhattan from the 110th floor of the World Trade centre. Beneath the haze stirred up by the winds, the urban island, a sea in the middle of the sea, lifts up the skyscrapers. . . . A wave of verticals. Its agitation momentarily arrested by

vision. The gigantic mass is immobilized before the eyes. It is transformed into a texturology. . . . To what erotics of knowledge does the ecstasy of reading such a cosmos belong? Having taken voluptuous pleasure in it, I wonder what is the source of this pleasure of "seeing the whole," of looking down on, totalizing the most immoderate of human texts. (de Certeau 1984:91–2)

This has keyed into a whole series of critiques of urban theory that question the subject position and viewpoint of planners, the panoptic disciplining of space, and the pretensions of social theory. Here he asks us to think about the enjoyment mobilized by theoretical and management accounts that offer us a privileged and "powerful" view of urban process—there is no innocent viewpoint, and the gaze of theory offers to satisfy desires for knowledge and order. In other words, the popularity of these approaches is not just about their better insights but also how they position us as powerful knowing subjects. As such, de Certeau is critical of visual metaphors for knowledge and practices of visualizing society, arguing, "Our society is characterized by a cancerous growth of vision, measuring everything by its ability to show or be shown and transmuting communication into a visual journey. It is a sort of epic of the eye and the impulse to read." His caution is that this converts the world into a "texturology" that we can read, but in so doing it freezes urban life and thus occludes a great many urban practices. Thus he argues that representational art and science immobilize the city's "opaque mobility" into a transparent text that offers only the "empire of the evident," where practices are often treated as inert contents or as cultural attributes to be measured. This leaves theory "mourning at the tomb of the absent," speaking about the laws or structures but not the actions themselves.

de Certeau's Urban Theory

De Certeau suggests that urban theory often replicates the epistemological vision of the powerful. Thus even if its purpose is critical or oppositional, it too tends to believe in plans, regularities, and structures, as though they were the limits of urban life. Instead he looks to a "scattered polytheism" of different systems of thought. The dispersed

knowledges of practices elude the gaze of theory. He does not see an aggregate sum of practices but an innumerable mass of singularities—not too numerous to count, but ontologically uncountable. In this he sees tactics transforming the *places* designed by hegemonic powers and envisioned as the neat and orderly realm of the concept city, into unruly *spaces*. That is, he sees practices as spatializing places. Here, then, he looks to the control of space as a matter of strategy that is oriented through the construction of powerful knowledges. In contrast, there are tactics—the arts of making do, like reading or cooking—that use what they find there in multiple permutations. This practical knowledge of the city transforms and crosses spaces, creates new links, comprising mobile geographies of looks and glances as people walk through and walk by these given places. Strategy claims territory and defines places, whereas tactics use and subvert those places.

The strategic vision of power and theory are thus transformed by small-scale tactics. De Certeau sees strategy as the imposition of power through the disciplining and organization of space—zoning activities, prescribing some activities in some places and proscribing them in others. Tactics are the “ruses” that take the predisposition of the world and make it over, that convert it to the purposes of ordinary people. The giant order of urban planning and the concept city is thus both vast yet also strangely tenuous when set against the “maritime immensity” of scattered practices—the city is an “order-sieve.” The gaze of power transfixes objects but also thus becomes blind to a vast array of things that do not fit its categories. Thus empirically we might look at different modes of knowing the city—what de Certeau called the “wordless histories” of things such as ways of walking, modes of dress, cooking, or childhood memories. These create absences and ghosts in the machine that render the city truly “habitable” and inhabited. Thus he is skeptical of knowledges that “map” cities from a God’s-eye view and more concerned with “stories” as epistemologies of actually getting by in cities, and in spatial terms he saw walking as a form of practical narration. The city is known by walking rather than looking down at a static plan.

His work looks at the use of objects and places rather than their ownership and production. So he turns our attention to how tactics appropriate what

has been created by hegemonic knowledge systems. Thus children make jungles and castles out of apparent wasteland or “spaces left over in planning”; street signs become associated with social memories that may reject their formal significance (instead of commemorating generals, for instance, they may be associated with a first kiss, a riot, or something different entirely); and monuments become refigured into popular culture (statues of reclining women in fountains in both Birmingham and Dublin have earned the local epithets of “the floozy in the Jacuzzi”). The city for de Certeau is as much about dreams as things. It is through taking what is there and reusing it that cities become meaningful and inhabited. But if we were to look for conventional indicators of production or use, then we would see nothing of this urban life. He has thus become associated with seeing consumption not as an end point or an afterthought to producing urban spaces and service, but as an active process. Although here he points to the overall framing of hegemonic power, he sees the Brownian movements of myriad practices within that system.

Nor can we map different uses into discrete urban cultures and neighborhoods of practice. The plurality of urban practices means we do not see a mosaic of discrete subcultures located in separated places but, according to de Certeau, a “piling up of heterogeneous places. Each one, like the deteriorating page of a book, refers to a different mode of territorial unity, of socioeconomic distribution, of political conflicts and of identifying symbolism.” That is, multiple practices, some of which may be powerful and others residues of former systems of knowledge, overlap. Thus, for example, gentrified neighborhoods may have been built to service factories that have disappeared, with streets named after forgotten heroes of empires that have fallen. “The whole [is] made up of pieces that are not contemporary and still linked to totalities that have fallen into ruins,” de Certeau observes.

Limitations of de Certeau’s Theory

Finally, it is worth pausing to think about the limits of the adoption of de Certeau into urban theory. He has perhaps been too easily co-opted as the champion of the common man. One might build three sets of critiques of how he has been used and his urban thinking. First, his conceptualization of

power tends to see a totalizing and powerful form of knowledge pitted against the ordinary citizen. This lacks a more sociological sense of the mediation of power by different institutions and actors within those institutions, all of whom have their own agendas (or tactics) about their work. Second, the opposition of tactic and strategy is thus rather more like a series of gaps or misalignments in a dance than how it is often portrayed as resistance or transgression. De Certeau's tactics are not politically oppositional; they are evasive of the orders and plans of the dominant knowledge rather than forming a coherent, and equally limited, resistance. Third, his empirical connection to practices of neighborhood life and walking the streets connects him to an imaginary of urbane life that is located in a European intellectual culture that may not reflect all urban lifestyles. Finally, these are linked in the sense that de Certeau had a coherent overall philosophical view and project, with its own language and terminology. The over-quick use of his terms and ideas in urban studies can often sound like invocation rather than analysis and risks losing the subtleties of his work.

Mike Crang

See also Architecture; Graffiti; Heterotopia; Urban Theory; Walking City

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national, regional, and urban economies. Technological advances in production processes, such as the use of robots for assembly, made it possible to produce goods with far fewer workers than in the past. In the 1970s and 1980s, although the volume of production increased, the number of manufacturing jobs fell in many places. Deindustrialization also occurred because factories left urban regions. The exodus of firms occurred more rapidly in the United States than elsewhere because companies reaped tax advantages for doing so. Firms began to move from older metropolitan areas to such places as the Caribbean, Latin America, and Asia, where wages were much lower and environmental regulations were lax. This process was somewhat slower in some countries because of regulations imposed by national governments. In Germany, for example, companies were required to give workers advance notice if they planned to leave, and they were required to meet other regulations as well.

Having absorbed one blow after another, and now facing this final disaster, workers in older urban regions wondered if they would weather the storm. The Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, region experienced a 44 percent loss in manufacturing jobs from 1979 to 1988, three quarters of them related to steel. Unemployment levels reached as high as 20 percent. In Glasgow, Scotland, shipbuilding and metal manufacturing experienced dramatic decline in employment from the mid-1960s through the 1980s, resulting in unemployment levels as high as 22 percent. The miles of docklands that had once been teeming with shipyard workers stood empty. Hamburg, Germany, lost 46 percent of its manufacturing jobs from 1970 to 1987. This experience was duplicated in older port and industrial cities throughout the United States and Europe.

But there were glimmers of hope. The number of service jobs began to rise, though regions and cities differed in the speed with which this process unfolded. Over the past decades this historic development has utterly transformed national, regional, and urban economies. In seven northeastern and midwestern metropolitan areas in the United States, the percentage of jobs in manufacturing fell from 32 to 12 percent in the 40 years from 1960 to 2000. The largest gains came in services, which grew from 15 percent of local employment to

DEINDUSTRIALIZATION

In the 1970s, a new word, *deindustrialization*, was invented to refer to the rapid restructuring of

36 percent over the same period. These changes closely paralleled the U.S. national profile.

In European countries, the human impact of deindustrialization was moderated somewhat by large public-sector employment and by housing and income support programs. Nevertheless, the dislocations stemming from high unemployment rates were extreme in older manufacturing and port cities throughout the advanced nations. In Europe, national governments and cities undertook aggressive programs to restructure local economies. Liverpool, for example, received massive amounts of aid from the U.K. government to renovate the abandoned Albert docks into a mixed development containing housing, a museum, shops, and bars and restaurants. By contrast, under the leadership of President Ronald Reagan, the U.S. federal government advised people to move to more prosperous regions. Urban leaders responded by launching efforts to regenerate their own economies, a process that continues to the present day.

Dennis R. Judd

See also Disinvestment; Gentrification; Revanchist City; Uneven Development; Urban Crisis

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DELHI, INDIA

Contemporary Delhi is the crystallization of a long history of absorption of different epochs and rulers, a place of convergence of influences from all over the world. A city conventionally divided into an old and a new part (roughly corresponding to the center/north and the south of the city), Delhi offers a precious window onto the political and cultural changes that have taken place in India. This entry introduces the city by summing up its history and by offering a few perspectives onto how its developments can be interpreted.

Before Independence

Historically, Delhi is composed of seven cities; all have functioned as centers for their respective kingdoms. First known as Indraprastha (home of the dynasty of the Pandava in the epic Mahabharata), Delhi became known as a capital during the reign of the Hindu dynasty of Tomar (around the year AD 1060) and through a succession of kingdoms lasting until the arrival of the Muslim conquerors. The Islamic Mughal period (which started at the end of the twelfth century and ended with the arrival of the British) was a flourishing period for Delhi. Best known is the phase from the Lodhi dynasty (early sixteenth century) to that of Shahjahan (1627–1658). The latter ruler brought the capital back to Delhi in 1638, after a long period of shifts, and founded Shahjahanabad, which today is the heart of Old Delhi.

When the British Crown took over Delhi from the East India Company in 1858, a new period was inaugurated. In 1911, King George V moved the capital from Calcutta back to Delhi and laid the foundation for the expansion of the city. The construction of New Delhi (located south of the old city) was a grandiose undertaking aimed at producing the ultimate symbol of the empire. Clearly detached from the old city, New Delhi was to develop as an area of low population density and open green spaces. Edwin Lutyens, the creator of the imperial Delhi plan, also created a new square (named after Admiral Connaught) south of the wall of the old city to demarcate even more clearly the distance between New and Old Delhi. Connaught Place was conceived as a natural divide between

old/north and new/south Delhi. A topographical buffer zone between the Indian and the British, the colonizers and the colonized, Connaught Place helped the British, who inhabited what was south of Connaught Place, to keep a safe distance from the old city with its high population density, bad planning, lack of hygienic structures, poverty, and congestion.

After Independence

After partition, the economic, infrastructural, and social gaps between different areas of the city Delhi widened even further. By the beginning of 1948, after the exodus of Muslims from India to Pakistan and of Hindus in the opposite direction, roughly 16 million people had lost their homes, and at least 1 million people (according to unofficial estimates) had lost their lives. These years were central to the construction of modern Delhi. Within two months, the population doubled, and the planning of the city experienced a drastic break. New colonies (the local term for *block*) were created to host the thousands of refugees coming from what had just become Pakistan.

In the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, Delhi would continue to attract people from all over northern India, and the city's growth would prove to go far beyond the expectations of the planners. During these decades, the pattern of Delhi's growth would be the continuous expansion toward the suburbs and the forcible displacements of poor people and migrants. The construction of new industries and infrastructures and the 1982 Asian Games, in particular, contributed to the creation of this pattern. Because of the need for cheap labor, migrant workers were welcomed to settle in the city, next to the construction sites, only to be moved away into the periphery on completion of the work.

The sanctioning of India's entry into the free market in 1991 did indeed boost this process even further. During this period, Delhi fully emerged as the epicenter of India's economic modernization. From being a purely political center, the city became an attractive business and industrial center. More than half of the multinational companies that entered India in that decade chose Delhi as their base. According to statistics, Delhi had, in the late nineties, the fastest rate of job creation in India and the country's most affluent market. The population of the city grew by 43 percent between 1991 and

1999, and according to unofficial estimates, it turned into a city of 15 million inhabitants. This period entailed the definitive enlargement of Delhi across the border with those surrounding satellite cities (Gurgaon, Noida, etc.) that were once built to absorb the stream of migrants heading for the city. The construction of the new metro (a grand project connecting the city with its suburbs) has sanctioned this new redefinition of the city's map.

City of Divides

Delhi's development as a globalizing hub has, evidently, also generated social and infrastructural problems. The differences in access to electricity, water supply, and sanitation are great between different colonies. Moreover, illegal settlements and slums have grown, as an answer to immigration, in the most diverse parts of the city. Several architects suggest that since the Delhi Master Plan of 1962, the authorities in charge of the city's development have shown a lack of capacity to interpret the needs of its inhabitants. According to them, this plan promoted an ideal of urban development detached from indigenous patterns. It gave the authorities the right to acquire almost all land within the boundaries of the city capable of being urbanized and led to the implementation of large-scale projects that reproduced the monumental aura of Delhi as a capital city but did not respond to the city's needs.

Indeed, the strong divisions in areas with different lifestyles, incomes, and ethnic profiles were present before that. In the immediate postindependence period, Delhi presented itself as already clearly divided. The areas with the most evident special character were the relatively rich West Delhi, South Delhi, Civil Lines, and Delhi University (in the north), and, at the other end, an increasingly commercial, polluted, and congested Shajahanabad. In the middle of the city was the imperial area, flagged by its completely unique and detached character.

Throughout the years, however, the divide between Old and New Delhi has become the most distinguishing trait of the city. Whereas the inhabitants of new/south Delhi consider themselves the most successful and modern inhabitants of the city, the Old Delhi *wallas* present themselves as the more authentic and genuine ones. According to the Delhi master plan, Old Delhi is indeed full of the fragrances of the past, but it is also a planner's nightmare with



Modern-day Delhi

Source: Steven K. Martin.

its congestion, unsanitary conditions, and narrow lanes. South Delhi, on the other hand, is regarded as the modern, middle-class part of the city, evoking the colonial and modern era with its structured streets, its overpasses, and its spectacle of architecture ranging from the modernism of the 1960s and 1970s to Punjabi Baroque (see below) and to the most recent (post)modernist styles echoing also ancient pan-Indian mythologies. Today, the booming suburbs of Noida and Gurgaon are problematizing such a division, emerging as symbols of the new, young, upcoming, successful, and globally oriented India.

The Aesthetics of the City

Another way to understand Delhi is to approach it as a living art installation displaying the cultural

trends at play in the city. The architectural development of modern Delhi can be roughly divided into two different stages. While the first period began with the colonial creation of Lutyens's Delhi, independence entailed a conscious attempt at forging a new Indian architecture able to represent the nation and its inhabitants.

In the 1950s and 1960s, architecture was mainly influenced by the logic of austerity promoted by Nehru's government to modernize quickly while administering its scarce resources. The construction inspired by this utilitarian modernism presented Delhi as a city with long lines of flat buildings with flat roofs and lime-washed façades. These buildings were intercalated by the impressive nationalistic monuments of modernity built to represent the government. This epoch

also witnessed, however, the birth of a popular trend favoring opposite ideals. The extravagant Punjabi Baroque became the favorite style adopted by members of the elites to represent their ambitions. Offering a continuity with the colonial past while also displaying the cosmopolitan desires of the middle and upper classes, such new designs also expressed the changing notions of home (which now became a symbol of the owner's identity and a refuge from the frightening outside world) and of the public and the private. A trend whose traces are easily detected in the most recent buildings, Punjabi Baroque epitomizes the image of a new India, globally oriented while at the same time firmly rooted in a sense of national pride.

Delhi's urban growth is, therefore, a window onto the political and cultural changes that have touched on the Indian subcontinent. Containing a story of successes, expansions, and transformations, today's Delhi also offers a precious window onto the delicate balances of the country.

Paolo Favero

See also Colonial City; Divided Cities; Urban Planning

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DEVELOPER

Real estate developers allocate land, capital, material, and labor to the production of the built environment. Their goal is the highest and best use of a site—that is, the use that will yield the maximum return on investment—given various legal and regulatory parameters. Although often considered a homogeneous group, developers vary considerably with respect to organization type and size, geographic focus, market specialization, and sector (private, public, or nonprofit). The developer provides the entrepreneurial initiative, management skills, and professional expertise needed to coordinate resources and interests within established institutional structures in order to transform the built environment. Developers, for example, were responsible for building the renovated Faneuil Hall marketplace in Boston, the office complex on Canary Wharf in London, the famous suburb of Levittown (New York), the Mall of America outside Minneapolis, and the entertainment complex known as Staples Center/L.A. Live in Los Angeles.

History

The history of modern real estate development in the United States has been shaped by the ideological dominance of property rights, free markets, and entrepreneurial spirit. Developers in the late nineteenth century were predominantly corporations that built their headquarters within the central business districts of cities. By the 1900s, speculative developers emerged to capture new demand for office space. As the pace of development accelerated and competition among developers increased, municipalities began to use zoning, land use, and building regulations to protect public health, stabilize property markets, and enhance land values. Residential developers turned their attention to the expanding opportunities in the urban periphery, purchasing and subdividing land to sell to builders. By the mid-1920s, land use regulations had spread to the suburbs in the form of subdivision guidelines. The 1920s also witnessed the professionalization of real estate as an industry, as developers began to form trade associations, advance their standards of practice, and engage the public sector. The end of the Great

Depression brought with it new capital markets and institutional structures for real estate, but development languished until after World War II.

The postwar years provided developers with demand and capital for substantial residential, retail, hospitality, and industrial growth outside of central cities, while urban renewal programs created new opportunities in the urban core. Suburban residential development firms grew in size and sophistication as family organizations such as Durst, Rudin, and Tishman—all based in New York City—dominated the urban office market. The volatility of market cycles and shifting spatial demand that defined the late 1960s to the late 1990s resulted in the ebb and flow of development in urban and suburban markets. The increasing complexity and internationalization of regulatory and institutional structures and capital markets led to the growth of national and international real estate developers, including such firms as Trammell Crow and Olympia & York.

Purpose and Organization

Developers are both entrepreneurs and managers. Real estate development requires the ability to create a conceptual plan and the capability to see a project to completion while managing interactions among a diverse and extensive range of actors, including consultants, municipal planners, citizen groups, nonprofit organizations, elected and appointed officials, and contractors. In addition, developers coordinate, and in many cases contribute to, the capital necessary to advance a project from concept to fruition.

Developers are a diverse group and include firms that subdivide land for sale, purchase individual parcels and construct buildings, consult for or partner with landowners and investors, or provide both equity and expertise while controlling the entire development process. Each type has different organizational structures and capacities, access to resources, and levels of control over the completion of a project. There is also significant variation in the scale of development organizations; they range from large consulting firms and publicly traded investment entities (such as real estate investment trusts [REITs]) to small entrepreneurs and family-owned businesses. Developers, particularly large firms with substantial project volume such as Toll Brothers—a major suburban

residential developer—can also provide in-house design, mortgage, and construction services.

Geographic Focus

The geographic focus of development firms can be international, national, regional, or local. Given the complexities of urban land markets and regulatory schemes—as well as the range of actors that must be managed, coordinated, and appeased—most developers specialize geographically. This allows developers to acquire knowledge about local real estate markets and the community and political actors who might influence project approval and completion. These networks facilitate development plans as relationships forged with consultants, contractors, and other local groups can often lead to lower costs, reduced risk, and new opportunities.

Large development firms, acting as consultants or equity partners in joint ventures, are often able to operate at the international scale using local branch offices and contacts to implement development plans in unfamiliar markets. One such development firm is Texas-based Hines Interests, which maintains offices and develops property in more than 16 countries. The number of multinational development firms has increased dramatically since the early 1980s, as greater access to capital and the convergence of international investment in real estate has created a higher degree of uniformity across countries in terms of financing structures, product amenities, and consumer preference. For example, shopping malls and new urbanist projects in England, South Africa, and Singapore look strikingly similar as they are designed and located according to common principles.

Market and Sector Specialization

Real estate developers typically specialize in specific market segments, or products, of real estate, such as residential, office, hospitality, industrial, or retail. This specialization is necessary given the unique regulations and market dynamics that affect different product types. As with geographic specialization, larger firms are best able to engage in development activities in a range of products as economies of scale provide greater opportunities to retain expertise within the organization or to hire consultants as needed. Smaller development firms often focus on only one or two products—residential or

retail, for example—in an effort to maximize the limited capacity of the firm and gain competitive advantage through experience.

Developers can be found in the for-profit, non-profit, and public sectors, although real estate development as an industry is typically associated with the private sector, where for-profit developers seek to maximize financial returns. In the 1970s and 1980s, nonprofit developers, such as community development corporations, entered the development industry in response to the dwindling availability of public funds for neighborhood revitalization and low-income housing. In fact, community development corporations have become central to the building of affordable housing in many cities. During the same time period, local governments began to emphasize economic development activities that would enhance their municipality's ability to attract and maintain a constant flow of private investment. These shifting motivations and changing institutional structures have expanded the opportunities for collaboration among sectors. Public-private partnerships, for instance, have become a common method of leveraging public funds with private investment and expertise. Metrotech Center in Brooklyn, New York, offers an early example of a large-scale project developed using such a partnership. When the government acts as a developer or development partner through public or quasi-public agencies, it can provide regulatory relief, tax abatements, and other incentives to stimulate and shape private development schemes.

Real Estate Markets and Planning

Developers are sensitive to market fluctuations, demand, and risk. In an effort to minimize risk and respond to demand, development firms perform extensive market and feasibility analyses that are used to determine and verify conceptual plans. The availability of debt financing or equity investment also heavily influences the nature, pace, and location of real estate development activities, as do the risk management efforts of lending institutions. When capital is abundant and markets are relatively unfettered, speculative development—building without specific tenants—is often the result. The overbuilding associated with speculative development has historically precipitated downturns in real estate market cycles.

Real estate developers operate in a highly regulated environment where local zoning laws and planning requirements determine allowable uses, densities, and the scale of individual site development. State and federal regulations, particularly in the form of environmental laws, also affect most development projects by increasing potential cost and uncertainty during the project approval process. This regulatory landscape has created an often contentious relationship between real estate developers and government officials and planners. Interestingly, it was developers, in an effort to minimize competition from speculators and reduce risk, who were a significant force in the creation of zoning laws and subdivision regulations in the early twentieth century.

The role of the developer varies significantly from country to country, based on differing political and economic systems. While the institutional structure of development in the United Kingdom, for example, is similar to that of the United States, national governments in continental Europe, and in many parts of Asia, play a more substantial and direct role in the development of land. Public officials and government agencies often limit the discretion of private firms by determining the location, type, timing, and scale of new projects.

Emerging Trends

For developers, the future may require significant changes in business activities and organizational structures. Increased scrutiny of real estate development projects and evolving measures of success will necessitate greater collaboration between sectors to achieve outcomes that are economically efficient, socially equitable, and environmentally sustainable. However, conflicts arising from the homogeneity encouraged by increasing standardization within capital markets and the contextual development demanded by local communities may serve to exacerbate the tension between developers, community groups, and planning agencies. In addition, tighter regulatory environments, sophisticated alternative sources of capital, and economies of scale will change the complexion of the real estate industry. This could force smaller organizations out of the market or into joint ventures with other developers. Finally, the convergence of real estate asset markets across countries, supported by

globalizing capital and demographic trends, might lead to new opportunities in developing countries experiencing rapid urbanization.

Constantine E. Kontokosta

See also Real Estate; Suburbanization; Urban Economics; Urban Planning

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DICKENS, CHARLES

London is the protagonist of Dickens's fiction, as it defined his popular success. Even as a mature writer Dickens continued to draw on the experience of the young newspaper reporter who had written *Sketches by Boz* (1836) in his spare time, capitalizing on his walks through the city to outline the different neighborhoods and their distinctive inhabitants. "What inexhaustible food for speculation, do the streets of London afford!" he comments. We "have not the slightest commiseration for the man who can take up his hat and stick, and walk from Covent Garden to St. Paul's Churchyard, and back into the bargain, without deriving some amusement—we had almost said instruction—from his perambulation." Throughout his career as a novelist, journalist, editor,

actor, and theatrical impresario, Dickens found in London an inexhaustible source for the instruction and amusement of his readers, including Queen Victoria. Throughout his life he was a walker in the city, a vagabond of the streets.

His close friend, John Forster, notes that for the young Dickens to walk "anywhere about Covent Garden or the Strand, perfectly entranced him with pleasure. But, most of all, he had a profound attraction of repulsion to St Giles's." Focusing on the cognitive dissonance generated by the city, this attraction of repulsion became his characteristic London signature. "'Good Heaven!' he would exclaim, 'what wild visions of prodigies of wickedness, and beggary, rose in my mind out of that place.'" This part of the city always evoked his childhood, and all those places in the neighborhood of Warren's Blacking Factory and Hungerford Stairs are central to his writing: Covent Garden, the Temple, St. Giles, Waterloo Bridge, the Strand, and Temple Bar.

Like the *Sketches*, the humor of *Pickwick Papers* (1838) illuminates the dark corners of the city's urban labyrinth and would continue to inform his fiction. Published in serial form, either in monthly or weekly installments, the 15 novels he wrote map the city and its characteristic inhabitants. Realism in Dickens's time was magical, for the city was a fairytale come to life: grim, exhilarating, and transformative. To describe this urban world was to create a new Bible, encompassing heaven and earth, and all that lies between.

The first great practitioner of the detective novel, Dickens created a linguistic universe that in the energy, deftness, and surprise of its syntax simulates the theatrical experience of life in the modern city. As we read his writing we participate in the modern theatrical project of urban life: Modern identity has become staged identity.

Like the detectives of the London Metropolitan Police, founded in 1844, whom he admired and wrote about in *Household Words*, Dickens teaches us how to decode that city world and navigate its darker streets. His fiction trains us in keen and swift observation, careful judgment, and wide-ranging sympathy.

When Dickens was born, on February 7, 1812, London was a city of horse-drawn carts and carriages, which entered through city gates like Charing Gate, NewGate (with its formidable prison), and

Kennington Toll Gate. When Dickens died 58 years later in 1870, the gates and city wall had been pulled down and built on, and London turned into a sprawling monumental city, transformed by the Industrial Revolution, especially the railroad and entrepreneurial capitalism as well as the British imperial venture, into the first world-city.

During Dickens's lifetime, London was more excavated, more cut about, more rebuilt, and more extended than at any time in its previous history. A huge sewer system had been built by 1853, when *Bleak House* was published, and a viaduct had been completed that brought clean drinking water to all parts of the city, thus ridding it of the fear of cholera and typhus, which had plagued it for centuries. Victoria Station and Euston Station had become the termini of the railroad, effectively bringing the commerce of the world and its people into the city. The underground was under construction by 1864 when Dickens completed *Our Mutual Friend*, and the Thames, relieved now of carrying the city's waste to the sea, had been organized into a pleasing promenade via the great Embankment projects. Spacious boulevards now graced the city, among them Victoria Street, Garrick Street, and the newly extended Oxford Street. Now there were four times as many streets and roads in London as when Dickens had arrived in the city with his parents at the age of 11. The remaining fragments of the city gates were now surrounded by universes of urban activity rather than the rural countryside.

Dickens was acclaimed in his time as an accurate recorder of economic, social, and cultural conditions. He was also a social reformer who explored the impact of past conditions on the present. His evocation of the workhouse, for example, in *Oliver Twist*, recorded the misery of the poor and outcast at a moment when reform had already changed some of the worst conditions. But the emotional impact of the novel led to further efforts at remediation. And the workhouse as the place where the poor and destitute were warehoused remained as a central theme in the last novel he completed, *Our Mutual Friend*, which was published in 1864, six years before his death. Yet his vision of Victorian England always implied the possibility of social, economic, and culture improvement, and of change directed toward greater sympathy and understanding.

In his fiction Dickens records and responds to an era of unprecedented rapid and radical social change, which he sought to influence and shape.

According to F. S. Schwarzbach, for Dickens, this magical place evoked the "attraction of repulsion" for it was "such a gritty city; such a hopeless city . . . ; such a beleaguered city" as *Bleak House* renders it a waste and wasteland, and yet also a celebration "of the city as the most impressive embodiment of change," increasingly the dominant fact of modern life.

Murray Baumgarten

See also London, United Kingdom; Manchester, United Kingdom; Tenement

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DISABILITY AND THE CITY

Disability is a diverse lived experience that is frequently shaped by barriers and exclusions in the context of the city. Definitions of disability that stress the way in which the organization of society serves to disadvantage people by a devaluation of the disabled body shed particular light on the barriers that shape disabled people's access to urban spaces and participation in city life. Inaccessible buildings and transport, or unclear signage, are some of the more obvious manifestations of these barriers. Disabled people and disability groups are, however, increasingly challenging and influencing urban policy processes and decisions about urban space. The experience of disability therefore illuminates processes of social division, exclusion, and resistance which are manifest in, and shape, the urban environment.

Definitions of Disability

Definitions of disability have tended to revolve around two different conceptual starting points, expressed as the medical and social models of disability. The former equates disability with a biological impairment or condition that needs to be treated or cured if the individual is to function

normally in everyday life. Hence, disability is located in the individual and understood in terms of the limitations of a “less than normal” body. This medicalized definition has arguably dominated understandings of disability in Western society. However, since the 1970s this definition has been challenged by disabled people, who have critiqued its representation of disability as a personal tragedy and disabled people as dependent and worthy of charity. In setting out a social model of disability, an emergent disability movement has located the “problem” of disability within the structures and social relations of a society that systematically ignores the needs of people with impairments.

Proponents of the social model draw a distinction between the terms *impairment*, as the actual bodily limitation or physiological state, and *disability*, as the construction of a society that devalues impaired bodies, thereby leading to disabled people’s economic, political, social, and cultural marginalization. According to the social model, it is within the structures and organization of society rather than in disabled people’s physiology or impairment that we are to find the answers to questions about disabled people’s unequal status. The model has become the basis for the development of a disability movement that stresses disabled people’s rights as citizens and calls for their equal participation in society. However, this model has been criticized for underplaying the bodily pain that many disabled people experience, as well as for more readily explaining the experiences of people with physical or mobility impairments, rather than those with learning disabilities or mental illness. It has thereby been accused of failing to address the heterogeneity of disability.

Barriers in the Disabling City

The insights of the social model nevertheless open up an understanding of the ways in which the contemporary city serves to disable individuals through its social, political, and economic organization. A key locus of debates about disabled people’s access to the city lies in the built environment, whether this be understood as public thoroughfares, private and public buildings (including places of consumption, workplaces, civic amenities, and housing), or indeed transport systems. The barriers that render the city environment inaccessible are often clear to

see: For example, for people with mobility impairments or wheelchair users, the absence of ramps into buildings, doorways that are too narrow, or broken paving stones are huge impediments. For others, they are less visible: A lack of clear and simple signage for people with learning difficulties, or the absence of induction loops for people with hearing impairments, mediate the experience of access. The presence of these barriers in the built environment hinders disabled people’s ability to move around unaided and limits their participation in city life, whether as consumers, workers, or as members of local groups or communities. The physical fabric of the city has therefore been seen as a spatial manifestation of disabled people’s oppression in society, reflecting a historical legacy in which many disabled people were sequestered away from society and thus came to be seen as “out of place” in urban environments and public space.

These barriers point to the need to explore the broader political, economic, and institutional processes that give rise to the creation of disabling urban spaces. The policies and practices of urban planning and development systems form an important institutional context here. Within these systems, professionals—architects, property developers, and local planning officials—have been shown to play a key role in creating the built environment and influencing outcomes in terms of access. Frequently, these outcomes are shaped by the imperatives of architectural aesthetics, economic efficiency, or both, rather than accessibility for disabled people. Such recognition has led the United States and many European countries to address the issue of access through the introduction of planning regulations and policies, and in some cases, antidiscrimination legislation. The U.K. Disability Discrimination Act 1995, for example, suggests that providers of goods and services and employers should make “reasonable adjustments” for disabled people, including, where appropriate, access to workplaces or other premises. However, although such regulations are seen to offer some form of safeguard against discrimination, they have been criticized for their voluntaristic nature and a reliance on technical solutions to disabled people’s exclusion.

Many disability scholars have stressed that the barriers disabled people experience in the city

cannot be explained by the institutional context of urban planning and development alone, but are rooted in the broader structural dynamics shaping the city and urban space. Through the commodification of land and labor power, cities have been shown to be sites and spaces of capitalist accumulation. Under neoliberal regimes of governance, maximizing land rents and privatizing public space have become key trends in the cities of advanced industrialized nations. In this climate, it has been suggested that the interests of private property developers and maximizing profitability from urban space frequently take precedence over creating inclusive environments that accommodate difference and promote access by minority groups in the city, including disabled people. Meanwhile, in linking disabled people's exclusion in the city to a historical-materialist analysis, others have stressed how the emergence of the industrial (capitalist) city served to separate out the productive (able-bodied) worker from the unproductive (disabled) worker. The spatiality of workplaces based on urban factory production and work routines were inaccessible to many disabled people, who thus became devalued in terms of their labor power, and marginalized on the basis of economic inactivity. For many, the inaccessibility of the contemporary city—and disabled people's continuing exclusion—has to be located within the legacy of these changing economic structures and the environments they created.

Contesting Urban Space: Disabled People's Organizations

More recently, the city has become the site of contests by disabled people over access, and organizations have emerged that seek to politicize and transform the structures and relations that lead to the creation of disabling environments. The past 20 years have witnessed a growing number of groups of disabled people (often distinguished from groups *for*, which are run by able-bodied people). Some of these are impairment specific, whereas others cut across impairment type. What many of these groups have in common is the projection of a positive disability identity and the assertion of a politics that draws on the social model of disability, in stressing disabled people's independence and self-determination. Whereas

some have grown out of national networks, others have their roots in the communities and interests of (urban) localities. For example, the emergence of ethnic minority disability groups has become a feature of some areas of cities in the United Kingdom.

Many of these groups have directly sought to challenge and influence urban policy processes and the role of professionals in determining decisions about urban space, arguably with varying levels of success. Specific sites in the city—buildings, civic amenities, public transport systems—have often become a focus for negotiation and struggle around issues of access. Thus, some groups have used direct action approaches, highlighting the inaccessibility of public transport or particular buildings by literally occupying urban spaces (blocking roads with wheelchairs, for example, or chaining themselves to buses). In other cases, disabled people have sought to participate in, and influence, planning policies and practices at the local level. Within the United Kingdom, for example, local access groups have been established in many localities to assess planning applications and meet with planning officers. However, questions remain about how far disabled people are able to access and influence key decision makers. The impact of disabled people's organizations appears to be contingent on a number of factors, including the size and resources of the group and how far local officials and institutions understand disability and are facilitative of engagement with disabled people. The disability movement itself has often been accused of being fragmentary, based as it is on so many different impairment groups with different interests. Developing effective political strategies that assert disabled people's rights to access the city therefore remains an ongoing challenge for many disability organizations.

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See also Public Realm; Transportation; Urban Planning

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DISCOTHEQUE

Discotheque is a word built by the combination of δίσκος—*dískos* (disk) and θήκη—*théke* (box, chest, tomb), both of ancient Greek origin. The *-théke* suffix has been used in a variety of contexts and languages to signify the physical place in the city, where one particular function is performed or where one kind of object is stored: for example, *Apotheke* (German for pharmacy), *bibliothèque* (French for library), *emeroteca* (Italian for printed media archive), *videoteca* (Italian for video rental shop). Discotheque is the physical place "where disks (i.e., records) are."

Definition

Currently the word is not so commonly used, and the abbreviation *disco* or the term *club* is preferred to refer to the same kind of physical place.

The word was first coined in France and it is connected to a historical era: During the Nazi occupation of Paris in World War II, the live performance of jazz ("degenerate" music) was banned from all clubs. Parisian youth were able to get around the prohibition by setting up illegal dancing places in cellars on the left bank of the river Seine, where people danced to music from record players. People began referring to this kind of place as *discothèque*.

From this short semantic and historical introduction to the term, it is possible to underline certain features of the discotheque:

- Urban
- Based on the storage and use of a certain kind of music support (record) and on the performance of a certain kind of practice (dancing to recorded music)
- Located in a closed, secluded physical space, usually apt to contain a certain number of people and limiting the emission of noise to the surroundings
- Connected to the expression of a political dissent, alternative, or resistance

The discotheque as a physical space reproduces some of the traits of city life: anonymity and density, social distance, and spatial closeness are all urban features that are brought to the excess on a dance floor. Simultaneously, the discotheque offers also a subversion of these same urban traits, first of all through an "excess of sociability" (e.g., dancing, touching, hugging), which contests the notion of urban *Blasiertheit* and indifference described by Georg Simmel, and celebrates unity, love, and community. Second, the discotheque challenges the people's daytime identity based on their professional, economic, social, and cultural status and destroys social boundaries, typical of the regulated and controlled daytime urban life. It allows the creation of a temporary alternative nighttime identity, which can be later maintained or not, in a manner similar to the carnivalesque as described by Mikhail Bakhtin.

The discotheque also redefines the way a city functions, shifting centers and peripheries, modifying social and spatial boundaries, and turning the emphasis on production to an emphasis on consumption.

Sometimes illegalities, ranging from squatting to drug dealing, may concentrate in and around discotheques, in connection to the habits of certain scenes and subcultures. This has brought up issues of social control involving door selection, bouncers, the use of security cameras, and even dedicated legislation (concerning, for instance, age limits, opening hours, licensing, and freedom of assembly).

Dance Music

Music played in discotheques is determined on one side by the music industry and on the other by the choices and practices of local subcultures and scenes. In this regard, it shares with many other urban cultural expressions an intrinsic tension between a mainstream and an underground.

Many more or less lasting music styles (with their corollary of dance moves, performing artists,

films, clothes, and merchandise) have been marketed and played in discotheques. The first is probably the Twist, brought to success by Chubby Checker. The Twist became the first dance craze to achieve a global success. In the late 1960s, North American disc jockeys (DJs) started experimenting with various dance music styles such as soul, Latino, electro, and funk, to achieve a musical flow able to last uninterrupted for the whole party-night in the disco. This was happening especially within African American and Latin American communities in New York City, in connection to the rising hip hop culture. At the same time, gay males began attending and organizing discos, and these locations became central for the self-identification of queer communities in cities like Chicago and New York. At the end of the 1970s, discos were taken over by the multinational corporate music industry. The legendary Studio 54 opened in Manhattan, New York City, in 1977. In the same year the film *Saturday Night Fever* (directed by John Badham) popularized practices and conventions of New York City disco dancing all over the world.

Discotheque and the Industrial City

The industrial outskirts of cities have had an important role for the consumption of music in discotheques. The adoption of secluded industrial outskirts for the opening of discotheques is connected to the noise, which increased thanks to the technological development of more sophisticated public address systems; to the rent, which was cheaper than in entertainment areas of the city; and to the need for bigger empty spaces to fit more people. Most important, it mirrors a topography of urban exclusion, in connection to the Latino and African American gay scenes in the United States.

This is particularly true of the dance music scenes, which originated at the end of the 1970s, in contrast to the commercial normalization of disco music. For instance, The Warehouse, a discotheque in Chicago West Loop, recruited Frankie Knuckles as DJ in 1977. Knuckles's style in mixing and re-editing was tagged "house" as in "Warehouse," the physical place where this kind of music was first created and danced to.

In the 1980s, discotheques around the world, especially in the United States and in Europe,

located in liminal and industrial areas, started playing house. The Hacienda opened in May 1982 in Manchester, United Kingdom, in a former yacht showroom. It started as a live music venue, but in 1986 changed its weekly program because of the increasing demand for house music. In Berlin, in 1991, soon after the fall of the wall, Dimitri Hegemann, previously involved in the West Berlin techno scene, and Johnnie Stieler from East Berlin, opened a club called Tresor. The club was located in a building on the former death strip (the empty area left by the disappearance of the wall) in the Leipziger Strasse. House music changed within the European context and was soon renamed *acid* house, because of the involvement of a new synthetic drug: ecstasy.

Discotheque and Real Estate

Discotheques play an unusual role within the shift from industrial to postindustrial cities. On one hand, they foresaw the chances given by abandoned industrial architecture and usually pioneered dilapidated downtown (in the United States) or peripheral (in Europe) areas that would later regain real estate value. In some cases, it could be stated that discotheques actively collaborated in the process, boosting the symbolic value of certain areas within cities. This effect was created by the sense of community and excess of sociability linked to the bustling house scene.

On the other hand, discotheques were the first to be excluded, within the final accomplishments of the urban renewal process in the 1990s, because of the increasing value of the built properties and to the retransformation of scene-related entertainment districts into residential ones. For instance, the previously mentioned Hacienda closed definitely in 1997. A private company, Crosby Homes, bought and demolished it. Between 2002 and 2004 on the site, an apartment and office complex was completed. The project maintained the same name of the club. Tresor in Berlin closed in 2005, because of its proximity to the renewed Potsdamer Platz.

The shift from industrial to postindustrial urban economy brought tourism and city attractiveness in general to the forefront. Discotheques of the past or present have sometimes achieved an important status in city-branding campaigns.

Discotheque and Resort Architecture

Discotheques have also been one of the ingredients in the homogenization and standardization of holiday resort architecture, together with souvenir shops, hotels at walking distance from the sea, shops, and cruising and pub-crawling “miles.” Places like Ibiza (Spain) or Goa (India) became world capitals of dance music, and clubbing is a major element of their tourist attractiveness. Discotheques in these locations often acquire hybrid features responding to a desire for both escapism (sometimes related to orientalism) and a vague supranational “urban” style, just like in the case of theme parks.

Discotheque and Technology

Technology affected the development of discotheques on three levels: the music support, the sound diffusion, and the lighting. From the point of view of the support, discotheques adopted, from their historical beginning, the vinyl record. The vinyl started as 78 rpm (revolutions per minute) and soon developed into the $33\frac{1}{3}$ rpm, which is still used for domestic listening. In the 1950s, the 45 rpm (7-inch single), which contained two to four songs (available on two sides), became the most popular format and the most used in discotheques. In the 1970s, the 12-inch record, a single with the size of an LP (i.e., the $33\frac{1}{3}$ rpm), but with just one or two tracks per side, began to replace the 7-inch record. The 12-inch resisted the heavy duty of mixing, scratching, and repetitive playing. Dedicated mixing desks (which included a mixer and two record players) were also produced in this period for specific use in the discotheque. Record labels and often DJs themselves started pressing “white label” 12-inch records in limited editions. Nowadays the 12-inch record is still the most used support by DJs, although the digitalization of music with the MP3 has given DJs the opportunity to store, play, and elaborate on an enormous number of tracks. The availability of sequencers and drum machines from the 1970s and of music software from the 1980s enabled DJs to become producers.

Technology is also responsible for the development of dedicated sound amplification systems for discotheques, able to diffuse the sound in its entire

range and evenly within the dance floor, limiting the emission in the so-called chill-out zones or in proximity to the bar. Lighting also developed, and the professional figure of the VJ (visual jockeys) is, in certain contexts, as important as the DJ for the success of a dancing event.

Giacomo Bottà

See also Gay Space; Hip Hop; Manchester, United Kingdom; Nightlife

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DISINVESTMENT

Most real estate development is investment driven, meaning that private financiers expect to make an adequate profit in return for providing funds for building construction and operations. When investors do not think they can make enough money from a particular kind of property or location, they often sell their holdings, taking money out of real estate and switching it to other assets (e.g., stocks and bonds), other types of property, or other locations. This withdrawal of capital from office buildings, apartment towers, schools, shopping malls, vacant land, and other types of real estate is what is meant by disinvestment.

Different kinds of investors engage in different types of disinvestment. Landlords, for example, may withhold money for crucial renovations,

maintenance, and repairs if they do not perceive an adequate return on their investment. “Redlining” is a type of disinvestment initiated by lenders: Banks and other financial institutions turn down mortgage applications in specific areas because they believe that the growing presence of racial and ethnic minorities increases the chances of borrowers defaulting on their loans. Individual homeowners make similar decisions when they sell their homes in response to a real or perceived decline in housing and land values. This is known as “panic selling.” Disinvestment in isolated properties in otherwise stable or appreciating areas is rare; most disinvested properties are located in places where neighboring properties have received a similar treatment.

The physical signs of disinvestment may include construction projects that have not been completed and buildings that have fallen into disrepair because money for maintenance and upgrading is withheld. Disinvestment can repel existing and potential tenants, suppressing rental revenues and leading, in some cases, to abandonment and demolition. It can also have potentially negative social and political consequences, including arson, crime, property tax delinquency, public service reductions, and health hazards.

The active withdrawal of capital from real estate may be distinguished from a decline in investment. All real estate investment occurs in boom–slump cycles, and investment might drop off in relative terms after a phase of overinvestment and overbuilding within an individual market. In the office building market in the early 1990s, for example, floor space exceeded demand in most North American cities, which caused vacancies to increase, prices to fall, and investors to expend less money on such projects than they did in prior years. However, the subsequent decline in investment did not last long, and most urban office markets recovered within the decade.

In many instances suburbanization, with the promise of fewer risks and more profit, has drawn capital outside city limits. The lure of the suburbs—made more accessible by cheap credit and public infrastructure—along with deeply embedded racial discrimination turned urban areas into relatively less attractive investments.

Disinvested locations, however, provide fertile grounds for the process of neighborhood change

known as gentrification, which is essentially sustained local reinvestment. Most disinvested areas and properties can reverse direction with the right amount of public and private assistance. Indeed, investors often take advantage of previous rounds of disinvestment to buy up properties cheaply, renovate, and sell them for a handsome profit when consumer demand rebounds.

Rachel Weber

See also Deindustrialization; Real Estate; Redlining; Uneven Development

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DISPLACEMENT

For as long as humans have congregated in urban centers, people have been forced to move for various reasons. Scholars, though, have struggled to define this displacement. Grier and Grier developed a definition in the 1970s that encapsulates people’s general understanding. They defined displacement as occurring when a household is compelled to leave its residence because of conditions that affect the dwelling or its immediate surroundings and (1) are beyond the household’s control, (2) occur despite the household’s adherence to previously imposed conditions of occupancy, and (3) cause continued occupancy to be impossible, hazardous, or unaffordable.

Natural disasters and human conflict are perhaps responsible for the largest amount of displacement. Hurricane Katrina in 2005 is an example of widespread displacement caused by a natural disaster. Some 50 percent of the population of New Orleans was initially displaced and

the total number of displacees in the various areas hit by Hurricane Katrina is estimated to be as high as 1 million. The Asian tsunami of 2004 displaced upwards of 5 million people.

Wars, too, can create widespread displacement, reconfiguring the settlement patterns of entire nations. United Nations estimates of the number displaced by the Iraq War (2003–present) range as high as 50,000 per month. World War II is estimated to have displaced tens of millions of people. Indeed, the boundaries of many central European nations (e.g., Germany, Poland) were redrawn as a result of the displacement of millions.

While natural disasters and wars offer the most dramatic examples of displacement, many households are displaced by the normal workings of housing markets or government policy. Some households have to move when the cost of their current unit becomes unaffordable. Gentrification, a process whereby relatively low-income neighborhoods experience an influx of investment and affluent households, has been thought to cause widespread displacement. Recent research suggests, however, that normal turnover rather than displacement is responsible for much of the demographic shift associated with it. Nonetheless, a number of individuals are forced out of their homes because of gentrification, even if the number is not as high as previously thought.

Governments exercising the powers of eminent domain have also contributed to displacement. Although painful to displacees, a need exists for public goods such as highways or military bases, whose construction often requires displacement of households. When the government is viewed as abusing this power or defining the public good too broadly, the resultant displacement can be controversial. City residents opposed the urban renewal program of the 1950s and 1960s, which provided government funds to condemn properties and assemble sites for redevelopment, when it caused too much displacement, particularly among low-income Blacks, without producing substantial benefits. The *Kelo v. City of New London* Supreme Court decision of 2005 generated concern because of the rather elastic way the Court interpreted “public use.” The benefits stemming from economic development were construed as a public use, as opposed to narrower definitions that focus on specific public facilities and uses like parks or roads.

The impact of displacement on the lives of displacees depends largely on postdisplacement conditions. The more similar conditions are to what life was like prior to displacement, the less traumatic the experience will be. When one can relocate nearby and maintain employment, routines, and social networks, the experience is unlikely to be disconcerting. At the other extreme, if an entire community is uprooted and unable to reestablish itself, the experience is likely to be traumatic. In fact, research shows that displacees from gentrification often achieve higher levels of residential satisfaction. In contrast, refugees from war often find it impossible to create any semblance of normalcy.

Lance Freeman

See also Catastrophe; Gentrification; Housing Policy; Neighborhood Revitalization; Rent Control

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DIVIDED CITIES

Divided cities are urban regions in which social, political, or economic barriers have segregated the residents, affected the distribution of infrastructure and services, and generated parallel jurisdictions. The globe is full of cities, big and small, that were either divided but are now reunited or were divided and remain so. As divided cities are not uncommon, and the problems they have are manifold, they are an important issue in urban studies. There are several causes of divided cities. Most often, divisions occur as a result of shifts in

national boundaries brought about by war and conflict. Europe's landscape is dotted with such cities. There are also some in China and in North America. Internal processes can also cause urban divisions. A particular form of ghettoization—which was once found throughout Europe in the form of Jewish ghettos and today is more common in the United States in the form of African American ghettos and American barrios—is one such process. Another internal process of socio-spatial urban division are those cities that contain gated communities. These are enclosed and protected territories designed to house a certain social stratum of the urban population. The following paragraphs describe some of these examples of cities divided by external and internal factors. Jerusalem as a divided city is discussed separately, as it belongs in a category of its own.

Cities Divided by External Causes

Shifting national boundaries as a result of war is the most common cause of urban divisions. There are many cities in Europe that have been divided in this manner. In the early nineteenth century, Napoleon divided Laufenburg across Switzerland and Germany. Later, after World War I and the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, conflicts between Slavic and German-speaking populations resulted in the creation of Bad Radkersburg as a border city. It was split by the Mura River into Bad Radkersburg, Austria, and Gornja, Radgona (which is now called Slovenia). Also in this time, the Lainsitz River formed the new border between Austria and what is now the Czech Republic. The city of Gmuend, on this river, was divided into Gmuend and České Velenice. Similarly, the city of Komarom of the Austro-Hungarian Empire was divided across the jurisdictions of Hungary and what is now Slovakia along the Danube River. Fighting over the Gorizia also began in World War I. It was not until after World War II, however, that the city became divided across the jurisdictions of Italy and what is now Slovenia.

After World War II, the reformation of Germany's northeastern border caused the division of cities sitting along the Oder and Neisse rivers. Muskau was divided into Bad Muskau and Łęknica, Görlitz was divided into Görlitz and Zgorzelec, Guben was divided into Guben and Gubin, Forst

was divided into Forst and Zasięki, Frankfurt (Oder) was divided into Frankfurt (Oder) and Słubice, and Küstrin was divided into Küstrin-Kietz and Kostrzyn and Odra. Since the fall of the Berlin wall the restrictions in mobility have been greatly relaxed, but the fragmented parts remain under the corresponding political jurisdictions of either Germany or Poland. The division of Germany into the eastern German Democratic Republic and the western Federal Republic of Germany, following the discussions at Potsdam, also created the famous divide of the city of Berlin (now reunified).

Cities divided as a result of changing national borders can also be found elsewhere on the globe. In the eastern hemisphere, the annexing of Hong Kong to the British Empire after the Opium Wars also generated some divided cities. In 1997, as Hong Kong was handed to China, the cities of Lo Wu (Hong Kong) and Luohu (China) were reunited under one jurisdiction. Similarly, Sha Tau Kok (China) and Shatoujiao (Hong Kong) were also reunited. Upon reconciliation, the parts that were previously governed by British Hong Kong came under the jurisdiction of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, while the other halves would be administered by Guangdong Province. In the western hemisphere, the dissension and separation of the United States from Britain led to the creation of the Canadian–American border that divided Derby Line in Vermont from Rock Island in Quebec, Canada. This border also split several North American Indian nations. The annexing of Sault Ste. Marie south of St. Mary's River from Ontario, Canada, to Michigan, United States, divided not only the city but also the Chippewa communities. Between New York and Ontario, the St. Regis Mohawk Reservation was also divided.

One of the most spectacular twentieth-century examples of a divided and reunited city is Berlin. Because it is a large metropolitan area, it showcases how extreme the problems associated with division can be. After World War II, Berlin was divided among the Allies, and the separate neighborhoods were occupied by the respective military powers. However, the allied cooperation broke down, and the city was divided into administrative areas, with the Soviets occupying the eastern half, and the French, British, and Americans occupying the western half. In 1961, the Soviet Union began building the “anti-fascist wall of protection”

(*Antifaschistische Schutzmauer*). At first, the barrier consisted of merely a guarded barbed wire fence. Later, as this was not enough to halt migrations, a concrete wall with 24-hour surveillance was constructed in its place. As the City of Berlin was located geographically in the middle of the Soviet-controlled German Democratic Republic, the barrier fully encircled the western sector. These years were marked by the cold war, and Berlin was a place where it played out at a local level, as the two sides of the wall became showcases of socialism and capitalism. At the Museum of Check Point Charlie in Berlin, numerous stories of attempts (sometimes successful, sometimes deadly) at crossing this barrier over the following 28 years are told.

The fall of the wall in 1989 was celebrated around the world. Today, sections of the wall that have been preserved as memorial can be viewed at Bernauer Street, as well as at the East Side Gallery near East Station (*Ost Bahnhof*). The reconnection of the city, however, was a sizable planning undertaking. A good introduction to the complexities of this task are articles from Hartmut Häußermann, Elizabeth Strom, Dieter Frick, and Karin Baumert, who discussed the geographic, political, sociological, and economic implications of reunification. The newly reconnected city had two of everything (e.g., two city halls, two opera houses, two subway systems). To physically reconnect East and West Berlin, roads, bridges, subways, and bus lines had to be built. The dismantling of the peripheral borders of West Berlin also meant that expansion of the built environment into the surrounding state of Brandenburg was possible for the first time in 30 years. Although many celebrated the collapse of Soviet control in the region, and families were reunited, the fall also presented some dilemmas. The characteristics that defined East Berlin between 1945 and 1989 were those that reflected socialist thought: (1) The “artistic” urban design of the city centers reflected the success of the socialist regime; (2) there was no suburbanization; (3) presocialist structures were neglected and left as reminders of the pitfalls of capitalism; (4) there was no segregation based on economic status but rather on political status and the capacity to participate in the socialist regime; and (5) an extreme centralization of power and decision making resulted in token municipal

participation. The ramifications of this transition from socialism to capitalism posed many problems, and many felt that the west had simply expanded eastward without assessing the merits of the former system—there was, for example, no homelessness or unemployment, and women were fully educated and occupied high-level positions of employment. And indeed, after the wall fell, there were huge expectations over a reunified Berlin as a city well situated for eastern markets. Developers from around the globe scurried to Berlin and began rebuilding. In the 1990s, Berlin became famous for its construction cranes, and tourists flocked to Berlin to see them.

Cities Divided by Internal Causes

Internal divisions can be identified throughout urban regions. Divided cities, however, should be differentiated from what might otherwise be referred to as fragmented cities. Cities, today, are riddled with spaces that are not accessible to everyone. The *béguinages* in the Netherlands, Belgium, and northern Germany were communities for women. There are also housing cooperatives in Canada that house members of specific groups with specific needs: lesbian and gays; or people of a specific language; or seniors. Cities governed by Islamic law also have spatial divisions according to gender and social status. Yet, these spaces are part and parcel of the city as a whole, because the people who live in these spaces often tap into the same infrastructural resources, participate in the same overarching political and economic milieus, and their membership is neither instituted nor protected by force. On the contrary, differentiated spaces of a fragmented city are said to provide spaces of empowerment for their users. Nancy Fraser, one famous proponent of this position, for example, refuted Jürgen Habermas’s concept of a single and open public sphere where everyone participated equally. Fraser argued that alternative discourses are not guaranteed in such models of democratic discourse. Rather, alternate discursive spaces are required—such as women-only spaces—where dialogues and ideas can emerge that might otherwise be drowned out in democratic forums such as Habermas’s model. In this way, the number and scope of topics that can be addressed in wider inclusive democratic forums is expanded.

Thus, as Fraser argues, such spaces that might seem exclusive at first glance are actually contributing to, and broadening, wider democratic discourse.

Cities that are internally divided, however, reveal a much higher degree of separation than spaces of fragmented cities. For example, cities that contain ghettos or barrios constitute divided cities. Loïc Wacquant had done extensive research on ghettos and had arrived at a specific definition of the term for the purposes of social scientific investigation and for the purposes of distinguishing ghettos from enclaves, disadvantaged neighborhoods, or alternate spaces. In his view, ghettos exhibit four characteristics: stigma, constraint, spatial confinement, and institutional encasement. The ghetto is a place in which the greater society singles out a particular segment of the population and sections them off, either through force or through systematic institutional exclusion. The result, according to Wacquant, is the growth of an extreme form of parallel institutionalism. According to Wacquant, this urban form existed in Europe as Jewish ghettos. Throughout the last millennium—fifteenth-century Rome, fifteenth- and sixteenth-century Venice, seventeenth-century Vienna and Prague, nineteenth-century Frankfurt, to name a few—many cities across Europe contained Jewish ghettos as regions where persons of Jewish faith were permitted to reside and work. In the twentieth century, myriad Jewish ghettos were established under the rule of Adolf Hitler, the most famous and largest being the Warsaw Ghetto. In the United States, Wacquant focused much attention on Chicago and the ghetto of Woodlawn, whose residents (1) lacked basic public services such as adequate schooling, health care, transit services, advocacy, and security—even the police stayed away; (2) endured a high degree of stigma and suffered substandard living conditions and life expectancies; (3) were dominated by a booming underground economy in weapons and narcotics trafficking; and (4) identified the world outside the neighborhood as inaccessible and foreign. Chicago is therefore a divided city because life inside and life outside of the ghetto represent two separate and independent urban systems. Similarly, it has been argued that American barrios, such as East Los Angeles, exhibit, although not as severely, structural and systemic segregation similar to

African American ghettos. High rates of unemployment and poverty and low investment in infrastructure and services lead to patterns of social and spatial segregation that resemble urban enclaves at best and ghettos at worst.

Perhaps the ghetto's opposite are urban gated communities that have been emerging throughout South America over the past 30 years as a result of socioeconomic changes around the region. Effectively, these become urban spaces for the rich, whose lifestyle expectations concerning comfort and security needed to be met. They are known as "gated communities" (*barrios cerrados*), "private urbanizations" (*urbanizaciones privadas*), or "gated condominiums" (*condomínios fechados*), and are found in Santiago de Chile, Buenos Aires, Mexico City, São Paulo, and Rio de Janeiro. The AlphaVille community of São Paulo is the oldest such development. It is home to 30,000 residents, it has an infrastructure that employs 150,000 workers, and it boasts its own private university and health care system. Utilities are provided without public assistance by the AlphaVille Urbanismo corporation. The community is outfitted with 24-hour surveillance by armed security personnel, and this is claimed to protect residents from the urban ills of São Paulo and its high homicide rates. The cost of living in AlphaVille is beyond the reach of the average Brazilian family. Thus, these communities may be seen as deepening and reinforcing the socioeconomic divides among the respective urban populations.

Segregation of elites is by no means a new phenomenon. The middle-class flight to the suburbs in North American cities is a twentieth-century example of this and is said to have exacerbated ghetto formation inside cities. In earlier times, religion often played a key role in separating the wealthy, educated, and powerful from what was viewed as the profanity of daily urban life. Monasteries, abbey complexes, and cloistered communities in the Middle Ages were home to servants of the Christian faith as custodians and guardians of the church's social, political, and economic capital. In China, the Forbidden City (*Zijin Cheng*), built to house the emperor—the earthly counterpart of the celestial emperor—was also a place that segregated the wealthy and the powerful from their subjects. Its construction occupied over a million workers, and upon completion during the Ming Dynasty, its

interior was vast. Its 8-meter wall and 6-meter-deep moat enclosed 7 hectares with 90 palaces with gardens and courtyards, 980 buildings, and 8,704 rooms. For 500 years it was entirely off bounds to the public. In both of these cases, these segregated communities of elites were backed with armies, ready to exert force over possible dissidents.

Jerusalem

Probably the most controversial divided city that exists today, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, is Jerusalem—a city whose religious significance is shared by members of many denominations and whose political situation reaches into wider global and historical political economics. Ever since the arrival of Jewish populations in the late nineteenth century—arrivals that came in waves referred to as immigrations (*aliyahs*)—there has been conflict with the Palestinian population. The conflict intensified to such a degree that in 2000 the prime minister of Israel, Ehud Barak, approved plans to erect a physical barrier. A neutral account of the humanitarian consequences of this barrier can be found in a document written in 2005 by the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs in cooperation with the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees. Israel began building the 8-meter-high and 670-kilometer concrete barrier, which is reminiscent of the Berlin wall, in 2002 as a temporary measure to protect against Palestinian attacks. Because the barrier extends into the West Bank, the length will be almost twice that of the West Bank Armistice Line (the Green Line)—the border between Israel and the West Bank. Palestinians living in lands located between the barrier and the Green Line have, as a result, hindered access to markets located on the western side of the barrier (the remainder of the West Bank). Along the barrier, various communities are severed from their agricultural lands and water wells, as well as services such as schools and hospitals. To ease movement, various gates will be built. There are agricultural gates for those needing to access their land on the opposite side. There are general access checkpoints manned by the Israeli Border Police, and military gates (not for civilian Palestinian use). Road gates are placed to ease the flow of traffic, school gates are for Palestinian schoolchildren,

seasonal gates are provided during harvest times, and settlement gates are designed for the Israeli settlers living in gated communities in the West Bank. To use any of the gates, the required permit must be shown. Generally, Palestinians must show either a permit to enter Israel or a Green permit to enter a closed zone. Palestinians who reside inside a closed zone receive a Green permit automatically that is valid for two years.

The barrier is not scheduled to cross through the middle of the city as one might expect were it to follow the Green Line. Instead, the wall will reach around the western districts of the city, encompass the Arab neighborhoods, and divide them from the West Bank. As is planned throughout the rest of the barrier along the Israeli–West Bank border, the barrier around Jerusalem will also be dotted with various gates. The *Qalandiya* checkpoint, for example, is designed to act as the gateway into Jerusalem for West Bank commuters and schoolchildren who are educated within the city limits but live in the West Bank countryside. To move through the gates, Palestinian civilians must retain the respective permit, which is granted for limited amounts of time.

The City of Jerusalem will not be divided in the same way that other cities mentioned earlier in this entry have. It will not be a city with a part of it sectioned off. Instead the division results as Palestinians are encompassed inside a closed zone and divided from the rest of the West Bank, forcing a degree of parallel institutionalism among their communities. Jerusalem is also not a city being divided by external forces per se, as the Israeli government is building the barrier for itself as a means of protection. It might be argued, however, that the Arab communities are being divided by external forces—namely, the Israeli government—because Israeli sovereignty over Arab lands is in dispute. Moreover, movement of Palestinians across the gates will be sharply surveilled.

There are cities all around the globe that are, or once were, divided, and there are varying degrees of separation. Some have been divided for so long that two separate and independent cities have emerged that peacefully coexist, such as Laufenburg (in Germany and Switzerland) and the cities along the German–Polish border. Some are divided or being divided and tensions are negative or hostile, such as is the case in Jerusalem and possibly barrios

and African American ghettos. Some are reunited and are rebuilding relations, such as Berlin. The forms of divisions also vary. Sometimes the division is formed by a national border, such as all the German examples. Sometimes it is administrative—such as the divided cities in Hong Kong. Sometimes the division is social and economic, as ghettos, barrios, and gated communities are. Divisions of all forms, because of their characteristic of permanency, are often a result, but also a further source, of deep-seated social, political, and economic problems and are thus an important lesson in the study of urban systems.

Constance Carr

See also Barrio; Berlin, Germany; Capitalist City; Chicago, Illinois; Gated Community; Ghetto; Hong Kong, China; São Paulo, Brazil; Social Exclusion

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DOWN, ANTHONY

From fluctuations in the U.S. real estate market to the causes and consequences of traffic congestion and suburban sprawl to the workings of a two-party democratic political system, Anthony Downs's career as an economist has been grounded in the principles of choice, rationality, and market forces. His work has been important to a broad spectrum of audiences, including academics, public policy makers, and corporate decision makers. Rooted in economic assumptions, Downs has hypothesized how and why people and institutions make decisions about property, development, politics, and transportation and has pointed to the likely consequences of these decisions.

Downs, born in 1936, received a PhD in economics from Stanford University in 1956. The following year he published his dissertation, *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957) and, a decade later, he penned *Inside Bureaucracy* (1966). These books are widely cited by social scientists studying elections, political participation, political parties, and government. Their popularity has grown over time. Since 1980, they have been cited nearly 4,500 times in social science journals. *An Economic Theory of Democracy*, in particular, contributed to the understanding of how parties compete for voters in a two-party system by moving toward the center and why voters choose to vote or abstain in these elections. Political scientists have used these theories to explain changes in voter behavior when institutional changes shift the costs and benefits of participation. This work has led to a long-standing paradox as the costs of voting almost always outweigh the benefits for each individual voter, yet many individuals still vote in national, two-party, winner-take-all elections.

Downs's work has highlighted how micro-level decisions often lead to unintended and unfortunate macro outcomes. He has advocated implementation

policies that would shift costs and benefits—such as changes to tax policy or the use of vouchers, quotas, or tolls—that in turn might produce more desirable social outcomes, such as the development of more affordable housing or an easing of racial tensions. At times, Downs views what is widely considered to be a problem, such as traffic congestion at peak hours, as an important consequence of local economic vibrancy rather than insufficient planning or infrastructure. His work on issue-attention cycles has provided insight into how the public perceives crisis and reacts to social and political issues over time.

Reviewers of Downs's work have sometimes noted that his policy prescriptions are very difficult or impractical to achieve given political realities. Yet, certain recommendations, such as the use of high-occupancy toll lanes in congested areas that have been implemented locally have resulted in outcomes consistent with Downs's predictions. Some of Downs's reviewers have found his underlying economic assumptions to be too abstract or too simple. Others note that Downs's predictions regarding the availability and pricing of housing and rents in the 1980s did not meet his expectations. Downs's advocacy for policies to break up disadvantaged urban communities in the late 1960s have been seen as both an important impetus to urban renewal efforts as well as a step that disempowered many in poor communities by diluting geographic concentrations.

Since 1977, Downs has been a fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington, D.C. He has also worked in government for both Republican and Democratic administrations and has frequently consulted for and served on the boards of corporations, nonprofits, and other organizations related to real estate, public planning, insurance, and finance. His father, James Downs, founded one of the nation's first real estate research endeavors, the Real Estate Research Council, in 1931. Anthony Downs later went on to work at the Real Estate Research Council and served as its chairman for four years.

Mark M. Gray

See also Governance; Local Government; Real Estate; Rent Control; Suburbanization; Urban Economics

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DOWNTOWN REVITALIZATION

Public efforts to remake downtowns long predated their decline. By the turn of the twentieth century, high-rise central business districts surrounded by low-rise residential neighborhoods were a distinctive feature of American cities, unlike European cities that typically intermingled commerce and housing.

Reform: 1900–1930

Functionally and visually distinguished, downtown became the iconic heart of the city: the engine of economic growth, the embodiment of civic pride, the “100-percent district” of peak real estate values, the showcase of cultural sophistication, and the meeting ground of diverse populations. Business and civic leaders worried, however, that downtowns were confronting the physical limits of growth. This was represented most vividly by inharmonious downtown traffic, a chaotic and hazardous mix of pedestrians, bicyclists, streetcars, carriages, and a small number of cars.

Two broad approaches arose to address this problem. One, rooted in the accomplishments of nineteenth-century civic engineering, sought to continually modernize infrastructure to accommodate growth. The next logical step in transit,

for example, was to replace streetcars and elevated trains with higher-capacity subways. Boston (1898) and New York City (1904) led the way, but soon subway plans were proposed even in smaller cities such as Cincinnati and Detroit in anticipation of what municipal leaders argued was inevitable future growth. Modernization signaled a city's aspirations.

The second approach originated in the "urban housekeeping" of women's clubs. Devoted to physical cleanliness, esthetic unity, and social surveillance, urban housekeeping had less success on city streets than in the more easily controlled environments of downtown office buildings and department stores (and later in suburban malls and theme parks). Subsequently, City Beautiful planners such as Chicago's Daniel Burnham argued that order and beauty could be achieved only by fundamentally rethinking downtown geography. In particular, they fought for height limits on buildings so that downtowns would be forced to expand outward, beyond their constraining borders, rather than upward. This would create space for parks and plazas, relieve traffic congestion, and generally humanize the scale of downtown. The battle over height limits in New York City resulted in the nation's first zoning laws (1916).

Renewal: 1945–1965

The presumption of a harmony between downtown and the rest of the city began to break down in the 1920s when plans for subways failed, in part because of neighborhood resistance. The first civic associations devoted exclusively to downtown development emerged in cities like Oakland (1931), Chicago (1939), and Pittsburgh (1943)—and nationally in the Urban Land Institute (1940). These groups faced the fact of decentralization. With the growing popularity of cars, accommodated only with difficulty by compact downtowns, both residents and retailers began moving beyond city borders and between the radial spokes of rail transit, while industry bought cheap land on the outskirts for its sprawling assembly lines.

The Depression and war masked some of the effects of decentralization, however, allowing some

planners to maintain their faith in downtown hegemony. Modernizers shelved subway plans in favor of more up-to-date technologies: hub-and-spoke automobile highways that would funnel traffic downtown, from suburbs as well as city neighborhoods, into multilevel parking facilities. With the dispersal of industry, planners envisioned downtown to be the center of the highest, if no longer all, of an area's economic functions. In its bid for renaissance, Pittsburgh replaced industrial blight with the acclaimed Gateway Center office complex (1949) at the same time that its ordinance against industrial smoke (1945) became a model for others to emulate.

Retailers perceived the need to compete with outlying business districts and suburban chain stores. They began with promotions ("Saturday Downtown Value Day"), but soon pushed for renewal along City Beautiful lines: a more attractive downtown that, in spreading outward, had the additional advantage of displacing "blighted" residential neighborhoods that deterred visits from suburbanites. They were aided by Title I of the Housing Act of 1949. Originally created to rebuild the nation's poorest slums by utilizing eminent domain, the act failed to mandate the replacement of condemned housing while empowering city agencies to choose which neighborhoods to renew first.

Before 1955, much of the funding for these transformations was local. Federal grants authorized in the 1949 Housing Act—which would pay up to two thirds of renewal projects—spent years in the pipeline. But the Highway Act of 1956 and a 1954 amendment to the Housing Act, allowing federal funding for nonresidential projects, led to massive expenditures to transform downtowns and nearby neighborhoods. Between 1955 and 1965, urban renewal surged in cities such as New Haven, Connecticut, which successfully lobbied Washington, D.C. Public officials pursued a vision of a downtown integrated into a regional transportation system, relieved of traffic congestion, and cleared of both residential and industrial blight. It was a distinctly American vision, as Europeans rebuilt their city centers along prewar lines, reserving more radical redevelopment for the outskirts.



An attempt to revitalize the 65-block business district that is downtown Los Angeles with upscale lofts and condominiums, chic restaurants, vibrant nightlife, and cultural and entertainment experiences has improved the look and feel of the once-dilapidated and -neglected area.

Source: Tracy Buyan.

Revival: 1965–Present

By 1965, there was a backlash against both the failures and successes of urban renewal. At its worst, it resulted in vacant lots in the heart of downtown—St. Paul’s “Superhole” or St. Louis’ “Hiroshima Flats”—and destroyed neighborhoods along its edge, whose residents painfully relocated to poorer areas or into high-rise public housing. On the other hand, renewal often succeeded in its goal of creating more office space. Easily stacked into tall buildings and benefiting from the proximity to professional and government services, offices continued to be viable in compact downtowns at the same time that American occupations shifted toward white-collar work. Some cities for the first time gained impressive skylines. The result, however, was often a monotony of International Style megaliths that paradoxically deadened downtowns even further.

In response, a new beautification movement, following the lead of critics such as Jane Jacobs and Kevin Lynch, conceived of cities as delicate ecologies of interlocking functional zones. Opposing the grand plans of renewal, they thought small. A new downtown residential population—artists, bohemians, gays, young professionals—reclaimed warehouse districts block by block. Historical

preservationists retrofitted old industrial spaces for new commercial uses, often following the example of San Francisco’s Ghirardelli Square (1964). As a grassroots phenomenon, similar efforts would continue for decades not only in large downtowns, but in satellite business districts and Main Streets: Mansfield, Ohio, sparked renewal with a refurbished carousel (1991).

In the early 1970s, a recession joined decentralization, rising crime, and municipal insolvency to bring downtowns to a postwar low. With shrinking federal support for neighborhood programs, a new generation of enterprising, deal-making mayors—often from ethnic or racial minorities—focused again on the downtown economy. They subsidized development using tax-increment financing, which earmarked future gains in tax revenue for bond payments, and federal Urban Development Action Grants, authorized in 1977 following the end of urban renewal (1974).

As suburban growth slowed, developers viewed downtowns as fresh territory—but not as blank slates. Because the charm of premodernist buildings was a draw, rehabilitation became the basis for commercial revival. James Rouse created Boston’s Quincy Market (1976) by transforming a decaying downtown warehouse into an attractive setting for

specialty shopping. Quincy Market inspired numerous imitations, including Baltimore's Harborplace (1980) and New York's South Street Seaport (1983). These "festival marketplaces" addressed new desires for rootedness while hewing to exacting standards of urban housekeeping. Developers also adapted more conventional malls to downtown, notably Chicago's vertical Water Tower Place (1976) and Philadelphia's Gallery at Market East (1977).

Grassroots and commercial beautification often emerged in tandem with big-ticket modernization projects. With revived public spending for public transportation, beginning with the Mass Transit Act of 1964, some cities improved commuter and intracity rail, including direct lines from airports. But much of the new infrastructure has been, like the festival marketplaces, "spectacular"—that is, created to attract and entertain visitors. Cities scrambled to build convention centers, hotels, sports stadiums, and (more recently) casinos with the aim of again connecting downtowns to a vital periphery, which now encompassed a global population of tourists and businesspeople.

The success or failure of revitalization has depended on a mix of factors. Larger downtowns with existing commuter rail and safer images garnered reliable daytime populations of office workers and increasing numbers of residents, who in turn made festival marketplaces feasible. Downtowns that could best capitalize on an aura of excitement and sophistication became tourist and business destinations. Born in the age of industrialism, the downtowns that have revived the most are the ones that have adapted to a postindustrial economy.

Matthew Roth

See also Developer; Gentrification; Public-Private Partnerships; Shopping; Urban Crisis; Urban Policy

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DRUG ECONOMY

Some 200 million people, or 5 percent of the world's population aged 15 to 64, use drugs at least once a year. The number of opiate users is estimated at around 16 million (11 million of which abuse heroin), while the number of cocaine users is said to be close to 14 million. Confining our overview to heroin and cocaine: Following strong increases in the 1980s, opium production has been basically stable at around 4,000 to 5,000 metric tons per year since the early 1990s. It is also estimated that 87 percent of opium destined for the illicit market is now produced in Afghanistan. As for cocaine, after the peak reached during the second half of the 1990s, production is now estimated at 674 metric tons per year, a 29 percent decrease when compared to the late 1990s. According to a 2005 United Nations report, most of the world's cocaine is produced in three countries: Colombia (50 percent), Peru (32 percent), and Bolivia (15 percent).

Although some commentators tend to focus on the profits generated within heroin- and cocaine-producing countries, many authors would concur that it is at the level of international trafficking, wholesale and retail distribution, namely in consuming countries, that the bulk of the proceeds of the drug economy is found. Descriptions of the drug economy devote specific attention to these three levels, and despite slight definitional differences, it is normally accepted that the organizational structure of the groups involved in this economy varies according to the function or task: manufacturing, international trafficking, or wholesale, medium level, and retail distribution. Large, formally organized groups are said to prevail at the international trafficking level, namely, groups that manage to establish steady partnerships

with producers. Trafficking routes, however, shift according to the groups involved, political circumstances, law enforcement efforts, and, finally, legitimate trade routes. The latter aspect is deemed crucial, as illicit drugs would normally follow the same commercial conduits carrying legitimate goods. Countries that are positioned on the traditional trade routes of the main source countries of heroin and cocaine, or are historically engaged in imperial and postimperial relationships with these countries, may therefore be major importers. In such countries, communities of residents whose background is in producing areas are said to play a central importing role.

Upper and Medium Markets

Drug trafficking, however, does not necessarily require access to producing countries, as transactions may take place in major distribution hubs, for example, in Pakistan or, as far as Europe is concerned, the Netherlands. Distribution in individual countries is not as structured as one may assume. Dorn, Murji, and South (1992), for example, found that domestic supply systems were not characterized by neat, top-down hierarchies controlled by a Mr. Big. Rather they painted a picture of a fragmented and fluid system populated by a range of opportunistic entrepreneurs from a variety of backgrounds, including licit businesses with an illicit sideline. These entrepreneurs were described as career criminals who turn to the drug business from other “project crimes,” such as bank robbery or major fraud. Upper- and medium-level distribution, therefore, is carried out by a variety of actors, including flexible groups engaged in the supply of other illicit goods and services, affinity groups based on family ties, small organizations formed through ethnicity links, and freelancers, namely, ephemeral entrepreneurial groups operating in a variety of areas in a contingent manner.

Other authors differentiate between middle- and upper-level markets but are aware that such differentiation obscures the fact that many “layers” of distribution can be found within both levels. The fragmentation of drug markets, the mobility of distributors between levels, and the overlapping “layers” at which transactions take

place may further complicate attempts to precisely classify the different market levels.

In brief, it would appear that the chaotic traits normally attributed to local markets increasingly characterize also the middle level of the drug economy. However, this chaotic and competitive climate does not always translate into violence, as groups seem to tolerate each other. At times violence may instead connote the bottom of the market.

Local Markets

Different types of users tend to be serviced by different types of supply systems. Recreational users, for example, may not engage in proper economic transactions, as they might receive drugs through friends and acquaintances. Problem users, on the other hand, are forced to maintain stable relationships with networks of suppliers and sources of legal or illegal income. At the local level, there are “place-specific markets,” such as street-level or indoor markets supplying regular users, and so-called open markets, which supply any buyer, with no need for prior introduction to the seller by known reliable buyers. More vulnerable to policing, open markets tend to slowly disappear and turn into closed ones, with the result that occasional, recreational users are forced to establish connections with problem users and professional suppliers.

Research conducted at the local level suggests that involvement in the drug economy does not necessarily imply embracing a specific drug subculture. Buying and distributing illicit substances appears to be increasingly determined by the profit prospect and perceived as a one-off remunerative enterprise or as a regular occupational choice. This is a relatively new phenomenon, as previous research found widespread use of “techniques of neutralization,” whereby dealers justified their activity by claiming that they were users as well, and by arguing that they provided a “service” to needy people similar to them. The different actors involved in local markets do not share motivations, values, or lifestyles, thereby inhabiting an economy based on fragmented roles and cultures rather than a homogenous social setting. Each actor, in other words, might participate in that economy while ignoring the rationale guiding other people’s

participation. Often users and small suppliers know and work with only one or two other people in the distribution network, thus confining their activity to a single segment of the drug economy. It is at this level that the majority of individuals involved may acquire from this economy what amounts to a criminal “minimum wage.”

Many young users and dealers supplement this illicit minimum wage with income derived from the hidden, or informal, economy. Here they perform unregistered work, and it is often here, in the informal economy itself, that their first encounter with illicit drugs takes place. This mainly applies to the vulnerable sectors of the drug economy, namely, individuals who are more exposed to detection and arrest. In brief, drug-dealing networks develop, first, as a result of mere occupational choices, and second, through involvement in the hidden economy in which many make a living. In this economy, marginalized youths may start using drugs on an occasional basis, but as barriers between recreational and problematic use are being eroded, “poverty drugs” become increasingly available.

Ethnicity and Drugs

Research, such as that conducted by Pearson and Hobbs, has previously suggested that drug-dealing networks are often organized along lines of kinship and ethnic identity. It is also suggested that this may be changing, as new market conditions increasingly encourage alliances between dealing networks and partnerships among different ethnic groups, according to the National Crime Intelligence Service.

At the international trafficking level, organized groups appear to be multiethnic, as business entails contact with a variety of countries and operators. The United Nations’ research, in this respect, suggests that in the majority of cases criminal groups are not tied together by ethnic linkages. Studies have also identified mobile groups of international traffickers, often from marginalized communities, acting as independent operators, who offer their trafficking services to a variety of large national distributors. These groups may be culturally homogeneous and consist of members of extended families, but the transactions

in which they engage are multiethnic in character. In most cases, therefore, risky international operations are covered by less-powerful groups and networks.

The development of drug-supplying networks might be understood through what are known as ethnic succession arguments. These have posited that crime can serve as a path of socioeconomic mobility for minorities, who eventually gain access to the formal economy. However, mobility can be constrained within criminal economies, and law enforcement efforts toward certain minority crime groups may have the unintended effect of creating opportunities for the upward mobility of other minority groups. Attention to certain criminal groups may create “vacancies,” which are being increasingly filled by new ones.

While the ethnic element is important, market dynamics may overshadow such an element. Mono-ethnic markets appear to be limited to small-scale supply, while partnerships are inevitable at upper supply level. This is not surprising, if one bears in mind that drug economies mirror some aspects of legitimate economies. Big businesses and large-scale financial operators are not discriminatory on the basis of their customers’ or partners’ ethnic background or skin coloration, whereas those who occupy the more disadvantaged positions in the labor market may very well be. It is ironic to note that, while users and small dealers are often engaged in the strenuous affirmation of ethnic identity, those above them conduct business in total multiethnic harmony.

Vincenzo Ruggiero

See also Crime; Urban Crisis

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DU BOIS, W. E. B.

William Edward Burghardt (W. E. B.) Du Bois (1868–1963) was an African American sociologist, historian, author, editor, and political activist whose contributions to the discipline of urban studies can be found primarily in his groundbreaking socioeconomic study of Black Americans in Philadelphia, *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899).

Education, Academic Career, and Research Goals

Born in 1868, W. E. B. Du Bois was educated at Fisk University, the University of Berlin, and Harvard University. In 1895 he became the first African American to receive a PhD in the social sciences at Harvard University. Du Bois's academic career

began at Wilburforce University (the older African American University), moved to Philadelphia in the mid-1890s (where he conducted research for his classic study *The Philadelphia Negro*), and then moved to Atlanta University from 1897 until 1910 (where he sought to establish a program for the study of African Americans, including their transition from rural to urban living). Over the course of this time, which circumscribed his formal academic career, Du Bois aimed to design and implement a series of systematic studies on African American social organization and culture. A significant part of his agenda concerned the status and fate of African Americans in urban America. The emergence of the industrial order in the United States, coupled with the end of slavery and the beginning of the migration of African Americans to urban areas, allowed Du Bois to consider the city to be the central geographic terrain for assessing the status of, and future prospects for African Americans.

Ultimately, Du Bois's early scholarly mission was to transcend the still-developing formal academic disciplines in order to create a supradisciplinary understanding of the social character, cultural status, and policy needs of African Americans, especially as they began the process of cementing themselves into the urban sphere of early twentieth-century American life. A major point of emphasis in these analyses was framing an orientation to interpreting, defining, and measuring social problems for this constituency. A core part of his objective was to document the barriers and obstacles inhibiting the social advancement of African Americans, to define some strategies and ideas for resolving them, and to illustrate how historical analysis, demographic data, fieldwork, and survey research can be employed to help achieve those ends.

The Philadelphia Negro

The strength of Du Bois's empirical contributions is best found in his most regarded study, *The Philadelphia Negro* (1899). Du Bois's approach to this work was influenced by his reading of Charles Booth's *Life and Labour of the People of London* (1891–1897) and the *Hull House Maps and Papers* (1895), authored by the Residents of Hull House. In his own work, Du Bois observed and documented the life experiences and social conditions

affecting African Americans in Philadelphia's Seventh Ward, which housed one fifth of the city's African American population. He set out to document and interpret a range of social issues pertinent to the Black experience in Philadelphia, including northern migration, social conditioning, the social institutions and lifestyles of the Black community, and the enduring effects of slavery. Du Bois employed a questionnaire on family structure, income and wealth, and qualities of residential life. He also observed public interaction in the community. Finally he acquired or created diagrams and blueprints of the physical structures throughout the Seventh Ward in order to offer a comprehensive account of unemployment, family decay, and social hierarchies in the ward.

Du Bois's commitment to empirical research emerged during his studies in Germany, where under Gustav von Schmoller he was exposed to empiricism. The multiple method approach to data collection, unparalleled in social research for years afterward, blended structural analysis with micro-level depictions of public interaction and behavior in private settings. In *The Philadelphia Negro*, Du Bois provided a masterful weaving of class and racial effects in documenting the conditions of the Seventh Ward in Philadelphia. Through such an effort, he was able to argue that the urban slum was a symptom, and not a cause, of the economic, social, cultural, and political condition of African American urban life. In the chapters where he presented his agenda for Whites and Blacks, he divided his discussion of what Black Americans must do for racial advance into specific charges for the different class segments of the African American community. This effort reflected Du Bois's reformist inclinations. He aimed to produce not only a scholarly contribution but an illustration of how scholarship connects to a policy platform for redressing problems, as in Philadelphia's Seventh Ward.

His efforts here helped him to argue that slavery, prejudice, and environmental factors were the three principal causal factors affecting African American life in Philadelphia. Moreover, he promoted a non-homogeneous depiction of African Americans by elucidating the class distinctions along the behavioral and organizational dimensions of social life. *The Philadelphia Negro* was the first comprehensive community study in American sociology. This

work reflected precisely the kind of community-centered sociology that appeared on the American landscape in the following two decades (in large part because its proponent, and one of the early leaders of the University of Chicago school of sociology, Robert Ezra Park, also studied under the empiricists in Germany). *The Philadelphia Negro* remains a pathbreaking community study that helped establish a vernacular for writing about the social conditions of Black Americans, despite its moralistic claims and an elitist disposition taken toward lower-income Black Americans.

Essentially, Du Bois regarded the city as the site of great promise and opportunity for African Americans as they escaped the ravages of slavery and as an incubator of disease, filth, crime, vice, and moral decay for its inhabitants who were not yet following a path toward socioeconomic mobility and stability. The city became Du Bois's socio-geographical backdrop for the processes of African Americans' adaptation to modernity. Accordingly, for him any cultural advance for African Americans would be reflected by the degrees to which they turned away from vice, criminal activity, and folk mores and moved toward the staples of American modernity, which included securing employment and cultivating stable families. The proliferation of wage labor in the city's emerging industrial sphere and commitments to community-level organizing for social betterment were two of the mechanisms that Du Bois believed would firmly position African Americans in modernity.

Critical Reactions

There was some critical reaction to Du Bois's theories of cultural advance for African Americans. Some argued that he too aggressively embraced White American standards for social conduct and cultural inclinations in making his case for what African Americans should strive for, both in and beyond the confines of the city. Others, like Ross Posnock, have argued that Du Bois did not equate Whiteness, per se, with being culturally advanced but that, instead, Du Bois was asserting that without having suffered the burdens of being African Americans, White Americans generally achieved a level of cultural advancement that most Black Americans had yet to acquire. Du Bois's high

regard for cultural advancement, together with his conviction that most socioeconomically disadvantaged African Americans lacked his sense of cultural sophistication, is what has led some observers to consider him a cultural elitist.

Contributions to Urban Studies

Du Bois's importance to urban studies may be seen in his pioneering social-scientific investigation of the African American urban community in multiple ways. First, he gave credence to the idea that African Americans were capable of surviving and contributing to American life and culture. Second, he documented how the city served as a geographical arena of increasing significance for assessing how that outcome could be achieved. He explored and explained how cities bring individuals and social groups into close and consistent contact such that opportunities for socioeconomic advancement, but also for conflict and tension, might unfold. Furthermore, he explained how different interactive styles and the various ways in which people represented themselves in public lead to perceptions of social status and significance and how that shaped the means by which strangers engaged and maneuvered with each other in city life. Finally, he introduced how a range of methodological techniques, including observational studies, interviews, census data, and reviews of historical documents, could lead to

different as well as complementary portraits of the social experiences of city dwellers and the social flavor of city life.

Alford Young Jr.

See also Ghetto; Social Exclusion

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E

EDGE CITY

Edge city is a term used to refer to the edge of an urban area, an area dense with businesses, entertainment, shopping, and recreation. Some argue it has become the major form of urban growth worldwide, pushing residential suburbs even farther away from the urban core.

Edge City in Popular Culture

Edge city is everywhere. The *Edge City Review* is billed as the “world’s only conservative literary magazine, featuring New Formalist Poetry, fiction, and book reviews.” *Edge City View* is a website that features articles on “Waco, Vince Foster, and the Secret War” and a review of the Mexican foto-novela genre *Mascaras en Accion*. Edge City is a cyberpunk game in which characters battle it out for control of Edge City: “Enter Edge City as the ultimate hacker, a Data Ripper, and jack into an exciting future. Battle Body Rippers in the apocalyptic Sprawl.” *Goodbye to the Edge City* is a 2001 recording by indie rock band Preston School of Industry, described as similar to early-period alternative or post-pop bands in a review of Laconic’s *Funhouse* compact disc. The Edge Cities Network is a business resource website including links to municipalities on the suburban fringe of European cities (e.g., Croydon–London, Espoo–Helsinki, Fingal–Dublin, Kifissia–Athens, Loures–Lisbon, Nacka–Stockholm, and Horth Down–Belfast) and

notes that “the Edge Cities forums are in place to encourage discussion and interaction between the various Edge Cities’ partners and businesses.”

The Edge City Collective in Philadelphia—offering improvisational music from beyond the new frontier—pays direct homage to Joel Garreau:

It’s an ironic reference to Joel Garreau’s compellingly written, but ultimately disturbing book, *Edge City—Life on the New Frontier*, which details the seemingly unstoppable trend in our society toward a homogenized quasi-suburban culture. In this world, every place could be anyplace. Minds are numbed by fast food, television, and countless hours spent driving between shopping malls and office parks. And music is shaped primarily by the profit motive and a resulting desire to please the masses. We seek out a different “frontier.”

Garreau’s *Edge City*

Most urbanists are familiar with the ideas presented in Garreau’s *Edge City* (1991). The edge city represents the third wave of urban history, pushing us into new frontiers at the edge of the metropolis. Garreau analyzed urban development across the United States and identified 123 places as true edge cities and another 83 up-and-coming or planned edge cities across the country. This first list included some two dozen edge cities in Los Angeles, 23 in Washington, D.C., and 21 in the greater New York City region. The edge city is

distinguished by a number of features, including the following:

1. The area must have more than 5 million square feet of office space (about the space of a good-sized downtown).
2. The place must include over 600,000 square feet of retail space (the size of a large regional shopping mall).
3. The population increases every morning and decreases every afternoon (i.e., there are more jobs than homes).
4. The place is known as a single end destination (the place “has it all”: entertainment, shopping, recreation, etc.).
5. The area must not have been anything like a “city” 30 years ago (cow pastures would have been nice).

Garreau goes on to identify three distinct varieties of edge city: boomers (the most common type, which develop around a shopping mall or highway interchange); greenfields (master-planned new towns on the suburban fringe); and uptowns (activity centers that have been built over an older city or town). The last two types are in opposition to the five distinguishing features in the previous list: Greenfields that are master-planned new towns include residential areas as well as entertainment and shopping and will not suffer the morning increase and afternoon decrease in population; uptowns that have developed from earlier satellite cities were, in fact, suburban cities at some earlier point in time.

Garreau notes that the actual boundaries of the edge city may be difficult to define, because they do not have the same look, political organization, or visual cues as older cities (they are less concentrated, do not have elected officials, and the semiotics of space and design are different). But Garreau asserts that edge cities are “the most purposeful attempt Americans have made since the days of the founding fathers . . . to create something like a new Eden.”

Moving beyond the classification of place based on physical structure and economic function, the edge city is also described as beyond the political boundaries of both the central city and suburban municipalities: “The reasons these places are tricky to define is that they rarely have a mayor or a city council.” Although this definition may sound similar

to the “interstitial areas” that figured prominently in the Chicago School studies, Garreau’s definition of the edge city contradicts the definition of *city* in political science and in sociology.

Other Definitions of the Edge City

Sociologists have many definitions of cities and urban areas, and it is common for books in urban sociology to contrast definitions of “cities” and “urban areas” based upon the numbers of persons and population densities required for places to be considered urban. But these are administrative and legal definitions that go beyond sociology and social theory. Perhaps the best-known sociological definition of urbanization is that of size, density, and heterogeneity from Louis Wirth’s essay “Urbanism as a Way of Life,” but this is presented not as a definition of a city per se but rather as a means of distinguishing between urban and rural places.

The lasting theoretical definition of the city is provided by Max Weber. In the first chapter of *The City*, Weber explains how cities developed from market centers that had gained political independence from earlier patriarchal and patrimonial regimes. The argument is presented in some detail, and it is clear from his description that the city is the result of the administrative regulation of economic markets.

Weber’s definition of the city is constructed as an ideal type, allowing for a comparison of cities across time and space, and it remains the starting point for the sociological study of the city and the modern metropolis. Crucial to Weber’s understanding of the rise of the modern city as a distinct form of social organization is the ability of the city to regulate economic activity and guarantee rights and privileges to the citizens. Garreau’s definition of the edge city specifically limits the edge city to areas that are outside the political boundaries of contemporary cities and suburbs. They cannot, therefore, be cities, because they do not have political boundaries and therefore do not have political authority or the ability to regulate activity or guarantee rights and privileges.

Edge City Studies

Discussion of edge cities has become almost ubiquitous in the many disciplines that comprise urban

studies. John Macionis and Vincent Parillo include an extensive discussion of edge cities at the end of their chapter on urban ecology (“Edge Cities: The Latest Growth Pattern”). In this presentation, the edge city follows concentric zones, sector theory, multiple nuclei theory, social area analysis, and factorial ecology to emerge as the new model for explaining the ecology of urban areas. Garreau’s claim to having information about 200 edge cities is comparable to Homer Hoyt’s analysis of growth patterns in 142 cities. “New patterns of urban growth since 1975 demand some fresh insights. . . . What Joel Garreau (1991) calls *edge cities* have become the dominant form.” The text presents Garreau’s definitions of the common characteristics of the edge city, and the type of edge city, followed by a discussion of evolving middle-class urban centers in the edge city and a note that edge cities are now appearing worldwide, on the fringes of Bangkok, Beijing, London, Paris, and Sydney. In this scenario, the edge city is placed alongside other models in urban sociology and then presented to students as the dominant form of urban development in the contemporary city.

William Flanagan’s *Urban Sociology: Images and Structure* presents a more tentative view of edge cities and relates Garreau’s work to other discussions of segmented development and multiple urban centers. Flanagan notes without comment that “edge cities rarely have a governing body nor do their dimensions respond to official municipal boundaries. More of the residents live outside the city proper than within it.” Much of his summary focuses upon the aesthetics of edge city development and popular taste and of the role of real estate developers in translating consumer behavior and preferences into collective special representations (edge cities) and profits. He then suggests that the negative views of edge city development may be similar to the “anti-urbanism” of the past: “As we consider the new sprawling urban annexes, some of us may find ourselves in a position of making nostalgic comparisons between the old, preferred urban form and the new, alien one. But as students of social science, we have to remind ourselves that a large part of our job is to discover and explain the authenticity that these new forms represent as an urban way of life.” In this manner the concept of edge city is unchallenged and indeed is presented as an authentic model of urban

growth that sociologists must incorporate into their work.

The edge city appears in numerous studies in the United States and, increasingly, in European research as well. But in most cases “edge city” has become a generalized label that no longer follows the definition outlined in Garreau’s original statement. For example, Richard Greene’s *New Immigrants, Indigenous Poor, and Edge Cities* argues that the “modern-day edge-city landscape of Chicago stands in dark contrast to the nineteenth-century industrial landscape depicted in the Chicago School’s classic model,” yet the study is based upon an analysis of percentage change in employment for incorporated places in the metropolitan region, areas that would not be edge cities according to Garreau’s definition. The edge city also figures prominently in discussions of urban growth in the Los Angeles region by Edward Soja and others, but once again the edge city is the same as the satellite city of an earlier era, the technopole of the postwar period.

Edge cities also appear in recent studies of European cities. Gordon MacLeod and Kevin Ward, for example, describe Joel Garreau as the preeminent thinker on the urban/suburban/exurban form and suggest that the edge city represents a “self-contained employment, shopping, and entertainment mode permitting millions of contemporary Americans to live, work and consume in the same place,” although Garreau’s definition of the edge city specifically states that these are not residential areas (the population during the day is greater than the population during the evening hours—the edge city is a place for people to work and to shop, but it is not a residential suburb). Nigel Phelps has studied political governance and economic development in edge cities in five European countries; in each case, these are “edge urban municipalities” that are part of a “self-styled network of European edge cities.” This is quite different from Garreau’s note that edge cities may be difficult to define in part because they do not have the same political organization as older cities and do not have elected officials.

Los Angeles School adherents argue that the growth of the postmodern city creates emergent suburban landscapes that require new models and new methods of study. Edge city is used extensively in this literature (although alongside older labels

such as the satellite city, outer city, technopole, and suburban fringe). While the edge city may have a more direct application to geography—it is after all the result of the concentration of business, commercial, office, and retail space—in current usage, edge city has lost the original meaning, and use of the concept challenges conventional understandings in political science and sociological analysis. Although urban scholars seek new models as well as new labels to better describe the continued expansion of metropolitan regions, there is recognition that models developed in the United States may not transfer to other countries because of differences in political governance. Contemporary research in the United States, United Kingdom, and beyond will allow scholars to better evaluate whether models, such as the edge city and growth machine, are applicable across cultures and regions.

Ray Hutchison

See also Exopolis; Suburbanization; Technopoles

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ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE

Environmental justice is both a normative principle describing the equitable distribution of environmental benefits and burdens and a political and legal movement that seeks to realize that goal. A closely related term, *environmental equity*, represents the state, achievement, or outcome of environmental justice, and *environmental racism* is the practice of contravening environmental justice along racial or ethnic lines.

Beginning in the United States in the early 1980s, advocates advanced environmental justice claims within the logic of racial equality of the civil rights movement and did so by following a legal strategy seeking change through litigation in the courts. Movement organizers also saw environmental justice as a means to move mainstream environmental organizations from their traditional focus on conserving and protecting nature to an anthropocentric concern with protecting people, especially those burdened by low income and racial and ethnic segregation or discrimination, from inequitable exposure to the harmful effects of environmental pollution.

More recently, the scope of environmental justice has expanded beyond the original focus on the inequitable spatial distribution of environmental burdens. This expansion has entailed the reconceptualization of justice beyond distributional considerations to consider procedural, systemic, and structural dimensions, and the reconceptualization of environment beyond the siting of noxious activities to include the economic and political construction of the geographic landscape within a broad political ecology framework. The conceptual evolution of environmental justice has prompted, in turn, a redirection of method and practice beyond the original, narrowly construed legal strategy to encompass a broader and potentially more far-reaching challenge to underlying sociospatial processes.

Historical Roots

The pivotal moments in the introduction, diffusion, and popularization of environmental justice have been memorialized in frequently rehearsed histories of the movement. Although local protests in the United States over noxious environmental conditions date back to colonial-era objections to rendering plants and mill ponds, the rubric of environmental justice emerged with the conjunction of the civil rights and environmental movements in the late 1960s and 1970s. The first organized protest to explicitly invoke themes of environmental racism and environmental justice is widely acknowledged to be the opposition mounted in 1982 by residents of rural Warren County, North Carolina, to the proposed construction of a landfill for disposal of contaminated soil containing highly toxic

polychlorinated biphenyl. Prolonged protests, the arrest of more than 500 demonstrators, and support from national civil rights and environmental groups captured widespread national attention to protesters' claims that siting the proposed landfill in the African American community constituted a violation of residents' civil rights.

A report released the following year by the U.S. General Accounting Office found that three of the four commercially operated hazardous waste disposal sites in the southeastern United States were located in predominantly African American communities. Prompted by the Warren County protest and the General Accounting Office report, the United Church of Christ established a Commission for Racial Justice, whose landmark report titled "Toxic Wastes and Race in the United States," published in 1987, found a strong statistical correlation between the racial and ethnic (i.e., non-White) proportion of the population in an area and the presence of both commercial hazardous waste disposal facilities and uncontrolled (unregulated or abandoned) toxic waste sites. The concept of environmental justice became popularized with the publication in 1990 of sociologist Robert Bullard's widely read textbook, *Dumping in Dixie: Race, Class, and Environmental Quality*.

The movement demonstrated its national stature by convening more than a thousand participants in the First National People of Color Leadership Summit in Washington, D.C., in 1991 (a second National Leadership Summit met in 2002) and releasing a 17-point statement, Principles of Environmental Justice. Among other claims, these principles asserted a fundamental right to environmental self-determination for all people. Environmental justice attained federal recognition with the 1992 establishment of the Office of Environmental Justice within the Environmental Protection Agency and with President William Clinton's signing in 1994 of Executive Order 12898 requiring federal agencies to consider the effect of their actions on the environmental conditions of people of color.

The origins of environmental justice in the civil rights movement account for the initial impetus among activists to pursue their aims through litigation. The strategy challenged individual instances of the proposed siting of environmentally noxious activities such as toxic landfills or hazardous waste

disposal facilities in low-income communities of color. In most instances, remedies were pursued under Title VI or Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or as violations of equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment.

The case-by-case litigation strategy, however, faced difficult legal and methodological hurdles and rarely prevailed in court. Cases brought on either statutory or constitutional grounds required plaintiffs to show discriminatory intent, which proved difficult to do when facility proponents defended siting choices on economic or technical grounds. Where the presence of the noxious facility predated the arrival of communities of color, discriminatory intent was rendered moot even as the resulting spatial juxtaposition violated the normative principle of environmental justice. Demonstrating a spatial correlation between environmental harm and communities of color encountered methodological obstacles when opposing expert witnesses produced differing statistical results depending on the geographic units—block groups, census tracts, zip code areas, municipalities, counties—employed in the analysis. Because a strong statistical correlation observed at one geographic scale might disappear when calculated using a different spatial unit, advocates were hard-pressed to prove that an observed relationship was real and not simply a statistical artifact.

The litigation strategy was more successful in cases challenging government administrative procedures rather than statutory or constitutional violations, but these successes were still unable to transcend the inherent limitations of the case-by-case approach. Successful opposition to an undesirable facility might simply relocate the problem to an equally marginalized but less-well-organized community elsewhere, displacing rather than attenuating the environmental injustice. Pursuing environmental justice based on the spatial distribution of environmental burdens took production of those burdens as given without challenging the mechanisms—from private investment decisions to land use controls and environmental regulations—that produced the environmental burdens. And the distributional understanding of environmental justice was unable to resolve the apparent paradox of impoverished communities seeking economic survival by "volunteering" for noxious facilities they would otherwise oppose on grounds of distributive

justice, as when a jobs-starved community agreed to a chemical plant in its midst.

Reconceptualizations

Growing awareness of the limited scope for case-by-case solutions, combined with theoretical advancements in the broader social sciences, prompted a reconsideration of the conceptual and theoretical underpinnings of environmental justice. Expanded conceptualizations of justice, rights, environment, and race have redirected the scope and approach of environmental justice from a legal strategy based on individual rights to a social and political movement seeking broad structural change.

Recognition of the limitations inherent in focusing exclusively on the spatial patterns of environmental burdens increasingly directed attention from distributional outcomes to causal processes and from distributive to procedural justice. Within a procedural justice approach, claims asserting a right of communities of color to participate in distributional decisions quickly gave way to more vigorous demands for participation in decisions affecting the production of environmental burdens to be distributed and for pollution reduction rather than mere redistribution.

Procedural justice demands in turn focused attention on the constraining effects on participation of entrenched social and economic inequality, prompting a debate between structuralists calling for the elimination of class, income, and racial disparities as a necessary precondition for equal participation, and proceduralists urging participation, however initially imperfect, as a means for exposing and thus challenging structural inequity. Political theorists pointed to an underlying shift within the environmental justice debate from a Rawlsian liberal framework of individual rights granted by the state to a structural understanding of the social and political construction of nature and the environment.

In practical terms, these reconceptualizations shifted attention from seeking distributional equity in the siting and location of individual noxious facilities to pursuing environmental justice in the large-scale structural processes through which both people and environments are distributed across the geographic landscape. A parallel

conceptual expansion broadened the theorization of race in the attainment of environmental justice from a concern with individual racist acts to a focus on institutional and systemic racism pervasive throughout society. In place of the traditional understanding of race as a characteristic of individuals differentiating people into preexisting categories, environmental justice theorists advanced the concept of White privilege as a diffuse social practice that works through racial categories such that privilege—including, in this case, access to privileged environments—is differentially distributed. The shift from individual noxious facilities to the structural production of large-scale environments, from individual rights to social justice, and from the racial categorization of individuals to systemic racist practices all cohere in a conceptualization of environmental justice as a responsibility shared not only by individuals held liable for transgressing principles of equity but by all those who benefit from membership in a political community. Environmental justice, on this account, is a responsibility of all.

Robert W. Lake

See also Environmental Policy; Landscapes of Power; Racialization; Social Production of Space

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ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY

Environmental policy is the framework and means by which public decisions take into account the natural, nonhuman environment. The origins of environmental policy in modern cities can be traced to efforts at comprehensive planning. Early examples include John Claudius Loudon's Breathing Places plan for London in 1829, Frederick Law Olmstead's work on Boston's Emerald Necklace beginning in about 1878, and Daniel Burnham's 1909 Plan for Chicago. Such plans incorporated the felt need for green spaces that would improve the physical beauty of cities, living conditions, and public access to nature. In the early stages of industrialization, cities turned to environmental policy to mitigate air and water pollution from industry and inadequate sanitation infrastructure and thus to prevent damage to human health.

Urban Environmental Policy and Regulation

Increased scientific evidence and public consciousness of the ill effects of industrial toxins on ecosystems and human health in the 1960s drove the development of regulations to monitor toxic waste in North America and Europe. Following this, environmental impact assessment protocols were legislated as part of national, and sometimes state or subnational, development requirements. Today, urban environmental policy packages encompass these historical concerns for green space, air and water pollution abatement, sanitation, and the regulation of toxins in the environment, but they also contain a new suite of policy approaches related to emerging concerns for urban sustainable development. The latter include policies to reduce energy use and greenhouse gas emissions to a per capita "fair earth share" in order to achieve distributional equity and mitigate climate change. As a means to reduce global economic insecurity, sustainable development policies may also encourage farmland preservation and food production for bioregional

resilience and close and localize production loops. Building industry and preservation activities include improving environmental construction practices and protecting ecology and biodiversity.

The starting point for urban environmental policy has been the need for a dependable and high-quality supply of the basic inputs to life like water and air and more effective "waste sinks"—means and mechanisms to externalize waste from urban production and consumption cycles—in order to reduce resource- and technology-driven limits to growth. Thus cities have developed lead paint abatement programs, air pollution reduction strategies, and recycling systems. Over time, environmental policy has become more broad-based and cross-sectoral, addressing environmental dimensions of citywide issues in urban management. Land use and strategic planning, transportation planning, site and building design, waste management, environmental impact assessment, environmental audit procedures, and state-of-the-environment reporting are some of the economic tools and regulatory systems pursued in the name of environmental policy.

Impact of Urbanization on the Environment

Despite the city's long-standing promise of a new, liberated set of human–nature relationships through scale efficiencies, technological modernization, and social, political, and economic innovations, the net impact of cities on the nonhuman environment is still grossly negative. Moreover, these negative impacts and hazards are a reality of urban life for all but the wealthiest citizens and are the result of rational and conscious trade-offs as well as neglect and oversight. The city provides a view to the consequences of environmental degradation that are impossible to ignore and that thus play an important role in shaping and rationalizing environmental policy.

Urbanization can bring about irreversible changes in water patterns and availability and other natural ecosystem functions. Urbanization also increases energy consumption along with expectations for complex humanmade infrastructural standards and systems. The concentration of industrial emissions and increased use of private automobiles severely erodes air quality and other key elements of quality of life. Acute respiratory illness associated with poor

air quality and poor housing conditions impact human and economic productivity. These are highly regionalized phenomena that track closely with rapid rates and volume of urban population growth.

Sprawling patterns of urban growth, evident in developed and developing countries alike, have consequences for the potential of cities to be resilient to external environmental shocks and to accommodate continued population growth without sacrificing quality of life. Environmental land use and growth management policies recommend, to varying degrees, high-density urban development as a means to decrease residents' need to travel via private automobile, increase transportation alternatives, reduce energy consumption, improve health, increase sociability and social capital, and create other scale efficiencies.

Responses to Environmental Policy

Individuals and groups in the city are affected differently by, and have different responses to, environmental policies based on socioeconomic status, job category, gender, and race. In particular, environmental policies are often charged with being discriminatory toward the poor, in spite of the persuasive argument of the World Commission on Environment and Development in 1987 that environmental degradation and poverty often coexist. Poverty generates environmental degradation; this increases the vulnerability of the poor. Basic infrastructure is missing from many poor households in cities in the developing world, as these households are confined to slum settlements. Lack of access to clean water and sanitation in slums leads to contamination of water and land and is a cause of many prevalent waterborne illnesses. Slum dwellers also suffer disproportionately from the risk of natural and human disasters. They lack access to green spaces and functioning ecosystems. Living in areas with depleted natural resources and a lack of public services, slum dwellers also suffer disproportionately from environmentally caused illnesses.

International Environmental Policy

Environmental policy has been advocated at the city scale in the international arena since the 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment was held in Stockholm, Sweden. There, the importance of

developing patterns of urbanization that are compatible with the limits of the natural environment was first discussed. The result was a number of recommendations emphasizing the importance of planning and managing human settlements, including cities, with sensitivity to local and global environmental quality.

Twenty years later, the 1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, expanded upon these recommendations via Local Agenda 21, a document that ties environmental and development policies together with local authorities, along with civil society groups initiating processes for the design of context-dependent policies. Local Agenda 21 also emphasizes the long-term nature of this work and the need for democratic involvement of civil society and local institutions for implementation and follow-through. Local Agenda 21 has been pursued primarily in Europe and Latin America. In North America, city-scale policies and programs for reduction of greenhouse gas emissions and other climate change mitigation and adaptation strategies provide good examples in the spirit of Local Agenda 21, as these interpret 1997 Kyoto Protocol national commitments down to the local scale. Voluntary commitments made under such policy packages include, as a means to greenhouse gas emissions reduction, higher environmental building standards, development of transportation alternatives and alternative fuels, and educational and behavioral challenges for households and institutions.

The Rio Conference also resulted in the popularization of a new organizing concept for environmental and development policy: sustainable development. As applied to cities, sustainable development expands the concerns of environmental policy to explicitly consider the integration of the "three pillars" of environmental, social, and economic priorities in urban development and management. Sustainable city policies attempt such integration with a consideration for intergenerational impacts. The framework of the sustainable city also raises the specter of environmental policies that address not just the human need for natural resources, systems, and services but also the intrinsic needs of nature as it adapts to growing cities. Examples of such policies include ecological restoration, biodiversity recovery strategies, bird

migration policies, and stream daylighting policies. This approach to urban environmental policy is seen to have strong potential for the long-term mitigation of environmental hazards that put cities at increasing risk under climate change, perhaps the clearest example of nature's adaptation to urban development worldwide.

The decision to take action against environmental degradation is socially constructed. The point at which waste becomes pollution, risk becomes unacceptable, or consumption goes beyond basic needs is a matter of context-specific interpretation. Even environmental policies that seem to be uncompromising attempts to dematerialize cities or separate cities from their dependence on increasing resource throughput, such as Canberra, Australia's "No Waste by 2010" policy, are implemented through public education about waste, waste valuation, and marketization programs.

Future of Environmental Policy

Urban environmental policy relies on sound science, access to resources, and political dialogue and decisions. The extent and severity of environmental problems in contemporary cities continue to be objects of much debate and conjecture. The holistic and forward-looking stance of sustainable urban development is appealing for its promise of coherence and balance, as demonstrated by "triple bottom line accounting" whereby the economic benefit-cost ratio of a given project must be balanced against both social and environmental benefit-cost ratios. Despite coherence in theory, practices of environmental policymaking in cities derive from a wide range of motivations—recreational, educational, ecological, economic, equity, health, reputation—and these can conflict. For example, providing for the basic needs of all people in the context of resource scarcity implicitly requires decreasing excessive consumption by some people. Also, activities that are environmentally harmful to cities in the aggregate and over the long term often make individuals' lives more convenient and immediately enjoyable. Dissent about the drivers of, and best policy responses to, urban environmental problems may be considered a sign of progress, as more diverse actors become engaged with the issues and challenge existing and proposed policies and positions.

Urban environmental policy has an uneasy relationship with urban governance, as it is usually quite separate from the core functions of urban government and as arguments persist about the utility of "command and control" compared to voluntary approaches to improving environmental performance. Considerable advances in environmental policy have made urban lives tolerable and often rewarding for billions of people through a range of legislative, voluntary, and partnership-based approaches. Most preferred by private sector interests are voluntary associations and agreements, often pursued at the international scale. Two prominent examples are the International Standards Organization's ISO 14,001, which offers an extensive list of environmental performance standards for signatories, and, specific to the construction industry, the Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design points-based accreditation system for green buildings. City governments and nongovernment organizations also engage in international networks for environmental policy research, dialogue, and action, such as the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives and the UN-HABITAT World Urban Forum, proving that cities are capable and prepared to play active roles in international environmental improvement.

Meg Holden

See also Environmental Policy; Sustainable Development

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ENVIRONMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY

The interdisciplinary field of environmental psychology began in the 1960s in the United States with the founding of the Environmental Design Research Association, the journal *Environment and Behavior*, and the first PhD program in environmental psychology at the City University of New York Graduate Center. Institutionally different but parallel efforts occurred in Europe, Scandinavia, and Asia about the same time. Environmental psychology focused on the important role of the physical environment in shaping human behavior and development. It offered an alternative to accounts based on internal psychological processes and social relations devoid of a physical context. There was also widespread agreement that environmental design, urban planning, and environmental conservation would benefit from a better understanding of people's perceptions, understandings, and behaviors.

Most founders of environmental psychology also believed that a valid account of psychological processes must start from the unit of "person in environment" rather than viewing psychological processes as internal to the person or to some particular region like the brain or function such as cognition. From this perspective, environmental psychology is a new interdisciplinary area of inquiry engaging not only psychology but also the multiple disciplines that account for human behavior and experience in terms of more macroscopic spatial, social, and cultural processes and structures, as well as the physical sciences that contribute to knowledge of the material nature of the environment and of human beings.

Kurt Lewin's field-theoretic orientation in social and developmental psychology, his student Roger Barker's development of ecological psychology, and the pragmatic psychology of William James and John Dewey each offer analytic tools to study "person in environment" units. Environmental psychologists also draw on existing mainstream psychological theories through, for example, applications of behaviorist paradigms to shaping pro-environmental behaviors or cognitive psychological approaches to wayfinding.

Not all of the founders of environmental psychology were themselves psychologists. Urban planner

Kevin Lynch's book *Image of the City* in 1960, anthropologist Edward T. Hall's book *The Hidden Dimension* in 1966, architect Christopher Alexander's book *A Pattern Language*, the Chicago School of Urban Sociology and the fields of human ecology, and systems theory, as well as the social upheavals of the times, all strongly contributed to the birth of environmental psychology. These ideas and disciplines remain important for environmental psychology, as does the problem- and action-centered, "real world" orientation that arose from the sense of the urgency of social and environmental problems facing the world.

Major Conceptual and Methodological Contributions

By starting with the question of how individuals engage with the world around them, environmental psychologists formed new concepts that place human experience in a dynamic relationship to the material and social world. In this regard environmental psychology shares many perspectives with geographical, sociological, and anthropological conceptions of how human experience is shaped. However, interest in the individual level of analysis prompted a focus on the experiential, face-to-face, everyday aspects of life rather than starting with more societal or cultural levels of analysis. Environmental psychology studies human experience and behavior at multiple levels of analysis. Environmental psychologists struggle, not always successfully, to avoid environmental determinism as well as the reductionism of all experience and behavior to individual-level processes. The focus on "individual in environment" led to new approaches to understanding human behavior. The concepts that follow constitute some major contributions of the field.

Affordances

James Gibson, a perception psychologist, defined *affordances* as the behavioral potential of the properties of the physical environment relevant to the particular perceptual and behavioral capacities of the organism. For example, a ledge one foot off the ground affords sitting comfortably for a three-year-old but not for a six-foot-tall adult. The concept has been extended to include socially organized

capacities for behavior and the social-historical nature of the material environment. For culturally competent members of the United States, a mailbox affords posting a letter. Gibson rejects the idea that there is a little man in the head who must take in information about the environment, represent it or process it, and then act. He places perception in a continuous process of moving, looking, seeking, correcting errors in which learning is not a matter of internalizing contingencies in the environment but rather of increasingly skilled pickup of information that resides in the environment.

Behavior Mapping

Numerous standardized methods have been developed to record human behavior in environments ranging from systematic observation of target individuals across environments through multiple approaches to recording the range of people and activities in a particular environment over time. This method has been useful in assessing the efficacy of interventions to increase variety and frequency of use of environments ranging from urban playgrounds and plazas through dayrooms in big city mental hospitals. In one well-known study, *The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces*, William H. Whyte used time-lapse photography to study how people use the sidewalks, plazas, and parks of New York City.

Behavior Setting Theory

Roger Barker developed the theory of behavior settings through naturalistic observation of children in their daily lives. He concluded that the behavior of one child in different settings varied more than the behavior of different children in the same setting. This led to the theory that there were “quasi-stable” person–environment units organized temporally and spatially (such as classes, bridge clubs, and coffee shops) that regulated the behavior of inhabitants in predictable ways through “programs” that organize the behavior of participants in coordination with the temporal and physical environment. These programs also enforce goals and norms. Alan Wicker, Barker’s student, later modified the theory to (1) contextualize behavior in relationships within broader institutional and societal systems; (2) elaborate the role

of specific individuals over the life course of behavior settings, especially during founding of the settings; and (3) use multiple methods. Behavior setting studies often reveal that the settings and programs actually existing within an organization are at odds with the ostensible mission of the organization, as when hospitals organize spaces and operating procedures to facilitate staff coping with the volume of patients in ways that interfere with patient care.

Cognitive Mapping

Cognitive maps are psychological representations of environments that guide way finding and affect the quality of experience in them. Urban planner Kevin Lynch and psychologist Edward Tolman both developed this concept though they viewed it very differently. For Lynch, the “image of the city” was conveyed by the legibility of its paths, edges, districts, nodes, and landmarks. For Tolman, cognitive maps arose in the brain through learning about how desires and needs could be satisfied in different places. Both approaches continue to be employed in efforts to make environments easier to navigate and more satisfying to inhabit. Later researchers differentiated the cognitive maps formed by social groups: people with different levels of visual, auditory, and cognitive capacities and developmental ages. Some study cognitive maps as products of cultural and media representations and socioeconomic and political regulation.

Environmental Meaning and Perception

Environmental psychologists use theories ranging from perception psychology to discourse theory, and Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of “habitus” to understand the behavioral, affective, and symbolic meaning of environments for people using a range of methods, including physiological measurement, behavioral and cognitive mapping, interviews, psychoanalytic techniques, visual recording, narratives, and ethnographies. Thus they have described the multiplicity of meanings and perceptions of urban plazas, community gardens, playgrounds, and inner-city neighborhoods that guide use of space, reinforce or challenge group identities, and promote conflict or tolerance among inhabitants

located differently in structures of power and resources as well as differently spatially situated in the physical environment.

Environmental Stressors

Environmental stressors have preoccupied the field since its inception. For all organisms, environments can provoke a physiological stress response when the adaptive capacity of the organism is challenged by environmental conditions, for example, extreme heat or cold. Environmental psychologists study human responses to high levels of noise, crowding, heat, cold, and air pollution, as well as more complex stressors such as environmental chaos. Some research includes studies of the physiological concomitants of stress, but much of it examines the effects of exposure to stressors on cognitive performance, affect, motivation, mental health, and environmental evaluation. The presence of many of these stressors in cities, along with conditions that often contribute to human stress (presence of strangers, fast pace, diversity of populations, unpredictability, and poverty), has been an important topic of study for environmental psychologists. In general, all of these conditions are found to increase negative responses after a certain threshold, but the findings are not uniform and are often subject to qualifications about the types of situations in which the effects will be more negative and the populations most at risk for stress. Chronic stress and exposure to multiple stressors are particularly problematic. People who are already depressed or coping with other life problems are often more sensitive to the negative effects of environmental stressors. Efforts to cope with stressors and psychological reactions to stress often increase social withdrawal and interfere with effective parenting.

Gary Evans and his colleagues' successful intervention to decrease stress among urban bus drivers exemplifies the commitment of environmental psychology to taking seriously environmental and not only psychological causality and intervening at both levels. For example, Evans et al., in cooperation with the Stockholm Transit Authority, demonstrated lower blood pressure and heart rate as well as lower perceived stress among bus drivers on routes redesigned to reduce congestion and job hassles that in prior research had been shown to

create psychological pressures on drivers associated with not only greater psychological stress and less job satisfaction but also higher incidences of cardiovascular, muscular–skeletal, and gastrointestinal problems.

Participatory Research, Planning, and Design

Among environmental psychologists, the focus on people's goals, needs, and capacities as criteria for good place design has led to the steady growth of interdisciplinary participatory research, planning, and design internationally. Environmental psychologists adopt these approaches out of the practical desire for better environments but also as a political response to power inequities and exclusion from decision making of some groups and individuals and a philosophical position on the nature of truth and knowledge. For example, residents of a squatter settlement in Caracas, Venezuela, demanded participation in a large-scale urban development project to increase access to clean water. Environmental and community psychologists engaged in participatory research with the residents in an organized information-gathering and problem-solving strategy that promoted critical reflection among residents. This process led to clear demands for specific components to the project (such as employment opportunities for residents) and to urban design changes.

Habermas's theories about communicative action; Paulo Freire's ideas about pedagogy, power, and knowledge; the American Pragmatic tradition; discourse theory; critical social theory, in general; and feminist theory, Black social thought, and queer theory all contribute to the rationale for participatory approaches and to particular methodological approaches.

Participatory methods involve researchers in engaging those who will be or are affected by an aspect of the physical environment in defining and analyzing the problems they face and the hopes they have for the environment and then conducting collaborative research, data analysis, and development of action plans to achieve goals as well as working on concrete design or environmental use programs. Participatory methods have been used to design schools, urban parks, multifamily residences, and even sections of cities as ways of creating environments that promote the goals and

satisfactions of those who use them and also promote democratic decision making and citizens', residents', or students' active engagement with the physical environment.

Person–Environment Fit

This concept captures the match between the affordances of an environment and people's personalities, goals, and capacities. Many disciplines use the concept to assess the suitability of the social environment to particular personalities. For environmental psychologists, the physical design, layout, other people, and anything that promotes or denies certain possibilities for behavior or experience are on the environmental side of the equation. For example, a crowd at a football game is likely to be congruent with the goal of cheering your team to victory but troublesome if you lose your child. Introverts may be less comfortable in such a setting than extroverts; a lone supporter of the opposing team may be less comfortable than the hometown fans. People who develop an attachment and identification with cities are likely to find it harder to satisfy their desires for aesthetic experiences, activities, and social interactions in nonurban settings.

Place Attachment and Place Identity

The concepts of place attachment and place identity have been used to study the bonds people have with particular places. Place attachment describes the extent to which a person finds it difficult to leave a particular place. This attachment is not always a positive experience and may arise from lack of resources, burdensome obligations, or exclusion from other environments. But more often it describes a positive affective bond to a place in its multiple social and physical aspects. Place identity signifies a deep, in many ways unconscious, relationship to place, for example, comfort on a city street for a native urbanite, or aesthetic appreciation of the flora and fauna associated with particular places. The smoothness of the way a person moves and the sequencing of habitual acts in particular places can be markers of place identity. In both concepts, places can be the repository for memories and evoke particular social identifications. Research has begun to suggest that manifestations of social

capital are sometimes tied to place attachment and place identity.

Preoccupancy and Postoccupancy Evaluation

Environmental psychologists attempt to improve person–environment fit by developing tools to understand what makes environments more satisfying and useful. Preoccupancy evaluation combines place-specific needs assessments with many of the activities common to architectural programming, such as determining the number of users in a particular space, the tasks they must accomplish, and the equipment, furnishings, technology, and spatial organization that would facilitate their effective functioning. Postoccupancy evaluations assess the extent to which built environments serve the needs, desires, and required activities of inhabitants. Postoccupancy evaluations also allow designers and researchers to learn about the implications of their design decisions for building users and how design influences psychological and social processes.

Privacy and Territoriality

The human regulation of interaction through the organization of space has been a core area of study. The ability to have privacy has been linked to a greater willingness to engage with others voluntarily and to allow people to regulate their emotions and restore coping and cognitive capacities. For example, both college students in crowded dorm rooms and parents in extremely dense urban housing in India interact less with those they share their space with than people in similar households in less crowded residences. Notions of territoriality from ethology have been expanded to explain the social and cultural functions of human territories, including the role of “defensible” space in discouraging crime and incivilities.

Restorative Environments

Natural or “green” environments have been shown to have positive restorative effects leading to recovery from stress, positive psychological states, and enhanced cognitive capacities. Even views of nature from the windows of hospitals have been related to reduced pain and quicker

healing. In public housing, views of nature have been associated with greater attention capacity and more effective life problem solving. "Nearby nature" in the form of gardens, street trees, and urban parks appears to increase environmental satisfaction and residential attachment. Urban green spaces also seem to attract social interaction, children's play, and use for physical activity. Hospitals and other health care settings sometimes incorporate "healing gardens" to calm both patients and health care professionals as well as to improve moods and increase perspective on problems. Despite these encouraging findings, the evidence base in the area of restorative environments is relatively thin and the theoretical explanation of restorative environments leaves many gaps.

Significant Areas of Study

Environmental psychologists have made particular contributions to the study of child development and child-friendly environments and environments for the elderly and those with disabilities. Environmental psychologists help design and evaluate schools, playgrounds, residential facilities for the elderly and disabled, health care facilities, workplaces, and jails. They work with urban designers and planners, as well as landscape designers, to apply their concepts and interventions to neighborhoods and whole cities. For example, environmental psychologists in many countries participate in the Healthy Cities movement.

Research and interventions on environmental sustainability runs a wide gamut from behavior modification interventions to participatory community research and action. Some of the most sophisticated contributions have been around the issue of how the meaning and social organization of places change during disasters and their aftermath, and in the face of toxic hazards. These analyses are used to develop policies and practices that facilitate greater cooperation and trust in programs to manage hazards and recovery and to make these programs more responsive to the experiences of residents.

The interdisciplinary fields of urban studies and environmental psychology overlap in that both study neighborhoods and cities. Environmental psychologists have made important contributions

in the area of community development, urban housing, assessments of the quality of the built environment, the relationship between the condition and uses of urban environments and crime, and the meanings of urban environments to residents. Both areas grapple with how spaces are produced, used, and understood. The theoretical debates common to all disciplines concerned with space and society occur in environmental psychology as well. As in urban planning, these debates have implications for practice as well as for research. Important journals that publish articles advancing knowledge in areas of shared interest include *Environment and Behavior* and the *Journal of Environmental Psychology*.

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See also Simmel, Georg; Urban Design; Urban Psychology

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ETHNIC ENCLAVE

Ethnic enclaves are singular demographic and spatial fixtures that contribute to the multicultural makeup, restructuring, and revitalization of urban metropolitan centers throughout the world. Some, like the Jewish *mellah* of North Africa or the Armenian quarter in Jerusalem, date back to the premedieval era, whereas others, like the Fujianese enclave of Hong Kong, the Slavic neighborhood in Kansas City, the Japanese area in São Paulo, or the Surinamese district in Amsterdam, are of a more recent origin. These *neighborhoods of globalization*, because they are multicultural sites and engaged in various forms of transnational relations, are diasporic communities with an ancestral homeland, were politically incorporated into the new country when the territory they shared with other groups became a nation-state, or both. They are *ethnic* or *diasporic* because they are the offshoots of a larger group located elsewhere and *enclave* because they are enclosed inside a legally recognized social formation. Some are integrated in the upper echelon of society, like the British in Hong Kong, whereas the majority of ethnic enclaves, like the old Chinatowns or the recent Little Indias, are located in the lower stratum in their city of residence.

Formation of Ethnic Enclaves

Three prominent factors have contributed to the formation of ethnic enclaves. They have come into being either through immigration, the changing legal status of the territory, or the redesigning of territorial boundaries. Ethnic enclaves occupy contiguous space based on linguistic affinity (Spanish Harlem as a *barrio*), religious tradition (the Jewish Quarter in Paris), or ethnicity (the Italian neighborhood in Montreal). In contrast, other urban enclaves are based on proximity to employment (African Americans in Harlem), same social class status (Russian Hill in San Francisco), same profession (Soho or the artists' quarter in Lower East Manhattan), or same sexual orientation (the Castro district in San Francisco).

The social standing of ethnic enclaves is reflected in their portrayal by the mainstream community, which places them in a hierarchical axis. Some are considered to be a miniature town, a duplicate, or a pole of a continent (Little Africa), of a country (Chinatown, Little Italy), or of the capital city of the homeland (Manilatown, Little Havana). In contrast, the mainstream refers to its site not as a town but as a "new" city ("New" York, "New" Orleans, "New" Jersey) to inscribe in space the superiority of its status vis-à-vis the others. To draw a line and distinguish itself from the non-Anglo Europeans in the United States, it also refers to their ethnic enclaves as "Hill" such as Russian "Hill" in San Francisco.

Jewish quarters, Spanish *barrios*, Black ghettos, and Chinatowns have been the focus of most of the historical, political, sociological, and geographical studies of ethnic enclaves. Since World War II, because of mass migration, other groups have joined the fray and established their diasporic neighborhoods in North America, the European Union, and elsewhere: the Bangladeshi neighborhood in East London, the Korean neighborhood in Tokyo, the Turkish neighborhood in Berlin, the Caribbean neighborhood in Toronto, and the Brazilian neighborhood in New York.

Interpretations of Ethnic Enclaves

Interpretive approaches to ethnic enclaves see them in binary but complementary terms. On the one hand, they are singled out as "communities," with their own institutions (churches, schools, newspapers, businesses) and their distinct cultural practices that glue the members together; and on the other hand, they are seen as "administrative units" that have their own needs in terms of housing, street electrification, water supply, and employment but are capable of influencing wider election results because of their ability to vote for candidates of their preference. The community approach privileges the culture and ethnicity of the group, whereas the administrative perspective prioritizes the integration factor that needs to be managed in its various facets.

The study of ethnic enclaves has had identifying features such as the reliance on assimilation theory to explain their integration in a given locale (political participation, voting behaviors, and participation in

civic organization). The dubious assumption here is that with time they will mingle and mix with the mainstream and will thereby contribute to the harmony of society. Such a vision projects the nation-state and diasporic communities as entities that must be understood inside the territorial space they are enclosed in and tends to ignore the diversity of their political inscription, as different state policies affect ethnic enclaves in different ways. Assimilation was supposed to lead to some kind of a “melting pot” that unites the various components of the nation, Americanizes foreign diasporic cultures, and harmonizes them with the hegemonic practices of the mainstream community. This way of interpreting integration is now challenged by globalization theorists who propose a new way of understanding ethnic enclaves more in tune with daily observations of the behaviors of residents in the digital age.

As a result of previous studies in the assimilation mode, much is known about the role of race in enhancing or undermining social integration of these groups, the impact of poverty on family life, criminality, overcrowding, the strengths of the informal economy and ethnic enterprises, and ethnic institutions such as language schools, media (newspapers, radio, television), and churches. In these studies, residents of these ethnic enclaves are seen as a “reserve army of the unemployed” that provides cheap labor and services, or they are portrayed as a problem that is a source of crime, disease, territorial disorganization, and a welfare clientele.

The newest interpretation of the social and political integration of ethnic enclaves uses globalization theory to redefine the local place not as a self-contained niche but rather as a node in a transnational circuit to which it contributes and that also influences its daily activities. This new approach forces us to relocate the unit inside of a much larger universe and to explain its relations with other units. Early typologies that emphasize ethnicity, religion, profession, and sexual orientation were developed to meet the assumptions of assimilation theory; therefore a new typology that concords with globalization theory is badly needed.

Types of Global Ethnic Enclaves

Ethnic enclaves in this global age can be divided into six types that reflect both their *modus vivendi* and *modus operandi*. The global connections that

sustain their daily practices are the criteria used to develop this new typology. The *global asylopolis* is a community of refugees that seeks either to gain legal immigrant status in the receiving country or to return to their homeland; it is a community whose status is in limbo and who hopes to resolve the problem one way or another. As a group of asylum seekers consumed by their transition status, they need to be differentiated from other types of immigrants because of the acuteness of the problem of transitory settlement they confront and because of their high level of emotions concerning the country they had just left or were forced to leave. The Somalian neighborhood in Cairo is an example of a global asylopolis.

The *global ethnopolis* characterizes the typical ethnic enclave that relies on ethnicity as the underlying principle of its organization. These are legal immigrant residents who maintain their homeland language and develop institutions to ensure the survival and reproduction of their cultural practices. They maintain ongoing relations with the homeland through occasional visits, e-mail, radio and television programs, and homeland newspapers, and some return to vote on election day or financially contribute to the campaign of candidates. The Congolese neighborhood in Brussels is an example of a global ethnopolis.

The *global panethnopolis* is a neighborhood made up of more than one ethnic group; they may be grouped there because of religion, as in the case of the Christian Quarter in Jerusalem; language and culture, as in the case of the Mission District in San Francisco; or race, as in the case of Harlem, which houses Blacks from the United States, Africa, and the Caribbean. Residents of a panethnopolis occupy the same contiguous space but maintain ongoing transnational relations with their country of birth. The Mission District in San Francisco, with its Mexican Americans, Cuban Americans, Chilean Americans, and Peruvian Americans, is an example of a global panethnopolis.

The *global chronopolis* operates as a community on the basis of a temporality different from that of the mainstream. Whereas the dominant society uses the Gregorian calendar, the chronopolis uses the calendar of its homeland (lunar or lunar-solar) in which the peak day of the week is either Friday (Muslims) or Saturday (Jews) and the New Year day falls on a different date than January first. The

rhythm of the community in reference to holidays, festivals, and days of work and rest is in disharmony with mainstream society, and that negatively affects the schooling of their children, their employment availability, and their business practices. The situation is reverse in places like Israel or Saudi Arabia, where the native calendar prevails over the Western calendar. The Jewish quarter of Scheunenviertel in early twentieth-century Berlin-Mitte is an example of a global chronopolis.

The *global technopolis* is a community constituted by high-tech technicians that feed by their labor and expertise the need of a regional high-tech economic sector. They are recruited for this kind of work, and the migration to such a neighborhood is influenced by their skills, labor demand, and family reunification schedules. The Indians of Fremont in Silicon Valley form a global technopolis, whereas elsewhere in the United States, Indian communities can justly be identified as ethnopolises.

Anglo-American neighborhoods are also presented here as ethnic enclaves. They can be called *global Creolopolises* because they are immigrant communities who maintain symbolic relations with their homeland or ancestral region and, in times of crisis, their ethnic consciousness comes to the fore. In daily life, they are unlike the other ethnic communities that more forcefully express their relations with their homeland.

These ethnic enclaves operate on the basis of their participation in a web of transnational relations that daily link them to their homeland and the other diasporic sites in the circuit. They are engaged in transglobal diasporic urban practices that explain the logic of their local interventions. *Transglobal diasporic urbanism* implies that each node is influenced by, and influences, the rest of the global network of sites. For example, products are purchased in a node and sold in another; events in a node may have a ripple effect on the others; and in case of persecution, members of a node may emigrate to resettle in another. This newer form of diasporic urbanism is transglobal and cannot be understood simply by focusing on one single nation-state or one single neighborhood without seeing its connections to other locales in other countries. Therefore the logic of action of a node must be seen within the context of the larger logic of the global network of sites.

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See also *Banlieue*; Chinatowns; Divided Cities; Ethnic Entrepreneurship; Ghetto; Global City

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ETHNIC ENTREPRENEURSHIP

Ethnic entrepreneurship is, by definition, located at the intersection of one sociocultural category, ethnicity, and one socioeconomic category, the status of self-employment. Although a useful concept to examine contemporary and historical urban societies from various perspectives, ethnic entrepreneurship is by no means clear-cut. Self-employment—operating a business as a sole proprietor, a partner, or a consultant—seems fairly straightforward. However, people can be part-time self-employed, or they can run their business without being officially registered. Who has to be labeled as self-employed or entrepreneur then becomes arbitrary. Since the demise of Fordism, nonstandard forms of employment have been increasing, and more people now have a portfolio of economic activities, often including some kind of self-employment. Ethnicity is even more problematic, as it results from the interaction between complex processes of labeling of others, on the one hand, and self-identification by different

social groups on the other. The outcomes of such processes, defining borders between insiders and outsiders, are contingent. Ethnic entrepreneurship, then, can be delineated only within a concrete context, and this dependence makes cross-border comparison difficult.

History

Ethnic entrepreneurship is anything but a new phenomenon. In preindustrial times, “ethnic” entrepreneurs already played a pivotal role in long-distance trade networks. As members of relatively tight-knit groups dispersed over a number of important trade cities, they were able to create far-flung networks in a world where contracts and their enforcement were rare or even absent. Notably, Armenian, Jewish, and Chinese diasporas facilitated flows of trade and finance and thus formed the backbone of the emerging “global linkages” in the Mediterranean basin, northwestern Europe, Southeast Asia, and other parts of the world. The extension of the international rule of law has eroded much of the necessity for these ethnic trade networks, but in specific trades (e.g., diamonds) they are still significant.

Ethnic entrepreneurs have also been conspicuous in another way. Mainstream entrepreneurs, tapping into the same pool of knowledge and routines, tend to share a more or less circumscribed outlook on the world. This collective view, inevitably, sheds light on some aspects but obscures or ignores others. Newcomers, Joseph Schumpeter’s “new men,” may be more sensitive to new opportunities for businesses than are established entrepreneurs. By exploiting these opportunities, they may become drivers of innovation. Ethnicity but also religion and coming from elsewhere can constitute grounds for “otherness.” Ethnic entrepreneurs have at times been crucial in introducing new ways of production, new products, and new ways of marketing and distributing. More recent examples of this can notably be found in food (e.g., Turkish entrepreneurs introducing *döner kebab* to the German mainstream) and in music (e.g., the almost continuous stream of innovations in popular music from *ragtime* to *rap* generated by African Americans in the twentieth century), and nowadays also in software development with Chinese and Indian entrepreneurs in the forefront.

Relevancy

Notwithstanding the conceptual ambiguity surrounding it, ethnic entrepreneurship is an important and useful tool to describe and analyze contemporary economic activities. It rose to prominence after the widespread deindustrialization and economic restructuring of the 1980s, when small businesses made a comeback in advanced economic societies. On both sides of the Atlantic, migrant or “ethnic” entrepreneurs seemed especially eager to set up shop. Many of them had become unemployed when factories closed and, as jobs were scarce, opted for self-employment. “Ethnic” businesses then became a familiar element in many urban landscapes, mainly to be found in low-value-added economic activities in markets with low thresholds in terms of educational qualifications (human capital) and start-up costs (financial capital). These businesses were mainly, but not exclusively, to be found in the poorer neighborhoods of cities.

Anthropologists and urban sociologists were among the first to look closer at this phenomenon, and they focused on the issue of how much these businesses differed from their mainstream counterparts. This “ethnic” dimension has been associated on a micro level with resources but also with markets. More recently, the broader context has also been drawn in to explain patterns of ethnic entrepreneurship.

Ethnic Resources

When research on ethnic entrepreneurship took off in the 1980s, first in the United States with Ivan Light and Roger Waldinger as pioneers, this type of self-employment was strongly associated with the lower end of markets in retailing, restaurants, and small-scale manufacturing (sweatshops). Migrants and ethnic minorities were funneled and pushed into these activities as other opportunities were blocked by their lack of human capital, financial capital, access to indigenous networks, and, in cases, by sheer discrimination. They seemed to be able to survive the cut-throat competition in these saturated, low-threshold markets partly by deploying their “ethnic” resources. These ethnic resources were understood to consist of a specific kind of social capital, namely, “ethnic” capital: the

resources (e.g., financial capital, knowledge, production inputs) that can be accessed by making use of networks of coethnics. To some extent, other sets of resources (notably financial and human capital) can be substituted by ethnic capital. Even more than “common” social capital, coethnic networks are seen as generators of trust—as was the case in the historic diasporic trade networks. Trust lowers transaction costs as formal contracts can be much shorter and even be done away with, making dealings between coethnics cheaper. This also holds especially true for the production inputs, as lending money and employing workers without the red tape can cut costs significantly. These strategies based on trust, more generally, facilitate informal economic activities that can be crucial for a business to survive in these markets.

Ethnic Markets

Ethnicity may also bestow advantages on businesses in another way. Members of a particular ethnic group typically have the knowledge and the trappings that are necessary to sell products strongly associated with their culture (e.g., food-stuffs, music, books, and magazines) to a clientele of coethnics. These so-called captive markets are usually too small for large firms and constitute attractive niches for ethnic entrepreneurs. A captive market may give a head start to a business, but it also entails the risk of eventually getting trapped in a stagnant market as coethnics may leave or assimilate, or as large firms may enter the scene and adapt to these consumer tastes.

Opportunity Structure

The first studies were focused on single cases of ethnic entrepreneurship. Some of them were liable to suffer from a myopic view tracing all kinds of behavior back to some essentialist interpretation of “ethnicity.” In the second wave, more comparative studies were undertaken and the approach that puts the entrepreneur and his or her resources at the center of the ethnic market proved to be insufficient to grasp differences in patterns of ethnic entrepreneurship. Similar ethnic groups showed rather divergent patterns of entrepreneurship in different places. The local and national context had to be brought in, because the kind of business

an immigrant starts and its subsequent role in the immigrant’s process of incorporation are not determined just by the resources this aspiring entrepreneur can mobilize but are also decided by time- and place-specific opportunity structures. Not just the supply side but also the other part of the equation, the demand side—or in other words, the set of opportunities that can be discovered and exploited by individual entrepreneurs—have to be taken into account to explain entrepreneurship.

In capitalist societies, opportunities are related to markets for goods and services. The opportunities in these markets have to be, first, legally accessible (e.g., no discriminatory formal rules or informal practices banning certain groups from starting a business in general or in a particular line of business) and, second, they should match the resources of the aspiring ethnic entrepreneurs. If, as in many cases, ethnic entrepreneurs are on average less well endowed in terms of human and financial capital, they are dependent on opportunities with low thresholds with respect to educational qualifications and start-up capital.

On the national level, institutional frameworks generate, along path-dependent ways, different opportunity structures with diverging sets of openings for small businesses. Different welfare regimes can create different economic opportunity structures (types and sizes of economic sectors) by creating or hampering markets. If, for instance, (full-time) female labor participation is relatively low due to institutional obstacles (e.g., as in Italy), the potential openings for new firms in personal services that could substitute household production (e.g., child care, catering, cleaning) are concomitantly small. Opportunities may also be relatively modest if the state is strongly present (e.g., Sweden) and is crowding out chances for small businesses. In the United States, by contrast, outsourcing by households has created a sizeable demand for low-end services (e.g., housecleaning, catering, dog-walking services). Other components of the institutional framework, such as the tax system and the labor relations, may also impinge on the opportunity structure and either foster or impede business start-ups.

On the level of individual cities, the specific trajectory of the local economy (orientation and dynamics) is important in determining the set of opportunities. A city struggling with its legacy of

an industrial past dominated by a few large firms will offer a rather different set of opportunities for small businesses compared to a booming, diverse postindustrial city. Ethnic entrepreneurs in New York face a very different opportunity structure compared to those in Detroit, or in London compared to Coventry.

The matching between resources of ethnic entrepreneurs and concrete local institutional opportunity structures is not a mechanistic, predetermined process. Entrepreneurs can be highly reflexive actors seeking and even creating opportunities while changing their set of resources. Nevertheless, opportunity structures imply almost palpable constraints to starting businesses.

The Emergence of a New Ethnic Entrepreneur

Recently, a relatively new phenomenon has surfaced as highly skilled migrants from emerging economies start businesses at the high end of markets in, for instance, software development, advertising, or fashion design. The concept of ethnic entrepreneurship, which once seemed so apt to describe poor and unskilled members of ethnic groups *pushed* toward self-employment, now appears to be less suitable to include these high-flying entrepreneurs as well. These new ethnic entrepreneurs bring with them a different set of resources, and this enables them to target a completely different part of the opportunity structure. Their emergence in many advanced urban economies in different parts of the world seems to have more in common with their preindustrial diasporic counterparts than the archetypal ethnic entrepreneur running a small grocery or café.

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See also Chinatowns; Ethnic Enclave; Shopping

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EXCLUSIONARY ZONING

Exclusionary zoning refers to land use regulations that discriminate against some types of people, especially those with low incomes. Whereas all zoning exists to exclude specified land uses from certain areas, exclusionary zoning separates particular people from certain areas. Exclusionary zoning works to limit the amount and pace of residential development, thereby rendering housing in a local jurisdiction unaffordable for low-income residents (and even municipal workers such as teachers and firefighters). Zoning codes might also place outright bans on apartment complexes or other types of affordable housing. In the United States, where numerous suburban localities have used exclusionary zoning to stabilize

community character and curtail demand for government services, excluding lower-income residents segregates racial and ethnic minorities within metropolitan areas. Whether such class and race effects are intentional or merely the logical result of regulations that control the housing supply is debated.

Exclusionary zoning includes requirements and prohibitions regarding residential development. Typical requirements are for minimum lot sizes, house sizes, or set-backs from the street; rigorous landscaping or building code standards; complex development approval processes; and provision of extensive infrastructure and public amenities. Common prohibitions involve moratoria or caps on multifamily housing, mobile homes, accessory apartments, subsidized housing, or group homes; limits on the number of bedrooms or children in a residence; and growth controls applying citywide or to undeveloped land.

Studies of exclusionary zoning report mixed findings regarding its consequences—local situations differ, and the influence of provisions like large-lot zoning may be inseparable from other factors. However, evidence suggests that exclusion fuels certain problems: first, hampering African Americans, Latinas/os, or Asian Americans who seek denser, less costly housing than is available; second, creating a “spatial mismatch” between the low-skilled service-sector jobs located in suburbs (and exurbs) and the workers tied by housing markets to central cities and older suburbs; and, third, contributing to urban sprawl, traffic congestion, and environmental damage linked to low-density development.

Affordable housing and civil rights advocates have challenged exclusionary practices. Courts and legislatures usually defer to the land use choices of local citizens and their representatives, but New Jersey’s Supreme Court ruled in landmark 1975 and 1983 cases that the Township of Mount Laurel and other suburbs were illegally zoning out low-income residents. Controversially, the court ordered offending localities to facilitate production of their “fair share” of affordable housing. This “inclusionary zoning” remedy, also used throughout California, depends on developers agreeing to produce low- and moderate-price housing, which is also controversial. Other models of anti-exclusionary policies are Oregon’s comprehensive

planning, which encourages land conservation along with affordable housing; “anti-snob zoning” in Massachusetts, which allows developers of affordable housing to appeal denial of development permission; and the Fair Housing Act, which outlaws various types of housing discrimination nationally.

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See also Housing Policy; Social Exclusion; Suburbanization

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EXOPOLIS

Exopolis (from the Greek *exo* “outside” and *polis* “city”) is one of many surnames given by the ancient Greeks to the goddess Athena because of the location of a statue in her honor outside the city walls of Athens. In urban studies, Edward Soja has used *exopolis* to refer to the edge city and other developments taking place outside of the city in what used to be called the suburban fringe, but it also refers to what comes after the city (thus *ex* “after” and *polis* “city”). *Exopolis* is the city without, but also the noncity, the city without a center, “a kaleidoscopic social-spatial structure of geometric fragmentation, increasingly discontinuous, orbiting beyond the old agglomerative nodes.” *Exopolis* is a *simulacrum*—an exact copy of a city that never existed—where image and reality are “spectacularly confused.”

Exopolis has had an interesting history in the Soja canon. It has not yet been born in “Los Angeles: Capital of the 21st Century,” the programmatic essay introducing the Los Angeles School, in which Soja and Scott describe the new peripheral agglomerations around Los Angeles as “the nodes of the new technopolis.” And in *Postmodern Geographies*

Soja describes decentralized urban and suburban growth in the Los Angeles region as peripheral urbanization for the suburbs (producing technopoles in the “outer city”) and as peripheralization of the urban core of the city (following the increased internationalization of the regional labor market). Soja first introduces us to exopolis in “Inside Orange County” (published in Michael Sorkin’s influential *Variations on a Theme Park*, in which he describes “improbable cities where centrality is nearly ubiquitous and the solid familiarity of the urban melts into the air.” The new urban spaces—based upon what elsewhere are described as edge cities—require new methods of observation to “take apart those deceptively embracing similarities and reconstruct a different topography of power mapped out inside exopolis.” Yet by the time this article was revised for inclusion in *Thirdspace*, exopolis had become simply another label for “the anonymous implosion of archaic suburbia”—the outer cities, edge cities, technopoles, technoburbs, postsuburbia, and metroplexes of urban disciplines.

In *Thirdspace* Soja is celebrating Baudrillard, and so exopolis has become “infinitely enchanting; at its worst it transforms our cities and our lives into spin-doctored ‘scamscapes,’ places where the real and the imagined, fact and fiction, become spectacularly confused, impossible to tell apart.” Soja argues that exopolis “stretches our imaginations and critical sensibilities in much the same way that it has stretched the tissues of the modern metropolis: beyond the older tolerances, past the point of being able to spring back to its earlier shape” and that we must acquire a new language to capture the multidimensional urban-scape. But exopolis—the city and the noncity, and the city in-between—has been relegated to a minor place in this interrogation, becoming yet another name for standard discussions of inner city and outer city, theme parks and Disneylands, edge cities on the suburban fringe. Indeed, in his essay on Amsterdam, Soja notes that “Greater Amsterdam” corresponds to the Randstad and may be seen as Europe’s largest exopolis—or edge city.

Exopolis also refers to those areas in between the city and the suburb, a meaning that bears close resemblance to the interstitial areas of the Chicago School (this appears to be Soja’s most original use of the term, and one that should have

a longer life than the exopolis of edge cities and technopolis). While exopolis has been widely used as a catch-all label for suburban growth, this more specific usage has been followed by others, such as Del Castillo and Valenzuela Arce, who articulate the transborder exopolis as the pedestrian spheres and ideological zones of the transborder area shared by San Diego and Tijuana, an area where urban life is indeed in between cultural and economic spheres represented by the two border cities.

Exopolis appears in the recent *manga* (graphic novel) titled *Metro Survive*, created by Yuki Fujisawa. The series follows Mishima, a repairman working in the Exopolis Tower, a new high-rise business and entertainment complex that includes its own subway station and luxury stores on the galleria level. But the Exopolis Tower was built from substandard materials and rushed into service, and it collapses during a massive earthquake, trapping Mishima and others in an elevator. The survivors must make their way to the ruined subway station and escape through the underground tunnels. Ultimately, *Metro Survive* is part of the postdisaster story genre (similar to movies such as *Poseidon Adventure*), and exopolis is a label for a skyscraper rather than a definition of a new architectural form or process of urbanization. While Soja’s exopolis invites us to explore the expanding metropolitan spaces of the postmodern landscape, and in the original version challenged us to think of new ways to describe developments in an ever-changing urbanscape transformed by global capital, Mishima’s escape from the Exopolis Tower offers a cautionary tale of rapid urbanization in the global city of the twenty-first century.

Ray Hutchison

See also Edge City; Suburbanization; Technopoles

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F

FACTORIAL ECOLOGY

Factorial ecology uses factor analysis to analyze social aspects of spatial units that are of theoretical importance to urban ecologists. Factor analysis is a statistical technique that assesses a large number of variables to find a few common underlying dimensions (factors). In the 1960s, with new computing technology and the dissemination of computerized census data, urban ecologists found this technique uniquely suited for statistical assessment of intra- and interurban spatial differentiation. Generally, any research of the 1960s through 1980s that applies factor analysis to the study of sociospatial units is termed factorial ecology.

Beginning with F. L. Sweetser in 1965, early factorial ecology tested theoretical propositions about natural areas of the city. A decade earlier, social area analysis hypothesized that the formation of neighborhood social homogeneity, a concept central to ecology in the Chicago School, is created by three unique social dimensions of an area: socioeconomic status, family status, and race/ethnic status. Factor analytic techniques allowed rigorous statistical evaluation of these dimensions with hundreds of indicators. Factorial ecology ultimately provided partial support for this theory. The method quickly expanded to related areas of substantive interest to urban ecologists.

From the late 1960s through the 1980s, factorial ecology research, especially the work of Brian J. L. Berry and collaborators, provided systematic

evaluation of sociospatial differentiation and identification of socioeconomic functional differentiation across cities and regions. Notably, Berry and Rees in 1969 used a factorial approach for evidence that contending theories of land use patterns—concentric zone, sector, multinucleation, and ethnic enclave theories—were based on separate factors that exist alongside one another in many cities. This work led to a theoretical synthesis of land use perspectives. Berry in 1972 used a factorial ecology approach to elucidate latent functional dimensions of the U.S. urban system. Comparative urban analysts adapted factorial ecology to create new classificatory schemes for the study of international urbanization.

Criticisms of factorial ecology studies were numerous but generally part of a larger critique of human ecology, aggregate analysis, and quantitative methods, not critiques of factorial ecology per se. Criticisms included the failure of factorial ecology to incorporate individual volition and subjective interpretation into the modeling process as well as lack of attention to the role of capitalism and cultural context.

Since the 1980s, studies that are explicitly labeled factorial ecology have been rare. However, factor analysis continues to be a widely used method in quantitative spatial analysis, and the identification of underlying social dimensions in space remains a central research issue in urban ecology.

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See also Berry, Brian J. L.; Chicago School of Urban Sociology; Human Ecology

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FAIR HOUSING

Fair housing policy is a product of the American civil rights movement. Prior to the 1960s, American laws promoted segregation and discrimination in the housing market. Although the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution granted equal protection of the laws to Anglos and African Americans, segregationists argued that these provisions did not prevent the government from separating the races, hence "separate but equal." In response, civil rights proponents noted that access to resources, such as adequate housing, was not distributed equally, and, in turn, the races were separate but not equal, rendering the laws unconstitutional.

Anglo communities populated good neighborhoods, and minorities inhabited bad neighborhoods. Moreover, with the expansion of Anglo suburbanization and urban decline after World War II, the polarization of housing opportunity grew. Predominately African American and Latino communities were left behind in the urban centers, where the built environment suffered from public and private disinvestment. Consequently, removing discriminatory barriers to minority movement into good neighborhoods became a central objective of fair housing advocacy.

Federal Action

In 1962, President John F. Kennedy issued Executive Order 11063, barring racial discrimination in federally assisted housing. Congress followed in 1964 with the U.S. Civil Rights Code. However, civil rights advocates argued that the central problems

of segregation and unequal access to housing remained unaddressed. After extended debate, one week after the assassination of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., and one year following the civil riots of 1967, Congress amended the code with Title VIII, known as the Fair Housing Act (FHA) of 1968. The act declared that "it is the policy of the United States to provide, within constitutional limitations, for fair housing throughout the United States." To do so, it prohibited discrimination in the sale or rental of housing based on race, color, country of origin, and religion. The law abolished exclusionary zoning and mandated equal access to housing tenure, mortgage credit, and good neighborhoods through integration.

Twenty years later, the Fair Housing Amendments Act (FHAA) of 1988 expanded the categories of protected groups to include disability and familial status. Problems of enforcement of the act, however, have been endemic. In 1988, various amendments addressed enforcement issues and many other practical limitations of the legislation. New enforcement measures were created to address U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) administrative complaints. As a result, HUD was authorized to initiate discrimination cases; punitive damages and attorneys fees applicable to private lawsuits were liberalized; and Congress authorized the Justice Department to award civil penalties to injured parties. In addition, the amendments created administrative law judges within HUD.

As stipulated by the FHA, and as amended, property owners, real estate and insurance agents, and residents are sanctioned from engaging in practices that exclude protected groups from housing access and/or impose increased costs relative to nonprotected clients. Notwithstanding legislation, however, discrimination continues to be prevalent in U.S. housing markets. Significant practices addressed by fair housing laws include steering, exclusion, harassment, poor service quality, exploitation, and blockbusting.

Steering occurs when real estate agents guide clients to vacancies in neighborhoods where there is a significant population of similar people. If clients are interested in renting or purchasing housing in an area where their race or ethnicity is relatively underrepresented, the agent may discourage pursuit of the property. This practice complicates processes

of supply and demand by creating submarkets based on segregation.

Exclusion occurs when information about housing vacancies, financial conditions, prices, rents, or security deposits is either concealed or distorted. *Harassment* involves intimidation or psychological abuse aimed at convincing households to move, while *poor service quality* results when minority clients do not receive the same services enjoyed by nonminority clients. By encouraging White homeowners to panic and sell based on suggestions that minorities are going to move into the area, agents engage in *blockbusting*. Documented cases exist where minority agents have been sent into Anglo-dominated neighborhoods to solicit homes, thereby reinforcing panic.

Mechanisms of Discrimination

Housing discrimination is said to occur for the following reasons. First is agent, broker, and landlord prejudice, which treats individuals poorly because they are from a particular minority group, even if it means losing revenue. Second, customer prejudice leads an agent to steer clients to a neighborhood where people like them live or steer them away from areas where residents discriminate against the client's racial or ethnic group. Third, potential customer prejudice influences landlords and agents not to offer housing to someone who may be seen as unacceptable to existing residents, fearing loss of business as a form of retaliation. Fourth, landlords may exclude people based on statistical discrimination, where their ethnic or racial group identification signals them to be inferior tenants. Fifth, and most important, pure-profit maximizing occurs when a particular group is viewed as having a low elasticity of demand and thus is denied access. A group with a higher elasticity of demand is able to generate higher sales prices, rents, or insurance premiums.

Many states and municipalities have adopted fair housing laws that reinforce provisions of the federal law. Some have expanded the number of protected groups to include marital status, military service, and sexual orientation. Municipalities have also attempted to regulate the activities of real estate agents. Prohibitions include the use of "for sale" signs to promote blockbusting practices and broker solicitation activities that maintain do-not-call lists for potential

home sellers. Realty firms might also be required to register with the city government and agree to abide by fair housing policies.

In addition to the FHA, the 1975 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) and the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) (1977) provide antidiscrimination legislation. They focus on discriminatory practices in mortgage lending. Congress passed the HMDA in response to community organizing against the practice of redlining, the collective disinvestment from select neighborhoods by lending institutions. The legislation requires lenders to disclose the number, amount, and location of mortgages. The CRA requires most lenders to meet the credit needs of their local communities, including financing for low- and moderate-income housing. More specifically, the law requires depository institutions (above a minimum size) to offer credit opportunity to all individuals in the communities from which they take deposits. Section 109 of Title I of the CRA also prohibits discrimination based on race, color, national origin, sex, or religion when implementing infrastructural projects using the federal Community Development Block Grant.

Fair housing laws have been criticized by housing scholars for being limited to the litigation of individual acts of discrimination. The housing problem is thus cast as idiosyncratic wrongdoing by agents and organizations and not systemic and institutionalized racism. Fair housing advocates call for laws that challenge the systematic structural arrangements that reproduce segregation and predominately minority, low-income communities.

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See also Exclusionary Zoning; Ghetto; Housing; Housing Policy; Redlining; Social Housing; Suburbanization

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FAVELA

The term *favela*, or *favella*, designates spontaneous settlements, all types of informal, illegal occupations, invasions, slums, and squatter settlements in Brazil. The Portuguese word *favela* characterizes different urban settlements inhabited by the poor population. They are also called *barriadas* in Peru, *villas miserias* in Argentina, *tugúrius* in San Salvador, *colonias* in México, *vilas de lata* in Portugal, *callampas* in Chile, *geçekondu* in Turkey, *ranchos* in Venezuela, *bidonvilles* in Morocco, *bustee* in India, *cantegriles* in Uruguay, *chabolas* in Spain, in addition to many other local epithets.

Urban slums are self-organized systems that are commonly portrayed as complex and apparently disorganized space built by the poor. This universal trait is recurrent, as are many others. All around the world, slums emerge from similar necessities: to find shelter and to survive amid the lack of resources, scarcity of land, and the external threats. All these settlements present similar spatial morphology because of their dynamic of growth. However, this spatial resemblance could be misleading; slums evolving from different social and cultural backgrounds present great diversity, which could be better understood regarding dwellers' socialization patterns, political organizations, and their beliefs about the future.

The Emergence of Favelas

The name *favella* (an old form of the spelling) was initially given to a hillside settlement in Rio de Janeiro, which, by the end of the nineteenth century was occupied by soldiers who had become homeless after a regional war. Soon after, shacks on other hills were informally built and occupied by a new incoming urban population of freed slaves and workers excluded from rural areas and now seeking opportunities in the city. The inhabitants were named *favelados* and from early on were stigmatized as poor and unskilled people living at the edge of society. They were also depicted as lazy people, scoundrels, and prone to criminal activities.

The twentieth century witnessed the growth of the favelas in the state capitals of Brazil. The first wave of rural–urban migration was mainly caused

by drought in the rural areas, land expropriations arising from conflicts, or extensive farming. In cities, the favelas usually occupied unwanted land, such as the steep hills in Rio de Janeiro and the mangrove swamps in Recife. Given the nature of the illegal occupation of urban space, other locations were also favored: river banks, public land alongside railways or near electricity power lines, vacant public lands; later, there was also squatting on privately owned land.

A Local Denomination for a Global Phenomenon

Favelas are an urban phenomenon present in most developing countries and for nearly a century have presented challenges for which solutions have been sought. The United Nations estimates that 837 million people were living in favelas in 2002, and this has been increasing at the rate of 25 million people a year. If this pace of growth is maintained, 1,500 million people will be living in spontaneous settlements by 2020. Most of these numbers are raw estimates because there is great variance in the definition of what a favela is. This definition is the object of much debate because the traits that can be said to comprise the concept are very wide ranging: illegal occupation of land, poor housing conditions, absence of or disputed land tenure, and level of residents' income; the definition also depends on the level of urbanization, the extent of the infrastructure, and the consolidation of the areas. According to other viewpoints, these places can also be called subnormal settlements, informal neighborhoods, or zones of social interest; after some degree of consolidation, they may be considered as popular (i.e., upper working-class) neighborhoods.

The favelas used to be a special feature of the landscape of large cities only in poor regions; but again, this is no longer the case. In countries like Brazil, medium-size towns have been displaying a major increase of population living in favelas. The favelas are growing and spreading into the wealthiest and most industrialized regions under a new mode of occupying the peripheral areas of towns and cities. This new pattern is seen as a result of the country enduring social inequality associated with urban growth and the inefficiency of economic and urban policies aiming at reducing poverty.

Favelas' Spatial and Social Features

Favelas have, in the main, been described as areas that have been illegally and densely occupied with poor-quality housing. They lack infrastructure and urban services, and yet all sorts of poor people with no qualifications find shelter there. Having thrived for nearly a century, today's favelas differ from this original state of being. Nowadays, they are complex places that may well have different physical and social features depending on their location, level of consolidation, and internal organization; consequently, they are also inhabited by people with diverse social and economic profiles.

Favelas are places of both great poverty and opportunity; this marks a change from the time when they were regarded as places of despair or little hope. In any case, favelas are lively and dynamic social environments. The morphology is of dense occupation, narrow alleys and patios entwined with domestic spaces. Windows, doors, steps, and front gardens are always open, thus leading to a highly interactive social pattern. Everywhere, men are talking or playing board games, women are chatting while doing their domestic tasks, and children are running free wherever they like. In this context, spatial proximity plays a fundamental role in the establishment of social ties and reciprocal relationships. Life in favelas is marked by informality: the few rules of behavior are loose; there are few moral judgments and great acceptance of the so-called facts of life. The inhabitants praise their lifestyle and usually say they are satisfied with their residential arrangements.

Despite the presence of strong ties between neighbors, in most cases this is not enough to conform to the definition of a community. Residents may act as a community when the situation demands, but usually they report that the daily struggle to survive in the city means individuals set goals for themselves rather than joining in collective goals. Favela inhabitants report they are discriminated against because of where they live and the conditions under which they live, and they complain about the prejudice that society shows toward poor people, in particular because they are regarded as marginal.

In the favelas, most of the households are headed by women, who generally play an important role in local organizations. Reports from favelas commonly

describe brave working women, bringing up children as single-parent mothers and fighting against all odds to sustain the family. Their households expand incrementally and generally consist of members from different age ranges and thus in different life cycles: grandmothers, single mothers, children, nieces and nephews, and other relatives. Joint family income is fundamental to maintain families economically.

Favelas' Cultural Relevance

These poor areas, wherever the location, are places of cultural effervescence. In Rio de Janeiro, the favelas were the cradle of samba, carnival schools, and other important artistic movements. On the hills and mangroves, folkloric manifestations of music and dance that give and symbolize the identity of the country are nurtured and kept alive. From these same environments, new movements spring up and flourish, such as hip hop, funk, and recently an amalgam of rock and folk music from the peripheries that expresses residents' roots, and the fact that while their feet are in the favela, their minds are on the world.

Different Views and Policies Toward Favelas

Favelas were initially seen as the cause of health and aesthetic problems, a case for public concern in view of the precariousness of the environment shaped and characterized by open sewage channels, no running water, and shacks made of wood, tin, and cardboard boxes. From this perspective, the favelas were regarded as dangerous places for general public health, and the authorities feared outbreaks of contagious diseases and were concerned about the risk of fire. With this outlook, the first official notion about favelas considered them as a social scourge that should be removed from cities by any means.

Early last century, cities witnessed the occupation of land by a migrating population and the proliferation of favelas; at the same time, new ideals of urban renovations and innovative projects for their transformation were arising. The example of the renovation of Paris inspired projects for modernization and urban reforms all over the world and aimed to order and civilize the cities and to shape their landscape with modern and progressive features. In this context, the favelas were seen

as an evil, a “cancer to be extirpated from the city.”

In Brazil, most of the policies at the time sought to remove them from central areas. The first interventions intended to remove the shacks by force and to relocate inhabitants in temporary residential sites until they could be rehoused in the periphery. Most of these earlier experiences failed. First of all, this was because forced removal was usually accompanied by great violence, which had a negative impact on the lives of the residents.

In the middle of last century, abjectly poor housing areas—that is, favelas—were part of the scenery of major cities. The cities grew and spread out beyond their original boundaries. This meant that many favelas stood on land that once had no other use but now became very attractive for expanding commercial activities or even new residential areas.

The state’s policies allied to pressures from the property market engendered eviction projects: road works and urban improvement projects invariably passed through the favelas and required expropriations. The high value given to the lands adjacent to favelas put the population under pressure from real estate agents. The market strategies for acquiring land were subtle but efficient and led to a so-called White expulsion.

Favelas as the Outcome of Structural Poverty

The 1970s brought a new way of looking at favelas: The theory of marginality was proposed as a model to explain urban poverty and the persistence of favelas in many cities. The theory considered that poor people’s inability to be included in the formal industrial circuit explained who this mass of urban residents were. The favela was no longer seen as a problem in isolation but as the consequence of structural forces leading to social exclusion and consequently poverty. The structural situation of developing countries was also explored by theories on dependency or imperialism and was used to explicate enduring poverty in these contexts.

Sociologists began to look at favelas as phenomena worthy of attention. In Brazil, the American sociologist Anthony Leeds devoted much time to an extensive and in-depth study of favelas. He

dedicated himself to understanding the diversity of these spaces by living in the favelas of Rio de Janeiro. The first Brazilianists consolidated a local view that contradicted the theory of marginality and the culture of poverty, which considered the presence of a subculture of the poor as responsible for their neither being suited for, nor able to adapt to, the urban environment.

The Consolidation of Favelas Within the City

Urban policies in the 1970s saw the issue of the favela as one of housing shortage, and a most ambitious program was set up to build large housing estates on the outskirts of cities. The solution was again to remove people from shanty homes in the central areas to apartments and houses on the periphery. The results of this policy were well reported by social researchers, who demonstrated the inadequacy of the solution. When people who mostly lived on income from informal jobs were removed to a place where they had to bear the regular costs of running a home and paying for urban services, they often abandoned the housing projects. The favelados sold their homes to people with formal jobs, who were able to absorb this type of commitment, while they themselves returned to other favelas in the city.

Several types of housing were proposed as housing solutions for the poor. The general model adopted was low-rise apartment buildings. This modern typology was shown to be very unpopular with favela residents. Apartments did not offer flexible solutions for family growth, and this type of condominium living demanded an internal organization that did not exist among the rehoused residents.

Pieces of evidence from other Latin American countries showed the need for new perspectives that considered the inhabitants as assets and had respect for their achievements. A new approach advocated that favelas must remain in the cities and that governments should seek solutions to improve housing and to supply settlements with a basic set of infrastructures.

Architects such as John Turner offered an original framework of analysis. In 1972, Turner, who worked to understand the favelas or *barriadas* in Peru, criticized the proposed solution of housing estates and, from a point of view that borders on

premonition, considered them a major problem. He pointed out that favelas should be regarded as concrete solutions built up by an extremely resourceful population to tackle the lack of adequate housing. In other words, the favela is a solution that itself provides its residents with the means for survival in the city.

Given the great chasm between the increase in the housing deficit and the inability of governments to respond to the expansion in the demand for housing, policies have emerged aimed at increasing the access of very-low-income groups to the full range of basic infrastructure services. The premises of the proposals for sites and services put forward in the 1970s and 1980s had the intention of offering and advertising infrastructure services at low cost. The projects also relied on people's own resources to build and improve their homes. These experiments led to bolstering experiments in self-help housing throughout all of Latin America.

The Urbanization of Favelas

The 1980s saw a major shift in policies toward the favelas; for the first time, the urbanization of these areas was considered a viable policy. The official policies sought therefore to integrate these informal areas within the city, and solutions for urbanization, in general, aimed to transform the favela into something more like the orthodox city. In areas of flat-lying land, the urbanization projects endeavored to lay out straight streets and clearly defined blocks, with public areas separated from privately owned land. In other words, urbanizing was about molding the favela to the formal city. The notion of urbanization also brought the understanding that access to income and services such as education and health, besides sanitation, were fundamental to combat poverty.

Some of the solutions for providing infrastructure in poor areas use new technological proposals deemed as alternatives. Thus began a period of applying alternative technologies to sanitation, cheap drainage systems, and the use of various materials for paving the streets. Solutions for cheaper homes used prefabricated panels, walls of soil or cement, and hybrid building systems. Most were purely technological solutions without fitting into the cultural reality of the various sites and many areas refused alternative technologies as solutions.

The Regularization of Favelas and the Movement for Land Tenure Rights

Urbanization unaccompanied by regularizing land tenure prompted the perverse effect of great pressure from the real estate market, which sought out the lands of the favelas with the best locations in cities. The consolidation of studies on poverty and the already extensive empirical data on favelas made it possible to understand why some previous policies were equivocal or limited.

The residents of favelas demonstrated they were well integrated into city life and able to get jobs in the formal and informal sectors of the economy. They also demonstrated they were important agents in social movements, fighting for land tenure rights and demanding participation in the planning processes of cities.

It became clear that the issue of favelas was also a political issue. Successful solutions stemmed from strengthening the residents not only in economic terms but also politically, through fostering citizenship and encouraging them to fight for their rights to participate in city life. The 1980s saw the emergence of social movements with demands for housing improvement, access to education and health services, income-earning opportunities, and physical safety.

The onset of the new century witnessed a new approach to reducing poverty and new perspectives on dealing with favelas in cities. The first important shift was the recognition of favela residents' rights to be in and remain in their places in the city. The second aspect considered the need to foster community organization to promote a sense of citizenship as a means of achieving social and economic inclusion and access to urban services. Several countries enacted innovative legal instruments and urban laws aimed at consolidating and making improvements to favelas.

The New Generations of Favelas

After a century, the new generation of favelas presents complex and diverse features. There are good examples of favelas having been improved and integrated with cities, as well as cases where poverty has persisted and proved impervious to change. In cities like Rio de Janeiro, some favelas are associated with drug trafficking dominated by

warring criminal organizations that establish rules from the gang-dominated hills to the Town Hall asphalt. These favelas threaten the formal city by disputing power with the police and keeping nearby city inhabitants under siege. Other favelas, deemed as neofavelas, are consolidated and organized places with good infrastructure, Internet access, and globalized patterns of consumption, housing a population that can no longer be regarded as poor. The generation of consolidated favelas demands new policies for renovation, while the evolving peripheral favelas are still wanting effective economic, social, and urban policies to deal with their increasing poverty and isolation in the cities, these being more fragmented and less inclusive than ever before.

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See also *Banlieue*; Ghetto; Housing; São Paulo, Brazil; Social Exclusion; Squatter Movements

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FLÂNEUR

During the past two centuries, the figure of the *flâneur* has metamorphosed from a literary type associated with the public places of Paris into a

protean cultural myth used to represent the fragmented experiences of modernity. This paradoxical figure came into existence within an increasingly democratized and commercialized cultural marketplace that emerged in Paris during the early nineteenth century. He was both the product and the producer of popular literary texts such as guide books, illustrated essays, *feuilletons*, and cheap pocket-size booklets called *physiologies* that were devoted to the classification of urban types. This entry looks at the character, his impact, and his evolution.

Characteristics

Invariably depicted as a man of leisure, meticulously dressed in black frock coat and top hat and carrying a walking stick or umbrella, the *flâneur* was both a familiar and yet an ambiguous figure. He was the consummate urban stroller at home on the boulevards and in the shopping arcades, restaurants, and art galleries of the city. As an observer of the everyday occurrences of the city, the *flâneur* was explicitly contrasted to the busy professional, who was oblivious to the fleeting nuances of modern life. As a recorder of these events, however, the *flâneur* was implicitly understood to be the modern journalist or popular artist, whose task it was to represent the unprecedented experiences of the modern metropolis.

How can one explain the cultural resonance of this seemingly ordinary figure? How did he transcend his relatively humble origins in popular literature to become an icon of modernist culture? The answer has to be sought in the *flâneur*'s radical sensibility and innovative visual practices, which made him distinct from all other social types of his age. The *flâneur*'s unique achievement was to pioneer a new way of seeing, experiencing, and representing urban modernity that privileged the everyday perspective of the man of the street over the bird's eye view of the rationalist or the moralist. At a time when the city was increasingly perceived as a dangerous labyrinth that escaped the control of elites, the *flâneur* valorized the dynamic and democratic possibilities of the modern scene. He had no interest in stabilizing the flux of the new environment, and he distinguished himself from political reformers and middle-class philanthropists who attempted to impose control

over the city by eliminating poverty, inequality, crime, immorality, and aesthetic squalor. Neither critical nor celebratory of the city, the flâneur was contemplative and reflexive. He resembled a “moving panorama,” wrote Walter Benjamin, who mirrored the fluid realities of the urban scene. He aspired to provide a synthetic representation of the contemporary world, without, however, imposing stable moral, ideological, or aesthetic formulae on it.

The flâneur’s simultaneous commitment to mobile experience and panoramic vision explains his profound ambiguity as a cultural symbol. Incribed within his figure was a fundamental duality that was invariably represented by two distinct images: the idle *badaud*, who passively abandoned himself to the crowd and gave in to the seductions of the city; and the discriminating observer, who retained his personal autonomy and was capable of privileged insights into modernity. As a characteristic text of the 1840s by de Lacroix summarized it: “The *badaud* does not think; he perceives objects only externally,” while the flâneur is the “most elevated and most eminently useful example of the observer.” Oscillating between irreconcilable opposites, the modern flâneur lacked a stable representational formula. Creators of the type occasionally splintered the flâneur into two distinct figures, but just as frequently, they fused them together in unexpected combinations.

Historical Evolution

While there is no single “historical flâneur,” it is possible to trace a genealogy of *flânerie* on the basis of the changing historical relationship between *badaud* and flâneur that was articulated in the course of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The flâneur of the early nineteenth century, exemplified by the anonymous pamphlet of 1806, *Le Flâneur au Salon ou M. Bonhomme* (The Flâneur in the Salon, or M. Bonhomme), was a mock-heroic figure in whom the traits of *badaud* and flâneur were not yet separated. Ironically presented as the potential founder of an illustrious lineage of future flâneurs, he remained a slightly ridiculous figure with no visible source of income or family connections. This early flâneur’s participation in the public life of the city was

at the expense of useful occupations or tangible accomplishments.

The flâneur’s transformation from an ineffectual idler into a keen observer of modern life took place in the 1830s and early 1840s, when the mass circulation newspaper and popular literary genres such as the *feuilleton*, the physiology, and the serial novel provided new opportunities and a public role for the journalist. This was the golden age of the flâneur, who was, for the first time, sharply distinguished from his inferior half, the *badaud*. Whereas the *badaud* was dismissed as a frivolous creature, satisfied with a superficial impression of the city, the true flâneur was presented as an astute observer capable of penetrating the hidden aspects of urban life and exercising control over the seductions of an emerging commodity culture. Lifted to the status of an intellectual aristocrat, the flâneur of the July Monarchy embodied the heroic, utopian aspirations of his age.

During the 1850s, in the wake of failed revolution and Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann’s massive urban renewal projects, the figure of the flâneur underwent yet another transformation. The flâneur of the Second Empire, anticipated by Edgar Allan Poe’s famous short story “The Man of the Crowd,” merged once again the passive qualities of the *badaud* with the active attributes of the flâneur and became the prototype of the modernist artist. Baudelaire’s pivotal essay of 1859, “The Painter of Modern Life,” provided perhaps the best-known definition of this *artiste-flâneur*. Through the exemplary figure of the popular lithographer, Constantin Guys, Baudelaire created a subtle amalgam of the *badaud* and the flâneur, a man who had the capacity to merge with the crowd but also to separate himself for brief moments when he dashed down the impressions he gathered during the day.

Although Baudelaire’s *artiste-flâneur* lived on into the latter half of the nineteenth century, finding fictional incarnation in such works as Zola’s *Le Ventre de Paris* and *L’Oeuvre*, the figure rapidly lost relevance by the early twentieth century. It was reinvented once again in the 1920s and 1930s, primarily through the fragmented but influential writings of the German émigré philosopher, Walter Benjamin. Benjamin reframed Baudelaire’s *artiste-flâneur* through the lenses of Marxism and surrealism and created a powerful new vision of

the flâneur that remained paradigmatic for much of the twentieth century.

Although still connected to the modern city, Benjamin's flâneur became the universal symbol of commodity culture as embodied by the modern intellectual who was forced to sell himself in the capitalist market. The commodified flâneur assumed the attributes of the nineteenth-century badaud, who had also been characterized by passivity and self-loss. In Benjamin's tragic reformulation of flânerie, the passive and active sides of the flâneur were once again splintered off from each other, with the commodified flâneur assuming the role of the badaud and the modernist artist that of the creative flâneur.

The acceleration of social and cultural transformations in the late twentieth century has given rise to an even more multifaceted image of the flâneur. Linked to an ever-widening range of phenomena, from the cinema and cyberspace to global tourism and the themed environments of Las Vegas and Disneyland, the postmodern flâneur has sometimes been accused of losing all coherence as a meaningful cultural symbol. According to some critics, this figure bears few traces of the historical flâneur who flourished in the Parisian arcades of the early nineteenth century. A symbol of a commodified and aestheticized culture, he has become "a pure sign, a signifier freed from, bereft of, any special signified," according to Gilloch.

While such observations are undeniable, it is important to stress that the postmodern flâneur's continuity with the past lies precisely in his instability as a cultural image. For the flâneur was, from his inception, characterized by mobility and resistance to stable definitions and essentialized identities. Compared to the reassuring promises of scientific objectivity and political analysis, the flâneur undoubtedly offers only a mobile and contingent image of the social world. Yet, he also provides an invaluable corrective to the objectivist perspective of the traditional social sciences. The flâneur's intimate association with the world of popular culture opens up new possibilities for conceptualizing the shifting constellations of modern experience. More important still, his affirmation of the discursive world of culture legitimates the individual's freedom to create meaning within the destabilized environment of modernity.

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See also Benjamin, Walter; Cinematic Urbanism; Photography and the City; Paris, France

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FLORENCE, ITALY

Florence is as much a complex cultural phenomenon as a physical place, and it is this culture that

the city projects to the world. Founded by the Romans, the city recovered from the collapse of the empire to become a leading commercial and banking center in the Middle Ages and an important cultural center at the dawn of the Renaissance. Following two centuries of relative stagnation, the city emerged temporarily as the capital of Italy in 1865 and underwent substantial urban redevelopment. In the twentieth century and beyond, while confronting industrialization, sprawl, the devastation of World War II, and lately mass tourism, the historic center continues to be an urban model.

History

The Ancient City and the Collapse of the Roman Empire

The city the Romans called Florentia was founded in 59 BC by Julius Caesar on a plain near the banks of the Arno River, at a narrow spot where crossing was easiest (the Etruscans had founded a town much earlier on the hillside to the north on the site of modern day Fiesole). The new town was laid out as a *castrum*: proceeding from a central *umbilicus*, the surveyor (*agrimensor*) established the principal east–west and north–south streets (the *decumanus* and *cardo*, respectively), defined the limits of the town, and laid out the gridded network of streets; the forum was located near the *umbilicus*. Its position near the wider Roman road network (especially the Via Cassia) helped the town to flourish. The leisure components missing from the original foundation—a theater, amphitheater, baths, and so on—were established beyond the original wall circuit in the first and second centuries AD.

Set out on the cardinal axes, Florentia only approximately responded to the course of the river and was removed from it by the equivalent of a few blocks; a wooden bridge extended from the southern end of the *cardo* to span the Arno toward a small suburb pinched between the riverbanks and the hills rising to the south. This original Roman urban framework—*cardo* and *decumanus*, grid, walls, and to a certain extent bridge—is still evident when looking at a map or aerial photograph of the modern city.

Florence, like Rome itself, achieved a degree of stability after the collapse of the western empire and its replacement by the Byzantines, albeit at a much reduced scale—first under the Ostragoths and later

the Lombards. New walls were introduced well inside the original Roman circuit, corresponding to the shrunken population (from 20,000 under the Romans to perhaps as few as 1,000). By AD 500, however, the foundation of the city's two principal churches, San Lorenzo (the first cathedral) and Santa Reparata (the future site of the Duomo), indicates a degree of modest recovery, in part because these structures were located outside the reduced mural circuit. These vulnerable centers of devotion are precursors of later ecclesiastical foundations that would push the city's growth outward from the twelfth through the fourteenth centuries. Near the end of Lombard rule, perhaps during the seventh century, the Baptistery was built facing Santa Reparata; its role as the site of baptism for every Florentine citizen made it an urban focus on par with the Duomo.

Carolingian Recovery and Medieval Consolidation

A late-ninth-century circuit of walls marks the beginning of Florence's growth in the Carolingian era; larger than the Byzantine circuit but still smaller than the Roman enclosure, these walls protected a population of perhaps 5,000. Monastic communities began to settle in the outskirts of the city; the Benedictines founded San Miniato on a hill south of the Arno in 1018; its façade and that of the Baptistery were sheathed in polychrome marble in the next century. Another circuit of walls was built under Countess Matilda in 1078, extending beyond the most ancient walls to the north and south to the river. By this time, the city's population equaled that of the Roman city.

The second-to-last circuit of walls was built between 1173 and 1175, enclosing an area almost five times the size of the original Roman enclosure. These walls crossed the Arno to capture the burgeoning district known as the Oltrarno—they also, therefore, protected the oldest bridge across the river, the Ponte Vecchio (originally on the site of the Roman bridge, it was eventually relocated slightly and rebuilt in its final form in 1345). Three new bridges followed in the next century.

The Florence of Dante and the Black Death

The new bridges built beyond the twelfth-century walls, the Ponte alla Carraia (1218–1220), the Ponte Rubaconte (1237, now alle Grazie), and



A view of Florence, as well as the Ponte Vecchio—the oldest of the city's six bridges—seen in the foreground

Source: David Ferrell.

the Ponte Santa Trinità (1258), indicate the growth of the city, the scale of traffic in people and goods, and the increasing importance of the Oltrarno.

The city's last circuit of walls was designed by Arnolfo di Cambio and begun in 1284, enclosing an area 24 times the size of the Roman castrum; they protected not only the urban fabric—the old gridded core and the streets extending from it in all directions to the regional road network—but also large areas of semirural land. The mendicant orders (Franciscans, Dominicans, Servites, Carmelites) settled during the middle of the 1200s in the loosely organized zone outside the twelfth-century circuit of walls. The Dominicans and Franciscans in particular—at their centers of Santa Maria Novella on the west and Santa Croce on the east sides of town, respectively—also offered large piazzas that served the crowds who came to hear popular itinerant preachers.

Their ambitious building enterprises attracted artisans and tradespeople to their neighborhoods, while their theological schools (*studium generale*) made them internationally known centers of scholarship. The monastic complexes, not responsible to the local bishop but instead to their own order's hierarchy and ultimately to Rome, were physically

and politically independent of their urban context; they had extensive land with gardens and livestock, making them effectively self-sufficient.

Numerous hospitals were also scattered throughout the zone between the twelfth- and early-fourteenth-century circuits of walls. These served pilgrims, the rural poor who filtered into the city looking for work, and the urban poor; essentially caretaking hospices, they mediated the effects of the population growth of the burgeoning late medieval city. Like the monastic complexes, they could be large and self-sufficient; estimates are that they provided roughly one bed per hundred citizens. They would be stretched to capacity and beyond by the plague, the Black Death, which struck in 1348 and reduced the population by nearly 40 percent.

The Palazzo del Podestà (now Bargello), begun in 1255, was the first permanent home of the communal government; it was soon replaced by the Palazzo del Popolo (begun 1299; now Palazzo Vecchio) on the site of the old Roman theater. Wrapped by the Piazza della Signoria, it occupied a hinge point between the edge of the Roman grid and the network of streets oriented toward the river. Its large bell tower established the civic pole

of authority on the skyline, counterbalanced by the cathedral and its campanile: Santa Maria del Fiore was begun in 1296; designed by Arnolfo di Cambio to hold 30,000 worshippers (the city's population was then about 100,000), it dwarfed rival Siena's cathedral. The freestanding campanile was designed by Giotto in 1334. The encircling Piazza del Duomo, loosely following the shape of the cathedral and baptistery, was created by progressive clearing of the surrounding urban fabric.

Early humanists of the late fourteenth and early fifteenth centuries believed they had found evidence of Florence's Roman past in buildings like the Baptistery (thought to have been a temple of Mars); the architectural and urban Renaissance in Florence was just as likely to be influenced by local Roman-looking Romanesque buildings as the actual remains of antiquity in Rome. Florentine humanists were active in civic affairs, and the city's chancellors, such as Leonardo Bruni, were often eminent scholars (Bruni was the author of a comprehensive history of the city): They both defined Florence to the world and helped shape it.

The Medici and Florence

In this century of the Medici's rise to power, the conservative pretenses of ostensibly republican rule precluded drastic urban planning interventions; it is, rather, the building of massive, prismatic private palaces like the Palazzos Strozzi and Medici that impacted their local fabric (in the former case by creating an adjacent piazza, in the latter by encouraging development around the Via Larga and toward the north). Brunelleschi's cathedral dome (begun in 1420), an engineering achievement on par with antiquity, continues to define the city's skyline; it is an orientation point both within the urban fabric and from the landscape beyond. His plans for the Foundling Hospital (the *Ospedale degli Innocenti*, on Piazza Santissima Annunziata) created the first regular piazza-defining building of the century (imitated later in Venice at the Procuratie Vecchie and at the Piazza Ducale in Vigevano by Bramante) under the patronage of Florence's renowned charitable guilds. Lorenzo (Il Magnifico) de' Medici's de facto reign did not impact the city fabric in any substantial way. His

death coincided with Savonarola's ascent; but with the burning of Savonarola at the stake in the Piazza della Signoria in 1498, a complex century ended and an even more tumultuous one began.

If the first decades of the sixteenth century were tumultuous, the century ended with several decades of pomp, stability, and relative prosperity under the Medici dukes. This is the century of the Medici: No less than three popes (the first, Leo X, a boon to the city; the second, Clement VII, a disaster in the balance; and the final, Leo XI, largely irrelevant in part due to a brief reign), the establishment in mid-century of ducal rule under Cosimo I (made duke in 1537 and grand duke in 1569) over most of what is now Tuscany, the Tuscan language ubiquitous in Italy as the language of humanism in part thanks to Medici sponsorship, building and art patronage on a grand scale sponsored by popes and dukes. The Medici returned to definitive control of the city after a long siege (whose resistance Michelangelo had aided) in 1530. During the brief reign of the ruthless Alessandro de' Medici (1530–1537), his principal urban intervention was the Fortezza da Basso, a modern bastion meant as much to protect the city toward the west as subdue it.

Cosimo I's interventions herald a change from the last vestiges of republicanism to totalitarian rule with its attendant bureaucracy (the Uffizi complex); they also introduce the definitive symbols of private power (the Corridoio Vasariano, the Pitti palace and gardens, the Fortezza Belvedere). By moving his place of residence from the Palazzo Vecchio (from whence it was known as "old") to the suburban Pitti Palace across the river, he symbolically initiated an autocratic process that would culminate in the next century with Louis XIV's transference of the center of power from the Louvre to Versailles. Linking the old palace with the new by a raised, completely internal corridor designed by his court artist Giorgio Vasari, Cosimo articulated the transformation of the city and its civic focus.

Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries

While some significant buildings were built during this period, little substantial changed in the urban fabric (indeed, the map of Florence would look much the same until 1860). New or remodeled churches like San Gaetano and San Frediano,

religious complexes like the Oratorian's San Firenze and the house of the Canons Regular of San Jacopo, and palaces like Palazzo Capponi and the vast Palazzo Corsini along the Arno enlivened the skyline and the streetscape, but they didn't make of Florence a Baroque city as the building boom of the same period did in Rome.

Firenze Capitale: The Nineteenth Century

The nineteenth century began as a period of dormancy that transformed by mid-century—with Florence's brief role as capital for the new nation of Italy—into decades of major building and rebuilding. Giuseppe Poggi's plans for the city (after the capital moved there briefly from Turin in 1865) both facilitated growth into the periphery and transformed the historic center. In the first case, Poggi proposed taking down the outmoded mural circuit and replacing it with wide boulevards. These *viale* facilitated transportation around the historic center, and the destruction of the walls allowed expansion of the urban fabric into undeveloped outlying areas. The *viale* were continued across the Arno to form a necklace of picturesque boulevards.

Today, only a small stretch of wall in the Oltrarno remains. The urban fabric filled out Arnolfo di Cambio's mural circuit, and beyond; this outlying residential development is characterized by a knowledgeable respect for Florence's Renaissance architecture. In the center, Poggi made a drastic proposal to demolish the market district centered on the site of the old Roman forum; Vasari's fish market loggia was relocated to another part of town, while whole blocks (much of it the Jewish ghetto) were replaced by large *palazzos* for commercial (hotels and cafes) and civic (post office) uses, defining the present Piazza della Repubblica. The scale of the demolitions mobilized the substantial British expatriate community to work for the preservation of medieval buildings and artifacts elsewhere in the city.

Futurism and Fascism

Belated futurism and growing fascism collaborated in Florence between the two world wars to build the infrastructure of the modern city: The train station and its support buildings, factories, a sports stadium, and an Air Warfare School marked a building boom of the 1930s. Deliberately contrasting with the historic city fabric, these modern

buildings define a relatively brief period in which discontinuity with the past was the norm in central Florence. Rapid expansion along the Arno (mostly to the west) of industry and working-class neighborhoods changed forever the historic relationship of city and countryside; only to the south—San Miniato and the old mural circuit—and the north—toward Fiesole—were vestiges of monastic holdings and villas retained. Real estate development on a large scale also characterizes this era, when the bones of Poggi's plan were more densely fleshed out and extended. The scope of the growth east and west established the geographic extent of the city even after the war.

Postwar Florence: Rebuilding and Conservation

Florence suffered from both Allied bombing and the German retreat in the waning months of World War II in Italy. Most notably, the German commander was ordered to blow up the city's six bridges, of which five were demolished while the sixth, the Ponte Vecchio, was saved by demolishing buildings at either end to block it. In the aftermath of the war debate centered on the nature of reconstruction: replicating what had been destroyed or building new. A compromise resulted: The buildings bracketing the Ponte Vecchio were rebuilt in a modern character with traditional materials, whereas the bridges were mostly rebuilt in their original form with modern reinforced concrete structures. Preservation, important in Florence since the later nineteenth century, fostered a half-century of "restitution" of the historic fabric (accelerated by the devastating flood of 1966) that is still ongoing.

Postwar public housing has been as problematic here as elsewhere in Italy, but efforts to redress it (e.g., Léon Krier's plan for Novoli) continue, if only on paper. Pressures of the mass tourism industry have taken their toll on the demographics of the historic center, now largely absent full-time Florentine residents. Unlikely to experience future population growth as it did in the century after the unification of Italy, the city's challenges today have more to do with managing its resources and fixing past mistakes.

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See also Allegory of Good Government; Medieval Town Design; Renaissance City; Rome, Italy; Venice, Italy

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FORUM

In a Roman city, the forum was a large, rectangular, centrally located, open space, usually surrounded by monumental public structures. These buildings typically included many of the principal political, religious, and commercial centers of the city. The forum was often the site of local markets, although as towns grew, this function was sometimes transferred to secondary fora, as at Rome. The forum was also the setting for a variety of spectacular urban rituals, such as aristocratic funerals, court trials, religious ceremonies, public assemblies, and popular entertainments. Due to the concentration of these essential structures and functions in and around the forum, to the Romans, this space was imbued with potent symbolic meaning as the core of the city and the repository of its most Roman qualities.

The main forum at Rome (the Forum Romanum), which subsequently became the model for all later fora in other Roman cities, was originally a seasonally swampy depression located at the foot of the Capitoline and Palatine Hills and close to a key ford of the Tiber River. Despite its marshy nature,

this space was a natural crossroads, and the first major construction project in the history of the city of Rome was the digging of a drainage ditch from the Forum to the Tiber, accompanied by the dumping of many thousands of cubic meters of fill in the Forum to raise the ground level and render the area dry and habitable year-round. These transformations, which were accomplished by the kings of Rome during the seventh and sixth centuries BC, paved the way for the rapid development of the Forum in the centuries that followed.

By the middle of the Roman Republic (509–31 BC), the key structures that would define the space of the Forum were in place. Among these were the Temple of Vesta (where the sacred flame of the city was kept), the Curia (the usual meeting place of the Roman senate), the rostra (speakers' platform), and the temples of Castor, Saturn, and Concord. The Forum at this point was a rectangular open space roughly 150 meters long and 75 meters wide, with its long axis stretching out in a southeasterly direction from the slopes of the Capitoline Hill. The two long sides of the Forum were originally lined by shops and businesses, especially those involving financial transactions, but these were displaced over time by two enormous multi-story colonnades, the Basilica Aemilia along the north side and the Basilica Julia along the south.

The open space of the Forum was the setting for many of the most dramatic public events of Roman history, including Cicero's fiery orations and Mark Antony's funeral speech for Julius Caesar, which ended in violent rioting and the impromptu cremation of Caesar's body in the Forum itself. Prior to the construction of the Flavian Amphitheater (Colosseum) in the first century AD, many public entertainments such as wild beast hunts and gladiator games were held in the Forum.

During the empire (31 BC–AD 476), the Forum became progressively more crowded with shrines, statues, and other monuments. The emperors also constructed a series of new, huge, lavishly decorated imperial fora to the north of the old Forum, which assumed many of the day-to-day juridical and political functions of the original Forum. Even as its official roles declined, however, throughout the Roman period, the Forum Romanum retained its symbolic identity as the heart of both the city and the empire. It was imitated in all other Roman towns, so that throughout the empire, the urban life of all Roman cities focused around

a central forum and its attendant monumental buildings.

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See also Agora; Piazza; Public Realm; Rome, Italy

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FOURTH WORLD

Fourth world refers to those persons, groups, and places left behind in the process of globalization and resulting changes in urban and regional systems—including urban and nonurban spaces in both developed countries and the developing world. The term has an interesting history, emerging from an earlier discourse that highlighted the social exclusion of indigenous and minority populations, then highlighting increased poverty and social exclusion in third world nations, and now finding its place within urban studies with new and significant meanings.

The generic label *fourth world* begins in the development literature that described different

regions of the world according to the geopolitics of the postwar twentieth century: The first world included Europe and the United States, and the second world included the Soviet Union and satellite countries in Eastern Europe. The Third World included all other countries, a diverse collection of countries with high levels of industrial development as well as less developed economies, including nations in Africa, South America, and Asia that are commonly thought of as the developing world. Immanuel Wallerstein's world systems theory placed countries within a three-tier system of core, semiperiphery, and periphery based on their level of incorporation within the global capitalist economy; nations might move upward or downward within this system as resources and obstacles within the world capitalist system change.

While fourth world refers to concepts from and thereby fits within the general development literature, it has substantially different meanings. In North America, the fourth world emerged from the growing Native American activism over environmental issues and the development of American Indian Studies programs in North America. George Manuel and Michael Poslum's *The Fourth World: An Indian Reality* argued that the fourth world contains "many different cultures and lifeways, some highly tribal and traditional, some highly urban and individual" and included aboriginal populations across the globe, including Native Americans as well as aboriginal groups in Australia and New Zealand and the Sami in Scandinavia. The Dene Declaration, signed by some 300 delegates to the Indian Brotherhood at Fort Simpson (Northwest Territories) in 1975, stated, "We the Dene are part of the Fourth World. And as the peoples and nations of the world have come to recognize the existence and rights of those peoples who make up the Third World the day must come and will come when the nations of the Fourth World will come to be recognized and respected." A contemporaneous United Nations study of fourth-world populations highlighted the social exclusion of included ethnic and religious minorities around the globe, including aborigines in Australia, ethnic minorities in Africa, and religious minorities in the Soviet Union. Within this framework, in other words, the people of the fourth world may share common status of social exclusion and denial of basic rights due to their condition of

statelessness. The 2007 Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples recognized the struggle of indigenous peoples and has led to increased communications and organizing among fourth-world peoples as well as international treaties between aboriginal nations for the purposes of trade, travel, and security. The Center for World Indigenous Studies, founded in Canada in 1984, gives voice to the shared concerns of these stateless and marginalized nations across the globe through the *Fourth World Journal*, which includes articles on globalization, land rights, climate change, and other issues.

Manuel Castells has offered important revisions to Wallerstein's schema of a stable core, semiperiphery, and peripheral countries. The information revolution has lessened the importance of manufacturing and trade on which the world system was based for much of the twentieth century, replacing it with wealth accumulation based on networks and flows of information. Within this new international division of labor, there is an emerging fourth world that Castells describes as "the poorest of the poor," where increasing inequality and social exclusion has produced conditions of life characterized by polarization, poverty, and misery throughout the world. In the new network society, areas that are nonvaluable from the narrow perspective of informational capitalism are systematically excluded from opportunities that would allow them to engage with the emerging informational economy; they do not have access to or control of significant economic or political interests. The exclusion of both people and territory from participation in the network society means that entire countries, regions, cities, and neighborhoods are left behind, denied the social rights of citizens for participation in the major economic, occupational, and social opportunities that might enable them to pursue an acceptable standard of living within their society. People living in these areas are relegated to the fourth world, a position below that of citizens in the (former) third world countries.

The use of labels such as third world has faded from academic discourse with the end of the Cold War, the cascading effects of globalization, and actual changes within the global economy, as many developing nations (such as the Asian Tigers) have achieved ever greater levels of urbanization and industrial production. Globalization has also

produced important changes affecting the fortunes of urban places, where cities that occupied important positions within an earlier colonial world system have become less central to the global economy, and other metropolitan regions have emerged as new and important sites of economic development and political control. World systems theory is better able to capture these changes, as countries move from the semiperiphery to the core, and as urban regions move from the periphery to the semiperiphery within developing nations.

The new vision of the fourth world that emerges from these earlier traditions emphasizes the impact of global capitalism and informational technologies on individuals, groups, urban areas, regions, and countries within the world system of the twenty-first century. One's position relative to the world system, and thus one's opportunity to participate fully as a citizen of that system, no longer depends on residence within a specific nation-state but instead is defined by the position that the region and urban area occupy within the world system. Cities that occupied important positions within an earlier colonial world system, such as Manila, capital of the Spanish colonial system in Asia and later the hub of U.S. activities in the region, have become less central to the world economy and less important in global politics; with a poverty rate of more than 50 percent and nearly half of the population of the capital city living in slums, many people now find themselves in the fourth world. The old mechanisms of social integration have lost their currency and exhausted their effectiveness, and a new urban underclass has emerged with no hope for homeownership or formal employment, a new dangerous class. The increased commodification of land and housing within cities in the developing world results in increased polarization and an environment where immigrants are unlikely to be incorporated into the formal sector.

But globalization produces the fourth world within developed nations as well, whether this be the extensive *banlieues* of the French city, the inner-city ghettos of the American city, or, with the collapse of the global manufacturing economy, entire cities that evolved within the Fordist mode of production that resulted in the concentration of automobile manufacturing in the urban regions around the Great Lakes of the United States.

Indeed, many of the industrialized nations of the former periphery and semiperiphery countries have seen a decline of rural and small-town populations, leaving behind a fourth world in the urban fringe that is similar to the fourth world of the inner city: All of these areas share a common fate because they have become structurally irrelevant to global capital accumulation.

Some have cautioned against the assumption that economic restructuring within the less developed countries produces a fourth world that is excluded from the global capitalist system. While these countries may be characterized by economic stagnation, increasing marginality, and potential for social upheaval, such a model does not recognize the important ways that these countries remain integrated within the global system. Gavin Shatkin suggests that these countries are linked by the diffusion of new technologies, regional economic change, and changes in the flow of information and people. Indeed, in many of the less developed countries, we see an urban region that is linked to the world system through information networks, financial investment, population flows, and the like. It is the asymmetric nature of these flows that reminds us of the former colonial world system (flows of labor from the Philippines to developed nations, flows of capital from developmental agencies to Phnom Penh, and the like) and results in the expansion of the fourth world to what Mike Davis has called a world of slums. Often these people are linked by cell phone technologies and the World Wide Web to others around the globe, complicating our models of a new informational society just as the fourth world (places left behind in the new global economy) becomes more noticeable in metropolitan regions around the world.

Ray Hutchison

See also Castells, Manuel; Globalization; Urban Theory; World-Systems Perspective

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FUJITA, MASAHISA

Born in Yamaguchi prefecture (Japan) in 1943, Masahisa Fujita completed a BS in civil engineering at Kyoto University in 1966. Soon after, he went to the Department of Regional Science of the University of Pennsylvania, where he graduated with his PhD in 1972. He then became a professor of regional science there. After two decades, he joined the faculty of the Institute of Economic Research of Kyoto University, where he remained until 2006. Fujita is the recipient of the 1983 Tord Palander Prize, the 1998 Walter Isard Award in Regional Science, and the First Alonso Prize awarded with Paul Krugman.

Out of more than 100 scientific books and articles, some major contributions emerge. The core of urban economics is the monocentric city model of which Fujita's urban economic theory provides the definitive exposition. The main weakness of this model was the lack of explanation for the existence of a central business district. Fujita argued that cities are concentrations of agents of different types (mainly, firms and households). The centripetal force is communications among firms, which permit the exchange of information:

Other things being equal, each firm has an incentive to establish itself close to the others, thus fostering the agglomeration of firms. The centrifugal force is less straightforward and involves land and labor markets. The clustering of many firms in a single area increases the average commuting distance for workers, which in turn increases the wage rate and land rent in the area surrounding the cluster. Such high wages and land rents discourage further agglomeration of firms in the same area. The equilibrium distributions of firms and households are thus a balance between these opposite forces. In two seminal papers published in the early 1980s, Fujita identified the conditions to be imposed on communication fields and commuting costs for a monocentric, polycentric, or integrated urban pattern to emerge as the market outcome.

The dominant view through about 1990 was that agglomeration was a condition produced by spatial externalities of various types, including knowledge spillovers, matching externalities in labor markets, and the provision of local public goods. The more recent approach, with roots in general equilibrium models of monopolistic competition, focuses on demand side advantages arising from clustering when agents have a preference for variety and local competition is limited by product differentiation. In 1988, Fujita developed the monopolistic competition foundations of the economics of agglomeration, which makes him one of the founders of the new economic geography. In *The Spatial Economy*, coauthored with

Paul Krugman and Anthony Venables, Fujita provided a synthetic application of nonlinear dynamics to regional economics and international trade, as well as to urban economics. This book is a landmark in spatial economics and has established new economic geography as an economic field proper.

Jacques Thisse

See also *Journey to Work*; *Urban Economics*

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GANS, HERBERT

The sociologist Herbert J. Gans was born in 1927 in Cologne, Germany, and was naturalized as an American citizen in 1945. His work has informed social science and public opinion for almost half a century, ranging from publications in prestigious academic journals, to award-winning books, to widely read articles in the popular media. In particular, he has made an enormous contribution to the field of urban studies. Gans is a true public intellectual, tackling polemic social problems whose relevance is widely recognized, defying stereotypes, and uncovering new perspectives.

Gans's biography reveals the trajectory of a scholar who has contributed to a wide range of fields in social science including urban studies, urban planning, poverty, race and ethnic studies, and American studies, as well as the media and popular culture, liberal democratic theory, and public policy. Gans received his PhD in planning from the University of Pennsylvania and went on to work at various municipal and federal agencies. In 1971, he was appointed to Columbia University's Department of Sociology, holding the title of Robert S. Lynd Professor from 1985 until he retired in 2008. Gans served as president of the American Sociological Association (ASA) in 1989. He was honored in 1999 with the ASA's Award for Contributions to the Public Understanding of Sociology, and in 2005, he was recognized by the association for his career of distinguished scholarship.

Gans's urban ethnographic work was rooted in the tradition of urban community studies, in the footsteps of Louis Wirth's 1927 *The Ghetto* and William Foote Whyte's 1943 *Street Corner Society*. This tradition, born of the Chicago School, focused on the importance of place and highlighted the rich social ties that were a fundamental part of social life in the city. Gans firmly advocated that participant observation must be part of the methodological tool kit in analyzing urban and suburban life. *The Urban Villagers*, published in 1962, was an ethnography of Boston's West End neighborhood, which was slated for demolition and replacement with modern high-rise apartments. His criticism of urban renewal and its effects on communities remains salient today. Gans's well-known academic correspondence with Mark Granovetter, concerning the failure of West End residents to effectively mobilize to prevent the demolition, highlighted the limitations of network analysis for uncovering complex social processes. Gans's work repeatedly advocated the importance of highly contextualized ethnographic data—gleaned from extended field immersion—to generate social scientific claims.

In *The Levittowners*, published in 1967, Gans challenged the prevailing postwar stereotype of suburbs as spaces promoting social conformity, isolation, and moral bankruptcy. He argued that individual agency plays a strong role in shaping social outcomes; physical environment does not automatically produce social, moral, and cultural outcomes. Gans's *Middle American Individualism: Political Participation and Liberal Democracy* is a subtle analysis of middle- and working-class

Americans. Gans showed both the fears and aspirations of these newly arrived suburbanites and argued for the need to understand the residents as individuals struggling to achieve the American Dream.

Gans's criticism of the term *underclass* in his book, *The War against the Poor* (1995), highlights his propensity to take on hotly contested subjects, often changing the trajectory of the debate. The term *underclass* was commonly used by both journalists and social scientists in an effort to highlight a social group seemingly isolated geographically and apparently outside the bounds of normative American conduct. But Gans argued that, in the tradition of the controversial report by Daniel Patrick Moynihan in 1965, "The Negro Family: The Case for National Action," the term perpetuated an essentialist understanding of the ghetto poor as culturally deficient and undeserving of aid. In dialogue with William Julius Wilson, author of *The Truly Disadvantaged: The Inner City, the Underclass, and Public Policy*, he abandoned the term *underclass*. They proposed that through ethnographic work, the overly simplistic and often derogatory understanding of the poor as an *underclass* should be challenged by portraying the complexity and diversity of the ghetto poor and the context in which they are embedded.

Eva Rosen

See also Ethnic Enclave; Gentrification; Ghetto; Neighborhood Revitalization; Suburbanization

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
GARDEN CITY

The Garden City is a planning concept and model developed by Ebenezer Howard, who founded the Garden City Association in 1899. Howard's writing strongly influenced an early generation of urban planners, as well as the City Beautiful movement in the United States. Two garden cities were built in England in the early 1900s, and urban planners and architects in Europe and South America followed with garden cities in their countries. In the United States, garden cities were promoted by the Regional Planning Association, resulting in the construction of three communities in the 1930s. The Garden City has served as a model for urban development and an inspiration for other planning models to the present day.

History

In 1899, Ebenezer Howard founded the Garden City Association, a group formed to promote his ideas for planned communities, which would be include balanced areas of residential, industrial, and commercial spaces, surrounded by greenbelt and agricultural areas, to produce a healthy living environment—smokeless, slumless communities—for the urban dweller. Howard was influenced by his reading of Edward Bellamy's socialist utopian novels, *Looking Backward* (1888) and *Equality* (1897), although elements of the Garden City could be found in earlier planning efforts (Benjamin Ward Richardson, for example, published *Hygeia: A City of Health*, his plan for a model city to alleviate the unhealthy conditions of the industrial city, in 1876). Howard's plan for the Garden City was first published in 1899 as *Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*, but the book did not generate much attention; a revised version titled *Garden Cities of Tomorrow*, published in 1904, became a cornerstone in urban planning.

The Garden City was designed to house some 32,000 people on a site of 6,000 acres. Six radial boulevards 120 feet wide extended from the center,



Ebenezer Howard's design for the Garden City

Source: Howard, Ebenezer. 1902. *Garden Cities of Tomorrow*, p. 22. London: Swan Sonnenschein & Co.

creating a radial pattern, with open spaces and parks separating areas for residential, industrial, institutional, and other uses. The Garden City was intended to be self-sufficient, to include a mix of employment as well as sufficient agricultural land to feed the local population. The Garden City was bordered by a greenbelt to separate it from other cities. In one mapping included in the original publication but not in *Garden Cities*, a ring of planned communities surrounds a larger, central city; the communities are connected to the central city and to the other suburban centers by rail transport. The Garden City was a blend of the city and nature, but without the problems of pollution and overcrowding found in the large industrial city.

With financial support from William Hesketh Lever, the first Garden City, Letchworth, was built in Hertfordshire, north of London (Lever was in the

midst of construction of Port Sunlight, a planned industrial community outside of Liverpool, during this period). Letchworth was viewed as a successful implementation of the Garden City, with new homes and ample open space, a wide range of industries to provide employment for town residents, and an agricultural greenbelt to control further expansion. After World War I, the British government provided support for the second Garden City, in Welwyn, also in Hertfordshire. The Garden City would also serve as a more general model for smaller developments, including the Hampstead garden suburb and Gidea Park in London, and for garden cities in other countries as well, including Hellerau (a suburb of Dresden) in 1909 and Bromma (in Stockholm) beginning in 1910.

In 1909 the Garden City Association changed its name to the Garden Cities and Town Planning

Association (in 1941 the name would be changed once again, to the Town and Country Planning Association). By this time, there was a worldwide Garden Cities movement, as Howard's ideas served as a model for urban development in other countries. In 1908, the Australian government selected the site for a new national capital (present-day Canberra) and commissioned an international competition to design the new city. The winning design, by two Chicago architects, is derived in part from the comprehensive regional mapping for central city and surrounding garden cities published in *Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform*. New Delhi, in northern India, was similarly designed (in the 1910s) as the new capital city for the British colonial rule of the Indian subcontinent, and the broad axial boulevards and clustering of functional areas within the city (built in the 1920s) are derived from Howard's Garden City model.

In the United States, the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA), a group of architects, planners, and economists, including Lewis Mumford, was formed in 1923. Influenced by Patrick Geddes, Ebenezer Howard, and the British Garden City, the RPAA lobbied for regional planning to replace the haphazard growth of urban centers in the United States. Inspired by the success of the British garden cities, two members of the group (the architects Henry Wright and Clarence Stone) designed two new suburban communities, Sunnyside (in Queens) and Radburn (in New Jersey). During the Depression, the Roosevelt administration planned for the development of 19 suburban garden cities as part of New Deal legislation and Work Progress Administration (construction of the new homes would provide jobs for unemployed workers). But Congress provided funding for just nine of the greenbelt towns, and only three were actually built (Greendale in Milwaukee, Green Hills in Cincinnati, and Greenbelt in Maryland). From the beginning the towns were attacked by the real estate and builders lobbies as socialistic enterprises, and Congress later required the government to sell the housing.

Postwar New Towns

In post-World War II Great Britain, with London and other cities suffering extensive damage from aerial bombing, Peter Abercrombie's *Greater London Plan* of 1944 proposed the relocation of up

to 500,000 people in of 8 to 10 satellite towns separated from London by greenbelts. In 1946, Parliament passed the New Towns Act, authorizing the construction of 20 new towns across Great Britain, including eight in the greater London area and five in Scotland. In the 1960s, a second group of new towns was authorized to further control urban expansion of Greater London, and the last (and largest at more than 200,000 residents), Milton Keynes, was begun in 1967. In the United States as well, the legacy of the Garden City influenced later urban development in the form of new towns built in Reston, Virginia, and Columbia, Maryland (both in the Washington, D.C., area). In France, nine *villes nouvelles* were built in the 1960s to control the expansion of older urban centers, and other European countries have followed this model in later decades.

A Continuing Legacy

Howard's plan for the Garden City was influential among urban planners in the first decades of the twentieth century, influencing the design not just of new garden cities but of new national capitals as well. Howard was president of International Garden City Association, which later became the International Housing and Town Planning Federation. Although the Garden City was opposed by powerful business interests in the United States (which effectively halted the Roosevelt administration's plan for more extensive development of the cooperative communities), the planning model was influential in the design of new towns in both the pre- and postwar period. In recent decades, the continuing legacy of the Garden City movement can be seen in urban planning around the world, most directly in the new urbanism and sustainable development initiatives that have become part of urban development in almost every country.

Ray Hutchison

See also City Beautiful Movement; City Planning; Ideal City; New Urbanism; Sustainable Development; Urban Planning

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GATED COMMUNITY

Privatized spaces have become an increasingly dominant urban trend over the past 30 years, radically altering the use of space in the city as well as the nature of urban society. From Los Angeles to Rio de Janeiro and Johannesburg, an archetype of militarized space, with electrified fences, impenetrable walls, and armed security guards, has developed, protecting and securing residential, commercial, and corporate zones from the dangerous outside world. Concurrently, the label *gated community* has gained popularity in academic, policy, and popular discourse, employed to describe and critique this urban trend, although the historical roots and regional variations of the phenomenon are far older and broader than the American label suggests.

Definitions

Gated communities are traditionally defined by their physical attributes: a perimeter enclosure (e.g., electrified fence, wall), surveillance (e.g., CCTV,

security patrols), and access control (e.g., boom-gate, security gatehouse). In other words, gated communities inhabit spaces that are closely restricted, monitored, and controlled; they are reserved exclusively for residents and their appointed guests, with no access for uninvited outsiders. In reality, the term is applied to a wide range of territorial strategies, from total security estates (residential or commercial) with electrified high walls and permanently patrolling security guards, sometimes including schools, shops, and social clubs within the walls, to sectional title developments, apartment blocks with a keypad entry system, and everything in between. In addition, recent analyses of gated communities emphasize definitions based on the private and/or collective governance mechanisms that control these spaces, rather than the physical presence of gates or walls per se. However, the form of gated community predominantly imagined and implied by commentators is that of a cluster of residential homes, surrounded by walls and protected by private security of some form (although these inevitably also rely on communal governance mechanisms, such as homeowner associations, the latter are not a primary defining feature).

The Global Rise of Gated Communities

Explanations for the rise of gated communities differ significantly according to local and regional contexts, but factors such as rising violent crime and decreased confidence in public security are common rationalizations. The global rise of gated communities is often understood as a distinctly American trend, spreading from U.S. middle-class suburban enclaves and urban ethnic securitized ghettos to cities throughout the world. However, the concept and practice of urban gating has a much longer and wider history and is subject to regional variations.

For example, in the medieval era, entire cities were walled off; in the context of nineteenth-century European industrialization, the wealthy elite increasingly deserted run-down city centers in favor of private residential zones on the urban edge; and historical examples of the sixteenth-century Venetian ghetto and thirteenth-century *béguinages* in European cities demonstrate gated community principles of social exclusion via physical barriers. While the contemporary trend toward gated communities has spread fastest in the United States and Latin America, gated communities are not merely



A gated community in a suburb of Los Angeles.

Source: Steven K. Martin.

an American export but also a response to local specificities (e.g., high crime and inequality in South Africa and Brazil), and they exist in regions and countries with diverse cultures and urban histories such as the Arab world, Australia, the Caribbean, Eastern and Western Europe, China, New Zealand, Russia, South Africa, and Southeast Asia.

This explosion in the number of gated communities worldwide is matched by the growth in literature explaining and analyzing them. Edward J. Blakely and Mary Gail Snyder's book *Fortress America* is widely considered the classic text, charting the modern rise of gated communities in the United States, which brought the issue of gated communities to the forefront of academic and policy agendas in the late 1990s. Building on this work, anthropologists Setha Low and Teresa Caldeira, focusing on America and Brazil respectively, have more recently explored the reality of life "inside the gates," as well as the implications for those excluded.

The global spread of gated communities is partly driven by the construction and security industries, promoting a public discourse of fear related to the

risks of urban life, which they allege can be ameliorated through the secure environment of a gated community. In addition, such communities are often promoted by local municipalities eager to attract high-rate taxpayers, particularly those who consume so few public services. Residents of gated communities themselves explain their decision to move to a gated community as predominantly couched in the desire for increased security that, in the context of neoliberal state withdrawal, is not reliant on a government or its associated public security enforcement, often perceived as ineffective (and in some contexts, corrupt). This desire for security is not an exclusively physical need for protection from crime but is equally financial, as gated communities offer a secure investment that is lifestyle based. For example, residents describe their way of life in a gated community in terms of a rural idyll—harking back to a bygone era in which children could play outside and doors were left unlocked—a lifestyle no longer possible in the contemporary metropolis but one that can be successfully re-created inside a gated community, albeit

reliant on walls and private security. In other words, families can remain in proximity to the services of the city (such as good schools, shopping centers, and employment opportunities) but detach themselves from its less desirable realities such as crime and general insecurity, without moving to a rural backwater. It is therefore ironic that Teresa Caldeira's "insider/outsider" discourse based on research in São Paulo found that residence in a gated community actually serves to increase fear of crime among those inside the gates, as the dual effects of everyday "talk of crime," in which insecurity "beyond the gate" is magnified, combines with insular movement patterns to produce amplified panic and fear related to life outside. Despite broad recognition that residents favor gated communities to meet household desires for privatized physical, financial, and lifestyle security, it is important to stress the absence of a singular or uniform experience of gating throughout the world.

Implications for the City and Society

Although gated communities are eulogized by residents, developers, and real estate agents for providing safe family spaces and secure financial investments, they have received a largely negative press from academics and the media, who perceive them as private fortresses that destroy the vibrancy of the city through their exclusivity. A minority of researchers endorse gated communities, highlighting their role in protecting threatened groups from ethnic conflict, providing employment and services for nearby poor communities, demonstrating economic efficiency in service provision, and ensuring the retention of financial capital in weak states. In the main, however, gated communities are understood as problematic urban domains.

To summarize the argument: Although moving to a gated community can be a rational individual decision, especially in the context of severe violent crime and weak state capacity, the collective consequences for the rest of society and the city are considered destructive. Two major negative outcomes are stressed in the literature: the exclusion of individuals and the fragmentation of the city. Although middle- and low-income gated communities exist in some contexts (notably the United States), most gated communities (in the United States and elsewhere) are populated by high-income

residents and thus effectively incarcerate the wealthy in highly exclusive spaces. Because these spaces are consequently accessible only to the minority with financial means, spaces (which often were previously public) become privatized, thus restricting freedom of movement in the city and deepening social polarization by excluding the unknown mass of "others" or "them" from "our" safe spaces. As gated community residents tend to be socioeconomically similar (a consequence of house prices and restrictive covenants), often functioning with limited interaction outside their walls, spatial separation is inevitably entangled with social exclusion. In addition, gated communities are criticized for physically fragmenting the city into a series of elite private citadels that ultimately lead to an urban future of increased exclusion and segregation. This imminent urban dystopia is visualized as a series of secure forts, in which the wealthy maneuver from private space to private space, functioning without physical, social, or civic engagement with the dangerous outside world, which is populated by the excluded factions of society. Less exaggerated accounts of this spatial distortion emphasize the influence of gated communities on disrupting traffic flows and their inevitable role in displacing crime into nongated zones.

A further implication, which receives less direct attention in the literature, is the political withdrawal of gated community residents. Gated communities represent an extreme form of citizen retreat in the global era of neoliberal state withdrawal. In this context, the private sector has emerged as the dominant service provider, alongside the growing privatization of space in contemporary cities. Gated community residents demonstrate an augmented version of this trend because they are in some cases wholly dependent on private services and governance, and thus their reliance on the state is further depleted, and consequently, they exhibit reduced willingness to submit to the state in other aspects of everyday life. Thus, at a larger scale, gated communities contribute to challenging the very basis of modern society, that of the state as sovereign.

Indeed, research in South Africa indicates that preference for living in a gated community is not solely a residential or security-based decision; it also reflects a desire to disconnect from civic engagement and abstain from the responsibilities of civil society. In other words, gating is about

much more than the physical fragmentation of the city or the social exclusion of citizens; it can also be understood as representing the absolute secession of some dwellers from civil society. Gated community residents essentially wield their market-oriented power as private property owners and consequently reject citizenship-based interaction with the state as part of civil society. As an extreme interpretation, gated communities thus provide an alternative reality for residents, one that is detached and sheltered from the physical, social, economic, and political attributes of wider society. However, as indicated, the implications for the city and society can be highly destructive.

Charlotte Lemanski

See also Common Interest Development; Crime; Divided Cities; Suburbanization

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GAY SPACE

Gay space, particularly urban clusters of leisure venues serving a male homosexual clientele, first attracted the attention of urban geographers and sociologists in the late 1970s. As historians have demonstrated, there were vital (and often overt) urban homosexual subcultures in many major cities from at least the eighteenth century onward. However, it was not until the 1970s, with the

growth of the modern gay liberation movement, that concentrations of gay venues were consolidated in the landscape of major North American and European cities and became the subject of academic and popular attention. The title of this entry consciously highlights the uneven gendering of the geographies that have examined these spaces.

Early studies of gay space centered on the experience of major metropolitan centers in the United States. In a much cited study, Castells and Murphy focused on the development of the Castro district in San Francisco as gay territory. Their study mapped concentrations of visible bars, clubs, and retail outlets patronized by gay men; it also attempted to map residential clustering by gay men and examined the spread of votes cast in municipal elections for pro-gay candidates. In the 1980s, this work was extended to examine the role of gay men in the gentrification of inner-city neighborhoods.

Initially, (male) researchers could not find similar territorial concentrations of lesbians and theorized that women had been socialized not to claim space in the same way and furthermore were materially disadvantaged by the systemic inequalities in women's income. Subsequent research has identified districts (such as Park Slope in Brooklyn) where lesbians have been primary agents of gentrification; of course, lesbian bars also exist, but they have frequently been more precarious and short-lived than male-oriented venues. However, lesbian and feminist scholars have contended that most analysis of urban space is overinvested in reading for public visibility and, consequently, overlooks women's use of the city. In contrast they advocate expanding analyses to include women's social networks, domestic spaces, and quotidian routines to offer a more comprehensive understanding of the spatiality of lesbian lives. Such an approach also offers further insights into bisexual space, as bisexuals operate in both gay and heterosexual space as well as creating bisexual spaces, and yet are seldom visible (as bisexuals) in either.

Early studies of gay space tended to stress how these were liminal spaces occupying marginalized areas of the inner city. During the 1990s, many clusters of gay space became recentered within their cities, being integrated into urban regeneration schemes and place marketing initiatives. This, in turn, led many users of these sites to complain that they were becoming systematically "de-gayd"

as they attracted heterosexual consumers keen to demonstrate their cosmopolitan cultural capital. For some critical queer theorists, the incorporation of gay space into urban planning regimes is indicative of how it has become colonized by the market and also has become a privileged site that is complicit in the reproduction of normative masculinities, class prejudice, and White supremacy.

For most of the last three decades, theories of gay space have centered on the experience of inner-city neighborhoods in the metropolitan centers of the global North. Increasingly, geographers of sexualities have highlighted how the predominance of these theorizations may obscure far more than it reveals; they have embarked on the spatiality of gay urban life in other contexts, such as the suburbs, small towns, and cities in the global South, where gay identities (as they are understood in Europe and North America) may be the preserve of a privileged, transnational elite and coexist with indigenous homosexualities that have their own distinct spatialities.

Gavin Brown and Kath Browne

See also Castells, Manuel; Discotheque; Gendered Space; Gentrification; Non-Sexist City; Sex and the City; Social Exclusion; Social Movements; Spaces of Difference

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GEDDES, PATRICK

Patrick Geddes (1854–1932) was a polymath who covered a remarkable number of disciplines and subjects. He was a biologist and a sociologist, an educationalist and an aesthete. Geddes is perhaps best known for making important contributions to the development of town planning, especially the Regional Planning Association of America, although his influence extended in many directions. Lewis Mumford acknowledged Patrick Geddes as "my master" and claimed that Geddes "was one of the outstanding thinkers of his generation, not alone in Great Britain, but in the world." In Britain, Geddes's ideas were amplified further by his close collaborator, Victor Branford. Although Geddes's ideas were championed in the United States by thinkers like Mumford, until recently, Geddes merited no more than a footnote in urban studies. In the past decade, scholarly interest has revived Geddes's legacy for urban studies.

Career

Geddes gave up on a career as a professional biologist after being blinded temporarily in Mexico in 1879. He settled in Edinburgh's Old Town in 1886 and helped renovate the tenements of the Ramsay Garden set of buildings and Short's observatory on Edinburgh's Royal Mile. This became the renowned Outlook Tower and has been called the "world's first sociological laboratory." An educational museum, the Outlook Tower provided a gradually ascending overview of, and commentary on, the evolution of the city in history, from its roots in the world on the ground floor, through continental, national, and regional levels, before arriving at the top floor, where the contemporary vista of Edinburgh's topography was contextualized in the

Forth Valley region through the lens of a *camera obscura*.

Around the same time, Geddes was appointed to a personal chair in botany at University College Dundee (1889–1914), and he was later professor of civics and sociology at Bombay University (1919–1923). Geddes was in no way a conventional academic. He never completed a formal degree and failed to be appointed to a number of academic positions, until the Dundee textile magnate James Martin White founded the Dundee College post especially for Geddes. The generous terms of the Dundee chair allowed Geddes nine months of the year away from the college to pursue his other passions. Geddes also helped found the Sociological Society in 1903 and presented his seminal statement, “Civics: As Applied Sociology,” to the first Sociological Society conference. Later, he was awarded the international gold medal for his applied sociology exhibition at the 1913 International Exposition at Ghent. He accepted a knighthood in the last year of his life (although only after earlier refusing one).

Thought

Geddes has been situated by Volker Welter as part of the pre-1914 mainstream of European utopian thought, a “larger modernism” where scientific rationality was mixed with aesthetics, myth, and religion. In his home country of Scotland, Geddes was deeply attracted to neoromanticism and Celtic revivalism. He also absorbed intellectual influences from around the world. Geddes studied and worked in Paris, Montpellier (where he designed the College des Ecosseis), Mexico, Palestine, and Bombay, as well as in Dublin, Edinburgh, London, and Dundee. Geddes’s civic modernism placed great stress on developing a national and regional environmental consciousness within an internationalist ethics and placed a special emphasis on the evolution of place as historically constituted.

Geddes was committed to an evolutionary model of social development. He studied Darwinian evolution under Thomas Huxley in the mid-1870s and attended the Positivist Church in London, where he embraced the teachings of Spencer and Comte before warming to Ruskin’s social and aesthetic critique of contemporary social conditions. But his unique form of civic modernism took

firmer shape in Paris where, under the influence of Le Play and Demoulin, he was inspired by the progressive possibilities of fusing evolutionary science with social science. Geddes centered his civic modernism on the city because it alone represents nature’s drive to balance free individuals with the propagation of the species. Complex social formations like the city evolved from more basic and simpler units. For Geddes, the earlier development causally determines the form of the later one under changed social conditions by being inscribed into concrete spatial relations. Cities are structured by unconscious survivals from past epochs. Geddes typically exaggerated this unconscious inheritance, for instance, that Haussmann’s boulevards in Paris unconsciously echoed wide medieval hunting passages through the forests that once covered the region.

In 1904, Geddes published one of the seminal documents in civic modernism, *City Development: A Study of Parks, Gardens, and Culture Institutes*. This represented a full-scale (and never realized) plan for the civic restoration of the ancient Scottish capital of Dunfermline. *City Development* was financed by a local trust founded by Andrew Carnegie, who was born and raised in the town, and it can be viewed retrospectively as a bridging document between twentieth-century civic modernism and nineteenth-century Garden City planning.

At the same time, Geddes tried to stimulate interest in applied sociology by advocating the value of civic exhibitions as instructive tools for engendering civic action. Later city-region studies were carried out under Geddes’s supervision in India and Palestine. In India, Geddes looked to preserve the historic traces of the 30 or so towns he surveyed, even as rapid urbanization began to take hold. Geddes’s reverence for indigenous culture informed his plans for civic reconstruction of urban India. He did not share the Eurocentric contempt for the temple cities of South India but viewed them as the most complete integration of culture, history, and urban form.

Geddes published few major works, and his writing style was often elusive and digressive. Notable, however, was his sociobiological history, *The Evolution of Sex* (1889), written with John Arthur Thomson, a provocative study of gender and sex that was thought shocking in Victorian society. His *Cities in Evolution* (1915) was an

attempt to summarize his brand of evolutionary urbanism in a popular and accessible style. It must be judged an unsatisfactory statement of Geddes's intellectual ambition for the study of the city. The excessive recourse by Geddes to specialized concepts derived from biology and the many neologisms that he constructed could seem obscure and bewildering. For instance, to better express the development of vast city-regions devouring small towns and boroughs Geddes minted a term that would become part of the lexicon of urban studies, *conurbation*. Geddes's other neologisms included *megalopolis*, *geotechnic*, *paleotechnic*, *neotechnic*, and *Kakotopia*. Nevertheless, *Cities in Evolution* contains insightful clues into urban modernity, especially with regard to physical environment, culture, spatial form, community, evolutionary history, and civics that, with more careful elaboration and illustration, continue to resonate.

Influenced by his own semirural childhood and the regional perspective of the French geographer and anarchist Élisée Reclus, Geddes came to favor regionalism as a way to extend the heterogeneity of cities to a broader, more diverse, and self-regulating unit. In the image of a river flowing through a valley, Geddes was attracted to Reclus's idea of the "regional valley section" as a coherent unit for research-informed action. His favored example was Glasgow. For Geddes, the incipient "buds" of the future society based on the city-region model were already emerging in Glasgow because its river, the Clyde, combined the various facets of advanced industrial and social organization, which other cities like London dispersed onto geographically specialized quarters of the city. For this reason, Geddes claimed, Glasgow was also preeminent intellectually in the applied sciences and political economy.

Civic Modernism

Unlike many contemporary environmentalists, Geddes's civic modernism was far from hostile to urban life and technological innovation. For Geddes, the early modern centralization of industry and government represented a Paleotechnic age while the modern evolution toward more decentralized economy and government could evolve into the Neotechnic age. In its blind drive toward industrialization and accumulation for its own

sake, the Paleotechnic age wasted natural resources, material, and energy on a huge scale, only to create mass physical and cultural impoverishment as well as a catastrophic relationship to the environment. Geddes called this situation a Kakotopia, in contrast to the emerging utopia that was being made possible by electric energy. Geddes positioned his image of the utopian city at a point "like the mathematician's zero," somewhere between the grim reality of the industrial city as Dante's inferno and the wholly abstract conception of the utopian city. The civic modernism of utopian cities like Glasgow was rooted in social, technological, and natural conditions, but its realization was dependent on social action through the many-sided flourishing of environmentally sensitized action.

Despite being identified with large-scale public planning schemes, Geddes opposed the neat orderliness of anti-urban town planning and urged an active, reciprocal interaction with the natural and built environment. Practical intervention should be modest, small scale, and localized, a process he called conservative surgery. Urban improvement ought to develop along the grain of local traditions. Only careful study, sensitive to the environmental distinctiveness of city-regions, would reveal which evolutionary buds could be self-consciously nurtured for the utopian future.

Alex Law

See also City Beautiful Movement; City Planning; Mumford, Lewis; Urban Planning; Utopia

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GEMEINSCHAFT AND GESELLSCHAFT

Gemeinschaft and *Gessellschaft* are two abstract concepts developed by Ferdinand Tönnies to encapsulate the characteristics of society as it shifted from a rural base and reliance on agriculture to dependence on commerce within an urban setting. *Gemeinschaft* highlights community relations based on kinship in a preindustrial, agrarian society; many of these associations are extolled. Conversely, *Gesellschaft* is presented on the whole as a critique to modernity, with relationships based on economic transactions.

The concept is highly significant to urban studies as it warns against some of the threats of modernity that are more typically found in an urban setting. *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* denote relations between individuals within social structures while paying attention to the importance of human will. The ascent of *Gesellschaft*-type relations denotes an enhanced role for the state in representing the interests of society. Social entities and norms and the shifting role of the nation-state are therefore embedded within the analysis. This entry begins with a discussion of Tönnies and then provides a more extended analysis of his influential ideas.

Biographical Background

Ferdinand Tönnies, along with Max Weber and Georg Simmel, is described as one of the fathers of classical German sociology. Like them, he sought to learn from the past in order to understand the future, and in so doing, he considered the characteristics of societies both traditional and modern. In his works he was heavily influenced by Hobbes and his theory of the human will. Today, and together with Simmel, he is credited with providing a leading contribution to urban sociology.

Tönnies grew up on a farm in Germany and witnessed the impact of both commercialization and mechanization on daily life. The historical context for ideas has relevance because they were promoted at a time when European society was experiencing a transition from an agrarian base to one that was increasingly reliant on commerce and trade. There was a fascination across the continent

with the implications of modernity for traditional society; as evidenced in the works of Émile Durkheim and Weber.

At the end of the nineteenth century, Tönnies published the book *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft*. This first edition (1887) gained a very limited readership, allegedly because of the old Germanic style of writing. Tönnies was ultimately a prolific writer in his native language, but it is often claimed that his work has been somewhat neglected. While seven German language editions were published between 1912 and 1940, an English language publication of the original book did not appear until the latter half of the twentieth century.

Tönnies had no advocate within Europe and beyond Germany. The impact of his work is therefore much less apparent. But closer scrutiny of twentieth-century sociology reveals a less than wholesale disregard of his work within a European context. Clearly, we see evidence of Tönnies's central ideas within theories of urbanization and associated dichotomies of urban and rural ways of life. His thinking is further implied in many of the community studies debates that emanated from the United Kingdom during the 1970s. Indeed, his influence is sometimes considered so hidden and inferred so that while the basic theory is well known, it is not widely read and as a result it is not fully understood.

The book was written in the positivist tradition, meaning that it is descriptive. But it also offers opinion and ultimately seeks to provide an archetype for the ideal society. Broadly, *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* provide a mechanism for understanding relations of community and society. Even though Tönnies was a progressive, the book provides an explanation of the major elements of the conservative style of thought that represented the German intellectual thought of the time. He tapped into a European fascination with modernity: Just as Durkheim expressed concern for the emergent modern society with the loss of social integration and the rise in suicide, Tönnies sought to understand the perils of modernity using social relationships. Although the theory is often approximated to relations within rural (*Gemeinschaft*) and urban (*Gesellschaft*) societies, the two are not mutually exclusive. In other words, the dual concept intermingles within many social relations and a steady progression from one to the other is not necessarily

evident within society. *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* continue to have resonance for modern urban societies so that in a modern *Gesellschaft* world, *Gemeinschaft*-like relations persist, *but with diminishing strength*, to remain a reality of social life. In Tönnies's pursuit of the ideal type, he was concerned with retaining stronger *Gemeinschaft* relations in the new world order.

Pre- and Postindustrial Society

The desire for the profitable use of money prevailed during seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe in the mercantile age. Major social change was brought about by the development of large-scale trade, technological changes, and the advent of capitalism. Further major changes were occurring within society in relation to science, religion, and the role of the nation-state in an era that is known today as the Age of Enlightenment. During this time, reason and scientific inquiry took precedence over irrationality and superstition.

These transformations had a direct impact on rural areas, which faced decline as people left the land and moved to industrial centers. In parallel with this shift, the supremacy of the ruling aristocracy was eroded due to the declining role of land within society. Consequently, the old ideologies of agrarian society were gradually swept away with the dawn of the capitalist age. Meanwhile, industrial society witnessed the rise of city and metropolitan areas. Central to this change was the shift from a predominantly closed community, where common interests are pursued for the greater good, to a more heterogeneous society, where individuals pursue their own interests. In the new world order, society is governed by a remote state rather than one that is structured around the locale. Protection of individuals and their physical and intellectual property and freedom form key roles for the state. The centrality of these issues (of individual freedoms, social relations, and state governance) implies that the original theory is germane to studies of society today.

Relations Within Society

Ties through blood and marriage comprise *Gemeinschaft* relations so that kinship bonds form the central unit, but friendships and neighborly

connections are also important. Relations are perceived to be personal, familiar, strong, and close-knit. Levels of trust and reciprocity are high. These relations prevail within rural settlements, be they towns or villages. Moreover, society is intimately connected to the land. Those who work the land earn a living and derive pleasure from this task. Traditional values and customary practices abound within social relations, which as a result are described as organic and natural. In other words, they are genuine inasmuch as they are instinctive and have emerged from within the community, rather than resulting from enforced relations. These are manifest in relations within the family; among man, woman, and child.

By contrast, in the *Gesellschaft* of the capitalist society there is no shared set of social norms or collective history. Set in a city environment, individuals develop relations as a result of economic transactions; they seek to exchange merchandise or services to further their own self-interest. Relations are impersonal, artificial, perfunctory, loose, and superficial. As a result, individuals are cut off from nature, and they experience isolation from one another and from their community.

In the *Gemeinschaft*, it is proposed that women are driven by conscience and sentiment, whereas men are driven by calculation and effort. Although Tönnies contends that these merely represent different types of individuals within a society, the gendered nature of the analysis is apparent. It suggests that women tend to develop natural relations, such as the deep, instinctive mother-child connection. These relations are superior to those of their male counterparts, which are artificial and authoritarian. In the utopian society, relations would be more akin to those found among women in the *Gemeinschaft*.

Government and Individual Will

Society is underpinned by the human will, specifically *Wesenwille* and *Kurwille*. Although intellect and reason pervade both, the former is associated with *Gemeinschaft* and refers to the will that is natural and innate within the individual. It represents the traditional and unchanging essence of the community. Choices are made instinctively on the basis of habit and custom, for the greater good of the community. Relationships are formed for their intrinsic value.

These are upheld by a higher authority, typically with input from religious bodies, through common law. Peace prevails because individual interests overlap with those of the community. Moreover, these traditional communities are distinct, with powerful social norms and bonds, and they share common enemies.

In contrast to the prevailing community interests of the *Gemeinschaft*, the *Kurwille* is the modern individual's will. It is arbitrary and is based on the notion of choice, rational judgment, the pursuit of self-interest and pleasure, and the attainment of power. Although the transition from natural to rational will signifies freedom for the individual, the gains are considered temporary. As free agents, individuals form associations as a means to achieving particular ends. Individuals have distinctive personal property, and altruistic deeds are viewed with suspicion.

Random choices may be made, but they are deemed to be preferable for the individual making those choices, with little attention paid to the common good. Such motivation is found within the industrial society with an accompanying fragmentation of the close-knit *Gemeinschaft* community. In this society, the metropolis and the super-/supra-nation state have a central role in creating and enforcing positive law; this central role of the state alone signifies the advent of modern society. Peace is maintained through convention by a legitimate nation-state; it does not emerge from within the community.

As society matures and citizens experience a shift from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft* relations, their character changes and kinship ties, community bonds, superstitious beliefs, and connections to nature are all eroded. The rise in commerce brings a more rational, detached, and diverse society.

Although critics would contend that the theory of *Gemeinschaft* und *Gesellschaft* is naive and romantic, the concepts are abstract. They represent ideal types that were devised to assist with understanding modern social structures. The classification of the different relations, of human will, and of the role of the state are necessarily abstract to provide a deeper understanding of social relations. In reality, the theory maintains that society will progress from a period where *Gemeinschaft* relations predominate, to one that is epitomized by the *Gesellschaft*, before evolving into a new society. It was this society that Tönnies was interested in

influencing. Ultimately, the theory is not pessimistic; it contends that the prevalence of *Gesellschaft* is a temporary condition, with new social relations emerging in the modern world. A critical question for urban studies must be: How can urban areas overcome the seemingly negative aspects of *Gesellschaft* relations and simultaneously reinvent *Gemeinschaft* links from a bygone era?

Ruth McAreavey

See also *Capitalist City; Community; Metropolis; Simmel, Georg; Urban Sociology; Urban Theory*

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GENDERED SPACE

Gendered space is a central concept for feminist scholars working in urban studies, geography, and planning. Gendered space is not absolute but is shaped by the dominant social and cultural institutions that reinforce traditional gender roles. For many years, gender as a subject was largely ignored by academics and policymakers concerned with urban spaces. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, feminist geographers and planners began critiquing the situation of women in cities and focusing on the various ways that women and men experience these spaces differently. In particular, scholars analyzed the spatial expectations about women and their ability to move through urban spaces, to engage in labor outside the home, and to participate fully in the social and political system created and dominated by men.

The genesis of this approach to space can be traced to Henri Lefebvre, who argued in *The Production of Space* that spatial patterns are not absolute but are shaped by the social and economic systems dominated by institutions and individuals who wield political power. In Western society, men traditionally have exerted the greatest social and economic power and have influenced the spaces around them to meet their needs. Some locations benefit, and others are disadvantaged as a result of these dominant forces. Similarly those individuals without power are restricted from using the favored spaces, causing spatial inequality.

Gendered Nature of Public and Private Spaces

In medieval Europe, women in rural villages worked in the fields and in village markets; other opportunities for women to live and work outside the home were quite limited. Some women sought the protection of the cloistered life in monastic orders that accepted them as sisters. Others found safety among the *beguines*, whose communities enabled women to live apart from men under semi-monastic conditions without formal religious vows and to be active in charitable works in the community. The Industrial Revolution accentuated the spatial separation of men and women. Linda McDowell argues that, for many years, the field of urban studies ignored gender in tracking social changes associated with the rapid urbanization of the Industrial Revolution. She suggests that the spaces of rapidly industrializing cities were considered unsafe for women, and this perception led to the Victorian era division of space into public and private arenas, which constrained women to the private space of the home and allowed men free rein to move through the public streets and seek out employment and entertainment in the city.

This understanding persisted during the first half of the twentieth century and established a pervasive basis for discrimination against women, which constrained them to private domestic spaces while allowing men to dominate the public workplace settings. Men were free to ramble through the Victorian city, but women who ventured into public spaces in cities were considered to be either lower-class or “fallen” women.

In some situations, women were permitted to join the labor force, although the effects of this varied considerably. Doreen Massey argues that differences in employment regimes in mining areas, cotton towns, and inner London resulted in different spatial employment relations and differences in women’s spatial empowerment. In mining regions, men worked in the mines, and women kept the home fires burning. In cotton mill towns, women were allowed to do the weaving tasks, which created new possibilities for them to organize and improve their lives. In London, women worked in various trades but mostly undertook home-based piecework, which was less threatening to the male patriarchy in the clothing industry. In the United States, groups like the Women’s Christian Temperance Union (WTCU) and the settlement house movement worked to establish safe spaces for women and immigrants within urban areas and raised social awareness of issues like suffrage, temperance, and the need to protect working women from men’s advances.

The form of the newly developing cities was also shaped by many of these long-standing gender biases. Delores Hayden critiques influence of the male-dominated field of architecture on the physical form of cities. She argues that this control over the built environment enabled the sexist nature of urban spaces. Houses were built in suburban locations that provided a tranquil home for men returning from work in the city, but at the same time, such spaces kept women isolated from each other. One solution to this bias was to reconfigure the urban fabric, especially in residential locations, to alleviate the isolation of women and create a more equitable society.

Daphne Spain provides a seminal treatment of this topic in her book, *Gendered Spaces*, in which she explicitly recognizes the status differential between men and women creates specific urban spatial configurations linked to the patriarchal spatial institutions that reinforce the dominance of men. In particular, she examines the spatial institutions of the family, the educational system, and the labor force, which operate through a variety of physical locations including dwellings, schools, and workplaces. In each of these settings, Spain argues, the social systems in place provided advantages to men that were denied to women. She also extends her analysis with a useful description of

the nature of gendered space in non-Western cultures. She argues that women's status is lower when domestic spaces are sex segregated, when men have separate initiation rituals, and when there is a highly differentiated division of labor. When spatial institutions are controlled by men, then the space within which they operate can be said to be biased in their favor and against women, making them effectively gendered spaces.

Shifting Understanding of Space as a Binary

To focus attention on the gendered nature of urban spaces, some scholars have critiqued the dichotomous nature of public and private spaces. Nancy Duncan suggests that the spatial binary is used to legitimate the oppression of women, and she deconstructs the binary of public-private space, suggesting that quasi-private space provides a richer description. Other writers have discussed the nature of urban spaces that are neither fully public nor entirely private, including shopping malls, bars, restaurants, and suburban lawns. The less rigid gendering of these intermediate spaces allows both women and men greater freedom to move between locations and to express a wider range of behaviors. Susan Gal even suggests that such division of public and private might be best conceptualized using a kind of fractal analysis that breaks down the subcategories of space into geometric fragments. There is a need to move beyond this public-private duality and reconceptualize gendered space along a continuum.

Kristine Miranne and Alma Young have produced an influential edited volume, *Gendering the City*, in which they note that women's lives in urban spaces are shaped by the visible and invisible boundaries created by the social structures that gender the city. Violence toward women is one of the mechanisms for perpetuating this dichotomy so that women who do transgress the spatial binary and enter public spaces must contend with an internalized fear of male violence. Women who enter male-dominated public spaces may be subject to a wide range of verbal and physical harassment for transgressing the accepted boundaries. In addition, other individuals whose identities reflect marginalized categories, such as race or sexual identity, also encounter this highly gendered spatial system and may feel especially constrained in the ways

that they may express themselves in public spaces controlled by the largely White and heterosexual regime.

Other scholars have used a different strategy to critique the dichotomous nature of sex and gender as well as the public/private dichotomy. Feminist scholars have long argued that not all males are or need to be masculine and not all females are or need to be feminine. This recognition has required gender theorists to develop more complex theories of what gender is and how it is constructed and whether the gender binary continues to be a useful construct for looking at space. Judith Butler has challenged the traditional gender binary and argued that gender is not located just in people's physical bodies; rather, it is constructed through everyday performances of gender, which can challenge dichotomous conceptualizations and add fluidity to the range of possible gendered identities.

In the Western world, when people express gender variance in public spaces, they are often faced with significant discrimination and harassment. People may assume that a woman who is a little too masculine or a man who is a little too feminine is lesbian or gay, but gender identity and sexual orientation are quite different phenomena. In any case, the response to visible public gender variance is often violent and quite personal. Transgender political activists argue that the perpetrators of hate crimes against gays and lesbians frequently select their victims because of their visible gender variance, not because they have direct evidence of their sexual orientation. Thus, the performance of gender at odds with social expectations can be unsettling for some and for others can trigger an outpouring of rage. This is an extreme example of the way that space is gendered.

Non-Western Conceptions of Space

European and North American scholars have sometimes failed to recognize the cultural dimensions of gender and the ways that the colonial enterprise exported Western conceptions of gendered space. Sara Mills suggests that colonial town planning was used to separate "native" peoples from the colonists and reinforced a distancing based on race and gender. However, when either party moved across this artificial spatial boundary,

the highly sexualized contacts that often resulted had a profound influence on both the colonizer and the colonized. Yet, Western observers continue to perpetuate colonialist discourses that marginalize women of the third world by situating them in spaces that have limited relevance to third world cultures.

In the Islamic world, there are strong cultural and religious restrictions on women's ability to move unaccompanied through public spaces. Visitors to Muslim countries are struck by the strongly gendered distinctions in both public and private spaces. Male visitors to a Muslim household are typically welcomed into a formal sitting area with a nearby dining space. Drinks and food are brought by the male head of household or one of his sons. The interior space of the dwelling is set up so that the women of the household can move through the rest of the space without being seen by anyone in the public rooms. This separation extends into the public sphere because women in public spaces must be covered or veiled. Similarly, in the public spaces of the mosque, there are separate areas for men and women to pray. Yet, within the culture, some women consider veiling an enabling device that frees them to enter public spaces that would otherwise be inaccessible to them. Other crossings into public space can occur in what Amy Mills describes as *Mahalle* space in Istanbul. These neighborhood spaces shift when men are at work, permitting the space outside the houses to become a semiprivate space shared by women in neighboring houses and that reverts to its fully public nature when the men return and becomes off limits to women.

In other parts of the world, the nature of domestic space is quite variable. Louise Johnson has edited a special series of ten articles in the feminist geography journal, *Gender, Place, and Culture*, that examined the varied understandings of kitchen space across cultures. Although in the West kitchens are usually within a private dwelling place, contributors to this issue note that many kitchens in developing nations are shared spaces located in a courtyard or other communal space.

In some cultures, land is inherited solely by men, but in parts of West Africa, land is inherited via the maternal lineage. Accordingly, in the case of the wife's death or divorce, the land reverts to the wife's

family, leaving the husband without a home or producing crops. There is great variability in the gendered nature of public commercial activity. For example, in the West African nation of Togo, women known as the *Mama Benzs* are the dominant force in commerce, especially for cloth and household goods, and because of their influence have also begun to exert political influence on the government. However, in other parts of West Africa, commercial activity is the sole province of men.

Many non-Western cultures show greater tolerance of gender diversity, and the resulting array of possible gender categories also undermines binary understanding of gendered space. These different cultural situations provide useful insights into the spatial implications of more fluid gender possibilities. Anthropologist Gilbert Herdt, in *Third Sex, Third Gender: Beyond Sexual Dimorphism in Culture and History*, has provided a rich collection of perspectives from around the globe demonstrating variations in gender categories. Some of these variations also have direct spatial implications. Sometimes, sacred spaces are protected or otherwise associated with nonbinary genders. For instance, traditionally, the guardians of the holy places of Islam were special eunuchs known as *mukhanath*, who were considered a kind of third gender, which enabled them to be present while both men and women approached the holy sites. In India, third-gender people known as *hijra* play important public roles during religious ceremonies marking births and weddings.

The gendering of urban spaces is a result of specific sociocultural processes, including religion, social structure, and economic class. As societies evolve, the social forces that create the gendered spaces may also change. For example, although some view religion as a conservative force in terms of gender, in fact, the spread of religion is dynamic and rises and falls with global expansion. In Turkey, for instance, in the 1920s, Ataturk led a revolutionary change toward a more secularized interpretation of Islam that decreed that veils would no longer be worn in "modern" society. More than half a century later, some of those secular changes are under considerable pressure with the rise of Islamist parties in Turkey, and the nature of gendered space is in flux.

In 1996, South Africa adopted its first post-apartheid constitution, which includes some of the

most progressive constitutional protections against discrimination on the basis of race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or social origin, color, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, belief, culture, language, and birth. It remains to be seen how such legal changes are reshaping the nature of gendered spaces in this country. In 2005, after many years of civil war in Liberia, a woman was elected president, the first female head of state in an African country. Once again, a gendered change in political leadership is likely to lead to a shift in the basic understanding of the gendered nature of government and its associated spaces.

These processes of social change are dynamic and nonlinear, reflecting changes in the social, economic, and cultural institutions of power. When sociocultural processes no longer demonize gender and gender variance, a broad array of gendered behaviors in public spaces may be possible and the gendered nature of urban spaces may be reduced.

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See also *Beguineage*; Gender Equity Planning; Urban Theory

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GENDER EQUITY PLANNING

Gender equity planning highlights the effects of planning on males and females, as well as the impacts of men and women on planning itself. Gender refers to the subjective, dichotomous characterization of individuals as being male/masculine or female/feminine whereas sex refers to the categorization as males and females based purely on biological characteristics (chromosomes, genitalia, etc.). The two terms, gender and sex, are often confused in discussions of gender equity planning, and the idea that the latter is about more than biology is important to remember.

Masculine and feminine characteristics are often thought to be socially constructed; what counts as meaningful gendered traits changes with the times. Jobs that were once seen as appropriate only for men, such as planning, are now available as acceptable choices for women. Physical traits, such as hair length and musculature, vary, too, according to their perceived relevance in classifying an individual as being feminine or masculine. In this way, practices such as gender equity planning become increasingly complex the more carefully one explores the concept and the more finely key distinctions are made.

If gender pertains to societal notions of what it means to be female or male, equity is concerned with fairness in terms of how those who are labeled as male or female are treated. Fairness may mean being treated equally, or it may mean that unequal practices are called for to create a more equitable situation. An interest in equity also implies an interest in, and commitment to, correcting injustices. Thus, gender equity planning is about preventing or remedying existing or potential injustices in cities and regions. Like gender categories, ideas about what counts as an injustice are not static, and so whether something (e.g., females not being able to own property or sign a contract) is an

injustice varies across time and cultures. Even if an injustice seems relatively unequivocal, its perceived severity or intensity may change, thus affecting the priority it receives by planners and policymakers.

Gender equity planning has arisen because of a perceived bias on the part of planning and planners to adhere to a gender-neutral approach. This bias is a consequence of a society in which males have the most power and public presence as well as, more specifically, dominating the planning profession in both numbers and prestige. Developed as a response to this bias, gender equity planning turns the attention of planners and publics to issues such as personal safety, child care, diverse and affordable housing, transportation, and public space to address many of the issues that women and girls, especially, face in their environments. In developing countries, gender equity planning is often particularly concerned with economic development and the provision of services that make life easier and more equitable for women.

For example, a gender equity approach to planning in a developing country might highlight the provision of small loans to women to support their business endeavors. Such loans might traditionally be given to men; these sorts of programs capitalize on the fact that women have been found to have a relatively high rate of loan repayment and accompanying economic success. Moreover, this success can also permeate an entire family or household, thus multiplying the benefits potentially derived from the program.

Analogous examples in Europe, Australia, and North America include safe-city projects in numerous communities, women's housing cooperative developments, gender mainstreaming projects in organizations such as the Royal Town Planning Institute, and purposeful input on planning decisions from the point of view of women's groups, such as Women Plan Toronto in Ontario, Canada.

Beyond instances of policies, plans, and programs are the impacts of a gender equity perspective on more fundamental aspects of planning. Leonie Sandercock and Ann Forsyth, for example, discuss a new gender agenda for planning and planning theory; this agenda includes different ways of knowing in planning (i.e., how we understand what planning is and how we go about doing planning). Thus, a new focus on treating men and women, as well as masculine and feminine attributes, fairly in

planning means that new planning methods, epistemologies, and modes of communication must be incorporated into planning theory and practice. Emphasizing participatory approaches, the involvement of marginalized individuals and groups, and more discursive ways of conducting planning exercises is consistent with these methods and epistemologies. Even new ethical guidelines are appropriate, given that women often think differently about ethical issues than men. This might mean that ethical codes could include norms other than those they do now: principles of doing no harm, a focus on interdependencies and relationships, and positive visions of a well-planned community, for example.

Equity here does not refer necessarily to equality. When one starts with an uneven playing field, as it were, equality is insufficient for making the situation fairer. For example, if a city caters to transportation patterns that are connected more to men's needs than those of women, fairness requires more than equal use of that system. It might mean that public transportation should actually favor routes and stops that address the particular, multifaceted needs of women. Similarly, professional planning practice that was focused almost exclusively on particular sorts of technical information might have to undergo a considerable shift to encompass other ways of knowing.

Furthermore, and as suggested earlier, as societies change, the gender roles of men and women change. Child care, for example, once almost always the purview of women, is slowly becoming also a male responsibility. Nevertheless, women continue to do the majority of child care and household chores, despite also working outside their homes. Thus, even in changing times, some gender stereotypes remain relevant, and these are at the heart of planning that has gender equity as a guiding principle. If these stereotypes and accompanying societal practices became obsolete, so too would gender equity planning.

However, some would argue that planning itself is a masculinist endeavor that emphasizes built form instead of people, for example. Histories of planning suggest that the social strands of the field split from a more physical orientation relatively early in the development of the profession. While those who were more interested in social relationships, including many women, went on to work in fields such as

social work, those who were more inclined toward the physical form of the city went on to become planners. In the early days, these were almost all men. Again, however, as it has become more acceptable for women to pursue professional education in fields such as planning, the proportions of them in practice have increased. Gender equity in professional planning organizations continues to encourage women to join the profession, but it is also concerned with the status of these women in the profession as well as their diversity with regard to such defining characteristics as race.

Although the effects of gender equity planning are difficult to discern or measure, it is clear that there are more women in the profession than there once were. It is also clear that so-called women's issues have received greater attention than they once did. However, gender gaps remain in terms of the salaries received by male and female planners in North America, with planning education still seen as focusing on masculinist approaches to planning and professional socialization. This inhibits female planners from asserting feminist perspectives in their work.

Thus, challenges to implementing gender equity planning principles include the continued domination of the field by men who may or may not perceive the need for this approach; professionalization of women who are often taught that their chosen careers are, or should be, neutral or unbiased (and thus not amenable to feminist or gendered concerns); and a postfeminist environment in which questions arise about the need for a continued focus on sex- and gender-based equity considerations. Other challenges—such as the increased voice and visibility of transgendered people, which further complicates notions of sex and gender; the enhanced integration of various aspects of identity (class, race, sexuality, etc.); and uncertainty regarding the validity or nature of the category woman or female—all point to the need for gender equity planning to advocate for sex- and gender-based fairness and to consider other aspects of people that contribute to inequities in cities and regions.

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See also City Planning; Gendered Space; Sex and the City; Urban Planning; Women and the City

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GENERAL PLAN

A general plan is a legal document that states the goals, principles, policies, and strategies to regulate the growth and development of a particular community. In the literature, general plan, comprehensive plan, and master plan are synonymous. The main characteristics of general plans are their comprehensiveness, long-range time frame, and holistic territorial coverage. General plans include elements on land use, economic development, housing, circulation and transportation infrastructures, recreation and open space, community facilities, and community design, among many other possible elements. After approval, the general plan is an expression of what the community wants for a certain time horizon, usually 15 to 20 years into the future. A general plan covers all territory within a jurisdiction.

Historical Evolution

The first plans in the United States were devised as ways of bringing order to the turn-of-the-century industrial city. Examples of initial plans are the 1907 plan by Henry Wright for St. Louis and the 1909 plan by Daniel Burnham for Chicago. The general plan was formally defined in the Standard City Planning Enabling Act of 1928 with the

purpose of guiding and accomplishing a coordinated, adjusted, and harmonious development of the municipality and its environs which will, in accordance with present and future needs, best promote health, safety, morals, order, convenience,

prosperity, and general welfare, as well as efficiency and economy in the process of development. (Section 6)

General plans evolved over time. Initially, they were seen as means to achieve an urban order in a democratic society, whereas, after World War II, plans were perceived more as expressions of control over growing municipal territories and devices of technical and scientific planning expertise. In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the general plan instrument was greatly criticized for being too strict and for its inability to adapt expeditiously to changing circumstances and market forces.

Nowadays, general plans are still very much in use but allow for more public participation during the making of the plan and for more flexibility in terms of their principles and in terms of the time frames for incorporating revisions. General plans are useful documents to establish the means for moving toward the desired long-term goals and to help guide decision-making processes.

How They Work

Typically, the general plan represents the fulfillment of a governmental legal requirement. For instance, in Arizona, the state statutes characterize a general plan as a municipal statement of land development policies, which may include maps, charts, graphs, and text in the form of objectives, principles, and standards for local growth and redevelopment. The most common goals today are public health and safety, effective circulation, provision of municipal services and facilities, balanced fiscal health, economic opportunities, and environmental conservation.

A general plan goes through five phases: a research phase, a period to articulate and clarify goals and objectives, a phase of plan formulation, an implementation phase, and finally a revision phase. One of the main challenges of the general plan approach to municipal development is its need for both comprehensiveness and relevance in rapidly growing urban areas.

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See also City Planning; Urban Planning

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GENTRIFICATION

In the mid-1960s, as middle-class households began to purchase and renovate rundown, tenanted Georgian and Victorian terraces in the West End of London, the British sociologist Ruth Glass coined the term *gentrification* to describe a process of working-class displacement that changes the district's prevailing social character. Initially, the defining features of gentrification included an influx of middle-class households and the renovation of working-class housing, invariably resulting in the displacement of tenants from gentrifying neighborhoods. Eventually, these processes are capable of completely changing the class composition and dominant tenure of inner area communities. Hence, in usage, gentrification has always referred to both the physical and social transformation of neighborhoods.

These days, given the large-scale residential redevelopment that is occurring in inner cities around the world, it is difficult to justify restricting the study of gentrification and displacement processes to what began as essentially home renovation. Gentrification studies have expanded to embrace all forms of residential investment and redevelopment in declining inner area neighborhoods; and now, although the context is quite different, in many postindustrial economies affluent newcomers and second-home owners are driving up house prices and destabilizing local housing markets for long-time residents in rural villages and coastal communities, producing effects akin to gentrification.

The effects of what is now characterized as urban revitalization were simply inconceivable to urban theorists confronted with suburbanization

after World War II. Urban rent models predicted the decentralization of employment and housing, never envisaging that gentrification would become one of the key signifiers of late-twentieth-century urban restructuring. Besides providing a visible expression of forces at work in the finance, labor, and housing markets of global cities, by the 1990s, gentrification had been seized on by politicians and urban managers in Europe, North America, and Australasia as a strategy for bringing the inner city “back to life” and as a catalyst for urban renaissance.

Urban revitalization has reached the stage in numerous cities where residential property investors and middle- and upper-class home buyers can choose between the inner city’s renovation, building conversion, townhouse, condominium, or apartment submarkets. Significantly, the much higher levels of investment required for multiunit redevelopment can quickly push up house prices and rents in old neighborhoods. So much has been written about gentrification that it is possible in this entry to point to only some key touchstones.

Seminal Studies of Gentrification

In the United States, the first commentaries on “central city revival” and a “back to the city” movement date from the mid-1970s. Isolated studies of neighborhood renewal and middle-class resettlement in older American neighborhoods were also beginning to appear. Yet, two decades of White flight had accentuated inner-city decline, making conditions so unpromising that, in the mid-1980s, Brian Berry went so far as to dismiss the phenomenon in North America as “islands of renewal in seas of decay.”

In the case of Australian cities, although the population decline, depletion of the housing stock, and job losses resembled trends at the heart of Anglo-American cities, race was not an issue, nor was abandonment as widespread. In that regard, the Australian experience more closely resembled the inner area conditions of Canadian cities. Early Australian studies documented housing conflict arising from gentrification in inner Melbourne—by the Centre for Urban Research and Action—and the contribution of displacement to the decline of boarding and lodging in inner Adelaide. Hal Kendig’s *New Life for Old Suburbs*, an analysis

of postwar land use and housing change in the Australian inner city, established that as well as middle-class incursion, displacement was being caused by freeway building and the expansion of large public institutions.

One of the best studies of class and tenure transformation actually follows up on the early observations of Ruth Glass. Flat break-up in Inner London was recorded by Chris Hamnett and Bill Randolph over a 15-year period (1966 to 1981): While the number of unfurnished flats fell by over half, the number of owner-occupied units doubled. Much of this was due to the sale of flats by property trusts, with a government home improvement grant acting as an incentive to remodel and convert them for homebuyers. As a result, extensive tracts of low-rent accommodation were lost within the heart of London.

Causes of Gentrification

It’s unlikely that Ruth Glass could have imagined the spirited debate that would occur about the causes of gentrification. Because of gentrification’s significance as a harbinger of urban restructuring in the 1970s and 1980s, it has served as something of a theoretical and ideological standard bearer within urban studies. Indeed, the evolving literature on gentrification has been shaped by opposing epistemology (structuralism vs. postmodernism; totalizing theory vs. eclecticism) and ideology (neo-Marxist vs. neo-Weberian analysis), as well as by the challenge posed to class analysis by the rise of influential social movements in civil society, for example, feminism, sexual liberation, and identity politics based on the celebration of cultural difference.

The Rent-Gap Hypothesis

The most fully developed theories of gentrification originally drew on quite different intellectual traditions but after a lot of dispute have come to be recognized as essentially two sides of the same coin; after all, housing is at once a consumption and an investment good. On the one hand, in the late 1970s, Neil Smith applied Marxist analysis to argue that gentrification was initiated by capital, rather than people, moving back to the inner city to exploit investment opportunities opened up by

a developing rent gap in run-down neighborhoods. This rent-gap hypothesis, which was tested in Malmo and Adelaide, recognizes that as housing disinvestment sets in, land becomes undercapitalized relative to its redevelopment potential.

By bringing together Marxian concepts such as uneven development, capital switching, and class conflict, Smith presents a theoretically coherent account of gentrification as an urban output of the capitalist mode of production. But the rent-gap hypothesis does not properly accommodate the role of the state: As part of urban revitalization, public development agencies actively underwrite neighborhood improvement to lower the risk for institutional investors and gentrifiers. Nor does the rent-gap hypothesis admit to how much of the emerging demand from gentrifiers is due to noneconomic processes such as demographic change, social restructuring, and shifts in culture and consumption preferences.

The rudiments of the competing hypothesis were originally outlined in a 1980 paper by David Ley on liberal ideology and the postindustrial city. Significantly, Ley's narrative directs attention away from the economic forces driving reinvestment in gentrifying neighborhoods to concentrate on the gentrifiers, the formation of a distinctive mode of consumption, and the demographic, social, and ideological influences acting on them. He begins by sketching the implications for gentrification of the shift from an economy dominated by the manufacturing sector to one with rapidly growing services. He postulated that a new middle class was forming as a consequence of the growth of financial, professional, administrative, and other advanced services in postindustrial economies.

A New Middle Class

A fraction of this new middle class—most still prefer the suburbs—gravitated to the central city, along with the rapid growth in employment opportunities for college-educated and therefore well-paid workers. In turn, some city workers sought out housing opportunities in the inner area. But note that this demand-side explanation makes no mention of how dependent gentrifiers ultimately are on the appraisal of risk by institutional finance, especially mortgage lenders. Progressively, the new middle class went about remaking the central city and in the process challenged the balance of power in urban politics.

In a similar vein, Saskia Sassen argues that in genuinely global cities like New York and Los Angeles, with their huge immigrant populations, and London or Tokyo, the production of gentrifiers is directly explicable in terms of the *socioeconomic polarization* caused by economic restructuring. Dual labor markets are forming in the service economy and concentrating jobs at both ends of occupational and pay scales. But according to Chris Hamnett, compared with New York or Los Angeles, the process in London has been closer to one of professionalization because more high-end jobs have been created in business and government relative to the numbers jobs available to lower-paid service workers.

As well as leading to a more critical examination of the gentrifiers, this focus broadened out into a consideration of the contribution to gentrification of the feminization of work, the winning of sexual freedom by gays and lesbians, and the postmodern refashioning of mass consumption. With this has come a deeper appreciation that the new middle class doing the gentrifying is also fragmented to varying degrees according to gender, race, sexuality, and culture.

Gender and Sexual Identity

Feminist theorists like Damaris Rose and Liz Bondi argue that the focus on economic class ignores an important gender dimension of gentrification. With the pursuit of career and more women postponing marriage and childbearing, many partnered and young single professionals find that working and living in the inner city is more supportive of their lifestyle than living in family-oriented suburbs. In fact, after analyzing longitudinal data on London gentrifiers, Michal Lyons concluded that young and single professional women probably played a greater role in transforming inner London's housing market through the 1980s than households with two high-status workers. In this way, women are solving problems of access to work and home, as well as the challenge of combining paid and unpaid work, where they choose to, with parenting.

The assertion of sexual identity by a growing number of gays and lesbians in the second half of the twentieth century gave rise to a number of

reasonably self-contained communities such as San Francisco's Castro and Mission districts or Sydney's Darlinghurst, Paddington, and Surrey Hills. Manuel Castells was the first to note the similarities between Castro and Mission, with their affluent gay communities and local "pink" economies, and other gentrifying neighborhoods in the United States. But what sets neighborhoods like Castro and Mission apart is their reputation for inclusiveness, tolerance of difference, and comparative security. Many other large cities have equally well-defined enclaves, and the presence of gay and lesbian couples and singles has lent added impetus more generally to gentrification processes.

Accordingly, these greater opportunities for congenial social interaction, self-expression and personal safety that gentrifying neighborhoods offer to women and homosexuals led Jon Caulfield to regard such enclaves in inner Toronto as emancipatory by comparison with the sameness and lack of inclusiveness that typify suburban social and cultural life.

A further perspective emphasizes the underlying importance of consumption to the lifestyle choices of the new middle class and where they can best access fashion goods and leisure activities. The inner city offers well-paid workers with disposable income greater scope for shopping, eating out, visiting galleries and museums, taking in music and theater, or attending festive events. Thus, gentrifiers are often found at the vanguard of trends in postmodern consumption.

Arts and Culture

Even as the debate on the causes of gentrification was warming up, the sociologist Sharon Zukin had decided that to explain how derelict Manhattan lofts came to be gentrified, she had to give as much credit to the search for space by people working in the creative arts (culture) as to those capitalizing on investment opportunities (capital). She coined the term *cultural capital* to describe how artists first reclaimed the loft district of SoHo for work and residence, thus paving the way for the much greater capital investment in housing that accompanied the rise of financial and business services in lower Manhattan.

Since then, by relaxing the insistence on one or other of the predominantly economic or cultural perspectives, it has been possible to reach a good deal of agreement about the fundamental causes of gentrification. Findings from numerous comparative studies have shown that gentrification processes are bound to reflect strikingly different urban histories and public policy settings in European and New World cities, not to mention non-Western cities. For example, disinvestment and neighborhood decline has seldom been part of the gentrification process at the center of many European cities, where gentrifiers have gravitated to long-established enclaves for the wealthy.

Eventually, in 2006, Tom Slater declaimed, in what was both a postmortem and a rallying cry, that for too long the theoretical and ideological squabbles over the causes of gentrification had diverted attention from critically examining the contribution of gentrification to displacement as well as the consequences of neoliberal urban strategy for neighborhoods earmarked for revitalization.

Contribution of Gentrification to Displacement

Researchers, policymakers, and commentators remain divided over the effects of gentrification. Where urban managers see it as the antidote to inner-city decline, their critics point to unacceptable social costs. Indeed, the mid-winter eviction in 1990 and 1991 of about 300 homeless people on Manhattan's Lower East Side—from a tent city in a local park surrounded by gentrified housing—prompted Neil Smith to liken the middle-class takeover of the American city to the revenge meted out on workers by bourgeois *revanchists* following the uprising of the Paris commune. According to Smith, the revanchist city marks a postrecession hardening in middle-class sentiment toward the urban poor in the United States, especially those made homeless by inner-city revitalization and gentrification.

Hence, the effects of gentrification are evident as much in the struggle to save the neighborhood as in well-documented research. Displacement is notoriously hard to measure because of the difficulty of tracing movers, especially if they are poor. In a systematic, rather than comprehensive review of the evidence on gentrification, Rowland Atkinson finds that displacement is the dominant

research theme in more than half the 114 books, papers, and items of gray literature examined.

A U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development survey prompted by widespread protest over condominium conversion in the 1970s remains one of the most thorough of its kind. Households in 12 major cities with high levels of conversion activity were surveyed. Between 1977 and 1980, 58 percent of the original households were displaced. Of the incoming residents, 70 percent were new owners.

Similarly, the combined results from two separate analyses of the New York City Housing and Vacancy Survey, which is conducted by the U.S. Bureau of the Census every three years, revealed that estimates of displacement rates for the years 1991 to 1993, 1996 to 1999, and 1999 to 2001 were 5.47 percent, 6.2 percent, and 9.9 percent, respectively, reflecting a tightening housing market; however, rents are either controlled or regulated for more than half of all housing units in New York City.

On the other hand, a larger study for the National Bureau of Economic Research of 15,000 U.S. Census tracts, representing gentrifying neighborhoods in 64 metropolitan areas, concludes that there is no evidence of displacement of low-income non-White households over the decade 1990 to 2000. Rather, the bulk of the increase in average family income in gentrifying neighborhoods can be attributed, first, to the retention of Black high school graduates (33 percent of the income gain) and, second, to the disproportionate in-migration of college-educated Whites (20 percent of the income gain). The out-migration rates of Black residents who never finished high school proved not to be significantly different between gentrifying and nongentrifying neighborhoods.

In conclusion, the weight of gentrification research points to the adverse effects of neoliberal urban policies designed to revitalize the inner city. Also, as the first years of the new century have shown, booming housing markets intensify displacement pressures. In these circumstances, the only sure way to preserve class shares of space is to permanently take housing in gentrifying neighborhoods out of the market. One of the boldest attempts occurred in the mid-1970s when the Australian government purchased three historic neighborhoods in inner Sydney and Melbourne to

demonstrate the efficacy of community preservation. With affordable housing at a premium in many inner cities, more governments are subsidizing not-for-profits with a presence in vulnerable neighborhoods and are requiring contributions from developers where new investment threatens low-rent accommodations. But this is costly intervention and can hope to secure only a modicum of affordable housing in gentrifying communities.

Blair Badcock

See also Creative Class; Global City; Neighborhood Revitalization; Revanchist City; Social Movements; Urban Culture

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GHETTO

Ghetto has a specific historical reference to the segregation of Jews within the Ghetto Nuovo in Venice of the 1400s, from which the name is derived, and to the segregated residential quarters that developed in European cities in the following century. The ethnic communities of Jewish immigrants in American cities were also called ghettos. In more recent times, ghetto has been used to describe

African American communities in the inner city, often characterized by high rates of poverty, crime, and social dislocation. Current discussions about the ghetto have raised concerns about the use of the term to define other ethnic communities and about the connections drawn to low-income communities in other countries—the Brazilian *favela*, French *banlieue*, South American shantytown, and Asian slum. This entry looks at the original Venice ghetto and the subsequent usage of the term in the United States.

The Venice Ghetto

The Jewish community in Venice dates to AD 1382, when the Venetian government authorized Jews to live in the city; the first residents were money lenders and businessmen. The enclosure of the Jews came after an outbreak of syphilis—a disease introduced from the New World that had no certain name, diagnosis, or treatment; it was said to be linked to the arrival of the Marrani Jews fleeing the Spanish Inquisition. By act of the Venetian senate on March 29, 1516, some 700 Jewish households were required to move into the Ghetto Nuovo, an island in the *cannaregio sestieri* on the northwest edge of the city, with entry controlled by two gates that were locked at sundown (the term refers to the original use of the island as a foundry and is from the Italian verb *gettare*, which means “to pour”).

The Jewish ghetto would eventually include the Ghetto Nuovo, Ghetto Vecchio (1541), and Ghetto Nuovissimo (1633). Jews emerged from the world of the ghetto each morning to work or to shop, their clothing marked with a yellow circle (for men) or yellow scarf (for women) and spent the workday among gentiles, returning to the ghetto each evening before sundown. Within the ghetto, Jews were free to wear jewelry and other clothing prohibited on the streets of Venice following the Decree of 1512, and, in 1589, a charter of Jewish rights guaranteed the right to practice their religion. There eventually would be five synagogues for the separate groups of French, German, Italian, Levantine, and Spanish Jews.

Although the Ghetto was intended to isolate the Jews from the Venetian world outside its gates, physical segregation provided the community with some measure of protection. When groups of angry Catholics tried to attack the

ghetto in 1534 during Lent, the bridges were drawn up and windows closed, and those inside were safe from the outside threat. Bernard Dov Cooperman notes that residents saw the ghetto as a biblical “camp of the Hebrews” rather than as a jail, a holy place en route to the Promised Land. The establishment of a ghetto in Verona was an occasion of celebration.

Segregation from the outside world would also turn the community inward, leading to the development of a religious culture different from other Jewish communities. By the end of the sixteenth century, fear of assimilation and intermarriage led rabbinic courts to forbid dancing between Jewish women and Christian men.

The example of the Jewish ghetto in Venice connects with the racialization of urban space across many dimensions. The process of racialization in this instance begins with the forced relocation of a group of people identified by a particular ethnic characteristic—their religion—to a physical space isolated from other areas of the city. People living outside of the ghetto view the behavior and beliefs of those inside with suspicion, and their bodies are seen as dangerous; as Richard Sennett comments that outsiders saw the ghetto as a place cut off from sun and water, supporting their beliefs that the Jews who lived there were prone to crime and idolatry.

The Venetian ghetto early on became a tourist destination as part of the grand tour of the 1600s and 1700s. Rail travel in the 1800s would directly link Venice with cities across Europe—although by this time there were travel narratives from many visitors from Europe and the United States. The Venetian ghetto is associated in the popular imagination with *The Merchant of Venice* (performed 1597, folio in 1600). The play likely has its origins in Edward de Vere’s visit to Venice in 1575 and 1576, at a time when it was fashionable for young aristocrats to complete their classical education in Greek and Latin literature with visits to Italy. Although the ghetto is not referenced in the play, and none of the scenes are set in the ghetto, popular culture still associates Shylock as *The Merchant of Venice* and situates the play within the ghetto. In Julia Pascal’s 2008 production of the play at the Arcola Theatre in London, a survivor of the Nazi Holocaust confronts a group of actors in the ghetto.

Today, the Museo Comunita Ebraica in Campo Ghetto Nuovo offers tours of the ghetto, with visits to three of the historic synagogues. There is a guided tour in the footsteps of Shylock (to connect us back to *The Merchant of Venice*). The ghetto remains a tourist destination, somewhat off the beaten path even though it is very near the train station; and there is an official tourist map available in English, Japanese, and other languages at the Venetian tourist offices.

The Ghetto in the United States

Given the usual narrative concerning the influence of the Chicago School of Urban Sociology, one might expect that the beginning point for discussion of the ghetto in American cities would be the publication of Louis Wirth's classic study, *The Ghetto*. But although *ghetto* was used by African American scholars to describe segregated neighborhoods as far back as the 1890s, it was not commonly used in the social sciences to refer to black settlement patterns for another quarter century.

Early References

References to the ghetto were commonplace in Jewish popular culture from the late nineteenth century onward. *Children of the Ghetto* (1892) by the British journalist Israel Zangwell (1864–1926) was dramatized and performed in England and America (he also published a series of biographical studies titled *Dreamers of the Ghetto*, 1898). Abraham Cahan (1860–1951), the Russian American journalist, immigrated to New York in 1882 and published *Yekl: A Tale of the New York Ghetto* (1898). This work presents the ghetto both as a historic entity and contemporary place and refers to the continuity of “ghetto culture” from the old world in New York's Lower East Side.

During the same period, African American scholars used *ghetto* to describe urban neighborhoods with significant Black populations. In *The Black North: A Social Study*, W. E. B. Du Bois describes the growth of the Black population in Philadelphia's Seventh Ward, which he says was a residential area for 50 years before African Americans were forced into “a ghetto bordering the Delaware River.” The *ghetto* here refers to an area of first settlement.

Louis Wirth's classic study of the Chicago ghetto, completed under the direction of Robert Park, was published first as an article in the *American Journal of Sociology* (this was common for the Chicago School studies) and appeared as a book a year later in 1928. Wirth gives a historical overview of the Jewish ghetto in Frankfurt and other European cities before describing the Chicago ghetto, where he traces the movement of the Chicago ghetto from the Maxwell Street neighborhood (the area of first settlement known as the ghetto) into North Lawndale (called “Deutschland” because this was the area of second settlement for German Jews) and notes that already there was a movement out of this area into the north side neighborhoods. (This was not the first discussion of the Maxwell Street ghetto, as the area is described by Manuel Zeublin in *The Chicago Ghetto*, published in 1895.)

Robert Park's race relations cycle provided the theoretical narrative; according to Park, the first stage of contact would be followed by competition, then accommodation, and finally assimilation. For Wirth, the Chicago ghetto was similar to other ethnic enclaves, an area where first-generation immigrants live and over time become assimilated to the mores of the larger society. Wirth's description of the assimilation of Jewish immigrants in *The Ghetto* would serve as a model for the acculturation of other ethnic—and later racial—groups. Although his work is cited in many of the Chicago School studies, it is important to note that in these studies the *ghetto* is used strictly to refer to the Jewish ghetto, not to other poverty neighborhoods (these remain slums), not to other ethnic neighborhoods (these remain Little Italy and the like), and not to African American areas (this will remain the Black Belt in the Chicago School literature). St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton's classic work *Black Metropolis* (1945) presents a study of Bronzeville, as the south side Chicago had become known. The term *ghetto* is used in only one section (it does not appear in the index), and it is used as a geographical reference to describe the poorest area of Bronzeville. Clearly, the ghetto was located within Bronzeville, but Bronzeville itself was not a ghetto.

Denoting African American Communities

Gilbert Osofsky's landmark study *Harlem: The Making of a Ghetto* (1963) marks the common usage of ghetto to refer to African American communities (the second edition of the book was published in 1971 with a concluding chapter titled "The Enduring Ghetto," which argues that the essential nature and structure of the ghetto have remained in the north since the end of slavery). Osofsky's work was followed by many other studies of the history of Black settlement in the urban north, including Allan Spear's *Black Chicago* (1968), Kenneth Kusner's *The Making of a Negro Ghetto* (1976), and Thomas Philpott's *The Making of the Second Ghetto*. In geography of the same period, Harold Rose would describe the African American ghetto as a new urban subsystem and refer to suburban Black communities as *mini-ghettos*. By the 1970s, the use of *ghetto* to describe not just specific areas within the city, but African American communities as a whole, had become solidified.

By the end of the century, the ghetto migrated from popular culture to scholarly research and then back into popular culture—with a vengeance. Indeed, the ghetto is ever present: in popular music, in the cinema, in consumer products (boom boxes became known as ghetto blasters), and of course, in the ever-present labeling of speech, behavior, and dress: *that's so ghetto!*

The ghetto remains a central concept in sociological research and in urban studies more generally. William Julius Wilson has published important books based on two decades of study in Chicago (*The Truly Disadvantaged*, *When Work Disappears*), and Loïc Wacquant reprised his own research from the same inner-city Chicago neighborhoods and the Paris banlieues in *Urban Outcasts*. Mary Pattillo has suggested that the boundaries of the Chicago ghetto (roughly the area encompassed by Drake and Cayton's *Black Metropolis*—although they did not consider all of Bronzeville to be a ghetto) should be expanded to include segregated neighborhoods for Blacks even if they are not poor, arguing that this would be more comparable to the original use to define Jewish communities. In 2007, *City* magazine published "Banlieues, the Hyperghetto, and Advanced Marginality: A Symposium on Loïc Wacquant's

Urban Outcast," a 60-plus-page collection of essays focusing on the work of Wacquant. And a recent symposium on the ghetto in *City and Community* invited scholars from several disciplines (and three continents) to discuss the usefulness of the term *ghetto* in the study of urban communities. This symposium notes that the gentrification of former ghettos such as Harlem and the Fillmore District in San Francisco, depopulation and gentrification on Chicago's south side (the area studied by Wilson and Wacquant), dispersal of African American populations from inner-city neighborhoods in other cities, and the like suggest that it is time to evaluate the conceptual merits and usefulness of the ghetto for understanding emergent patterns of social exclusion across the metropolitan region. In Chicago and Harlem, the visitor may take guided tours of the ghetto, and the earlier zones of exclusion now appear in the official city websites for tourists. With the commercialization of ghetto spaces, important questions emerge as to the usefulness of the ghetto to understanding the social exclusion of ethnic and racial minorities in the United States and other countries.

Ray Hutchison

See also Banlieue; Chicago, Illinois; Ethnic Enclave; Favela

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GLOBAL CITY

Global cities are key urban nodes that concentrate command and control functions in the global economy. They are mechanisms through which global economic integration takes root because they play a generative economic role not just within their national borders but also within increasingly global networks of production and consumption. In addition, they usually exhibit a high degree of ethnic diversity and are marked by social and spatial fragmentation.

Evolution of the Concept

Building on Peter Hall's *The World Cities* (1966), the most recent popularization of the term derives from a series of seminal articles of the 1980s and 1990s. John Friedmann and Anthony King developed their concepts of world or global cities through empirically grounded research and engagement with the third world; King examined both the developed and developing world, and Friedmann mostly the latter. Starting in the 1990s, attention turned to the advanced capitalist world, driven largely by the work of Saskia Sassen. Her 1991 book, *The Global City: New York, London, Tokyo*, set forth a major research agenda on issues like the nature and workings of economic globalization, the role of cross-border finance in urban development, and social or class polarization, thereby shifting the focus toward rich and prosperous cities in democratic nations and inviting a larger debate.

Sassen's view of the global city as exemplified by a particular class of economic activities increasingly tied to high finance and advanced services is contested. Similarly, her explanation of social polarization in global cities has been qualified by proponents of dualization and fragmentation, while her initial marginalization and even disregard for the role of the state in shaping global cities

has invited sustained criticism. Nevertheless, Sassen's research program propelled cities into a global context and onto the social science and policy agenda. It also contributed to a rising and heated debate over the nature and features of globalization and its impact on the urban realm. With the growing popularity of the global city paradigm, even the most conventional topics long studied by urbanists, ranging from suburbs and midtowns to real estate, architecture, and urban governance, are now examined in a global context.

Global cities are considered good cases for exploring the workings of economic globalization. The globalization of capital and labor affects both urban employment patterns and shifts in the sectoral character of the urban economy in many European and American cities. Global cities are those whose growth and character are determined by the generative economic role they play within their national borders and within global networks of production and consumption. Consequently, global cities are no longer to be seen as fetters on the national development of their host countries, as in the past with the dependent urbanization literature, but more likely to be conceptualized as the mechanisms through which global economic integration takes root and greater prosperity is achieved.

Emerging Analytical Perspectives

At least four main themes have emerged in this rapidly changing field: (1) a nuanced appreciation of scale as a means for overcoming relatively schematic accounts of the local-global relationship, (2) more detailed examination of the links between world networks and global cities as a strategy for describing both cities' embeddedness and the multi-scalar nature of globalization, (3) increased attention to the continuing relevance of the state and levels of development in analyzing global cities, and (4) efforts to describe and explain the role of historical trajectories, pathways, and path-dependence in global city formation.

Scaling the Global in Global Cities

Early approaches to the global city implicitly or explicitly adhered to a strong globalization thesis; namely, the *unmediated* and *unilinear*

impact of global forces over particular territories worldwide. The global city became as much a process as a place, and similarities between global cities were highlighted to the detriment of their specificities and differences. Many studies treated social and spatial polarization as a universal consequence of globalization and as a prominent feature of all global cities. Few scholars considered the multiplicity of interacting and changing spatial scales of globalization, and most worked under the assumption that globalization processes intertwined two clearly delineated conceptual categories—the “local” and the “global.” This framing posited the global as active and powerful and the local as passive and weak; it also omitted possible covariations with places larger than the city (or the city-region) yet smaller than the global level.

This schematic characterization of local against global has been overcome by integrating multiple spatial scales (local, regional, national) in the analysis. The new assumption is that regional and national states play a significant role in the reconfiguration of local processes, not only because they react to processes occurring at the global level but because they mobilize resources to actively link cities and nations with the global economy. The problem with the earlier local–global duality was that it confined cities to a politically irrelevant role in the face of globalization and reified spatial scales as self-contained units.

Networks and Global Cities

One approach to world cities focuses on the transnational networks in which cities are embedded and then analyzes the composition and character of these networks in a global context. This is quite compatible with the growing interest in the changing locations and economic roles that cities play in regional, national, or international hierarchies of urban places. It is also used to historically study cities embedded in colonial and imperial networks. With this approach, as much attention is paid to the transnational network itself as to the institutions or practices linking particular cities and mediating the development of the network.

A second, equally popular approach shares a concern with global networks but focuses on territorially bounded locations in these global networks.

To use Manuel Castells’s terminology, the concern is as much the “spaces of places” as the “spaces of flows.” Scholars who employ this perspective would argue that the globalization of capital and labor fuels the growth and economic successes of some cities (e.g., New York) while constraining others (e.g., Detroit), thereby exacerbating regional economic polarization.

A third approach is the regional approach but understood in transnational as much as intranational terms. This is a conceptual departure from the past when the notion of region referred to a spatial territory within a single nation-state. Scholars of Europe (and slightly less so East Asia) now study the urban effects of globally integrated (transnational) regionalism, perhaps because their home nations are caught up in these dynamics. Their concern is how globalization increases transnational economic integration so as to form megaregions with their own supranational governing institutions; whether locales on the receiving end of global investments and labor flows assume greater political and economic significance; and the conditions under which globally integrated cities will bypass the nation-state and negotiate directly with each other in larger regional pacts.

These lines of research have implications for understanding the dynamics of cities as well as the global context in which they operate, if only because they underscore the ways that, in an increasingly globalized world, the nation-state or other subnational or supranational jurisdictions are challenged or remain the most politically relevant unit for mediating among cities, addressing intranational regional disparities, or coordinating new practices and institutions. Instead of having to choose between the local and the global view, the network approach posits a global entity that is continuously local, even as it builds on relational thinking.

Nation-State in the Production of Global Cities

Although the nation-state was a significant factor in the early literature on global cities, it fell to the sidelines in the initial heyday of global cities discourse, partly owing to the claims of globalization theorists that national governments had increasingly less control over flows of capital passing through their borders. Efforts to remove

this blind spot are under way, even among those initially responsible for the oversight. Saskia Sassen now argues that the declining significance of the state in the global economy has been over-emphasized and that it would be more accurate to say that globalization is transforming the state.

The unanswered question is whether the nation-state plays a different role in different cities/nations around the globe and whether and how time has changed that role. For example, do global cities in democratic, authoritarian, and communist societies develop similarly? How might established democracies differ from newer ones or from non-democracies? Such issues were once the source of critical debate in the third-world urban literature, and recent trends suggest they are relevant again, partly because postnational discourses are increasingly being questioned in the face of evidence that states continue to have the capacity to mold globalization processes and affect how global cities link to the world economy. Studies of the role of national financial institutions and how they implement new global rules are central in sustaining such propositions.

Despite the renewed emphasis on the state, particularly from scholars who study financial regulations and institutions, efforts to bring politics into the literature on global cities are still limited. Indeed, there is surprisingly little writing on social movements, civil society, and popular politics, especially in the advanced capitalist context. These points of entry are still more likely to be found in the general literature on economic globalization in the form of studies of antiglobalization protests. With very few exceptions, writings that focus on antiglobalization or transnational social movements have not been situated in the context of the city, and when they are, they appear as antiliberalization or antiglobalization movements rather than as urban movements. What remains to be studied is the extent to which globalization-fueled social movements emerge in opposition to formal urban politics or urban dynamics—global “city-ness,” as opposed to globalization itself.

Pathways and Path-Dependence in Global City Formation

A final line of research concerns pathways to global city formation and the interrelationship

among path-dependence, multiscalar networks, and globalization. Much of the debate revolves around the asserted newness of globalization and whether patterns in the contemporary world build or depart from patterns of the past. Scholars who claim that globalization is a radically new process rarely examine past developments, while analysts who turn to history claim there is nothing new to current global processes. In an attempt to bridge this divide, scholars are bringing together historical macrosociology, world systems analysis, and global city research, and turning their attention to the path-dependence of current developments.

In addressing such concerns, a key point of departure is contemporary capitalism and its dynamics. So far, the hegemonic view holds that global cities concentrate most of the economic processes that are significantly changing the landscape of capitalism because certain cities are key nodes that remain centers of command and control for the main agents of global capital accumulation. This returns the field to the original claims of Saskia Sassen. Yet, it is still unclear as to whether contemporary global cities constitute a unique social formation in late capitalism because of their interactions with the global economy or whether they simply concentrate in a few critical locales the general and enduring processes that occur in many other cities.

Among those who are tackling this set of issues is British geographer Peter Taylor, director of the Globalization and World Cities (GaWC) Research Network. He acknowledges the fact that cities as international financial centers have steered the capitalist world economy for centuries; but he also builds on four overlapping and systematic accumulation cycles—globalization cycles—in the capitalist world economy, ranging from the Genoese/Iberian cycle from the late fifteenth century through the Dutch and British cycles of the interim centuries and up to the American cycle of the late nineteenth century to the present. This leads Taylor to claim that current descriptions of recent, world economy restructuring are not unique, a proposition that is consistent with David Harvey’s view of the historical transition from Fordism–Keynesianism to flexible accumulation, understood as the latest capital accumulation phase, another epoch of financial expansion, and the latest rebirth of capital. Taylor then concludes that because economic

globalization has provided new outlets for capital, competitive intercity relations have given way to cooperation. The outcome is “a contemporary world city network” linked to global capitalist prosperity.

In short, the global city paradigm has evolved and matured since the 1980s. What started as an attempt to give shape to a concept and emergent field of study led to a the proliferation of new research questions and is now preoccupied with overcoming premature generalizations expressed in the initial formulations while also replacing them with more nuanced accounts of the spatial, temporal, and scalar contexts that influence the formation of global cities and urban outcomes worldwide.

Questions still remain. One is whether there is some implicit or unexplored assumption that global cities can exist only in economically vigorous nations or in those in transition to such status. This pivots on whether global cities generate national prosperity or national prosperity generates global cities. The evidence suggests, for already poor countries at least, that it might be the absence of global linkages that thwarts urban prosperity or another mediating factor independent of the linkage. There also are methodological concerns. Is it possible to pursue reliable theory building (let alone testing) about global cities if most research is focused on “like” or developed cases? How much of the shift in emphasis to the generative economic impact of the global city is owed to timing, including the fact that more scholars now are examining major cities in a post-Fordist period when the global economy itself may have transformed considerably, at least in comparison to the post-World War II period when cities were first examined in a global context?

*Diane Davis and
Gerardo del Cerro Santamaría*

See also Globalization; Sassen, Saskia; Urban System; World City

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GLOBALIZATION

Globalization entails a growing economic, social, political, and cultural interdependence between different nations and localities. It is a process made possible by advanced technology, which drives both the speed and volume of cross-border transactions. These transactions cover a wide range of goods and services, capital flows, and information. Since the 1970s, globalization has become a powerful force in almost all aspects of our lives, with hardly a place in the world untouched by this phenomenon. From business corporations located in New York City to street vendors in Mumbai (Bombay), all have found themselves part of a worldwide, seamless, and indivisible web of interconnected parts.

Politics plays a pivotal role in globalization. Globalization has magnified interactions among states, localities, and social movements throughout the world. Signs of this are visible in the rise of multilateral organizations, regional pacts, and talk of a borderless world. States, localities, nongovernmental organizations, and labor unions increasingly ignore old boundaries and are driven by the seemingly contradictory stimuli of cooperation and competition. For some, this has opened new worlds of opportunity where masses of people can be mobilized for democratic ends. This interaction, both in place and across cyberspace, makes government

more accountable and also more replaceable. For others, it signifies a concentration of wealth and power and the threat of lower living standards. This has led to perilous instability and thunderous reaction from both left- and right-wing protestors.

In addition, globalization shifts economic power from governments to transnational organizations and corporations. With the active role of the World Trade Organization (WTO), World Bank, and International Monetary Fund (IMF), trade, tariff and investment barriers have been lowered, sharply reducing the role of national government. A succession of crises in the 1990s—Mexico, Thailand, Indonesia, Argentina, Turkey, and Brazil—vividly demonstrated the importance of global financial institutions for redressing fiscal imbalances.

Accompanying the shift in economic power is increased interdependence facilitated by standardization. Defined as the international acceptance of uniform criteria for producing goods and services, standardization has promoted globalization. Once goods and information become alike, they become recognizable and interchangeable and thus more easily traded. Common standards of measurement, universal criteria, interchangeable parts, and identical symbols are essential. Just as the grid system of streets enabled land development, so too does standardization facilitate globalization. Products sold at Sony, Nike, and McDonald's can be found across the globe and are easily recognized by consumers. Licenses and professional certifications have also become standardized to allow human resources to flow across regulatory boundaries. International free trade, championed by the WTO, has become an instrument of standardization. Complying with the WTO's regulations, member countries have developed common criteria for their products and opened new markets.

A number of developing countries have also embarked on the road toward global integration. China, India, Malaysia, Brazil, Mexico, South Korea, and Thailand no longer export only raw materials but also finished products and services. In India, for example, software exports accounted for about 10.5 percent of India's total exports in 1999 and 2000. Meanwhile, free trade and the competitive advantages stemming from it have made industry there more efficient and increased wealth.

Globalization has brought opportunities as well as problems. It has facilitated the proliferation of innovative technologies and medical advances that have significantly decreased mortality rates, especially in developing countries, as well as promoted liberal democracy, human rights, and good governance. During the last 25 years, for example, life expectancy rose by over a decade in industrialized countries and by over 20 years on average in developing countries. Moreover, although globalization has created prosperity, it has not created comparable mechanisms for redistribution of benefits among and within countries. Conditions in some countries have improved, but in others, they have stagnated. Problems include deeper disparities between social classes, increased levels of poverty, and large-scale demographic displacement. As one UN report stated, "Homeless people are living in cardboard boxes on sidewalks of gleaming corporate skyscrapers, whose budgets exceed those of many countries."

How do cities fit into this overall picture? Although the noted urbanist Henri Lefebvre wrote before the onset of globalization, he was quite prescient in foreseeing a world in which over half of the human population would live in cities. Lefebvre also argued that as society developed the language of cities, its identities, forms of capital, and organization of social reproduction would become dominant. As Lefebvre saw it, cities mediate between the person and the rest of the world, with city life a prism through which the world is viewed.

For centuries, urban areas have been the centers of production, distribution, services, finance, and banking. As globalization weakens national borders and intensifies competition, cities have become the main driving forces of globalization, its agents of change. In cities, global operations are centralized and manifested in changes in the structure of employment, the formation of public/private partnerships, the development of mega-projects, and the spatial exclusion of certain population groups. Cities have quickly transformed their economies to accommodate multinational corporations, international media, and foreign tourism. World trade centers, international festivals, and immigrant communities saturate the urban landscape.

Cities also have taken the initiative in competing for Olympic Games, courting multinational corporations, and selling their products abroad.

Some cities have appointed representatives to foreign nations to pursue inward investment or market local products. Other cities have declared themselves to be “nuclear free zones”; while still others have taken steps to welcome immigrants. The term *glocalization* has come to denote the growing impact of global forces on local decision making.

Cities now operate in a borderless world in which they search for capital markets, political influence, or wider recognition. These “glocal cities” have drifted from their national moorings. London, Tokyo, Mumbai, and New York are already larger than some nation-states and play a role on the world stage. London’s economy would rank as the ninth-largest in all of Europe, surpassing entire national economies of countries like Austria, Greece, and Portugal.

The advent of globalization has brought increased foreign immigration and international tourism to many cities. Most of the immigration moves from the underdeveloped world to cities with the most advanced economies. By 2000, more than 50 percent of the population in New York and Toronto were classified as ethnic minorities or foreign born. In London, the percentage of foreign residents has risen to 29 percent, while in Paris, the percentage is above 15 percent. Many immigrants take lower-paying jobs cleaning offices and hotel rooms or working as day laborers in construction. At times, the presence of large immigrant populations has bred violence, xenophobia, and social tensions. Youth whose parents were born in North Africa rioted in the Paris suburbs; cultural tensions have erupted between immigrants and native residents in Amsterdam and Brussels; and attacks against immigrants from the Caucasus mountains are common in Moscow and St. Petersburg.

Another aspect of globalization involves a substantial increase in international tourism. More than 6 million international tourists on average visit New York annually, and the figures for Paris and London are even higher, reaching 15 million and more than 11 million, respectively. Tourism is a major urban industry involving massive flows of people across continents. It has become a major agent of change and one of the most visible expressions of globalization. Cities have become centers of consumption, entertainment, culture, and services to accommodate this industry by investing in

infrastructure, construction of airports, mass transportation systems, and urban amenities.

While cities such as New York, London, and Tokyo have large financial resources, global connections, and substantial opportunities, other cities located in less developed economies have been unable to establish diversified economies or generate a substantial tertiary sector. For leading cities (New York, London, Tokyo) or those quick to adapt (Singapore, Bangkok, and Shanghai), globalization has been a blessing and a key for transforming their industrial base. For less fortunate regions, the capacity for converting local resources into an export sector has limited their interaction with the global economy. Cities like Lagos, Dar es Salaam, and Cairo have increased in population but have not been able to boost their economies to supply their swelling populations. In many other cities, a paucity of affordable housing and discriminatory practices force newcomer immigrants to live in spatially segregated ghettos. Growth without development continues to hinder cities in many parts of the world.

One might suppose that globalization makes cities less important or more alike as they are swept into a common world of economic competition and social interchange. Presumably, people could be located anywhere and conduct business via the Internet from a mountaintop retreat. In fact, the opposite is true—at least for some cities. A knowledge-based economy has accelerated face-to-face and informal contacts. In addition, businesses search for that extra advantage that comes from personal contact.

Cities in strategic locations, such as Singapore, have successfully used international opportunities to shed heavy industries and switch their economies to accommodate financial centers, corporate directorships, and other professional services. Less fortunate cities, mostly in Africa, have lost industries and been unable to attract emerging economic sectors. Globalization has had differential impacts on cities, and not all cities share the same fate. Thanks to globalization, cities like New York, London, and Paris have become switching stations where many global transactions take place. London, for instance, has emerged as a banking center where capital is concentrated, New York as a producer of financial instruments where loans and mergers are consummated, and Paris as a seat for

corporate headquarters and professional services where deals are made. Each of these cities has carved out a niche for itself as a command post in a larger world economy. Other cities, like Detroit, Liverpool, and Essen, have been hit with devastating losses in jobs, trade, and population.

The differences can be palpable in the built environments of cities. A booming central business district, sleek office towers, and chic hotels arise in one city and are contrasted with boarded-up storefronts and vacant factories in another. Despite the ascendance of digital technology, geographic location or place continues to matter. Neat suburban residential enclaves, edge cities, busy commercial downtowns, urban ghettos, vacated industrial areas, and campus-like office parks are all part of a complex urban fabric that differentiates opportunities. Some cities have taken advantage of those opportunities and the enormous wealth that springs from global trade.

Moreover, the absence of internal and international redistributive mechanisms has made poor areas extremely vulnerable. For some cities, hypermobile capital and free-floating money eroded economic bases because businesses rapidly shifted from one location to another in search of the highest return on investment. Cities in less developed economies have been reduced to a secondary status as suppliers of primary products or cheap labor. This leaves countries vulnerable to fluctuations in the world price of their main products.

Other negative spillovers attributed to globalization include increasing disparities in income, threats to traditional ways of life, and allegations that power is increasingly concentrated in advanced economies. These consequences have been the main reason for abuse of labor and human rights, air pollution, and global warming.

As technological innovations and free trade advance, globalization appears to be gaining strength. This process is likely to continue and even accelerate within the next decades. Much as the Industrial Revolution changed the course of history, globalization will bring tremendous transformations. Some cities will take advantage of its opportunities and emerge as global centers, while others will be bogged down in economic and social problems.

Anar Valiyev and H. V. Savitch

See also Castells, Manuel; Global City; Sassen, Saskia; Urban System; Urban Theory; World City

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GOTTDIENER, MARK

Mark Gottdiener has been a leading proponent of the new urban sociology, a paradigm of urban analysis that has challenged human ecology since the 1970s. Emphasizing academic dialogue and work ranging across disciplinary boundaries, he has developed ideas of European critical and social theory to serve urban analysis. Notably, he was the first person to systematically introduce in the Anglophone world Henri Lefebvre's theory of the social production of space.

Active in the 1960s student movements, Mark Gottdiener started his career as a transport analyst and consultant. He studied mathematics, economics, and sociology and defended his PhD (sociology) in 1973. Gottdiener has been full professor at several universities, including University of California, Riverside (long periods in 1980s and 1990s) and Hunter College, part of City College of New York (1991–1992). He has been invited as a visiting professor to University of Colorado, Boulder, and Helsinki University of Technology, Finland. Since 1994, Gottdiener is the professor of sociology at State University of New York at Buffalo.

In his 16 books and numerous journal articles, Gottdiener has analyzed the real estate industry, metropolitan development, themed consumption environments, and urban and suburban lifestyles, to take some examples. Although most of his

research focuses on the United States, its explicit discussion of the ways to explain urban patterns and processes facilitates comparisons with other contexts. This entry explores Gottdiener's influences, research themes, and new theoretical formulations, emphasizing the linkages between ostensibly separate topics and the coherence of his *oeuvre*.

The Social Production of Urban Space as the Center of Analysis: Henri Lefebvre

In the 1970s, Gottdiener was already aware of the philosophical and sociological ideas of Henri Lefebvre. When preparing his first book, *Planned Sprawl* (1977), he realized the weakness of the dominant urban ecology in explaining metropolitan growth patterns. However, Marxian political economy, as developed by Manuel Castells and David Harvey among others, also had limitations. To achieve a better theoretical frame, Gottdiener took the task of introducing into the Anglophone debate Henri Lefebvre's work on Marxism, everyday life, and conception of space, a project that culminated in *The Social Production of Urban Space* (1985).

For Gottdiener, Lefebvre's value as an urban thinker lies in four areas. First, Lefebvre showed that economic categories such as rent, profit, or uneven development, which Marx and Engels used in the study of industrial urban capitalism, can also be applied in analyzing cities. Second, Lefebvre valorized real estate investment as a "second circuit of capital," a partly independent area to make profit and acquire wealth. Third, Lefebvre maintained that space never is neutral background for social activities but both the condition and product of those activities, reproducing social relations and the very relations of production. Fourth, Lefebvre discussed the importance of government and state actions in space.

Gottdiener develops Lefebvre's theory, showing how both the real estate industry and the state conceptualize space through its abstract qualities, such as size, distance, monetary value, and profit. For people, however, space is the milieu of everyday life. The uses and meanings of this appropriated social space, for example, home and neighborhood, may be undermined by real estate projects and public plans, causing conflicts.

According to Lefebvre, the conflict between abstract and social space is fundamental, ranking with the separate and different conflict among classes. Gottdiener notes that, with this view, Lefebvre departed from the Marxian perspective, which holds that class conflict is the basic force in the history of capitalism.

In his engagement with Lefebvre's thinking, Gottdiener goes beyond a mere introduction: He successfully operationalizes Lefebvre's theory in the field of urban analysis. By introducing Anthony Giddens's scheme of social structuration, where the structures, institutions, and agency all play a role, Gottdiener makes Lefebvre's theory more applicable. He maintains that space—its social production and struggle about it—is an indispensable element of contemporary urban analysis. In *The Social Production of Urban Space*, he states that "the contingent process in the production of space must always be at the centre of analysis, rather than focusing on the political economy of capitalist development per se."

This epistemological position has informed Gottdiener's work from 1970s till the present. From the realist and materialist angle, he has mounted a systematic critique of several contemporary currencies in urban studies, especially ideas of Edward Soja and the postmodern geographers. Gottdiener rejects their "structurationist formulations which deploy an abstract and nominalist account of space circumscribed around a disembodied signifier such as 'spatiality.'" Gottdiener claims that, on the one hand, every level of urban social analysis has to be spatially embedded, and, on the other, the underlying structures always have to be analyzed as political, economic, and cultural.

Understanding Signification as Culturally Conditioned: Sociosemiotics

Like Lefebvre, Gottdiener is keenly interested in the symbolic aspect of space. To complement the new methodological frame needed to understand contemporary metropolitan areas, Gottdiener, with Alexandros Lagopoulos, tailored in the 1980s a new version of semiotics. The approach is called *sociosemiotics*. It draws together ideas from Ferdinand Saussure, Algirdas Greimas, and Louis Hjelmslev.

The foundation of all semiotics is the concept of sign. According to Saussure's well-known definition, a sign is composed of the signifier and the signified. In urban semiotics, material objects and forms of settlement space are studied as vehicles of signification. In these studies, the symbolic act always involves a physical object and social discourse on it. The objects of analysis can be streets and facades or planning texts and real estate advertising. As a sub-field of urban semiotics, sociosemiotics focuses on the study of culturally constructed connotations, the deeper meanings or conception people attach to spaces (in distinction to denotations that work on the level of perception), or the ideological conditioning of the individual experience. Sociosemiotics is thus explicitly linked to critical theory, avoiding the individualist bias of much of cultural studies. In *The City and the Sign*, Gottdiener defined it as "materialist inquiry into the role of ideology in everyday life" (p. 14).

Applied in urban analysis, sociosemiotics questions the epistemological legitimacy of cognitive geography and mental mapping as being limited to perceptions only and stressing psychobiological adaptation to the environment. As Gottdiener sees it, urban practitioners create connotative codes as social products. If this is true, both social affiliations and spatial practices shape the meanings and emotions each individual invests in a particular material object. Indeed, red lights, McDonald's logo, or a modern glass façade are interpreted and experienced differently, depending on the individual's income, age, ethnicity, education, and gender.

The actual sociosemiotic method decomposes spatial signs. Both the *expression* and *content* (signifier and signified) are broken down to form and substance. Instead of two terms, the analysis deals with four. Data gathering requires both visual methods and cultural research. Once researchers have a good command of the subject, they can produce rich studies of the relations between conditioning ideology, immediate perception, objects, and their wider urban context. In *Postmodern Semiotics* (1995) and *The Theming of America* (1997) Gottdiener presents sociosemiotic analyses of environments for consumption, leisure, and tourism. Sociosemiotics can also be applied to gang graffiti, visual demarcation of ethnic areas, and many other elements, which together compose the contemporary settlement space.

Bringing the Threads Together: Sociospatial Approach

The theoretical frame Gottdiener has developed can best be called the sociospatial approach to urban analysis. It is a synthetic perspective, which takes what is best in the new ideas while avoiding the endemic reductionism characteristic of both traditional human ecology and recent Marxian political economy. It does not seek explanation by emphasizing a single principal cause such as transportation technology, capital circulation, or production processes. Rather, it takes an integrated view of growth as the linked outcome of economic, political, and cultural factors.

When elaborating on Anthony Giddens's analysis of urban process, Gottdiener lists three main structural changes working behind the emerging new regional settlement space: (1) the emergence of the global corporation, (2) the interventionist state (since the 1930s Depression), and (3) knowledge and technology as forces of production. In the other end of the process, the real-estate sector receives an important agency. Gottdiener views it as the partly voluntaristic power that can influence the outcome of societal structures as actual built environments and urban systems.

These considerations are elements of the sociospatial approach described in *The New Urban Sociology*, which Gottdiener summarizes in the following six points:

1. The unit of analysis is not the city, but the multicentered metropolitan region (MMR), which is seen as the new, qualitatively different form of settlement space.
2. Settlement spaces are considered not only in their local and national contexts but also as part of the global system of capitalism.
3. Settlement spaces are affected by government policies and by the actions of developers and other actors of the real-estate industry, creating definite "pull factors" that partly explain urban patterns and growth directions.
4. Analysis should not overlook everyday life, human signification, and meaningful places. Symbols and objects are likely to have different meanings to different individuals or groups, which the sociosemiotic perspective helps to explain.

5. Both social classes and different social groups are essential elements of industrial and postindustrial societies.
6. The sociospatial approach emphasizes the interaction between society and space. To class, gender, race, and other social characteristics that define the difference among groups in contemporary society, the element of space itself needs to be added.

The importance of space as an independent category of analysis reflects Henri Lefebvre's notion of space as product and condition of production. In *The New Urban Sociology*, Gottdiener further elaborates the dynamism of space and the interdependence of actors producing space, saying that

the spatial arrangements found in urban and suburban settlement space have both manifest and latent consequences: They influence human behaviour and interaction in predictable ways, but also in ways the original planner or developer may not have been anticipated. But individuals, through their behaviour and interaction with others, constantly alter existing spatial arrangements and construct new spaces to express their needs and desires. (p. 19)

Multicentered Metropolitan Region: The New Form of Settlement Space

For Gottdiener, the emergence of the multicentered metropolitan region is a qualitative change that ranks in importance with invention of the city itself as a separate social form. When analyzing this new form, Gottdiener argues against technological determinism. He shows that the long process of suburbanization since the nineteenth century can be understood through real-estate investment and speculation, government housing programs and tax subsidies to homeowners, and the big demographic and social changes after World War II. Automobiles and highways are not the cause of urban change, but one of its means.

The distinguishing characteristic of the MMR is the way downtown has spun off its functions to other centers so that each is more functionally specialized, including the old city center. A twin process of overall decentralization and local

recentralization of functions and a parallel deconcentration and local reconcentration of population characterizes the MMR. Decentralization involves the dispersal not only of actions but also of social organization. Although there are differences between the speculation-led U.S. process and more planned urban regions in Europe and Asia, the general effects of sprawl and clustering do play a role across the contexts.

In the field of urban studies, the sociospatial approach, with the MMR as the unit of analysis, is unique in its ability to provide a rigorous theoretical framework for the study of a broad range of empirical issues. Examples of subjects that can be better understood include urbanization and suburbanization, immigration and ethnicity, urban problems such as racism and housing shortage, and issues of third world urbanization such as shanty towns, planning, and social policy.

Conclusion

Throughout his career, Gottdiener has developed the unifying sociospatial framework. In *The New Urban Sociology*, he confesses that "Lefebvre is responsible for many of the ideas that inform the sociospatial perspective" (p. 71). Gottdiener's relation to Lefebvre recalls Lefebvre's relation to Marx. Both Gottdiener and Lefebvre took a certain critical orientation and key concepts from the preceding thinker and developed them to serve the situation and intellectual climate of their own time. Marx (and Engels) theorized about capitalism when its spatial product, the industrial city, was just emerging. Lefebvre used Marxian concepts to study the city at a time when the centrality of the industrial city was challenged by the new regional settlement form, MMR. Building on Lefebvre's conception of space, Gottdiener has achieved a mature theory about the political, economic, and cultural aspects of that form. In his oeuvre, several topics not discussed in this entry's concise introduction further valorize the condition of the new settlement space. Those include urban crises and uneven metropolitan development, sociology of air travel, postmodern lifestyles, and global tourist attractions.

Panu Lehtovuori

See also Castells, Manuel; Chicago School of Urban Sociology; Harvey, David; Human Ecology; Lefebvre, Henri; Sprawl; Suburbanization

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GOVERNANCE

Governance is a term referring to the nexus among states, civil society, and market actors who collaborate to achieve public purposes. Over the past three decades, urban studies scholars and practitioners have given significant attention to the question of how governments can more effectively provide public services and be receptive to rapidly changing urban populations in resource-poor, local environments. In the context of globalization, cities must respond to the pressures of growth, economic restructuring, service needs, and the demands for representation of an increasingly transnational and multiethnic population. They must do so in a context of rising labor costs

and capital mobility and declining public resources. The response has been a shift away from purely state- or market-led approaches to service provision and toward “multiple actor” or “partnership” models of serving the urban public.

In the United States, the focus of these discussions has revolved around the concept of regime theory, whereby urban coalitions have been formed to govern in the economically competitive metropolitan environment. Across the rest of the world, a different framework focuses on the network of actors who work collaboratively across public and private boundaries to respond jointly to public needs. The divergence in approach reflects tangible differences in the role and power of state actors and in the governing networks forming among and within state, civil society, and market sectors, as well as a difference in the conceptualization of power, instrumentality, and capacity.

Origins of the Term

The term *governance* has been widely used by social scientists but often in divergent ways. Historically, the concept was derived from its roots in two other words—*government* and *governing*. Government (the noun) has been traditionally understood as a structural entity with the authority to make and enforce laws and, more generally, to allocate public goods. To govern (the verb) reflects the actions taken by governments, described loosely in relationship to their ability to direct, control, or to regulate the public sphere. Governance (the noun) has historically referred to the system or manner in which governments govern. Governance therefore is reflective of a political process shaped by a dynamic and changing institutional environment. Not surprisingly, the term is often used in a generic sense to refer to the governing process.

The term *governance* is not the exclusive domain of urban studies. One can find references to governance in business (e.g., corporate governance) and in international relations, where a growing discourse exists around global governance. For the most part, these disciplines use governance to describe processes through which outcomes are achieved—be they the tangible goods of a business or the less tangible outputs of international organizations such as treaties and regulations.

Understanding this systemic or process-oriented interpretation reveals the historic usage of the term governance, its cross-disciplinary application, and its fluid and changing conceptual orientation. Given both its generic origins and the multifaceted contemporary context of globalization, governance has become a complex and at times contested term. Despite its complexity, agreement exists among urban scholars as to its principal elements.

Principal Elements

Urban governance is understood as a way of describing new combinations of actors and power flows involved in public decision making in the city. Traditionally, local governments, as arms of the state, held primary responsibility for the allocation of local public goods. Power was hierarchical, flowing from the top down. The power of the state was, of course, limited and, in democratic societies, subject to popular will and the rule of law (authority). During the late 1970s, in the aftermath of recessions, oil shocks, and economic restructuring, a shift ensued. Private-sector actors were increasingly enlisted as partners with local state actors in urban policy and politics. Public goods were allocated competitively and distributed through the “invisible hand” of the market. Urban governance theory emerged more recently in the context of a retracting state and a growing civil society. Governance is premised on the existence of a wide group of actors united by shared needs, working collaboratively through networks and using different types of power than those of either states or markets.

Power in urban governance is cast as being primarily instrumental. In turn, the goals of governance networks are defined by network members and structured around their ability to achieve ends. Effective governance is based on the capacity to achieve goals. By virtue of the underlying interdependency of actors in governance, one finds networks operating through collaboration. By contrast, market power is competitive. Ideal markets are generally viewed as those operating under no regulations, where individuals exert choices premised on calculations of costs and benefits. Governmental power most commonly involves regulation or control through the rule of law. The

underlying view is that the complexity of the urban arena and the challenges of responding to the needs of urban publics lead to the realization that no actor has the capacity to effectively govern alone and that neither states, markets, nor civil society can amass the needed power or resources to administer unilaterally.

Governance theories point to the emergence of new mechanisms (specifically, networks) through which decisions are made and goods allocated. Decision-making processes in governance networks operate both horizontally (across state, civil society, and market sectors) and vertically (across local, regional, national, and supranational governmental levels). Researchers also suggest that governance is undergirded by different motivations, that is, collaboration rather than competition or control. This is not to suggest that conflict has disappeared, nor that state control is absent, but rather that conflict and stringent control can be damaging to the outputs of governance.

What Does Governance Add?

Governance theory, to some degree, is a corrective to American regime theory. Regimes represent enduring coalitions of actors who are united for the purpose of governing. Unity is maintained by selective incentives, and the actions of regimes are shaped by a competitive political economy. Critics argue that regime theory has a normative bias that accepts the competitive external environment as a given and then focuses on internal dynamics and resource constraints. Governance, in contrast, considers institutions and the structures of government, looking at how they connect with external environments, norms, and value systems.

In addition, critics also suggest that regime theory is incompatible with the strong states common across Western Europe and Pacific Asia. Regime theory is thus positioned as an abstraction of the U.S. political economy.

Cross-National Variation

While most urban political scholars agree on the core elements of urban governance and on its utility as an advance on regime theory, a great deal of cross-national variation appears when normative questions of effectiveness and equity are considered.

These differences are most evident when contrasting the governance literature emerging from cities in the northern hemisphere as compared with cities in the south.

Because governance theorists seek to incorporate contextual knowledge in our understanding of networks, power, and collaboration, one finds great variation in how scholars evaluate governance. These normative views are often shaped by national context; that is, strong versus weak states, empowered versus disempowered civil societies, open versus closed decision-making systems. Differences also relate to the institutional origins of governance. In some localities, governance is the result of a highly formalistic top-down arrangement while in other places governance emerges out of a highly informal bottom-up process. The way governance networks function is also conditioned by the urban economy, for example, whether it is embedded in strong and developed markets, operating at the core of the global system, or existing in weak and emerging markets that operate on the periphery of the capitalist economy.

Normative discourses on urban governance are most common in the United Kingdom where government has seemingly been eclipsed by governance. Governance is viewed as “governing without government.” This normative interpretation leads to the emergence of two rival camps: those who see governance as a more creative process for solving societal problems and those who viewed governance as a mechanism for allowing the state to abdicate its responsibility for providing social care and support. Underlying this normative discourse is the question of where power should rest.

For those who view governance as an abdication by states, a parallel debate concerns the democratic dangers in such a shift. Particularly in democratic governments in which power bases derive from the rule of law, power is limited, and leaders are subject to controls. Governance, in contrast, takes decisions beyond elected officials and, at times, outside the electoral arena, which can result in corruption. Several scholars remind us that governance, while enhancing capacities (instrumental power), may at the same time undermine democratic accountability. The growing fear is that the new partners are not subject to the same controls. Governance networks may be vulnerable to the machinelike tendencies of particularism and

parochialism. Unlike democratic governments, governance is only tenuously and indirectly subject to democratic control.

In Latin America and Africa, urban governance has been viewed as an opening up to a wider set of actors, often in the absence of a democratically legitimate state. Governance becomes an opportunity to provide a more influential voice for civil society actors who have historically been relegated to the informal periphery of decisions made by strong autocratic states. Thus, in the global South, the governance literature is viewed optimistically as enhancing urban political systems and processes. The debate broadens the urban challenges in developing countries away from the technical confines of urban management and local government. This is considered a useful move because it focuses attention on issues of governmental legitimacy, citizen empowerment, and the vibrancy of civil society.

Conclusion

Theories of urban governance are filled with conceptual complexity. One response is a hybrid north/south view of governance as a process that brings state and nonstate actors together in networks (vertical and horizontal) to generate, manage, and implement public policy, or in other words a group of interdependent actors negotiating around public purposes. Governance in and of itself might best be viewed as the contemporary scaffolding supporting public decision making in a global era. How that scaffolding is built and the types of poles and planks that one uses to construct it will depend on the ground on which it is built, the actors who build it, and the reasons for its construction.

Thus, there are agreed-on trends in governance theory, such as the changing role of the state, the emergence of a range of new partners in civil society, and the promotion of more collaborative mechanisms for public decision making. At the same time, the way governance networks ultimately operate will be conditioned by the breadth and vision of the actors participating in them and the institutional environments in which they are embedded.

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See also Citizenship; Regime Theory; Urban Politics

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GRAFFITI

Urban surfaces have always carried unauthorized messages and images—famously, graffiti has been found among the ruins of ancient Pompeii. These graffiti messages and images have taken all sorts of forms. Some are political, some are humorous and witty, some are expressions of individual or collective identity, some are claims of territorial ownership, and others are elaborate forms of artistic expression. The emergence of new graffiti styles and techniques in recent decades has provoked sustained debate among policymakers and scholars. After briefly outlining these changes in graffiti, this entry discusses different perspectives on the nature of the so-called graffiti problem in contemporary cities.

Historical Evolution

Graffiti is certainly not a new phenomenon, but in the late 1960s and early 1970s, new forms of graffiti began appearing on the streets and public transportation systems of Philadelphia and New York City in the United States. Young people in these cities started writing their tag names with ink markers and aerosol paint. Gradually, as these graffiti writers sought to maximize the exposure of their tag identities, both the quantity and the quality of their productions increased. By the late 1970s, elaborate artistic productions (or "pieces") by writers like Dondi, Futura 2000, and others covered whole subway cars in New York City.

These new graffiti styles gradually gained wider exposure through books like 1984's *Subway Art* by photographers Martha Cooper and Henry Chalfant, and through early films such as the Public Broadcasting Service documentary *Style Wars* and the film *Wild Style*. This media circulation of graffiti subsequently helped facilitate its global diffusion and proliferation. Thriving graffiti scenes exist in hundreds of cities around the world, with every populated continent boasting its own hot spots and styles. These scenes and styles are by now exhaustively documented in glossy books published by major commercial publishing houses and in graffiti-related magazines and websites.

Graffiti might be viewed as an example par excellence of Michel de Certeau's tactics—an appropriation of space that insinuates into and against the dominant normative values inscribed in the urban environment. Graffiti writers see urban surfaces not as sanctified private property but as a medium for circulating their identities, artistic ambitions, and messages for each other and the wider public.

An Urban "Problem"

Not surprisingly, then, the global diffusion and proliferation of these new forms of graffiti have typically been viewed as a problem by urban authorities. Graffiti is frequently described as a kind of antisocial behavior that undermines urban quality of life. Indeed, critiques of graffiti played a formative role in the development of current approaches to law and order, which place emphasis on the need to curb antisocial behavior in the name of quality of life, such as the "broken windows"



Examples of urban graffiti

Source: Erin Monacelli.

crime control thesis advanced by Wilson and Kelling, which claimed that signs of physical decay would lead to neighborhood decline. As a variety of scholars have emphasized, such a reading of graffiti was not uncontested and has been privileged over other possible readings in the service of quite particular political and economic interests. And, just like graffiti itself, this particular reading of graffiti as antisocial has spread from its epicenter in New York City to other cities where graffiti scenes have emerged.

Prevention Approaches

With the spread of this discourse of graffiti as a quality of life offense, a variety of measures

designed to prevent and eradicate graffiti have been developed and deployed in cities where the existence of graffiti is defined as a problem for urban policy. Antigraffiti measures include: new forms of urban fortification intended to deny graffiti writers access to strategic spaces; new forms of urban design and graffiti-proof materials designed to deny opportunities for graffiti; electronic surveillance to deter and catch writers; the formation of specialist graffiti squads by policing agencies; increased penalties for graffiti writing, including custodial sentence for repeat offenders in many jurisdictions; bans on the sale of aerosol paints to minors, and restrictions on the display of aerosol paints in shops; rapid removal of graffiti to deter

writers seeking fame (now frequently contracted out to specialist graffiti removal companies by public and private urban authorities); and censorship of graffiti publications and websites. In many cities, vast resources are devoted to various combinations of these graffiti prevention measures.

When the effectiveness of these measures is assessed at the local scale, there may be some evidence of success in reducing or eliminating graffiti. However, if we measure efforts to prevent graffiti on a wider metropolitan or even global scale, they have certainly failed to stem the widespread growth of graffiti. Considered at this wider scale, it would appear that the waging of wars on graffiti has led to the mutation, rather than eradication, of graffiti writing practices. Writers have developed new styles and techniques designed to evade or outmaneuver the efforts of urban authorities. The rapid growth of sticker and stencil graffiti toward the end of the 1990s, for instance, was in part a response to antigraffiti measures—both stickers and stencils can be designed and executed in advance of their application to a surface, thus reducing the risks associated with graffiti by markedly reducing the time it takes to “get up.” Similarly, new forms of graffiti-proof glass resistant to ink and paint, which is used on trains and bus stops, are now frequently adorned with etched tags cut into the glass itself. Indeed, some graffiti observers and scholars have pointed out that one irony of the currently dominant approach to graffiti prevention is that it has tended to lower the quality of graffiti by pushing writers toward styles that can be quickly executed.

Graffiti as Art

Efforts to curb graffiti are limited in their success by the capacity of graffiti writers to evade them. In addition, certain styles of graffiti have been embraced in both the marketplace and the art world. Established graffiti writers are often commissioned to do work to lend street credibility to advertising campaigns or to lend an urban edginess to film and television sets. Contemporary art galleries in many cities have sponsored exhibitions of work by graffiti writers. And, of course, paint manufacturers stand to gain from the ongoing proliferation of graffiti, and many have developed products specifically designed for graffiti writing.

Furthermore, there has been substantial (if uneven) support for the provision of legal graffiti spaces in many cities, and often, this support comes from state or state-funded agencies who work closely with young people. Here, however, there is an important distinction to be made between those who support the provision of legal graffiti spaces as a different means to address the graffiti problem (i.e., as a way to reduce graffiti), and those who argue that the way graffiti is framed as a problem is itself problematic (e.g., where legal graffiti spaces are provided as a means to improve the quality of graffiti).

Different positions in political debates over the construction and solution of the “graffiti problem” are informed by different understandings of graffiti writers and their motivations. Are writers simply antisocial vandals, as some would have it, or are their motivations more complicated? Sociologists and others tend to disagree. Richard Sennett, for instance, sees no more in graffiti than a “smear of the self”—a narcissistic concern with displays of individual identity that seek no genuine engagement with a wider public on issues of substance. Others like Nancy Macdonald and Kevin McDonald, who have undertaken ethnographic research with graffiti writers, see more complex negotiations of age, class, and gender in the graffiti scenes they have studied.

Yet others have sought to understand graffiti scenes as *counterpublic spheres* through which different ways of inhabiting and mobilizing urban space have been constructed. These latter perspectives present a picture of graffiti writing as a fundamentally *social*, rather than *antisocial*, practice. That is to say, they portray graffiti scenes as collectives engaged in their own discussions over the aesthetic and ethical values of different graffiti styles and practices. This is not necessarily to position the graffiti writer as some kind of folk hero but rather to assert that the writing of graffiti is not simply a form of mindless vandalism attributable to dysfunctional individuals.

The Writers Speak

Of course, graffiti writers themselves are not passive spectators in such debates. In particular, they continue to debate whether or not there can be any such thing as legal graffiti. These debates tend to hinge on whether the essence of graffiti lies in its legal status,

or its style, or its placement. Some graffiti writers take sides in such debates, whereas others work across these different realms, putting on gallery shows and doing legal commissions (sometimes under the label of street art) in the public realm while maintaining an active profile on the streets through uncommissioned and illegal graffiti work.

More work remains to be done to bring the insights of graffiti writers into dialogue with scholarly discussions in sociology, criminology, and urban geography about the urban public realm. In particular, there is certainly more scope for research that asks what graffiti writers themselves tell us about the city. As they inhabit the city in different ways and mobilize urban space for different purposes in the face of significant normative and legal regulation, have graffiti writers developed new insights into the nature of the cities in which they write? Criminologist Jeff Ferrell's work on graffiti begins to address such questions. Ferrell has firsthand experience to draw on, having himself been an active graffiti writer and arrested for graffiti writing. He situates graffiti among a range of urban practices that point toward alternative and more anarchic ways of inhabiting the city and negotiating urban life.

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See also Crime; Hip Hop; Urban Semiotics

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GROWTH MACHINE

The growth machine concept appears most systematically developed in John Logan's and Harvey Molotch's *Urban Fortunes*, published in 1987. The book follows a series of research papers by the authors and develops the ideas crafted by Molotch in his 1976 classic paper, "The City as a Growth Machine." In these pieces, Logan and Molotch proposed a distinct approach to urban theory. This entry looks at the idea's evolution, its current application, and cross-national contrasts.

Conceptual Background

In the 1970s, the field of urban sociology—and other fields focusing on urban research such as economics, urban geography, and planning—were proponents of the idea that cities could be understood as mere containers of human action. According to this idea—which echoes the original proposals of the Chicago School—a competition among actors takes place in the city for land and other resources. City form, distribution of land uses, and central place theory can be explained by this seemingly impersonal competition. By opposing this approach, the growth machine idea placed social action in the urban realm at the forefront of analysis.

Emerging to explain the political economy of the city, the growth machine idea countered the structuralist overtones present in urban theory since the publication in 1972 of Harvey's *Social Justice and the City* and Castells's *The Urban Question* by focusing on urban actors rather than forces. Explicit in the concept is the claim that land parcels are linked to specific interests, especially commercial, sentimental, and psychological interests. Prominent

among the city shapers are the land interests of those whose properties gain value when growth occurs. These social actors make up *the local growth machine*—a term that has become standard in urban studies. The growth machine approach suggests that human action, especially urban action by specific actors, carries causal power when it comes to explaining the organization, shape, and distribution of people and jobs in the city. Interpersonal market forces are not enough to explain these mechanisms. Rather, social action, including manipulations and dealings guided by interest, becomes a key explanatory force in urban studies.

Cities and towns in the United States have traditionally welcomed capital investment, with little regard to the social or fiscal costs involved. Under tensions generated by the growing international concentration of capital, however, communities are realizing that the costs of such investments have risen. Some localities resist the usual growth agenda, and both the property-oriented *rentier* elite and the middle and working classes sometimes try to substitute other local goals. Capital responds with new efforts to penetrate localities by activating their branch managers, increasing political campaign contributions, and directly participating in the property development business. National politics and policies such as Ronald Reagan's New Federalism—help capital by manipulating urban policy to provide advantageous sites.

Contemporary Applications

The growth machine concept has generated substantial research in the United States and abroad. Comprehensive literature reviews were published in 1997 and 1999. A twentieth anniversary edition of *Urban Fortunes* was issued by the University of California Press in 2007. International surveys of contemporary U.S. urban sociology identify growth machine research as one of the four main themes in the field.

Urban research studies focusing on renewal and redevelopment show the wide influence that the growth machine concept has had since the 1980s, especially in the United States. What seems to be missing in many analyses, however, is a careful examination of the role of urban politicians and officials, political opportunity structures, and state

actors in explaining the genesis, development, and impact of growth coalitions.

The concept has been enriched with the use of narratives of path dependency, historical accounts, and policy feedback to argue that past events, structures, and actions, as well as key decisions and conflicts, have the potential to alter or narrow the field of action of growth coalitions and policy strategies. Growth policies can be affected by shifting alliances between the growth machine and urban development agencies over time. As a result, investigations into path dependency in redevelopment schemes and institutional alliances may be helpful to understand how exactly growth and development agendas emerge and change as a result of new socioeconomic frameworks and circumstances as well as past agendas and projects. Such investigations may also reveal linkages between local growth machine arrangements and political and economic macro processes.

Further refinements of the concept also include discussions of the changing composition of pro-growth coalitions and, specifically, the importance of immigrant place entrepreneurs in revitalizing growth machines. Immigrant entrepreneurs may play a role in regional property development. One researcher has argued that they can seriously restructure a city's morphology by developing residential and business clusters for immigrants. Immigrant communities, having an origin in the arrangements by immigrant property developers, expand and coexist with already established ones. Immigrant property developers operate as a typical growth machine by buying land cheaply, promoting it within ethnic communities, and then selling it. This process may have consequences for the perception of immigration processes (as it enhances their appeal), as well as the reality of immigration (because it eases it). Ethnic residential clustering, thus, does not necessarily arise from leaderless social processes. Deliberate dealings and plans requiring political and economic knowledge and experience are at the root of the creation of residential clusters. As this process develops, place entrepreneurs of immigrant origin join the local growth machine.

Cross-National Applications

Growth machine-type coalitions are to be found both in the United States and abroad, but one can

argue that one interesting thing about the model is its variations and specificities across time and space. For example, it is becoming increasingly clear that pro-growth coalitions in many cities now aim at gaining global visibility to attract flows of money and people so that growth can take place, but one of the keys is to identify the specific local outcomes produced by the articulation of local, regional, national, and global forces as they develop over time. Rather than becoming a meta-narrative, the model gets enriched by accounting for multiple scales of social and political action, and especially so if one deals with cities and regions showing contentious political relationships with their nation-states.

Global visibility is sometimes achieved by the organization of mega-events, and thus another cross-national application of the concept has been in studies of urban development and more specifically the impact of mega-events on urban development. Mega-events such as the Olympics and world fairs are typically short-term and high-profile events aimed at having a significant impact on the urban realm. They have an impact on policy priorities and discussions about best uses of facilities. In addition, they tend to enhance redevelopment strategies and serve as catalysts for urban ideologies and plans aiming at maximizing economic growth. Cities in emerging regions and nations have been joining the trend of urban mega-events usually organized in Western cities. In studying mega-events in connection with growth coalitions, one can pose the question as to whether the form of development represented by mega-events just legitimizes growth machines and business interests or whether this phenomenon may be analyzed in conjunction with the role that state actors and agencies play in urban restructuring. Growth machine coalitions may represent a form of urban/national boosterism repositioning cities in the global economy. Mega-events, as pro-growth strategies advocated by political and economic elites, may be less important as events at the grass roots than as symbols or catalysts of economic improvement and potential prosperity.

Contemporary problems such as urban environmental challenges have been studied from a growth machine perspective and framed within the entrepreneurial city debate. Urban officials and elites increasingly need to approach the politics of local

economic development with effective policies and tools to manage environmental expectations and demands, as well as economic impacts. Obviously, interurban competition and pressure from the grass roots foster debates about quality of life in cities, but the increasing significance of ecological concerns is also a reflection of larger forces working to change the relationship between nature, the environment, and the urban realm. As a result, there is evidence that adopting and implementing green ecological policies may have a significant impact on the social regulation of urban governance, as it may represent a shift away from neoliberal approaches. This may lead to a redefinition of the growth machine concept by suggesting that evolving urban economy–environment relations can be understood as a set of practices of government designed to manage and ideally resolve shifting and conflicting demands (economic, political, sociocultural) at various spatial scales.

Criticism

There is considerable debate as to whether the growth machine idea can be fruitfully applied in empirical research beyond the United States. One approach to this question is that the concept can be used for the study of cities abroad insofar as it is appropriately applied. According to proponents of this view, the limitations of the growth machine idea in transnational settings simply originate in misunderstandings and misapplications of the concept. In his review of research about business interest mobilization in Britain, Wood critically examines this argument and reaches the opposite conclusion. Wood's central claim is that, even when focused on the right issues and questions, U.S. frameworks quickly exhaust their explanatory capacity. The author suggests that one needs to acknowledge the narrowness of the growth coalition approach and leave it behind for an appropriate understanding of disparate urban contexts in different national settings.

In addition, one can argue that the growth machine concept needs to be used carefully, considering how its geographic emphasis changes over time, from suburban to city core growth, as has been happening in U.S. and European cities for the past 20 years. Authors proposing this criticism argue that, rather than being value free (as is suggested in

Urban Fortunes), the geographical constraints of growth are value laden; that is, the matter is about how exchange values can be used to achieve a new and improved set of use values, as it occurs in gentrification processes. Typically, gentrification (regardless of whether it is triggered by supply or demand) represents the replacement of old-use values by the exchange values established by growth coalitions, which market displacement of the poor as positive and necessary to overcome concentrated poverty and other social problems.

Another set of criticisms suggests that changes in state policies relative to the private sector render the effective use of the growth machine concept problematic. As the private sector gained importance in the management and governing of society, the state semiabandoned some of its traditional responsibilities in health care, education, and welfare. Whether the cause is the changing character of state policies or neoliberalism's latest turn, the result is that the private sector has become almost intertwined with local state forces, agencies, and actors in the entrepreneurial city. Thus, rather than speaking of growth machines, it is more appropriate to refer to local/regional states in the case of American cities.

Growth Machine and Global Forces

Contemporary uses of the growth machine concept are increasingly embedded in the variable geometry and specific trajectories or pathways of global forces' urban impact and the mediation of developmental states. According to one author, these pathways consist of (1) economic and political strategies developed at the regional level to establish flows and transnational connections with the world economy (such as state-led export-oriented growth strategies), (2) local developments to cope with changes triggered at the global level (such as industrial restructuring), and (3) structural and territorial adjustments to position the city in the context of world cities (such as mega-project development).

Pro-growth coalitions usually identify with the aims of developmental states, especially (although not only) in emerging economies. Local growth machines may be presented as seeking national or regional competitiveness globally, in a comparative

framework that provides local elites and actors with external models to emulate. This context intensifies, although it does not essentially modify, the thrust and aims of state policies because growth and productivity were national priorities for many countries and regions even before the current global era. In fact, local growth machines and commercial-state alliances seeking the retention of local commercial privileges are visible in many European regions during the shaping of modern capitalism in the sixteenth century. In some cases, the focus on growth and development had a reflection in the local legal code.

Late industrializers seem to require a strong state that prioritizes growth to overcome the drawbacks of comparative disadvantage. In this context, the role of local growth machines may be viewed as addressing (and benefiting from) state priorities concerning industrialization and development; the matter of effectiveness typically replaces debates of state intervention in the economy. The common goal of both the state and pro-growth coalitions is that of maximizing gains from global trade and export-led development, as well as strategically deploying the local reserves of capital, information, and labor.

Global market efficiency and economic advantage may not be the only strategic goal pursued by aligned state and pro-growth actors in nations, cities, and regions. Expanding the local economic reach may also be related to gaining global visibility to better preserve local political autonomy and identity. Such preservation strategies about autonomy and identity are carried out by local elites in reterritorialized national states and local/regional governments. Together with the expansion of foreign direct-investment flows, the corporate goals of foreign trade and investment become a policy priority for regional governments in multinational states with the aim of increasing the ability to maneuver politically vis-à-vis nation-states. This process may have a direct influence in the particular articulation of the local growth machine.

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See also Growth Management; Urban Politics; Urban Sociology; Urban Theory

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GROWTH MANAGEMENT

Beginning in the 1960s in the United States, dissatisfaction with the negative effects of urban sprawl led to an interest in growth management. Starting with the land use initiatives of a few local U.S. jurisdictions, today growth management has attained the status of a mainstream planning tool.

Definitions of growth management have changed over time, with each definition representing a different epoch and planning philosophy. The early definitions were related to emerging growth policies of the 1970s. Growth management was defined as a more effective means to time, regulate, or even halt an increase in population. During the 1990s, growth management definitions added governance, institutions, and incentives, as growth management imposed an ideological obligation on governments to establish institutional arrangements for using taxes, expenditures, and regulatory powers to influence the distribution of land use activities in a community. At the same time, more emphasis was put on collaboration and regional initiatives. Under growth management, local governments would aspire to contain a community's development in ways that balance competing land uses and coordinate interlocal benefits.

The various definitions make clear that growth management is about regulating and steering land use with policy tools. However, as planning has shifted over time, growth management has evolved from a singular focus on regulation to a more complex set of activities that reach beyond a single community and take various stakeholder interests into consideration.

Development of Growth Management

Growth management emerged as a movement in U.S. planning in the 1960s. Given the problems related to urban sprawl, such as environmental degradation and overstretched infrastructure, citizens grew more conscious of their urban and natural environment. Preserving environmental resources was the overriding concern of many of the first-generation growth management programs.

Following regulative and quantitative planning modes fashionable at the time, tools such as boundaries, staging, and growth caps were applied. These first-generation regulations were generally implemented in conjunction with existing planning and zoning regulations.

The development of growth management can be divided into programs driven by the initiatives of single municipalities and those driven by individual

state governments. Prominent examples on the local level include Ramapo, New York, where in 1969 the community was divided into land use segments to be realized in a certain order (tiers; staging). In Boulder, Colorado (1972), and Boca Raton, Florida (1972), population growth was limited to 40,000 additional housing units. Petaluma, California, established a growth rate (cap) of 500 housing units per year in 1972.

State growth management programs grew out of land use reform meant to fulfill environmental protection goals. State and local governments would share authority to protect designated areas from growth.

Oregon's innovative growth management system has been a role model for other states. It was the first to empower the state government to control land use by partially shifting growth control power from local governments to the state and by combining different land use approaches. Of especial importance in the development of the Portland metropolitan area is the Metropolitan Service District, a regional government. One of the prime responsibilities of this elected regional government is to manage a growth boundary that curtails development around Portland.

By the 1980s, growth management had become an established tool of mainstream planning. In that decade, the public became more involved. Collaborative approaches engaged task forces, and advisory committees were integrated into the growth management strategy. Unlike the regulatory strategies of the 1970s, these approaches were embedded in a comprehensive framework that melded economic, environmental, infrastructure, and quality of life concerns.

Other states formulated comparable legislative frameworks to control and steer development locally and regionally and to ensure that it was consistent with local and state planning goals. In addition, states instituted incentives for collaborative approaches, adjustment between state agencies, regional control mechanisms, the use of geographic information systems, and bodies for conflict resolution.

Smart Growth

Another policy shift took place in the 1990s, with the move toward the newly and highly celebrated

trend of smart growth. The term is grounded in participation in planning and an emphasis on the rediscovery of small-scale development. The approach is similar to "growing smart," a registered term of the American Planning Association, and the "livable communities" movement.

Both sustainable development and smart growth rely on the three principles of economy, environment, and social equity. Compared to previous growth management approaches, the social equity component is new. Unlike sustainability, however, smart growth does not explicitly consider the requirements of future generations, and growth is still the primary concern. Other definitions of smart growth include diversity, density, and design as subgoals. They point to a quality of urban development that reaches beyond a focus on regulating growth, as was done by the earlier growth management approaches with growth caps, staging, and urban growth boundaries. One important example is Maryland's state legislation for smart growth. The legislation targets resource conservation, infill development, and infrastructure costs in a comprehensive approach.

Growth Management Today

On the local level, the application of regulations, in particular urban growth boundaries, has increased steadily over time. At the state level, Tennessee and Virginia have developed or adapted existing growth policies according to smart-growth principles. However, by the end of the 1990s, only 12 states had established growth management systems: Hawaii (1961), Vermont (1970), Florida (1972), Oregon (1973), Georgia (1989), New Jersey (1986), Maine (1988), Rhode Island (1988), Washington (1990), Maryland (1997), Tennessee (1998), and Virginia (1998). The regional scale has become increasingly important, and smart-growth advocates have sought to incorporate both regulations and aspects related to the quality of urban development. Smart growth has yet to be proven to be a solution to the cities' growth problems.

Growth Management in Europe

The multifaceted planning systems of European countries, often driven by national land use and planning regulations, offer an insight into a different

growth management realm. Europe has a much denser settlement pattern than the United States such that, in most countries, national land use planning law mandates that cities set up growth boundaries distinguishing the settlement area from the urban fringe. Switzerland, the Netherlands, and Germany are good examples.

Switzerland has quite strict regulations. As in the United States, the 1970s marked a shift in planning toward stronger environmental consciousness and landscape protection. Switzerland's response was mainly on the cantonal (regional) level, with regional plans that reduced the growth plans of many cities. Despite growing tensions between the cantons and the cities over the new regulations, a reverse-zoning policy that cut back land use areas previously designated for further urban growth was widely implemented. This normative approach was considered successful. Newer policy approaches of Swiss growth management include denser settlement structures. This is achieved with incentives provided by the cities such as higher-density allowances when a developer provides better quality and better design, and the shifting of zoning regulations between lots, a process monitored by a land management system.

Being a small country with a high population density, the Netherlands has generated nationwide growth management principles steered by national-level directives. This policy establishes the basic regulations and locations for housing, employment, public transportation, and other land uses. The aim of the Dutch policy is to enhance the development of the Randstad, a metropolitan area consisting of the agglomerations of Amsterdam, The Hague, Utrecht, and Rotterdam, while at the same time protecting a large territory within the Randstad—the Green Heart—from further settlement. Whereas the central government usually outlines the planning vision, implementation is dependent on other planning bodies. For this reason, there is a close collaboration between the national government, the provinces (regions), and the cities as to the future allocation of housing. The Fourth Report on Physical Planning, "Extra" from 1990, continued this policy approach and placed more emphasis on implementation at a city–regional level. Development directives indicated that development should take place at the outer fringes of the Randstad, keeping the Green Heart free from settlement.

The German approach to growth management is similar to the Swiss regulations. It has a relatively detailed national planning code and is based on the consensus that effective growth management should include legal, regulatory, economic, and organization-oriented tools. Economic or market-oriented tools became of interest during the 1990s when planners claimed that normative tools were too strict and ineffective to react to land use changes. The market-oriented tools include taxes, soil sealing fees, density or infrastructure incentives, and road pricing. Some of these approaches have found their way into national planning law, paving the way for more flexibility in growth management.

Criticism

When the growth management movement in city and regional planning started, developers and property owners opposed it. For most of them, growth management represented a challenge to their property rights. One popular argument of the time (and which is still raised) is that growth management raises land prices and housing values.

Moreover, contemporary growth management approaches, like the smart-growth movement, are criticized for being ineffective at steering land use expansion. Smart growth has not been sustainable, with citizens using smart-growth initiatives to disguise a NIMBY agenda.

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See also Environmental Policy; Growth Machine; New Urbanism; Suburbanization; Sustainable Development; Urban Planning; Urban Village

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GROWTH POLES

Growth poles refer to a grouping of firms or an industry that generates expansion in an economy. Economic growth from a lead or propulsive firm or industry induces growth in other firms or sectors of an economy through agglomeration—or positive external—economies. Growth poles are at once a theory of development and a regional development strategy or policy application.

As many in the development planning literature have noted, the origin of the growth pole had little to do with geography per se and certainly not with regional development. Nonetheless, growth poles—and its related term, growth centers—played a major role in regional development policies in the 1950s and 1960s. Across developing countries, growth poles or growth centers were targeted as places to concentrate public investment to promote development and spread it to outlying areas. The principal and most commonly used means was through industrialization strategies. Growth poles were not limited to developing and industrializing countries, however. They were also used to promote development in lagging, or backward, regions in countries such as the United States, France, Japan, and the United Kingdom.

The notion of growth poles originated with the French economist Francois Perroux and the French School of Spatial Economics. In the 1950s, Perroux developed his theory of growth poles—or what he called the pole of development. Perroux built on the work of economists Joseph Schumpeter and John Maynard Keynes and proposed growth poles as *nonspatial* propulsive forces of economic growth. The propulsive enterprise generated growth in other parts of an economy through its own growth and innovation. The driver was what he called a propulsive unit in the economy—the growth pole. The growth pole could be firms in an industry, such as steel or electronics, or a set of related firms. The growth pole generated rapid growth through innovation and advanced technology applications. This occurred as growth and development spread

to related sectors, creating multiplier effects of development through linkages.

Multiplier effects are achieved through increasing scale economies, which lower the costs of production to firms. Linkages can be upstream to suppliers—backward linkages—or downstream to customers—forward linkages. Growth poles develop new linkages with the rest of the economy over time, as well as with other poles. Thus, as the growth pole grows, so do other related firms, and the economy expands. As in the work of Schumpeter, who analyzed the role of entrepreneurship and innovation in capitalist development, innovation was key for Perroux in the development process.

Perroux was part of a group of regional development theorists writing at the time who understood that economic growth was unbalanced and thus development was an unequal, rather than equilibrating, process. Along with Albert Hirschmann and Gunnar Myrdal, Perroux challenged national equilibrium growth models by observing and attempting to operationalize uneven growth. Myrdal termed this cumulative causation. Growing regions would generate more growth over time, while backward regions would lag further and further over time. John Friedmann developed a further extension of unbalanced regional growth through his core-periphery model, a dualistic model of growth and decline. Here, Friedmann promoted the need for regional policy and planning in those parts of developing countries that were declining or not growing, or what he called the peripheral regions to the country's growing core.

Although Perroux's initial conception of a growth pole was aspatial, the term and theory quickly took on territorial dimensions and entered into the regional development literature. Economists and geographers placed Perroux's growth pole in geographic space. Governments and policymakers soon followed, developing subsidy and incentive programs with a decidedly spatial orientation to expand and induce regional growth. French economist Jacques Boudeville, among others, used the growth pole as a central tenet of regional development planning and a focal point for regional investment decisions. The pole became an urban center in a less developed or lagging region, with the policy goal to induce growth throughout the region.

Policies based on growth pole theory expanded during the 1960s. Support for growth pole policies extended from advanced industrial nations to the developing world and through the communist bloc. In practice, growth center policies spanned a wide range of investment decisions of nations and regions, from creations of large industrial complexes to subsidies to industrial plants to rural growth centers in developing nations. Academics debated topics such as what size growth centers should be. Policymakers across the world, meanwhile, focused investments in growth centers as small as rural villages and as large as major metropolitan areas. Goals usually included reducing regional disparities, reducing unemployment, increasing income, and modernizing “backward” sectors and regions.

Growth pole policies in advanced economies centered on lagging regions. Traditional macroeconomic policies to reduce unemployment were deemed inadequate to deal with regional inequalities. In the United Kingdom, for example, growth center policies promoted regional regeneration through manufacturing modernization in older industrial regions. In the United States, the Appalachian Regional Commission (ARC), established to promote development in rural Appalachia, created growth centers more as service provision locations based on central place theory rather than on industrialization and propulsive industries. In the case of the ARC, the desire to spread funds politically created other goals for growth centers. The work of Andrew Isserman, among others, shows that growth pole policies can be based on political determinations as well as regional development strategies.

By the 1970s, growth center policy began to be evaluated. Evaluations of planned growth poles in rural areas of developing nations and lagging areas of advanced industrial nations were showing few spread effects from the development investments. Reasons for failure included time horizons too short for development to occur; inadequate resources from the state sector to induce agglomerative effects of planned development; unsuitable implementation of policies; inaccurate assumptions about how growth diffuses spatially; and

preoccupation with manufacturing sectors to the neglect of growing information and service sectors.

Nonetheless, the theories underlying growth poles and growth centers have continued to be important in regional development and regional planning. By the 1980s and 1990s, the importance of innovative firms driving regional economic development was evident in places from new high-technology centers such as Silicon Valley in California to older industries clustered in the Emilia-Romagna region in Italy. Industrial clusters became one of the main means to examine the agglomerative effects of firm collocation, rather than growth poles, although the underlying forces of innovation on generating growth through agglomeration economies remained at the root.

Sabina Deitrick

See also Technopoles; Urban Economics; Urban Planning; Urban System

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H

HALFWAY HOUSE

A halfway house is an intermediate residential facility for people who are making the transition from an institutional to an independent living situation. Halfway houses are known by several names, including community-based residential facilities, community-based residential centers, community residential centers, and community residential facilities. The majority of residents have moved from regulated settings, such as prisons or mental institutions, to places with greater independence and freedom.

Halfway houses allow residents to maintain relationships with friends and family and reestablish connections to the labor market while providing support and services during the transition period. Thus, while residents work, attend school, or undertake employment training, they also, for example, receive counseling or treatment for substance abuse. The programs are delivered in informal settings under less supervision than residents would receive in a regulated institution. Residents, however, are provided with structure to facilitate their readmission into the larger community. That structure might include required curfews, abstinence from alcohol or other substances, restricted visits to certain people or neighborhoods, and attendance at drug treatment.

In addition to basic needs, such as food and shelter, halfway houses provide services themselves or coordinate with outside service providers who can assist the resident while living at the halfway

house and after the resident moves to independent living. The services vary but may include employment counseling, vocational testing and training, education counseling, financial literacy classes, leisure and recreation activities, community service projects, medical and services, personal appearance assistance, and housing counseling and assistance. Counseling is an important component of many halfway houses. Individual and group counseling may be offered to address several issues, including family or marital problems and drug and alcohol abuse.

One of the largest issues that halfway houses face is their location within residential communities. The needs of residents must be balanced with community opposition. To serve residents, some locations are more desirable for halfway houses; for example, they should be close to public transportation, employment opportunities, educational institutions, medical facilities, and other community resources.

Many neighborhood residents do not want halfway houses in or near their neighborhood because of concerns that such facilities will decrease real estate values and bring crime and drugs to the neighborhood. Although a common belief is that a halfway house devalues a neighborhood, empirical evidence shows otherwise. The concerns about crime are also unfounded; rates of recidivism decrease significantly for people who make a gradual transition into the community through stays in a halfway house. To overcome community opposition, research suggests that working closely with neighborhood

groups in the planning process facilitates the acceptance of halfway houses.

Greta Goldberg

See also Homelessness; Housing Policy; Neighborhood Revitalization

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HALL, PETER

Sir Peter G. Hall (1932–) is the author and editor of 40 books on the influence of technological and economic change on metropolitan development, the cultural and planning history of cities, and the urban structure and planning systems of the United Kingdom and the United States. He has been professor of planning at the Bartlett School, University College London, since 1992, after being chair in city and regional planning at the University of California at Berkeley (1980–1992).

In the 1950s, Hall focused on the economic geography of London before broadening his inquiry to the development problems of world metropolitan areas in *The World Cities* (1966). Hall then focused on planning systems: In *The Containment of Urban England* (1973), he analyzed the postwar British town and country planning system in terms of urban sprawl, arguing that it led to suburbanization, the growing separation of home and work, and shortages in the supply of building land. *Planning and Urban Growth* (1975), a follow-up to *Containment*, compared English and U.S. planning systems.

Throughout the 1970s, Hall became increasingly frustrated with the rejection of the social-scientific comprehensive planning of the 1960s with which he was associated, as well as with the structuralist Marxism that came to dominate urban and regional planning studies. Although

Hall recognized the causal link between social evolution, economic development, and technical change; he believed in the creative power of capitalist enterprise to generate growth and well-being, albeit in alternative forms mediated by historical, geographical, and political circumstances.

In 1980, Hall moved to the University of California at Berkeley. His fascination with nearby Silicon Valley led him to focus on the nature of innovation in successful metropolitan regions in the United States and the United Kingdom. Four books resulted: *Silicon Landscapes* (1985), *High-Tech America* (1986), *Western Sunrise* (1987), and *The Carrier Wave* (1988). Hall then worked with Manuel Castells on a study of the *Technopoles of the World* (1994), which investigated innovation in planned science parks and cities. In parallel, Hall prepared a major study of urban planning ideas in the twentieth century: *Cities of Tomorrow: An Intellectual History of Urban Planning and Design in the Twentieth Century* (1988). In that book, he critiqued the influence of Le Corbusier on planning; in *Sociable Cities* (1988), he highlighted the value and legacy of Ebenezer Howard's Garden Cities.

By the early 1990s, Hall had returned to London and published his most important book, synthesizing a decade of research on innovation and planning: *Cities in Civilization: Culture, Technology, and Urban Order* (1998). This comparative cultural history explores the nature and geography of cultural creativity in the world's great cities, from ancient Athens to late twentieth-century London. Hall analyzes the emergence of urban creative milieus leading to industrial innovation, artistic creativity, and urban planning innovation, and he investigates how cities like London, Paris, and New York have successfully renewed themselves over time. In the last decade, he has worked collaboratively on London's economic competitiveness and on the development of polycentric mega-city regions in northwest Europe (*The Polycentric Metropolis*, 2006).

Since the 1960s, Hall has been an influential policy adviser to U.K. governments. He has often been credited with being the father of the concept of enterprise zones—designated areas in which planning and tax constraints are relaxed to encourage inward investment—introduced in 1980 in the United Kingdom by the Margaret Thatcher government.

In 2005, Hall won the “Balzan Award for the Social and Cultural History of Cities since 1500” for his “unique contribution to the history of ideas about urban planning, his acute analysis of the physical, social, and economic problems of modern cities, and his powerful historical investigations into the cultural creativity of city life.”

Claire Colomb

See also City Planning; Growth Poles; Informational City; Technopoles; World City

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HARVEY, DAVID

Few scholars have affected our understanding of cities in North America and Western Europe more incisively than David Harvey (1935–). Long affiliated with Johns Hopkins University, briefly at Oxford University, and currently at the City College of New York, where he holds a distinguished chair in anthropology and the Center for Place and Culture, Harvey has written prodigiously and to wide acclaim. At the core of his vision has always been a commitment to seeing and understanding cities as the expression of generalizable principles and forces that permeate capitalist societies. Above all else, Harvey has been a modeler of city dynamics, explaining their evolving character by emphasizing regularity and generalization rather than contingency and place-specificity. His “multiple facets” of cities—neighborhoods, districts, downtowns, social relations, restructuring projects—have continuously been rooted in locally sustained but society-wide forces. Unleashing a powerful understanding of cities, to Harvey, requires a thorough understanding of the “inner laws” of societal realities.

Early Works

Before his arrival at Johns Hopkins University in 1973, Harvey embraced the utility of logical empiricism. The centerpiece of this research, *Explanation in Geography* (1969), emphasized quantitative methods, spatial science, and a positivist philosophy. In this landmark study of the methodology and philosophy of geography, Harvey argued for the logic of a robust empiricism and rigorous testability to advance understanding of a spatialized world. Chapters on systems, models, deductive and inductive reasoning, the role of mathematics and geometry, and the philosophy of science codified a “science of geography,” which had recently ascended in the discipline but which lacked a unifying theoretic exposition. As Anglo-geography moved from a descriptive–regional to a

positivist–scientific paradigm, it drew heavily on Harvey’s *Explanation in Geography*.

In the early 1970s, Harvey abruptly broke from positivist science to begin a lifelong expedition into understanding the Western European and U.S. city from a Marxist perspective. Harvey now presented the city as a complex human-made space set in capitalist economic realities. His seminal contribution to this project, *Social Justice and the City* (1973) argued, first, that geography and urban studies were deeply political enterprises that could never produce value-free understandings. Harvey sought to smash the myth of value-free research to position Marxist analysis as one among many competing analytic perspectives with political designs and content. He proposed that explanations for and policy directives about urban issues and problems (e.g., poverty, deprivation, homelessness) always contain a bundle of values that reflect existing power relations as well as the need for social change. The book argues, second, for a new focus in urban studies: on the explanatory power embedded in the societal structures of capitalist societies. Set against the power of such structures (e.g., the drive to accumulate, the necessity to reproduce labor power, the impulse to legitimate existing capitalist social relations), Harvey asserts that other kinds of explanation are superficial.

Harvey’s subsequent work has laid out a distinctive Marxian frame that has become more nuanced and multitextured over time. The city, a whirlwind of complexity, is a place that both reflects and generates crisis, in his view. Its dynamic is one of a deep and pervasive struggle between competing and opposing classes whose turbulent relations must be managed and controlled. Crisis follows from antagonisms between capital and labor over the extraction and distribution of surplus value, labor-exploitive practices, and repressive political strategies rooted in the social relations of production. The never-ending concentration and centralization of capital and the tendency for the rate of profit to plummet thereby create periodic bouts of overconcentration and less profitable investment. The key crisis, to Harvey, is the tendency for investment to overaccumulate in economic circuits and thus to force a collision of classes from which new economic and political forces emerge. Cities are ultimately instruments for capital accumulation, engines of economic growth

whose everyday rhythms depend on capital exploiting labor to create surplus.

On Capitalist Cities

In *Limits to Capital* (1982), Harvey offered his first extended analysis of space and time in capitalist cities. His analysis is organized around three dimensions of capitalist crisis. The first dimension stresses how the cycle of overaccumulation and devalorization are ritualistic in national and urban economies. Investors rhythmically follow each other and concentrate capital in production, thus establishing the basis for overaccumulation and lower rates of profit. The second part of the crisis involves attempts to fix the problem of overaccumulation. Here investors unwisely create fictitious capital to manage the fluctuating and long time lags between investment and payoffs. The third part of the general crisis entails a spatial fix, which involves finding new terrains as outlets for profitable investment. Harvey views all responses as merely temporarily ameliorative; investment inevitably concentrates in a particular economic circuit and overaccumulates to produce falling rates of profit.

Harvey applied this theoretical perspective to Paris in his *Consciousness and the Urban Experience* (1985). (See also *Paris, Capital of Modernity*, 2003.) There, he explores, through a Marxist lens, the massive 1850s and 1860s restructuring of Paris. Baron Haussmann’s initiative—constructing massive boulevards and physical infrastructure, clearing slums, building bourgeois neighborhoods—is dissected as a complex government response to the instability of profitable accumulation. Crisis, never far from the surface, drives intense rounds of physical restructuring. Peeling away any hint of an innocent or crisis-free redevelopment under Haussmann, Harvey reveals how real-estate capital and the local state seek to both thwart falling profit and benefit themselves. Thus, capital switching from the primary (industry) to the secondary (built environment) circuit drives the building of roads, highways, and railways that “bourgeoisied” a massive population and enriched financiers and manufacturers. A property boom, manipulated by bankers and the state, filled the coffers of local government with revenue to sustain the frenetic restructuring. New patterns of industrial location

and social class segregation followed and collectively imposed new social and physical spaces that renewed Paris as a built form for extracting real-estate and industry profits.

Response to Postmodernism

By the late 1980s, Harvey found it necessary to defend the intellectual rigor of Marxian political economy from a dramatic post-1985 emergence of “the postmodern turn.” His forceful *Condition of Postmodernity* (1989) critically examines the ascendant postmodern movement in academia and urban studies and its proclamation of something new: a postmodern world and postmodern city. Harvey argues that the many supposed manifestations of postmodernity—a new culture, a new city form, a new set of societal spaces and temporal realities—flow from a continued powerful force: the operation of a capitalist political economy. To Harvey, capital’s operation is a constant that persists to produce new spatialities, temporalities, and cultural forms. What is new, and what propels these new appearances, is the rapid supplanting of a modern, relatively fixed system of production (Fordism) by an unparalleled flexible form of production (post-Fordism). This ascendant reality, particularly visible in how humans experience space and time on a daily basis, follows most fundamentally from a capital-inducing time–space compression. So-called postmodern cities and society, it follows, have not broken with the trajectory of history but merely reflect a continuation of capitalism where capital seeks to harness space, cultural forms, and time in the service of class interests and profit accumulation.

The theme of alternative geographical imaginings, increasingly important to Harvey in recent years, is most forcefully taken up in *Spaces of Hope* (2000). Harvey argues that capitalism and its entanglement with cities should be seen as open and rife with alternative political possibilities. The challenge issued to readers and others is never to lapse into a deterministic conception of capitalism. Identifying a new punishing and demeaning capitalism (“new neoliberal times”—see *The New Imperialism*, 2003) the socialist possibility is offered as a fruitful source of contemplation and a potential humanly made reality. Capital’s hold on power, Harvey argues, is always tenuous and an

ongoing human endeavor that requires guile and dexterity. The source of the tenuousness is a city and world that grow more impoverished, despoiled, and in need of a constant set of rhetorical infusions to be viewed as normal. In his conclusion, Harvey speaks of a utopia that came to him in a dream—Edilia, a postrevolutionary world of tranquility. This image, Harvey concludes, can become a reality, given the instability of current class and military–theocratic authority.

Harvey’s structural Marxism has proved a compelling force in urban studies. His perspective deepens our understanding of urban ills and quandaries that have eluded more contingent, place-specific visions. Current conditions and processes in these cities—deepening minority poverty, growing economic segregation, the intensified splintering of city morphology, the upgrading and increased policing of downtowns—verify Harvey’s rendition of city dynamics written more than 25 years ago. As Sharon Zukin notes, contemporary newspaper headlines are spot-on with Harvey’s prognostications about city conflict, social relations, the kinds of spaces that are being created, and how government operates. Harvey’s perspective provides us with something vital, a rendition of restless, humanly made structural forces in cities that continues to challenge and provoke.

David Wilson

See also Capitalist City; Marxism and the City; Urban Geography; Urban Theory

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HAUSSMANN, BARON GEORGES-EUGÈNE

Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann (1809–1891) was charged by Emperor Napoléon III with turning Paris into a capital worthy of an empire. Creating broad boulevards that connected the city and highlighted its greatest monuments, Haussmann used the principles of axiality and symmetry to build a city that was a showcase not only for France but for all of Europe. His model was widely admired, and it had many imitators. The power of the imperial government was required, however, to pay the enormous costs and to summarily eliminate large neighborhoods whose shabbiness did not suit the plan. This entry looks at the context of Haussmann’s project, summarizes its principal features, and contrasts it with other European cities.

Historical Context

After the coup of 1851 that established the Second Empire in France, the complete lack of *grandeur* that its capital displayed proved unbearable for its Emperor, Napoléon III. Its sanitary conditions were appalling, demanding a heavy toll from epidemic diseases. Its road infrastructure was incapable of handling traffic, which had increased dramatically since 1842, when Paris became the national railway hub. Its townscape was more reminiscent of the late Middle Ages than of a modern representative capital.

The city government was slow to react to Napoleon’s growing pressure to intervene. After two years, the Emperor lost patience. He sacked aldermen and council. By appointing Georges-Eugène Haussmann as prefect of the Seine, he initiated the largest urban renewal project Europe had ever witnessed.

Although not trained as an architect, Haussmann had demonstrated his skills as a ruthless manager

as a Prefect of various *départments*. In Paris, he immediately set out to reorganize the public works department. He replaced its staff with talented engineers, architects, and surveyors, who produced Paris’s first reliable and detailed city map. On it, Haussmann drew his first major intervention, the *Grande Croisée*.

The First Initiative

Starting from the northern and eastern railway stations, he projected a major street cutting right through the city’s core, the Boulevard Sébastopol, crossing the Seine at the Ile de la Cité, and continuing its devastating course on the South Bank as the Boulevard Saint Michel until it reached Montparnasse. The Ile de la Cité was almost completely razed, providing room for impressive new administrative buildings and isolating Notre Dame de Paris from its decrepit surroundings, showing the cathedral in all its splendor.

This major new artery met with the Rue de Rivoli, a street dating back to Napoléon I, at Châtelet, turning this square close to city hall into the focus of Paris. Its eastern extension, although never fully realized, found its pinnacle at today’s Place de la Bastille, mirroring its western counterpart, the Place d’Étoile.

Unlike his predecessors, Haussmann did not see the Great Crossing as an isolated intervention. Rather, he linked it to a number of secondary streets, thus demonstrating that he conceived of the city as a whole. Until 1850, Paris had been a collection of rather isolated quarters. In 1870, the year of Haussmann’s abdication, the city’s infrastructure had become a veritable network.

Improving Lifestyle and Appearance

The surgical operations in the dense urban fabric served more purposes. Most new arteries were planned to destroy as many slums as possible, ridding Paris of its vast army of beggars, rag pickers, and marginal craftsmen. Under the surface of the new boulevards, Haussmann created a subterranean infrastructure for the provision of gas, sewage, and drinking water, thus adding substantially to residential hygiene and comfort.

Until then, foul water was carried through open gutters to the river Seine, the main source for

drinking water. Haussmann gave orders to tap two unpolluted rivers several hundred miles east of the capital. The construction of aqueducts and canals to bring clean water to Paris cost a fortune, but it improved sanitary conditions dramatically. Finally, Haussmann created 24 public squares and parks, offering urbanites artfully designed excerpts of French natural geography.

Both scale and speed of the *transformation de Paris* were dazzling. But what impressed visitors to the capital most was that all these improvements were inextricably linked to *embellishment*. Few new arteries demonstrated Haussmann's aesthetic preferences more convincingly than the Avenue de l'Opéra.

This artery was destined to become one of the most prestigious avenues due to the construction of the New Opera. Begun in 1861, it was clear that Charles Garnier's masterpiece would become the ultimate temple of bourgeois opulence. Thus, it deserved to be highlighted by a monumental axis. To further visual drama, every obstacle was removed. Haussmann destroyed recently built apartment blocks and ordered the clearing of a natural elevation, the Butte des Moulins as well. Much more land was obtained than was needed for the new road. Its flanks were reserved as building sites for monumental new apartments. Haussmann made sure that developers strictly obeyed his architects' supervision. Façades should be stately, uniform, and symmetrical, not distracting the eye of the pedestrian from the main objective, the Opéra.

A National Showcase

Paris was to become the showcase of the nation. By combining massive expropriation with the twin techniques of axiality and symmetry, the special effects of urban design, Haussmann drew the visitor's attention to icons of French glory such as the Arc de Triomphe. Older monuments such as the Gothic Tour St. Jacques were disengaged to bear witness to the city's venerable past. Indeed, the prefect created the city as a work of art.

The human toll, however, was considerable. With the destruction of an estimated 27,000 premises, some 350,000 slum dwellers were removed from the central areas. At first, they took for the *petite banlieue*, still within the walls of Paris. But

after its annexation in 1860, Haussmann continued his social cleansing. By raising excises on raw materials, he forced industry, rail depots, and other undesirable land users outside city limits. They took their workforce with them. Thus, he created the grim *grande banlieue*. Its social stigma haunts French governments to this day. No foreign visitor set foot in this urban wilderness that ringed the city. They came for the splendor of New Paris, the city that continued slum clearance and embellishment well after Haussmann's abdication in 1870, creating an almost exclusively bourgeois residential domain of unprecedented size.

International Impact

Haussmann was admired no more in France than in other countries. For the many new states in Europe, Paris became the design standard for a capital that would be instrumental in forging a collective national identity and convincing foreign visitors that here was a modern and prestigious nation state. Brussels, Budapest, and Rome testified to the impact of Paris.

To emulate Haussmann's *grands travaux*, a first requirement was a strongly centralized national administration, capable of taxing the nation to the benefit of the capital. This was no easy task, given the predominantly rural outlook of both France and its emulators. To suppress the widespread protest from rural communities, an authoritarian implementation of such a centralist structure was a second prerequisite. It also provided Haussmann with the legal instruments to proceed energetically. During his reign no less than 80 Imperial Decrees, issued in a matter of days, ordered the compulsory purchase of all the property that stood in the way of his plans. The mounting debts of the compensation costs were carried by the state.

Such preferential treatment of the capital was unthought of in a country like Great Britain. Dominated by liberal *laissez-faire* politics, it had a decentralized administration that denied special privileges to *any* city. Each expropriation of private property required a separate Act of Parliament.

Thus, despite widespread admiration for Haussmann's work, nothing much happened in London as a result. Legal and political obstacles were not the only barriers. The dominant residential culture in

Britain was not favorable to urbanism of the Grand Manner either.

French residential culture was decidedly urban. It enabled the prefect to complete his *grand projet*. For all his might, he was dependent on market forces for the building of the flanks of his new arteries. That private developers were willing to pay high prices for the cleared sites and accept strict architectural supervision means they felt that wealthy tenants were willing to pay high rents for these apartments. From a land rent perspective, building in the city's periphery would have been more advantageous. But no developer would even consider building luxury dwellings there.

Although most Frenchmen lived in the countryside, residential culture was oriented on the city. Rural France was considered an underdeveloped backwater. This paradox was equally prevalent in countries like Italy, Hungary, and the new Balkan states, where the Haussmann strategy was enthusiastically embraced.

Great Britain offers an opposite image. Residents preferred the suburban alternative to living in the congested city. No British developer would have considered building the inner-city luxury apartments that their French counterparts did. They focused their attention on suburbia, where they provided single-family homes ranging from terraced housing to detached villas.

As a result, visitors from continental Europe were astonished to see that the world's leading economic and colonial power was accommodated in such an unimpressive capital. Although France was a more modest power, Paris had become the role model for the representation of national grandeur.

Michiel Wagenaar

See also Capital City; City Beautiful Movement; City Planning; London, United Kingdom; Paris, France; Rome, Italy; Urban Planning

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HAWLEY, AMOS

Amos Henry Hawley (1910–) is the founder of neo-orthodox human ecology and a prominent scholar in population analysis, urban sociology, and population policy. He is currently professor emeritus at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and Kenan Professor at the University of North Carolina. He has served as president of the Population Association of America and of the American Sociological Association; as demographic adviser to the governments of the Philippines, the Netherlands Antilles, Thailand, and Malaysia; as adviser to the director of Selective Services during World War II and to the Michigan State Planning Commission. He has assisted the National Academy of Sciences and the U.S. Senate in population projects. He is a recipient of the Lynd Award from the Urban and Community Sociological Section of the American Sociological Association (ASA) and of the Award for Human Ecology Contributions from Cornell University. The Amos H. Hawley Distinguished Professorship at UNC is named in his honor. The author of 150 papers and books, his work redefines human ecological study as a general theory of social organization, which has become the primary theoretical perspective in contemporary human ecology.

Born in 1910 in St. Louis, Missouri, Amos Hawley received his AB degree from the University of Cincinnati in 1936. Here Hawley was exposed to sociology and human ecology by James A. Quinn who, like Hawley, would later figure prominently in the neo-orthodox movement in human ecology. Taken with the macrosocial approach aspects of society, Hawley pursued his graduate work at the University of Michigan under one of the best-known human ecologists of his day, Roderick D. McKenzie. In his first year, Hawley worked closely with McKenzie on a comprehensive treatise on human ecology. This collaborative

manuscript was lost in a fire, and McKenzie, then suffering from a debilitating illness, turned over restoration of the work to Hawley.

Early Works

Hawley received his PhD in 1941 and joined the faculty at the University of Michigan in the same year, taking over the position left open by the death of his mentor a year earlier. His dissertation research, published as *An Ecological Study of Urban Services*, is notable in that it departs from the Chicago School's stress on space as an object of study. Instead, his work focuses on urban institutional arrangements and their relationship to nonspatial elements of cities. This emphasis on the structure of social organization underlying spatial patterns and of the organizational units constituting this structure would come to characterize his approach to human ecology.

Throughout the 1940s, Hawley reconstructed the notes from the lost collaboration with McKenzie, largely from memory, adding his own theoretical perspective as he went. In particular, Hawley turned to new concepts emerging in animal ecology, especially the idea that all populations are engaged in collective adaptation to the environment. In a seminal article (1944), Hawley applied this notion to human population and highlighted the role macrosocial organization plays in the process of human adaptation. These ideas are honed and expanded in his final manuscript based on the collaboration, *Human Ecology: A Theory of Community Structure* (1950). This work retains McKenzie's influences, especially in its emphasis on the effect of transportation systems on land use and on the metropolis as an analytic unit. However, this work departs from traditional human ecology in ways that came to define neo-orthodox human ecology.

Holding to the traditional ecologist's notion that adaptation refers to the struggle for existence in its creative form, Hawley's 1950 work reorients ecology from the study of spatial regularities to the study of organization of collective action to adapt to resources. Where traditional ecology stressed competition as the mechanism of adaptation in human systems, Hawley asserts that ecological relationships reflect an interactive process of competition and interdependence. Organized

around basic sustenance activities, human social systems move toward integrated organizational interdependence.

In this, social systems are seen as adaptive collectivities that supersede individual action. Humans better themselves by expanding the number of interdependencies and increasing the complexity of social structure. This holistic, macrosocial, and material reconception of human ecology reinfused human ecological theory and launched the neo-orthodox movement in the field. Furthermore, Hawley's 1950 reformulation places the organization of society as the main point of focus for human ecology, moving it from a limited theory of city patterns and development to a general theory of social organization.

Hawley remained at the University of Michigan until 1966, serving as chair from 1951 through 1961. During this period, Hawley engaged in a number of empirical studies with students and colleagues, on subjects ranging from fertility and migration to suburbanization and metropolitan reorganization. Many of these projects explicitly tested his theoretical propositions whereas others expanded on his earlier work. This interaction between empiricism and theoretical development is a distinguishing characteristic of Hawley's sociology. Emblematic of this synthesis is his 1963 article, "Community Power and Urban Renewal Success," which builds an ecological notion of social power as a property of ecological structure, a notion missing in the 1950 work but figuring prominently in further theoretical and empirical development.

Moving Forward

Hawley joined the Department of Sociology at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1966. Here he produced a series of theoretical and empirical works that solidified human ecology as a prominent approach to the study of society. His 1968 article, "Human Ecology," both summarizes ecological principles and provides the outlines for his subsequent development of an ecological theory of change. This codified theoretical approach can be seen applied in *Urban Society: An Ecological Approach* (1971). Hawley situates the analysis of the city, as an organizational aspect of larger society, through a careful historical exegesis from an ecological perspective.

This concern with cities as a theoretical and real object of study is found in his presidential address for the Population Association of America, "Population Density and the City" (1972). Here Hawley makes the point that social density and spatial density are increasingly separated, with emphasis on the increasing importance of social density. This emphasis keeps with the theme of the primacy of organizational over spatial aspects.

This work also suggests Hawley's increasing interest in the study of change itself, which culminates in his 1978 Presidential Address at the ASA, "Cumulative Change in Theory and in History." Here Hawley carefully explicates types of change and argues that the study of change in social systems should focus on patterns that are nonrecurring and irreversible because these two patterns lead to accumulation of further change.

Although retiring in 1976, Hawley continued to serve actively as mentor and adviser on theses, dissertations, and independent study, shaping several generations of students. His scholarship continued, unabated, resulting in additional explorations of human ecological theory (see "Human Ecological and Marxian Theories," 1984) and a number of influential edited volumes. These volumes brought together macrosocial researchers to encourage, shape, and expand ecological approaches on such topics as the analysis of social change, nonmetropolitan change, metropolitan trends, and environmental issues.

During this time period, Hawley pursued his final sociological book, a culminating work of the essence of his approach to ecological theory: *Human Ecology: A Theoretical Essay* (1986). In his more recent reflective essay, "The Logic of Macrosociology" (1992), Hawley notes the completion of his neo-orthodox revolution in human ecology shifted interest from spatial patterns to the change, functioning, and structure of the social system in environmental context and as a result, "Human ecology takes its place as one of several paradigms in the inclusive field of sociology."

Michael D. Irwin

See also Factorial Ecology; Human Ecology; Urban Sociology

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HEALTHY CITIES

Healthy Cities is a worldwide movement developed by the European office of the World Health Organization. It has been implemented formally through WHO in many cities, and others have adopted the model. Grounded in 11 qualities that range from housing to economy and social characteristics such as a supportive community, Healthy Cities goes well beyond the definition of health as an absence of disease. This entry looks at its development and implementation around the world.

Historical Context

Population health and urbanization have been inseparable twins since the dawn of humankind. Cohen,

in his 1989 masterpiece of paleo-epidemiology, demonstrates that the shift from nomadic to sedentary and eventually urban lifestyles impacts on occurrence of disease. Still, rural etiology and population pathology differ considerably from urban patterns. Urban organization, on the other hand, allows for different types of interventions, and it is no surprise that the emergence of modern public health can be traced back to urbanization (from public toilets in ancient Rome to sewage systems in industrializing Britain, and from city-state “Health Police” in medieval Germany to surveillance systems in contemporary megacities). In the late 1990s, Porter and Hall even maintained that the shape of twenty first-century cities is dictated by health considerations.

Clearly, they find that modern public health is a direct result of sanitarian programs emerging in mid-nineteenth-century industrializing nations. The Health of Towns movement in Britain (established in 1844) is a direct precursor to Healthy Cities. Modern cities, however, seem to have failed to recognize the most recent shifts in health and disease patterns and their unique potential urban assets to address these.

The etiological shift has moved from predominantly parasitic to microbial infectious and currently chronic diseases; public health interventions have moved from surveillance (such as quarantine) via high-tech pharmaceutical and other clinical interventions to addressing social determinants of health (e.g., inequity and community development). Urban environments are uniquely impacted by such social determinants but are also in a historically unparalleled position to deal with them.

This was recognized as early as 1963 by Duhl and colleagues. In describing what would later become the Healthy Cities movement, they laid down the tenets for analysis and intervention in, for, on, and with social, natural, economic, and built urban environments for the promotion of human and ecosystemic health.

Foundations

The first city to truly adopt these principles became Toronto, more than two decades later (1984). In a serendipitous confluence of global and local developments, the city celebrated emergent emancipatory

health promotion approaches by the World Health Organization (WHO) and a decade of innovation in Canadian health policy (the Lalonde Report); its leaders had the ambition to take a radical stance on the health of city dwellers.

The model was quickly taken up by the European Office of WHO, engaging Duhl and Toronto health entrepreneur Hancock to launch an urban health demonstration project. In collaboration with a small group of European cities, they developed 11 qualities a healthy city should attempt to achieve:

1. a clean, safe physical environment of high quality (including housing quality)
2. an ecosystem that is stable now and sustainable in the long term
3. a strong, mutually supportive, and nonexploitive community
4. a high degree of participation and control by the public over decisions affecting their lives
5. the meeting of basic needs (food, water, shelter, income, safety and work) for all people
6. access to a wide variety of experiences and resources, for a wide variety of interaction
7. a diverse, vital, and innovative city economy
8. the encouragement of connectedness with the past and heritage of city dwellers and others
9. a form that is compatible with and enhances the preceding characteristics
10. an optimum level of appropriate public health and sick care services accessible to all
11. high health status (high levels of positive health and low levels of disease)

The original ambition of WHO to run a small-scale demonstration project exemplifying the potential of urban administrations to deal with late twentieth-century health and disease demands was quickly challenged by its enormous popularity. Within the first five years, hundreds of European cities had expressed an interest in joining the project, and cities outside Europe used guidelines to establish their own. This put a demand on WHO at a global level. In Europe, a small group of WHO-designated cities (meeting strict entry requirements into the project) were to be hubs for national, language-, or topic-based networks of Healthy Cities.

International Exemplars

The initiative continued to be popular in Australia and Canada; in Central and South America, it easily linked with WHO policy on SILOS (Sistemas Locales para la Salud—Local Health Systems) and the Healthy Cities equivalent in the Americas became Healthy Communities. Japan has had a long-standing relation with Healthy Cities, with Tokyo taking an early lead in the 1980s. A broad range of groups, agencies, and communities associates itself with Healthy Cities, from national networks and Agenda 21 initiatives mostly in Europe, the Civic League in the United States, a global International Healthy Cities Foundation (www.healthycities.org) providing a clearing house function, and the Asian–Pacific Alliance for Healthy Cities (www.alliance-healthycities.com). In some counts, there are close to 10,000 Healthy Cities worldwide, the smallest reputedly being l’Isle Aux Grues (Canada, population around 160) and the largest metropolitan Shanghai (China, population in excess of 20 million).

Ever since the initiative was formally launched in 1986, it has been subjected to an evidence-based health paradigm, asking whether Healthy Cities actually deliver health. This is a highly contentious issue, as a core tenet of the paradigm that embeds the movement is that health is not the absence of disease but a resource for everyday life. It is created by individuals and communities and heavily determined by public and corporate policy. It is therefore no surprise that the 11 qualities listed above have been translated by Healthy Cities into an enormous range of actions, themes, and interventions. Sofia (the Bulgarian capital) was a member of the movement for a short while in the late 1980s and used its designation to upgrade the public transport system. Liège (Belgium) addresses the high prevalence of antidepressant use by tackling general practitioners’ prescription behavior while at the same time running programs in community-driven neighborhood cleanups. Kuressaare (Estonia) uses the Healthy City label to restore its tsarist-era reputation as a great spa town on the Baltic. Accra (Ghana) aims to coordinate the international aid industry’s attempts to clean up its heavily polluted Korle Lagoon under the Healthy Cities banner. Curitiba (Brazil), positioning itself as an ecological city, is highly successful in generating

synergy between enhanced (public) mobility, poverty reduction, and primary education. Wonju City (Korea) has established innovative programs in health promotion financing, just as Recife (Brazil) has. Noarlunga (South Australia), one of the longest running Healthy City projects in the world, has effectively addressed health inequity, multiculturalism, severe environmental degradation, and sustainability issues. Several cities around the world are involved in approaches such as community gardening, walkability, urban design, safety, and the informal economy. Virtually all cities look at equitable access to services reaching far beyond the health sector alone. An additional illustration of the range of activities that can be undertaken by a Healthy Cities initiative can be found in the directory of projects of the 199 members of the “Réseau québécois des villes et villages en santé,” one of the oldest networks of such initiatives in the world situated in the province of Québec, Canada (see www.rqvvs.qc.ca/membres/realisations.asp).

Healthy Cities also has become the vanguard of other settings-based health initiatives with which the project connects locally: Healthy Marketplaces, Prisons, Workplaces, and Islands; Health Promoting Universities, Hospitals, and Schools. In itself, this is an important proxy of the effectiveness of the approach, inspiring actors and communities at many different levels and domains to be engaged with a social model of health.

Quite apart from the formal Healthy Cities movement, there is increasing attention to the impact of urban planning and design on parameters for health. This increase could be attributed to Healthy Cities, but more important, it will provide new impetus to the movement: The evidence that physical activity is directly affected by urban design parameters has become a high political priority in the early twenty-first century, when the obesity epidemic is predicted to *decrease* future population life expectancy for the first time in history. There is general agreement that the belief that the epidemic can be tackled in behaviorist manners is untenable now and that community-based, integrated, institutional, systemic, and hardware solutions must be sought—precisely the Healthy Cities tenets launched over 40 years ago.

*Evelyne de Leeuw, Len Duhl,
and Michel O’Neill*

See also Sustainable Development; Urban Climate; Urban Planning

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HERITAGE CITY

The notion and designation of the Heritage City conflates two distinct concepts: city and heritage. City status involves not just size but symbolic importance as well, with the latter a function of history and institutional and political processes. Royal charters, cathedral cities, provincial and administrative cities, and capital cities are all examples. Heritage, on the other hand, is a more recent and fluid concept open to contestation. It involves interpretation of a legacy from the past and therefore requires the identification and valorization of an authentic provenance. This is commonly manifested in terms of buildings, monuments, the physical environment, and artifacts and occurs through individual and group collective memory. Heritage, therefore, is sometimes passed down

from previous generations and is of special value and thought worthy of preservation. Who controls this preservation and valuation process and what relationship such heritage has to the city—spatially, culturally, and symbolically—are of increasing concern and debate. The commodification of heritage assets creates economic benefits that accrue to property interests and the heritage tourism industry. Heritage has, therefore, moved from a benign, specialist concern to a central role in city branding and the promotion of the city to its citizenry and to the outside world.

Selectivity is key to heritage planning. A dichotomy exists between the original positivist *preservation* and the normative *heritage*, which implies a process of selection and conservation of history, memory, and relics, as well as their interpretation for contemporary consumption. The concept of *heritage*, which encompasses all historic and style periods without exception, is different from *tradition*, which is only a component of the former and requires a choice be made by (or more often, on behalf of) the public and by certain social classes. Heritage in both of these senses is socially produced.

Heritage as represented in art and architecture is also subject to assessment and valuation by the scholarly canons of art history and through codification and curation and the symbolic importance attached by heritage experts. Although such designation has been dominated by classical and iconic styles represented by historic monuments, castles, churches, cathedrals, palaces, museum quarters, and their collections—*grand projets* of the past—more recent heritage has begun to appear in designation and preservation movements. The importance of visible clues that anchor the development of cities to the past typifies the current desire to reconcile modern development and change with remnants of the city's past. This also reflects the wider democratization of social history or urban archaeology; that is, the heritage of ordinary citizens and the everyday, for example, houses, workplaces, and leisure pursuits. Industrial and twentieth-century heritage is now subject to the preservation and value judgments applied previously to the historic. Consequently, the heritage question and heritage city branding have been applied to a wider range of sites and typologies.

World Heritage

World Heritage site inscription was introduced following the UNESCO Convention on World Heritage in 1972. The Convention responded to the growing conservation and preservation movement and a rising concern about the deleterious encroachment of modernization and modern construction that, directly and indirectly, was responsible for the destruction of historic buildings, structures, and views. Listing and preservation of buildings and historic sites had been practiced in Europe since the late nineteenth century, and from the mid-twentieth century, national and city conservation legislation was created specifically to protect buildings and heritage quarters from modern development, for example, in London (Civic Amenities Act, 1967), Paris (*Plan de Sauvegarde*, 1970), and Montreal (*Héritage Montréal*, 1975). World Heritage Site designation was thus an international recognition of the universal value and importance of a site. It brought both international branding (through the use of the UNESCO logo) and the installation of heritage management and interpretation measures to protect and control access to these sites. In 2007, there were 830 inscribed sites, of which 644 are cultural (man-made), located across 138 countries. The over 200 cities that host World Heritage Sites are members of the Organization of World Heritage Cities (OWHC). More than half of them are based in Europe (with 25 in Italy); 38 are in Latin America, 25 in Arab states, and 20 in Asia. Heritage city sites include the Stone Town (Zanzibar); Alhambra, Granada (Spain); Jerusalem (proposed by Jordan in 1981); Kyoto (Japan); Oaxaca (Mexico); Bath and Edinburgh (UK). Heritage sites from past city civilizations are not included because they are no longer populated or functioning cities (e.g., the pre-Colombian Mayan cities of Central America).

The dominance of the Western European cultural hegemony in heritage designation has effectively exported this preservation ethic and system to other countries, mostly under the auspices of international heritage agencies such as UNESCO and ICOMOS (Paris). The preservation of heritage in towns and cities in non-European countries is a reflection of this movement and also of the imperative for heritage tourism and development aid

from the West. Conversely, the belated recognition of “oriental culture” as seen from the perspective of Western cities now forms part of cosmopolitan city heritage in designated ethnic quarters, festivals, and institutions; for example, *Arab Monde*, Paris, and Native American museums in New York City and Washington, D.C.

Who owns this heritage, culturally as well as legally, is contested when political and cultural power shifts. For example, Québec City, the administrative and political capital of francophone Québec Province (and Canada), was founded by Samuel de Champlain in 1608. Its historic quarter, fortifications, and battlefield sites were designated a World Heritage Site in 1985 and have been a national monument since 1952. However, the site is actually the British garrison, which replaced the French garrison in the 1750s with the support of Native Americans, earlier explorers, traders, and migrants. This particular heritage city, therefore, represents local (residents), provincial, separatist, national (Canadian), First Nations, migrant, and colonial (English, French, Irish) interests and histories, but not on equal terms.

Modern Heritage

Recent modern heritage listings include Gaudi's works in Barcelona, Oscar Neimeyer's Brasilia, Bauhaus sites in Germany, The White City of Tel Aviv, the Maritime Merchant City (Liverpool), and Le Havre, France, and proposed additions of modern and industrial heritage include Chatham Dockyard in England and the Art Deco buildings of Miami. These listings reflect the growing intervention of architectural movements (e.g., DOCUMOMO) and the recognition of modern architecture as worthy of preservation.

Few cities actually use the designation *heritage city* because this generally applies to specific buildings, sites, or areas as in Lyon and Bath within the larger city. The label can also refer to a collection of cultural and historic elements such as museums and galleries, monuments, historic buildings, and palaces or to a sociocultural legacy as represented by living culture, language, food, fashion, and festivals. Different aspects of heritage serve resident, visitor, and tourist markets, particularly in terms of the historic, culture,



The historic center of Bruges, Belgium, and the city's medieval architecture, are protected under the UNESCO World Heritage site convention.

Source: Karen Wiley.

nightlife, and shopping attractions of the tourist destination.

The Heritage City is one example of competitive city place-making, along with designations such as City or Capital of Culture, Knowledge City, Creative City, Science City, and Sport City, among others. These are not exclusive, as cities strive to maintain multiple images and brands. The absence of heritage in a city implies a lack of a past legacy of value and a dearth of opportunities for heritage tourism and self-identity, which only the most insular and autocratic city-state could risk.

Old-world cities have had longer to reconcile the largely incremental pressures from growth and new building with preservation and heritage,

whereas in new and resurgent cities such as Shanghai, Beijing, Dubai, and Kuala Lumpur, the heritage protection and value system is weaker—the new is reified over the old. In cities of renewed national and political freedom, legacies from the past can sit uncomfortably with both painful memories and new directions, as in former Eastern bloc capitals, where communist monuments (e.g., of Marx or Lenin) are dismantled; this is also the case in places where despotic leaders are deposed as in Saddam City (Baghdad), first renamed Al Thawra “Revolution City,” then “Sadr City” after the late Imam. The dismantling of the *Palast der Republik* (People’s Palace) in the former East Berlin, along with the re-creation of the historic

castle that predated it, is an example of city heritage rejection and reversion. The redevelopment of the Museum Quartier from the Imperial Stables in Vienna into a “Shopping Mall for Culture” is another approach. Here, contemporary culture (museums, galleries, theater spaces) was created within the walls of an historic structure.

Heritage City Tourism

The globalization of tourist space has fueled the exploitation of city heritage sites as places of internal and external consumption. This latter phenomenon has become common to major cities and urban heritage sites and is not a recent development but an expansion of inscribing power through the materialization of bourgeois ideologies that has occurred since the nineteenth century. Historic City quarters, along with medieval, old town areas, have been rediscovered and zoned as heritage assets, necessitating the displacement of poorer, often working-class and migrant communities. These now serve as locations for culture-led regeneration, with the siting of contemporary cultural facilities such as Pompidou (Paris) and MACBA (Barcelona) and the associated gentrification through residential, office, and retail property use.

Entire cities can adopt the heritage tag where built environment and heritage legacy is of sufficient scale and homogeneity, notably in heritage cities such as Venice and Florence. The use of heritage designation for industrial sites and cities has also helped repair postindustrial decline in places such as Lowell, Massachusetts, and Bradford, Yorkshire (UK). Former industrial complexes in ports and docklands, mines, mills, and manufacturing plants have also been recognized by heritage listing, such as Essen, Germany (coal mining), and the open museum at Ironbridge, Shropshire (UK). Redundant industrial buildings increasingly serve as atmospheric sites for cultural facilities, whether celebrating industrial heritage itself (e.g., brewery buildings: Heineken, Amsterdam; Guinness, Dublin) or, more often, undergoing conversion to modern galleries and museums, such as the Tate Modern (a former turbine station in London); Salts Mill, in Bradford, Yorkshire; Musée D’Orsay (a former railway station in Paris); and Parc de La Villette (a former slaughterhouse, market in Paris).

As perhaps the location for the ultimate accumulation of artifacts and architecture and subject to continuous interpretation, the city defies a single heritage branding such as “Gaudi Barcelona” or “Macintosh Glasgow.” Moreover, the imperative for heritage policies and selection can be counterproductive, when the drive for being different and unique indicates how much cities have become the same. As postindustrial cosmopolitan cities multiply in number and in the range and layers of their heritage, they become both invisible and self-consciously visible through the official narratives and interpretation of heritage. As a consequence, cities become more and more alike.

Graeme Evans

See also Cultural Heritage; Historic Cities; Tourism

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HETEROTOPIA

The term *heterotopia* was first used in a social-theoretical context by the French philosopher Michel Foucault. It refers in one sense to a place that is socially different from the (implicitly normal)

spaces surrounding it. However, the difference presented by heterotopia is not essential to that place. Instead, heterotopia is foremost an ambiguous, variable, and dynamic site that incites (re-)consideration and (re-)negotiation of sociospatial norms. The concept has therefore been deployed by critical theorists, architects, and geographers to interrogate the ways in which social norms and differences are built into particular places. Most important, the concept of heterotopia has been interpreted creatively to theorize new forms of thinking and living differently grounded in ordinary everyday spaces (rather than in utopian plans).

The variable usage of the term *heterotopia* should initially be considered with reference to Foucault's theoretical corpus. First, Foucault's direct treatment of heterotopia was inconsistent and unfinished, represented by merely one book chapter and a short lecture. The preliminary nature of Foucault's discussion means that its usage varies, as does the degree to which his original texts are read literally rather than metaphorically. Second, although Foucault's influence on geography and urban studies is widespread, his theorization of space remained underdeveloped. Hence, critics have warned against a literal and simplistic reading of heterotopias as physical, locatable sites (Foucault offers examples such as asylums and cemeteries), which can be compared with other "normal" sites. Third, in overcoming this danger, heterotopia can be more usefully aligned with Foucault's writings on power, difference, and discourse. Foucault was concerned with ways in which normative political power was exercised (and resisted) through small-scale social practices and structures. More complex deployments have thus asserted that heterotopia provides a space or rupture—conceptual—discursive as well as literal—that can unsettle expected conventions. Heterotopia provide(s) a methodological tool, therefore, to effect contestations of normative political power.

Since the 1990s, heterotopia has figured relatively prominently in Anglo-American urban studies. Conceptually, it has been related to contemporaneous writings on otherness and marginality (e.g., those of Henri Lefebvre and the Situationists). Much empirical research on heterotopia has aligned the concept with postmodern urbanism and in particular with the place-specific

emergence of new spatial expressions of power in Los Angeles. Elsewhere, the concept has enabled sophisticated readings of the idealistic, aesthetic, and commercial imperatives that inform new urban developments as diverse as the Las Vegas Strip and gated communities in postapartheid South Africa. Finally, the term has been used to identify alternate and unpredictable forms of (largely urban) utopian experimentation that shed new light on the historical processes inherent to the emergence of modernity. Heterotopia remains contested—indeed, its boundaries with both nonheterotopian and utopian spaces are still blurry. Yet, this ambiguity is its greatest strength: the power of spatial practice and discourse to unsettle convention and to evoke alternative forms of living.

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See also Lefebvre, Henri; Los Angeles School of Urban Studies; Situationist City; Soja, Edward W.; Urban Theory

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HIP HOP

Hip hop, like any historical process, has shifting meanings over time. At one scale, it is the global transmission of the localized cultural practices of urban Black and Latino youth in the United States. At another, it is the persistent reconfiguration of these gestures by global participants in locally situated contexts. At another scale, hip hop is a kind of diaspora, a condition of the dispossessed and dislocated. As Alex Weheliye points out, hip hop links those excluded from the nation-state to a global citizenship where alternative belonging, desire, and imagination can be expressed. At yet another scale, hip hop is an effect of unbalanced power relations. Like other U.S. forms of material and ideological culture, hip hop is mediated across the globe, creating varying degrees of friction and synergy with indigenous cultural traditions. Last,

hip hop is how bodies, technologies, and built environments are continually remade to produce locally relevant meanings in music, speech, dance, and public art.

A Brief History

Hip hop includes at least four elements: MCing, DJing, B-girling/B-boying, and graffiti. Additional elements of hip hop include fashion, slang, beatboxing—an improvisational exercise of the mouth—and R&B music. Hip hop is a polyrhythmic practice that merges the percussive instruments and chant circles of West African traditional folk music, the call and response of Black gospel sermons, the improvisation of blues and jazz, and the cadence of Black arts movement poetry.

The origin of hip hop is heavily contested as it combines many aesthetics of West African and West Indian cultural performance. Hip hop's genesis is largely accredited to Jamaican-born DJ Kool Herc, who began throwing block parties in the South Bronx in 1973. Jeff Chang writes that the 1970s was a time of social upheaval as the dreams of the civil rights movement fell flat in the South Bronx with the relocation of Yankee Stadium, massive deindustrialization, White and Black middle class flight to the suburbs as houses were razed for an expressway, and the construction of urban renewal public housing projects. The music reflected these harsh social conditions as “good times” disco died out. Known for his Hercules sound system, Herc would loop and mix the bridge between verses repeatedly (“the breaks”), switching between two records. To keep the momentum, MCs would chant over records in a style similar to the toasting of Jamaican DJs.

Hip hop, in its earliest form, was a live improvisational event inspired by the interaction between performers and the crowd. Hip hop sprouted from a culture of idleness due to rampant unemployment, social program cuts, and overcrowded housing. As Robin D. G. Kelley suggests, the bodies of Black and Latino youth were used as sites of competitive labor to advertise their distinct, individualized work and create financial and social networking opportunities. Crews divided by neighborhoods would battle, on benign and hostile terms, for bragging rights on the dance floor.

“We on Award Tour!” Hip Hop Across the Globe

Hip hop has always been a global process. Mixtape cassettes, magazines, music videos, and hip hop films have been circulating throughout parts of Africa, Europe, and the Caribbean since the early 1980s. Historically, forms of popular culture are exchanged along migration routes between the United States and other countries as people travel for work, military/government service, education, health care, and leisure. Hip hop's global presence has intensified with advancement in technologies of travel, communication, and immediate access to worldwide information. Digital media have transformed sound production and the recording process. Consumers can now become producers and manipulate sound into an infinite composition of remixes. Hip hop aficionados identify, engage, and collaborate with one another across geographical distance through free profile sites, blogs, chat rooms, and podcasts, along with Web sites such as Nomadic Wax, AfricanHipHop.com, okayplayer.com, flight808.com and cell phone text messaging and ringtones. For instance, North Carolina-based rapper Phonté, half of the group Little Brother, recorded and released 2004's *The Foreign Exchange: Connected* album with Dutch producer, Nicolay, entirely over instant messaging and e-mail.

Although digital media access is not distributed equally across place, youth cultural politics have been critically reconfigured through hip hop in many countries. Unfortunately, hip hop artists, particularly in differently developed countries, experience great difficulty securing record contracts and confront issues like payola and a lack of copyright protection for their work. Hip hop outside the United States is not pure mimesis but rather an intricate web of local and global dialects, cultural histories, gestures, and capital. In Senegal, Positive Black Soul revolutionized youth participation in electoral politics with lyrics about government corruption and AIDS. In Ghana, rappers Reggie Rockstone and Talking Drum created hiplife, a mix of U.S. hip hop and Ghanaian high life music. Hiplife combines the beats of hip hop, soukous, and dancehall with traditional folk instruments and rapping/singing in the local dialects of Twi, Ga, Ewe, Fante, pidgin, and English. In fact,

highlife artist Gyedu-Blay Ambolley's simigwa music featured rapping as early as 1973.

In Brazil, *favela* life is the cornerstone of hip hop. Popular artists such as Racionais MCs and MV Bill fuse together hip hop, funk, manguebeat, and samba. Artists, breakers, capoeira players, and cinema often challenge police brutality, domestic abuse, political corruption, and the drug economy. Hip hop's entrance into Japan and Germany began about 1983 with the film release of *Wild Style*. B-boy competitions are regularly held in Japan with RockSteady Crew Japan member Crazy A's annual "B-Boy Park" and Germany's "Battle of the Year." U.K. grime music mixes diasporic memory with garage, dancehall, and hip hop music by popular artists Dizzy Rascal and Sway (Ghanaian descent) and M.I.A. (Sri Lankan descent). Hip hop in Cuba was imported from Miami in the 1990s. The government formed the Agencia Cubana de Rap, which houses a record label and magazine and supports the annual Havana Hip Hop Festival organized by the Black August Collective, a group of progressive U.S. hip hop artists.

Hip hop has become an interchangeable term for *urban* and *ghetto* in popular discourses, often in ways that circumscribe Black and Latino subjectivities. However, hip hop music and cultures are important for considering how local practices of urban identity are made global and then relocalized as innovative capacities. Hip hop, as an overlapping series of Black expressions that are not bound by race, is an ongoing articulation of political identity for and by the youthful of the world.

Sionne Rameah Neely

See also *Favela*; Ghetto; Graffiti; Racialization

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HIROSHIMA, JAPAN

Hiroshima, the tenth-largest city in Japan, is located on the Seto Inland Sea and is the capital of Hiroshima Prefecture. With a 2007 population of 1.16 million people, Hiroshima is the largest city in the Chugoku region of western Honshu Island and is the commercial and cultural hub of western Japan. The automobile manufacturer Mazda is headquartered in Hiroshima and accounts for roughly one third of the city's economic base. In 1945, Hiroshima became the first city in the world to be attacked with nuclear weapons. Hiroshima is today known worldwide as a Peace Memorial City. Its municipal government and civic groups, especially those begun by *Hibakusha* (atomic bomb survivors), have historically been at the forefront of global efforts to abolish nuclear weapons.

Hiroshima is of particular importance in Urban Studies for two reasons: Hiroshima demonstrates the temporality of existing city centers because the destruction of the nuclear attack was more absolute than that of the fire bombing inflicted on most Japanese cities in World War II and because hilly Nagasaki, which was also hit with an atomic bomb, retained some previous structures. In addition, said to be uninhabitable for decades after the attack, the city nevertheless survived and rebuilt, offering a blank slate to city planners. It provides an example of an urban area sustaining and recovering from unique challenges presented by modern warfare.

Hiroshima is a river delta town, located at the mouth of the Ota River, built on land reclaimed from the Seto Inland Sea. In 1589, the local *daimyo* (feudal lord) Mori Terumoto changed the name of the town to Hiroshima ("wide island") and began construction of Hiroshima castle, which would anchor urban development for generations. In 1871, during the Meiji period, feudal domains were abolished and Hiroshima Prefecture was established, and in 1889, the city of Hiroshima formally gained municipality status.

On August 6, 1945, Hiroshima was attacked by the United States, which dropped a single atomic bomb on the city. It was the first city in the world to have been attacked with a nuclear weapon. This single bomb unleashed destructive power equivalent to 15,000 tons of TNT, destroying 69 percent

of the city's buildings and killing or injuring more than 300,000 people. During the war, Hiroshima was among a small number of towns removed from U.S. conventional and fire bombing target lists to provide undamaged targets that would facilitate later atomic bomb damage assessments. The important military facilities located in Hiroshima during the time of the bombing were not targeted (and largely survived), but rather, the bomb was aimed at the city center. On August 9, 1945, the world's first plutonium bomb, nicknamed the "Fat Man," was dropped on Nagasaki, the second and last city to be attacked with a nuclear weapon. There is widespread disagreement about the extent to which the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki led to the end of World War II.

After the end of the war, Hiroshima moved fairly rapidly from a population low of 137,000 in late 1945 to the vibrant city that it is today. In 1949, first the city government and then national government declared Hiroshima a Peace Memorial City, and construction was begun on the Peace Memorial Park to honor the victims of the bombing. In 1996, the Atomic Bomb Dome, a former industrial promotion center near the hypocenter of the blast, whose mangled shell was preserved after the war, was declared a UNESCO World Heritage Site.

Among the challenges facing modern Hiroshima is how to keep the memory of the experiences of the Hibakusha salient for future generations. Toward this end, the newly built Hiroshima City University in 1998 established the Hiroshima Peace Institute, an academic research institute focused on global peace research so that the name Hiroshima would always be associated with work toward a peaceful planet for generations to come.

Robert A. Jacobs

See also Catastrophe; Heritage City

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HISTORIC CITIES

The historic city is a concept; a creation of the human imagination. The raw materials from which the imagination shapes it, however, may be, and usually are, composed of tangible physical structures, forms, and shapes as well as nontangible memories and associations with past events and personalities: all of which can be related to actual physical locations on the Earth's surface. The adjective *historic* modifies the noun *city*, separating historic from nonhistoric, assuming the existence of two categories of cities. The answers to two questions are sought here. What is a historic city? Why and how have historic cities been created?

What Is a Historic City?

We can distinguish three approaches to time, their expression in urban environments, and their relationship with place management philosophies. There are old cities, historic cities, and heritage cities.

The past is the totality of whatever has happened being continuously augmented by the passage of time. Logically, cities are new only at the instant of their creation and subsequently vary in the degree of their antiquity. However, some arbitrary comparative division could separate old from new cities, raising the question how old is old. Also, does an old city, in this sense, need to be characterized by a dominance of old buildings or morphologies? Old cities are not necessarily the same as cities composed of old buildings. There are

many cities in the world that conceive of themselves as old, in the sense of being conscious of having had a lengthy or even distinguished history, even though little physical record of this remains in the urban fabric. Hamburg, Germany, for example, thinks of itself as old and stresses in its promotion its antiquity and historic associations, expressed especially through its historically significant citizens and its former role in the Hanseatic League. It is, however, uncompromisingly modern in its postwar rebuilt city center. The reverse situation could conceivably occur, although the globalization of the heritage industry renders this increasingly unlikely, namely that a city composed of old buildings and structures would be unaware of its antiquity and its potential historicity.

History is the attempt of the present to describe, necessarily highly selectively, aspects of the past. As, by definition, the past does not exist any longer in the present, a city of history, in this sense, can exist only in the descriptions of historians. However, relict structures, street patterns, and sites that have associations with historical events and personalities may survive and be acknowledged in the present. Old cities become historic cities through the application of the strategy of preservation. Preservation is the action of preserving from harm but involves first recognizing that the object to be preserved has value through its antiquity or beauty and then imposing physical and legal protective measures. Such official designations of historic city may be local, national, or even international, through organizations such as UNESCO, and there are officially sanctioned leagues or networks of such historic cities nationally and internationally. A conclusion might be that a historic city is a city declared to be so by a competent authority.

However, differences in the criteria for inclusion as historic are wide. China, for example, lists 62 officially designated historic cities based on their absolute historic values, thus including all the major cities. The Council of Europe, on the other hand, lists historic cities based on proportional values, thus ignoring London, Rome, and Vienna as nonhistoric in favor of more completely historic Bath, Florence, and Salzburg.

Preservation rarely remains a purely defensive strategy. There is a spectrum of increasing intervention through preservation activities. This proceeds

from protection of what remains from further harm, maintenance so that it remains in the current state, repair of damage, replacement of what is missing, renovation to return it to an original condition, reconstruction of what once was but is now not, facsimile building in the spirit of what once might have been, ultimately to the creative invention of what should have been but never was. Cities cannot be left as ruined relicts if they are to continue to function as cities, although individual buildings may be, if like the Kaiser Wilhelm Gedächtniskirche in Berlin, they are deliberately endowed with a new meaning as a ruin. The functional demands of cities on space predispose management to intervene beyond protective maintenance and repair to facilitate adaptive reuse for modern functions.

The difference between history and heritage is that the former attempts, however imperfectly and selectively, to describe or re-create a past believed to have once existed, whereas the latter is the contemporary uses of pasts that are products of the imagination in the present designed to satisfy present needs. Although both are contemporary creations, the motives and criteria of the creators are different. In preservation planning, the focus is on the maintenance of the forms and morphologies for their own sake. Although there is inevitably some consideration of function, this will always be a secondary and usually subsequent concern. Conservation, however, is preserving purposefully, with the contemporary and future function being a crucial criterion for selection. The conservation planning of historic cities concerns function as well as form and thus urban planners and managers as much as historians and architects.

Heritage makes no assumptions about a fixed endowment of intrinsically valued artifacts from a past but views the past solely from the standpoint of the present, using the past as an almost infinite resource to be quarried for the creation of contemporary products through the process of commodification. The resulting cities reflect how the present sees the past, or even wishes it to have been. The postwar Polish reconstruction of the nation's destroyed cities, especially Warsaw, in a detail so meticulous as to produce a cityscape too perfect to have ever been, was considered a necessary cultural assertion of a Polish identity and the political legitimacy of a reborn Polish state. Violett-le-duc's

renovation of Carcassonne owed more to his imagined medieval city than to the actual historical experience of the place.

Dual Definitions of the Historic City

Historic cities can be defined in two significantly different ways, which, while not mutually exclusive as both meanings can coexist in the same city, are not describing the same phenomenon.

First, the term can refer to the city as a whole, its essence or *genius loci*. The city conceives of itself as historic or projects an image of being historic for internal or external consumption. This place identity does not necessarily imply that all or even most of the existing physical structures are themselves historic, in the sense of possessing an ascribed historicity. It can be little more than a state of mind, whether felt by insiders or imposed by outsiders.

Second, the term *historic city* may relate to a specific district of the city and may be used to differentiate it from other districts that compose the modern city. The second sense of historic may contribute to, or be the justification of, the first sense, but equally is not a condition of its existence. This may be no more than a reflection of the evolution of the urban form through time as the older city is physically expanded by the addition of later newer districts. However, it normally means more. The older part of the city may serve a significantly different function and be treated in a different way. The historic city in this sense is a functionally specialized district within the city in which historicity is expressed through both the built environment and by the uses to which the district is put. History becomes a function that can be regionalized in much the same way as other such districts, such as the shopping city, the administrative city, or the residential city. The creation, evolution, and management of historic districts within cities have been modeled in the tourist-historic city, a concept that has been applied globally to many different types of city, within many different cultural and political environments.

Why Have We Created Historic Cities?

The reasons why historic cities are created and the criteria used for selecting appropriate elements in

their creation can be divided into two categories, intrinsic and extrinsic.

Intrinsic values are those that are purported to be intrinsic to the object, whether the structures or the site itself. These values are regarded as existing independently of the observer and thus waiting to be discovered. The three most commonly used intrinsic criteria, which have often been inscribed into the protective legislation in most countries, are age, aesthetic beauty, and place associations with historic personalities or events. These criteria are assumed to be capable of objective determination and verification, usually by dispassionate experts. The concept of authenticity becomes central to these decisions and the benchmark against which the objects and sites are judged. There is a quite fundamental distinction between the authenticity of the object, building, or site and the authenticity of the historical record as a whole. The first would question the authenticity of the buildings, ensembles, associations, and location itself. The second argues that the total of what is preserved together represents an authentic reflection of what has occurred.

Extrinsic values by contrast are ascribed to the structures and areas of the city for a wide variety of contemporary reasons, which are neither inevitable nor immutable. The benchmark for assessment is not the intrinsic qualities but the extent to which extrinsic needs are satisfied. These needs may be sociopsychological, relating to the identification of individuals and social groups with a heritage; political-ideological, legitimating a jurisdiction or dominant ideology; or economic, in which heritage becomes a resource to be commodified for sale on many economic markets, of which tourism is only one. Few heritage cities have been created to serve a single purpose. Most are as multifunctional in their heritage component as in their other functions, serving many different heritage markets, internally and externally, for a variety of motives, political and social as well as economic. Even "epitome historic cities," that is, those that are selected to represent and symbolize wider, often national cultures and their values, such as Rothenburg ob der Tauber (Germany), Eger (Hungary), or Telč (Czech Republic), have major tourism functions as well as their symbolic cultural-political roles. Historic cities performing multiple heritage functions are more typical than aberrant,

but this condition of serving multiple markets raises the possibility of conflict and thus the necessity for continuous heritage management.

Historic Cities Are Also Cities

Most of the above discussion has focused on the meaning and importance of the adjective *historic* rather than the noun, *city*, to which it is applied. However, it needs to be simply stated that historic cities must also be cities. The danger is that the process of “heritage-ization,” that is, creating historicity for contemporary purposes, can threaten the existence of the city itself. Historicity may be a threat to urbanicity. The conceptual problem is that the conferring of historic status turns what was a functional building, ensemble, or city into a monument. The very act of preservation, through its interference with the process of change and decay, replaces what was with something new. The related planning problem is that of fossilization, that is, the denial of the right and capacity of the city to change. This raises the question: Can a preserved city remain a city rather than an extended museum exhibit?

It is easy to distinguish in theory between historic cities that are functioning cities with an historic component and heritage theme parks that have been created solely as a vehicle for the transmission and selling of heritage. Few would confuse a Disneyland creation of a streetscape with a settlement. However, the line between the two can become very blurred indeed. There are many reconstructed and usually relocated open-air museums (following the Hazelius archetype of the Skansen), some of which are urban, being not just located in cities but endeavoring to express urban life. These may be animated by a costumed population engaged in activities suitable to the period being reenacted. *Den Gamle By* near Aarhus (Denmark), begun in 1909, is one of the oldest, but other well-known cases would be Williamsburg (Virginia, United States), Louisbourg (Nova Scotia, Canada), or even the Blist’s Hill Victorian Town in the Ironbridge Gorge museum complex (Shropshire, United Kingdom). Although these heritage theme parks try to represent cities of the past, they clearly are not cities, having no permanent population or modern urban functions: They are theatrical stage sets.

However, in the town of Shelburne (Nova Scotia, Canada), the older central part of the town has been fenced off to become a museum experience with the inhabitants remaining in situ and behaving, at least within the defined heritage area, in costume and in period while the rest of the town functions normally. Then there are the fossilized “gem cities,” usually small and compact historic towns, whose historic fabric has survived more or less intact and whose subsequent preservation has been total. These are often fortress towns, such as Willemstad or Naarden (Netherlands), Cittadella (Italy), and Mont St. Michel or Neuf-Brisach (France). The strict and complete preservation of the historic town expels modern facilities from the city. The dilemma is clearly that such functions are disruptive to or discordant with the historic town but necessary for its continuing functioning, including those serving the needs of the heritage industry itself.

The management of historic districts within multifunctional cities poses similar dilemmas and necessitates similar compromises. Many cities contain heritage action spaces that are little more than open-air museums mono-functionally serving heritage industries. Elm Hill (Norwich, United Kingdom), for example, is a historic street renovated, substantially rebuilt, and enhanced with period paving and street furniture in the early 1960s. It functions as a heritage tourism experience and is dominated by tourism shopping and catering businesses. It became an archetype for the reconstruction of the medieval streetscape, as expected by the tourism industry, and has been globally replicated, from Vancouver’s Gastown to Sydney’s Rocks, all of which both house specific heritage-related functions and help designate the city concerned as historic.

Thus the historic city is not the totality of its preserved artifacts from the past nor the spatial setting in which remembered events and personalities acted. It is a phenomenon created by the present, which like the study of history itself, will be re-created anew by each generation according to the needs and attitudes that then prevail. The historic city may often freely make use of the preserved architectural forms, morphological patterns, and promoted historical associations, but it remains a creation of the present in the service of contemporary needs. Authenticity, defined as the accurate representation of the past through the

conservation of its relict features, has little relevance to this creation. Between the archaeological site and the heritage theme park there are many intermediate points, and a series of short steps links preserving what is, restoring what was, re-creating what was but somewhere else, and building what was not but could or should have been. Similarly, there is a clear difference between a museum of urban history and a modern functioning city, with historic cities occupying a sometimes uncomfortable middle ground. Therein lies the role of urban heritage planning and management.

G. J. Ashworth

See also Heritage City; Tourism; Venice, Italy

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HOMELESSNESS

While no doubt there have always been people who lived outside of regular abodes, as defined by a customary four-walled home or dwelling, it took the development of Western notions of civilization, modernity, and capitalism for homelessness, along with associated terms such as *vagrancy*, *transience*, and *vagabondage*, to be defined as a social problem. Scholars note that in medieval times, there was little stigma to begging or living on the streets, and social groups such as students and religious travelers were frequently associated with street living. The rise of modernity stigmatized those who lacked homes and linked those

who had no “regular settlement” with being “savages,” such as those encountered in the forests of the New World.

While the history of homelessness is long and complex, its nature as a social problem depends on both its scale and the level of threat it appears to pose to the social order. Such threats may be political or criminal, and most often these fears overlap. As urban America developed, three historical periods have led to particular concerns among the public about homelessness: the period between the Civil War and the close of the nineteenth century; the Great Depression period; and the late 1970s to the present. Following the Civil War, a combination of the demobilization of troops along with changing economic conditions gave rise to a large number of men who were labeled tramps. Although most men traveling along the roads and railroads were no doubt migratory workers (or, in the argot of late nineteenth century, would be better labeled hoboes than tramps), cultural rebellion in the form of petty crimes, riding the rails without paying fares, and the tendency of the very poor to be associated with social protests such as the Great Railroad Strike of 1877 and Coxey’s Army of 1894 gave tramps a radicalized and feared reputation. By the 1880s, most states had strengthened their tramp and vagrancy laws to develop draconian punishments for begging or even standing in or walking on the roads without an established settlement or a job. While most victims of these laws were thrown into houses of corrections or workhouses, there were instances of tramps being killed or severely injured by mobs or special police hired by railroads and other companies.

Depressions, however, particularly the Great Depression of the 1930s, lessened some of the stigma of poverty and evoked sympathy. The late nineteenth-century depressions led to the creation of soup kitchens and municipal lodging houses to serve the poor, and in the 1930s, the first New Deal program, the Federal Emergency Relief Agency (FERA), actively aided homeless encampments. At times, homeless people of the 1930s joined the ranks of what was seen as the “deserving poor.” They participated in public works programs and were pictured by famous New Deal artists and photographers as desolate migrants searching for jobs. Such empathy should not be overstated. Often,



A homeless youth on the streets of New York City

Source: Steven K. Martin.

homeless people were treated harshly, evicted from trains and makeshift accommodations, and removed from towns and cities as they did not hold legal settlements there. Only with World War II did the number of homeless people begin to fall.

Although homelessness never totally vanished, the word virtually disappeared in the 1950s and 1960s, to be replaced by the association of severe poverty with the skid rows of urban areas. No matter how harsh life was in the single-room occupancy apartments, hotels, and boarding houses of American cities, where the “bums” and hoboes lived, the occupants had roofs over their heads. Suddenly, around the late 1970s, residents of large cities noticed something new, people without any apparent homes at all. Advocates in Washington, D.C., led by the charismatic Mitch Snyder and his Coalition for Creative Non-Violence (CCNV) and the New York-based Coalition for the Homeless led by attorney Robert Hayes, defined the “new

homelessness” and demanded that government provide emergency assistance as well as economic and housing aid. The more structural or socioeconomic proposals of advocates (and later homeless people themselves) for jobs, permanent housing, and income were lost amid both the public perception and political leaders’ desire to stress charity or public emergency measures of amelioration such as soup kitchens and shelters.

In the 1980s, homelessness emerged as a public issue for the first time since the 1930s. On the one hand, a furious debate raged, with liberals and radicals condemning the massive social welfare cutbacks of the Reagan administration, as well as blaming housing gentrification, deindustrialization, and other systemic problems (lack of jobs and income, for example). On the other side, conservatives, led by a president who commented that many people chose to live out on the streets, emphasized alcohol, drugs, laziness, and mental

illness to different degrees to account for the sudden appearance of homelessness.

Moreover, the very definition of homelessness became contested. Advocates argued with much justification that a true measure of homelessness would include not only those literally on the streets or in shelters but those who were “crashing” or “doubled up” with relatives or friends and those living in group homes and prisons. In spite of the seemingly vast differences between liberals and conservatives, homeless shelters and similar palliative strategies from soup kitchens to clothes pantries to case management to increasingly specialized casework services dominated the response of almost all governmental levels. These solutions crossed the mainstream political spectrum.

The federal government’s first response came with the passage of the Stuart A. McKinney Act of 1987, which provided reimbursement for a growing number of palliative measures (shelters, case management services, emergency food provision). Like other periods in which reformers spoke for the poor, it was hardly clear if the answer of shelters and services was what homeless people and those at risk for homelessness most wanted. By the later 1980s to the mid-1990s, new groups of indigenous organizations of the poor emerged, including some national efforts such as “Up and Out of Poverty” and the National Union of the Homeless, and many more localized efforts consisting of homeless encampments and tent cities spread throughout the nation. Despite some radicalism reminiscent of the earlier periods of high homelessness, these efforts also seemed to have led to palliative remedies, and even to repressive measures rather than any major social structural changes.

As homelessness entered the 1990s and the new century, a central paradox was the growing national recognition and acceptance of homelessness along with an increased “compassion fatigue” among the middle class and deepening repression of the very poor at the local level. These responses are perhaps not as contradictory as they seem. The election of a national administration (President Bill Clinton) that had little investment in denying homelessness led to a rhetorical acceptance that there were many people who were homeless and/or in poverty. However, with neither the Clinton nor George W. Bush administrations supporting major social welfare or employment initiatives, not

surprisingly the optimism of the big charitable events of the 1980s—such as the “Hands Across America” rallies (the large corporate and government sponsored event in the 1980s to hold hands and help the homeless)—quickly faded. As the middle classes pulled away from the optimistic voluntarism of the early 1980s, cities and towns moved by economic competition and a new criminal justice approach of “broken windows” (i.e., the belief that prosecuting minor and status crimes would make for a better overall economic, social, and civic environment) cracked down on the homeless. Typified by New York City’s former Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, but copied in nearly all major cities, loitering, begging, congregating in public spaces, and various sorts of “shadow work” (“off the books” work such as New York’s famous “squeegee men”) have been banned or repressed. Increasingly, homeless people have been pushed out of view to suburban or less central urban areas. These changes are well documented by the National Coalition for the Homeless.

As the new homelessness reaches its third decade, it is clear that what was once seen as a temporary crisis is fairly consistent with American history’s long tolerance of extreme poverty. While economic upswings and more jobs have had little effect on the wages of working-class people, there is even less reason to believe that those most poor will benefit. At this time, it does not appear that either political party or major figures in the national debate endorse any major strategies to end homelessness.

David Wagner

See also Affordable Housing; Housing; Housing Policy; Social Housing; Squatter Movements

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HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATIONS

Homeowners association (HOA) is a specific term used in the United States and some other countries for incorporated associations of homeowners who have formed an organization to govern common property. Common property might include shared parts of buildings, parking lots, streets, recreational facilities, and, in larger developments, schools and private town halls. Homeowners associations collect monthly fees from homeowners (assessments) and organize a contractual version of local government, delivering services and enforcing private land use restrictions. Decisions are made by an elected executive board and are governed by an annual homeowners' meeting. The board employs a property management company to execute its day-to-day estate management responsibilities.

Homeowners associations are set up variously as companies, trusts, and other entities, depending on the legal instruments a country has at its disposal. In the United States, homeowners associations govern landed properties, usually in master planned developments, and are distinguished from condominium associations, which govern shared property in apartment developments. *Community association* is the more general term used to describe private organizations that govern neighborhoods and may include condominium

associations, homeowners associations, cooperatives, and their variants.

The idea of a legal entity governing shared private territory has a long history. In France, the first modern joint-ownership (condominium) law was created in 1804. For 200 years, every new land subdivision in France has been required to establish restrictive covenants and, in the case of private streets, a homeowners association. Condominium law was exported from France to the United States in the 1960s; subsequently, there was a veritable explosion of private local governments. In 1964, the United States had 500 community associations. This grew to 274,000 by 2005, providing housing for 54.6 million Americans (18.5 percent of the population). The economist Robert Nelson views the rise of homeowners and condominium associations as the greatest innovation in ownership since the birth of the modern joint stock company in the late nineteenth century. He argues that it redistributes ownership of urban infrastructure stock from the few to the many, decentralizes control, and radically changes the incentive structure and the politics of investment and stock management.

Not surprisingly, a great many controversies are associated with the phenomenon. Privately governed neighborhoods are alleged to reduce political participation and change voting behavior. They are said to exacerbate social-spatial segregation, fuel the fear of others, displace crime and traffic problems, and pose a long-term risk to social cohesion. On the other hand, they clearly offer something of value to homeowners, including reduced investment risk, a greater sense of community, a better quality of local services, and more clearly packaged neighborhood choice. The balance between costs and benefits is an empirical matter and currently subject to much scrutiny.

As important as the alleged social and systemic costs are the private costs of contractual government (the legal costs of setting up a well-founded administration and the cost of settling disputes). There is a growing body of research on the coevolution of private and public urban governance and a variety of institutional models are emerging in different economic and cultural contexts.

Chris Webster

See also Common Interest Development; Condominium; Governance; Housing

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HOMEOWNERSHIP

Homeownership refers to the possession of certain rights as regards the housing unit in which one lives. This may involve control and use of both the dwelling and the property on which the dwelling is built, a popular form of homeownership in the United States. Alternatively, homeownership may take the form of condominium or apartment ownership, whereby an individual has rights regarding a housing unit that is one of many units, each sharing a common property area. In this instance, an individual has sole ownership of the dwelling unit and collective ownership of the property on which the unit is built as well as any other common areas associated with the dwelling unit. Condominium or apartment ownership tends to be popular in urban areas where land is scarce, particularly in European cities. In the case where the property comes with garden amenities, as is common with condominium ownership in the United States, maintenance of the land tends to be contracted out, allowing individuals to own their dwelling units without laboring to maintain the common property areas.

Homeownership rates vary by world region and tend to be highest in low-income countries and nonurban areas of higher-income countries. Dwelling ownership takes many forms, and in many of the countries, owner-occupied housing units frequently lack basic amenities such as potable water and indoor cooking facilities. High-income countries tend to have well developed mortgage markets and, as a result, a relatively high-quality housing stock as well as widespread homeownership. After exploring those topics, this entry summarizes the extensive

research on homeownership issues: Wealth and family composition are important determinants of dwelling ownership, homeownership generates private as well as social benefits, and although homeowners tend to be more politically conservative, political beliefs are determined by factors associated with homeownership rather than homeownership per se. Finally, in the United States, federal policy initiatives have played a role in boosting the homeownership rates of households in general and, more recently, for historically underrepresented groups.

Characteristics of Ownership

In most countries, homeownership is the dominant form of housing tenure, with homeownership rates varying by world region. Asian and sub-Saharan African countries have among the highest rates of dwelling ownership, at roughly 75 percent, and Western European countries have among the lowest, with a country-average rate of slightly less than 60 percent. In some Western European countries, such as Austria, Germany, and the Netherlands, the majority of households are tenants. The United States has one of the highest homeownership rates of the industrialized countries. Homeownership also tends to be lower in urban than rural areas.

The predominant form of homeownership in the United States is a single-family detached unit, whereas individual ownership of apartments in multifamily buildings is common in European countries. In developing nations, self-built housing, often lacking piped water and other basic amenities such as indoor cooking and bath facilities, makes up a significant portion of the owned housing stock. For example, although the estimated rate of owner occupancy is roughly 85 percent in Mali, the percentage of occupied dwelling units estimated to have piped-in water is only 4 percent.

One of the most common ways to purchase a home is through mortgage financing. This involves the home buyer contributing a lump sum toward the purchase of the house, known as a down payment, and a lending institution providing the funds for the remainder of the home price. The buyer then makes payments to the lending institution over a fixed time period, known as the mortgage

maturity, until the loan is repaid. The down payment serves as collateral on the loan. Should the borrower fail to make loan payments, the bank may take possession of the home, and the borrower loses his or her funds in the house.

The availability of mortgage financing, low down-payment requirements, and long-term loans plays an important role in determining the quality of the housing stock, homeownership rate, and age profile of homeownership. Countries such as the United States, Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom have well-developed mortgage markets, relatively high-quality housing stock, and relatively high homeownership rates as well as high ownership rates among young families. In other industrialized countries with less extensive mortgage markets, such as Spain, Italy, and Germany, homes are purchased later in life, with the average age of first purchase in the late thirties or forties. Only a small fraction of the owned housing stock in developing countries tends to be financed. In Mexico, for example, although the homeownership rate is at 77 percent, only 13 percent of the housing stock is mortgaged, and self-built housing lacking basic amenities accounts for roughly half of all dwellings.

Related Research

There has been extensive research on homeownership issues. Three areas of importance include the determinants of homeownership, benefits of homeownership, and the impact of homeownership on political activity and beliefs.

Determinants of Ownership

First, consider the determinants of homeownership, particularly as they operate in the United States. At nearly 70 percent, the homeownership rate in the United States is at an all-time high. The national average, however, masks important differences in homeownership rates across groups. The rate for White, non-Hispanic households is 76 percent, whereas rates for Asian, Black, and Hispanic households are 60 percent, 49 percent, and 48 percent, respectively.

The lower ownership rates of non-White households reflect, in part, past discriminatory practices in U.S. mortgage and real estate markets and differences in household characteristics. The extensive

research on U.S. housing markets finds that the cost of homeownership relative to renting, wealth, permanent and transitory income, income uncertainty, price uncertainty, and family composition are important in explaining housing decisions. Many of these homeownership determinants vary by race and ethnicity. Recent work suggests that the primary constraint to homeownership in the United States is having adequate wealth to meet down payment requirements, and the current Black-White gap in homeownership rates in the United States is largely explained by differences in wealth.

Low homeownership rates of certain groups may come about because few households enter into homeownership or those who enter have high exit rates. Households may exit homeownership due to crisis events such as family instability or financial distress. Recent research suggests that Black and Hispanic households sustain homeownership at rates similar to those of White households, suggesting that gaps in homeownership rates are due to differences in entry rather than exit rates.

Benefits of Ownership

Second, homeownership yields both private and social benefits. The private benefits include pride of ownership and increased social status, greater selection of housing attributes through owning, and declining real housing expenditures over time for households with fixed mortgage payments. Homeownership has also been associated with improved quality of life through positive impacts on children and greater life satisfaction. Through mortgage financing, moreover, homeownership may serve as a means for households with little wealth to acquire wealth, as the monthly mortgage payment serves as a form of forced saving for households that would have difficulty saving otherwise.

Another private benefit of homeownership is the potential for wealth creation as property values rise. The evidence for U.S. markets suggests that homeownership is an important means for households to accumulate wealth. The median net wealth of U.S. homeowners is higher than that of renters when compared across age groups, race, ethnicity, and annual income. Home equity is the

primary source of wealth for most households. In the late 1990s, despite strong stock market gains, home equity was a dominant investment for most U.S. households. Whereas roughly two thirds owned their homes, less than half of all households held stock. Of those households owning both stocks and homes, 60 percent had more wealth in home equity than in stocks. Recent research suggests that even low-income homeowners acquire wealth through homeownership. In addition, among low- and moderate-income households, wealth accumulation is associated with homeownership stability, and even households that are only temporary homeowners appear to achieve greater wealth holdings than persistent renters.

Homeownership also generates social benefits. It is said that homeownership gives people a stake in society, inducing them to care about their communities. Becoming a homeowner is thought to motivate the individual to better maintain his or her property, be more vigilant in preventing crime in the neighborhood, and vote for policies that improve the community. Such activities by a homeowner increase the quality and stability of the community, thereby raising property values. Research on these topics finds that homeowners are more civically involved, while increasing rates of homeownership in a community tend to improve community quality. Undoubtedly, the recent collapse of housing markets in the United States (and around the world) will be an important topic of research in the coming years, with a reevaluation of earlier findings concerning benefits of homeownership and related issues.

Link to Political Beliefs

Third, several studies indicate that homeowners are more likely to be politically active, with some researchers believing that homeownership causes people to become more conservative in their political beliefs. Since the writings of Friedrich Engels, it has been argued that owning property makes one part of the system of capitalism and thus gives one a stake in preserving the status quo. A broad system of homeownership ostensibly creates a group of people with common housing interests that transcend class differences and weaken the political focus of the worker class. Others maintain that

housing tenure might have been important in shaping political beliefs in early industrial Great Britain or currently in countries in the early stages of economic development, but not so in countries like the United States, where the capitalistic system is firmly established and a high homeownership rate, quality of housing stock, and standard of living exist.

At first glance, U.S. data seem consistent with the idea that homeownership is associated with a more conservative political persuasion. Homeowners are far more likely to identify themselves as conservative and far less likely to identify themselves as liberal than renters. However, as a group, homeowners are evenly split by political party. Evidence suggests that wealth has a greater effect on political affiliation than homeownership per se. Age and education (factors associated with greater wealth holdings) as well as religiosity also seem to have more of an impact on political beliefs than the act of owning one's dwelling.

Government Role

In regard to the political implications, the U.S. government has played a role in encouraging homeownership since the Great Depression. With passage of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act of 1932 and the Homeowners Loan Act of 1933, funds were targeted to help homeowners pay mortgages, undertake maintenance, and pay taxes. The National Housing Act of 1934 created the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), which changed the way in which homes were financed. The FHA initiated the long-term, fixed-payment loan covering a large portion of the appraised value of the property. The Federal National Mortgage Association, known as Fannie Mae, was created in 1938 to expand the U.S. mortgage market and homeownership opportunities. Mortgage interest has been deductible from federal taxable income since the inception of the income tax. Currently at roughly \$70 billion, the deductibility of mortgage interest is the second-largest revenue loss to the U.S. federal government.

In response to persistent gaps in homeownership and because of the belief that homeownership creates social benefits, boosting the homeownership rates of low-income and minority households

has been a federal priority since the early 1990s. Successive presidential administrations have launched policy initiatives, largely using front-end programs that help households attain homeownership, such as homebuyer training programs, down payment assistance, and housing rehabilitation. Furthermore, financial institutions have expanded their commitment to lending to low-income and minority households in response to the passage of what are known in the United States as fair-lending laws, an example of which is the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, which requires lending institutions to demonstrate they are meeting the credit needs of all households in the communities they serve. These policies have been successful in boosting the homeownership rate of low-income and minority households.

Tracy Turner

See also Common Interest Development; Condominium; Homeowners Associations; Housing; Housing Tenure; Social Housing; Suburbanization

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HONG KONG, CHINA

Hong Kong, meaning "fragrant harbor" in Chinese and officially called Hong Kong Special

Administrative Region (Hong Kong SAR) since 1997, is located on the Pearl River Delta, south China. Hong Kong SAR is made up of Hong Kong Island, Kowloon Peninsula, New Kowloon, and New Territories. It borders Guangdong province in the north and faces the South China Sea in the east, west, and south. It has a land area of 1,068 square kilometers and a population of 6.9 million (as of 2006), giving an overall population density of 5,385 people per square kilometer.

Hong Kong is among the world's most compact and densely populated cities. Whereas average population density in the New Territories is 2,560 people per square kilometer, on Hong Kong Island, Kowloon Peninsula, and New Kowloon, population density increases to 26,950 people per square kilometer. Within the urban area, for example, the Mongkok district, population density can be as high as 116,531 people per square kilometer. Hong Kong's population is predominantly Chinese (95 percent); the rest are non-Chinese residents and expatriates. Hong Kong is one of the world's leading financial centers, a major business hub where East meets West.

Historical Evolution

Its modern history started when Hong Kong Island became a British entrepot for China trade in 1842 following China's defeat in the first Anglo–Chinese Opium War (1839–1842). Britain ceded the Kowloon Peninsula in 1860 during the Second Opium War (1858–1860). In 1898, the New Territories was leased to Britain for 99 years. British colonization transformed the onetime village into a town and introduced planned settlement through urban planning, as practiced under British town planning legislation. For much of the colonial period, the administration's attitude was largely laissez-faire, as concern was with trade development. The British administrated Hong Kong through a governor appointed by the Colonial Office in London, aided by the executive and legislative councils. No Chinese officially sat on either council until 1880.

Hong Kong's early development was driven by the growth of international trade between Europe and Asia. Its free market enterprise society soon became the center of immigration for Chinese from mainland China and a refuge for

reformers and revolutionaries, including Sun Yat Sen (1866–1925), who had significant roles in shaping China’s modern history.

Following the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, more migrants fled to Hong Kong in fear of persecution by the communist regime. They further swelled the population, adding pressure to its housing. Acute housing shortage and overcrowding prevailed. By the end of 1949, an estimated 300,000 people lived in squatter homes built on hillsides, on rooftops, and in street alleys. Most of these squatter huts were dark; badly ventilated; without water, plumbing, and other facilities; and under constant threat of termites, typhoon, and fire. Many private companies in Shanghai and Guangzhou also shifted their operations to Hong Kong. Prior to China’s present open door policy in 1978, Hong Kong was the only contact place between mainland China and the rest of the world. After China’s open door policy, Hong Kong remains an important source of foreign direct investment to China. Its dynamic growth offers a model for other Chinese cities.

In recent decades, Hong Kong’s economy has grown rapidly with industrialization, especially in textile and manufacturing industries where labor costs are low. By the 1980s, Hong Kong had become one of Asia’s economic “tigers” or newly industrializing economies. Since the 1990s, it has restructured its manufacturing base and shifted to business services, emphasizing financial services, tourism, trading and logistics, professional services, and other product services. Manufacturing plants have been relocated to the Pearl River Delta, promoting the development of regional economy and formation of a metropolitan region from Hong Kong to Guangzhou, south China. China’s economic policy innovation of special economic zones in Shenzhen and Zhuhai in the late 1970s further augmented Hong Kong’s hinterland.

In 1997, Hong Kong entered a historical phase of development. The city returned to Chinese sovereignty under the 1984 Sino–British Joint Declaration. Hong Kong is granted a high degree of autonomy in all areas except defense and foreign affairs under the “One Country, Two Systems” policy, at least up to 2047, allowing Hong Kong’s capitalist system and lifestyle to continue for a further 50 years. The chief executive and Executive Council govern Hong Kong as a unitary authority

or special administrative region. Its legal system continues to follow the English Common Law tradition established by the British colonial administration. Although presenting challenges as it is an untried formula, the One Country, Two Systems policy also yields opportunities for policy coordination such as in trans-border issues, regional infrastructure, tourism, technology policy, financial markets, and coordination to stabilize exchange rates. Many of those who emigrated ahead of the 1997 handover have since returned to Hong Kong. Hong Kong’s vision for the twenty-first century is to develop as Asia’s world city.

High-Density Vertical City

What makes Hong Kong unique is its high-density vertical urbanization. Its high-density development is a result of geography, historical development, and land policy. Much of Hong Kong is hilly to mountainous; more than 75 percent of the land is on a hill slope. The average distance from the harbor front to the steep hills of Hong Kong Island is only 1.3 kilometers. Only 25 percent of Hong Kong’s land area is developed. About 40 percent of the remaining land is reserved as country parks and nature reserves. Most of its urban development exists on Kowloon Peninsula, along the northern coast of Hong Kong Island, where most of the flat land was created by government-sponsored hill levelling and land reclamation, and in scattered areas throughout the New Territories.

Government Role

The government owns all the land in Hong Kong. The sale of land leases for terms of 75, 99, or 999 years is one of the major sources of government revenue. Land is amalgamated before leasing to private developers through auction and tender. The government has full control over the timing, location, and amount of land to be leased, in part a factor behind the city’s high land prices. The lack of horizontal space combined with high land prices have led to vertical city development; 38 of the world’s 100 tallest residential buildings are located in Hong Kong. There are more than 7,600 tall buildings, rising from 50 to 88 floors and heights of above 200 meters; the tallest is 415 meters. Hong Kong has more people living or working

above the 14th floor than anywhere else on Earth, making it the world's most vertical city. The inevitable consequence of vertical urban development is that few older low-rise buildings remain. The city has become a showcase for modern, high-rise architecture.

A distinctive feature of Hong Kong's vertical urbanity is its large-scale, high-rise public housing. As with Singapore, about half of Hong Kong's population live in high-rise public housing. In the initial years, these were built to resettle fire victims and squatters. The construction of the Shek Kip Mei Estate following the Shek Kip Mei fire, which left 53,000 people homeless in 1953, marked the beginning of Hong Kong's public housing program and the government's role as financier, contractor, and landlord of housing. Designed and built as emergency housing, each apartment block could house 2,000 people, 340 people including children per floor. These early buildings were generally seven stories tall with an average space allocation of 3.25 square meters per person (the lowest is 0.85 square meter). Cooking was done outdoors along the common corridor, immediately in front of residents' apartment doors. Residents shared communal bathing and toilet facilities, and there were no elevators.

Over time, public-housing space standards and facilities have improved in response to consumers' needs and demands for better quality housing. With technology advancements, taller buildings were constructed. Residents are increasingly consulted to find out what they want and what works for them best before a new design is introduced. There is consideration beyond the utilitarian approach to domestic comfort and lifestyle. New estates are planned as neighborhoods, with such urban amenities as kindergartens, playgrounds, wet markets, sports facilities, clinics, and shopping malls. Old estates are upgraded. In 1997, the government introduced its aim to increase home ownership to 70 percent, giving further impetus to public housing improvement.

A Green Environment

Although Hong Kong is intensely urbanized, in recent years it has made much effort to promote a green environment. Since 2004, the government has started to develop greening master

plans for its urban districts. Community forums are held to gather public feedback on the contents of these master plans, which are due for completion by 2009. The government has also started a green Hong Kong campaign to promote and enhance public awareness of greening in the community, including greening activities among school children.

Hong Kong suffers from increasing pollution, compounded by its geography, proximity to the Pearl River Delta, and high-density urbanization. About 80 percent of the city's smog originates from nearby industrial areas in south China. On the transportation front, Hong Kong introduced strong car-restraint and bus-priority measures early in its development. Hong Kong has a well-developed transportation network that encompasses bus, tram, rail, and ferry, both public and private. More than 90 percent of daily trips (11 million) are on public transport, one of the highest usages in the world. The development of Hong Kong provides important lessons in planning creative solutions for a number of urban challenges, including urban expansion, economic development, housing redevelopment, and participatory planning at the city level.

Belinda Yuen

See also Social Housing; Urban Planning

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HOTEL, MOTEL

Contemporary urban theorists have explored how cities are profoundly defined by the nature of their

circulation, whether of cars, goods, or people. If we accept this, then we have to look for sites that coordinate, stage, or enable that circulation. Hotels and motels are a key articulating mechanism for such flows, a central element of modern practices such as driving, rationalized work routines, architectural design, and new building technologies. This entry looks at their history and role in urban life.

Historical Evolution

At their essence, hotels emerged to replace older forms of hospitality shown to travelers (from the inns of medieval England to the *caravanserai* of traditional Arab cultures), with a systematized, modern equivalent. As historians such as Cynthia Cocks and Andrew Sandoval-Strausz have described, the modern hotel offered a controlled, commodified way of dealing with strangers, a challenge posed by the vast explosion in city populations experienced in the booming commercial economies of the nineteenth century.

Many of the earlier urban hotels were designed to cater to a rural elite visiting the city for social functions such as weddings or dinners, or else to meet with the distributors and purchasers of their farm products. However, the growing sophistication of modern consumer economies increased the demand for basic hotel space by agents pursuing all manner of commercial services, from traveling salespeople to touring entertainers featuring in adjacent music halls and theaters. With the growth of international trade relations, hotels became important way stations in the maintenance of colonial economies.

Luxury Hotels

Within some of the key commercial cities of major nation-states or imperial economies, luxury hotels became important features of central business districts. Through the provision of a full suite of services—restaurants presenting international (and hence familiar) cuisine, laundry services, and telex, telephone, and then fax and Internet systems—the large hotel often boasted that it was a city in miniature. Annabel Wharton,

in *Building the Cold War*, showed how, from the 1950s, the Hilton Corporation fused modern techniques of hotel management with innovation in modernist design (including the use steel, glass, modern plumbing, telephony, and ventilation systems) as part of a strategy of international expansion that mirrored the economic expansionism of American firms. Five-star hotels were, in these cases, designed to insulate the traveler from the unpredictability of a foreign culture (or else, back in the United States, from the mean streets of the inner city, in the context of the perceived dangers of the postwar American downtown).

Of course, it is important to note that alongside the large, full-service hotels, many cities and towns have sustained an ecology of hostels, boarding houses, single-room occupancy hotels, and cheap hotels with basic facilities, all crucial institutions in the provision of affordable options for migrant workers, pilgrims, budget travelers, and the homeless. This can often be an expression of social polarization in developing economies. As David Gladstone has shown, Indian cities such as Delhi display a stark contrast between gated luxury hotels and the multitude of *dharamshalas* (pilgrims' rest houses), dormitories, guest houses, and small hotels tucked into the densely packed older city quarters, with intermittent water supply and no air conditioning.

Basic Products

Such privations underline the fact that the hotel product can be fairly basic. Hotels can specialize in the provision of a bedroom, but with minimal services, given the preponderance of options—be it dry cleaners or cafés—in the bright lights of big cities. Most recently, the rise of the boutique hotel (a reaction to the studied homogeneity of the chain hotel), pioneered by the likes of Ian Schrager in Manhattan, has leveraged the excitement of its urban location, allowing carefully designed, but typically small hotel rooms to be charged at relatively high prices. This is underpinned by a typical guest who seeks the buzz of cultural life in Shanghai or New York, rather than the bland and the predictable.



This contemporary hotel in Beijing, China, offers a taste of Eastern decor along with the basic comforts that Westerners seek when traveling far from home.

Source: Blake Buyan.

While big-city hotels became key institutions within central cities, the rapid expansion of road networks in the first decades of the twentieth century brought a new architectural form to the fore. The motel was an important aspect not just of the city but also of the development of nation-states into an urbanized system of communications and markets. Motels were emblematic of a major tension within American cultural life: Main Street versus Wall Street. As described in Jakle et al.'s *The Motel in America*, motels were an early embodiment of popular American culture as seen in the “mom and pop” form of hands-on, independent motel management, where families converted their roadside properties into spartan lodgings (an important economic activity during the Depression).

By the early 1950s, these were being increasingly challenged by the corporate power of chains such as Holiday Inn or Days Inn, which emerged as harbingers of standardized, homogenized landscapes based around franchise models. They signified modular construction and a minimum of decoration and the standardized, bulk purchasing and supply of towels, toilet rolls, and soap; they usually guaranteed the guest a television, serviceable bed, and modern plumbing. Motels have continued to play important roles in automobile-centered economies, yet are examples of the cultural homogenization of American landscapes.

So, motels and hotels have always existed for a very functional reason: to meet the leisure or business demands of travelers. This can be as

simple as a room and bed (and parking space) for the night, with a single staff member on duty, or as elaborate as a fully provisioned, meticulously designed, and heavily staffed luxury hotel. In the contemporary context, the growing sophistication of information technology and mobile communications has required that hotels upgrade their communications infrastructure. In the extreme, this allows the wired-up, hypermobile executive traveler to remain constantly in contact with business associates with a strong degree of predictability and trust, a central element for businesses in undertaking the risk (in terms of lost time traveling and time spent away from the base office) of travel.

Social and Cultural Roles

It is worth dwelling on the role that luxury hotels have always played in the gendered cultures of display and social identity that are such an important part of advanced urban economies. From the nineteenth century onward, hotels provided an opportunity for women to appear in public in a male-dominated public realm. As Carolyn Brucken has noted, single-sex “Ladies’ Parlors”—often located in prominent positions on the street fronts of hotels, yet segregated from the clublike surroundings of male society—played an important role in allowing middle-class women to be both literally and metaphorically in the public eye as never before, certainly in the context of polite American society, offering them an unprecedented opportunity to enjoy forms of self-expression in public space. A century later, it is worth noting that hotel chains still stand accused of neglecting the specific needs of female travelers, from specific demands in terms of room design and layout to a desire for privacy and security in the public areas of hotels. In strict Muslim societies, such as Saudi Arabia, hotel design is still governed by careful segregation of men and women. In 2008, the country saw the opening of its first women-only hotel, seen by some as an important step forward (given existing practices of requiring male permission to check in), but by others as a retrograde step, one that further institutionalizes male–female segregation.

Finally, hotels are important, although often neglected spaces of labor relations. Economic development agencies often support large-scale hotel construction because of the sizeable number of jobs they create (many requiring little formal prior training). As such, they have been promoted as important contributors to local economies where unemployment is high. However, this often means that their wages are low and conditions harsh, particularly given the demanding physical nature of the work tasks performed by room-service staff, cleaners, and kitchen staff. As Jane Wills has demonstrated in a study of London’s Dorchester Hotel, many of the most luxurious hotels possess a glittering front of house design, while hiding a backstage of nonunionized labor, often drawn from recent immigrants and ethnic minorities. In many ways this is a metaphor for the city, where debates over public and private space, luxury and poverty, and the gendered nature of city life can be illuminated.

Donald McNeill

See also *Caravanserai*; Las Vegas, Nevada; Railroad Station

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HOUSING

The urban character is shaped through its residential neighborhoods, some of which have been intact for centuries. Scholars and public policy officials recognize housing as a critical element of community development. Thus, efforts to rejuvenate communities within metropolitan areas are often accompanied by a strategy to rejuvenate housing as well. Because of the multidimensional nature of housing, it is both an important element of an urban area's macrolevel character and a primary determinant of individual living experiences through its interaction with the physical and natural environment. In addition, social policy is often concerned with issues of homeownership, commonly seen in cities' attempts to move families and households along a continuum of housing, in hopes of improving both consumer welfare and socially desirable outcomes. Improving social well-being through housing choice also requires policies directed toward improving the physical quality of the housing unit itself, the degree of choice in housing selection, and the variety of housing that is made available across urban areas and cultures.

The Importance of Housing to Community

Over the past century, there has been an attempt throughout the developed and the developing worlds to recognize a universal right to housing. During the Great Depression of the 1930s in the United States, the Roosevelt administration legitimized the role of the federal government in creating and providing housing through the formation of large-scale public housing. This was followed shortly thereafter by the National Housing Act of 1949, which went further than any national government had previously gone in legitimizing a standard of housing for citizens by stating the need for "a decent home and a suitable living environment for every American family," without necessarily codifying the terms of such a standard.

On the international stage, the United Nations created its own standardization of a basic level of housing quality through the passage of its Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which stated that "everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and his family, including . . . housing." In addition, housing's importance as a driver of economic growth cannot be underestimated. In the developed world, residential transactions directly create a variety of job categories, including home builders, real estate agents, mortgage lenders, and appraisers, just to name a few. Beyond these direct employees, such activity generates enormous multiplier effects on the general economy.

In many areas, a distinct architectural quality of housing helps define the urban area's character. For example, Baltimore's historic row-house model is uniquely identified with the city as a housing form unlike any other. In other cultures, there is an emphasis on vernacular housing, in which locally available resources and production methods are employed, as a way of maintaining local tradition rather than being influenced by a particular architect or designer. By emphasizing purpose over aesthetic appeal, such an approach allows neighborhoods and cityscapes to be created and maintained in a consistent manner and for habitants to feel a sense of connectedness as a result.

The Integration of Housing Within Existing Sociological Theoretical Frameworks

Housing serves an important role within the context of one's physical and natural surroundings. The human ecology model, popularized by Bubolz and Sontag in 1993, emphasizes that the built environment serves as a conduit between the self and both the social-cultural environment and the natural environment. Similarly, housing also has a connection with each stage along the pyramid structure of Maslow's hierarchy of needs, first popularized in the 1940s. The most basic need is physiological. Housing serves this role by providing shelter and protection from the natural elements. Housing also serves the second stage of Maslow's pyramid by providing safety and security to its inhabitants, as a form of protection from potential harm. In the subsequent level, a sense of belonging, the home environment serves as a place in which families are raised and nurtured and where people interact with friends and other community members. The final two stages of the hierarchy, self-esteem and self-actualization, address the important roles that housing plays in people's identity and social status and in satisfying their creative side and allowing them to reach their full potential.

Housing Continuum

Morris and Winter, in *Housing, Family, and Society*, put forward a housing adjustment theory, which shows that housing consumption can be analyzed along a continuum. Just as it is important from a community standpoint to plan for area growth through the adequate construction and provision of housing and housing infrastructure, it is also important from a household perspective to prepare for different levels of housing consumption along a household's life course. As a result, at each stage of a household's development, there will be a shift in the types of housing norms or housing expectations. The need for housing space, and hence, housing consumption, tends to increase along with increased family size and economic resources during the early years of a household. As household size stabilizes, housing consumption may also stabilize. Later, as children leave the home and household size shrinks, space needs will tend to

decrease. Finally, as age brings functional decline, more accessible and supportive housing characteristics become critical.

However, this ideal of housing consumption across the life course is often unavailable. At the most extreme end of this continuum, families experience homelessness. Homelessness typically means an individual has no access to a conventional residence. This can result in sleeping in homeless shelters or nonresidential public or private spaces, such as abandoned buildings, cars, streets, subways, bus terminals, or parks. Although statistics on world homelessness are not consistently available, it is safe to say that homelessness is a concern in both developing and developed countries throughout the world. The reasons behind homelessness are myriad, ranging from displacement of people after natural disasters, the failure of cities and metropolitan areas to adequately provide enough low-income housing stock for their populations, and the individual lack of available income due to unemployment, drug and alcohol abuse, mental disorder, or expenses associated with children.

Government Support

Affordable housing is often developed through government support of private development or direct government construction and management of housing. In the United States, there has been a shift away from concentrating government-managed affordable housing in large, centralized public housing projects in one location (normally in mostly low-income neighborhoods) within each urban area. Instead, newer strategies encourage diffusion of poverty through construction of smaller, scattered-site public housing and subsidization through housing vouchers that allow low- and moderate-income recipients to choose from many private-market dwellings, often in less economically disadvantaged neighborhoods.

From an international perspective, several developed and developing countries also offer varying degrees of public assistance to low-income households, often with the intention of having these households eventually transition to nonsubsidized housing. Such a transition is rarely an easy one, however, in that the ability of these households to

afford housing has been hampered by years of rapid house price appreciation in many urban areas.

Beyond the transition to unsubsidized market rent housing, a common policy objective is to encourage homeownership. Several city governments encourage such a move along the housing continuum through offering such incentives as down payment and closing cost assistance, a phenomenon that accelerated during the 1990s. Despite the recent housing downturn, such home buyer assistance programs are still widely offered by many states and large municipalities.

The concept of the housing continuum, of course, also allows for movement away from, as well as toward, homeownership. For example, in the event of a mortgage default, owners may be forced back into renting. In addition, life cycle changes may cause older homeowners to voluntarily forgo the effort and expense of home maintenance by selling and returning to renting.

Housing Quality and Residential Satisfaction

Many urban areas attempt to ensure the quality of their housing stock through the implementation of zoning laws and building codes. Zoning, which became widespread during the early twentieth century, was intended to subdivide land parcels throughout a metropolitan area and to limit the uses of land for particular purposes within particular zones. This usually meant separating commercial and industrial land uses from those intended for residential purposes. In major industrial areas, these types of laws helped to create more value within a city's built environment and drastically reduce public health concerns by separating residential areas from factory areas.

Building codes are city or county regulations that mandate the quality of the built residential structure, rather than the location of residential homes. Building codes can improve building safety and quality, as well as force the incorporation of modern building and construction techniques. However, in some areas, building codes may also add excessive requirements designed to keep the construction costs of new housing high and limit the entry of low-income residents into wealthier enclaves.

Housing quality concerns can come from the aging of the current housing stock as well as a lack of affordable housing. In many nations, the lack of habitable housing stock, coupled with the large number of urban dwellers in extreme poverty, forces many city residents to occupy high-density slums. As housing ages, the need for capital repairs begins to mount. Historically, repair needs for low-income apartment units in major cities have been ignored, causing housing quality to suffer as a result. Within U.S. cities, there is a demonstrated pattern of housing "filtering" occurring, in which housing is gradually passed down to lower-income populations as it gets older. Such a situation helps to create an imbalance in the quality of housing among income groups. As construction techniques and processes improve, the potential increases for even wider disparities in housing expenses related to housing quality. For example, the move toward more environmentally sensitive and energy-efficient housing, sometimes referred to as "green" housing, dramatically reduces energy expenses, but it is generally available only to higher-income households.

Aside from the residential structure itself, many cities are currently experiencing difficulties in their supportive infrastructure systems as well. Such inadequate services can lead higher-income residents to leave the cities for suburban or exurban locations, where newer housing stock with adequate road networks, utilities, and other services are offered. To counter some of these forces of inequality in housing, urban planners have advocated, and in many cases implemented, mandatory mixed-income housing within urban areas.

Housing quality and residential satisfaction can also have indirect effects for families and societies. Low residential satisfaction is a key predictor of residential mobility. Excessive residential mobility prevents individuals from rationally investing in community and neighborhood well-being. People who are not planning to stay in a neighborhood generally do not invest their time or resources in improving the neighborhood. This lack of investment in neighborhood social capital in turn produces socially undesirable neighborhoods. Poor neighborhood quality, especially in issues of safety and security, can be a key driver of residential

dissatisfaction. Such dissatisfaction leads to increased mobility for those with opportunities to move, which can exacerbate the downward spiral of some communities.

Differences in Housing Across Cultures and Countries

Across regions and across time, the very character of housing may change dramatically. In the United States, the average square footage of a new house rose from about 1,000 square feet in the 1950s to more than 2,600 square feet in the beginning of 2008. Such changes correspond with increases in the average American household's housing norms over time. This trend is occurring despite a concomitant drop in household size. Meanwhile, in other countries, average square footage per living area is much lower. In some international urban cities, housing size may be limited by the lack of developable land, when compared to a country such as the United States. The joint effect of the two trends on the built environment has been an increasing stress on the natural environment.

Housing Tenure

The difference in housing tenure trends across countries is also notable. Since the mid-1990s, the United States has heavily advocated a homeownership strategy, culminating in a homeownership rate approaching 70 percent by the mid-2000s. Such a high homeownership rate is unusual in many other countries. For example, Germany has a homeownership rate just over 40 percent, suggesting a difference in housing norms across the two countries. However, tenant rights also vary dramatically across nations, which makes it difficult to compare tenure categories. The disparities in homeownership rates across different ethnic and racial groups in the United States is also dramatic, with African American and Hispanic homeownership rates consistently more than 25 percentage points below non-Hispanic White homeownership in recent census surveys.

The age of the housing stock can also differ dramatically across urban cities. In the case of Paris, nearly two thirds of its housing stock was erected before 1949, while about half was

constructed before 1915. The age of New York City's housing stock is slightly lower by comparison. Those American cities incorporating more land mass and sprawling housing developments, such as Los Angeles and Houston, meanwhile, have much younger housing stock. Across the international landscape, the age of the housing stock may not necessarily be negatively associated with quality. Several cities, such as Florence, Italy, boast of centuries-old housing that is among the highest priced within the metropolitan area. In several other cities where older neighborhoods are protected by historic preservation policies, housing is both well preserved and highly valued.

Throughout much of the world, a nascent movement is gaining strength toward implementing adaptive reuse as a redevelopment strategy. Such a strategy seeks to recycle older commercial buildings for residential purposes, allowing such things as old factories and schools (among other building types) to become apartments and condominiums. Housing can also be shaped by cultural differences such as religion. In some Muslim countries, for example, housing is placed in an environment built for promoting Muslim societal behavior. Such architecture blends basic spatial/policy parameters with existing religious tenets and local conditions.

The persistent drive for greater and greater residential size may have peaked in the United States and elsewhere. Average new home sizes have actually begun to fall recently in the United States, driven by economic change and possibly growing concern for green living and limiting one's ecological footprint. The ever-expanding American suburbs have led to an increased realization of the ecological impact of housing choices. Dramatically increased commuting time and fuel consumption accompany these suburban and exurban expansions. Ironically, it is often the desire for green space, in the form of one's own private large yard or garden, that drives suburbanization.

Return to the City

In the United States and elsewhere, the limits of suburbanization and commuting have led to a reemergence of urban residential living as an appropriate and desirable solution. Here, however,

the amenities are of a quite different character than suburban developments. Rather than the focus being on individual yards and perhaps a neighborhood pool, urban residential developments are large multifamily buildings where amenities include retail and cultural opportunities conveniently located within walking distance or available by mass transit. Such urban residential amenities may differ substantially by climate and culture. For example, the shared open courtyards of the Mediterranean may be less functional in the colder climates of Scandinavia.

While various cultural and climactic circumstances can impact the design and function of housing, many characteristics are consistently important for housing satisfaction across regions, nations, and cultures. In studies of residential satisfaction in Japan, Western Europe, and the United States, the presence of noise from traffic or neighbors has a dramatically negative effect on residential satisfaction. Although greater size is typically associated with higher residential satisfaction, the characteristics of the space, especially the inclusion of areas such as multiple bathrooms that allow for zones of privacy, are more important in determining residential satisfaction. However, many of the factors that drive residential satisfaction do not relate to the physical structure of the home itself. For example, a variety of studies have shown that perceived neighborhood safety and security is a driving characteristic of residential satisfaction.

Individual housing choice may be driven by specific characteristics, but almost inevitably, broad location choices are based on available employment. In nations where public school availability is based on housing location, such extra-housing characteristics can also drive housing choice for families with children. As with many issues within urban studies, the goal of residential satisfaction can be achieved only with a combination of successes at the individual, neighborhood, community, city, and regional levels.

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See also Affordable Housing; Housing Policy; Housing Tenure; Social Housing; Suburbanization

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HOUSING POLICY

Housing policy may be defined as government action to achieve housing objectives. These objectives could include the improvement of the quality of the housing stock of dwellings or dealing with homelessness. Another definition of housing policy would be government intervention in the housing field. The difference is that some interventions in the housing field may be directed at objectives outside the field. Examples could be the regulation of housing finance markets to influence activity in the national economy or restrictions on the amount paid in subsidy to low-income households to encourage incentives to

work. Research shows that increasingly more housing policy is directed at economic objectives of efficiency in the national economy with the result that housing policy is increasingly becoming intervention in the housing field to achieve economic objectives.

This entry seeks to examine the objectives and mechanisms that are used by governments in their housing policies; look at categorizations of countries constructed according to their housing policy; consider the forces that shape the similarities and differences in housing policy in individual countries; and examine the scope of individual governments to define their own national policy.

Government Objectives

Governments may have a number of objectives in the housing field. One set may relate to the supply and condition of the housing stock. For example, many countries have policies to ensure that new housing is built to stipulated standards. Also, many countries will intervene to improve the condition of existing housing, such as through slum clearance or upgrading. Policy may also be directed at the quantity or location of new production.

Another set of objectives may relate to the consumption of housing. Intervention may be directed at the legal structures of tenure that determine the rights and obligations of the parties involved. Another area of intervention is access to housing, usually for low-income groups. Thus housing finance and subsidy systems may be designed to enable households with low incomes to access housing that otherwise they could not afford and may be related to policies on income distribution and the alleviation of poverty.

Policies may also be aimed at the functioning of housing markets. Governments set the framework within which markets operate and may intervene to stabilize or change the level of activity.

To achieve these aims governments may use a variety of forms of intervention. One may be the direct provision of housing, as in forms of state housing such as council housing in the United Kingdom. Regulation is another form where the state will influence the actions of other parties by setting standards or frameworks. An example would be building codes or regulations. Another

common form is a system for the regulation of new development through a land use planning system. Subsidies may be used to influence the behavior of either housing developers or consumers. Intervention may take the form of the provision of information or guidance to the relevant parties. An example could be the provision of information on the legal rights of tenants. Government also sets the framework of accountability that can make parties respond to the needs of particular groups. An example may be the institutional structure of public housing, which may be run by local councils with tenants having rights to be consulted.

Categorizing Housing Policy

Individual countries will vary in their mix of housing objectives and forms of interventions. There is a substantial literature on the categorization of these differences and the factors that explain them.

Much work has followed the welfare state regimes approach of Esping-Anderson. He was not specifically concerned with housing but with the identification of three categories or regimes of welfare state as a whole. The first category is the liberal regime in which can be included Britain, Ireland, and the United States. The second category is the conservative regime—and the examples used are Germany and France. His third category is social democratic, and examples are Sweden and Denmark. Housing researchers have used his categorization and have sought to identify the housing models that relate to each type.

For example, in the liberal regime, housing is dominated by market provision, primarily owner occupation but also private rental. Direct government provision is usually small scale and limited to the poorest of the population, which means it is usually stigmatized and unpopular. State help for the poorest is often directed through housing elements of income support programs such as housing allowances or vouchers. The emphasis is on choice through participation in markets. Help for the poorest may also be reflected in support for homeless people, either through the state or voluntary organizations. Further state intervention is in the form of regulation of the market, for example

by setting frameworks for financial institutions or for land use planning.

In contrast, the social democratic regime is characterized by substantial direct state provision of housing aimed not just at the poorest. Housing is viewed as a right for citizens, and state responsibility for homeless people may reflect this. Housing finance mechanisms may be designed not only to help the poorest but to achieve egalitarian aims. State intervention in the housing market may be extensive and designed to change market outcomes to reflect social aims.

The conservative regime is characterized as corporatist in nature with partnerships between government and long-standing social institutions such as churches or professional or trade groups. Provision of housing is often through these institutions and vehicles such as housing associations that serve the interests of their members. The state may protect these institutions from market competition. The access of households to housing may depend on their relationship to these institutions rather than on market participation or state conferred rights.

Other categories of housing regime have been considered. For example, there was been much debate in the 1990s about whether or not there is an Eastern European model. Clapham and others have argued for the existence of an East European model based on state ownership and distribution, centrally planned production; housing was all but free at the point of use, and market mechanisms were excluded. It is argued that this model never really existed in a pure form because of a shortage of resources and the costs and difficulties of achieving state control. Political changes in the late 1990s meant that democratically elected governments pursued policies of privatization and market freedom and most moved quickly to a liberal regime.

Others have argued for a separate category for southern Europe, where there is generally a reliance on extended family structures for the provision of housing through self-build. Housing policy in many of these countries is undeveloped compared to northern European countries. Eastern countries such as Japan or China also have very different housing systems and policies that do not seem to fit the three regimes.

Convergence or Divergence

The second major area of debate and academic research has been on the movement over time of these models and the scope for individual countries to vary their systems. The major schools of thought have been divided into the convergence and divergence approaches.

Convergence Approaches

The convergence approach stresses the similarities in the movement of housing policies over time, usually based on the economic sphere. This is sometimes called the “logic of industrialism” approach and is associated with “end of ideology” theories. There are a number of different examples of this approach. One idea is that welfare states change as the rights of citizenship develop, and one author suggested a move from a focus on civil rights to political rights and then social rights. Donnison adopted this perspective on the development of housing policy identifying embryonic, social, and comprehensive models, which bear more than a passing resemblance to Esping-Anderson’s later classification.

Examples of embryonic states were given as southern European countries such as Portugal or Greece, which have more recently become industrialized states with the concomitant urbanization. In these countries, the states had only just begun to intervene in the housing system, partly because housing is seen as a consumption good and the priority has been given to economic development.

The second category of social states included countries such as United Kingdom and the United States, where the primary aim of government is to come to the aid of people who cannot secure housing for themselves through the market. Interventions are designed to rectify particular problems or deficiencies in the market and do not reflect a government responsibility for the housing of the whole population, which is the defining element of the third category—the comprehensive model. Examples given are Sweden and the former West Germany where governments have taken a long-term view of their involvement in housing. Donnison argued that states moved along the continuum from embryonic to comprehensive as they developed economically. However, the credibility

of this analysis has been hit in recent years by the retrenchment of many welfare states despite increasing affluence.

A very different example of a convergence approach is that used by Ball, Harloe, and Martens. They argued that common economic forces move housing policies in broadly similar directions, although the uneven spread and speed of economic development means that countries start from different places and move at different speeds. They highlighted the common trend across many countries of commodification that involves a reduction and restructuring of state involvement in housing and the growth of market provision. These common trends do not necessarily result in similar housing policies or systems because of what the authors term the *structures of provision* in each country. By this they mean the institutions and cultures that structure the housing field and through which policy is perceived and policy decisions made.

More recently, focus has been on the impact of globalizing economic trends. For example, Clapham has shown how the discourse of globalization has been adopted in the United Kingdom and has led to constraints on the state that impact on the housing sector. For example, the perceived need to support entrepreneurship has resulted in constraints on the ability to fund government action through taxation on high earners. Also the deregulation of financial markets has reduced the ability of governments to intervene in housing markets by making ineffective traditional policy instruments such as credit controls. At the same time, the perceived need to increase the flexibility of labor markets to increase economic efficiency has changed the focus of housing policies. Geographic mobility is seen as being important in enabling people to follow employment opportunities, and so flexibility in housing with new-house production in growing areas and low mobility and transactions costs are given prominence in policy. Another key policy area is the need to design policy to avoid or minimize income disincentives and poverty and employment traps to reinforce incentives to work. Acceptance of the discourses of globalization and flexible labor markets seems to be associated with neoliberal housing policies that emphasize market processes and outcomes.

Divergence Approaches

The second major approach is the divergence approach. This sees countries as differing substantially in their housing systems despite similar levels of economic development and does not see them as necessarily converging. It is argued that political ideologies and cultural norms differ and profoundly influence the shape of housing structures. Kemeny and Lowe use the work of Esping-Anderson on different kinds of state welfare to point to the influence of political ideology in shaping state policy. In his own work, Kemeny examines the nature of cultures of homeownership in different societies, arguing that these are related to different political philosophies of individualism or collectivism. In homeowner societies, Kemeny argues, government housing policy is related to socially constructed ideologies and cultural myths that vary between different societies. These are used to justify special support for owner occupation and measures to prevent cost-renting from becoming too large and a competitive tenure.

Common measures are the stigmatization of tenants of cost-rental landlords or the forced sales of housing stock. In cost-rental societies, the state-subsidized sector dominates private rental provision, and government may intervene to create a unitary system in which the rights and obligations of tenants are similar and state institutions regulate access and conditions in the private sector. In these societies, cost-renting can compete with owner occupation for middle-class households and so will not be stigmatized.

The distinction between convergence and divergence approaches is increasingly questioned because it does not uncover the underlying bases of the different approaches but concentrates on and overemphasizes one of the outcomes of their application. In other words, the key issue is not whether different countries are converging or diverging. Rather, it is which factors are the key influences on policy. The approach of Ball and Harloe is loosely based on what may be termed a realist position, whereas Kemeny's approach is built on social constructionism. Clearly, this leads to different emphases and conclusions on the factors to be taken into account in examining housing policy. However, the two approaches have more in common than is immediately apparent. Convergence approaches reduce to a residual important factors that explain the evident

differences between countries. Furthermore, convergence approaches do not develop a theoretical position that can explain divergence or any differences in the direction or speed of social change. For example, Ball and Harloe identify structures of provision in each country, which they argue are at the core of differences between countries. However, this is seen as a sensitizing concept to alert researchers to recognize differences. The concept lacks a theoretical underpinning that would allow an analysis of why differences exist and why they may change over time.

The areas of agreement of the different approaches are great. Some common trends are driven by the globalizing forces of advanced capitalism. Globalization may be seen as a socially constructed discourse accepted and promulgated by governments and economic agents or as a real economic force. But, this difference of view does not necessarily hinder agreement on the impact of globalization on housing policy in different countries. General trends can be identified, such as marketization, liberalization, and the restructuring of state intervention from direct provision and subsidy toward forms of regulation. In addition, there has been a move by governments away from social objectives in housing policy and toward economic objectives.

However, there is not a clear and direct relationship between this level of change and institutional housing structures and state housing policy in particular countries. Some of the differences may be due to the position of different countries in the globalized economic world. Also, governments may differ in their acceptance of the globalization discourse or their openness to global economic forces. The scope for political choice in responding to globalizing trends is an important matter of debate. The degree of freedom of maneuver may be influenced by many factors including existing institutional structures and political discourses and ideologies.

The need for an effective housing policy is felt by governments in many different contexts. The problem may be the failure of housing markets in the declining parts of older cities in Western countries or the counterpart of the rapidly expanding need for new housing construction in economically thriving areas. In rapidly developing and urbanizing countries such as India or China, there is a need to ensure that housing standards are high and

that cities expand in efficient and sustainable ways. An effective housing policy is a major instrument of urban policy, and the successes and failures of housing policies can explain the developing features of cities across the world.

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See also Affordable Housing; Homeownership; Housing; Housing Tenure; Social Housing

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HOUSING TENURE

Housing tenure refers to the possession of residential real estate. The term tenure stems from the Latin *tenere*, meaning "to hold." *Homeowner* and *renter* distinguish individuals with permanent or temporary possession of property. About 70 percent of Americans own their home, and 30 percent rent. Homeownership is the cornerstone of American conceptions of prosperity. High numbers of homeowners are equated with economic and social well-being. Increased numbers of renters are viewed as a sign of diminishing prosperity.

Basic Characteristics

Between 1940 and 1960, the United States changed from a country of renters in cities to one of suburban homeowners. During the Great Depression, a decline in homeownership led to government loan programs and changes in the housing finance system. As a result, and during a time of improved economic conditions, homeownership increased from 44 percent to 62 percent. Homeownership increased by 2.5 percent in the following two decades. In years prior to 2007, low interest rates, an increased number of mortgage products, and government support translated into a rate closer to 70 percent.

Housing tenure of a single residential property can be complex. Six primary property rights can be owned or rented by different parties. They include the right to exclude others, to profit from the sale of a property, to improve or demolish structures, to develop the land beneath structures, and to access air and light. Some forms of tenure combine elements of renting and owning. Examples include cooperatively owned housing, where multiple residents retain equity in the property, and the leasing of land by mobile homeowners.

The choice to rent or own is subject to constraints differentially distributed along class and often racial lines. Constraints include: household financial resources and prospects, relative costs between purchasing and renting, discrimination in housing and mortgage markets, and employment opportunities.

Tenure Sectors

Housing can be held through legal arrangements that are classified within three tenure sectors, delineating who owns and resides in the house and how it is priced and allocated. Policymakers are often asked to endorse or oppose housing policies according to tenure sector. Private-sector housing is privately owned, priced, and allocated by the free market. Single- and multifamily properties retain exchange value (their value in the housing market) above use value (their value to the homeowner). There are owner-occupied and rental properties. About 90 percent of U.S. housing is privately held, and public policy favors this sector.

Public-sector housing is owned by the state or a quasi-public corporation. Units are priced and allocated by nonmarket methods. Price controls

are established by public policy and through means testing to meet low-income demand. Third-sector housing is privately owned but priced and allocated by nonmarket methods. Price controls limit rental and sales assessments and are based on predetermined contractual limits. Units are produced for use value rather than exchange value. Among industrialized countries, the third sector is comparatively small in the United States.

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See also Affordable Housing; Fair Housing; Housing; Social Housing

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HUMAN ECOLOGY

Human ecology is a theory of human population adaptation to the environment in time, space, and social structure. Initially associated with theories of the spatial and social organization of cities, contemporary human ecology is considered a general theory of social organization that encompasses earlier urban ecological approaches. The history of human ecology is divided between the traditional period, often associated with the Chicago School, and the contemporary period, associated with sociocultural human ecology and neo-orthodox human ecology.

All approaches share common characteristics: a concern with macrosocial structure, the centrality of community as a theoretical object of study, and a holistic conception of macrosocial community structure. This holistic approach is often summarized as an interaction among four major analytic components: population, organization, environment, and technology, termed the *ecological complex*. In its various forms, human ecology is a definitive theoretical approach that has substantial impact on sociology and geography.

Traditional Approaches

Associated with Robert Ezra Park, Ernest W. Burgess, and Roderick D. McKenzie as a perspective overlapping but not encompassed by sociology, the main focus of traditional ecology was on the city as an object of study. These Chicago School ecologists drew on an eclectic milieu of social theory (Durkheim, Simmel, Comte, Spencer, Tönnies), on Charles Darwin's notions of competitions and the "web of life," and on the writings of plant biologists who were developing a biologic economics of plant and animal communities. Blending these conceptions created a materialist approach that viewed the city as an interdependent system that could be analyzed by spatial structure and function.

Traditional ecology argues that the social organization of human populations, like plant and animal populations, is distributed in time and space. The human community is organization divided into the biotic (natural) and societal (cultural) levels. Traditional human ecology takes as its object of study the biotic processes: competition, succession, and dominance. The city is conceived as a territory delimited by the scope of economic and residential competition among individuals. As with biotic communities, this competition gives rise to spatial differentiation. Different activities take place in specific areas within the city. Cultural elements of social organization are assumed to be constrained by these ecological forces. Yet all are linked as a single ecological system functioning as an interdependent unit.

This conception generated three complementary lines of research for Park and his colleagues. The first focused on socioeconomic regularities in the distributions of people and activities. These natural areas are exemplified by Burgess's 1925 model of concentric zones. The second line of research evaluated effects of these areas on populations. This work focused on aspects of social disorganization such as crime rates and mental illness. Finally, the assumption that these natural areas shaped the cultural conditions for individuals gave rise to a rich tradition of urban ethnography. Works by Harvey Zorbaugh (*The Gold Coast and the Slum*, 1929) and Louis Wirth (*The Ghetto*, 1928) exemplify this approach, using natural ecological areas to delimit close analysis of individual behaviors and attitudes.

Despite commonalities in these three areas, the integration of cultural and material (biotic) conditions proved contentious in theoretical development. The main thrust of theory was toward the externally imposed constraints of space and environment while incorporation of culture introduced volition and an internal source of change. Cutting across these issues was an increasing awareness among critics that community was treated as both an analytic construct and as an empirical unit of analysis (the city). This was most problematic to the early ecologists' inductive methodology, where the conceptual division between biotic and cultural elements could not be distinctly operationalized and was often tautological.

These intrinsic problems gave rise to a number of substantive and theoretical criticisms leveled at traditional ecology. Furthermore, during the 1930s and 1940s, empirical findings of ecologists on spatial configurations of social organization studied by the Chicago School were contradicted by other studies. Critics argued that because ecologists denied the presence of culture and symbols, essentially they were presenting an economic/technologically determinist view of communities. Most important for scholars working within the ecological tradition was the criticism that the analysis of spatial units did not fit the theoretical tenets of ecology.

Responding to Critiques

In response to these criticisms, human ecologists reconceived human ecology along two distinct lines. Sociocultural ecologists retained traditional ecology's inductive foundations but rejected attempts to theorize the underlying forces determining the mode of human organization. This approach, first presented by Walter Firey in "Sentiment and Symbolism as Ecological Variables" in 1945, incorporated inductive study to explicate the role of culture and attitudes in creating sociospatial organization.

Neo-orthodox human ecology rejected both an individualist and cultural approach. This approach sought to develop the concept of the ecological community as an abstraction, then verify theoretical propositions deductively through empirical analysis. Amos H. Hawley's *Human Ecology: A Theory of Community Structure* (1950) stands as the foundation of the neo-orthodox approach.

Hawley's reconception of human ecology moved it into mainstream sociology by orienting

the discipline away from the study of spatial regularities to the study of collective action of a population in adaptation. Hawley's conception of human ecology differed from the traditional in a number of ways: the assumption that general and human ecology address the same central problem, the recognition that ecological relationships reflect a combination and interaction of competition and interdependence, the view that the adaptation of human population is a collective rather than individual accomplishment, and the identification of sustenance activities as the principal component of social organization.

Furthermore, Hawley's 1950 work directly addresses both the cultural and methodological criticisms of the 1940s. Hawley explicitly defines an ecological community as the smallest unit in which a full range of ecological interactions takes place, building further theoretical postulates on this concept. The question of whether the city is coterminous with an ecological community is left as an empirical question. By making explicit that the smallest effective unit in the ecosystem is an organization, Hawley excises theoretical problems associated with the volitional and ideological elements in ecology.

The Neo-Orthodox Movement

This holistic, macrosocial, and material reconception of human ecology reinfused human ecological theory and launched the neo-orthodox movement in the field. Furthermore, Hawley's 1950 reformulation places the organization of society as the main point of focus for human ecology, moving it from a limited theory of city patterns and development to a general theory of social organization. Hawley has clearly and completely enunciated the major principles of ecological organization elsewhere. A brief summary of principles is given below.

Hawley argues that human ecology may be stated as three propositions on population level: (1) adaptation proceeds through the formation of interdependencies; (2) system development continues to the maximum size and complexity afforded by social organization. Once the limits of technology and organization are reached, system growth stops, that is, it reaches equilibrium, and (3) system development is resumed when new information

increases organizational and technological capacity. This ecosystem can be abstracted into four broad components: population, organization, environment, and technology.

These four components are conceptually, not necessarily analytically, separate. Population refers to any collectivity of units that has a clear boundary and that interacts. As a common denominator of ecological analysis, the population exhibits a number of properties not shared by individual members. Organization is synonymous with social system structure. It refers to the entire network of interdependencies that a population uses to sustain and maximize survival. Environment is defined by the potential resources for any social system. In this, it is both the physical environment and other social systems external to the population in study. Technology refers to the set of artifacts, tools, and techniques employed by a population to organize sustenance. Together, these four components comprise an ecological community: any bounded area where the full range of ecological interactions takes place. Given that social systems arrange themselves to maximize external environmental conditions, there is an explicit causal arrangement among these four analytic components. The environment is the primary causal mechanism of system change.

From these basic premises, contemporary human ecology has generated a variety of supporting concepts regarding community adaptation to environment, explored through deductive empirical analysis from the 1950s through the 1980s. Ecological research explored and evaluated the role key functions play in ecological structure, showing that they exert disproportionate control of community power. Implications for basic types of interdependence—symbiotic (based on specialization) and commensalistic (based on aggregation)—were evaluated at societal, community, and organizational levels. The formation of fundamental types of units is typified by these types of association; corporate (symbiotic) and categoric (commensalistic) have been evaluated, and the implications of alternative sustenance structures were studied. Prominent in these theoretically driven empirical studies were the works of John D. Kasarda, Dudley Poston, Miller McPherson, and Parker Frisbie.

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See also Chicago School of Urban Sociology; Factorial Ecology; Hawley, Amos; Urban Sociology; Urban Theory

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I

IDEAL CITY

Sharp straight lines create linear perspective dominated by a rotunda in the painting *Ideal City* (c. 1470), attributed to Italian Renaissance painter Piero della Francesca. Symmetrical blocks of buildings border the frame of the painting. Patterned pavement in the foreground augments the perspective. Rare vines are seen on several facades. No person is seen.

Francesca's *Ideal City* was praised for its perfect linearity and orderliness and shunned for its perfect sterility and emptiness. The apparent contradiction between Francesca's idealized orderly vision and the common image of the city as a bustling, lively, messy entity reveals the crucial problem embedded in the notion of ideal city: What is ideal according to a set of standards and logical statements may turn out to be not at all acceptable in terms of real life.

"Ideal city" is a trope found throughout the history of human habitation. As a systematic description of the vision of how the city, its form, and content should be, it originates in classical Greek thought. This vision may also be revealed as underlying city building practice before and after that. Its varieties include ideal cities in the Western utopian tradition, visions of ideal city in planning practice, and anti-utopian and dystopian antipodes of ideal city. All these visions have important consequences as they are actualized in human practice.

The Phenomenon of Ideal City

An ideal city is a religious or secular vision of the city in which the portrayed urban environment reflect a complex of conceptions about what is deemed good, desires for something better, and imaginations about what should be. Behind this vision is the intention to best satisfy the needs of the population while subjecting it to an idealized order. This is a normative ideal of the city. It is a product of the desire to represent and actualize those features and properties of cities and societies that are perceived to be absent in real life.

A range of traits may be found, to varying degrees, in most visions of ideal cities. Ideal city reflects the values of harmony and order. It encompasses the eternal desire of humankind to succeed in creating a balanced social fabric where the anthropogenic environment serves the needs of the people and overcomes the age-old ills of urban living—density, congestion, dirt, crime, poverty, inequality. Ideal city offers its residents comfort, justice, happiness, cleanliness, beauty, health, and well-being. Ideal city is a fundamental entity: planned and developed by an intentional subject such as a visionary architect. It implies a totalizing vision whereby every facet of ideal order is included and accounted for in the design.

The residents are assumed to voluntarily comply with the rules and conditions imposed on them by the designer and by the environment. The power of nature in the ideal city is implicitly considered destructive and is effectively eliminated by

imposing the same seamless orderly pattern on urban nature. Grass, trees, and animals often find their way into ideal conceptions only in the form of parks and gardens.

The core assumption behind the ideal city is spatial determinism: the belief that the people's happiness may be achieved by putting them into the correct environment, which will guide their behavior and channel it in acceptable directions, thus ensuring smoothness and seamlessness (and even rigidity) of imposed urban social organization.

Although there is a narrow class of representations that are explicitly labeled ideal city, such as Francesca's painting and a number of similar artworks, to an extent city plans, design conceptions, and urban utopias, as well as imaginations and projects of architects, planners, rulers, and administrators, are all ideal cities. Ideal city differs between cultures and times. It need not necessarily be explicitly described in artistic form or planning conceptions: As Lewis Mumford once suggested, ideal city is implicit and may be inductively grasped by examining the actual practice of planning and building cities. Ideal city may have different degrees of relation to the actual human practice. The ideal city of utopia has, perhaps, the farthest relation.

The Ideal City of the Western Utopian Tradition

The origins of the Western utopian tradition, as Krishan Kumar has shown, are found in the classical Greek thought and in Judeo-Christian religious thinking. Utopian thinking throughout its history has produced ideal cities as forms of utopias. The very conception of utopia as city may be traced to the Hellenic utopias of Plato, who in his *The Republic* and particularly in *Laws* has portrayed his utopia as an urban form. Aristotle's *Politics* continued this focus. Among the best-known Western urban utopian visions are those found in literature after *Utopia* of Thomas More and *The City of the Sun* of Tommaso Campanella. All these ideal cities share the properties of orderliness, cleanliness, and rationality as well as clear-cut governmentality.

However, utopian thought does not necessarily take the form of ideal city. Rather, description of an ideal city gives utopian visions a very tangible and demonstrable form that conveys the properties

of utopia. Ideal city is a powerful spatial imagination of utopian thought. In his explorations of ideal urban geometries, Spiro Kostof stresses the connection between the "diagram" of the ideal city and, on the one hand, the idea of power and government embodied in the ruler who uses the urban diagram to organize and govern the population, and on the other hand, the aura of divinity and sanctity of political order. Utopian ideal cities typically share this kind of clear-cut power, which may be sanctified by the belief in rationality and possibility of rational social organization as well as by religious beliefs. Yet utopian ideal cities are but imaginations conveyed through artistic media. Ideal cities in urban planning are species having more direct impact on human practice.

Ideal Visions in Architecture and Urban Planning

Although modern theoretical urban planning was invented in the second half of the nineteenth century, urban planning as practice may be said to have existed since the earliest human settlements. Designs and plans of architecture and urban planning bear many features of ideal cities. They are created on purpose with the idea of managing human settlement and ordering the urban process. They often aim at alleviating what their creators perceive as the ailments of existing settlements. Yet the crucial distinction from utopian visions is that urban planning is a practice that entails human agency in actually changing the material environment. The Renaissance tradition of architecture (Filarete, Leon Battista Alberti) and architectural painting (Piero Della Francesca school) clearly reveals the close connection of architecture and planning and ideal visions of the city.

Kevin Lynch, discussing sets of ideas about proper city form that he calls "normative theories of good city form," has outlined three such conceptions: the cosmic city, understood as a reflection of the universe and divine order (seen in ancient temple cities); the machine city, seen as a rational design for fulfillment of certain social goals (evident in modernist planning); and the organism model, invoking the analogy of living body (present in planning influenced by ecology). Essentially, these are varieties of understandings of ideal cities actually found in the history of city planning and building.

Very often, ideal cities of architecture and planning leave the minds and drawings of their creators and enter the actual process of constructing and altering urban environment. One of the model examples of an ideal city plan actually built in Renaissance Europe is Palmanova (commenced in 1593), a military outpost town in the Friuli region of northeastern Italy. Palmanova was constructed in the form of a nine-pointed star and employed state-of-the-art military defense design. St. Petersburg in Russia is an example of a city that was built from scratch according to a preconceived plan in 1703. The Russian Tsar Peter I the Great wanted the new city to correspond to his vision of European cities of the time and devised the original city plan accordingly. Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann's reconstruction of Paris in the 1850s is a well-known occasion of reconstructing an existing city according to an idealized vision. Brasilia, the new capital of Brazil, is one of the most striking moments in the history of twentieth-century urban planning. Designed by Lucio Costa (the principal planner) and Oscar Niemeyer (the principal architect), its airplane-shaped city plan first brought to life in 1956 embodied the modernist planning principles of Le Corbusier.

On a lesser scale, many urban designs and planning projects—such as community development programs, planned communities, urban revitalization projects, historic city center reconstructions—all imply an idealized vision of the city or its part, whether conceived as reinstating a past that has once been or realizing a conception of how things should be. Even the shopping mall evokes the ideal-city design principles implemented at the scale of consumer facility.

Anti-Utopian and Dystopian Visions

The last species of ideal city to be discussed here is the anti-utopian portrayal of anti-ideal cities. Anti-utopia is a genre dedicated to depicting imagined societies where utopian ideals lead to terror, abandonment of humanity, violence, totalitarian repression, and excessive control. The genre of dystopia is sometimes distinguished from anti-utopia. In dystopia, catastrophe, war, disaster, or just the continuing “business as usual” of a flawed society result in desolation, poverty, and terror.

Anti-utopian and dystopian literature, such as Yevgeny Zamyatin's *We* (1921) or Aldous Huxley's

Brave New World (1932), often portrays cities and urban living. But these are the imaginations of what the principles of utopia and ideal city may lead to if actually implemented. Even dystopian cities of devastation may be considered instances where “ideal city” is portrayed as a warning or foreboding. This kind of vision has grown particularly vivid with manifold cinematic anti-utopias, such as Fritz Lang's *Metropolis* (1927), Jean-Luc Godard's *Alphaville* (1965), and Terry Gilliam's *Brazil* (1985) and dystopias, such as Ridley Scott's *Blade Runner* (1982) and *The Matrix* (1999–2003) series.

Ideal Cities and Real Cities

The phenomenon of ideal city reflects the grounding of human practice in conceptions, ideas, and designs. However, it is a double-edged sword: Ideal cities of the utopian tradition serve as hallmarks of imagination and hopes for progress and yet may also signify the possible unintended consequences of striving for the good. Even the classical utopian cities of Plato and More may be viewed as negative examples of unjust and freedom-less worlds.

Although they are often designed with the best intentions, ideal cities realized in planning practice may lead to unfavorable outcomes, as is seen in many failures of modernist architecture and planning. Brasilia is arguably a case of such failure to provide true comfort and satisfaction to its inhabitants. The Pruitt-Igoe housing project in St. Louis, Missouri, stands as a model of failure of design, which also was guided by the vision of “good city” form. Furthermore, what has been seen as good at the outset may later come to be seen as an opposite. Early communist urban design and planning was done in accordance with the conception of ideal living in a new society and yet came to be seen as unfit for habitation. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union solved its housing crisis with massive construction of cheap prefab concrete five-story buildings. Seen as a miracle and a long-awaited rescue at their time, “Khrushchevkas” (after the USSR First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev) now stand for all the misery of Soviet architecture and construction, as they still form the decaying backbone of housing stock in much of the contemporary former Soviet Union.

Nevertheless, ideal city is the principal challenge for planning, design, and management of urban landscape. It embodies the fundamental questions of how to create better cities and to alleviate the ills of existing ones. It also embodies the fundamental problem that the ideal city for some people may not at all be the ideal city for other people, and furthermore, what is believed ideal now may be a disaster tomorrow. Another challenge of ideal cities is that many traits of actual cities throughout the history of civilization—diversity, multitude, crowds, pollution, dense habitation, opportunities for different groups of people to mingle and conflict—are part of what the very notion of city entails, and therefore, ideal cities may in fact be something different from cities altogether.

Finally, the ideal city is also a legitimate object for research. The important fields of interest include history of idealized artistic depictions of the urban and ideal cities in the history of architecture; the way conceptions of an ideal city guide the actual practice of planning and design; and the way the outcomes of attempts to realize the ideal city are coming to be successful or unsuccessful.

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See also Architecture; Brasilia, Brazil; Lynch, Kevin; Medieval Town Design; Mumford, Lewis; Renaissance City; Urban Planning; Utopia

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INFORMATIONAL CITY

Many cities worldwide face the prospect of major transformation as the world moves toward a global information order. In this new era, urban economies are being radically altered by dynamic processes of economic and spatial restructuring. The result is the creation of informational cities, or their new and more popular name, knowledge cities.

For the last two centuries, social production had been primarily understood and shaped by neo-classical economic thought, which recognized only three factors of production: land, labor, and capital. Knowledge, education, and intellectual capacity were secondary, if not incidental, factors. Human capital was assumed to be either embedded in labor or just one of numerous categories of capital. In the last decades, it has become apparent that knowledge is sufficiently important to deserve recognition as a fourth factor of production. Knowledge and information and the social and technological settings for their production and communication are now seen as keys to development and economic prosperity.

The rise of knowledge-based opportunity has, in many cases, been accompanied by a concomitant decline in traditional industrial activity. The replacement of physical commodity production by more abstract forms of production (e.g., information, ideas, and knowledge) has, however paradoxically, reinforced the importance of central places and led to the formation of knowledge cities.

Knowledge is produced, marketed, and exchanged mainly in cities. Therefore, knowledge cities aim to assist decision makers in making their cities compatible with the knowledge economy and thus able to compete with other cities. Knowledge cities enable their citizens to foster knowledge creation, knowledge exchange, and innovation. They also encourage the continuous creation, sharing, evaluation, renewal, and update of knowledge.

To compete nationally and internationally, cities need knowledge infrastructures (e.g., universities, research and development institutes); a concentration of well-educated people; technological, mainly electronic, infrastructure; and connections to the global economy (e.g., international companies and

finance institutions for trade and investment). Moreover, they must possess the people and things necessary for the production of knowledge and, as important, function as breeding grounds for talent and innovation.

The economy of a knowledge city creates high value-added products using research, technology, and brainpower. Private and public sectors value knowledge, spend money on its discovery and dissemination, and, ultimately, harness it to create goods and services. Although many cities call themselves knowledge cities, currently, only a few cities around the world (e.g., Barcelona, Delft, Dublin, Montreal, Munich, and Stockholm) have earned that label. Many other cities aspire to the status of knowledge city through urban development programs that target knowledge-based urban development. Examples include Copenhagen, Dubai, Manchester, Melbourne, Monterrey, Singapore, and Shanghai.

Knowledge-Based Urban Development

To date, the development of most knowledge cities has proceeded organically as a dependent and derivative effect of global market forces. Urban and regional planning has responded slowly, and sometimes not at all, to the challenges and the opportunities of the knowledge city. That is changing, however. Knowledge-based urban development potentially brings both economic prosperity and a sustainable sociospatial order. Its goal is to produce and circulate abstract work.

The globalization of the world in the last decades of the twentieth century was a dialectical process. On one hand, as the tyranny of distance was eroded, economic networks of production and consumption were constituted at a global scale. At the same time, spatial proximity remained as important as ever, if not more so, for knowledge-based urban development. Mediated by information and communication technology, personal contact, and the medium of tacit knowledge, organizational and institutional interactions are still closely associated with spatial proximity. The clustering of knowledge production is essential for fostering innovation and wealth creation.

The social benefits of knowledge-based urban development extend beyond aggregate economic growth. On the one hand is the possibility of a

particularly resilient form of urban development secured in a network of connections anchored at local, national, and global coordinates. On the other hand, quality of place and life, defined by the level of public service (e.g., health and education) and by the conservation and development of cultural, aesthetic, and ecological values, gives cities their character and attracts or repels the creative class of knowledge workers; this is a prerequisite for successful knowledge-based urban development. The goal is a secure economy in a human setting: in short, smart growth or sustainable urban development.

Creative Class of Knowledge Workers

One of the greatest challenges of the knowledge city is its social and environmental setting. In the production of places of knowledge, image is as important as reality. The presence of knowledge professionals and creative talent attracts innovative, knowledge- and technology-based industries. When a place is home to a creative class of knowledge workers, social interactions drive value creation and further concentrate creative knowledge workers (e.g., computer and mathematical occupations; architecture and engineering; life, physical, and social science occupations; education, training, and library occupations; and arts, design, entertainment, sports, and media occupations).

A key determinant in attracting and retaining these people is the quality of life of a place. Knowledge workers do not select their residence simply to maximize their salary. They are also concerned with consumption opportunities. Typically, knowledge workers value a whole series of place-based characteristics, not the least being cultural activities and amenities. Consequently, quality of place and life is a factor of growing importance for knowledge-based cities. Besides that, the city's heritage—the meanings attached to the past and present from the foundations of social, political, and cultural knowledge—can attract additional talented workers.

One of the goals of knowledge-based urban development is a virtuous circle of attraction that retains skilled and creative people, who, in turn, attract smart industries and businesses that need their labor and investors looking to invest in high-value production. With a strong sense of

community and a pool of skilled and talented people, a knowledge city will enjoy robust growth at way above average rates.

Technology Parks as Essential Knowledge Clusters

The ongoing transformation of advanced economies from manufacturing to services and knowledge-based activities has important implications for the formation of knowledge cities. Firms increasingly use technology as their prime source of competitive advantage, and the economic wealth of nations is increasingly tied to their technological competence.

The increasing interconnectedness of the world economy as part of the ongoing process of globalization depends on technologies such as information and communication technology. These are the keys to corporate success and national growth. Such technologies impose an almost irresistible drive to be part of international growth. Similarly, since the end of the 1980s, the development of the knowledge-based economy, globalization, and international competitive pressure has increased the importance of innovation. Simultaneously, globalization increases local differences arising from local capabilities and environments.

New developments in globalization and communications technology have prompted countries and cities to focus their competitive strategies on improving innovation. This shift has increased the value of knowledge-based activity. Knowledge-based production, however, generally clusters in areas with a rich base of scientific knowledge tied to specific industries. This spatial imperative has polarized high-growth activity in a limited number of areas of the world.

Proximity generates and transfers knowledge. Thus, new knowledge-based activities cluster in specific geographic localities. Proximity is essential to stimulate company learning, create compatible knowledge spillover effects, and establish positive feedback among various local agents. Such clusters are built around advanced technological infrastructure and mature networks of innovation.

Knowledge clusters are not all equal but have differing dynamics. Among the forms already identified are the knowledge (or technology) park, the knowledge village, the knowledge corridor, the

knowledge hub, the knowledge district, and, beyond the knowledge city, the knowledge region. Tacit knowledge embedded in a city is also critical. The most successful cities are those able to combine the structural or spillover effects of a rich local knowledge base with international best practice.

For example, the successful development of Silicon Valley in the United States was based on a knowledge network that encompassed both regional learning institutions (i.e., the universities of northern California) and for-profit industry research teams. Innovations produced in the knowledge network were adopted and developed economically by proximate industries operating in an environment of flexible development. Silicon Valley has inspired knowledge-based urban development around the world. Since the 1970s, the establishment of technology parks and precincts in both developed and developing countries has become widespread.

Technology park, knowledge park, research park, business park, industrial park, and innovation park are descriptors that have been used interchangeably to refer to knowledge clusters—the high-growth technology industry. The term technology park distinguishes the functional activity in an area and refers to an area where agglomeration of knowledge and technological activities has positive externalities for individual firms located there.

Technology parks are generally established with two primary objectives in mind. The first objective is to be a seed bed and an enclave for knowledge and technology and to play an incubator role nurturing the development and growth of new small high-technology firms, facilitating the transfer of university know-how to tenant companies, encouraging faculty-based spin-offs, and stimulating innovative products and processes. The second objective is to act as a catalyst for regional economic development, which promotes economic growth and contributes to the development of a knowledge city.

While there are many different models of technology parks, a technology park generally provides both support and an environment of technology transfer that nurtures the start-up, incubation, and development of innovation-led, high-growth, knowledge-based businesses. Although technology parks strive to focus research and development

(R&D) and innovation in their area, the types of R&D and the sectors they focus can vary widely. Overall, by attracting new firms, technology parks can create substantial agglomerative effects for the regional economy.

Despite their differences, contemporary technology-park initiatives have the following aspects in common. They have knowledge and technology-based enterprises (e.g., Nokia in Helsinki Digital Village), knowledge workers, and R&D and educational institutions; provide living facilities that promote creativity, cater to emerging lifestyle choices, and celebrate the experience of place; and are guided and managed by partnerships between governments, real estate developers, educational or research institutions, and information and new media companies.

Strategies for Building Successful Knowledge Cities

Attempts to transform cities into knowledge cities will likely fail if they are not guided by sound strategic visions. These strategic visions should incorporate policies for attracting and retaining knowledge workers and industries and also for empowering citizens as knowledge creators and innovators. The top-tier knowledge cities specialize in a few sectors only and set ambitious goals for each; they develop their knowledge-based policies carefully.

The common strategies include political and societal will; strategic vision and development plans; financial support and strong investments; agencies to promote knowledge-based urban development; an international, multicultural character of the city; metropolitan Web portals; value creation for citizens; creation of urban innovative engines; assurance of knowledge society rights; low-cost access to advanced communication networks; research excellence; and robust public library networks.

Implementation of the above-mentioned strategies and policies requires a broad intellectual team with expertise in urban development, urban studies and planning, socioeconomic development, models of intellectual capital, and knowledge management. It also requires understanding of the diverse spatial forms of the knowledge city, where a large number of knowledge clusters are particularly

important in promoting the spillover effects vital for long-term economic prosperity.

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See also Castells, Manuel; Creative Class; Cyberbia; Technopoles; Urban Planning

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INTELLECTUALS

There has been much heated debate among journalists, academics, and others recently on the question of who is an intellectual and whether there has been a decline in intellectual life. The trend now is toward a less prescriptive definition than the one previously accepted. The label *intellectual* now tends to be applied to individuals who employ their mind to learn, understand, think abstractly, or apply knowledge rather than allowing their emotions to dominate behavior, although modern psychology recognizes a more complex interrelationship between emotions and intellect, for instance, with respect to creativity. Those labeled as intellectuals are not necessarily associated with any particular field of endeavor, but they usually make some effort to communicate ideas to an audience either verbally, in writing, or artistically. Although there is no hard and fast division between intellectual and artistic life, intellectuals have usually been regarded as a separate group from artists.

The concept of intellectuals, therefore, usually includes philosophers and writers inspired by the archetypal model of the classical philosopher exemplified by the life and especially the death of Socrates. The inclusion of scientists, academics, and professionals is regarded as more problematic. It is important to note that although the term intellectual is used for convenience here, it was not employed as a noun until the late nineteenth century, by which time the concept of intellectuals as omnivorous polymaths was being seriously challenged by the specialization, institutionalization, and commensurate fragmentation of scholarly endeavor.

In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, designations such as man of letters, *philosophe*, philosopher, savant, and scholar were used to denote some of the characteristics we now associate with the noun *intellectual*. Intellectuals are sometimes combined together as a social class or grouping known as intelligentsia and held to comprise professionals such as teachers, artists, and academics, especially in France, Russia, and Central and Eastern Europe, where they have played a public role as political commentators. However, the concept of intelligentsia and the label intellectual are regarded much less favorably in Britain, the United States, and the English-speaking world, especially by right-wing commentators.

In the present context, we are primarily interested in public intellectuals as a social group rather than lone private figures as, in this form, intellectuals have had the greatest impact on urban society and urban studies. At least since the Enlightenment, intellectuals and intellectual communities have become primarily regarded as an urban-centered phenomenon, although this has not precluded, of course, residence in—nor inspiration from—the countryside. In fact it is ironic that many intellectuals, including William Wordsworth, Mathew Arnold, and John Ruskin, while making considerable use of urban networks, audiences, and experiences, made strong criticisms of modern urban society. In the rich and dense cultural interstices of urban-centered living, intellectuals have had a major impact in the modern world.

Some modern commentators have argued variously that there has been a decline in the quality of intellectual life, the number of intellectuals, or the opportunities for intellectuals to thrive in modern

institutions such as universities. Developments in information technology have, to some extent, severed the link between intellectuals and urbanity, and it is now possible for remote or roving thinkers to remain part of a virtual global intellectual community with the aid of the World Wide Web. It has been argued that government institutions and other bodies can intervene to nurture the development of intellectual or creative communities in urban areas to further economic regeneration. This has encouraged renewed analysis of the cultural geography and urban contexts in which intellectual communities have thrived in the past. This entry begins with a look at history, then examines current issues.

The Enlightenment Intellectual

Although a period of striking modernity, the Enlightenment was steeped in reverence for antiquity, and the principal model for the intellectual in society was the classical philosopher. The Enlightenment has traditionally been associated with French philosophes and autocratic rulers, but recent work has tended to emphasize the differences between Enlightenment cultures. Although some intellectuals such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau remained suspicious of urban living, the city was idealized in the Enlightenment as a polite, refined, cultural, and intellectual center that embodied rationality in its ordered neoclassical buildings, squares, circuses, public walks, and piazzas, where a lively public intellectual culture thrived.

Enlightenment citizens were idealized for their urbanity, civic humanism, and rationality, whereas the intellectual was idealized as a trenchant, independent-minded, public—usually male—philosopher such as Francois Voltaire, Rousseau, David Hume, Benjamin Franklin, Erasmus Darwin, and Johann Wolfgang von Goethe. Enlightenment ideas were generated and experienced in a variety of public and semipublic places including coffeehouses, public houses, salons, Masonic lodges, theaters, clubs, and knowledge-based societies as part of a broad urban civility that offered opportunities for women as well as men.

In England, for example, the Royal Society tended to be superseded by metropolitan coffee-house clubs and provincial intellectual associations such as the Lunar Society of Birmingham,

Manchester Literary and Philosophical Society, and the Derby Philosophical Society. In France, the academies that came to dominate provincial organized intellectual life such as those at Bourdeaux, Lyon, and Toulouse, were closer to states and monarchies than their British counterparts. Likewise in the German states, the Berlin Academy fostered by Frederick II (the Great) was intended to rival Italian, French, and British institutions and nurtured the international scientific careers of philosophers such as Leonard Euler and Pierre Louis Maupertuis.

The broad concerns of all these European philosophical associations reflected the Enlightenment ideal of interdependent fields of intellectual endeavor and practical activity from meteorology, electricity, and botany to medicine, architecture, and antiquities.

Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Intellectuals

The importance of intellectuals in modern urban industrial and industrializing society is demonstrated by their diverse role in public aesthetic culture and political activity. Major urban centers produced intellectual cultures with their own distinctive characteristics, and there is a complex cultural geography of urban savant culture over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As during the Enlightenment, this intellectual life was often centered on formal or public institutions, but webs of informal social networks and semiprivate associations were often equally important.

In postwar Parisian cafés such as Les Deux Magots and the Café de Flore, for instance, during the 1950s and 1960s, existentialists and poststructuralists such as Jean-Paul Sartre and Simone de Beauvoir held court for their philosophical and political discussions. Urban intellectual culture frequently thrived in centers of mixed populations or international entrepôts, reflecting the characteristics of immigrants and established cultures. While the intellectual culture of *fin-de-siecle* Vienna, for instance, reflected general contemporary European cultural concerns, its special qualities stemmed from the importance of Jewish culture, the decline of liberalism, and the flight toward late-Romantic escapism variously embodied in different mediums in the works of Gustav Mahler, Sigmund Freud,

Ludwig Wittgenstein, Arthur Schnitzler, and Hugo von Hofmannstahl.

Similarly, New York was the polycentric gateway between the old and new worlds, and this was reflected in the distinctive intellectual life of a complicated and contentious city where diverse European ideas and cultural ideals combined with developing U.S. culture to create rich cultural complexity. In the milieu of 1920s and 1930s New York, for instance, Edmund Wilson strove to embrace European Marxism and modernism, demonstrating how the Europeanization of American intellectual life was encouraged by the city's growing international political and cultural status.

The importance of intellectual interventions in political campaigns is evident throughout the nineteenth century from the French Revolution (actually eighteenth century) to the Paris commune of 1871 and the St. Petersburg uprising of 1905. These interventions are most evident where intellectuals act together as an intelligentsia consisting of teachers, academics, artists, writers, and other educated or self-taught individuals, forming powerful groups that had a major impact on political developments. Although some, of course, sided with aristocratic elites, many social thinkers, as Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels hoped, formed centers of opposition to aristocratic, monarchical, and reactionary regimes, especially in the Austro-Hungarian, Turkish, and Romanov empires of Central and Eastern Europe. Working-class intellectual movements also emerged strongly in the period, and there was resistance to the patronizing and debased anti-intellectualism propagated by many communist agitators as the strength of the British "autodidact" or self-taught working-class intellectual movement demonstrates.

Urban intelligentsia played a less important role in the Chinese revolution because of the continued domination of agriculture and the slower pace of industrialization and urbanization. It was not until the decades up to 1949 that a recognizable modern urban intelligentsia appeared in China, for example, the new breed of educated professionals in Shanghai who led organizational and ideological challenges to imperial, postimperial, and nationalistic governments. The relative weakness of this Chinese intelligentsia and changes in the communist state have meant that direct political challenges to government and party have been muted, and

change has occurred through economic realities rather than intellectual endeavor.

Are Intellectuals on the Decline?

Some influential commentators in the United States, Britain, and elsewhere have argued that there has been a decline in intellectual life evidenced by the debased figure of the public intellectual and demise of the humanist ideal in higher education. Fears have been expressed that intellectuals, entrepreneurs, artists, and innovators are fleeing Western cities in the context of a modern global economy driven by intolerance, poor education, inequality, ineffectual government, and the allure of expanding developing economies. Of course, such arguments depend on the definition of intellectual adopted, and fears of intellectual decline have been expressed in various societies for centuries. It is argued that many public intellectuals are merely media commentators passing opinions on cultural and lifestyle issues beyond their original areas of expertise rather than making direct political interventions.

Knowledge-based institutions such as universities, especially in Europe, are now frequently viewed as tools of government economic intervention and motors for economic and social regeneration rather than autonomous bastions of learning, critical thought, and innovation. Despite the rapid expansion that has taken place in higher education, it is contended that there has been a decline in the quality of intellectual life and the educational experience offered in modern universities. This is due to excessive politically motivated and often contradictory governmental interference resulting in the erosion of academic autonomy, in student debt, and in the decline of the humanist ideal. Hence, although large quantities of academic work are being produced and universities are now frequently one of the largest provincial urban employers, a managerial instrumentalist and utilitarian ethos now dominates, enshrined in targets and public-private partnerships.

Can Intellectual Communities Be Revived or Created?

Governments have sought to revitalize and transform urban centers for political and economic

reasons by implementing measures intended to foster the development of intellectual communities. Some support for this has come from considerable empirical work undertaken by economic geographers and others investigating concepts of the knowledge economy, learning regions, and the role of universities in fostering developmental strategies. Attempts have been made to replicate a formula or set of conditions under which urban intellectuals will thrive and help to inject vitality into local economies.

Interventions have taken various forms in different countries but have usually involved institutional subsidies or tax incentive schemes, partnerships between national and local government, local businesses, universities, and community groups. These attempts presuppose, to some extent, an interrelationship between the arts and sciences, and thriving artistic and intellectual communities have often been associated with economic success although, as studies of the knowledge economy and learning regions has shown, such a relationship is by no means certain. Societies experiencing economic or political decline have experienced an artistic renaissance.

The productiveness and originality of intellectuals and creative individuals is partly the result of their self-perception and status as a socially distinctive or marginal group with alternative values defined against dominant or majority culture. Hence, intellectual or artistic originality has often been associated with social distinctiveness or marginality as defined in terms of gender, religion, race, sexuality, or other characteristics. The homosexuality of Gertrude Stein, Alan Turing, Oscar Wilde, and Peter Tchaikovsky, for instance, is often regarded as a major factor in their creativity, casting them as partial outsiders struggling for identity and admittance. Similarly, when Chicago sociologists such as Robert Park and Everett Stonequist analyzed the strategies employed by immigrants such as Jews to preserve something of their individual culture, they found that integration into U.S. urban society was achieved through attaining excellence in special fields of endeavor.

Recent work on the knowledge economy, learning regions, the rise of a creative class, and patterns of economic growth provides some support for the idea that modern intellectuals are able to take advantage of the special qualities of modern urban

living and that modern Western industrial economies depend for their success on creative originality. Intellectuals such as scientists, artists, entrepreneurs, and venture capitalists lead a bohemian lifestyle, deriving their identity from creativity. This has replaced the organizational and instrumental ethos that prevailed until the 1930s. Intellectuals are regionally differentiated; can be correlated with groups of bohemians, homosexuals, and other relatively distinctive categories; and while being regionally differentiated, in some estimates comprise 30 percent of the U.S. workforce.

Larger urban locations provide the necessary quasi-anonymity, sociability, and weaker social ties for stimulation and creative interplay and for the forging of original identities and the reinvention of the self. Intellectual groups capitalize on the irrational aspects of creativity, acting outside the norms of the wider society and following a distinctive lifestyle that includes ignoring normal working hours, dressing uniquely, and holding distinctive moral and aesthetic values.

Attempts have been made to replicate Silicon Valley in the context of the modern knowledge economy. At Wellington, New Zealand, for example, the growth of the film industry has attracted many innovators, lured by the city's technological infrastructure, the relatively low cost of labor and resources, and the quality of lifestyle. Other attempts have been made to replicate Silicon Valley by encouraging new economic spaces in other U.S. centers, such as Philadelphia and Atlanta, and also in Japan, parts of Germany, and some British towns such as Cambridge (called "Silicon Fen"). It is therefore possible that governments and local urban communities can meet the challenges of globalization by fostering the development of cities of knowledge, although the continued success of Silicon Valley has been the result of a complex nexus of factors difficult to replicate elsewhere.

The impersonal, irrational, quirky, contingent, and creative aspects of urban living encourage the interplay between arts and sciences on which creativity is founded. Sites of rationality cannot be neatly separated from sites of irrationality, with deliberate irrationality and emotionally founded distinctiveness being, in fact, often at the heart of intellectual originality. Urban centers can serve as forums for intellectuals where new ideas, behaviors, and identities are forged. Scientific, technological,

and artistic creativity are intermixed, influencing each other through changing fads and fashions, which are also most rapid and transient in the relatively impersonal nexus of the urban melting pot. Far from trying to re-create the vast postwar technological military urban complexes of the cold war, this suggests we should be looking more to relatively informal coffeehouses, taverns, and clubs of the Enlightenment as the models for cities of knowledge.

Paul Elliott

See also Bohemian; Creative Class; Mumford, Lewis

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ISARD, WALTER

The founder of the field of regional science and its most prominent scholar in industrial location

theory and methods of regional analysis, Walter Isard (1919–) established an interdisciplinary movement of regional and urban research in North America, Europe, and Asia. Through his determined leadership and insistent persuasion, Isard encouraged economists, geographers, sociologists, and urban, regional, and transportation planners to construct theories of urban and regional phenomena and to apply methods of analysis to the emerging policy issues of the middle and late twentieth century.

Isard's research contributions, while large and diverse, tend toward imaginative syntheses of current and earlier research, as contrasted with wholly new theory and methods. His interests in the location of regional and urban activities, formed during his graduate studies, led to his first major book, *Location and Space-Economy* (1956), which drew on the location theories expounded earlier by German economists and geographers. Next, he initiated research on the economic and social consequences of atomic power and industrial complexes and intensified his research on methods of regional and urban analysis, including population and migration projection methods, regional economic and social accounts, industrial location and complex analysis, interregional and regional interindustry models, interregional linear programming, and gravity, potential, and spatial interaction models. This comprehensive exposition appeared as his second, jointly authored major book, *Methods of Regional Analysis* (1960), later thoroughly updated as *Methods of Interregional and Regional Analysis* (1998). Isard's unique contribution to these two works were the chapters on "channels of synthesis," which demonstrated diagrammatically how the diverse methods of analysis described previously could be applied in a systematic, integrated manner.

During the 1960s, Isard turned to more theoretical pursuits related to individual behavior and decision making, as well as general equilibrium theory for a system of regions, presented in his third, jointly authored major book, *General Theory* (1969). Concurrently, he and his students undertook ecologic-economic-oriented studies as well as a major interindustry analysis of the Philadelphia region. Later, he coauthored a book on the theory of spatial dynamics and optimal space-time development.

Isard was born in 1919 in Philadelphia to immigrant parents. By 1939, he graduated with distinction

from Temple University and entered Harvard University as a graduate student in its Economics Department. There, he developed a research interest in building construction, transportation development, the location of economic activities, and the cycles of growth and stagnation that characterized the 1920 to 1940 period. From 1941 to 1942, he studied economics at the University of Chicago, where his interest in mathematics was rekindled. As a Social Science Research Council predoctoral fellow, from 1942 to 1943, he was affiliated with the National Planning Resources Board. There, he completed his doctoral dissertation. Subsequently, he served in the Civilian Public Service as a conscientious objector; during the night hours at the state mental hospital where he was assigned, he translated into English the works of the German location theorists, including the works of August Lösch, Andreas Predöhl, and others.

During the postwar years as a Social Science Research Council postdoctoral fellow, 1946 to 1948, Isard accelerated his studies of industrial location theory and later joined W. W. Leontief's interindustry research project at Harvard. Simultaneously, he honed his teaching skills at various part-time appointments, offering the first course on location theory and regional development ever taught at Harvard's Economics Department. In 1948, at the age of 29, Isard initiated meetings of leading economists, geographers, sociologists, and demographers on interdisciplinary regional research. These efforts found a welcoming audience among participants of annual disciplinary conferences and continued intensively throughout the next six years. In December 1954 at the meetings of the allied social science associations in Detroit, he organized a conference program of 25 papers; at the business meeting, 60 scholars endorsed the idea of forming a separate association named the Regional Science Association (RSA).

Having launched the field of regional science, Isard served as associate professor of regional economics and director of the Section of Urban and Regional Studies at M.I.T. In 1956, he accepted a professorship in the Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and formed a graduate group in regional science. Two years later, he founded the Regional Science Department and the *Journal of*

Regional Science. In 1960, the first PhD in Regional Science was awarded to William Alonso for his seminal study of urban location and land use.

Isard then expanded his horizons to Europe and Asia. In 1960, he visited many research centers in Europe where he organized sections of the RSA. The first European Congress was held in 1961. Sections of the RSA were subsequently established in many countries throughout Europe and Asia as well as North America. During the mid-1960s, regional science summer institutes were held at the University of California at Berkeley, and, in 1970, the first European Summer Institute took place in Karlsruhe, Germany. Subsequently, summer institutes were held in Europe every two years. International conferences are now held every year in North America and Europe and every second year in the Pacific region. In 1989, the Regional Science Association was reorganized and its name modified to the Regional Science Association International (<http://www.regionalscience.org>).

In 1978, the RSA established its founder's medal in honor of Walter Isard. The following year, Isard moved to Cornell University as professor of economics, and six years later, he was elected to the National Academy of Sciences. He continued to teach until his recent retirement from active research. Over the decades, Isard received six honorary degrees, as follows: Poznan Academy of Economics, Poland (1976); Erasmus University of Rotterdam, the Netherlands (1978); the University of Karlsruhe, Germany (1979); Umeå University, Sweden (1980); the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign (1982); and Binghamton University (1997).

Throughout his career, Isard also pursued policy interests related to conflict management and resolution, disarmament, and peace science. He founded the Peace Research Society, later renamed the Peace Science Society, and the graduate group in peace science at the University of Pennsylvania. Several of his books, which number more than 20, as well as many of his 300 published papers, concern topics in peace science.

Isard's accomplishments are more related to interregional constructs and relationships than intraurban ones. The general focus concerns systems of cities and regions; even so, some of his thinking pertains to interactions among urban communities and neighborhoods. In fostering and developing the RSA and various journals on regional

science, he welcomed contributions at any scale of region: neighborhood, city, economic region, country, and the world. His orientation was generally theoretical and methodological. Policy issues, such as regional development and environmental management, seemed to interest him more for their modeling challenges than their policy content.

David Boyce

See also Location Theory; Regional Planning; Transportation

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ISLAMIC CITY

The term *madinah* by and large refers to the primordial Islamic city—the city of the Prophet Muhammad, established circa AD 622 to 632. Abu Nasr al-Farabi's (ca. 870–950) famous work, *The Virtuous City*,

takes inspiration from the constitution of the city of the Prophet, al-Farabi notes that the linguistic term *madinah* denotes legal, ethical, social, political, and religious knowledge, transforming and transcending the contributions of mere human experience. The suggestion here is that the term *madinah* also embraces the idea of authority, submission, obedience, conformity, and consensus—the nature of the Islamic City.

Because the *madinah* also represents the cumulative experience of successive generations of urban dwellers, it offered a solid foundation for Ibn Khaldun (ca. 1332–1406) to reflect critically and to rethink the relationship between the interdependent conditions of urban existence. Writing on the subject of urbanism, Ibn Khaldun notes that *umran* (culture, habitat, milieu) is “the cumulative social heritage of a group [of people] as objectified in institutions and conventionalized activities in a particular time and place.” In an attempt to provide an acute analysis of urban spaces in the Islamic city, the issue in contention here is twofold: (1), understanding how the representation of law (*shari‘a*), order, and habitat are embodied in the appearance and fabric of the *madinah*; (2) in relation to hermeneutics, understanding how the topography of the Islamic city is linked as a text for reading various scales of space and the cultural landscape (*kultur-landschaft*) in relationship to urbanism.

This argument is particularly apt to the *madinah* of the Maghrib (North Africa) for three specific reasons: (1) knowledge of the mapping out of the city came with the first wave of Arab conquerors in the seventh century AD; (2) the establishment of the Maliki *madhhab* (school of law) in the Maghrib, ninth century AD, which led to the infusion of ideas and inhabitants from the Citadel of Faith; (3) as a result of the *reconquesta*, a fresh wave of émigrés (mostly Jews and Muslims) were forced to immigrate to the cities of the Maghrib in diaspora from Spain (*al-Andalus*) in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries AD. The *reconquesta* altered the urban demographics of the *madinah* immensely, and it also influenced land use and the complexities of urbanism.

The Islamic City as a Legal Concept

The study of urbanism as it relates to the study of law is a relatively new concept. Karl Llewellyn’s 1940 essay, *On the Good, the True, and the*

Beautiful in Law, formulated a critique on the affinity between law and habitat in view of the fact that the city embodies a particular sense of urbanism, and building ordinances are a means of sustaining particular modes of dwelling. Undoubtedly, much has been written about the urban features of cities in the Muslim world up to the present day. Mohammed Arkun’s essay “Islam, Urbanism, and Human Existence Today,” highlights a number of lingering misconceptions about Islamic law as it relates to the fabric of the *madinah*. Arkun argues that the correspondence between law, the relative dimensions of habitat, the spatial equilibrium of the *madinah*, and the setting out of theoretical principles has guided the Islamic city up to the present day. Historical texts, which depict Muslim cities in North Africa, offer very similar interpretations about law and habitat, especially the treatment of public and private space.

Islamic Law (*shari‘a*) has substantive meaning for the study of urbanism in the *madinah* or the premodern Islamic city, with reference to the efficacy of building ordinances (*ahkam al-bunyan*). The *shari‘a* is a commonly accepted means of adjudication in habitat disputes; it is therefore a reasonable criterion for the ordering of habitat, which forms the corpus of building ordinances. Like zoning conventions, the *ahkam al-bunyan* allows action but also limits illegal actions. Because the principles and praxis of the *shari‘a* is a normative practice for settling habitat conflicts, one of the goals of *ahkam al-bunyan* is to address spatial equilibrium. Above all, the difficulties of excluding the *shari‘a* from the study of the *madinah* has been intensely debated. The problem includes two opposite worldviews, which imply antithetical models of habitat: One personified a landscape under Muslim law, the other personified a radically different concept of space whose roots predate the rise of Islam but that is clearly transformed by Muslim political rule. In all likelihood, the contrasting modulation of *shari‘a* land-use ordinances contains more features than many historians would care to record or mention; furthermore, linguistic and historical evidence indicates the professional role of the jurist-consult, the specialist known as the *mufti*. It also implies a surprisingly sophisticated cadre of legal scholars, who could settle any environmental problem that confronted them. Clearly, by the fifteenth

century AD, Maliki law was highly developed and enjoying much success among the urban population as well as in local towns and villages in the North Africa.

Speaking mostly about cities in North Africa, Brunschvig's 1947 "Urbanisme medieval et droit musulman" notes how Maliki law was applied in cases relating to roads, walls, rebuilding, and problems relating to water, neighborly relations, and the location of business like tanneries, forges, stables, the origination or the abolition of easements, and legal procedures in general. In his view, the defining element of the Islamic city is a typology with its own identity based on legal traditions, intimately associated with the shari'a. Apart from being sympathetic to Brunschvig's argument, Titus Burckhardt also refers to urban rules and building ordinances, which emerge from the tradition (*sunnah*) of the Prophet and customary law (*urf*).

This explains why the shari'a is needed to adjudicate disputes in building proximity, spatial organization, and the configuration of a dwelling, to safeguard the rights of people, and to prevent harm or reciprocal harm. Legal judgment applies to these situations, and it may well affect the way we critique the habitat conditions in the madinah. The madinah remains important, given the constantly shifting patterns and the construing of the word of law; the concept involves a considerable number of mental images that exist only in authority/power representations. The concept of the madinah informs our understanding of the underlying structure of urbanism. Finally, it enables us to refer to the pattern of language by the precise semantic properties.

Also useful for comparison is Ibn Khaldun, the fifteenth-century North African scholar, statesman, historian, and jurist, who provided a number of descriptive markers that characterize the Muslim city. In the *Muqaddimah: An Introduction to History*, Ibn Khaldun examined

several theoretical and practical concepts of the Muslim city. The text of the *Muqaddimah* is extraordinary for the way in which Ibn Khaldun modulates the interpretation of history and the dichotomies of urban life. A number of literary images emerge in juxtaposition: exegesis, economics, ethnicity, law, demography, and air and water pollution.

Because the image of the madinah is problematic, the meaning made possible by a hermeneutic reading lay emphasis on the ethos of the madinah accounting for the operative shari'a system. Furthermore, there remains an excess of physical evidence available for research, for that reason, historiography remains an open debate. The Muslim world includes a wide assortment of



Islamic city Tunisia, cobblestone street 1860–1900

Source: Copyright © Library of Congress.

Muslim cities. However, the existence of legal rulings and judgments in Maliki law can ultimately be traced to the exegesis of the sacred text, the Qur'an.

The Topos of the Islamic City

In summary, the topos of the Islamic city consists of a two primary tropes: a strong sense of affection (*topophilia*) for a place and a sense of aversion (*topophobia*). As a mode of dwelling, *topophilia* means that competing disputes can be resolved through mutual regard for one another in order to maintain mutual affection. *Topophilia* also means a social homogeneity, as evidenced in the topography of a landscape, is both figurative and communicative. The house is a private retreat or a mode of private dwelling; public gathering exists in the city in the congregational mosque. Bringing together public gathering and private dwelling, the madinah embodies a habitat, a physical expression, and the physical nature of a place and context. Although the character of the ground of a habitat varies, its space is what enables it to play its role in uniting a community of human beings, and the order of the space gives them identity and fellowship, hence the basis for a city.

The madinah Fes evolved in the ninth century AD as a magnificent example of urbanism and social hierarchy. The topos of Fes is a matrix of linear spaces immediately accessible (streets) and spaces conceived out of an empty central area (mosque courtyard, house, dwelling), both determining the laws of juxtaposition and organization. The courtyards are designed to isolate, to ensure the intimacy of the inside as opposed to the outside. These types of enclosures are antonymic, meaning the enclosure presents an opposition in its function to the order that brought it about in the first place. The opposition is materialized through the juxtaposition of inside as opposed to the outside defined by blind perimeter walls.

Apart from being a place of human habitation, the topos embodies political authority, religious knowledge, and collective memory. It is therefore possible to speak of the madinah in terms of the idiom power/knowledge. The well-known maxim, *I am the city of knowledge (Ana madinat al-Ilm)*, embodies topography, landscape, and meaning. Fes is a luminous example of collective memory, which

is associated with a pious primogenitor, Idris II, who is entombed within the precincts of the city.

We are told that when the city was fully inhabited, Idris II ascended the *minbar* and addressed the people of the city. He prayed for their sanctity, their prosperity, and the protection of the city. The collective influences of natural springs that provide fresh water to the inhabitants of Fes have a pervasive effect on the site. In the collective memory, it is impossible to ignore the power of Idris's words: He speaks with the language of incarnation, *verba concepta*. Idris II repeats the archetypal *du'a* (heavenly supplication) of Abraham for Makkah, the Prophet's *du'a* at the time of entering Madinah, and Uqba's *du'a* at the time of the founding of Qayrawan. Idris II also prayed for knowledge and sacred law. In the city of Fes, two significant monuments are associated with knowledge and sacred law: the Qarawiyyin (university) mosque and the sepulcher mosque of Idris II.

Many historians tell us that the city of Qayrawan was founded by Uqba b. Nafi's, and he sanctified the site with a *du'a*. Uqba's charisma is evident from the site of the mosque, which bears his eponym. It explains the importance of the city as a place embodied with ritual prayer, knowledge, and the enactment of sacred law.

Several conclusions can be drawn from the foregoing remarks. First, the Islamic city is a landscape immersed in knowledge and power. Second, the topos bears a relationship between language and landscape. It is possible that the extravagant claims associated with various indigent narratives attached to the mapping out of settlements in the Islamic cities in North Africa may have encouraged some historians to ignore these claims and to adhere strictly to a list of chronological events. But extant physical evidence points to the narrative, inasmuch as it is a proviso that is naturally suggested by time and place. Habitat narratives are connected with custom and vernacular traditions, which are a source of collective memory and therefore cannot be easily ignored. The choice of a site and how that site is visually composed or how the building process becomes part of a shared human experience are among the reasons why the urbanism of the city has accepted a particular type of building activity or how a peculiar settlement pattern has evolved.

The madinah, it would seem, is well understood; scholars in history, cultural anthropology, architecture, urbanism, and geography have been devoted to the study of the features of the Islamic city. Cognizant of the fact that social, religious, and cultural traditions associated with urbanism or *umran* are often misunderstood, we reiterate that the meaning and use of domestic and public space and property ownership posit a wide spatiotemporal experience. The Islamic city stands in striking contrast to the polis or the Platonic city as in Plato's *Republic*, St. Augustine's *The City of God (De Civitate Dei)*, or More's *Utopia*.

In sum, three distinct accounts bid to explain the notion of the Islamic city. These are mentioned by Ibn Khaldūn, who used the terms, private ownership (*mulk*), tribal kinship, and solidarity (*asabiyah*). When Ibn Khaldūn says, "man is *madani* by nature," he is suggesting that his lifestyle depends on an urban culture and organization. This sheds light on the idea conceived by al-Farabi as well; authority, submission, obedience, conformity, and consensus govern the internal workings of the Islamic city, where spatial transparency can be achieved only by tacit agreement. This usage is legitimate because it presupposes a true social contract and implies that coercion does not exist where virtue is paramount. Al-Farabi's virtuous city is governed by the shari'a of the Qur'an, which exercises control over human behavior and serves as an apparatus to allow the society to exercise its freedom.

It should be noted that the notion of a collective social environment refers to the idea of culture as it is used in modern sociology and anthropology. Culture in this sense has an overriding influence on people's views and the things that people do on a daily basis, or whether the immediate community matters to society at large. Finally, as an idea, the term *madinah* relates to an ordered landscape as a semiotic space of dwelling, a discursive model, and legal practice. In other words, the Islamic city is not a grammar of objects or perceptions, which do not add up; it also characterizes an epistemic configuration of habitat in terms of Muslim conventions of political and religious authority.

Akel Ismail Kahera

See also Cairo, Egypt; *Caravanserai*; Damascus, Syria

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ISTANBUL, TURKEY

Istanbul, previously known as Byzantium and later as Constantinople, can be described as an early modern city of the period 1500 to 1800. It was comparable with other great cities of western and central Europe during that time. This account of early modern Istanbul intends to show the city's urban features that belonged to the era. For much of the period Istanbul was one the most densely populated cities in Europe. It numbered probably 60,000 inhabitants in 1477. These people had been forcibly brought to the city from different areas of the Ottoman Empire following the Ottoman conquest in 1453. There were Muslims and non-Muslims, including Greeks, Armenians, Jews, and Gypsies. By the 1600s Istanbul had more than 300,000 inhabitants. The city's economic growth and prosperity attracted the people. Many also had left their hometowns or provinces because of the civil wars in Anatolia in those years. There was a continuous

flow of immigrants to Istanbul. The population reached to over half a million in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and it continued to grow thereafter. The first census of 1885 recorded 875,000 individuals living in the city.

Urban Development

In the sixteenth century, the walled city of Istanbul was administratively divided into 13 districts that contained varying numbers of quarters. These districts were identified by Friday mosques, the largest mosques of the district and where Friday noon prayer was held. Friday mosques were substituted for quarter mosques over the years, and new Friday mosques were founded within the existing districts. But the number of districts remained unchanged, at least until the end of the sixteenth century. The three succeeding volumes of Istanbul *vakif* (pious endowment) registers of 1546, 1578, and 1596 show the development pattern over the 50 years. The first volume records 219 quarters and 244 mosques in the city in 1546. Each quarter had at least one mosque and some had two or more. The number of quarters rose with the number of mosques to 227 with 254 mosques in 1578, and 230 with 256 mosques in 1596.

The rise in the number of quarters occurred in two ways in this period: First was the appearance of a new quarter under the name of an existing mosque that was the second mosque of an existing quarter. Second was the development of a new quarter in association with a newly constructed mosque. In the latter, the new mosque generated the urban development in its surroundings, and this was normally experienced in less densely built-up areas. In the areas where the quarters could not expand, new buildings had to be fitted into the existing urban fabric. Some buildings had to be pulled down to make room for the new developments. And the quarters became denser.

Urban Production and Consumption

It was not easy to supply the city with a population approaching half a million. Istanbul had become a center of consumption but relied heavily on imports. The Ottoman authorities tried to impose controls on the system of supply, giving priority to the walled city over the other places.

According to the regulations, various foodstuffs shipped to the city were to be unloaded in specific quays on the shore of Tahtakale. They were taken to some authorized depots inside the walls to be taxed and priced, and then to be distributed to wholesalers, producer-retailers, or both. For instance, many foodstuffs were brought to the Balkapan Han (literally Honey-Depot Inn), where they were to be distributed to grocers. And thus, groceries were concentrated on the area. However, often dealers smuggled goods outside markets to sell them at higher prices. Probably for this purpose, many possessed storehouses and shops in this area. As a result, the shoreline area had become highly congested. In 1579, the construction of new shops in the Tahtakale area outside the wall was prohibited.

The district of Unkapani, the other end of the busy shoreline area, was authorized as the unloading point for grain. It possessed the Grain/Flour Depot on the shore outside the wall near the quay for grain. Grain sent by ship and land was to be brought to the Grain/Flour Depot to be taxed and priced before it was distributed to millers and bakers. However, it was difficult to monitor the system of grain supply throughout the early modern era. Because grain was in short supply and its price was fixed, opportunist merchants emerged who intended to make money in trading grain. They either sold it on the way or hoarded it in their storehouses along the shore outside the wall to export it at a higher price. This caused a shortage and price rise in the city. And in this case, the authorities usually issued many decrees addressed to the authorities of supplying villages and towns to send grain immediately from their reserve.

The Grain/Flour Depot, giving its name to the district, seems to have dominated the occupations of the area. For example, grain merchants took up lodgings and shops on the shore, probably not to risk missing cargoes entering the city. Inside the wall, there were many mills and baker's shops. They were conveniently located close to their suppliers. However, mills and baker's shops were also scattered in the city. They were the two important links in the process of bread making, and thus they were established accordingly. Bakers were dependent on millers for supplies of freshly ground flour, and for this reason, most of them built their own mills, which were attached to the back of their



An apartment building in current-day Istanbul.

Source: Jill Buyan.

shops. This was also what the authorities preferred to maintain. Apparently, if there was a baker's shop in the neighborhood, there was most likely a mill nearby.

It was possible in those years to follow the whole process of bread production, from the arrival of grain cargoes at the city ports to the loaves of bread on the dinner table of Ottoman households. On a more local level, residents could hear their work noises or breathe the fumes coming out of their chimneys. The neighbors were familiar with the regular sounds of the process, when the next-door bakers started the day or if they finished early or the millers' busy time at work throughout the year. However, living next to one of the flour mills, most of which were operated by horse or mule power in Istanbul, was not

always very pleasant, even in the standard of the early modern era. Sometimes the neighbors complained about the noise and smoke or any pollution caused by the activities of these establishments in the neighborhood.

However, heavy industrial occupations were generally pushed outside the city walls, away from the neighborhood life. For example, the district of Edirnekapi housed the livestock market just beyond the city gate of the area, and thus it had become the center for some dependent establishments related to the meat supply. It possessed slaughterhouses even though it also had neighborhoods inside the wall. Candle and soap makers used animal fat in their production, and thus many workshops of candle and soap makers were located in this area near their suppliers. A part of Yedikule, marking

the other end of the city on the coast of the Sea of Marmara outside the wall, had developed into a suburb of the tanning industry, most probably because of the convenience of water and large open space required for the tanning process. This area also possessed slaughterhouses, and workshops of candle and soap makers.

Neighborhoods

As in other cities of the Ottoman realms, the city quarter, *mahalle*, had administrative and fiscal meanings in Istanbul. It appears in official documents under the name of their local mosque. This system had been gradually introduced after the conquest, and in the sixteenth century, it was a normal practice in Istanbul, the walled city. However, this was not widely experienced in Galata, situated on the north bank of the Golden Horn, which was inhabited mainly by non-Muslims and foreigners. Many quarters of Galata bore names of ethnoreligious groups or congregations and churches of the area.

In those years, people were also officially identified by the quarter in which they were residents. This was important because in any dispute related to administrative, fiscal, or criminal matters they could be traced by the quarter of residence. In 1578, the authorities wanted to separate one quarter from another, probably to make it more controllable. For mainly security reasons, they said, they ordered the city inhabitants to construct the quarter gates at the entrance of each main street. But this project was not feasible and had to be abandoned. Apparently, Istanbul was then overpopulated, and it was very difficult to promote public security in the city. Newcomers, particularly bachelors, were blamed. In 1579, those who were unable to show a warrant in the city were to be deported, including those who had already managed to stay for five years.

Throughout the early modern era, the city's neighborhood was also socially defined in the minds of local inhabitants. Its boundaries were drawn by the familiarity and common practices. The locals could establish neighborly contacts among themselves, shopping in the same grocery or baker's shop and socializing in the coffeehouse or public bath of the area. The neighborhood was also a source of social and economic supports. For example, the male and female members of the

neighborhood would raise funds to cover the dome of their mosque with lead or to construct a public bath or a public fountain of the area. They sometimes shared the responsibility for tax payments and helped poor or needy people.

Public Places

The main public places in the neighborhood were the mosque, public bath, and the local market, with one or two grocery, butcher's, and baker's shops, and probably the street. Here, residents of the neighborhood came together not only for prayer meetings or special sermons but also for neighborly socializing activities. There were also public drinking and eating establishments, such as *boza*-houses (alehouses) and *bařhanes* (cook shops specializing in sheep's head). These public houses provided complementary venues for public socializing. Taverns (*meyhanes*), by contrast, stayed outside the neighborhood's public life because the construction of taverns within the walls was not normally permitted. And those that had been built were often ordered to be closed down by the complaints of Muslim inhabitants of the area.

The public and private socializing began to change in the city by the arrival of coffeehouses in the 1550s. The first coffeehouses were opened in the Tahtakale area, which was the center for international and local trade. By the 1600s, the number of coffeehouses grew in these commercial areas and accelerated thereafter. Their popularity probably increased by the spread of the habit of tobacco smoking in the city during these years. Some earlier coffeehouses were converted from older *boza*-houses, but new ones were also built. Many neighborhoods acquired these new public drinking houses. They were built near the mosque and the public bath of the neighborhood, near communal residences. They attracted both wealthy and poor inhabitants of the area except for women. Women experienced public sociability as separate from men and usually in the public bath of the neighborhood. They sometimes spent the whole day there, conversing and drinking coffee.

However, as elsewhere in the early modern world, these public drinking houses were associated with a wide range of criminal activities, from prostitution to urban violence in the city. The authorities often issued decrees ordering the wholesale closure of coffeehouses, *boza*-houses, and taverns. They

tried to control them, especially during the politically critical years. In the neighborhood, the inhabitants also often had problems with the presence of these establishments. There are cases where the locals played an active role in the closure of coffeehouses. But people continued to build them in the city, even in the years they were banned.

Urban Houses

In sixteenth-century Istanbul, rich and poor shared the same social and physical environment. Their houses were of different sizes and standards, but they were neighbors. It was not unusual for modest houses to be built against the outer walls of a palace or highly privileged houses in the nosiest area of the neighborhood. However, the analysis of three succeeding volumes of Istanbul *vakif*-registers of 1546, 1578, and 1596 has shown that the characteristics of houses and their future development varied according to their particular locations in the city. In predominantly commercial areas, some lived in their shops or workshops. For instance, there were many bakers living in their mills or bakeries, and many grocers and gardeners lodging in their shops and working areas; almost all of them were recent immigrants who had left their families in their hometowns.

At the neighborhood center were rows of one-room apartments. These were communal residences usually built by wealthier individuals in proximity to larger establishments. They were constructed against the walls of a mosque, a public bath, or a dervish lodge or above shops. Each apartment was almost the size of a street shop. Few contained individually used reception rooms, stables, and toilets. These row-apartment buildings (known as bachelors' rooms) generally accommodated working bachelor immigrants and poorer families who probably could not afford private houses in the city. Some rows housed Jewish lodgers exclusively; these were known as Jewish rooms and later Jewish houses, *Yahudhanes*. Some bore names of the occupations of their residents, such as fishermen's rooms and jewelers' rooms. They accommodated Christian and Muslim tenants of the same occupation. Many of these rows of one-room apartments developed through the construction of new apartment units in addition to old ones over the period of time.

However, in sixteenth-century Istanbul, the majority lived in simple houses of one or two

rooms. These were generally two-story dwellings incorporated into larger related structures. They had no private kitchen or bath. The residents had to share the basic facilities with the neighbors. Some used the fireplaces in a shared courtyard for cooking or water from a shared well. Few occupied large houses with several rooms, private kitchen and bath, and gardens or courtyards. And these houses usually contained reception rooms (for male visitors only), coffee rooms, rooms for only servants or staff, and some stables and storage areas.

As the city grew and new inhabitants were added to the numbers, the older dwellings experienced some alterations and redevelopment. Some larger houses, depending on where they were sited, were converted into tenement blocks through subdivision, whereas others acquired new construction. The houses built in the commercial area of the neighborhood usually possessed shops on the street front. Those that had room for such development acquired them later. It was also often the case that the houses built on the main roads were turned into rows of one-room apartments associated with commercial units over the years. All these developments were to be supervised through the Organization of Imperial Architects. However, the control mechanism does not seem to have been effective enough to prevent illegal developments in early modern Istanbul. For example, the construction of any buildings against the city walls inside and outside was not permitted, and those built had to be pulled down. However, this was a common continuing practice, especially in the congested areas alongside the Golden Horn. In addition, although there were restrictions, people extended their properties through the construction of veranda-like structures, encroaching directly on the street.

Of note is the importance of neighborhood in the city's urban social and economic organizations across the early modern period. The neighborhood housed diverse social, religious, and ethnic groups even though some neighborhoods were dominated by a particular group. People lived and worked in the same area and they got together around neighborhood-based socioreligious and commercial foundations. Several occupations and productions also took place within the neighborhood next to residential life. Unlike our present time, they were parts of the urban environment in the early modern era.

See also Bazaar; Damascus, Syria; Islamic City

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JACKSON, KENNETH T.

Kenneth T. Jackson, one of the most prominent U.S. urban historians, has strongly influenced the agenda of the field and also made active collaborative and institutional contributions. His work covers the broad sweep of U.S. urban history and more specific topics, especially New York City, where he is Jacques Barzun Professor of History and the Social Sciences at Columbia University. Throughout his career, Jackson has shown an ongoing concern with linking the processes of urban organization and form with larger historical questions.

Born in 1939, Jackson earned his PhD from the University of Chicago in 1966 and a year later established his interest in the conflicts between social ideologies and urban life in his first book, *The Ku Klux Klan in the City, 1915–1930* (1967). His most widely read work remains *Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States* (1985). The book addresses belief systems and public policies that contributed to the rise of the suburbs, along with the built and spatial forms that resulted. Jackson argues that the dominance of suburbia in the United States can be attributed to a constellation of causes ranging from the ideological to the economic. He especially sees economic forces working together to make suburban housing less expensive in the United States than elsewhere, with four factors being dominant: inexpensive transportation; abundant, cheap land; government subsidies for loans and infrastructure; and low-cost construction methods. In the years since its publication,

this broad interpretive synthesis has encouraged much subsequent scholarship and remains foundational for the study of urban history.

In addition to scholarly monographs and articles, Jackson has made numerous collaborative contributions to the field and worked to promote organizational and institutional development. His work with photographer Camilo Jose Vergara resulted in several exhibitions and the book *Silent Cities: The Evolution of the American Cemetery* (1989). Among his many editorships, particularly notable for urban history is the monumental *Encyclopedia of New York City* (1995). More recently, *Robert Moses and the Modern City: The Transformation of New York* (2007), coedited by Hilary Ballon, calls for a reevaluation of that long-maligned city builder.

Institutionally, Jackson has contributed actively to urban history and U.S. history generally. Beginning in the mid-1960s, he played a major role in the Columbia University Seminar on the City, an important forum for discussion and scholarship. He has also headed several professional organizations, notably the Urban History Association and the Organization of American Historians, and he is currently president of the New York Historical Society and director of the Lehman Center for American History. Finally, Jackson's many documentary and media appearances have helped bring urban history to a wide and diverse audience.

Robert Buergler

See also New York City, New York; Suburbanization; Urban History

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JACOBS, JANE

Jane Jacobs (1916–2006) is among the most influential writers on cities in the twentieth century, both in the academic and popular spheres. Many of her most powerful ideas can be found in her first book, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, published in 1961. She argued powerfully against urban renewal projects of the mid-twentieth century and was a proponent of preserving the social and cultural life of neighborhoods. Jacobs was also an activist who played a pivotal role in protecting areas like New York City's West Village and SoHo from a variety of threats, paving the way for their eventual designation as historic preservation districts. Jacobs's goal was not simply preserving a neighborhood's buildings but rather sustaining the mix of people and activities that made up a vibrant community. She played a similar role in Toronto, Canada, after moving there to protest the Vietnam War.

Early Years

Born into a prosperous Scranton, Pennsylvania, household, Jacobs nevertheless observed the tenuous economic conditions faced by the miners in that anthracite coal region and the poor Appalachian farmers she encountered while accompanying her aunt on Presbyterian missionary work in North Carolina. These exposures—combined with the onset of the Great Depression as Jacobs was entering her teens—implanted in her a lifelong concern with the forces of community growth and decay. Her formal education in Scranton's public schools was unremarkable, and she recalled secretly reading books of her own choosing under her classroom

desk. Her intellectual curiosity, however, led her to a long life of bucking academic authorities.

Although she never obtained a degree beyond a high school diploma, a six-month course in business stenography armed Jacobs by age 20 to follow her sister to New York City and obtain work as a secretary. At the same time, she began selling articles as a freelance writer on urban life to publications such as *Vogue* and the *Sunday Herald Tribune*.

Following two years of continuing education courses at Columbia University, Jacobs joined the New York branch of the Roosevelt administration's Office of War Information. She continued after 1945 in the State Department's Overseas Information Agency, essentially producing propaganda pieces about the United States for publication abroad. Her wartime writings included an appeal for federal action to aid rusting industrial centers like Scranton. In 1952, she left the State Department in the wake of a series of McCarthy-era interrogations about her labor activity in the United Public Workers of America.

During the 1930s and 1940s, Jacobs lived first in Brooklyn, then near Washington Square in Greenwich Village. She married architect Robert Hyde Jacobs, and in 1947, the couple purchased a converted candy store at 555 Hudson Street in the West Village neighborhood, where they had three children.

Writing About Cities

After leaving the State Department in 1952, Jacobs worked as an associate editor at *Architectural Forum*. Her work there brought her into contact with influential ideas and individuals during the high-water mark of government-funded urban renewal programs. She soon became skeptical about these large-scale redevelopment projects. An encounter with William Kirk of the Union Settlement in East Harlem alerted her to the social shortcomings of new high-rise public housing projects, which replaced the traditional street pattern with superblocks. Meeting renowned Philadelphia city planner Edmund Bacon, Jacobs was struck by his abstract, aesthetic preoccupation with modernization and his insensitivity to the vitality in older (even impoverished) neighborhoods.

Jacobs first expressed her criticisms publicly when her boss, Douglas Haskell, offered her the

opportunity to speak at a 1956 Harvard University conference on urban design. Seizing the offensive, Jacobs challenged the assumptions of an audience composed of some of the most influential proponents of modernist urbanism, including Jose Luis Sert, Jacqueline Tyrwhitt, and Lewis Mumford. Mumford encouraged her to obtain a wider audience for her ideas, and soon thereafter, *Fortune* editor William H. Whyte, Jr., commissioned her to write for his magazine. In an April 1958 article, “Downtown Is for People,” Jacobs suggested that planners, architects, and businessmen were working “at cross-purposes to the city” in ways that deadened all local flavor and vitality.

Jacobs’s *Fortune* article was packed with enough ideas to fill a book, which is what she set about doing next, courtesy of a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation. The 1961 publication of Jacobs’s first book, *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, sparked a firestorm of debate about the means and ends of the urban renewal program and of city planning.

The success of that book enabled Jacobs to devote herself to writing for the next four decades. Two subsequent books—*The Economy of Cities* (1969) and *Cities and the Wealth of Nations* (1984)—explored first the economic and then the geopolitical functioning of cities. Together with *Death and Life*, these constituted a trilogy elaborating Jacobs’s analysis of urban life. She also wrote works delving into ethics (*Systems of Survival: A Dialogue on the Moral Foundations of Commerce and Politics*, 1992), ecology (*The Nature of Economies*, 2000), and broad social criticism (*Dark Age Ahead*, 2004).

Activism in New York City

Beginning in the mid-1950s, Jacobs joined a number of public debates in the Greenwich Village neighborhood where she lived. In 1958, the community successfully opposed a proposal by Robert Moses to bisect Washington Square with a sunken traffic artery. She discussed some of those experiences in *Death and Life*, and her observations from these engagements formed the basis for her ideas about the nature of politics and power in cities.

Jacobs’s most intense political battles came in response to the New York City Planning Commission’s designation of her West Village neighborhood as

blighted and the target of a 14-block urban renewal scheme. Leading a citizens’ Committee to Save the West Village, Jacobs cultivated allies including Tammany leader Carmine DeSapio as well as Democratic reformer Ed Koch and the Republican U.S. Representative John Lindsay. Sustained publicity, as well as political and legal pressure, induced Mayor Robert Wagner to withdraw the proposal by early 1962. Later that same year, Jacobs became the chair of a committee to fight a proposed expressway across lower Manhattan. Once again, she proved herself a strategically and tactically effective leader, publicly articulating the case against the highway plan and speaking forcefully at government hearings.

In the mid-1960s, she devoted sustained energies, ideas, and organizing resources to bringing affordable housing to the West Village. The West Village Association, a community organization Jacobs cofounded, involved residents in the design and development of subsidized apartments that stood in stark contrast to other housing projects (both public and private). The envisioned West Village Houses would have entailed no demolition or tenant relocation, the buildings would have been oriented toward the street rather than on superblocks, and the architecture would have harmonized with the existing neighborhood.

To the association’s frustration, the erection of the West Village Houses was stymied for nearly a decade by resistance from city officials, so the completed buildings fell short of the original projections for mixed use and amenities. More important over the long term, Jacobs was unable to find a suitable response to the erosion of affordable housing that was undermining the neighborhood she adored.

Relocation to Toronto

Beginning in 1965, Jacobs became an outspoken critic of the Vietnam War, contributing her name to high-profile protests, including a 1967 sit-in at New York’s Whitehall Street Induction Center, where she was arrested along with pediatrician Benjamin Spock, writer Susan Sontag, and others. Jacobs’s opposition to U.S. foreign policies was so intense that she cited it as the primary factor in the decision to move her entire family—including two draft-age sons—to Canada in 1968.

Settling into the university area of Toronto known as the Annex, Jacobs was immediately confronted by a plan to route an expressway through her new neighborhood. Joining with influential University of Toronto professor Marshall McLuhan, Jacobs lent her voice and her experience to a campaign that successfully defeated the Spadina expressway proposal in favor of mass transit.

Beyond Toronto highway opposition, Jacobs supported a broad civic reform initiative. Jacobs actively endorsed candidates such as radical neighborhood organizer John Sewell, who was elected to the city council after campaigning against slum clearance and overdevelopment. By the time this ideologically diffuse movement gained control of the mayoralty in 1974, reformers of all political stripes valued Jacobs's counsel, particularly on questions of urban development.

Jacobs's association with the reform administrations gave her influence over a variety of policies and projects. The most significant was the redevelopment of a 45-acre former industrial zone near downtown Toronto into a mixed-use residential area dubbed the St. Lawrence neighborhood. Conceived and built between 1974 and 1979, the initiative produced 3,500 new units and represented (according to designer Alan Littlewood) "the most complete expression of Jane Jacobs' ideas in concrete form."

In 1979, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation commissioned Jacobs to deliver its Massey Lectures, a series of five radio addresses on the topic of Canadian cities and sovereignty association, which she later expanded and published as *The Question of Separatism: Quebec and the Struggle over Separation* (1980). Stepping into the center of the contentious debates around Canada's bicultural history, Jacobs encouraged the country to eschew emotional nationalisms, acknowledge the distinct needs of the Toronto- versus Montreal-centered economies, and conceive a step-by-step "model for peaceful separation." This position followed from Jacobs's opposition to the centralization of power but also resonated with broader trends of political devolution to subnational cultural regions like Catalonia in Spain (devolved in 1979).

As a founding board member of Energy Probe, Jacobs advocated deregulation in the energy sector and was particularly critical of the Ontario province's nuclear power plants. After the turn of the

century, Jacobs brought together the mayors of Canada's five largest cities to press the provincial and national governments for more pro-urban policies.

Ideas and Influence

Many of Jacobs's most powerful ideas can be found *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*. The most immediately controversial—and ultimately the most effective—aspects of *Death and Life* centered on her trenchant critique of the urban renewal policies being applied in U.S. cities and of the erroneous assumptions and goals that underlay the attitudes of planners and policymakers. The latter included a set of influences dating back at least to the City Beautiful movement's emphasis on monumentality at the turn of the twentieth century, followed by the functionally segregated urbanism of Le Corbusier and other modernists at mid-century—all of whom she assailed as fundamentally anti-urban.

Jacobs articulated her critique not on aesthetic grounds but on the basis of her observations about how cities work, as well as why many recent interventions produced failures. *Death and Life* analyzed the dynamics of the public sphere in the most basic spaces of community interaction: parks, squares, sidewalks. One of the most renowned passages is an hour-by-hour account of "the intricate sidewalk ballet," which unfolded outside the window of her Hudson Street home on a typical day. With this memorable example, and others, she sought to point out the underappreciated strengths and social functions inherent in the traditional urban block form. In consequence, a "classic Jane Jacobs neighborhood" is one displaying a wide variety of lively activities throughout the day and night.

Jacobs then explored the structural underpinnings of such vitality. She identified four generators or conditions for healthy urban neighborhoods: First, they needed to host a mix of uses, thereby embracing the diversity that comes with various activities. Second, they should possess buildings of various ages, types, and conditions to incubate the broadest set of uses. Third, neighborhoods should exhibit a quite dense concentration of people in order to achieve a critical mass of activity. Finally, streets should be divided into relatively short

blocks to maximize opportunities for choice and serendipity at their many intersections.

Notably, each of the characteristics stood in diametric opposition to basic tenets of modern planning and urban renewal, which included a preference for superblocks, lower densities with more open space, the replacement of older areas with new redevelopments, and the increasing segregation of various functions (e.g., housing, work, leisure, and transportation). Jacobs challenged a wide range of assumptions about how cities work, noting, for example, that parks were not an absolute good—nor was bigger necessarily better. Instead, vast open spaces, not easily traversed or monitored, could function as “border vacuums,” deadening uses in their vicinity.

Generally, Jacobs provided lessons for urban social scientists as far away as Germany. In the United States, her influence is particularly evident in the work of Richard Sennett (*The Uses of Disorder: Personal Identity & City Life*, 1970). William H. Whyte continued to emphasize Jacobsean concerns in his Street Life Project (*The Social Life of Small Urban Spaces*, 1980). Jacobs’s argument for having more activity—and hence more eyes—on the street was developed further in critiques of crime-ridden high-rise housing projects, where layouts prevented community self-policing, particularly Oscar Newman’s “defensible space.” Jacobs’s general concept of unrecognized services that issue from community patterns prefigures political scientist Robert Putnam’s exploration of civic community and social capital, as well as Richard Florida’s writings on the creative class in cities. Nobel laureate economist Robert Lucas has suggested that she deserved a Nobel Prize for what he termed the “Jane Jacobs’ externalities,” that is, the effect of cities in catalyzing human innovation.

Jacobs concluded her first book with an extended meditation on what “kind of problem a city is”—namely a system of “organized complexity.” She regularly compared urban systems to complex ecosystems with myriad niches and invoked organic metaphors. Her characterization of the gradually emergent, unpredictable patterns of urban society anticipated the later enthusiasm for chaos theory and other dynamics that are neither linear nor random. Her late writings turned to urban environmental questions, and she ultimately saw much promise in “bio-mimicry.”

Jacobs delved deeper into the question of cities as dynamic, generative entities, particularly as engines of economic development. She held urban centers to be the necessary locus for nearly all of the most important developments in human civilization, even agriculture. In her view, cities were indispensable, constantly evolving sites of social organization, where innovation could be brought to bear in regional and eventually international markets. Her emphasis on the role of cities in a global context paved the way for later studies by sociologist Saskia Sassen, geographer Peter Hall, and economists Robert Lucas and Edward Glaeser.

Jacobs has directly influenced many important thinkers with particular relevance to urban studies: Robert Caro cited Jacobs as a primary inspiration for his devastating biographical attack on a master of urban renewal, *The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York* (1974). For Marshall Berman, Jacobs’s vision was the apotheosis of urban democracy as expressed through an unruly “modernism of the streets,” which he explored at length in *All That Is Solid Melts into Air: The Experience of Modernity* (1982).

More broadly, her reaffirmation of the traditional urban streetscape became a touchstone for architects, planners, and preservationists rejecting various aspects of modernist urbanism. Although urban professionals initially greeted Jacobs’s first book with great hostility, by 1974, New York City Planning Commission Chair John Zuccotti claimed, “We are all neo-Jacobseans.” In the 1990s, the new urbanism movement invoked Jacobs as a foundation for pedestrian- and community-oriented suburban developments like Seaside and Celebration, both in Florida.

Aside from the ire of planners directly stung by her critiques, Jacobs work engendered sustained criticism as well. Those on the political Left viewed her recommendations as insufficient responses to large-scale capitalist forces. Indeed, Jacobs often advocated entrepreneurship, innovation, and other self-help as the solution for “unslumming” economically depressed areas, while she attacked large-scale government programs, including not only urban renewal but also the Tennessee Valley Authority. Although never willing to label herself politically or ideologically, Jacobs harbored lifelong suspicions of power and authority.

Throughout her life, she remained a gradualist, opposed to cataclysmic change and tyrannical forces—whether public or private. She retained confidence in the inherent ability of healthy communities to be self-correcting in the face of a various dangers, and dedicated her writings and activism to ensuring the vigorous civic life she thought necessary to do so.

Christopher Klemek

See also Neighborhood Revitalization; New Urbanism; Public Realm; Urban Life; Urban Planning; Urban Village

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JOURNEY TO WORK

The concept of journey to work normally refers to journeys from the residence to the workplace, usually also including the return from the workplace to the home. *Commute* is often used as a synonym. Often, journeys to work include stops on the way, for example, at kindergartens, coffee shops, kiosks, or grocery stores. In the United States, less than half of the journeys to work are nonstop trips between home and workplace.

In spite of a rapid increase in leisure travel, journeys to work still make up a major proportion of travel in urban areas on weekdays. Among workforce participants in the United States, work tours accounted for 45 percent of the travel time on weekdays and 42 percent of weekday traveling distance in 2001. In Europe, higher proportions of daily traveling distances are often reported; for

instance, among workforce participants in the Copenhagen Metropolitan Area, commuting accounts for about two thirds of the distance traveled within the region on weekdays and nearly half the weekly traveling distance. Across nations, there is a general tendency for longer journeys to work among men than among women.

Although increasing use of flextime work has leveled out the morning and afternoon traffic peaks somewhat, journeys to work are still characterized by a higher temporal concentration than other traveling purposes. The capacity of urban expressways and public transit services are used to the highest extent in the peak periods, and changes in journey to work patterns are therefore important to congestion levels as well as revenues for transit companies. This has led to a strong focus on journeys to work in transport planning and research. These journeys have considerable social, economic, and local environmental implications associated with their nonoptional character and their temporal and spatial concentration. They are also important to overall energy use and emission levels. Journeys to work probably make up a higher proportion of actual travel time and distance than reported in many trip-based travel surveys, which often fail to take into account the role of the daily commute as the fixed and basic trip onto which other trip purposes, for example, grocery shopping, may be hitched.

Commuting Distances

Following general trends toward higher mobility, commuting distances have increased over time. This applies both to the journeys made by urban residents to workplaces within the same city and intercity commuting. In particular, the latter trips have become longer and more frequent as the friction of distance has been reduced through motorway construction and new high-speed rail connections, leading to a functional integration of increasingly large regions.

In countries like the United States and Denmark, one-way commuting distances are on average about 18 kilometers (11 miles). In comparison, on the affluent Chinese southeastern coast, where car ownership rates are still low but rapidly rising, urban workers travel on average less than one third of that distance to reach their workplace.

In most countries, the proportion traveling to the workplace by car is increasing. This also applies to societies where car ownership and usage has for a long time been high. In the United States, car commuting has risen from a share of about 85 percent in 1980 to 93 percent in 2001. Transit and nonmotorized modes now account for less than 4 percent each (although with higher rates of transit ridership in New York and other cities along the northeastern U.S. coast). In some European countries with gross domestic product on a par with the United States or above, commutes by public transport and nonmotorized modes account for relatively high proportions, in particular in the larger cities. For instance, in the Copenhagen Metropolitan Area, the proportions of journeys to work by car, public transit, and walk/bike are approximately 60 percent, 10 percent, and 30 percent, respectively, and these shares have changed only modestly during the recent decade.

The above-mentioned differences illustrate that traveling distances and modes for journeys to work are not merely a function of affluence levels. Neither can variations in travel behavior between countries or regions at similar levels of affluence be explained solely by cultural differences. A considerable body of research indicates that journeys to work can be influenced through transport policy measures and land use policies.

Duration of Travel

Evidence from a number of urban areas has shown that journeys to work are on average considerably shorter among inner-city residents than among their outer-area counterparts. This follows both from the generally higher concentration of workplaces in the inner than in the outer areas of most cities and from the fact that the distance to a randomly chosen address within an urban area will usually be longer from a peripheral than from a centrally located residence.

Checking for demographic, socioeconomic, and attitudinal differences, outer-area residents of the Copenhagen Metropolitan Area travel on average three times as long to reach their workplace as their inner-city counterparts do. The proportion of car commuters is more than 80 percent among residents living more than 28 kilometers (17 miles) from downtown Copenhagen, compared to

35 percent among those living less than six kilometers (about four miles) from the city center. Conversely, more than half of the latter respondents travel by bike or by foot to their workplace, compared to only 10 percent among those living in the outer suburbs. The implication of these findings, which are in line with results from studies in several other European cities, is that in-fill residential development—in particular in inner-city areas—will contribute to reduced commuting distances, a reduced share of car commuters, and an increased proportion of journeys to work by nonmotorized modes. In contrast, urban sprawl contributes to increase commuting distance and automobile usage for journeys to work.

The influence of residential location on the time spent on commuting is less clear. Some American studies have found shorter travel times for journeys to work among suburbanites than among inner-city dwellers, mainly due to more freely flowing car traffic on the roads in the outer areas. On the other hand, according to several European studies, lower average traveling speeds among inner-city residents (due to higher shares of nonmotorized travel and less freely flowing motorized traffic) are offset by shorter commuting distances. As a result, average commuting times are similar, or even somewhat shorter among residents living close to the city center than among their outer-area counterparts.

The proportion of white-collar workers commuting by car is usually lower if the workplace is located close to the city center than if it is located at the outskirts of the city. The accessibility by public transport is normally highest in the central parts of a city. In addition, congestion and scarcity of parking space in downtown areas may cause a number of potential car commuters to leave their car in the garage at home. In Oslo, Norway, and in Copenhagen, the proportion of car commuters is typically less than 25 percent at downtown workplaces, compared to 50 percent to 85 percent among employees at outer-area offices, depending on whether or not the job site is located close to a commuter train station. Similar results have been reported from other Scandinavian cities, with the most pronounced differences in modal shares between center and periphery typically found in the largest cities. For blue-collar workers, the difference in travel modes between centrally and peripherally located jobs is generally much smaller.

These results support the Dutch so-called ABC principle for workplace location, according to which workplaces (apart from local service facilities) attracting a high number of employees or visitors per area unit should be located in areas easily accessible by public and nonmotorized transport but less easily accessible by car. Blue-collar workplaces, which often generate considerable goods transport, should be located in areas with high accessibility for trucks.

Transport Infrastructure

Commuting travel patterns are also influenced by the provision of transport infrastructure. Although the phenomenon of induced traffic has been heavily disputed, there is growing evidence that road capacity increases in congested urban areas tend to attract more drivers to the new, less congested roads, thus making improved traveling speeds a short-lived relief. Conversely, faster and more frequent public transport improves the competitive power of the transit mode and can make some previous car travelers leave their car in the garage. Empirical studies in Oslo and Copenhagen show that the choices of travel modes among a considerable proportion of commuters is influenced by the ratio of door-to-door travel times between car and transit (and also between car and bike). Building larger urban expressways is thus a counterproductive way of dealing with congestion in situations where transport policy goals aim at curbing the growth in car commuting. In the United Kingdom, national transport authorities have since the late 1990s acknowledged these mechanisms.

In the United States, campaigns for carpooling have been an important policy measure to limit peak-period car travel in congested urban regions. In spite of this, the proportion of car commuters driving alone increased between 1990 and 2001. Among the 20 percent or so of car commuters who did not travel alone, three out of four traveled with members of the same household.

Many transport researchers have pointed to road pricing as a powerful instrument to reduce congestion in urban areas. Fear of negative voter response has prevented most governments from implementing such schemes. A few examples still exist, including Singapore's tolls introduced in 1975 and toll rings introduced in the 1990s around four Norwegian cities. In London, a toll ring established in 2003 around the inner city has reduced the number of cars and minicabs crossing the cordon by 35 percent to 40 percent while improving traffic flows within the affected area. In Stockholm, Sweden, an experiment that included a toll ring around the inner city improved transit services, and increased park-and-ride facilities were carried out in 2005/2006. This package of policy measures resulted in a reduction of car traffic across the toll ring by 20 percent to 25 percent, considerably less congestion on the arterial roads and in the downtown area, reduced air pollution in the inner city, and a gradually increasing public support of the policy measures.

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See also Streetcars; Suburbanization; Subway; Transportation; Urban Planning

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KAMPUNG

Kampung, the Malay word for “village,” refers to a small rural settlement but may also denote a separate urban community, neighborhood, or subdivision of a town. In Indonesia, the term is used to refer specifically to urban neighborhoods in contrast to rural *desa*. In Malaysia, however, it refers to predominantly (but not exclusively) Malay, rural settlements. The *kampung* often conjures up the idea of a strong sense of community, anchored on a moral discourse of egalitarian solidarity, mutual aid among neighbors, and strong family and kinship ties. It also symbolizes home and the locus of Malay identity. At the same time, the term is also used to signify “backwardness”: People who are deemed to have behaved in an uncivilized manner are often called *kampungian* (villagelike). Both nostalgic and derogatory narratives locate the *kampung* as a site outside of, or marginal to, urban modernity.

As the main settlement form predating colonial urban planning in parts of Southeast Asia, *kampungs* were characterized by a distinct socioeconomic class stratification, which was exacerbated by the extension of colonial and postcolonial state bureaucracies from the early twentieth century. Although *kampung* livelihoods are primarily dependent on agriculture, there has been a shift in recent decades to a more diversified occupation structure and sources of income, with some *kampungs* becoming commuter villages characterized by a constant flow of people between the *kampung* and the nearby town.

In Malaysia in the 1990s, the government’s call to produce “new” Malays—entrepreneurial individuals able to compete in a capitalist world economy—prescribed “urbanizing” the Malays and rescuing them from the entrapments of a “backward” *kampung* mentality. At the same time, the *kampung* remains the site of temporary return and reconnection with kin and a sense of Malayness. In practice, however, the rural–urban divide is fast dissolving, as urbanism as a cultural force—transmitted through mass media, education, and people movements—becomes pervasive in rural areas. *Kampung* dwellers today negotiate everyday lives in an overwhelmingly urban world. The reworking of rural spaces into urban ones is central to understandings of urbanism in many parts of Southeast Asia, as encapsulated in the concept of the *desa-kota* (literally “countryside city”) region to describe the imagined and material space between urban center and rural periphery.

In Singapore where urbanization has almost completely erased the *kampung* landscape from the city-state, the notion of *kampung* living continues to be remembered as an idyllic place characterized by a relaxed pace of life and communitarian cooperation, in contradistinction to the stresses and strains of urban life. The timeless quality of *kampung* life associated with childhood innocence, social cohesion, spontaneous interaction, and the simple life functions as an immanent critique of the urban present.

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See also Asian Cities; *Banlieue*; Community; *Favela*

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KOLKATA (CALCUTTA), INDIA

Kolkata, formerly known as Calcutta, is one of the world's most populous cities, with more than 13 million people inhabiting a metropolitan agglomeration that stretches outward from an urban core to envelop an expansive peri-urban hinterland, according to the Census of India in 2001. Known in popular discourse as the "black hole," Kolkata is seen to embody the stereotypes of third world megacities: crushing poverty, filth and disease, jostling masses, slums, and underdevelopment. In this imagination, Kolkata is also rescued by saintly figures, such as Mother Teresa and her tireless work for the city's beggars, lepers, and orphans, and it is thus also the "City of Joy," where compassion and humanity emerge from misery.

Colonial Calcutta

The appellation "black hole" refers to an alleged incident in 1756 when British prisoners suffocated to death in a small dungeon of the Nawab of Bengal. Indeed, Kolkata traces its origins to colonial battles. The city's official history begins in 1690 with British trade and settlement. As British mercantilist interests were transformed into colonial rule and military occupation, so Calcutta was declared, in 1772, capital of British India. And thus it remained until 1911, when a growing nationalist insurgency pressed the British to move the capital to the newly constructed and thus more easily controlled city of New Delhi. In 2001, Calcutta was renamed Kolkata, after one of the three tiny villages that dotted the land when British traders arrived, a renaming that was part of a more widespread move to reclaim Indian cities from their colonial legacies.

Colonial Calcutta, like many other colonial cities, was divided into two distinct areas—the British "White Town" and the Indian "Black Town." As the British White Town was known for its monuments of government and commerce and open spaces of leisure, so the Indian Black Town was known for its claustrophobic poverty. But in colonial Calcutta, these classic colonial distinctions between White and Other were more complex and ambiguous. By the early nineteenth century, Calcutta was witnessing a "Bengal Renaissance," with a flourishing Indian elite, increasingly fluent in English and more broadly in Western liberal philosophies. This was also a landowning elite that invested heavily in the White Town such that by the mid-nineteenth century, much of British Calcutta, the so-called city of palaces, was owned by Indians though occupied exclusively by Europeans (except for their Indian servants). The homes of rich Indians themselves in North Calcutta, the erstwhile Black Town, were often lavish compounds, indicating the lines of class and caste that cut through racial formations and calling into question the image of homogenous Indian poverty and shantytown life.

Colonial Calcutta was an economy built on the manufacture of, and trade in, key commodities, such as jute and paper. Postcolonial Calcutta was to witness the collapse of these industries and a steady deindustrialization of its economic base. At the moment of independence, in 1947, Calcutta and Bombay were the premier economic centers of India. Indeed, Calcutta bravely absorbed large numbers of Bengali "refugees," rendered stateless by the partition that accompanied independence. But by the 1970s, Bombay had cemented its prosperity while Calcutta was in the throes of capital flight and soaring unemployment. In the last decades of the twentieth century, Calcutta persisted primarily as an informalized economy: a city of day laborers, informal vendors, and domestic servants. This informalization was hastened by continuing migration from a vast rural hinterland of poverty—the wretched stretches of Bihar and Orissa and the villages of West Bengal where a communist government had promised but not fully delivered on land reforms and redistribution. The informal city found spatial expression in a landscape of slums, squatter settlements, and pavement dwellings, each governed by different forms of

regulation, negotiation, and political barter, but all signs of the hollowing out of the city's formal economy.

Modern-Day Kolkata

Urban Renewal Under the New Communists

Kolkata is the capital of the state of West Bengal, which is ruled by the world's longest-running, democratically elected communist government, the Left Front, which has been in power since 1977. As the twentieth century ended, the Left Front adopted a new economic policy meant to liberalize the West Bengal economy and attract global investment, primarily in the sectors of real estate and high technology, to Calcutta. With this New Communism came new imperatives for urban renewal and redevelopment. Informal vendors who had long occupied the city's sidewalks were rapidly evicted; the peri-urban fringes of the city, inhabited by squatters and sharecroppers, were now earmarked for suburban subdivisions and new townships. The New Communists had rather obvious ambitions to place Calcutta on the map of globalization.

The eviction of informal vendors, in 1996, from the sidewalks of Calcutta happened under the banner of a municipal drive with an Orwellian title: Operation Sunshine. It was an eviction conducted to reclaim the *bhadralok* city, the gentlemanly city of order and discipline. However, the term *bhadralok* has deep roots in the cultural politics of the region. It refers to a Bengali urban intelligentsia that emerged in the crucible of colonialism, formed by English education and yet shaped by opposition to colonialism, a genteel and refined elite that stands in opposition to the poor and the proletariat but that is also the heart and soul of Bengali leftism. According to Dipesh Chakrabarty, the *bhadralok* are the bearers of a distinctive "Bengali modern" and the inhabitants of a bourgeois public sphere, including one that is being revived through the practices of New Communism.

Ethnic Division of Economic and Political Power

The bourgeois public sphere of Kolkata warrants closer scrutiny. A distinctive feature of Kolkata's elite structure is an ethnic disjuncture

between economic and political power. In broad terms, while political power is held by the Bengali *bhadralok*, economic power is vested in the Marwaris, an ethnic group with roots in the state of Rajasthan. The Marwaris are not a new presence in Kolkata. Important traders during the nineteenth century, the Marwaris were to become industrialists in the twentieth century, establishing pan-Indian dominance in key industrial sectors. However, they were to rarely participate in the political life of Kolkata. In the colonial city, representative rule was introduced to the Calcutta Municipal Corporation in 1875. The Bengali *bhadralok* took up this form of rule. Today, Kolkata is governed by a mayor-in-council system with the Kolkata Municipal Corporation as an apex body and the Kolkata Metropolitan Development Authority as a regional authority. The Bengali dominance of the municipal corporation and regional authority has continued in uninterrupted fashion. The split between economic and political power also continues, with political institutions dominated by the Bengali *bhadralok* and economic life dominated by Marwari industrialists and merchants. It has been argued that Kolkata Marwaris draw upon the idioms of lineage, kinship, and community rather than on the imaginary of a bourgeois public sphere. Kolkata's cultural and political life—cinema, art, theater—then is animated by a distinctive Bengali radicalism, at once socialist and bourgeois, at once nationalist and modern.

The Bengali Middle Class

There is more to the *bhadralok* city than its public guise. The making and remaking of the Bengali (sub)urban middle class is a story not only of urban renewal and peri-urban frontiers but also a story of domestic labor. In Kolkata's informalized economy, domestic servants, mainly poor women, are a prominent feature. Raka Ray has pointed out that just as European colonialists had to negotiate the spatiality of their Calcutta homes and spatial proximity of their Indian servants, so today's middle class has to make itself in relation to the domestic subaltern. But it is also here that political life in Kolkata far exceeds the bourgeois public sphere. Through a rich repertoire of contestations and entitlements, the rural-urban poor claim space, services, livelihood, and voice. This

“political society” stands in contrast to bourgeois “civil society,” wrote Partha Chatterjee, and signals the ways in which the formal and governed realm of the “public” becomes a domain of quasi-claims and paralegal practices: the *pablik* (an interlingual term that captures how the original English word is pronounced in colloquial Bengali). There are historical traces of this *pablik* domain in colonial Calcutta, in the rowdy practices and critical narratives of poor women as they produced a popular culture of the streets that challenged the city of elite parlors.

Today, on the edges of Kolkata, new suburbs and townships are being imagined and implemented by a New Communism. The expansion of the *bhadralok* city seems endless. This urban frontier seems to have replaced the deindustrializing impulse of the twentieth century. But, in 2006, the edges of Kolkata were to witness a new type of political drama. As the state government sought to establish a special economic zone at Singur, to house a global factory for automobiles, so the long simmering controversy over the displacement of sharecroppers and squatters exploded. The Singur discontent spread and at Nandigram, peasants blocked entry to their village and resisted the implementation of a special economic zone. Had New Calcutta reached its limits? Or was the *bhadralok* city also always the informal city, the city of subalterns?

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See also Asian Cities

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KRACAUER, SIEGFRIED

A trained architect, the German–Jewish cultural critic Siegfried Kracauer (born in Frankfurt am Main in 1889, died in New York City in 1966) quickly gave up his profession in the early 1920s to devote himself to philosophical and sociological studies. First as a journalist and editor with the *Frankfurter Zeitung* and then as a film and cultural theorist, he was an original and prolific writer who explored the quotidian experiences, popular culture, and mass entertainments of the modern metropolis. Influenced by Marxism, psychoanalysis, and the sociology of his former professor in Berlin, Georg Simmel, and closely associated with the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt Institute for Social Research (the Frankfurt School), Kracauer came to develop a highly critical and frequently pessimistic vision of contemporary urban life as indelibly marked by a sense of spiritual homelessness, inner emptiness, and the diminished sensitivities of the present-day individual subject.

Writing the Urban Experience in Frankfurt and Berlin

Between 1921 and 1933, Kracauer wrote nearly 2,000 contributions to the *Frankfurter Zeitung*

dealing with the widest possible array of subject matter drawn from the everyday lifeworld of Frankfurt and Berlin; articles relating particular (sometimes uncanny) experiences in the city's streets and squares; curious encounters with eccentric figures; visits to various bars, cafés, and restaurants; discussions of metropolitan architecture, planning, and design; numerous film and literary reviews; reports on contemporary exhibitions, shows, and premieres; and, additionally, occasional communiqués from other cities, Paris in particular.

For Kracauer, these miniature texts were of greater and more enduring significance than mere commonplace journalism. In true modernist fashion, and like his contemporaries Walter Benjamin and Ernst Bloch, Kracauer eschewed any systematic, totalizing account of the modern cityscape. Instead, he and they recognized the potential of textual fragments for authentically capturing and representing the disparate, fractured reality of mundane metropolitan existence. For Kracauer, in particular, the seemingly innocuous "surface manifestations" of the cityscape were nothing other than traces, hieroglyphs, or dream images that, once recovered and deciphered by the critical theorist, could render the metropolis momentarily legible.

Many years later Kracauer selected a number of these fragments for inclusion in two collections: *Das Ornament der Masse* (1963, translated as *The Mass Ornament*, 1995) and *Strassen in Berlin und Anderswo* (1964). These textual mosaics, or montages, repeatedly foreground the superficial and transient features of the urban environment. Shunning the planned and permanent architectural fabric of the city, for example, Kracauer is fascinated by the spontaneous figures and serendipitous formations fleetingly composed by the crowds and traffic in motion on the urban street. He is irresistibly drawn to the intricate play of memory, to the ephemeral glimpsed en passant, to the instantaneous and improvised. Indeed, "improvisation" understood as a freedom of flow between forms, as an effortless process of emergence and disappearance, as intentionless, endless unfolding, becomes the key concept in his writings. Improvisation, be it as a writer, a musician, an acrobat or dancer, be it as a *flâneur* in the city, is a kind of idiosyncratic and utopian mode of creative composition

in contrast to the strictly calculated and controlled routines choreographed by the culture industry and exemplified by the machine-like precision and repetition of the Tiller Girls dance troupe, the mass ornament par excellence.

Writing the Urban Ethnography

Kracauer's journalistic writings came together in a slightly different form during the Weimar Republic. Originally serialized in the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, his 1929 "ethnography" of the emergent and increasingly dominant class of white-collar workers in Berlin, *Die Angestellten* (The Salaried Masses: Duty and Distraction in Weimar Germany) constitutes a pioneering study of the terra incognita of the contemporary urban petite bourgeoisie. Drawing on a wealth of diverse documentary sources, interviews, and observations, Kracauer's study presents the thoroughly rationalized and routinized lifeworld of office employees as blighted by spiritual homelessness and boredom, impoverished by inner meaninglessness and existential isolation, abject feelings for which the distracting products of the city's rapidly expanding culture industry were peddled as compensation and consolation. In response to this crisis, the alienated modern individual, like the Tiller Girl, desperately sought integration into the wider social group, longed for a sense of purpose and belonging, all too happily fell into step, be it dancing, be it marching. Kracauer's eclectic ethnography presents a timely series of images of an urban petite bourgeoisie soon to swap its white collars for brown shirts.

Writing the Paris Cityscape

On the advice of the *Frankfurter Zeitung*, on February 28, 1933, the day after the Reichstag fire, Kracauer left Berlin for exile in Paris. There he began work on, and in 1937 published, *Jacques Offenbach and the Paris of His Time*, a "societal biography" (*Gesellschaftsbiographie*), which, instead of foregrounding the life of an individual like conventional biographies, took the experiences of the famous composer as a lens with which to view the socioeconomic, cultural, and political life of Parisians during the Second Empire. In tracing the fluctuating popularity of Offenbach's witty

operettas and musical comedies, Kracauer's study provides a panoramic and critical representation of the prevailing cityscape from which these frivolous works drew their inspiration and in which they found acclaim: boulevards peopled by bohemians and journalists; the world exhibitions; the salons of fashionable society; the courtesans and the demi-monde; and the court of Napoleon III, with its imperial pomp and ceremony. Contemporaneous with Benjamin's planned but unwritten Arcades Project, Kracauer similarly sought to disenchant Paris, capital of the nineteenth century, as a locus of phantasmagoria, dreams, and chimeras. As itself an absurd "operetta world," the Second Empire found perfect expression in, and was subject to critical debunking by, Offenbach's seemingly innocent musical enchantments. Laced with unmistakable references to the brutality of dictatorships and their phony spell of "joy and glamour," Kracauer's study constitutes an exemplary reading of the metropolitan life of the recent past through one of its "surface," cultural phenomena.

Writing a Theory of Film

Kracauer escaped German-occupied France in 1941 and spent the rest of his life in New York City. There he wrote and published the two major (and much misunderstood and maligned) studies of film and cinema for which he is best known in Anglo-American scholarship: *From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film* (1947) and *Theory of Film: The Redemption of Physical Reality* (1960). These are of particular relevance for urban studies for two reasons. First, as part of his "psychological history" of Weimar films as reflections or premonitions of deep-seated authoritarian predispositions and inclinations, Kracauer discusses in some detail the "street film" as a particular and popular genre during the 1920s. These films, typically portraying the doomed romantic rebellion of youth against the restrictions and cozy comforts of the bourgeois familial home, presented apparently contrasting messages. Films like *Die Strasse* (1923) served as warnings to the unwary as to the dangers of the metropolitan street as a site of vice, corruption, and brutality, whereas later variations on the theme, like *Die Freudlose Gasse* (1925) and *Asphalt*

(1929), sentimentally contrasted the impoverished integrity of a lowly but genuine life among social outcasts with the arrant hypocrisy and crass conventions of middle-class domesticity. The city as threatening chaos; the city as romantic escape—for Kracauer both of these clichéd images played their part in preparing the German public for what was to come.

Most significantly in the *Caligari* book, Kracauer begins to identify and sketch some key correspondences between the cinematic medium itself and the urban environment. These find much fuller development in, indeed become central to, his subsequent attempt to delineate a more general theory of film per se. For Kracauer, film has a special elective affinity with the city. The movie camera finds its most appropriate subject matter in the perpetual mobility, fluidity, transience, and happenstance of metropolitan existence. Film has a particular penchant for the "flow of life" on the urban street. Put another way: The city is itself cinematic. Indeed, Kracauer argues, in its ability to penetrate and record with unprecedented felicity everyday street life, film promises to reawaken our jaded senses to that which surrounds us. Film captures and focuses our attention on what is usually perceived in a state of weary distraction and indifference. In so doing, film images facilitate a new recognition and vital appreciation of our everyday environment. Redeemed by film, the city is restored to us. Film thereby becomes, for Kracauer, the very medium by means of which modern urbanites can overcome the rationalized and routinized existence of the big city. Film offers a home for the spiritually homeless.

Kracauer's varied writings on the theme of the city offer a kaleidoscopic, critical, and ultimately redemptive vision of the modern metropolis and popular urban culture.

Graeme Gilloch

See also Benjamin, Walter; *Cinematic Urbanism; Flâneur; Paris, France; Simmel, Georg*

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LAGOS, NIGERIA

The modern city of Lagos developed from a fishing settlement originally founded in the fifteenth century by the Awori-Yoruba. Although it ceased to be the capital of Nigeria in 1991, Lagos remains the commercial, industrial, and political nerve center, and it was a critical factor in the development of the country, as this entry discusses.

Early Incursions

The intrusion of the Benin kingdom from the seventeenth century marked the first major external stimulus that shaped the fortunes of a community that rapidly developed into a melting pot of African and European elements. The abolition of the transatlantic slave trade and the establishment of British rule, two major developments of the first half of the nineteenth century, shaped the later development of the settlement. Declared a colony in 1861, it soon acquired the trappings of an outpost of Victorian Britain. Modern architecture, new food and dress styles, newspapers, the British legal and political system, formal schools, and Christian evangelization became the hallmarks of an emergent colonial city. As the seat of the nascent British administration, the missionary gateway to a hinterland wracked by the Yoruba civil wars and an increasingly important outlet for the (postslavery) forest produce of the hinterland, Lagos attracted voluntary and forced migrants from various communities in its hinterland.

Steady population growth was aided by an influx of returnee ex-slaves and their descendants from Brazil, Cuba, and Freetown (in Sierra Leone), founded in 1792 by the British to resettle former slaves. Many of the returnees, who still retained emotional ties to their Yoruba homeland, found refuge in Lagos. The émigrés brought various skills and cultural practices to an emerging city that welcomed and rapidly absorbed them. Lagos thus became the staging post for the expansion of British rule and values into the hinterland. Whereas the returnees from Brazil and Cuba were mainly artisans, those from Sierra Leone were essentially clerical in orientation. They became cultural intermediaries between the British and their indigenous counterparts and were, indeed, the purveyors of the British “civilizing mission.” It was through them that Lagos pioneered the development of Western formal and technical education, along with a new urban lifestyle. The Brazilians, on the other hand, introduced and popularized the now famous Brazilian architecture that still adorns the Portuguese/Brazilian quarter in the city.

British Rule

By the end of the nineteenth century, Lagos had become the capital of the Lagos colony and the chief port of Nigeria. The imposition of British rule in the Yoruba hinterland was formalized in an agreement of 1893. This facilitated the introduction of modern economic, legal, and political systems that underpinned the expanding British administration. The British law and order regime,

complete with the road and rail transport infrastructure, fostered the development of produce exports. Primary produce and imports were channeled through the Lagos port, which became Nigeria's dominant seaport outlet beginning in the 1890s. By that date, Lagos had earned the sobriquet of the Liverpool of West Africa.

During the twentieth century, Lagos became the hub of Nigeria's politics, economy, and society following administrative amalgamations carried out by the British in 1906 and 1914. Urban amenities and an expanding colonial economy enhanced the urban status of Lagos and linked it more effectively to a widening hinterland. As expected, leading European firms established their head offices in Lagos, and the major shipping lines offered regular services between Lagos and European metropolitan centers.

The presence of European traders, missionaries, and colonial officials, as well as Western-educated Africans, gave the city a cosmopolitan character. Indeed, with the possible exception of Freetown, Lagos was the most Westernized settlement in West Africa during the twentieth century. This was reflected in the city's fashions, tastes, and institutions. The legal system was essentially British, with the supreme court and lower courts operating in the city. The twentieth century witnessed a blend of architectural styles, although the Brazilian was dominant until the 1950s. In Lagos, corrugated iron roofing sheets began to displace the thatched roofs that had been dominant in indigenous parts of the metropolis. Commercial booms of 1906 through 1914 and 1918 through 1920 fostered conspicuous consumption and an ostentatious lifestyle that continue to characterize Lagos city life.

Residential segregation has been noticeable in Lagos since the nineteenth century, when European settlers established exclusive settlements on Lagos Island. By the 1920s, there was a distinct spatial segregation based on race in Lagos. The Macgregor canal separated the densely populated African town from the low-density European settlements and offices in the western parts of Lagos Island. The major European settlement at Ikoyi, east of the indigenous quarter, took off from the 1920s and subsequently developed into a status symbol that the Nigerian elite inherited from the 1950s. It is instructive that even in the African quarter, the

émigrés from Sierra Leone and Brazil also developed their exclusive residential areas, at Olowogbowo and Popo Aguda, respectively.

The acquisition of a Western education, especially by the more clerical Sierra Leoneans, produced the first crop of African lawyers, medical doctors, missionaries, teachers, traders, and journalists in Lagos. Among such prominent Lagosians were Sapara Williams, R. B. Blaize, Sir Kitoyi Ajasa, Candido da Rocha, S. H. Pearse, J. H. Doherty, the Jacksons, the Macaulays, Eric Moore, and Dr. Orisadipe Obasa. The new African elite copied the marriage and social lifestyles of the British, which made them cultural hybrids. Yet, they were the pioneer African anticolonial nationalists although their principal aim was to seek accommodation in a system that discriminated against them regardless of their qualifications. Hence, most of them embraced cultural nationalism, a precursor of the anticolonial movement of the 1930s and 1940s. This African elite, however, had more in common with its members than with the indigenous Africans of Lagos. This was reflected not only in their residential segregation but also in their practice of marrying within their social class.

The indigenous Africans of Lagos were not totally eclipsed, although the *Oba* (king) and the traditional political order had been completely sidelined in the administration of the colony. Still, a good number of them embraced the colonial order, especially the commercial opportunities it provided. This response produced indigenous entrepreneurs such as Braimah Igbo, a prominent kolanut trader; W. A. Dawodu, the pioneer automobile entrepreneur in Nigeria; Karimu Kotun, a successful businessman who served as an agent for British firms in Liverpool and Manchester, and D. C. (Daniel Conrad) Taiwo, who came from lowly origins to accumulate wealth through the trade of palm oil and urban land holdings (Taiwo Olowo). The institution of the Obaship gradually assumed some political significance with the deposition and later reinstatement of Eshugbayi Eleko in the 1920s and 1930s.

The Contemporary City

Land is a scarce and highly valued commodity in Lagos. This is buttressed by the large number and

protractedness of litigation over land in Lagos since the colonial period. The *Lewis v. Bankole* case, decided by the Supreme Court of Nigeria in 1912, affirmed the right of inheritance of property by female descendants. The Amodu Tijani landmark judgment by the Privy Council in London in 1921 upheld indigenous land rights in Lagos against the claims of the British colonial administration. Land speculation is rife, especially by indigenous Lagosians (*omo onile*), who continue to fuel violent crises in the community. This has contributed to the rise of the “area boys” (delinquent youth) in the downtown sections of the city.

Poor urban planning and waste management have been the bane of Lagos and its suburbs since the early twentieth century. The outbreak of bubonic plague in the 1920s and 1930s necessitated slum clearance on Lagos Island and the creation of new settlements at Yaba and Ebute Metta on the mainland. Government policies have failed to check unregulated urban and suburban development in Lagos, and poor waste management remains a great threat.

A long-standing feature of Lagos is the inadequacy of urban facilities in the face of a massive population increase down to the twenty-first century. With the massive increase in the population from 73,766 in 1911 to 655,246 in 1963 and more than 12 million by 2005, the gap between demand for and supply of water, electricity, and municipal transport facilities has become unbridgeable. Various government interventions, especially during the petroleum boom years of the 1970s, have failed to keep pace with demand in the face of the sharp decline in the value of the national currency, official corruption, and poor maintenance culture. A 2006 initiative by the federal government, the Lagos Mega City Project, is still unfolding.

Lagos has played a pioneering role in Nigerian political, social, and economic development. The first political parties (Peoples Union, 1908; Nigerian National Democratic Party, 1923) and the first pan-Nigerian political parties (Lagos/Nigerian Youth Movement, 1934; the National Council of Nigeria and Cameroon, later known as the National Council of Nigerian Citizens, 1944) were established there. With a vibrant press, multiethnic population, and educational facilities, Lagos has been the hotbed of ethnic, cultural, and

anticolonial nationalism. It was the birthplace of radical labor unionism, anchored on the agitation for higher cost of living allowances in the 1940s.

Lagos is also the entertainment capital of Nigeria with a large number of hotels and recreation centers. In music and social lifestyle, Lagos typifies the Nigerian urban milieu, a meeting point of various cultures and a theater of intense interpersonal and intergroup relations.

Ayodeji Olukoju

See also Colonial City

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LAND DEVELOPMENT

Land development is a process of land use change most often initiated by the private sector, managed by the public sector, and subject to intense social conflict as existing and future interests collide. This is almost always true, regardless of the place of land development—whether in an urban neighborhood or at the city’s edge. Urban land development can alter the character of neighborhoods through gentrification or revitalization; urban fringe development can lead to air and water pollution and declines in adjoining urban area viability while also providing for safe, affordable housing.

The land development process in the United States occurs in a highly decentralized system of governance and public finance. Authority for land

development is a state government responsibility, but most states pass this authority to their local governments. Funds for public services are raised locally, and the types of services to be provided (schools, police, fire, etc.) are locally determined. The primary revenue source for services is the local property tax.

Pressures for land development originate from two sources that reinforce each other. First, in a system of decentralized governance and finance, local governments are compelled to continually grow physically and fiscally in response to ever-rising public services costs. Local officials have two choices—raise property taxes on existing landowners or generate more economic value from land. Encouraging land development is one easy way to generate more value. So, land intensification—whether in the form of urban gentrification or agricultural land conversion—increases the land's market value and thus the taxes that the land provides to local governments. Therefore, local officials are predisposed to pursue land development because such development allows for the continued provision of local services, and perhaps an increase in services, without having to increase tax burdens on existing owners.

A second source of land development pressure is the mismatch between the different logics of individual and social decision making about land. An individual landowner can achieve significant personal benefits by selling land for a more intensive use. Yet, the accumulation of a set of logical individual decisions can become socially illogical; for example, the inability of long-standing, elderly residents to live in a neighborhood because of increased assessed values or the loss of agricultural land and environmental resources. In short, local government wants land to be developed to generate more tax revenue, and some owners can want to intensify land use, but the result can be a loss for society.

Governments have experimented with a diverse set of tools to manage this process, including zoning, property tax relief, transfer of development rights, and support for nonprofit land and community development organizations. In selected places, these approaches have reshaped the geographic form of land development. Still, pressure on land continues.

Land development is not just about dollars and cents, but rather about the relationship of

landownership to fundamental rights in a democratic market society. It is wrapped in complex historical and legal baggage that makes it difficult to address and resolve.

Harvey M. Jacobs

See also Developer; Environmental Policy; Growth Management; Real Estate; Sustainable Development; Urban Planning

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LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE

Landscape architecture is broadly defined as the profession concerned with careful stewardship, wise planning, and artful design of natural and cultural environments. First use of the term as a professional title is often credited to Frederick Law Olmsted and Calvert Vaux in the 1850s, describing their role in the planning and design of Central Park in New York City. Drawing on traditions in agriculture, landscape gardening, architecture, and design, the professional title grew in popularity among early practitioners responding to public health, open space, and recreation needs in rapidly developing urban environments, culminating in the formation of professional degree programs and a professional association in the United States by the close of the nineteenth century.

Although rural environments and natural reserves have historically been important areas of work for landscape architects, the majority of work and accompanying discourse in the field has

evolved in response to urbanization and has resulted in great diversity among the work of landscape architects today. Landscape architects are involved in the design and planning of large landscapes, such as watersheds and community-wide plans; many large urban spaces such as parks, recreation facilities, plazas, and streets; and many small spaces such as monuments and residential gardens. This work in urban environments has revealed significant ecological and social challenges that characterize the field.

Urban Ecological Challenges

The stewardship, planning, and design of natural environments by landscape architects requires an understanding of landscape structure, that is, the patterns of land form, plant, and animal species found to be existing within a region, as well as landscape function, the natural processes that shape these patterns. Urban development often dramatically alters landscape structure by displacing native vegetation and sensitive animal species, as well as landscape features such as wetlands, streams, or hillsides. Although it has long been common practice to preserve some existing landscape structure in urbanizing areas through the development of parks and open space reserves, these remnants often degrade in quality over time due to changes in the function of these landscapes. Key natural processes, such as the migration of plant and animal species, hydrology, carbon and nutrient cycling, and ecological disturbances such as flooding and fire, are typically suppressed or radically altered in terms of frequency, extent, and diminished beneficial impact.

The alteration of landscape structure and function affects the ecological integrity of open spaces as well as the quality of the overall urban environment. Some native species may become locally extinct due to insufficient or isolated habitat. Others may thrive due to their adaptability to urban conditions or the reduction of their predators or competitors. Alterations in natural processes, such as hydrology, may result in insufficient quantity to meet human demand, as well as degradation of water quality due to chemicals, fertilizers, and sediments common to urban environments. Suppression of ecological disturbances such as flooding and fire may result in less

frequent, but more intense events that threaten life and property.

Current landscape architecture practice favors a variety of approaches designed to sustain the urban ecosystem over an extended period of time. A primary approach is the establishment of ecological networks, an assemblage of connected open space, often along streams and other hydrologic systems, to facilitate species migration and preserve natural hydrologic processes. Native plant species are often advocated for designs to provide wildlife habitat, reduce water usage, and prevent the use of exotic species that may be invasive to surrounding ecosystems. Efforts are made to capture and filter storm water runoff using wetland plants and microorganisms to enhance water quality, and some open spaces are designed to flood as a storm water management strategy. Efforts are made to reduce energy consumption of projects, both in terms of daily operations and maintenance, to reduce greenhouse gas emissions associated with development.

Ecological networks and sustainable processes are most effectively achieved if these concepts are integrated into the initial planning of urban environments, but landscape architecture has long been concerned with the reestablishment of ecologically beneficial landscape structure and function in existing cities, a sector of practice that has enjoyed renewed interest in recent years. These approaches often rely on the regenerative qualities of natural processes, which if supported possess the potential to restore landscape structure as well as address soil, water, and air pollution. Although the restored ecosystem is not identical to the native ecosystem displaced by urban development, it has the potential to be ecologically beneficial while also supportive of the surrounding urban community.

Urban Social Challenges for Landscape Architecture

As stewards, planners, and designers of the cultural environment, landscape architects are concerned with the broad range of social issues that impact community life, with particular attention paid to impacts from the physical environment. Work may include the design of large spaces to support community activities and smaller spaces for small groups and individuals. Such work often

draws on environmental psychology and behavioral research in the creation of spaces that are comfortable and attractive for human activity. When working in existing communities, landscape architects typically strive to integrate their work into the fabric of the community in ways that respect and enhance cultural values and local sense of place.

Often serving as the technical experts in the real estate development or redevelopment process, landscape architects can enhance community life by supporting community investment through planning and design. However, this traditional role is inadequate in addressing the needs of communities lacking investment or communities whose interests are not served by redevelopment efforts. In such situations, community-based design has emerged as a small but critical tradition within the field of landscape architecture.

Advancing social justice is a fundamental concern of community-based designers, primarily through responses to inequities that disadvantage communities. As with the broader environmental justice movement that emerged in the 1960s, early community-based design efforts responded to environmental negatives that disproportionately affected disadvantaged communities, such as pollution and locally unwanted land uses. Design and planning efforts either eliminated or ameliorated the adverse impacts of these negatives. More recent efforts in landscape architecture have broadened the justice framework to address the distribution of environmental positives, such as access to recreation, open space, safe community spaces, and opportunities to experience natural areas. The influence of both negative and positive environmental factors on perceptions of justice have led some to conclude that ecological sustainability should be advanced in landscape architecture as a social justice issue: Disadvantaged communities are disproportionately affected by the adverse impacts of unsustainable practices in society, so strategies that promote ecological sustainability in urban environments also have the potential to promote social justice, if consciously recognized and addressed by practitioners.

Community-based design differs fundamentally from more traditional practice models of landscape architecture. Due to its focus on justice, the work often closely resembles community organizing, as the process of inclusion, participation, and empowerment

of local communities becomes as important as the resulting plan or design. This contrasts sharply with more traditional perspectives of the landscape architect as a highly trained technical expert who may engage local communities for input, but owns, analyzes, and synthesizes the information in developing external solutions or recommendations. Such diversity of viewpoints on the role of landscape architects in the stewardship, planning, and design processes illustrates another dimension of the diversity of landscape architectural work. For this reason, many scholars argue that professional identity stems as much from shared training, shared processes, and shared values in response to ecological and social challenges as it does from the outcomes or products of the work itself.

Kyle D. Brown

See also Parks; Renaissance City; Sustainable Development

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LANDSCAPES OF POWER

Sharon Zukin's 1991 book, *Landscapes of Power*, developed an argument that the creative destruction

inherent to capitalism also remakes the places in which people live, work, consume, and recreate. The term has been adopted by geographers, sociologists, urban studies, historians, anthropologists, and political scientists and is present in many different debates about economics and geography since the publication of Zukin's book. Because the term is about the dynamic relationship between economics, politics, culture, and space, it can be used to support a variety of arguments. This entry looks at the key arguments in Zukin and later adoptions to other areas of study.

Key Principles

Following in the tradition of the historian Karl Polanyi, who described the emergence of capitalism in *The Great Transformation*, Zukin outlines how deindustrialization and the shift to a postindustrial economy in the United States has changed five different locales.

The conception of landscapes of power includes the thesis that market forces and attachments to place have become ever more antagonistic. Zukin explores this thesis in a number of different regards. She examines how deindustrialization has meant that towns developed in relationship to particular industries are particularly vulnerable to changes in the economy. For instance, Detroit has become one of the most intensive concentrations of poverty in the United States as the domestic auto industry has lost its economic viability. Attachment to a particular place can be an economic disadvantage if workers do not want to relocate to follow economic opportunities, or if the economic opportunities available in a given locale do not match their skills. Douglas Rae has pointed out in his examination of New Haven, Connecticut, that the economy changes much more quickly than the infrastructure that is built to support it; therefore, we can see a gap between how quickly the market and the landscapes that support it can change.

This theme is also explored in recent work on globalization and place. The globalization of the economy has detached production from particular locations due to the reduced costs of transport. No longer do products need to be made near the spaces where materials are found, nor is it necessary that objects be made in proximity to where

they will be sold or consumed. For this reason, economic production becomes less bound by geography.

Just as the concept of creative destruction encompasses the demise of some forms of market behavior and the birth of new ones, so the concept of landscapes of power argues that market forces end up destroying some landscapes while giving rise to new ones. The analysis explains both degenerative and generative changes in the built environment through reference to shifts in economic production. Deindustrialization has hollowed out former company towns such as Gary, Indiana, and Detroit, Michigan, but it has also spawned new developments such as those catering to retired workers in moderate climates.

Zukin also describes how landscapes of power can lose their particular characteristics as another example of the antagonism between the market and locality. For instance, malls around the country have the same stores, restaurants, and recreational opportunities. The economies of scale offer a competitive advantage over competed distinctive local establishments. On the other hand, divergence in the landscape is also evident. Zukin points to the growing disparity of economic opportunity in the United States between coastal regions and the interior as a result of shifts in the market. Evolving market arrangements do not entirely remake the landscape, however, and different layers of economic history are evident in many different locations, as, for example, the luxury loft apartments that have become common in abandoned warehouse space, showing how the economics of intensive capital can redefine—and recycle—the spaces of industrial production.

Another central element in the concept of landscapes of power is that economics reshapes all spaces of living, not just spaces of production. Deindustrialization has created the phenomenon of highly segregated spatial arrangements: Spaces of habitation are distinct from those of production, and places of consumption or leisure are segregated yet again. We move between distinctive environments to work, live, and play. Even those spaces that are designated as spaces of leisure are a result of market forces. Zukin's book considers how both Detroit and Disneyworld can be understood in relationship to the economics of deindustrialization in the United States.

Last, Zukin discusses how cultural forms can simultaneously oppose and reflect the rules of the market economy; for example, how spaces of alternative artistic production attract the forces of gentrification, as evident in Lower Manhattan. Landscapes of power include cultural forces that contest the values of capitalism, as well as providing spaces that allow people to escape the pressures of being a productive member of a late-capitalist economy. The concept unites what seem to be ever more disparate elements of the landscape, showing how they all reflect a singular economic system.

Impact in Other Areas

The literature on the emergence of global cities often adopts Zukin's framework as a model. While the original concept was articulated in relationship to deindustrialization, similar arguments have been made in terms of the globalization of the economy and the emergence of regional centers of the global economy, what are called global cities or world cities. Saskia Sassen, a sociologist, points out that the structures of the global economy have created distinctive labor patterns in these urban centers. There is also an increasing convergence of the labor patterns, consumption habits, and the built environments of these global cities, despite their distinctive histories and vastly different locations and cultures. Whereas cities such as New York, Tokyo, and Paris may be converging landscapes, the distinction between these global cities and cities that do not play a central role in the global economy is growing. For example, the patterns of living, working, and consuming are becoming more similar in London and Paris, but there is a greater difference between Paris and Lyon than there was 40 years ago because of the different roles these cities play in a globalized economy.

Recent work on the cultures of consumption, tourism, and leisure have also drawn heavily on the idea that even spaces designated as alternatives to economic production reflect market forces. For example, eco-tourism allows spaces that have fallen outside of the circuit of economic production to attract global capital. As spaces become more homogenized through transnational global investment, cities have discovered that developing

more authentic depictions of their historical culture increases their economic viability by attracting tourism. Urbanism itself has become a major lifestyle attraction in many inner-city neighborhoods as it is redefined as a sophisticated, multicultural, and elite form of culture that is promoted by dense living space.

Keally McBride

See also Deindustrialization; Global City; Loft Living; Shopping

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LAND TRUSTS

In the United States, land trusts are a form of social ownership of land. Typically, nonprofit organizations own land in trust through either a conservation land trust or a community land trust. The two types of land trusts are different from each other in origin, use, and intent. Conservation land trusts are nonprofit organizations that conserve land in perpetuity for natural, recreational, scenic, historic, and productive uses. Community

land trusts are nonprofit organizations that typically own land to provide a perpetually affordable stock of housing for low- and moderate-income households; however, other uses are possible.

There are more than 1,500 conservation land trusts in the United States. Conservation land trusts either own land or are the recipients of conservation easements. Landowners sell or donate land to a land trust for stewardship. Alternatively, landowners may keep ownership of the land and donate or sell the conservation easements. These easements are legally binding agreements between landowners and the land trust or a government agency, which permanently limit the use of the land. For example, a landowner might donate a conservation easement that would permit the owner to continue to grow crops but restrict the building of additional structures. Future owners would also be bound by these restrictions. Donors of conservation easements typically receive a deduction on income taxes as well as estate tax benefits when the land is passed to heirs. In addition, 12 states have state tax credits for conservation easements. Some local governments assess land with conservation easements at below market rate, thus reducing the landowner's property tax bill. There is great variation in the use of conservation easements by land trusts due to variation in local capacity to select critical lands (e.g., those with greatest ecological value), enforce easements, maintain records, and manage the lands, among other issues.

The community land trust mechanism has roots in nineteenth-century England and Ireland, Ebenezer Howard's Garden City movement, and the Gandhian *Gramdan* (village gift) movement of the 1950s. The first community land trust in the United States was New Communities, Inc., established in rural Georgia in 1968 by the civil rights movement as a response to the displacement of black farmers in the rural South. Today, there are more than 150 community land trusts across the United States in rural, urban, and suburban settings. Most community land trusts are small organizations stewarding as few as a dozen units of housing. The largest of them stewards more than 2,000 units of housing. A new trend is the interest of municipal governments in sponsoring community land trusts, often to build and manage affordable housing created under inclusionary zoning.

Typically, a community land trust is governed by a tripartite board of directors, where one third represents the interests of leaseholders, one third represents the interests of residents from the community, and one third represents the public interest (e.g., public officials or funders). The leaseholder and community representatives to the board are elected from the trust membership, which includes leaseholders as well as community residents.

The ground lease is the legal document that governs the relationship between the homeowner and the community land trust. The trust establishes a resale formula that governs the sale of the house from one leaseholder to the next. Although the house passes from one owner to another, the land continues to be owned by the trust. The resale formula balances the goals of the organization and the interests of the current and future low- and moderate-income homeowners.

Rosalind Greenstein

See also Environmental Policy; Land Development; Sustainable Development

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LAS VEGAS, NEVADA

Las Vegas, Nevada, represents a singularly fascinating subject within the field of urban studies. This is not so much because of its history in terms of urban development—which is nevertheless rich and illuminating—but more because of its *historiography*, in that its locus and meaning within scholarly discourse have changed dramatically and controversially within the past 50 years. As a

place, Las Vegas continues to stimulate debate as globalized economics, social deprivation, and climate change begin to have a powerful impact on its future development.

There are, of course, other sites in the continental United States where gambling is legalized or where the focus of the urban environment is toward leisure and recreation. Atlantic City, New Jersey; Reno, Nevada; and Tunica, Mississippi, for example, as well as many state- or federal-sanctioned casinos on tribal lands and riverboats across the United States, play host to gambling and other forms of gaming. Compared with other places associated with gambling in the world, however, Las Vegas has attracted more attention, developed more innovatively, and courted more controversy. This entry begins with a historical review and then looks at key issues related to urban studies.

Historical Background

Gambling was first legalized in Nevada in 1896 and at that time was focused along Fremont Street in Las Vegas, adjacent to the railroad station. Gambling was then banned in 1911, and licenses were granted again only in 1931, a move intended to help Nevada, a state notable for its lack of industry, minimal agriculture, and depleted mines, survive the Great Depression. Las Vegas also got by thanks to the patronage of many of the 5,000 workers building the nearby Hoover Dam, and the so-called maverick state later came through World War II by an injection of federal government resources.

Robert E. Parker describes how Las Vegas then entered the “mob phase” of its history, marked by the opening of Bugsy Siegel’s Flamingo casino in 1946, which paved the way for casinos along the Strip becoming ever more lavish and extravagant in their vision and their execution. The corporate phase began after 1967, when reclusive entrepreneur Howard Hughes began to buy up casinos on the Las Vegas Strip, starting with the Desert Inn, where he had been living. Hughes’s investment in Las Vegas is thought to have helped the town throw off its associations with organized crime and move from being seen as the ultimate Sin City to a typical all-American city. As a result, perceptions of the Strip have now been upgraded with its renaming as Las Vegas Boulevard, and casino

ownership has become increasingly monopolized by companies such as Harrah’s, MGM Mirage, and Station Casinos: The big operators reputedly now own more than 60 percent of casino real estate.

By the 1990s, Las Vegas casinos had become enormous resort complexes, attracting a wide variety of international clientele, enticing them with spectacular events such as volcanoes erupting, fountains dancing, pirate ships sinking, and spectacular urban collages of New York, Venice, and Paris. Las Vegas’s earlier incarnation as a Strip development where giant signs made up the skyline, where there were no buildings to speak of, has been replaced by an avenue of striking and substantial structures, where the architecture itself is the sign. The smaller and older casinos located in the former downtown area of Las Vegas along Fremont Street were suffering a loss of patronage due to the success of the megacasinos on the Strip and conceived a plan designed by architect Jon Jerde to attract customers back to this location. Jerde’s branded Fremont Street Experience is an event space that consists of a high-tech vaulted canopy running the length of the now pedestrian street, and it is fitted with millions of programmable LED lights. Sound and light shows are programmed throughout the day, featuring aspects of American and local history, race car driving, and aliens; the space also hosts the town’s New Year’s Eve party, with fireworks relayed on the display system at 9 p.m., so as to be televised live at midnight on East Coast television screens.

So much for some brief Las Vegas facts and developmental timeline: As countless websites attest, elaborated chronology functions as a proxy for Las Vegas’s identity and status, superficially legitimizing its contribution to urban history through a series of sensational build costs, insurance payouts, and visitor and land-take figures over the years. It still has the highest hotel room inventory of any city in the world. Richard Florida, writing in *Cities and the Creative Class*, notes, however, that Las Vegas might have ranked first for population growth and third in terms of job growth between 1990 and 2000, but in terms of per capita income growth, it came in 294th out of the 315 U.S. metropolitan areas surveyed. Las Vegas’s population is 58 percent service class, and the city is unusual in its lack of interest



Las Vegas at night, from the top of the Luxor hotel on the Strip.

Source: Erin Monacelli.

in attracting the creative class that other cities across the world have found essential to sustain economic growth. Despite Las Vegas's proven viability to date as an economic force, many of its less attractive statistics are usually played down, and the reality of a city of low-paid workers working antisocial hours is masked, along with issues to do with the precarious situation regarding air pollution, energy consumption, water supply, underage and compulsive gambling, lack of affordable housing, male homelessness, degradation of the desert environment, and underinvestment in community benefits.

Urban Theory Research

The scholarly community has of late been turning its attention toward addressing these pressing topical issues and, in the process, reflecting on the role of Las Vegas within urban theory. Academic

assessment of Las Vegas has in fact been continuous ever since the publication in 1972 of *Learning from Las Vegas* (LFLV) by Robert Venturi, Denise Scott Brown, and Steve Izenour. Their book was reputedly inspired by reading an essay by Tom Wolfe, quirkily titled "Las Vegas (What?) Las Vegas (Can't hear you! Too noisy) Las Vegas!!!" in which, according to Douglass and Raento, Wolfe "captures the essence of the city's postwar reinvention of itself and its metamorphosis into a true gaming destination."

The Original Study

LFLV is the culmination of the fieldwork of a group of architecture students from Yale University and contains essays, diagrams, and analysis of Las Vegas as they found it at the end of the 1960s. Their interest was in understanding how a commercial strip was organized, how it worked

spatially and temporally, and where its popular appeal lay. By their account, it is clear that in 1972, Las Vegas was already embarking on an amelioration of its tawdry urban environment, and LFLV is thus not unlike Walter Benjamin's work on the Paris arcades, capturing an era that was in danger of being replaced by a new incarnation.

Sarfatti Larson reminds us that LFLV represented "a shocking comparison of private and public spaces in eighteenth-century Rome with the Las Vegas strip." Albert Pope, author of *Ladders*, qualifies arguments expressed within LFLV favoring chaotic urban form by suggesting that the authors overlooked a significant contradiction: Both the Strip and Fremont Street were in fact ordered around a linear armature, and despite the messy vitality of the discrete pieces of Las Vegas's urban form, this linearity served to unify and regulate the city's development.

Whatever reading is applied, there is no doubt that LFLV showed that as a place Las Vegas required a different mode of inquiry regarding how its urban landscape functioned compared to other twentieth-century places. A 2004 book on *Design-based Planning for Communities* goes as far as to suggest that *Learning from Las Vegas* represents "an important event in the demolition of modernist urban theory, it created room for the development of new ways of thinking about urbanism in America." Jon Goodbun allows an even more direct influence, establishing the place rather than the book about the place as the instrument of change: "Las Vegas represents the rejection of modernism."

Paradigm or Pariah

It is profoundly fascinating that Las Vegas could, as an object of study, have been responsible for prompting a wholesale shift within planning and urban design, a shift that has since given rise to Traditional Neighborhood Development (TND), Transit-Oriented Development (TOD), and other new urbanist concepts, especially given the lack of focus on public transportation in Las Vegas (the monorail system is still only partially built). Las Vegas is often held up simultaneously as a paradigm and a pariah in urban design terms. Reyner Banham registered how "so much has been written about that city as an image of fear, loathing,

bad taste, depravity, cultural emptiness and all the rest that the simple truth behind it can no longer be seen . . . [namely] a true oasis." Hal Rothman argues that Las Vegas is now in the process of switching from pariah to paradigm, in the sense that Las Vegas is no longer exceptional in the American urban landscape but wholly consistent with other places functioning as tourist destinations.

The Dutch architect Rem Koolhaas, who was a student at the time LFLV came out, and was taken with its premise, instigated a second look at the city with a bunch of East Coast students, this time from Harvard University. Koolhaas claims in his book, *Project on the City*, that "Las Vegas is one of the few cities to become paradigmatic twice in thirty years: from a city at the point of becoming virtual in 1972, to an almost irrevocably substantial condition in 2000."

In terms of benchmarking current practice, Las Vegas thus represents a changeable and problematic irritant to urban theorists, one that was consequently either belittled or ignored. Writing in the *Architectural Review* in 1962, Lewis Mumford saw Las Vegas as an example of "roadtown," and as such was an "anti-city," constituting an "incoherent and purposeless urbanoid nonentity, which dribbles over the devastated landscape." From the later vantage point of 1993, Alan Hess explains that "Las Vegas was largely incomprehensible to eastern architecture critics, but being ignored allowed it time to gestate as a city before it was noticed at all." Hess claimed that "Las Vegas is not an ideal urban model, but it is well worth considering as American urbanism gropes towards a new definition and a new form," especially given that most American cities are in a state of adolescence. At that time, the urban village concept was only just "emerging from the primal suburban soup," where by contrast, the Las Vegas Strip, although "no older than many such suburbs, has been changing and remodelling since . . . 1941."

The case for ignoring Las Vegas did not end with the publication of LFLV, however: witness the fact that despite Fredric Jameson declaring *Learning from Las Vegas* to be *the* canonical text of postmodernism, Nan Ellin, for example, in *Postmodern Urbanism*, does not discuss Las Vegas once, yet her book evolves an entire narrative about the relationship between cities and

postmodern urban design theory. One is left to assume that, in her view, Las Vegas lies outside realms of deliberate strategic, design-centered urban development and is therefore not noteworthy.

Nevertheless, as a product of postmodern urbanism, the typology of the Urban Entertainment District (UED), which Las Vegas amply exemplifies, has generated a broad spectrum of unique selling propositions, which now extend from slot machines and video poker all the way up to fine dining (4 of the 17 five-star restaurants in the entire United States are on the Strip), haute couture (Caesar's Forum, at \$1,300 per square foot for leased space, is the world's greatest concentration of luxury retail outlets), and upmarket art collections. Shopping now ranks first with visitors, above gambling, as the reason they come to the city.

Social and Cultural Studies

Studies of Las Vegas as an urban phenomenon have not been restricted to architectural theory and urban geography. Las Vegas also looms large within film studies, sociology, tourism and leisure studies, and critical theory. Within this multidisciplinary landscape, debate has tended to focus on the real/fake distinction, where Las Vegas is seen to offer a pertinent and challenging configuration. Judd and Fainstein suggest that "Las Vegas explicitly advertises itself as a fake neon city. . . . But tourists do not always want to be humored or amused. Instead they often seek immersion in the daily, ordinary, authentic life of a culture or place that is not their own." Hal Rothman's take is more nuanced: "It's not that people can't tell the difference [between authentic and inauthentic in Las Vegas]—they can. But in a culture without a dominant set of premises or culturally agreed upon values . . . it's hard to communicate why conventional authenticity is better."

Mark Gottdiener, coauthor of *Las Vegas: The Social Production of an All-American City* and author of *The Theming of America*, has examined the relationship between values and their communication via theming. He regards authenticity in Las Vegas as having to do with being overendowed with signification and meaning to produce an intensely specialized pleasure zone. Gottdiener also shows how this becomes part of a bigger process, where the stakes are raised for iconic

skylines and buildings-as-brands. As such, the strong visual and iconic appeal of Las Vegas becomes normalized and contiguous with urban development agendas elsewhere, and Las Vegas consequently takes its place in the global order of things, as part of the global pecking order of other Guggenheim museums, other Dolce and Gabbana stores, other Hard Rock cafés.

Never far from debates about authenticity is the specter of Disneyfication and the privatization of public space. George Ritzer's take on Disneyfication regards it as a handmaiden to capitalism, capable of producing and sustaining markets with strong, infantilized, predictable, and controlling imagery. Las Vegas may have strayed into the market of family entertainment but never fully embraced it for fear of alienating its core customer base. Family-oriented elements are evident in Las Vegas, and the general ambience has become more daytime, more televisual, and consequently rehabilitated as a result. Ritzer sees the greatest similarity between Disney and Las Vegas in the notion of a *total institution*, defined by Erving Goffman as "places of residence and work, where large numbers of like situated individuals, cut off from the wider society for an appreciable period of time, together lead an enclosed, formally administered round of life." As a total institution, Las Vegas gathers and isolates those who come with hopes of winning but an underlying acceptance that they will lose money in the interests of enjoyment.

Writing his *Scenes in America Deserta* in 1982, Reyner Banham claimed that Las Vegas avoids the question of "How could they have made a place like that?" Today one could also claim that Vegas ducks the question "Do people actually live here?" There is an obvious disconnect between Las Vegas the UED and Las Vegas as an entire settlement. This leads one to question if in fact Las Vegas is a city at all—or conversely, is it what all cities are in the process of becoming?

Looking Ahead

Banham suggests that above all else, Las Vegas represents "the impermanence of man in the desert." It remains to be seen whether the quality of impermanence is to be realized: Will Las Vegas at some point be abandoned due to rising surface

temperatures, the scarcity of land, and the prohibitive cost of oil? Or will it survive?

To date, there has been little emphasis on conservation or preservation of Las Vegas's ephemeral architecture, for either cultural or ecological reasons. As one of the most isolated cities in the United States, located in possibly the least hospitable part of the country, Las Vegas nevertheless seems to be responding to environmental pressures: The new 61-acre Union Park development on a brownfield site claims to herald a new era of green design, with a fully master-planned, Leadership in Environmental Design–certified, high-density, mixed-use, sustainability-centered urban village. Is it smart, however, to cater to the demand for dense urban lifestyles in a part of the United States where the prospects of supplying water and hence land suitable for development are diminishing? If it is to survive, Las Vegas will need to become an exemplar for low-impact development, as Edward McMahon, director of the Urban Land Institute, speculates: “Living in a desert has always been a challenge, but the realities of geography and global warming are going to force Las Vegas to go green or suffer the consequences.”

The consequences include falling land values and the prospect of rising unemployment and social security claimants leading to a situation potentially where Sun Belt cities could come to eclipse Rust Belt cities in terms of their relative unviability, in which case Las Vegas would become more than just an extended boneyard of abandoned neon signage. Other places in history such as Fatehpur Sikri, Prypiat, and Thebes have suffered the same fate due to ecological or political reasons: In the future, it is not inconceivable that the main tourist motivation for visiting Las Vegas may be to experience a museum of historic twentieth century artifacts on an urban scale. Conservation and preservation will become the new thematic content of Las Vegas, the ghost town. Its very existence has perhaps been one long hundred-year gamble, for as Baudrillard says in *America*, “gambling itself is a desert form, inhuman, uncultured, initiatory, a challenge to the natural economy of value, a crazed activity on the fringes of exchange.”

Sarah Chaplin

See also Cinematic Urbanism; Gottdiener, Mark; Tourism; Urban Planning; Urban Semiotics

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LAWN

A lawn is defined by four characteristics: It is composed only of grass species; it is subject to weed and pest control; it is subject to practices aimed at maintaining its green color; and it is regularly mowed to ensure an acceptable length. Although many authors



A well-maintained lawn in front of a home in a suburb of Detroit, Michigan.

Source: Karen Wiley.

include parks, golf courses, and playing fields within the broad rubric of the lawn, the term is most often associated with the green spaces that border private dwellings. Despite its commonplace presence in most North American and some European cities, the lawn generates considerable dialogue concerning its social and cultural symbolism as well as its role in urban ecological processes.

History

There is some evidence that manicured grassed landscapes made their first appearance in ancient China. A form of lawn is also associated with English and French elites of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries. However, a more prosaic dating of the urban lawn places it with the growing middle class in the late-nineteenth-century cities. Rapid growth of industrial cities and concern for urban morals fueled the emergence of a pastoral idyll. And, whereas a complete removal from the city was impossible for many families, middle-class rural desires were manifest as a suburban, single detached home surrounded by private green space.

These desires depended on the convergence of a number of factors. First, the emergence of commuter travel and later the automobile allowed urban dwellers the necessary mobility to move to

suburban homes. Second, the adoption of the eight-hour workday and the five-day workweek meant that people had adequate time for lawn work. Finally, and contemporaneously, the development of technologies such as lawn mowers, irrigation devices (hoses and sprinklers), pesticides, and herbicides, as well as the identification of appropriate grass plants, offered homeowners the means through which lawns could be created and maintained.

Early-twentieth-century advertisers sought to convince homeowners of the moral, aesthetic, and social virtues of owning a lawn. However, in the 1930s, these same advertisers shifted strategies. That is, instead of persuading homeowners of the lawn's appropriateness, new advertisements offered consumers better means to care for a lawn. The

implication is that by this time, most consumers were convinced of the appropriateness of the lawn and now needed to be disciplined to care of it. A post-World War II climate conducive to consumerism and the advent of mass suburban development fixed the lawn in discourses surrounding home and property ownership, public presentation, industriousness, gender, the nuclear family, and good citizenship. In North America, in particular, yard after yard of unfenced turf bespoke democracy.

Although it is impossible to fix the degree to which lawn covers the Earth's surface, there are some data that illustrate its extent. For example, 2008 estimates suggest that the lawn is North America's largest agricultural crop and that it covers nearly 2 percent of the continental United States. Furthermore, lawn maintenance has become big business. The production of lawn equipment and lawn products produce commodity chains that touch every continent except Antarctica. Global estimates in the early 2000s for lawn-related expenditure range between \$22 billion and \$35 billion annually. This amount includes the increasing use of professional lawn care companies that range from small (less than \$50,000 in sales per year) to large (more than \$1 million in sales per year). Estimates suggest that in 2008, more than 80,000 lawn and landscaping companies operated in the United States alone.

The Lawn as Sociocultural Landscape

Apologists make a number of claims concerning the benefits of a well-groomed lawn. First, many commentators contend that a uniform covering of turf is aesthetically pleasing. This has immediate benefits; it creates a good impression of the homeowner and adds significant value to any home. Second, proponents contend that a good lawn can be therapeutic. It offers urban residents opportunity to engage with nature on their home fronts. Moreover, both working on the lawn and relaxing on it afterward are good therapy for relieving the stresses of everyday life. A lawn also provides a good space for exercise and a soft, resistant space on which children can play safely next to their homes. Third, a neighborhood of good lawns is conducive to good citizenship. Lawns, proponents argue, function as detriment to litter and to crime. A SULIS report, for example, suggests that the social and material problems of inner cities may be combated with lawns and other forms of landscaping.

Despite these claims, the lawn lies at the interstices of numerous social divides. Scholars have historically associated suburban movements with white middle-class pioneers. Wishing to leave behind the perceived ugliness, disorderliness, and material and moral pollution of the city, these people sought refuge in the new suburbs. Central to this move was the desire to keep particular sets of values safe from undesirable people and obnoxious nuisances. At once reacting to and entrenching this demand, many developers enacted covenants that restricted habitation in subdivisions based on race, ethnicity, religion, and/or class. Although civil rights legislation has rendered most of these restrictions unlawful, scholarship suggests that they continue, but in the guise of discriminatory lending practices and real estate steering. The upshot is, a suburban home surrounded by a verdant lawn remains a landscape simultaneously raced and classed. Moreover, research suggests that these White, middle-class desires are reemerging in gated and otherwise closed communities. Upkeep of the lawn is often an initial clue of the homeowner's willingness to internalize the values implicit in these communities.

Like other markers of suburban conformity, the appearance of well-kept lawn continues to signify the gendered division of domestic labor. Inside

work belongs to women; it is moral work based on family care. Where associated with outdoor work, women are limited to the gardens that fringe the lawn. Outside work belongs to men; it is also moral work but based on public performance and good citizenship. Furthermore, advertisers have targeted audiences along familiar gender roles; advertisements aimed at women tended to emphasize appearances and home care whereas those aimed at men emphasize mechanics and engineering. The reproduction of the lawn, then, is a key element in the reproduction of particular values centered on a nuclear family. Such roles continue seemingly unabated. Indeed, scholars have found that children as young as two or three years old identified yard work as appropriately masculine.

The lawn also points to a number of contradictions with which its owners must engage. First, the lawn is an important feature of discourses of the individual and privacy. Indeed, in many cases, the lawn marks the initial transition from public to private space. Yet, the autonomy of private green space is far from complete. That is, with its close association with good citizenship, public mindedness, and suitable aesthetics, the lawn is difficult to disavow. In many cities across North America, for example, it has been transformed from a sociocultural could or should to a legal must. By the mid twentieth century, officials in many North American cities codified regulations for the upkeep of lawns through bylaws; homeowners with unkempt lawns face fines and may have their lawns cut for them.

It is worth noting that this process is often complaint driven. This suggests neighbors augment formal laws with informal community standards. Scholars suggest that this kind of enforcement is based on the lawn's role in maintaining a veneer of conformity in an age of increasing anxiety over cultural and social difference. This conformity is manifest in the lawn's appearance and its ritualized care regimens. Deviance can be socially costly. Lawn dissidents are marked as uncooperative, lazy, and morally inept. Worse, lawn owners see these qualities as contagious. Neighbors may associate a single lawn dissident with lower property values, diminished local community standards, and moral and material pollution.

Second, the lawn represents an ecological dilemma. Although many lawn keepers are aware

of the potential dangers of repeated applications of herbicides, pesticides, and fertilizers, they continue to apply them. This points to a complicated relationship among the needs of the lawn itself, the exigencies of capitalist production, and the social, cultural, political, and economic contexts of individual lawn owners. Lawn product manufacturers and lawn care companies have a stake in maintaining and strengthening markets in the face of environmental lobbies and competition. To that end, they work to continue to convince consumers that inputs are necessary for a good lawn and, therefore, for good families and communities. But in so doing, they also download the risk of using these products to consumers who have at least some knowledge of commensurate environmental and personal risk.

There are two strands of such risk. First, consumers become responsible for their own decisions regarding chemical use. Despite knowing something of the hazards of chemical application, many homeowners seem unwilling to change behaviors. This may be explained by a second strand of risk. That is, consumers are also well aware of the financial (fines and falling real estate values) and socioeconomic (fall out with neighbors) costs of deviance.

The Lawn as Ecology

The lawn, because of its ubiquity and density in urban spaces, is at the center of intense debates over its ecological implications. Lawn critics suggest that the lawn and its related maintenance have a number of negative environmental consequences. First, critics suggest that the propagation of monoculture crops of introduced species erases local flora and fauna and thereby overcomes the ecological diversity of local areas. This leads to concerns over air, soil, and water quality as well as environmental health generally.

Second, critics maintain lawn care practice is environmentally deleterious. Some authors point to the vast amount of fossil fuels that lawn equipment consumes. The U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), for example, contends that in the United States alone, lawn owners consume 800 million gallons of gasoline annually to power lawn mowers. EPA also states that Americans use about 7 billion gallons of water per day for lawn and garden use.

Third, critics also point to the pollution that is produced through the operation of powered lawn care equipment and the application of chemicals; both are important sources of air, water, and soil pollution. By extension, several authors point to potential links between the use of gas-powered lawn equipment and chemicals and reproductive complications, neurological problems, and certain kinds of cancer. Children who play on treated lawns are at particular risk.

In answer to these allegations, lawn proponents claim that turf is an environmental asset. First, a healthy lawn makes positive contributions to the atmosphere. A lawn can play a large role in cooling urban environments. It also serves to generate oxygen as well as to sequester carbon dioxide. In fact, research suggests that the carbon dioxide output from a gas-powered mower is more than offset by the lawn's ability to use it. The conclusion is that homeowners who carefully manage their lawns do more for the environment than those who do not.

Second, proponents contend that a lawn can improve local water and soil quality. A healthy lawn should trap dust and pollutants. Constant microbial activity in the lawn breaks them down into harmless components before they can dissipate into the wider soil and water systems. The lawn also contains storm runoff and minimizes potential damage caused by erosion. Finally, the annual cycle of growth and decay contributes organic material to the soil, thereby contributing to its health.

Both sets of arguments lie at the heart of a mass of material that describes how the lawn might become even more environmentally sustainable. Indeed, a 2008 Internet search for key words *lawn* and *environment* generated nearly 30 million hits. Most of these outline environmentally friendly lawn care advice. Few, however, question whether or not there might be alternatives to the lawn. Lawn equipment and chemical companies and lawn care companies also contribute to the debate. In response to the stresses of another wave of environmental concern, most companies will make claims to using safe products and processes. But they have also become active lobbyists that attempt to thwart bans on chemicals, restrictions on noise, and/or other threats to the lawn. In the end, consumers must contend with a barrage of information with a dizzying variety of research outcomes provided by both environmental advocates and corporations.

Pressure to seek safer alternatives, however, continues to mount. Whereas most North American cities employ a weed inspector to uphold lawn standards, many cities have begun to ban pesticides and other chemical inputs, monitor water use, and issue noise restrictions. Lawn dissenters are becoming more common and much more active. Some have adopted “Freedom Lawns” (whereupon no chemicals are applied) or xeriscaped yards (use of only drought-resistant plants). Still others are pushing further. Advocacy groups encourage the use of private greenspace for growing food or rebuilding local environments. However, Robbins argues that the widespread acceptance of these alternatives will not be easily achieved. Enforcement of deeds, covenants, and weed laws limit what any individual may accomplish in particular neighborhoods.

At present, the lawn remains a seemingly permanent fixture in North American and some European urban landscapes. In fact, as more suburban homes are built, the lawn continues to expand its reach. Currently, it is the fastest-growing landscape in North America. Thus, despite emerging evidence that the lawn has serious ecological implications, many homeowners seem to have internalized the values it represents. However, although various apparatus help maintain the lawn as appropriate for private green space, an increasing number of people are searching for alternatives to swards of managed turf.

Michael Ripmeester

See also Environmental Policy; Gated Community; Gendered Space; Real Estate; Redlining; Racialization; Restrictive Covenant

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LE CORBUSIER

Le Corbusier was one of the most influential yet controversial architect-planners of the twentieth century, as well as being a prolific writer, painter, sculptor, and poet. He occupies a troubled place in architectural scholarship. Some cannot forgive him his arrogance and political opportunism. Others see a designer of genius and a polemically brilliant writer.

Early Years

Born Charles-Édouard Jeanneret in Switzerland in 1887, he seemed destined for a career in watch-case engraving before developing an interest in architecture. The first house he built was the Villa Fallet (1907), which reflected his hometown vernacular with its steep roof and ornamented façade. Between 1908 and 1911, however, Jeanneret was apprenticed to Auguste Perret and Peter Behrens, early pioneers of reinforced concrete construction and industrial design.

He traveled extensively around Europe and the near East, where the Hagia Sophia and Parthenon had a profound effect on him. It was also around

this time that he read the works of the Viennese architect Adolf Loos, in particular *Ornament and Crime* (1908). These influences inspired Jeanneret to devise an architectural style that eschewed decoration and combined the latest building technologies with the monumentality of ancient architecture.

During World War I, Jeanneret attempted to patent a new housing prototype for postwar reconstruction. The Dom-Ino had six columns, a staircase, and three slabs for the ground, first floor, and roof. This design encapsulated the theory that would characterize his architectural work in the 1920s, the *Five Points of a New Architecture* (1926): *pilotis*, open plan, free façade, strip windows, roof garden.

Moving to Paris in 1917, Jeanneret met the painter Amédée Ozenfant, and together, they published *Après le Cubisme* (1918), the founding manifesto of the Purist movement. Their Purist still lifes had interlocking forms spread calmly across the canvas, often in gentle pastel colors, unlike the swirling, fragmented forms of Cubist still lifes. This pictorial orderliness was part of a more general return to order that Ozenfant and Jeanneret hoped to see in Europe after the upheavals of the war.

Architecture and town planning were part of the plan and these were discussed in the Purist journal, *L'Esprit Nouveau*. Le Corbusier was invented as a pseudonym for Jeanneret when writing about these topics, but soon the name stuck, and his articles were collected into books that define the Modern movement, including *Vers une Architecture* (1923) and *Urbanisme* (1924).

A Theory of Architecture

Vers une Architecture outlined Le Corbusier's theory of architecture as the sculptural arrangement of volumes under light, which he derived from his analysis of the Parthenon. It discussed also the architectural promenade, where the complexities of space are revealed as one passes through them in a carefully orchestrated sequence. These principles were put into practice in a series of elegant homes, including the Villa La Roche-Jeanneret (Paris, 1925) and the Villa Savoye (Poissy, 1929).

Urbanisme introduced Le Corbusier's theory of town planning. It focused on his designs for the Ville Contemporaine, exhibited at the Salon

d'Automne of 1922. The centerpiece of this "city for two million inhabitants" was a transport hub complete with airport and surrounded by 24 skyscrapers, each of them 60 stories high, clad in glass and cruciform in plan. Further out were residential blocks arranged according to set-back and perimeter-block patterns. Each residence was soundproof and had a double-height living room and an internal garden, and each block enjoyed catering and cleaning services as well as allotments and sports facilities. The buildings were to be lifted up on pilotis, and the different grades of vehicular traffic were segregated, some running underground. This allowed the entire ground surface of the city to be cultivated into a vast park.

Le Corbusier observed later that this centralized design was flawed as it could not grow but only be duplicated. He remedied this in the 1930s with proposals for linear cities such as the Ville Radieuse: the different zones—commercial, industrial, residential—were arranged in linear bands that could be extended indefinitely. Even so, the central tenets of Le Corbusier's urbanism were contained in the Ville Contemporaine, not least his commitment to social engineering. Run by the managerial elite in the skyscrapers, the city would defuse revolutionary tendencies in the working classes by giving them better homes and the leisure time and facilities to cultivate body and mind.

The question of how to implement such grand plans seemed to resolve itself fortuitously around this time. In 1927, Le Corbusier submitted his competition entry for the League of Nations building. He appeared to have won, but his designs were later dismissed on the technicality that they were reproductions rather than original drawings. Le Corbusier and others saw this as a conspiracy, and the following year they formed the Congrès Internationaux d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM). CIAM became the official body of modern architecture and planning and included influential figures such as Hannes Meyer, Gerrit Rietveld, El Lissitzky and Josep Lluís Sert.

Members would gather for conferences to thrash out design policy, and although there was never perfect consensus, there was considerable agreement. CIAM delegates lobbied successfully to get their principles adopted in the building and land-use legislation of governments around the world, as well as in the educational curricula of

the schools of architecture and planning. The reductionist tendencies of CIAM are represented best in *The Athens Charter* of 1943, where the city was presented as a simple puzzle with just four functions: dwelling, working, circulation, and recreation.

In addition to CIAM, Le Corbusier courted others whom he thought had the power and finances to implement his plans. He was scornful of the parliamentary infighting of France between the wars and believed the remedy was to adopt nonparliamentary means. This found an echo in the *Redressement Français*, a technocratic organization formed in 1925 that campaigned for society and the economy to be reorganized according to scientific principles and managed by experts.

But Le Corbusier was attracted to antiparliamentary movements more generally, such as the French fascist movement, *Les Faisceau*, and the paramilitary leagues that toppled the Radical government in the riots of February 1934. Working in Vichy during German occupation in 1941 to 1942, Le Corbusier lobbied Marshal Philippe Pétain to sanction his plans to redevelop Algiers, and imagined a postwar France that would see him crowned The Lawgiver with a mandate to remold the built fabric of the empire.

Le Corbusier was frustrated in these ambitions and after the war he appears to have given up on politics, and this is when he completed some of his most important work.

Masterpieces

The *Unité d'habitation* (Marseilles, 1952) was an opportunity for Le Corbusier to put his ideas on high-rise living into practice. The double-height apartments and amenities like shops, a gym, and school recall the mid-1920s, but they were presented here in a bold new sculptural style that became known as Brutalism. The concrete was untreated and retains imprints from the wooden forms, and deeply cut *brise-soleil* transform the exterior into a play of light and shade. This new expressiveness reached its zenith in the Chapel of Notre Dame du Haut at Ronchamp (1954), a building of wild exuberance, symbolism, and color.

The largest work undertaken by Le Corbusier was the city of Chandigarh, commissioned as a new capital for the Punjab after Indian independence

and partition in 1947. The original design team was headed by the American military engineer Albert Mayer and the Polish architect Matthew Nowicki. The project stalled, however, and Le Corbusier was contracted to head a new team that included the civil engineer Pierre Jeanneret and the English architect-planners Maxwell Fry and Jane Drew. They arrived in India in 1951 with a mandate to implement the original plans, and while they kept certain ideas, such as neighborhood units and a capitol complex of government buildings, they straightened out the Garden City layout with a CIAM gridiron and increased the overall scale.

The residential sectors reflected the socioeconomic status of the residents. Luxurious homes for government officials are in the topmost sectors, space and amenities getting squeezed as one proceeds literally down. Sector 17 is the city center, with a cinema, banks, restaurants, and shops. Running the length of the city is a park containing fitness trails, fountains, and a museum. Le Corbusier divided traffic into seven different types—*les sept voies*—and provided routes for each, motorized traffic being privileged over foot and cycle paths. But he concentrated most attention on the buildings of the capitol complex, including the Palace of Assembly (1962), High Court (1956), and Secretariat (1958). These buildings are monumental in scale and sculptural in impact, the Secretariat being 250 meters long while the Palace of Assembly looks like a combination of industrial furnace and astronomical observatory.

Chandigarh suffered many problems, and Le Corbusier is often blamed. The scale made walking and cycling difficult, and relatively few early residents could afford cars. The commercial rents were too expensive for many shopkeepers, and there was little provision for markets and street vendors. Also, the house rents were too expensive for the very people who built and serviced the city, leading to the growth of squatter settlements that were periodically bulldozed by the authorities. But the question of blame is moot: Chandigarh was consistent with Jawaharlal Nehru's vision of a modern, technological India.

Le Corbusier died of a heart attack while swimming in 1965, leaving several major projects incomplete.

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See also Architecture; Brasília, Brazil; Sert, Josep Lluís; Urban Planning

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LEFEBVRE, HENRI

Henri Lefebvre (1901–1991) was one of the most original Marxist theorists to think with Marx beyond Marx about the changes taking place in the capitalist mode of production since his death in 1883, and especially since the first decade of the twentieth century when Lefebvre dates the emergence of modern capitalism, *modernity*. He had the good fortune of living a long, intellectually productive life in a century of political disasters that drove most intellectuals on the Left to despair or worse.

Lefebvre took the position that Marx's critical analysis of early capitalism was necessary but not sufficient for fully understanding modern capitalism. Lefebvre appropriated, in a critical manner, the concepts of some of the most important social theorists of the twentieth century in his analysis of modernity to fill in the gaps in Marx's analysis. He made a remarkable number of substantive contributions to the field of sociology in his critical analysis of this mutation: his reconceptualization of dialectical method; his analysis of new forms of alienation; the concepts of everyday life; the urban, difference, social space, modernity, reproduction of the relations of production as *the* structural process in modernity; and the reinvention

of the meaning and the possibilities for social revolution.

This entry discusses urban sociology from the perspective of Henri Lefebvre's critical analysis of modern society, as well as discussing the possibilities for social change: the urban revolution and the revolution in everyday life. It explicates his critical concepts and then discusses recent events in light of the possibilities that Lefebvre envisioned in his writing on urban issues.

Critical Concepts

His dialectical method of conceptual analysis begins with the emergence of a concept and the attempt to grasp a new relation, a new aspect of reality in the historical process of becoming. This is the *retrojective* moment in his dialectical method.

Everydayness

According to Lefebvre, every historical form of preindustrial society has a daily life but no everydayness. Preindustrial daily life is structured by natural cycles—day and night, weeks, months, seasons, and lifecycles—and framed by religious meanings and the predominance of use values. For Marx, daily life in early capitalism was the working day organized on the production site.

For Lefebvre, everyday life emerges in the writings of early-twentieth-century novels like James Joyce's *Ulysses*. The center of daily life shifts from the working day to private life, the household, and urban social space. Everyday life is a modern experience that emerges with two additional relations, the urban and differences that he analyzes in the dialectical triad: the everyday/the urban/differences. Everyday life is lived experience, a potential moment for self-creation (a concept borrowed from Nietzsche). Everyday life is a residuum: a moment of history, what is left over after working activities are extracted, humble actions that are repeated daily and taken for granted, the positive moment, and potential power of daily life.

For Lefebvre, everyday life is the social structure of modernity, a mediator between particulars and the social totality, a level and foundation of the social totality. Like the classical working class, the new working classes reproduce the structure

of neocapitalism voluntarily through their daily activities. But humans do not live by work alone; daily life provides meanings for the productive activities of working people, although in its present state, it is an alienated experience. According to Lefebvre, it is only when people can no longer live their everyday lives that the possibilities for change in social forms and social structures become imminent or concrete.

The Urban

The urban is another form that detaches itself from its content of encounters, assemblies, and simultaneity. It has been structured according to industrial, commodity, and bureaucratic logics. It is organized in ways to facilitate the movement of products and people, reflecting the logic of the technical division of labor. It is a place where the realization of surplus value and capital accumulation is accomplished. It is divided into levels: the global/the mixed/the private. It polarizes between those who manipulate this form—urban managers, and those who possess the active content—the inhabitants.

The urban develops and is generalized throughout the world, creating an urban world. While only one third of the world population was urbanized at the time that Lefebvre did most of his work on urban topics, more than one half of the world population is now living in urban areas. Moreover, urbanization casts its shadow across the countryside dissolving in the process the urban/rural opposition—the urbanization of the countryside.

Difference

Difference is another important concept that Lefebvre linked to the process of urbanization and the urban revolution. Difference is another form that becomes detached from its content, particularities. This leads to a polarization between those who manipulate the form—the technocrats—and those who possess the contents, differential groups. Urbanization has a differential logic; it creates a world of differences. Like urban sociologists at the University of Chicago in the early twentieth century, Lefebvre argues that one of the most unique qualities of the urban is all of the differences that are evident there.

While most American urban sociologists analyzed these differences in terms of subcultures or minority groups and natural ecological processes, Lefebvre used this concept to emphasize relations of inequality (of relations of domination and subordination) and thought about them in terms of political, economic, and cultural processes. In the struggles that take place in urban social space, differential groups affirm their difference against the process of homogenization. They assert their right to participate in the decision-making centers, against fragmentation and marginalization, and they claim their right to equality in difference against the process of creating hierarchy. According to Lefebvre, differential groups have no existence as groups until they appropriate a space of their own.

Space and the Worldwide

The reproduction of the relations of production creates new relations: space and the worldwide. Space is organized through the following dialectical sequence: homogenization/fragmentation/hierarchization. This process creates an abstract space that complements the abstract quality of alienated labor and the abstract time of everydayness. Capitalists increasingly invest their wealth in space, including industrial, commercial, agricultural, residential, and leisure spaces—even cosmic spaces. This allows capital to accumulate beyond the crisis tendency in the industrial sector, although this second circuit is also subject to crises of falling profits, overproduction, and depreciation, which is quite evident in the 2008 crisis in the real estate sector in the United States and across the globe.

According to Lefebvre, we move from the production of things in space in the nineteenth century to the production of space and things in space in the twentieth century. It sets in motion a conflict between the technocratic producers of this abstract space and the users who want to appropriate space as differential space, as lived space. The reproduction of the social relations of production becomes the central process, the total social phenomenon of modernity. However, there is no logic of reproduction; there is only a class strategy. Structures are not stable, eternal; structures are always destructuring, undermined by internal contradictions, and always require efforts to reproduce or change them.

When these production relations are reproduced, so are the relations of bureaucratic domination for the state and the domination of the technocrats as a class—the state/society relation. Crises in modernity are more political than economic in their origins in contrast with nineteenth-century capitalism. Failure to reproduce these relations usually creates a crisis, a deconstruction, followed potentially by a regime change. Furthermore, it sets in motion the following dialectical sequence: history/space/worldliness. The production of space leads to the gradual dissolution of the state, the end of history (of the state), and either a worldwide urban society or the destruction of the human species (and possibly all of the other species). I will now turn to Lefebvre's analysis of the changes that have transformed the capitalist mode of production into modern capitalism, modernity, and to the state mode of production.

Perspectives on Events

In the modernization of French capitalism, the reproduction of capitalist relations of production were accompanied by a new process, urbanization, and new relations: the urban, the everyday, and differences (although this second process and these new relations were not perceived or understood). Lefebvre saw some virtual possibilities for the creation of new forms of time and space as well as an urban society where the problems of urbanization would predominate over the problems of industrialization. Modernity was slowly emerging in France, as the commoditization and the bureaucratization of everyday life was becoming much deeper, more alienating, and all the more pervasive.

The late 1960s provided another moment in Lefebvre's development. Once again capitalism was going through a political and then an economic crisis. Different groups (i.e., racial and ethnic groups, students, youth, women, homosexuals, peasants, and people in developing countries across the world) were contesting bureaucratic state authorities and the Western model of modernization, and later the Eastern model, in their struggles for self-determination and national liberation. The events in May 1968 in Paris became, in his eyes and analysis, the opening salvo in the urban revolution. The revolution in everyday

life will become the metamorphosis of daily life into moments of presence, a permanent urban festival.

A Social Revolution

With the creation of modernity, many of the historical tasks of the working-class revolution have been accomplished, especially the growth of productive forces and rising standards of living. Lefebvre proposes a different path for social revolution: Revolution in everyday life and urban revolution will complement and extend the proletarian revolution, all directed toward generalized self-management and emancipation from class exploitation and bureaucratic domination at work, in public life, and in private life. This process will lead to the creation of an urban society that is likely to be a long historical process because changes in everyday life are slow in temporality. Lefebvre argues that the failure of revolutionary movements in Russia, China, and Cuba was in part a failure to produce new production and property relations to replace or displace the commodity form as well as new forms of time and space. For Lefebvre, we must shift from an obsession with economic growth to the development of social relations in far more depth and complexity.

Lefebvre's concepts of modernity and the urban society allow us to get beyond the dismal debate about postmodern or postindustrial societies. His concept of urban society is far more precise than the premature notion of a postindustrial society. While industrial work is shrinking in Western societies, industry is wandering off and flourishing in developing nations across the globe, which are tightly linked to the metropolitan centers through global commodity chains. The two processes are tightly linked, and one of the objectives of an urban revolution would be to subordinate industrialization to urbanization. Postmodern society is simply too vague. Does it mark a break from or a continuity with modernity? Lefebvre sees this as a form of hypercriticism that leads only to nihilism and perhaps a fatal nostalgia for the past. Lefebvre returns us to thinking about different possibilities, and perhaps the choice for us is between a worldwide urban society and the collapse of modernity, which some might call postmodern society.

A New Role for the State

The modernization of post–World War II capitalism proceeded with the entry of technology, knowledge, advertising, bureaucracy, a new class (the technocrats), and an interventionist state, with all of these elements creating a form of capitalist planning. This new form of capitalist planning would rival the centralized planning in the socialist bloc, with military procurement in particular requiring a lot of coordination among the state, research and development institutes, defense corporations, and financial capital. The state was coming to dominate society as a whole, whether in the East or the West.

The age of political economy would gradually transform the capitalist mode of production into the state mode of production. But this new strategy did not solve or dissolve the old contradictions of capitalism; it attenuated the old contradictions and added new contradictions related to the process of urbanization: center/periphery, segregation/integration. At the same time, there was a dissolution of essential relations: class relations, social relations in everyday life between the sexes, between age groups, and within communities.

The Worldwide

For Lefebvre an urban society was a virtual possibility, veiled by the way it was developing in modernity under the ideology of urbanism. The urbanization process was also producing a new social relation, space that would become generalized at the global level. Abstract space was detached from its content, living space, and became polarized as well between the technocrats and the inhabitants. Furthermore, the production of space would create a new relation—the worldwide, with space becoming militarized.

The worldwide was also detached from its content worldliness, and a polarization ensued between the technocrats and the global proletariat. Simultaneously, the creation of the worldwide was also leading to the dissolution of the nation and the states that organized these national territories. Multinational corporations and new global institutions were limiting the capacity of nation-states to organize their societies and economies. Again, the urban was the terrain of struggle between the local order of daily life and the

global order of multinational corporations and nation-states.

The new strategy had two levels: the urban and the global, with the reproduction of the relations of production in play on both levels. Lefebvre analyzed this movement on the global level in terms of the following sequence: history/space/worldliness. In the process of the production of space, a new mode of production was emerging: the state mode of production.

These new processes, relations, and structures have produced the world we live in today without abolishing the contradictions along the way (although attenuating some of them, especially the old contradictions). The objectives of the urban revolution are dual: to fully subordinate industrialization to urbanization and to subordinate the global to the urban. Lefebvre's proposal for a counterstrategy involves the following:

1. Linking differential groups to groups in the centers that have broken from the ideology of economic growth, a new global proletariat defined as groups without legal claims on wealth. On the local level, opposition must create urban assemblies with the differences brought together in affirmation and in relations based on reciprocity and mutual respect. This would require institutionalizing the right to be different as an extension of citizenship rights. These new forms of urban democracy would need to be mediated to urban centers across the world.
2. A reorientation of economic growth to social needs and qualitative development in the urban (and in the everyday) with use values dominating exchange values. Urban rights would also include: rights to education, health care, leisure, housing, time for self-creation, the creation of community and qualified places for the realization of moments of lived time, and the creation of the city as a work of art.
3. Going beyond representative democracy to direct democracy: (a) the end of bureaucracy and the withering away of all states with the reappropriation of their legitimate administrative and security functions in new forms of self-management generalized across work, public life, and private life and (b) The right to participate—to be present—in decision making must be institutionalized as a new citizenship right.

This worldwide urban society will be the end of history—the end of the history of the state. This creation will become the meaning of the end of history; time will be liberated from the pseudo-cyclical time of modernity to become lived time in the lived space of the worldwide urban society.

With the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression currently in play, the question about how to distribute the social surplus is on the political agenda: Do we continue to invest in the military sector and pursue global domination, or do we invest it in unmet social needs in the worldwide urban? Do we give tacit consent to the authoritarian politics of the neoconservatives in both political parties in the United States, or do we change direction to create new forms of concrete democracy?

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See also Gottdiener, Mark; Los Angeles School of Urban Studies; Marxism and the City; Social Production of Space; Social Space; Urban Space

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LOCAL GOVERNMENT

A local government is any subnational territorial unit of the national state or government; the unit is formally responsible for administrative and policy functions related to the delivery of a range of public services. Where local government also includes elected offices, such as mayors or councils, it performs the political function of the representation of local interests.

Local governments are typically defined by geographic territory and range from the largest spatial units, such as regions or provinces, to cities, rural areas, and counties and villages. In many intergovernmental systems, local government refers to both meso (provinces, regions, or states) and municipal (urban and rural) levels. Local governments are here considered primarily at the latter level, also often referred to as "general purpose" local governments. "Special purpose" local governments (special districts responsible for the management of one or a few services) have become an increasingly important type. In a few cases, local governments can be established on ethnic or another nongeographical basis. Despite this variety, many issues are common to all types of local government.

Historical Development

The formation of modern nation-states offers distinct insights crucial to understanding local government in the modern world. Premodern medieval Europe was characterized by the existence of self-governing cities possessing municipal autonomy and ruled by urban oligarchies. During this period,

central monarchs and parliaments were forced to partner with these local governments to govern regions and cities so as to secure the resources necessary for war making and state making. However, the development of modern national states depended crucially on the elimination of municipal autonomy in favor of centralizing state bureaucracies and power holders, transforming the state system from indirect to direct rule.

Between the late seventeenth century in absolutist France and mid-nineteenth-century reforms in England, most European states transformed varied forms of urban governments from autonomous units to professional, bureaucratic agents of the central government, and with that came the centralization of important public sector functions such as taxation and conscription. Ancillary to these goals were functions such as maintaining public order, providing housing, and organizing urban food supply, as well as the concession of power to local representative bodies.

Out of this process emerged modern national state systems and their expansion into social and economic policy. The new regime after the French revolution of 1789 represents an extreme case of the subordination or tutelage of local government as an instrument of centralized rule. All modern local governments are a legacy of this historical transformation. Most contemporary non-Western state systems are also modeled on one or the other version of European intergovernmental state systems.

Types of Local Government

The types of local government can be analyzed principally in terms of two variables related to the form of political regime: (1) power sharing, the type and degree of division of power, and (2) the degree of decentralization. Local governments also vary widely in their structure as well as their functions and services.

Almost all regimes, whether majority rule or consensus based, divide power to some degree between central and noncentral levels. In principle, the degree of autonomy of local government is highest in federal systems, which allocate constitutionally guaranteed powers to subnational units. In contrast, unitary states reserve final authority to central governments. A dramatic recent example

of the exercise of central authority over local governments in a unitary state was the abolishing of the elected Greater London Council by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom in 1985; it was reinstated in 2000.

Significant country-specific differences exist even within each of these categories. For example, although the United States is a federal state system, it provides constitutional autonomy only to the (50) states, whereas city governments are considered “creatures of the state” (this is known as Dillon’s Rule after a U.S. Supreme Court case in 1868). This power relationship was illustrated most dramatically in the 1970s when the state of New York temporarily replaced the city council of New York City with a special board to manage the city’s budget directly.

The design of local government autonomy is based on one of two principles. The *ultra vires* principle restricts municipal competencies to those explicitly granted them by central government. The principle of *general competence* permits local government authority in all areas except those explicitly restricted by central government law.

Decentralization is the process of transferring responsibilities from central to local government, often a combination of fiscal, political, or administrative functions. Decentralization often, although not always, corresponds to local governments getting a bigger share of total public-sector expenditures and revenues and greater local financial autonomy from central government. In the last three decades, many countries, including many unitary systems, have undertaken experiments to decentralize authority and administrative functions. From this perspective, the federal–unitary distinction appears less salient than the de facto degree of local autonomy.

Therefore, at the most generic level, all local government systems can be classified along two axes: (1) high/low degree of constitutional autonomy (fiscal, political, administrative) and (2) wide/narrow range of functional responsibilities and services delivered. Although a majority of countries fall into either the unitary–centralized and federal–decentralized cells of the typology, other combinations also exist. For example, the Scandinavian countries and Japan are unitary and decentralized, whereas India is both federal and highly centralized.

Structures of local government can vary between two poles, stressing either the political or administrative aspects of governance. In the United States, for example, urban local government can be legally either mayor–council or council–manager in form, although in practice most cities are a mix of these two models. In the United Kingdom, the 2000 local government law permitted localities to choose from three distinct structures, with or without a directly elected mayor. Only a minority of countries permit local choice over the organizational shape of local government. The majority of local governments, particularly in the developing world, are highly constrained and controlled by central government, both in form and in content.

Most municipalities are responsible for basic maintenance of the streets and parks, for sanitation and solid waste management, and often for local traffic management and policing. Local governments typically are also responsible for urban land-use planning. More expanded functions include infrastructural development and construction (such as roads and sewerage systems). Some large municipalities may be responsible for social services such as health care and education and even welfare policies.

Economic Aspects

Local government (sometimes referred to as *fiscal federalism*) is studied extensively in the economic literature from the point of view of the efficient spatial allocation of public goods in an intergovernmental system. The principles of accountability to the full range of interests and intensity of needs in the community and responsiveness to the heterogeneous and time-varying needs in the local community underlie justifications for decentralizing functions from central to local governments. Decentralization is justified where preferences for a given public good meet the following criteria: (1) they are heterogeneous, (2) there are few jurisdictional spillovers or externalities, (3) there are few economies of scale, and (4) central government has less access to information about local preferences than local government. If these conditions are not met, then decentralizing to local governments is inefficient. Furthermore, if the sociocultural conditions necessary for democratic citizenship (such as education or the presence of plural local political

and associational life) are absent at the local level, then decentralization to local governments is unlikely to advance democratic accountability. Thus, the consensus in the field is that there cannot be any a presumption that decentralization will represent the interests of the poor more equitably or that it will necessarily improve the efficiency of public service delivery.

Democratic Aspects

A venerable assumption is that local government is a crucial arena in which individuals and groups can learn the arts of cooperative, participatory democratic governance. This is because local governments are responsible for issues of immediate concern to most people and operate at a scale accessible to ordinary people. For example, when conflicts arise over local government plans for physical urban development (such as urban renewal or road construction) that threaten local communities, democratic participation is a way for residents to express their (potentially conflicting) views on local matters.

In *Democracy in America*, published in 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville advanced the founding statement of this assumption: “Town-meetings are to liberty what primary schools are to science; they bring it within the people’s reach, they teach men how to use and how to enjoy it. A nation may establish a system of free government, but without the spirit of municipal institutions it cannot have the spirit of liberty.” This claim was echoed famously by J. S. Mill in 1859 and 1861; he saw local government as an arena in which citizens were educated in the habits and dispositions necessary for the exercise of free democratic government. This tradition continues to inform advocates of grassroots democracy.

History, however, has treated both the quantitative and qualitative aspects of this claim harshly: Rather than being an arena of vibrant and extensive political participation, local government today is less vibrant than national politics in terms of political activity, participation, and interest. Voter turnout rates, for example, are generally lower in local as opposed to national elections. Scholars have identified two main reasons why local politics is less appealing than national politics: (1) there are fewer institutional mechanisms at the

local level to motivate participation, such as competitive political parties or media; and (2) local politics lacks the dramatic and emotive matters of high consequence, such as war and nationalism as well as charismatic politicians. Furthermore, in many cases, small-scale political institutions are equally if not more likely to encourage parochial self-interested behavior rather than cooperative and cosmopolitan attitudes and behaviors. Local jurisdictions of local government are often vulnerable to “state capture” by local elites, who then advance policies that are not responsive to the full range of interests in the local community.

In sum, historical experience shows that de Tocqueville’s and Mill’s equation of localism with greater democratic control is misleading: The premise that tackling a democratic deficit necessarily implies greater political decentralization to municipalities is not a priori sustainable. The objective of deepening democratic governance at all levels of government is not necessarily incompatible with greater central government control and even a diminished political role for lower levels of government. The unit of analysis for democratic institutions is primarily the intergovernmental system as a whole rather than local or central levels taken independently.

Paradigms in the Study of Local Government

Given its decentralized and federal structure and prominent cities, the United States has the most extensive theoretical debates over the nature of local government. These debates, which focus on issues including community power, comparative historical and political sociology, and urban regime theory, have influenced debates in other countries to greater or lesser extents.

The debate over community power has contrasted three paradigms, seeking to account for the nature of political power in local urban settings. Elite power theorists claim that local governments are dominated by social and economic elites and that politics and policy are shaped in accordance with elite interests, thereby marginalizing the interests of ethnic and racial minorities and the poor. In contrast, pluralists, such as Robert Dahl in his famous study of local politics in the city of New Haven, Connecticut (United States),

claim that in fact local government is an arena of competing political, economic, and social groups, which combine to shape the policy decisions of the local government. The different arenas of power do not accumulate into a single elite. Radical critics advance the idea that not all pertinent issues are permitted to reach the arena of pluralist bargaining between groups. Local elites and masses are subject to ideological biases against raising certain issues for debate (such as significant income redistribution in a capitalist system). These taboo issues are thus kept off the agenda, either as a result of conscious design or unconscious or ideological biases.

In an influential synthesis, Paul Peterson reversed the established causality between politics and policy: He argued that it was more fruitful to view the types of local politics (elitist, pluralist, or radical) as resulting from the nature of the policy tasks required of local governments (economic growth, allocation of economically neutral public services within the city, and redistribution, respectively). Where cities are forced to compete for economic resources (a situation particularly characterizing the United States but less so in other settings such as France or the United Kingdom), city politics is highly constrained.

Another influential strand in the study of local government draws on comparative historical and political sociology. Ira Katznelson’s *City Trenches* demonstrated that different local government systems and the different political and sociospatial contexts in which they are embedded have played an important role in shaping local social movements as well as determining the boundaries of what local government can do.

Over the last two decades, urban regime theory has dominated the American political science and urban studies literature on local government. It seeks to develop a classification of local governments in terms of the relationships that local government has with the private sector and local civil society. Different types of relationship and influence lead to different types of urban regime. However, it is unclear to what extent this paradigm represents an advance over earlier debates; moreover, its applicability outside the U.S. context has been questioned. This paradigm should not be confused with debates over regime change. In post-communist Eastern Europe, for example,

local governments often played important roles in the transition from communist to democratic capitalist regimes.

Future Trends

Scholars of local government in the Western developed countries point to three key trends that will shape local government in the near future: specialization, urbanization, and globalization.

The role of local governments as unique providers of services that cannot be provided by the private sector, quasi-public organizations, and nongovernmental organizations is increasingly called into question. Neoliberal emphasis on economic growth has resulted in diverse approaches, including public–private partnerships and contractual agreements between central, regional, and local government levels as well as nongovernmental organizations, and to greater competition between localities. Local government is becoming one element of an increasingly complex and diverse array of intergovernmental systems rather than an autonomous unit of governance. Whether local governments will take on a new leadership role in this broader coalition of actors is unclear.

Large metropolitan regions are increasingly becoming important units of local government. Metropolitan local governments will face the challenges of coordinating numerous and fragmented subunits.

This trend poses new challenges and potential new opportunities for local governments. In the Western countries in particular, many local governments find themselves having to contend with economic competitiveness to attract capital and labor; emerging claims and conflicts over specifically local citizenship rights resulting from multicultural populations; and the emerging international role of local governments in conflict resolution and human rights initiatives. In 2008, for example, the first International Conference on City Diplomacy convened mayors and international local government associations to advance the role of local governments as key players in negotiations over social and ethnic conflict in divided and conflict-ridden cities.

The key questions facing local government is the extent to which they can be a unique authoritative arena of governance and whether the

principle of legitimacy of local government in the eyes of citizens, residents, and consumers will be primarily (1) administrative and economic performance or (2) democratic accountability and greater participation in decision making.

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See also Citizenship; Community; Metropolitan Governance; Urban Politics

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LOCATION THEORY

Location theory focuses on the geography of economic activity with particular attention to industry. Four industrial categories are used: primary (agriculture, mining, and fishing), secondary (manufacturing of goods), tertiary (services), and quaternary (information).

In relation to the primary industry, Johann Heinrich von Thünen developed a theory of agricultural location in his 1826 work, *Der Isolierte*

Staat (The Isolated State). He investigated the relationship between the distance from a market and the pattern of land use by hypothesizing an isolated area located in a homogeneous environmental plain. A single city served as the market and was surrounded by farmland. Von Thünen assumed that farmers attempt to maximize profit, or economic rent, with the determining factor being transportation costs. He also assumed that transportation costs rise with the distance from the market and that the fertility of the soil is equal across the area. Because transportation costs also increase as the weight of the specific farm product itself increases, the resultant geography is a series of concentric circles with a different crop planted in each circle.

Location theory exists for secondary industries as well, specifically goods production or manufacturing. In 1909, Alfred Weber developed the notion of a location triangle in his book, *Über den Standort der Industrien* (Theory of the Location of Industries). The location triangle is made up of three fixed locations: a market and two raw material sources. Weber sought to determine the optimum location of firms, given the requirement that they minimize transportation costs within the triangle. He assumed that production costs are the same everywhere. Thus, transport costs will control the choice of location. They are a function of the weight of the raw materials and the commodity being produced and the distances between the location of raw material sources, the market, and the firm. The optimum location is the center of gravity of the triangle as determined by transportation costs. To this, Weber added labor costs and the economies of agglomeration (i.e., the spatial concentration of firms). Minimizing transportation costs and labor costs and maximizing agglomeration economies results in an ideal location, one that minimizes total production costs.

A third major contribution to location theory is the central place theory developed by Walter Christaller in 1933. The main function of a central place is to supply goods and services to the surrounding population and to do so by minimizing the travel costs of the population in the surrounding region. The determining factor in its location is the threshold; that is, the smallest market or trade area that is needed to bring a new firm, service

provider, or city into existence and keep it functioning. Once a threshold has been established, the central place will expand its economic activities by adding higher-order goods that have larger market areas. This will continue until the range—the maximum distance that consumers will travel to buy these services or goods—is reached.

Competitive forces will enable some places to have a greater proportion of higher-order goods—and thus more residents—than others, and this will lead to a hierarchy of places of different size. In this way, Christaller explained how settlements and places (or cities) are located in relation to one another and the number, distance between, and size of settlements within a region.

Since these earlier formulations, location theory has moved away from its emphasis on transportation costs and markets. Emphasis has shifted to agglomeration economies, access to educated labor, quality of life issues, information, and the availability of government subsidies. As economies have become less dominated by agriculture and natural resource extraction and less reliant on heavy manufacturing, location theorists have focused more on the location of light manufacturing, retail services, and a variety of businesses for which transportation costs are less important than highly skilled workers, complementary industries, and telecommunications technologies. Nevertheless, the issue remains where to locate one's business and, thus, what factors have to be taken into account.

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See also Fujita, Masahisa; Lösch, August; Urban Economics; Urban Geography

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LOFT LIVING

Loft living began in the 1970s in the United States as an informal way for artists and others to take old manufacturing spaces in the centers of cities and transform them into unconventional studios and residences. These spaces had been partly abandoned—at least, by the building owners—and, with the transfer of factory work to low-wage regions of the world as well as the obsolescence of multistory factory buildings, they became available at low rents to those who used their “sweat equity” (or own labor) to modernize and renovate them.

Within a few years, favorable media coverage and changes in local laws enabled the property market in living lofts to expand beyond artists communities and beyond cultural capitals like New York and London. Many cities encouraged both the creation of special artists’ districts and new residential construction, which were in turn associated with center-city revival. Although loft living sparked a new style of chic home décor and generated new uses for old manufacturing districts, it raised serious questions about this type of gentrification: specifically, where future manufacturing would take place and whether loft neighborhoods ultimately benefited cultural consumers more than cultural producers.

Loft Living in New York City

New York, with its continually replenished stock of artists and a declining number of small manufacturers, offers an archetypal history of lofts. The city had been a trading center since the days of the Dutch colony in the seventeenth century, a center of crafts production as a British colony before the American Revolution, and a media and fashion center from the era after the Civil War. From the mid-nineteenth through the early twentieth century, waves of immigrants filled the streets and tenements, working in the factories and buying the products—especially clothing—that were now

ready made. Many New Yorkers worked in garment factories, usually located in multistory buildings with open floors, high ceilings, structural weight-bearing columns, and cast iron facades. These floors were called lofts, after the spaces where sail makers plied their craft. Other New Yorkers worked in similar spaces in the printing industry, producing newspapers and magazines from hot type, making silk screen prints for artists and advertisements, and creating posters and sheet music for Broadway or Tin Pan Alley.

As workplaces, loft buildings were an integral part of the city’s two main cultural industries—fashion and printing—from the 1860s. They filled a large part of lower Manhattan, stretching from north of the Wall Street financial district to midtown near Times Square. Lofts were located as well along the docks in Brooklyn and Queens—in warehouses, sugar refineries, and other specialized industrial buildings.

After World War II, the city’s industries suffered structural decline. Garment manufacturers gradually shifted production to lower-wage towns in New Jersey, outside the urban core. Printers confronted technological improvements that replaced human workers with machines and eventually with computers. Losing readers to television and facing rising costs, most of the city’s daily newspapers folded. By the late 1960s, employment in the garment and printing industries was steadily falling, and loft building owners refused to modernize their properties if they couldn’t demand higher rents. At the same time, a vision of the city as a service rather than a manufacturing center made industry seem less desirable. Under these conditions, loft buildings seemed to be obsolete.

But, as in other postwar cities, private real-estate developers did not rush to create new districts in the historic core. Besides the mammoth building of the World Trade Center, New York City and state tried to goad developers into action by planning new infrastructure—a cross-Manhattan expressway along Broome Street, which would demolish a large number of late nineteenth-century loft buildings; a sports stadium nearby; apartment houses for the middle class so they could walk to work in Wall Street—but these plans aroused unexpectedly strong community protest.

Led by Jane Jacobs and other urbanists and activists, New Yorkers demonstrated at city planning

hearings. They demanded an end to highway construction that tore neighborhoods apart, to new construction that erased structures with historical memory and character and put banal, homogeneous buildings in their place, and, most important, to the high-handed governmental action carried out by the appointed official, Robert Moses, who had torn down housing and built highways, bridges, parks, and public housing projects without consulting neighborhood groups. This popular backlash to the mode of urban renewal practiced during the 1950s and 1960s made it politically impossible to tear down loft districts. It also led to an unprecedented appreciation of their historic and aesthetic character, a point that was argued by a new social movement for historic preservation.

The future of Lower Manhattan's loft districts remained cloudy while many manufacturing tenants continued to downsize or move out of the city. Artists began to fill the gap, following the example of the abstract expressionists of the previous generation, who had begun to live and work in lofts during the 1940s and 1950s. Although they lacked standard residential amenities like heat, kitchens and bathrooms, and hot water, lofts were relatively cheap. They provided a large amount of floor space—usually from 1,500 to 5,000 square feet—and large windows with lots of natural light. The absence of residential neighbors permitted artists to fabricate work with noisy metal welding and smelly paints and dyes. Although younger artists did not yet form a concentration in specific neighborhoods, they made their live-work spaces in lofts more visible by staging performances, exhibitions, and concerts and by gradually opening up galleries in them.

In the late 1960s, several galleries and performance spaces opened in SoHo—a loft area south of Houston Street that prior to this point had no particular neighborhood name or character apart from manufacturing. At the same time, a private



An example of a modern loft in Manhattan, New York City

Source: Jennifer Herr.

foundation that wanted to support artists' housing gave a grant to the leader of the Fluxists, an avant-garde artists' group, to buy and renovate a loft building in the center of the district. This concentration of artists' lofts in SoHo marked the beginning of a widely recognized trend of loft living and its identification with an artistic way of life.

Shaping the Housing Market

At first, loft living was illegal in New York City because it violated the zoning laws, which restricted the use of space in industrial districts to manufacturing, as well as the building code, which required

residences to meet specific conditions that did not apply to other kinds of structures. Lobbying by artists and their supporters, however, resulted in their getting a special status: If the Department of Cultural Affairs certified them as artists, they were allowed to live in lofts. To alert the fire department of their presence, an artist-in-residence sign was posted on the building's exterior.

During the 1970s, a series of laws protected the artists' right to live in SoHo and also permitted residence in adjacent loft areas of TriBeCa (the Triangle Below Canal Street) and NoHo (north of Houston Street), which slowly shifted from manufacturing to arts-related uses and residence. After the New York City Council established a Landmarks Preservation Commission in 1965, SoHo received a historic district designation for the loft buildings' cast iron facades, and this legal status confirmed the district's special aesthetic qualities. Equally important, preserving relatively short but dense structures prevented big developers from moving into the area, modernizing buildings, and turning lofts into standard apartments. All of these laws tended to establish living lofts as special spaces—legal for residence, aesthetically distinguished, and outside the mainstream of consumer culture.

These points were emphasized by increasing media coverage that featured photos and descriptions of artists' lofts. The media dramatized how artists individualized their lofts' décor, and, when richer people moved into them, articles dwelt on their expensive appliances, "industrial chic" aesthetic, and impressive modern art collections. Lofts did in fact offer large spaces at cheaper prices than apartments in the most expensive areas of the city. But it was their aesthetic distinction—and promise of an artful style of life—that made them into an influential cultural model.

Rising rents and sale prices soon made loft living more expensive—too expensive for either artists or manufacturers—and attracted the interest of big real-estate developers. With legalization of residential use, banks granted mortgages and construction loans to buy loft buildings as well as individual loft units. As a result, demand for loft living increased. Residents began to outnumber manufacturers in loft districts, and developers converted many buildings to standard apartments—although with the appeal of exposed structural components (columns,

pipes, ducts, brick walls), concrete or old wooden floors, and open floor plans.

Loft Living Spreads Through the Heartland

Since the 1970s, with the further reduction of manufacturing in many cities in the United States, Canada, and Europe, loft living has become a popular housing style from Los Angeles to London and Montreal. The appeal always begins with artists and an artistic way of life—marketed as an opportunity to create your own living space in a structure whose gracious proportions are not possible in most housing built after World War II. The spread of loft living is also related to the revitalization of many downtowns, supporting their concentration of cultural amenities and raising their tax base. Whereas in cities such as Chicago or Minneapolis, loft living attracts wealthy empty nesters from the suburbs, in Austin, Texas, or Portland, Oregon, it appeals to young artists and other cultural producers who cannot afford more expensive downtown houses and do not want to live in the suburbs. Yet elements of loft living—exposed structure, large windows, open floor plans—have also been incorporated into new suburban developments, where denser buildings satisfy both potential residents and local laws that want less sprawl and more sense of community. Without the grit of an industrial past, loft living becomes just another model of townhouse design. In the old nineteenth-century buildings, however, loft living still offers a sense of authenticity.

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See also Back-to-the-City Movement; Downtown Revitalization; Gentrification; Housing; Sustainable Development

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LONDON, UNITED KINGDOM

London has a long and fascinating history as Britain's capital city. Over the last 20 years, London has experienced a period of considerable, if very uneven, prosperity, largely as a result of its dominance in financial and business services and the large number of highly paid jobs this has generated. This has had major implications for house prices and housing affordability. The impact of the 2008 financial crisis is as yet unknown. This entry begins with a historical overview and then looks at issues directly related to housing.

Historical Background

Beginning as the Roman origins Londinium, London grew through its Norman and medieval periods up until the Great Fire of London in 1666, which destroyed much of the original city of half-timbered buildings. Subsequently, it grew and developed toward the West End, the center of the court and the royal palaces. By 1750, it was the biggest city in Europe, with a population of half a million.

A more significant growth spurt, however, came in the nineteenth century, when in the course of a hundred years, its population grew from 1 million to 6.5 million. This was the period when much of Georgian and Victorian London, with its distinctive terraced housing, was built. This period also saw the creation of areas of slum housing with poor families living one to a room. During the late nineteenth century, the City of London (the historic center of the city and a separate political entity) began to emerge as a major financial center, servicing both the needs of empire and capital investment worldwide.

London's most rapid physical expansion, however, was in the interwar period from 1919 to 1939, when its area doubled as suburban semidetached housing spread out, aided by the new

subway system. Inner London, the former London County Council (LCC) area, is primarily nineteenth century in origin, whereas outer London is largely a twentieth-century creation. After World War II, the creation of the green belt limited the outward expansion of London, although some development jumped this barrier; the London region now extends into a commuting zone 30 miles or more beyond. The City and the East End of London around the docks suffered major bomb damage in World War II, with large areas of housing being destroyed. Miraculously, St. Paul's Cathedral, Christopher Wren's great masterpiece, survived intact, although many of his other City churches were destroyed.

A Global Financial Center

The contemporary economy, social structure, and housing market of London need to be seen in the context of its role as one of the world's leading global cities. London, along with New York, has been one of the two major centers of global finance since the deregulation of the late 1980s. Tokyo, which was also a major global financial center until the Japanese bubble economy collapsed in the early 1990s, has slipped back. The dominance of financial and business services in the London economy has been an important key to understanding the changing nature of the city over this period, and the global financial crisis of 2008, which hit London hard, is likely to have an equally important effect over the next few years.

The collapse or takeover of a number of major investment banks such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and Merrill Lynch will inevitably have a big impact on employment in both London and New York, as will the partial nationalization of some of the major clearing banks and the collapse of some hedge funds, many of which are based in London. The effects in terms of earnings, spending, and house prices will be considerable, and it is likely that London's economy will suffer disproportionately from the financial crisis and subsequent recession, given its reliance on financial services. Although the financial crisis of 2008 is not the first one, it may prove to be the most severe in terms of its long-term repercussions.

An Economy Transformed

The key to understanding the magnitude of the transformation of London's economy over the last 40 years can be seen in the reversal in the importance of manufacturing industry and financial and business services. In 1961, manufacturing accounted for almost a third of total employment, and financial and business services for about 10 percent. By 2001, the proportions had been reversed; manufacturing employment now accounts for only 7 percent of jobs.

Another rapidly growing sector has been that of the cultural and creative industries, including film, music, publishing, theater, museums, art galleries, fashion, and digital arts, which has rapidly expanded the city's labor force. This dramatic shift in industrial structure, which has been paralleled in New York, Paris, and other global cities, has had important implications for the structure of occupations, for earnings and incomes, and for housing, gentrification, and the office and commercial property markets and people's lives.

Class Structure

The decline of manufacturing industry and the growth of financial and business services have led to a major shift in the occupational class structure of London, with a long-term decline in the size and proportion of traditional working-class jobs and a major increase in the size and proportion of middle-class, white-collar office jobs. Hamnett and colleagues have argued that this points to the professionalization of the occupational class structure of London, rather than to class polarization as defined by Sassen. A number of commentators have countered that this overlooks the growth of the low-wage, immigrant labor force of London, not all of whom are included in the official statistics.

There is no doubt that London has witnessed a dramatic increase in both immigration and the size and proportion of its ethnic minority population in recent decades. Immigration, both legal and undocumented, has grown rapidly, from both Eastern Europe and from a number of African countries. This has been a major factor in the growth of the population of Greater London to 7.5 million in the 20 years ending in 2007, reversing the long-standing

loss of population from London. From 2001 to 2007, London's population grew by a net 500,000 from documented international migration. London accounts for a third to a half of net inward overseas migration to the United Kingdom.

In addition, the ethnic minority population of London has increased from about 3 percent in 1961 to 29 percent in 2001 and 34 percent in inner London. In three boroughs, the ethnic minority population now exceeds 50 percent, and there are a number of others where it exceeds 40 percent. In addition, London as a whole has seen a small fall in the size of its White population from 1991 to 2001; in some boroughs, this has exceeded 10 percent. To what extent this reflects replacement by ethnic minorities or an active process of White flight is impossible to say.

Thus, London has changed from an overwhelmingly monoethnic, White-dominated city to a multiethnic city with similarities to New York. The ethnic minority population of London has not been confined to the inner city, however, and 53 percent of minority groups now live in outer London. In the case of some Asian groups, in particular, a process of suburbanization has been accompanied by the growth of homeownership, although other, less economically successful, groups have become more strongly represented in social housing and privately rented housing.

The changes in ethnic composition have also had implications for educational attainment, which has long been seen as a major problem in London, with average attainment below that for England and Wales as a whole. There are large differences in attainment between the inner boroughs and the more affluent suburban boroughs, as well as large differences between ethnic groups. Indian and Chinese pupils have the highest levels of attainment, with Whites following and Black Caribbean and Bangladeshi pupils at the bottom. These differences are partly related to social class, but culture and home background also play a part. A key issue is the high proportion of pupils in some boroughs who do not have English as a first language, as this holds back both teaching and learning.

One of the major impacts of the growth of financial and business services has been the growth of high-earning and high-income individuals and

households and large increases in the level of earnings and incomes for these groups. At the other end of the spectrum, low-earning and low-income groups have seen much smaller increases, if any, in real incomes. This has led to a sharp increase in the extent of earning and income inequality between the top 10 percent to 20 percent and the rest. In this respect, London's experience is broadly similar to that found in other major global cities, which have become both more affluent and much more unequal in income distribution over the last 20 to 30 years. There is a major difference between growing inequality and social polarization, however.

The Housing Market

The growth of a large affluent middle class has had a major impact on the housing market in terms of demand and prices. As the supply of housing is broadly fixed in the short and medium term, the impact of increased effective demand for housing in more attractive areas of London has had the effect of pushing up house prices across the board and generating major problems of housing affordability, which have been intensified by the large number of wealthy overseas buyers who bought investment property in London during the last 10 years. Average property prices in London in 2007 were in excess of 10 times average earnings. The house price slump of 2008 to 2009 is likely to reduce the problem of housing affordability.

The growth of the middle class has also had a major role in propelling the process of gentrification: a term first introduced by Ruth Glass in 1964 to describe the interaction of social class and housing changes in inner London. Large parts of inner London have now experienced some degree of gentrification as the process has spread outward from the original core areas. The gentrification process has taken a variety of different forms, ranging from the classic renovation of single-family houses to the conversion of houses into apartments; new build gentrification, particularly in Docklands and along the river and canals; and recently, loft conversions of former industrial/warehouse buildings, offices, and public buildings into luxury apartments. Many of these processes have introduced a new middle-class resident population into former working-class or run-down or derelict areas as well as the recolonization of areas

formerly built for the middle classes in the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries but later abandoned.

Gentrification is only one of the processes that have transformed the housing market of London in the last 40 years, however. In 1961, more than 60 percent of households in inner London still rented privately, and social housing and homeownership were both relatively small (each under 20 percent). During the 1960s and 1970s, large areas of poor-quality private rented housing were compulsorily acquired and demolished, and the areas were then redeveloped as large social housing estates, some but not all in the form of high-rise tower blocks. As this sector expanded with the simultaneous growth of homeownership, a process of tenure social polarization began to occur in which social housing began to see a growing concentration of the economically inactive, unemployed, low-skill, and low-income workers, and some ethnic minority groups. This process of social residualization has persisted and intensified, and social housing in London today, as in Britain in general, has become linked with the less economically successful, the deprived, the socially excluded, and some ethnic minority groups.

This process has been intensified by the numerical success of the Conservative "right to buy" legislation introduced in 1980, which led to large numbers of council housing tenants buying their home from the council. Although this was beneficial to the tenants concerned, it had the effect of significantly reducing the size of the sector. In addition, the Conservatives also cut the money available for new construction significantly and directed funding to the housing association sector. As a result, the council sector has shrunk dramatically from its high-water mark in 1981, when it accounted for 42 percent of households in inner London, to 25 percent in 2001. A series of other policy measures, including the large-scale voluntary transfers of council homes, have also effectively forced many councils to dispose of their holdings to other social landlords.

The 10 years from the late 1990s to 2007 have also seen another major change in the structure of London's housing—the revival of renting from private landlords. This sector had declined continuously from the 1950s to the early 1990s, largely as a result of rent controls and security of tenure, which meant that many landlords sold

when a property became vacant and others sold to the tenants. The introduction of assured tenancies from the late 1980s has led to a major resurgence of private landlordism or buy-to-let, although this appears to have hit problems in the wake of the financial, house price, and mortgage crisis of 2008. One indirect indicator of high prices and rents in London has been the high level of housing benefits paid in the city to subsidize rental costs for low-income groups. The inner London boroughs have taken a very disproportionate share of national housing benefit payments, although these effectively subsidize private landlords.

The result of all these changes is that London has seen a major shift in its housing tenure structure over the last 40 years, first with the decline of the private renting and the growth of both council housing and homeownership; after 1981, with the decline of council housing and the growth of other social landlords; and in the last 10 years with the resurgence of private renting. Overall, however, London now has a much higher level of ownership and a much lower level of private renting than it had in the 1960s.

East London's Growth

One of the important changes in the physical structure of London has been the growth of the office sector, the expansion of the City of London, and the development of a number of major new office developments, particularly the construction of Canary Wharf in the former docklands area of East London. Canary Wharf has become one of the largest commercial regeneration projects in Europe and now houses many of the world's leading banks and financial companies. As such, it has played a key role in terms of the provision of modern office space to enable London to compete successfully with other global financial centers. The success of Canary Wharf was assisted by construction of the Jubilee line underground extension, which provided direct access from central London, and by the development of London City airport, which provides easy access to European cities.

Other developments include Paddington Basin and King's Cross railway stations; the Stratford area of East London is undergoing major redevelopment in preparation for the 2012 Olympics. The planned Crossrail scheme, which is designed to link

Heathrow Airport and Paddington to East London, will have big implications in terms of improving public transport and accessibility in London.

One of the major changes in planning policy in London in recent years has been the plan to focus more housing and other development in East London, particularly in the Thames Gateway. It is intended to build large numbers of new houses in this sector of London and to help shift the growth focus away from west London, but the recession of 2008 to 2009 has led to a sharp cyclical fall in both housing and office demand and construction, which may not recover for some time.

Important political developments in London were governed at the metropolitan level by the Greater London Council until 1986, when it and the other Labour party-controlled metropolitan councils were abolished by Thatcher's Conservative government. London survived with no metropolitan government until the formation of the Greater London Authority in 2000. The Labor party mayor until 2008 was Ken Livingstone, and he backed more high-rise office development to reinforce London's dominance as a leading European financial center, combined with an affordable housing policy, which required new housing developments to provide up to 50 percent of units as affordable housing. He also introduced the congestion charge for all vehicles entering central London, put more investment into bus services and public transport, and supported the London Development Agency. In the mayoral election in 2008, he was replaced by Conservative Boris Johnston. What the implications of this will be are uncertain, although the new mayor is committed to retaining London's leading role as a financial center.

Conclusion

London has experienced a period of considerable, if very uneven prosperity over the last 20 years, largely as a result of its dominance in financial and business services and the large number of highly paid jobs this has generated. This has had major implications for house prices and housing affordability. The financial crisis raises questions regarding the continuing viability of Sassen's global city thesis, which was predicated on the centrality of financial and business services. Although it is

likely that London will retain its global city status, it is possible that the dominance of banking and finance may prove to be London's Achilles heel, at least in the short term; this could result in a major economic downturn with consequent impacts on people's lives. What the implications are for Sassen's polarization thesis remains to be seen.

While the impact of the financial crisis and recession will increase unemployment, it is unclear whether this will affect the highly skilled and high-paid groups more than the low-skilled groups. If it does, it could lead to a slowing or reversal of the growth of the middle classes and of immigration. What is very likely is that job losses and income cutbacks in the high-income sectors of banking and law will reduce earnings and income inequalities and increase housing affordability, at least in the short to medium term. Only time will tell whether London and New York will recover their global position or whether there will be a permanent shift in economic and financial power toward Southeast Asia.

Chris Hamnett

See also Gentrification; Globalization; Housing; Social Housing; World City

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LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA

In the field of urban studies, Los Angeles is a key reference case for the analysis of contemporary urban restructuring. The followers of the Los Angeles School of Urban Studies ascribe to Los Angeles a paradigmatic status among postmodern urban regions. Los Angeles exemplifies a new model of urbanism, which, in contrast to the teachings of the Chicago School of Urbanism of the 1920s, is no longer organized around a central urban core or a central business district (CBD). Instead, its polycentric settlement pattern is best characterized as "dense sprawl." Less than 1 of 10 jobs and even fewer of the housing units in the region are located downtown. But even without an equivalent to midtown or downtown Manhattan, at 6,000 inhabitants per square mile, the Los Angeles urban area is the densest metropolitan region in the United States.

The greater Los Angeles area, also called "the Southland," extends over 400 square miles. Los

Angeles is the second-largest city in the United States and the largest city in the state of California. It is home to 3.8 million people, while Los Angeles County has about 10 million inhabitants. The surrounding five-county region has 17.6 million inhabitants and is expected to grow to about 25 million to 30 million people over the next decades.

Urban Development

Los Angeles's rapid ascent over the last century to an economic powerhouse and a leading world city is surprising, given its unfavorable environmental conditions compared to its regional competitors. The Los Angeles River carries a trickle of water during the dry summer months, hampering agricultural development. The proximity to the San Andreas Fault line makes the region prone to earthquakes. The San Gabriel and Santa Monica mountains provide natural barriers to freight shipping, while the geography of the ports is less ideal than other stretches of the coast. Also, because of its geographic location in a basin surrounded by water and mountains, Los Angeles is prone to smog, a situation further exacerbated by the region's excessive reliance on automobiles as the main means of transportation. So, early on, all signs pointed to San Francisco, Seattle, or San Diego as more likely candidates for the leading West Coast trade hub.

Working in favor of Los Angeles, however, was the unrelenting boosterism of its political and civic elites during the early twentieth century. These elites included such key figures as the water baron Walter Mulholland (prominently featured in the classic film *Chinatown*), the *Los Angeles Times* publisher and investor Harry Chandler, and the railroad and real estate tycoon Henry Huntington. The pleasant climatic conditions in the Land of Sunshine further encouraged the relocation of the entertainment industry, particularly the motion picture industry, from the East Coast in the 1920s.

But Los Angeles was a late bloomer compared to other leading American cities. Founded in 1777 in the viceroy-ruled territory of the Spanish Empire under the name of El Pueblo de Nuestra Señora la Reina de los Ángeles del Río de Porciúncula, the area had 650 residents in 1820. The economic development of the region rapidly accelerated only with the arrival of the Southern

Pacific Railroad in 1876, the discovery of oil in 1892, and the completion of a much needed water aqueduct in 1913. Between 1890 and 1930, Los Angeles's increasingly diverse population grew from 50,400 to 1,200,000. The old Mexican ranchos were quickly replaced by citrus groves and endless subdivisions of single-family detached homes.

In contrast to classical industrial cities, where explosive growth during the mid- and late nineteenth century translated into extremely high inner-city population densities, urban growth in Los Angeles took a horizontal pattern right from the start. As early as 1930, population densities in downtown Los Angeles were less than three times higher than in surrounding suburbs, compared to a ratio of 30:1 in San Francisco and 26:1 in New York. Yet, contrary to common belief, the most crucial factor for this spread-out pattern was not the advent of the private automobile but rather the development of an extensive interurban passenger railway system. By the early 1910s, Henry Huntington's famous Pacific Electric Red Car Line had more than 1,000 miles of track and extended far into the surrounding counties. Even during their heyday, however, these passenger railway operations were never profitable by themselves. Rather, Huntington and others used them as loss leaders to encourage the real estate development of outlying suburban and exurban land. When the bulk of these parcels had been developed in the 1920s, the first Red Car lines were converted to cheaper buses.

In the next decades, buses and above all private cars began to dominate the regional transportation system. Despite a temporary boost in ridership during World War II, when gasoline shortages hampered further motorization, what was once the world's most extensive interurban rail system increasingly fell into disrepair; the last Red Car ran in 1961. However, contrary to a popular urban myth, the fate of electric rail in Los Angeles (and elsewhere) was not determined by General Motors, Firestone, Standard Oil, and other auto industry giants that bought up trolley lines across the nation and replaced them with buses. The so-called GM scandal merely accelerated a decline already in progress due to financial and structural problems of the trolley industry.

Also, influential urban planners advocated for "magic motorways" as the modern solution to

southern California's urban congestion problems. Following the successful completion of the Arroyo Seco Parkway from downtown Los Angeles to Pasadena in 1940, the California Department of Public Works (now Caltrans) constructed a dense network of freeways in the coming decades, thus establishing the public image of Los Angeles as a sprawling, centerless sea of single-family homes, big-box stores, and low-rise office complexes connected by an endless number of fast-moving freeways.

After another half century of almost continuous population and economic growth in the region, this image has all but reversed itself. Motorization has increased to an astonishing rate of one car for every 1.8 people—the highest in the world—and traffic on the magic motorways is now crawling along at an average speed of 13 miles per hour for much of the day (which, ironically, is equal to the average speed of the Red Cars during their heyday). Due to growing political and neighborhood opposition, less than two thirds of the freeway miles originally proposed in the 1954 master plan have been built, with gaps particularly in affluent communities such as Beverly Hills and South Pasadena.

Meanwhile, Los Angeles continues to grow and become denser, with new multistory and high-rise living, working, and entertainment complexes going up all across the region. The mounting negative consequences of the region's sprawled settlement pattern have made Los Angeles, and southern California more generally, a hotbed for new urbanism ideas and practices such as transit-oriented, mixed-use development and smart growth.

Economic Development

Despite its strong and famous service sector industries, such as movie production, Los Angeles is by no means a postindustrial city. In fact, Los Angeles is the largest manufacturing center in the United States, with manufacturing accounting for almost 12 percent of all employment in the region (down from about 18 percent in 1990). From the 1920s onward, the motion picture and aerospace industries have provided important economic boosts to the region, complemented by other entertainment and media industries, oil, technology, fashion, and tourism as well as banking and finance. World War II concentrated military industries in the

region and thus brought an enormous economic and employment boon and a near doubling of the regional population. The end of the cold war and the subsequent collapse of the defense industry threw the region into recession in the early 1990s, but the military-industrial complex still plays an important role in the regional economy. Meanwhile, the world-famous Los Angeles district of Hollywood is synonymous with the world of movies and stars, leading to a unique clustering of film-related businesses and creative industries.

Los Angeles is also one of the world's most important trade gateways. The Long Beach/Los Angeles port complex ranks fifth in the world in container traffic and accounts for one third of all waterborne container traffic in the United States. By 2020, this already impressive volume is expected to double. Meanwhile, the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) handles more "origin and destination" (as opposed to through-transit) passengers than any other airport in the world and is the world's sixth busiest in cargo traffic.

Politics and Governance

Local public life and politics in the immigrant city of Los Angeles have been fraught with class and racial tensions. Los Angeles has always been a stronghold of progressive, social, and labor movements, where artists frequently joined political radicals and working-class communities in reform struggles against big business. Progressives won important victories in the 1920s and 1930s, but in the 1940s, the political landscape became dominated by anti-Left, racist, and anti-Semitic sentiments. In 1947, foreshadowing what became known as McCarthyism in the 1950s, U.S. Congressman J. Parnell Thomas held secret hearings on the alleged communist infiltration of the Hollywood entertainment industry. The tides turned again with the advent of the civil rights movement, but deep racial and economic divides continued to strain the city's socioeconomic fabric as new groups of immigrants sought a place in Los Angeles's hodge-podge of cultures and ethnicities.

Los Angeles was the most segregated city in the United States during the 1960s. The African American neighborhood of Watts experienced five days of race rioting in 1965, primarily triggered by years of police brutality and harassment. In 1992,

riots were sparked across the city after the acquittal of four white police officers who had been caught on videotape beating Rodney King, an African American, subsequent to a high-speed pursuit. The underlying racial animosities fueling the Rodney King uprising were different than during the Watts riots, however, as many historically black neighborhoods in south-central Los Angeles were turning increasingly Latino. Economic prospects for African Americans grew dimmer throughout the 1980s as unionized Black workers in downtown Los Angeles lost their jobs to Latino immigrants who were ready to work for substandard wages and African American-owned liquor and grocery stores were taken over by Asian immigrants.

In 1973, the Democrat Tom Bradley became the first Black mayor to be elected in a large U.S. city with a White majority. He governed Los Angeles for 20 years, contributing to the city's transformation into a multicultural world city. After Bradley's retirement, the businessman Richard Riordan became the city's first Republican mayor in more than 30 years. His administration was overshadowed by public controversy over the massive cost overruns and construction mismanagement related to the construction of Los Angeles's first modern-day heavy rail subway line, the Red Line.

Transit politics in Los Angeles have always been closely linked to complex ethnic and class struggles. In most other cities of the world, a federally subsidized rail project would have been hailed by a majority of residents as a much-needed project, but in Los Angeles, both the predominantly White residents on the affluent West Side and the poorer African American and Latino residents in South, Central, and East Los Angeles strongly objected to the Red Line. While the former group largely preferred car-oriented to transit-oriented solutions, the latter argued that a diversion of scarce funds from the overcrowded and underfinanced buses, which carried the vast majority of transit passengers and almost exclusively served transit-dependent people of color, to expensive new rail projects targeted at more affluent residents was racially and spatially discriminatory.

The Bus Riders Union (BRU), a civil rights advocacy group organized by the L.A. Labor/Community Strategy Center, brought a class action lawsuit against the Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA/Metro) in

1996 and successfully forced the authority into a 10-year consent decree designed to support bus operations and reduce bus overcrowding. The BRU consent decree has received nationwide attention as a key success story of the environmental justice movement.

In 2001, Riordan was succeeded by James Hahn, the son of the late Kenneth Hahn, who served on the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors for 40 years from 1952 to 1992. Then, in a closely watched race, incumbent Hahn lost the 2005 mayoral race to Antonio Villaraigosa, who became the city's first Latino mayor since 1872. At the time Villaraigosa took office, Los Angeles was 48 percent Hispanic, 31 percent White, 11 percent Asian, and 10 percent Black. Villaraigosa arrived in office with strong credentials as a labor and community advocate, and he stepped onto the national political scene as a charismatic and progressive urban leader who vowed to put environmental and working-class community issues at the forefront of his local agenda.

However, many of the city's most pressing problems, such as environmental degradation, traffic congestion, unaffordable land and housing prices, and substandard public services, including poor educational and medical facilities, can be effectively addressed only at the regional or state level. Unfortunately, regional governance in the Greater Los Angeles area has always been extremely fragmented. Los Angeles County is a hodgepodge of 88 incorporated cities and many additional unincorporated areas, and the larger region has more than 180 individual municipalities.

Los Angeles's Urban Renaissance

Los Angeles is currently well on its way to defying most of its historical stereotypes. Downtown is undergoing a major urban renaissance. Apart from new museums and entertainment and sports centers, thousands of new residential loft and condominium apartments have been created since the city council passed an adaptive reuse ordinance in 1999, encouraging the conversion of vacant office and commercial buildings. Several spectacular mixed-used urban redevelopment megaprojects are in the advanced planning and early construction stages.

The future of the large industrial district around downtown is uncertain. Between 2005 and 2007,



New development in Los Angeles is transforming formerly run-down and neglected parts of the city into an entertainment, business, and residential hub.

Source: Tracy Buyan.

the downtown residential population jumped more than 20 percent to almost 40,000 residents. Most of the new development is taking place around the Staples entertainment center and in the Bunker Hill central business district core.

Bunker Hill has been an urban renewal area since the 1950s, when a massive slum clearance project replaced run-down historic Victorian residences with modern office towers. However, because of the city's high taxes, congestion, and economic recession, the vacancy rate for downtown commercial real estate was more than 20 percent by the 1990s. Commonly known by the name of Skid Row, the district immediately to the east of Bunker Hill is still home to several thousand homeless people living in cardboard boxes and tents. The gentrification of downtown Los Angeles now threatens the transient and low-income populations in this area with displacement, once again demonstrating how the politics and economics of urban growth divide Los Angeles into winners and losers.

Deike Peters

See also Davis, Mike; Los Angeles School of Urban Studies; Soja, Edward W.; Urban Geography; Urban Theory

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LOS ANGELES SCHOOL OF URBAN STUDIES

In the early 1980s, urban researchers at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) and

the University of Southern California (USC) began to study urban restructuring processes through a series of detailed cases studies on the Los Angeles region. Much of the research in urban geography and sociology up to that time had focused on East Coast industrial cities and was largely informed by models developed by Chicago School scholars in the first half of the twentieth century. However, rather than finding a city with concentric zones ordered by a dominant center, Los Angeles researchers found a fragmented urban region with a center that was too weak to impose order on all the different parts.

These researchers believed that they had identified new patterns of urbanization and drew on a wide body of theoretical work (from Marxism to postmodernism) to understand them. Moreover, many suggested that although underlying urbanization processes were not unique to Los Angeles, they developed in Los Angeles earliest and with the greatest intensity. Although what could be called the Los Angeles School of Urban Studies (LA School) is far from a perfectly cohesive community of scholars, the scholars who compose it tend to be unified in the belief that several key urbanization processes are restructuring cities in entirely new ways and that these processes have intersected in particularly intense ways in Los Angeles, making it the paradigmatic city of the twenty-first century.

The Post-Fordist Turn

The LA School has its roots in urban economic geography, drawing from broad theoretical traditions including structural Marxism, neoclassical economics, and the Regulation School. Edward W. Soja draws from the Marxist-inspired work of David Harvey to argue that a central response to capitalist economic crises has been to reconcentrate certain aspects of capital and labor in certain cities while dispersing others across space. In Los Angeles and other global regions, this has resulted in a process of “*extensification*” whereby corporations have sought out inexpensive and unorganized sources of labor throughout the developing world. This has led to the deindustrialization of major urban areas in the advanced north.

Concomitantly, key functions (e.g., managerial, finance, and innovation) have been concentrated in several prominent regions in advanced capitalist

countries, resulting in profound changes in the physical form (central business districts, science parks, new consumption complexes, etc.) and class structures of these regions. Different processes combined in particularly intense ways in the 1970s and 1980s to restructure the economic logic of Los Angeles.

These researchers also drew insights from the Regulation School to argue that as large industrial plants underwent a process of deindustrialization, those industries that remained in urban regions like Los Angeles were likely to be organized according to post-Fordist principles. They suggested that firms were embracing new models of organizing the production process that centered on more flexible production systems, where small and medium-size firms were linked to one another in clusters of transaction-intensive networks. These changes improved the abilities of firms to reduce uncertainties; respond to new information, trends, and competitors; contain labor costs; and maximize innovation capacities.

The principal examples of these agglomeration economies in the Los Angeles region are Orange County’s technology industry, Hollywood’s entertainment industry, downtown Los Angeles’s craft industry, and the Wilshire Corridor’s financial and insurance industries.

The Polycentric City Region

These economic processes contributed to unleashing important changes in the sociospatial forms of urban regions in general and Los Angeles in particular. These processes transformed the concentrically centered cities identified by the Chicago School into sprawled, multinodal, and polycentric city regions. Early economic elites in Los Angeles laid the foundations for a sprawling and low-density metropolitan region with a loosely defined and increasingly inconsequential downtown. Changes in the economic structure beginning in the 1970s transformed this low-density and flat city into a polynucleated one.

The transition to a post-Fordist urban economy triggered important changes in the spatial structure of the region as activities in the most dynamic economic sectors clustered into different business and industrial districts throughout the metropolitan region. It must be stressed that the multicentered

urban region is not the result of chaotic and anarchic processes but rather reflects the spatial logic of post-Fordist capitalism in which small and medium-size firms agglomerate in distinct economic districts throughout urban regions. These new urban centers are distinctive from traditional residential suburbs because they are relatively autonomous poles that combine work, residential, leisure, and consumption activities.

New Modes of Stratification

Changes in the class structure intersected with rapid changes in race and ethnicity to produce a new system of social stratification in Los Angeles. In terms of the changing class structure, several Los Angeles scholars asserted a causal link between new patterns in urban restructuring and new inequalities. They maintained that globalization, labor-saving technologies, and plant closings combined to rid Los Angeles's economic landscape of Fordist manufacturers, resulting in the loss of 70,000 middle-income jobs between 1978 and 1983. As the supply of middle-income manufacturing jobs declined, intense growth in other sectors of the economy (high technology, craft, finance) contributed to the expansion of jobs at both the top and bottom ends of the occupational structure and relatively weak growth of mid-level jobs. In addition to this, rapid growth at the top end of the occupational structure fueled growth at the bottom end by creating new demands for labor-intensive services (e.g., personal services, restaurants, hotels). These trends in the regional labor market combined to generate a highly polarized occupational and income structure.

Further contributing to the region's changing system of social stratification was the rapid increase of its non-White population. Los Angeles was one of America's most homogenous large cities up until the 1940s. Three large waves of migrants changed the face of the urban region. First, African Americans moved to Los Angeles in the 1940s. After the late 1960s, antidiscriminatory hiring policies and expanded university opportunities created a sustainable Black middle class. At the same time, deindustrialization closed off a major source of employment for low- and semiskilled members of the Black community.

These two processes bifurcated the Black community along class and geographical lines.

Second, the Hart-Celler Act of 1965 eliminated strict immigration quotas and introduced new visa requirements based on labor market needs and family ties. Significant numbers of Asian professionals were granted visas and were later able to sponsor their relatives. In addition to these professionals, Los Angeles also attracted a flow of refugees from Southeast Asia. The economic endowments of a large proportion of Asian migrants (skills, entrepreneurial know-how, capital) distinguished them from traditional working-class immigrants and facilitated their integration into the region's middle and upper-middle classes.

Third, the end of the temporary migrant program in 1962 prompted many Mexican migrants to settle in the United States, with social networks to their home communities enabling the migration of hundreds of thousands of Mexicans to Los Angeles. The region also experienced an important increase in El Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees in the 1980s. Latino migrants have largely been low-skilled and have occupied labor market niches that offer little hope for upward economic mobility. Thus, dramatic changes in the region's occupational structure have intersected with a remarkable increase in immigration to produce a particularly new social division of labor. These changes have made the region a paradigmatic case for understanding the implications of this new system of social stratification.

Governing the Fragmented Metropolis

Los Angeles researchers have also highlighted the particularly weak and fragmented character of the region's governance institutions, with many of them placing the blame for this on the Lakewood Plan. The Lakewood Plan allowed residents of unincorporated areas to exercise municipal powers—zoning powers were particularly useful for limiting the access of low-income residents to middle-class areas—without incurring high taxes for service and administrative costs. This formula of municipal governance provided the framework for 60 new municipalities formed between 1940 and the 1970s, further shattering the already fragmented metropolis.

Middle-class suburban areas were undergirded by a dense network of homeowners associations

(HOAs), which provided residents with a ready-made social infrastructure to mobilize against perceived threats to their interests (e.g., rising property values, low taxes, and racial homogeneity). In a series of mobilizations to limit property taxes, roll back school integration, and secede from the city of Los Angeles, these residents have played a central role in further fragmenting the region.

In terms of social policy, urban officials throughout the 1980s and 1990s cut social expenditures while redoubling spending in policing. What remained of a local welfare apparatus was scaled back dramatically during the 1980s, the result of a massive reduction in revenue to cities and counties (limits on property taxes and cutbacks in federal aid to large cities) and the policy choices of neoliberal city and county officials. As crime rates rose and the homeless population soared, a new culture of fear drove middle-class residents to embrace law and order policies (e.g., police repression, strict sentencing guidelines) and private security measures (e.g., surveillance, private security forces, gated communities, urban design and architecture). Widespread popularity of these measures resulted in the transformation of the urban landscape, with security technologies and instruments carving up the region into thousands of fortified zones ranging in scale from privately guarded homes to gated communities. Following from this, Mike Davis observed in 1990 that

The old liberal paradigm of social control, attempting to balance repression with reform, has long been superseded by a rhetoric of social warfare that calculates the interests of the urban poor and the middle classes as a zero-sum game. In cities like Los Angeles, on the bad edge of postmodernity, one observes an unprecedented tendency to merge urban design, architecture and the police apparatus into a single, comprehensive security effort. (p. 224)

Postmodern Urbanism as a Way of Life?

Edward Soja and Michael Dear, two founders of the Los Angeles School, have also sought to understand the relation between new patterns of urbanization and the consciousness of urban residents. They have asserted that the particular features found in contemporary urban regions have

fueled a new postmodern urban consciousness. Southern California's fragmented and decentered character has blurred the real and imagined boundaries that once underpinned modernist categories for knowing the world.

The deconstruction of modernist precepts has resulted in greater conceptual instability, with signs and information no longer rooted in underlying truths and realities. For Soja, this presents both constraints and opportunities for new progressive politics. On the one hand, urban elites have stepped into this knowledge vacuum by combining and sanitizing cultural markers in the production of new spaces of mass consumption. Los Angeles's *City Walk* serves as an example of such a space, with entrepreneurs repackaging and representing urbanity to residents in a tightly controlled environment. As residents of the region isolate themselves in their guarded enclaves, encounters with urbanity are increasingly shaped through these types of spaces, transforming these idealized simulations of city life into a (hyper) reality.

At the same time, Soja maintains that the weakening of universalizing and essential political truths has provided ideological openings for establishing new hybrid alliances across traditional political divides (ideological, racial, class, spatial). In such a context, actors can form common alliances around pragmatic issues that bind them together, with internal differences often viewed as assets in the common struggle for social justice. Whereas modernist epistemologies based on universalizing truths made the development of alliances across traditional political and ideological divides difficult, more relativized and reflexive postmodern ways of thinking make these types of alliances more feasible.

The work of the LA School has proven to be very influential in national and international urban scholarship, with many researchers having adopted its central propositions. Nevertheless, the LA School has come under criticism from several well-known urban scholars. Some suggest that the "new" processes highlighted by the LA School are not so much *new* empirical realities but the application of *new* theories (largely developed by non-LA School scholars) to existing urban realities, revealing processes that classical urban theories had failed to uncover. The power of these new urban theories justifies a shift away from the

Chicago School model, but LA School researchers do not possess intellectual ownership over them. The label *new urban sociology* is seen as a more accurate reflection of the new theoretical developments in urban studies.

Others have questioned Los Angeles's status as the paradigmatic city of the twenty-first century and suggest that other cities are equally or more deserving of this title. The last type of criticism has targeted the politics of the LA School, with scholars from the Left and the Right attacking its ideological underpinnings and the political implications of its arguments. In spite of the merit of some of these criticisms, the individual scholars of the LA School have made important contributions to their respective areas of specialization (e.g., urban and regional economics, sociology and immigration, urban politics, postmodern urban theory) while collectively illustrating how these different strands can all come together to shape the form, function, and fate of a single urban region.

Walter J. Nicholls

See also Chicago School of Urban Sociology; Davis, Mike; Los Angeles, California; Soja, Edward W.; Urban Geography; Urban Sociology; Urban Theory

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LÖSCH, AUGUST

Together with Johann Heinrich von Thünen (1780–1850), Wilhelm Launhardt (1832–1918), and Alfred Weber (1868–1958), August Lössch (1906–1945) is regarded as one of the early creators of spatial economic theory. His most important work, *Die räumliche Ordnung der Wirtschaft* (The

Spatial Order of the Economy), translated into English 1954 under the slightly misleading title. *The Economics of Location*, became internationally recognized as an important theoretical base for the newly developing discipline of regional science.

Biographical Background

Lössch was born on October 15, 1906, in the small town of Öhringen in southwestern Germany. Two years later, the family moved to Heidenheim, where the young man passed *Abitur*, the German version of the high school final, in 1925. After an apprenticeship with a local industrial firm, he began his studies at the University of Tübingen. “A royal feeling,” he writes, in youthful idealism, in his diary in July 1927, “to be free for all that is noble and true. To be on your own in research and in life!”

He continued his studies at the University of Freiburg and moved on to Bonn in 1930. There, he met professors Arthur Spiethoff and Joseph Schumpeter, who admitted him to his seminar and to a special philosophical–sociological workshop. Lössch received his doctorate in 1932, based on a thesis on the question, “What to Think about the Fall in Birth-rate,” an earlier version of which had already won a prize in 1931. He used the prize money to publish the manuscript under the original German title of *Was ist vom Geburtenrückgang zu halten?*

During the following years, Lössch concentrated his research on the interrelationships between the development paths of population and the economy. This interest continued into his first visit to the United States, where he went in the fall of 1934 on a one-year Rockefeller fellowship. After his return to Bonn, Lössch passed habilitation—in the German tradition, the prerequisite for a university career—in 1936 based on the manuscript of his new book on population waves and business cycles, *Bevölkerungswellen und Wechsellagen*.

In this book, he analyzes the differing impacts of population growth on the business cycle in economies dominated by the agricultural or industrial sectors. In the former case, a close relationship between demographic and economic variables can be clearly shown, but the interaction is not as strict in the latter. Here, the political frame conditions for technological and economic development are more important.

In 1936, Lösch's Rockefeller fellowship was extended for another year. During his U.S. visit, he met again with Schumpeter, who had moved to Harvard and who received him "like a father." In Schumpeter's seminar, he met old friends like Wolfgang Stolper—whom he knew from Schumpeter's seminar in Bonn—and made new ones—like Edgar M. Hoover, Jr., then Schumpeter's assistant. Deeply impressed by the diversity of the country, where he traveled rather extensively during his second visit, and by the spirit of freedom in America, Lösch began research on the topic of economic regions.

In 1933, after *Machtergreifung* by the Nazi party, Lösch wrote in his diary: "I will walk upright through these hopeless times." Many of his friends decided to leave Germany for good, and his birthrate book had been indexed by the German authorities in 1936. Nevertheless, he returned to his home country in 1937. "What would become of Germany, if all of us were leaving?" he asked.

During the following years, he worked in Heidenheim and Bonn as a freelance scientist on the manuscript of *Spatial Order*, which he completed in the fall of 1939. In 1940, the year when the first edition of this book was published, he entered the Kiel Institute for World Economics, where he worked as a coresearcher and later as the leader of a research group. Under the protection of the Kiel Institute, he wrote in a letter to a friend, "I could avoid to fight for Hitler."

His gratitude to the institute did not prevent Lösch from criticizing its policies. In his diary, he complained that the institute director forced on him "totally useless" reports, thus deliberately keeping him from productive work on his currency plan.


The currency plan that Lösch worked on during the last years of World War II and of his life dealt with developing a currency system that would, after the end of the war, help reintegrate the world economy. The first part of the concept is based on the assumption that a single world currency exists. The transfer system then works in relation to distance and the distribution of activities in space. Introducing partial currencies and thus approaching reality again, the point of view of the spatial distribution of activities is dominant in explaining the impact of price-level movements and price fluctuations on the rates of exchange.

In October 1944, after heavy air raids by allied forces on the city of Kiel, Lösch and his research group were evacuated to the small town of Ratzeburg. Here, weakened from exhaustion and the lack of medical attention, he died from an attack of scarlet fever on May 30, 1945. He did not complete his currency theory. The fragment was published posthumously in *Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv* 1949.

Intellectual Legacy

Lösch's *Economics of Location* is a book with many facets and is easy neither to read nor to understand. Lösch subdivides it into four parts: I. Location, II. Economic Areas, III. Trade, and IV. Examples. While the explorations elaborated in these four parts are closely interrelated, the most important and revolutionary concepts are developed in Part II.

Here, Lösch starts from the following set of assumptions: Economic activity takes place on an unlimited homogeneous plane where the population—equipped with equal preferences and



Lösch's Ideal Central-Place Hierarchy

Source: Lösch, A. 1954. *The Economics of Location*. Translated by W. H. Woglom and W. F. Stolper. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

incomes—is settled in equidistant locations. Economic decisions are based on rational behavior and the possibility of free market entry. Production functions are independent from geographical location; however, the existence of economies of scale and agglomeration economies favor spatial clustering. The market area of the single producer is geographically extended until the price at market location becomes equal to the sum of factory price and product-specific linear transport costs, so that profits disappear—because factory prices are equal to average production costs. Most important, for each finished product, each location on the plane is supplied by exactly one production location.

Starting from the market area for a single producer and moving on to nets of markets for producers of competing products, Lösch describes, “for the various classes of commodities,” nets of equilateral “hexagons, close-meshed and wide-meshed ones which, to begin with, we can throw across our plane at random.” However, considering the existence of agglomeration economies, the nets are to be rearranged “in such a way that all of them have in common at least one center.” Thus, a central city evolves, as shown in the figure on the previous page.

Then, the various market nets are rotated around the central city in such a way that the highest number of market locations coincide with each other. Thus, a sectoral pattern of densely and loosely clustered locations comes into existence: a Löschian economic area.

Next, moving away from the strict conditions of spatial homogeneity, the market areas have to be redetermined for differing conditions of the geographic distribution of consumers. Also to be considered is that production and demand functions for identical products may differ as a result of divergent impacts from natural or behavioral factors or political conditions. Finally, systems of market nets as derived from these redefined production and demand functions have to be introduced for different products, and the various market nets, again, have to be overlaid to form economic areas.

Whatever the detailed conditions, Lösch finds that “the honeycomb is the most advantageous form of economic areas,” where the advantage benefits the totality of consumers, whereas for the

single producer the circular market area would be most opportune.

On April 21, 1971, the first August Lösch Days were held by the City of Heidenheim, for more than three decades a series of biannual events. August Lösch in memoriam, as well as theoretical and practical problems of spatial structure and development have been discussed; the August Lösch prize for outstanding publications in regional science, written in German or—after a change of the constitution—in English, has been awarded. Most recently, commemorating the centenary of Lösch’s birthday in October 2006, the event was held at the Kiel Institute for World Economics.

In 1982, the first August Lösch Ring of Regional Science, to be conferred on no more than six living persons of undisputed international renown in the field, was offered to Wolfgang F. Stolper. Further awardees are Leo H. Klaassen (1984), Torsten Hägerstrand (1986), Walter Isard (1988), Kazimierz Dziewonski (1992), Martin J. Beckmann (1998), and Herbert Giersch (2000).

Rolf Funck

See also Location Theory; Urban Economics; Urban Geography

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LYNCH, KEVIN

Kevin Lynch (1918–1984) was a professor of city planning at the Massachusetts Institute of

Technology, where he taught for more than 30 years. By all reckoning, he was a leading thinker in the field of city planning and design. His work inspired many researchers, practitioners, and students in his field and influenced academic thinking and writing in areas outside planning. His name is most commonly associated with his seminal work, *The Image of the City*. First published in 1960, the book has gone through multiple printings. It has been translated into many different languages and is widely read and consulted in academic work and practice.

Image Studies

In contrast to the prevalent Beaux-Arts and modernist traditions of city design, Lynch was committed to defining a new practice of design that would be informed by the human experiences of the built environment. By asking people to draw maps of their cities, and to tell what came to their mind first when they thought of their city, or to describe what the experience of the city meant to them and how that affected their sense of well-being, Lynch demonstrated how it is possible to construct a collective or consensus image of the city. This “public image”—as he preferred to call it—consists of a collection of the physical features of the city that consistently appear in individual mental maps of the city: certain streets, significant buildings, functional districts, important public spaces, concentration and intensity of activities, major streets and roads commonly traveled, natural elements like rivers and hills, and so on. He suggested that such frequently mentioned elements shown in individual maps or included in the aggregated public image can be categorized as districts, edges, landmarks, nodes, and paths, although the respondents may not consciously use such rubrics. These concepts, however, are now routinely used in the practice of urban design.

Lynch argued further that some cities are more “imageable” than others, and this depends on the legibility of the urban form. What makes a city more or less legible? It is a function of three things, he proposed: identity, structure, and meaning. Cities that have buildings and natural features with strong identities, street patterns that are easy to comprehend, and other form elements that have functional and symbolic meanings are

likely to be more imageable than cities lacking such attributes.

Considered a seminal work, *The Image of the City* inspired both practice and pedagogy of city planning and design, on the one hand, and scholarly research on the other. Many urban design projects in U.S. cities to this day begin with an imageability study in an effort to understand how the form of a city is perceived by lay citizens and whether that conforms to the planners’ own understanding and intuitions of the significant features of the city. But his theoretical insights about imageability—that is, identity, structure, and meaning, which would seem to have more relevance to city design policies—did not seem to take deep roots in the world of practice. Instead, the taxonomy he proposed for describing city image—districts, edges, landmarks, nodes, and paths—became a popular methodological tool for analyzing the visual form of cities.

The contribution of the image studies toward the formulation of urban design policies and guidelines, however, has been uneven, and Lynch himself expressed some disappointment in retrospect. Nevertheless, the methodology has become a popular pedagogic tool in many urban design studios. It is a common practice for instructors to ask students to do a “Lynch map” of the city or neighborhood they are studying. This methodology has proved an effective learning exercise in making the students aware of the visual form of the physical city.

In academia, Lynch’s work inspired a whole new research paradigm that made human–environment relations and interactions integral to urban design. It paved the way for a host of cognitive mapping studies—a term that was taken from the title of an earlier article by psychologist Edward Tolman in 1948—by environmental psychologists, geographers, sociologists, and planning academics. Lynch himself never used the term, nor is he believed to have been aware of Tolman’s work. Nevertheless, the gaggle of research that followed covered a broad spectrum of inquiry.

Many of these studies explored the differences in the images or mental maps—a term favored by geographers—of the same urban area by age, stage of life cycle, class, gender, location, and even occupation. Others examined the styles of representation and the developmental aspects of mental

maps. Some of these studies included cross-cultural comparison. Collectively these studies confirmed Lynch's earlier findings, vindicated the methodology, and advanced additional insights.

Other Works

Although *The Image of the City* has almost exclusively defined Lynch's reputation worldwide and outside the field of planning, it is but a small part of his published work, which includes eight other volumes containing more than 3,000 printed pages. The 1962 volume titled *Site Planning*, his second publication, came out soon after the first, to be followed by two other updated and expanded editions in 1971 and 1984, the last edition coauthored with Gary Hack. Collectively, these three editions remain a scholarly treatise that combines principles and good practices of site planning with relevant theories from allied fields.

In the 1960s, Lynch coauthored another important book, *The View from the Road*, with Donald Appleyard and Jack Myer. Written against the backdrop of planning and construction of the inner-city links of the interstate highway system, this book documented, analyzed, and simulated the visual experience of high-speed travel through the newly constructed and proposed urban freeways. In the 1970s, several other publications followed in quick succession—the second edition of *Site Planning* (1971), *What Time Is This Place?* (1972), *Managing the Sense of the Region* (1976), and *Growing Up in Cities* (1977), the last one edited from the contributions of several authors. The last three addressed different aspects of city design: The volume *What Time Is This Place?* is a treatise on time, especially how time embeds in space, the resulting implications for growth, change, and decay in urban form and space, and what these mean for historic preservation. *Managing the Sense of the Region* (1976) focused on questions of environmental quality, livability, and sustainability at the regional and metropolitan scale and the possibilities for managing the sensory quality at a regional scale. Finally, *Growing Up in Cities*, a 1977 study sponsored by UNESCO, reported on a comparative study of the life experiences of adolescent children in urban settings in four different countries—Argentina, Australia, Poland, and Mexico—with a specific

focus on the human consequences of the built environment.

In the 1980s, he published perhaps the most important book of his career, *A Theory of Good City Form* (1981), or *Good City Form* (in later editions). This was followed by a significant and enhanced edition of *Site Planning* (1984) coauthored with Gary Hack. Another volume, *Wasting Away* (1990), came much later and posthumously, under the editorship of Michael Southworth. This was a remarkable book that focused on the waste and inefficiency in modern consumer societies and the impact of waste on nature and environment. Translated into Spanish and Italian, the content of this volume has proved quite prescient today in the context of the global environmental crisis. Finally, another volume, titled *City Sense and City Design* (1990), edited by Tridib Banerjee and Michael Southworth, assembles all of his published journal articles and book chapters, along with other previously unpublished works and projects that defined his career profile. These nine volumes then define, more or less exhaustively, his professional and scholarly accomplishments in city planning and design.

A New Perspective

Arguably, the work of Kevin Lynch represents a distinct and new way of thinking about the design and planning of the built environment at an urban scale. When he began his academic career in the late 1950s, ideas of large-scale design of cities were dominated by the classical civic design traditions and large-scale landscape design, followed by influences of architecture and planning of the modernist era. The legacy of these traditions was profoundly deterministic and based on the belief that design of the environment can determine behavior and, if done right, improve the social and physical well-being of the users and their quality of life. The incipient field of urban design that found its identity in the interstitial spaces between architecture, landscape architecture, and planning continued this tradition in urban redevelopment and other large public works projects in the 1950s and 1960s.

Lynch distanced himself from the nascent field of urban design and preferred to use the term *city design* to define the scope and possibilities of the design of the large-scale built environment. His

contribution was particularly significant at this time because the tradition of design at the large scale was very much under attack and discredited by the social scientists engaged in studies of contemporary urban problems and the attendant planning and policy response. Social scientists saw the deterministic approach of designers as megalomaniacal and what they had to offer as not particularly relevant for addressing the fundamental issues of social welfare and collective well-being. At best, the design concerns were relegated to a lower priority.

Lynch's approach to city design began with a conversation with community clients about how they organize and represent their experiences of the everyday built environment. In this approach, the design response was to be informed by the perceptions, values, and expectations of the public, not professional predilections. It was an argument that design matters in a fundamental way and not just as a window dressing. Furthermore, this was essentially a bottom-up approach, not the top-down authoritarian design of the earlier tradition of grand design and visionary aesthetics. In Lynch's approach, the role of the designer is to help people achieve their desired environment, one that fulfills their immediate needs and offers flexibility for change and adaptation. His scenario of city design would involve participation from the users of the environment in the design and future control of their urban space. In this view, the designer serves as a facilitator and technical expert, perhaps requiring a few minimal master strokes here and there, as Lynch's own practice and projects often reflected.

While championing this new approach, Lynch also advanced many normative positions in his writings. He was particularly interested in exploring future scenarios for change—possible utopias and dystopias (which he called *cacotopias*) of human society.

Thus, a career that began with a passion to understand the visual and perceived form of the city evolved into a distinct philosophy of city design. Lynch's earlier and renowned work, *The Image of the City*, helped restore the place of city design in public policy, and his subsequent research, writings, practice, and teaching reflected a new approach to design that emphasized human purposes and consequences of the built environment,

as well as possibilities of city design that engaged the public in the process.

The philosophical formulations of this approach culminated in *A Theory of Good City Form*. The theory was profoundly normative and explored the questions of what constitutes good city form and what might be its performance characteristics. Lynch searched for answers to these questions in the historical models of ideal city, examined them analytically and empirically in contemporary research, and explored them in speculative scenarios. Many of these writings were published in journal articles or book chapters. In *A Theory of Good City Form*, Lynch argued that a normative theory is necessary to identify the performance characteristics of good city form. He proposed five basic dimensions of performance—vitality, sense, fit, access, and control—and two meta-dimensions described as efficiency and justice. The first dimension, vitality, is the requirement of the form to sustain life, health, and biological functions of the inhabitants. Sense has to do with the perception and cognition of the environment and includes much of the imageability requirements he advanced earlier. The dimension of fit refers to the degree of congruence between the environmental form and the customary, desired, or expected behaviors of the users of the environment. Access is the dimension that defines availability of amenities, conveniences, and opportunities within the environmental form and the aggregate efficiency and equity in the distribution of such resources. The dimension of control refers to matters of rights, responsibilities, and ownership of common space, as well as the ability of the inhabitants to change and transform such spaces. Finally, the two meta-dimensions of efficiency and justice, according to Lynch, refer to the balancing act between minimizing cost while maximizing distributive justice and equity in the organization of resources in space.

One could reinterpret these criteria today in the form of a synthesis of John Rawls's 1971 original theory of justice and Amartya Sen's 1999 treatise on human capability as the basis for development as freedom. While Lynch was aware of and cited Rawls's work, it was not possible for him to anticipate Sen's work, much of which postdated his book. It is fair to assume that his emphasis on the justness of the city form

was supported by the works of Rawls, which he discussed. The apparent convergence of Lynch's normative philosophy of good city form and Sen's moral theory of human functioning, capability, and freedom remains an area of future scholarly explorations.

Practice of City Design

While making such theoretical, if normative contributions to our understanding of the human purposes and consequences of urban form, Lynch was also engaged in the practice of city design throughout his career. He began his career as a city planner in Greensboro, North Carolina, before he was recruited by MIT to join the faculty of city planning. During his academic career, he never lost touch with practice and as a scholar-practitioner always combined pedagogy with research and clinical experiences. He often tried to apply his normative views in practice, while drawing from his practice in his teaching and writings.

Some of the more notable examples of his projects include a plan for Boston's waterfront development, a campus plan in Cleveland, a development scheme for the Rio Salado corridor in Phoenix, a plan for the future development of the San Diego metropolitan region (with Donald Appleyard), and a conservation plan for Martha's Vineyard. Lynch's projects were often collaborative and participatory but never deterministic or definitive. He often emphasized the process that can accommodate change and, rather than proposing a concrete scheme, almost always preferred broad guidelines, design rules, and illustrative possibilities.

Lynch had his share of detractors. While appreciating his intellectual contributions, social scientists found his work lacking rigor—they questioned the size and selection of samples for *The Image of the City*, for example—and full of assertions or speculations. Others found his writing imprecise and containing ambiguities and contradictions. Practitioners found his writings too visionary or unrealistic. Because Lynch never offered concrete images of the good city form he advocated, many found his work inspiring but difficult to translate into practice. His work did not lead to the kind of paradigms—new urbanism, for example—on which practitioners often rely.

Biographical Background

Lynch was born in Chicago, and grew up in the northern part of the city near the shores of Lake Michigan. He attended the progressive Francis Parker School where the curriculum was influenced by John Dewey's philosophy of learning by doing. His early years were influenced by major world events—the Spanish War, the Great Depression, and the rise of communism. In high school, he developed an interest in architecture and went to Yale to pursue this interest. Soon, he was disillusioned by the rigid Beaux-Arts tradition of Yale's architecture program. He was intrigued by Frank Lloyd Wright's work and contacted Wright about the possibility of studying architecture with him.

With encouragement from Wright, Lynch left Yale and joined Taliesin in Wisconsin. As Wright chose to move to Arizona, Lynch, along with other apprentices, accompanied him. He did not stay there too long, however, finding Wright's authoritarian style stifling. He went on to study biology at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute in New York. In 1941, he married Anne Borders and soon was inducted by the U.S. Army and sent to the South Pacific, Japan, and the Philippines as a member of the Army Corps of Engineers.

After he came back, he went to MIT under the G.I. Bill and finished a bachelor's degree in city planning in 1947. He joined the MIT planning faculty in 1948 and began his early explorations on the visual form and images of the city with Gyorgy Kepes, a renowned expert on visual arts, and a colleague at MIT. A study grant from the Ford Foundation gave him the opportunity to spend a year in Italy, based mainly in Florence. His *flânerie* in European cities—not unlike Walter Benjamin's wanderings in Paris—was inspirational for him and helped him to conceptualize his seminal work, *The Image of the City*. After retiring from MIT in 1978 he became fully engaged in practice with the Cambridge, Massachusetts-based firm of Carr Lynch Associates, and he remained active in writing and practice until his unexpected death in 1984.

His students remember him as a kind, supportive, and affectionate mentor who always tried to inspire his students to explore new ideas and branch out to do original thinking. He appreciated creativity, unconventional views, and even wit and humor in student proposals. Many of his

writings and projects involved collaborations with his students.

The legacy of Kevin Lynch continues to inspire architects, landscape architects, planners, and urban designers even though he never offered a concrete paradigm for one to follow. His approach was one based on many important influences—from arts and aesthetics to pragmatism, naturalism, and social change—and represents a unique blend of values and norms that remains an important anchor point of urban design theory and practice.

Tridib Banerjee

See also Environmental Design; Urban Design; Urban Planning

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M

MANCHESTER, UNITED KINGDOM

Manchester is a city of almost half a million people (441,200 in 2001) located in the northwest of England; 1 of the 10 boroughs of Greater Manchester, which constitute the third-largest conurbation in the United Kingdom (2,547,700). As a regional center, however, Manchester has long claimed to punch above its weight in terms of economic reach and cultural influence. In the last 30 years, this has taken the form of a highly visible regeneration of the city center. The re-imag(in)ing of Manchester as a postindustrial success story takes diverse strands of Manchester life and weaves them into a coherent strategy. In recent times, the name of Manchester has achieved its fame through, for example, the vibrancy of its music scene, the global reach of both its football teams (Manchester City and United), and its hosting of the 2002 Commonwealth Games. It has sought its fortune through a distinctive model of urban regeneration that pins its hopes on the commercial success of leisure and consumption and an urban politics bowed by the apparent exigencies of interurban competition.

Industrial Period

The history of Manchester is often told as a story of revolutionary change. Its emergence as the world's first industrial city was dizzyingly rapid and presaged an unprecedented scale and scope of social and economic change. In the mid-sixteenth

century, Manchester was a relatively prosperous market town with a population of a few thousand. By 1773, the population was 43,000; by 1801, it was 80,000; and by 1851, well over 300,000. From a proto-industrial base including textiles and clock making, Manchester rose to become the central node in the dense network of southeast Lancashire cotton towns that served as cradle and crucible of the Industrial Revolution. The legacy of this industrial urbanization continues to dominate the city's built environment, labor market, social problems, civic pride, and political myths.

Between 1760 and 1850, Manchester was propelled from provincial center to the world city of an international cotton industry. The root causes of the city's success have been subject to much debate, with some emphasizing geographical advantages such as a damp climate suitable for spinning or proximity to coalfields. More intriguingly, the growth of urbanized labor, new forms of production, and the stimulation of enterprise generated what Peter Hall calls "the world's first innovative milieu." This set the scene for innovators such as Kay, Hargreaves, Arkwright, and Crompton to drive a decisive shift from domestic to factory production. By 1780, Manchester had become famous as a boomtown and an emerging symbol of all that was best and worst in the new age. By the 1840s, Manchester dominated contemporary reflections on the factory system and the state of England, showcasing the best and worst of capitalist urbanization. The details of this social geography are remarkable, from the extensive middle-class suburbs to the dense, dirty, and diseased working-class dwellings

described by Friedrich Engels in 1844 or Elizabeth Gaskell's realist novel *Mary Barton* in 1848.

The stereotype of a self-made Cottonopolis has much truth to it but requires qualification. Manchester had its share of "dark satanic mills," but the city center's economy included commercial and service functions as well as factories, warehouses, and weavers. Likewise, for all of its bristling independence, Manchester's history is one of complex and changing interdependencies with cities like Bombay, Alexandria, and New Orleans, which provided the raw cotton to stock Manchester's warehouses and make yarn and cloth in mill towns like Oldham. Also notable is the industrial, if not political cooperation with Liverpool, which by the late eighteenth century had displaced London as England's major cotton port.

From the 1840s, the image of King Cotton dominated, and yet industrialization was underpinned by social revolutions in commercial and political culture as well as revolutions in technology, transport, and engineering. Manchester's strong tradition of political radicalism is a remarkable fusion of nineteenth-century liberalism and industrial socialism stretching from Chartism to the Anti-Corn Law League and the Cooperative Movement. Gradually, the cotton industry was faced with growing foreign competition (e.g., from India after 1914), but Manchester prospered well beyond the collapse of Britain's colonial and industrial hegemony. Particularly significant in this was the diversification of the manufacturing base: the opening of the Manchester Ship Canal in 1894, the parallel growth of the port, and the influx of (largely American) foreign capital to the world's first industrial park in the neighboring borough of Trafford.

After 1945, Manchester developed a series of grand city and urban plans and embarked on an intense period of slum clearance and public housing provision. This period of hope and stability gave way to the inner-city problem and urban policy responses of the late 1960s, with Manchester largely out of step with national modernization strategies. As late as 1971, Greater Manchester boasted a balance of 532,000 manufacturing and 577,000 service-sector jobs, but a series of increasingly severe waves of deindustrialization and decentralization saw a violent restructuring of the manufacturing base. The relative decline of Britain's

urban core was reflected in Greater Manchester, where 135,285 jobs were lost from 1971 to 1997 (12 percent of the workforce), two-thirds of them in Manchester itself. Manufacturing employment declined from a position of parity with services in 1971 to 283,000 by 1989. Although the service sector grew, it never compensated for the decline of full-time male industrial employment. By the end of the century, nearly 80 percent of jobs were in services, some in high-value sectors like finance, but many more casual and low wage. This devaluing was mirrored by counterurbanization and a concomitant decline in the quality of built environment and urban services.

Contemporary Renewal

Politically, the last three decades are best understood as a series of attempts to come to terms with this sequence of decline and renew Manchester's sense of purpose and progress, along with its urban fabric and population. The crisis of Manchester's political settlement was hastened in 1979 by the rise of a national Conservative government increasingly hostile to all forms of municipal socialism. The decisive period coincides with Graham Stringer's leadership of the city council (1984–1996) and struggle to rethink ideological defeat in terms of the pragmatism of the new urban left.

The emergence of Manchester as an entrepreneurial city is superficially encapsulated in the change of council slogan in 1987 from "Defending jobs and improving services" to "Make it happen." While the substance of this shift was vague, Manchester readily became a leading example of a new entrepreneurial mode of urban development, characterized by a civic boosterism that sought above all else to attract capital and people as sources of urban renewal. In lieu of a novel democratic response to globalization, the Manchester "growth machine" was galvanized through the strategic leadership of the city elite and council executive, while the governance of the new growth agenda was broadened to a partnership of public and private sector groups.

In adopting these tendencies toward urban entrepreneurialism, Manchester was far from unique, let alone self-determining, but it demonstrated an ability to adapt national policy to local demands for change, winning successive rounds of

discretionary urban funding. The Central Manchester Development Corporation (1988–1996), with its renovation of the derelict canal sides of Castlefield, has become a case study of postindustrial regeneration as notable as London's Docklands. Indeed the whole idea of a Manchester model of regeneration has some force, even if much of it can be traced to the form of central government funding and the examples of cities like Barcelona. The 1990s saw an orthodoxy of partnership-led regeneration, from the redevelopment of the deprived residential area of Hulme to the successful bid to stage the 2002 Commonwealth Games and the ambitious strategic vision of City Pride, which aimed to remake the city as an outstanding European regional capital.

In the wake of the Irish Republican Army terrorist bombing of the city center in June 1996, the city elite mobilized around an unprecedented opportunity to redesign and redevelop the heart of the city center. The aftermath energized yet another version of partnership working in the guise of the Manchester Millennium, and yet the nature of the crisis generated diverse debate about how Manchester should be rebuilt and for whom. Although the basic tenets of urban entrepreneurialism remained, the crisis coincided with a period of change locally and nationally as the new Labor government of 1997 prioritized social concerns more explicitly. The decade since has seen a substantial revitalization of the retail core, along with significant projects in East Manchester and beyond.

But as Manchester has evolved from globalizer to globalized, the city has borne a paradoxical combination of economic decline and political revival, social ruin and cultural renaissance. Typical of many similar cities, Manchester has nevertheless attempted to make the process its own. One final example glosses this story. The 1819 Peterloo massacre was one of the defining moments of the early industrial period: Troops wielding sabers charged a crowd of 60,000, who had gathered to listen to Henry Hunt speak on behalf of parliamentary reform, causing 15 deaths and hundreds of injuries. The Free Trade Hall was built on the site, first in timber, then in brick, then finally in 1843 in stone, as a monument both to a particular idea of political economy and to the city's spirit of pragmatic individualism. Today, the building's shell houses a luxury and award-winning

hotel adjacent to all the glittering prizes of city center renewal.

Adam Holden

See also Deindustrialization; Downtown Revitalization; Growth Machine; Local Government; Marxism and the City; Public–Private Partnerships; Regime Theory; Urban Politics

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MANILA, PHILIPPINES

Metro Manila is the national capital region of the Philippines. In 2007, the Economics and Statistics Office of the National Statistical Coordination Board reported that it generates 33 percent of the country's gross domestic product (GDP). It has more than 11.5 million residents, which is 13 percent of the country's total population. This entry traces Metro Manila's colonial and historical past and its integration into the world trading system during the Spanish and American periods. It elaborates on a number of socioeconomic gains and environmental conditions that are associated

with its present-day urbanization and spatial development.

Historical Background

Maynila was referred to as the Muslim Kingdom of Luzon on the eastern shores of Manila Bay before the fourteenth century. Accounts of dynamic trading activities in *Maynila* had caught the interest of Spanish conquistadores in the middle of the sixteenth century. They attempted to vanquish it on many occasions; on May 19, 1571, with the help of native warriors, they colonized *Maynila*. The colonizers had built on the banks of the Pasig River the fortified city of *Intramuros*, which literally means “inside the walls.” Here the colonial city of Manila was established.

The chronicled monopoly of Spain on the production, manufacture, and trade of tobacco was based in Manila. From 1565 to 1815, the colonizers incorporated Manila into the commercially secluded galleon trade between Manila, Acapulco, and cities on the Iberian Peninsula. The galleon trade ended in 1815; its conclusion opened up Manila’s ports to foreign shipping vessels and incorporated it into the emerging global economy.

According to Maria Serena Diokno and Ramon Villegas, the American and British merchants and shippers were behind the expansion of foreign trade opportunities in the Philippines at the turn of the nineteenth century. They propelled the development of the sugar, hemp, coffee, and silk industries. Manila became more economically competitive in 1889 with its street electrification and transport system improvement programs. The construction of the Manila–Dagupan rail line facilitated the transport of raw materials from peripheral areas in provinces north of the city. The installation of communication and telegraphic lines in Manila functionally linked it to Shanghai, Hong Kong, and Singapore.

The United States invaded Manila in 1898. Under the terms of the Treaty of Paris, Spain sold the Philippines to the Americans for \$20 million. It was a flawed transaction because at the time of the sale, the Spaniards had already been defeated by the revolutionary Filipinos. From 1899 to 1903, the Americans thwarted the revolutionary movements of the Filipinos. The Americans made Manila its seat of colonial government and established the American-controlled Philippine Assembly in July of 1901.

Architect Daniel H. Burnham and Pierce Anderson drew the physical development plan for Manila in 1905. Burnham took into account the City Beautiful planning concepts, American imperialist interests, tropical climatic conditions, and some Philippine traditions. Burnham’s plans provided a walkable city with a gridiron pattern, roads and streets that followed land contours, waterfronts and waterways, and government buildings that were facing each other in large open spaces. Architect William E. Parsons carefully executed Burnham’s plans. Parson built spacious buildings, such as the Philippine General Hospital, with broad and deep archways and shaded porches that connected the cool and naturally lit building interiors; the designs derived inspirations from Spanish and Philippine traditions.

The American buildings housed the imperialist government, which further integrated Manila into the emerging global economy. Although Manila was devastated by World War II, the general outlines of Burnham’s physical plan of Manila and Parsons’s American–Spanish and Philippine-inspired building architecture became the standard for the development of the postwar Philippines.

From the 1950s to 1970s, Filipinos from different parts of the country migrated en masse to Manila. The suburbs of Manila had problems with the provision, maintenance, and deterioration of utilities and infrastructures. In 1976, President Ferdinand Marcos created Metro Manila. The Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC) was created to manage the metropolis’s physical infrastructure development. In 1986, President Corazon Aquino changed MMC to Metropolitan Manila Authority (MMA). In 1995, the MMA was renamed the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA), which maintains and develops Metro Manila’s garbage disposal and its traffic, flood, and sewage infrastructure systems, in coordination with officials of the Pasig River Rehabilitation Commission (PRRC) and the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH).

Contemporary Manila

Geographic Transformations and Ecological Ills

Metro Manila’s land area is about 15 square miles or 38 square kilometers. It is bounded by the provinces of Bulacan, Rizal, and Cavite and the Laguna

Lake and Manila Bay. Its elevation ranges from less than 1 meter to 70 meters above the mean sea level. It has a tropical monsoon climate. Its dry season runs from November to May and its wet season from June to October. The average daily temperature ranges from 20° C to 38° C, and humidity is high year-round. The southwest monsoon and about six typhoons bring in a lot of moisture and cause floods in the city's low-lying parts during the rainy season.

Metro Manila's major rivers, such as Pasig, Marikina, Paranaque-Zapote, Malabon-Tullahan-Tenejeros, and San Juan, flow toward Manila Bay. The lack of environmental pollution control and abatement systems on waste generation and disposal among industries and households has led to the transformation of the river systems into massive sewage and industrial-effluent storage areas.

Population Growth and Competition

In 1903, the capital region contained 4 percent of the country's population (328,939 out of 7.6 million). As of 2007, Metro Manila's residents make up 13 percent of the 88.5 million Filipinos. Metro Manila covers only .21 percent of the country's total land area of 300,000 square kilometers. In 2007, the capital region's average population density of 18,166 people per square kilometer is way above the country's 295 people per square kilometer.

Job-seeking Filipinos who migrate each year from other regions have contributed to the fast urbanization of Metro Manila. Filipinos consider Metro Manila the center of job opportunities. The saturation of the labor market with qualified workers gives employers leeway to hire the most qualified and offer lower wages and fewer employment benefits. Decent living spaces are unaffordable to low-wage, underemployed, and unemployed migrants. Millions reside in living spaces without sewerage facilities, such as shanties built on pavements of side streets, open areas beside railways, and covered spaces under concrete bridges. Shacks are built in between tombs of public cemeteries and on top of putrid garbage dumps. Population density in squatter colonies, with multistory shacks or "shanty-condominiums," may number eight people per square meter. A recent trend, however, is the increasing number of houses on stilts in the

mouths of river systems and along the shallow waters of Manila Bay and Laguna Lake. The constricted roads in the settlements' drier portions are impassable to fire trucks. They lack sanitation infrastructure, institutional sources of potable water, and systematic collection of solid wastes.

Concentration of Wealth and Sociopolitical Privileges

Another trend in Metro Manila is the increasing exclusivity of affluent enclaves. The postwar central business district (CBD) of Makati occupies only 15 percent of the total land area of Makati City, but this includes some three million square meters of prime office spaces, which house half of the nation's international and domestic commercial activities. The income from licensing business activities and payment of real property taxes in the Makati CBD greatly contributes to the fiscal revenue of Makati City. The Makati CBD is where the national headquarters or offices of almost 40 percent of the top 1,000 corporations in the Philippines are based. To maintain their comparative advantage over other cities and financial centers in Metro Manila, the city revenues are spent by local government officials to further improve its world-class physical infrastructures and utilities.

Adjacent to the Makati CBD are the wealthiest neighborhoods in the country, where access by outsiders is greatly restricted by the uniformed and highly trained providers of security services. Among them are Forbes Park, Dasmariñas Village, Magallanes, and other gated neighborhoods. The wealthy families who reside in these enclaves comprise part of 20 percent of the country's population, and they control 97 percent of the country's GDP. Similar economic and sociopolitical conditions are found in other major financial districts of the country that are adjacent to high-class residential subdivisions.

Muslim Enclaves

The district of Quiapo, Manila, has always been the home of the Muslims, even before the advent of Spanish colonization. The spatial markers of the district include the Quiapo Islamic Center, DVD stores with signs using Arabic scripts, and women who don traditional Muslim headdresses and

clothes. Every day, more than 30,000 Muslim Filipinos congregate in its trading places. The Muslim Filipino enclave in the district is expanding steadily. This can be attributed to the intensifying war and conflict in Mindanao and the national government's neglect, in terms of development, of the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao. About 120,000 Muslim Filipinos were forced to migrate in Metro Manila. Muslim Filipinos have judged that the capital region is a safer place to live. The health facilities and educational opportunities in Metro Manila are a hundred times better and more accessible. Moreover, their children are not exposed to injuries and deaths due to perennial exchanges of gunfire.

Spatial Markers of Urbanization

The assigning of Manila as the seat of the colonial government and nucleus of trading activities of Spain, and consequently that of the United States, put in place the infrastructure and spatial characteristics that attract the influx of people in its urban spaces. The centrality of Manila led to siphoning of financial resources toward the city. The privileging of Manila also means marginalization of other places, such as the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao.

Financial institutions congregate in central places where good physical and economic infrastructures abound. This is evident in the Makati CBD. Profits from extracting resources and other commercial activities from all parts of the nation are siphoned to this enclave. This condition leads to the increasing attractiveness of the city as a migration destination for the poor. However, poor migrants to Metro Manila are unable to get decent homes. They end up competing for small living spaces with appalling living conditions. Political privileging of spaces operates at different scales, and they imprint diverse economic benefits and spatial markers.

Some suggest that the concentration of infrastructure, energy, utilities, economic opportunities, information, and people in the metropolis will lead to the formation of Mega Manila—an area that will incorporate the adjacent towns and cities in the central Luzon region in the northern part of the metropolis and the Calabarzon and Mimaropa regions in the southern portion of Metro Manila.

Such a Mega Manila would contain nearly half of the country's population.

Further urbanization of Metro Manila does not mean development for the Philippines. The social and spatial transformations that urbanization brings result in impacts on diverse human groups, and the gains and ills of urbanization are experienced differently by those who occupy diverse places with differing spatial markers. If Metro Manila becomes more urbanized, leading to the formation of Mega Manila, the implications for the future are both promising and grim.

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See also Capital City; City Beautiful Movement; *Favela*

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MARXISM AND THE CITY

To clarify the contribution of Marxism to urban studies and to identify the contours of this theoretical approach, it is necessary to begin with the original work of Marx and Engels, before dealing

with the more complex issue of how subsequent developments in urban theory and Marxism have overlapped and intertwined. For Marxists, modern cities are capitalist cities, not merely “cities in a capitalist society,” and they are shaped in key respects by the dynamics of capitalist accumulation.

The most important characteristic of the capitalist production process, Marx argued, is the exclusion of the majority of workers from ownership of the means of production, with the result that workers are compelled to sell their labor power in order to survive. Unlike other commodities, labor power has a number of specific attributes, including its capacity to create new products. Under capitalism, when a worker sells his or her labor power, he or she does not receive the full value of the goods produced, and the resulting surplus is appropriated by the owner of the means of production. This mechanism of economic exploitation lies at the heart of capitalism and is linked to the Marxist analysis of social class and economic crisis.

In contemporary society, the labor process is highly fragmented, involving cognitive and material transformations that are carried out by a large number of workers with different skills and roles, and the complex division of labor that results is associated with changing social and spatial forms. Within this context, Marx confronts the specificity of the capitalist city, arguing that the distinction between city and countryside is a constitutive element of the capitalist division of labor.

The competitive nature of the accumulation process gives rise to a dynamic of continuous investment in the means of production and the transformation of production processes. The specificity of urban areas rests with the ways in which they bring together labor, capital, and land to form a dynamic and spatially uneven configuration of productive resources. The approach developed by Marx and Engels explains the historical development of urban areas by referring to the transformations generated by capitalist relations of production in agriculture and manufacturing. Agriculture is theorized in terms of primitive accumulation—the expropriation and enclosure of common lands—which led to the exclusion of agricultural laborers from the means of agricultural production, while manufacturing entailed a rapid expansion in the demand for labor in the industrial centers.

The concentration of large numbers of laborers in industrial cities gave rise, according to Marx and Engels, to a series of contradictions in the countryside (summarized by the notion of declining soil fertility) and the city (the impoverishment of the working class, segregation, and environmental degradation). In *The Condition of the Working Class in England*, Engels emphasizes the spatial form that this assumes, observing that, in each large city, it is possible to find one or more slums where the working class is concentrated. Nevertheless, rapid increases in productivity associated with mechanization and competitive development generated not only poverty, but also fantastic concentrations of wealth, which fed the expansionary logic of capitalism.

In Marxist theory, therefore, the capitalist relations of production are the chief driving force behind spatial and social organization in urban areas. Its commitment to “grand theory”—producing an integrated account of capitalist society as a structured whole—has been strongly criticized, particularly by postmodernist writers, while others have accused Marxist theory of subordinating gender differences, cultural influences, and issues of ethnic or gender identity to social class divisions. Marxists have responded by referring to the need for a comprehensive theory as a guide to political practice, simultaneously arguing that historical materialism can provide a nonreductionist account of cultural forms and social outcomes.

Cities also present unique characteristics that are not reducible to their position within the international division of labor. Marxists attribute these to the role and form of the state, to historically sedimented patterns of settlement, and to cultural and aesthetic ideals regarding the organization of urban space, while arguing for a class-based and materialist understanding of these phenomena.

During the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, Walter Benjamin, a German Marxist, provided an important contribution to the development of Marxist ideas about the capitalist city. In the course of his arcades project, Benjamin gathered an enormous quantity of material on city life in nineteenth-century Paris, focusing on the city’s roofed outdoor arcades and exploring the rationalization and commodification of urban space

alongside the sensory experiences provided by Parisian street life. Later Marxists, such as Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey, took up Benjamin's invitation to develop a culturally rich and dynamic reading of the economic, political, and aesthetic aspects of the expansion of new forms of consumption within the space of the city.

Postwar Marxism and the Capitalist City

The wave of students' and workers' struggles that erupted in the advanced capitalist countries during the late 1960s and early 1970s had a far-reaching impact on urban studies. A new generation of geographers, urbanists, and sociologists, radicalized by their contact with these movements, looked to Marxism for the theoretical tools to explain the transformations that were taking place. This engagement led to a number of accounts of spatiality and scale, taking Marx's analysis of the accumulation and circulation of capital as a point of departure. The resulting theories, while remaining relatively abstract, played a key role in shifting debates within urban studies away from the evolutionist and functionalist theories that previously dominated this field.

Marxists study cities in terms of concentrations and flows of people, commodities, capital, means of production, and information. Two aspects—the relative stability that inheres within particular urban configurations, as well as the contradictions, tensions, and dynamics that they manifest—are deemed essential to providing a satisfactory theoretical account. In the following paragraphs, we will provide a brief overview of three distinct elements of Marxist theory in relation to the city, namely the concentration of capital, the role of the secondary circuit, and the role of the capitalist state.

The Marxist theory of accumulation, as outlined above, implies that regional structure emerges spontaneously from the accumulation process, along with increasing quantities of capital that cannot be invested profitably within the regional system. The Marxist theory of uneven development is based on this insight: that the competitive, profit-seeking behavior of individual capitalists gives rise to a systemic tendency toward overaccumulation and crisis. Contemporary Marxists argue that these crisis tendencies can be temporarily offset by a range of strategies—diverting surplus capital toward the financial and property markets, investing in the

social and physical infrastructure, exporting capital to new locations—although the result is to further intensify the initial contradictions.

Second, Marxist urban scholars have drawn attention to the importance of the secondary circuit of capital accumulation, which relates to the commodification of land and the extraction of monopoly rents. The diversion of capital from the productive sector to this sphere, it is argued, has the potential to generate substantial short-term profits, while setting in motion a complex set of processes that include the accentuation of scarcity in housing markets, the generation of speculative property “bubbles,” and the displacement of profitability problems to the financial sector. These phenomena have been studied in relation to the emergence of the neoliberal city, gentrification processes, and the expulsion of poor residents from central areas.

These considerations regarding the relationship between capital accumulation and physical space, which have made a decisive contribution to urban studies, have also brought about a considerable renewal within Marxist thought. David Harvey has been at the center of this debate, developing the concept of the *spatiotemporal fix*, which describes the (temporary) displacement of crisis tendencies within a given region, at a specific time, either into the future or toward other regions, as capital engages in the “creative destruction” of urban landscape and space.

Third, Marxists argue that accumulation strategies increasingly depend on the role of the state as a vehicle for fixing productive resources and infrastructure in specific locations. The state plays an important role in coordinating urban labor markets, organizing private and collective consumption, elaborating strategies for infrastructural investment, and defusing resistance to exploitation. The development of the transport infrastructure is particularly central, as the construction of canals, railways, motorways, airports, and, increasingly, information, communication, and technology networks, is a key factor in explaining the historical development of urban space. Because of the scale of investment required to construct these infrastructures and the length of time required to recover the initial investments, the state typically plays a key financial role. Although Marxist scholars have, on occasion, lapsed into functionalist accounts of the state, attempts have been made to overcome this limit by focusing on the

role of competition between rival blocks of capital located in different regions to establish an indirect link between state decision making and capital accumulation.

Although contemporary urbanization in eastern Asia appears to conform to the classical relationship between industrial growth and rural–urban migration described by Marx and Engels, in many other third world cities, the dynamics of urbanization have become increasingly detached from processes of economic development. The American Marxist, Mike Davis, attributes this to the effects of the debt crisis of the late 1970s and the structural adjustment programs that were implemented during the 1980s. The effect of these programs, together with the deregulation of international trade, was to render peasant families particularly vulnerable to the effects of drought, inflation, sickness, and civil war, giving rise to an exodus of surplus labor from rural areas. As a result, the number of people living in slums exceeded 1 billion in 2005, leading Davis to conclude that the principal role of these areas is to provide a dumping ground for an excess population that has little chance of being drawn into the primary circuit of global capital.

Arguably, the main contribution of Marxist theory to the study of cities is its capacity to explore changes in work, the built environment, and everyday urban life through the categories of political economy. This entails uncovering the ordering principles underlying patterns of accumulation and investment, as well as the ways in which capitalist social relationships are embedded in the fabric of urban society. But Marxists also emphasize the role of resistance to exploitation and oppression, viewing this as an active force in shaping cities.

In recent years, attempts have been made to extend Marx's concept of primitive accumulation to a range of ongoing processes involving the appropriation of assets that are bound by collective property rights or produced outside the capitalist economic system. Relevant examples include the privatization of public resources, the commodification of new forms of labor power, the suppression of alternative forms of production and consumption, the appropriation of assets using military force, and the extraction of rents via the "debt trap" or using patents and intellectual property rights. Many urban social movements, in the

advanced capitalist countries as well as in the developing world, arise in response to this form of accumulation by dispossession. Marxists seek to explore the determinants of this process and to link these individual struggles in a generalized critique of capitalism that is rooted in the working class.

Jonathan Pratschke

See also Benjamin, Walter; Capitalist City; Castells, Manuel; Davis, Mike; Divided Cities; Harvey, David; Lefebvre, Henri; Right to the City; Uneven Development

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MEDIEVAL TOWN DESIGN

Most of the towns and cities of Europe owe their origins and early development to the period between the ninth and fourteenth centuries AD. This time of population growth and commercialism saw the

expansion of older existing urban centers, especially those of Roman antecedence, as well as the foundation of new towns established sometimes on greenfield sites, virgin land that had not been under the plow, and sometimes by being grafted onto existing preurban settlement nuclei. These twin processes of urbanization affected the whole of medieval Europe, but as is typical with this period, contemporaries wrote down relatively little about who was involved in shaping these new urban landscapes and how they went about their work. Instead, the main indication that these changes were taking place lies in the physical forms and layouts of these towns and cities, which in many cases have survived through to the present day to be analyzed by geographers and archaeologists. This question of how urban landscapes were formed in the Middle Ages has led modern scholars to look for evidence of town planning and urban design in the morphology of medieval urban landscapes. In those rare cases where contemporaries do refer to planning and design processes, historians have been able to piece together from documentary records something of those individuals and groups that were involved and how they went about their work. The results of these modern historical studies, together with the work of urban morphologists, enables us to see now a little more clearly how urban landscapes were designed and planned in the Middle Ages.

Medieval Urban Design in Modern Urban Discourse

As well as the relative paucity of information to tell us about how medieval urban landscapes were formed, a further issue that has complicated the subject somewhat is the way that medieval towns and cities are represented in modern urban discourse. Textbooks on urbanism, for example, still widely refer to the uncontrolled or unplanned growth of most towns and cities of the medieval period, drawing a false distinction between planned and organic growth-type towns. Both are preconceptions that are overly simplistic and unhelpful in trying to understand urbanism in the Middle Ages. In part, these misunderstandings may be traced back to the start of the twentieth century and a battle drawn between planners and architects working in Europe who used the medieval town to make cases for their own particular aesthetic or for formulating design ideas for

new urban forms. Le Corbusier in particular had great distain for the medieval period and its urbanism, and in his polemical works such as *Urbanisme* (published in 1924), he sought to paint a picture of the medieval city as barbaric and haphazard in its development and spatial organization. Those at the time who countered Le Corbusier's modernism by arguing for a picturesque approach to architecture and planning (such as Camillo Sitte and Raymond Unwin) likewise drew attention to the medieval forms of towns and cities, but while they were seeking inspiration in them for their new urban designs, all the same, like the modernists they too depicted medieval urban development to be on the whole unplanned and organic.

In the mid-twentieth century, urban studies began to reveal a more complicated picture, and medieval town planning gained acceptance as a historical reality. Much of this research focused on new towns of the Middle Ages, especially those towns that appeared to have been planted on greenfield sites by entrepreneurial landlords. In Europe, these studies tended to concern particular groups of such new towns, notably the *bastides* of southwest France, which attracted the attention especially of scholars in France. These towns have also fascinated British historians, notably T. F. Tout in the 1920s and M. W. Beresford in the 1960s. The latter in particular wrote his book, *New Towns of the Middle Ages*, as a comparative study of "town plantation" in England, Wales, and Gascony. He made claims that founding new towns was characteristic especially of the period between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries and that the process was led by enthusiastic lords seeking to populate and commercialize their lands.

Beresford's *New Towns* remains the standard work on the subject in English, despite its 1967 publication date. Even so, he still characterized medieval towns and cities according to the bipartite model differentiating between irregular and organic-growth towns, on the one hand, and regular, planned towns on the other. Toward the end of the twentieth century, more detailed studies of medieval urban forms, notably by geographers such as M. R. G. Conzen and T. R. Slater, as well as historians such as D. Friedman and A. Randolph, have revealed the complexity of these urban design and planning processes and finally begun to shatter the myth that urban landscapes in the Middle Ages grew spontaneously and were rarely planned.

Aspects of Urban Design in the Middle Ages

The formation of new urban landscapes in the Middle Ages involved a wide variety of different agents, as well as a long and negotiated decision-making processes. One part of this involved what we would understand to be design: that is, working out beforehand what an urban landscape was to look like. But more broadly, designing was a phase in a lengthier planning process that required a series of related stages including finding suitable sites for urban development, consulting between local landholders, working out property parcel sizes and street patterns, and laying out on the ground the plan elements that were required. Only after all this had been completed could townspeople come to take up residence. The whole process was thus carefully orchestrated and controlled by the different parties involved—it was certainly no free-for-all and not at all a spontaneous activity.

The final stage in the process in the case of founding a new town would come with granting legal privileges. These privileges were usually set out in a charter marking the town's foundation and were typically awarded by the local lord who had initiated the process. Even where the newly formed urban landscape was an addition to an already existing town or village, a grant of privileges might be made to likewise encourage newcomers to take up residence as townspeople. This entire process of creating new urban landscapes thus proceeded through a series of discrete stages, each involving different individuals and groups, which may be summarized diagrammatically (see Figure 1).

Of this process, the design stage is unfortunately one of the least visible in documentary records, yet from morphological evidence, it clearly did take place. A case in point is the town of Grenade-sur-Garonne, a bastide in southwest France founded in the 1290s that has a precise geometrical layout (Figure 2). This surely must have been designed before construction, but by whom is not clear.

Some contemporary sources help to illuminate this design stage of the planning process. For example, a parchment plan of Talamone, Italy, is likely to have been drawn for the purposes of deciding the shape and contents of the new town at the time of its foundation, to set out its plan, and to allocate properties. This plan is a unique manuscript, although there are also cases of architectural drawings—of elevations for




Figure 1 Flowchart Showing Stages in the Formation of a Medieval New Town

cathedrals and other important buildings, for example—that similarly show designs being worked out before work began. Again, however, it is rare to find accounts of who drew up these designs and guided this stage of the process, although through meticulous study of the records kept by the Florentine city government in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, David Friedman is able to show how committees were formed to help in the design of certain new towns being established in the territory around Florence. The individuals concerned with this often had experience of other building projects and design work.

The towns they designed were, in some cases such as Terranuova, highly geometrical in form, suggesting that some knowledge of geometry and its application in design work was important to the individuals employed on these projects and to their




Figure 2 The Geometrical Design of Grenade-sur-Garonne (France)

idea of how to create a new town. Indeed, there are treatises called practical geometries surviving from the Middle Ages that seem to have been written with this purpose in mind and that often contained advice on how to use geometry to design towns and help in solving surveying problems.

Surveying and laying out a new urban landscape on the ground presumably followed on from the design stage. Again, however, this is somewhat difficult to discern from surviving written accounts, and the possibility has to be that, in the Middle Ages, an urban designer and surveyor were in some cases the same person, responsible for working on both. One thing is clear, however: Design was an important aspect of the formation of urban landscapes in Europe throughout the Middle Ages, and studying it as one part of a broader process of urbanization exposes the false distinction often drawn between planned and unplanned towns that has persistently dogged our modern understanding and appreciation of urbanism in medieval Europe.

Keith D. Lilley

See also City Planning; Florence, Italy; Historic Cities; Le Corbusier; Renaissance City; Urban Design; Urban Geography; Urban History; Urban Morphology; Urban Planning

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MEDITERRANEAN CITIES

South European and Middle Eastern cities, addressed as Mediterranean cities, are represented as a space between Orient and Occident, embedded in history of the *longue duree*, but "lagging behind" the European city and closely conditioned by the sea. These discourses do not always do justice to their cosmopolitan diversity or their uniqueness. The Mediterranean "sea in the midst of land" used to be a bridge, always punctuated by great cities: In antiquity, the city-state emerged here; in Roman times, the unifying sea, *Mare Nostrum* bridged urban civilizations; and during the Renaissance, Italian city-states rose to hegemony as a series of metropolitan leaders. Then, with the emergence of nation-states, the Mediterranean Sea turned from a bridge to a border, and the Industrial Revolution marginalized southern Europe and fragmented the Mediterranean region, so that scholarly definitions became necessary.

European Union (EU) cooperation programs usually define it through the nation-states with Mediterranean coasts, departing from Braudel's 1972 definition through the limit of the olive and palm trees. The latter delimitation included a lot of Portugal but excluded most of France from the Mediterranean. Besides ports and larger island towns, for purposes of this entry, Mediterranean cities will be cities by the sea and major inland cities of south Europe and north Africa in the limits set by Braudel.

The Mediterranean as a Bridge: Cities From Antiquity to the Renaissance

The Mediterranean was the cradle of Europe, according to a mythical narrative placing its epicenter on the island of Crete to the south of Hellas. Even before the period of written history, civilizations around the Mediterranean were distinctively urban. There were only a few rural monuments in the Minoan civilization, and that was also true of all Aegean civilizations, including the Cycladic and the Mycenaean ones. Towns were animated by the sea as ports of trade and centers of weaving and other crafts, until the city-state emerged: the Greek *polis*, then the Latin *urbs* and *civitas*.

Miletus had earlier developed much of Greek civilization and scientific wisdom, but the most impressive early Mediterranean city was Athens in

the fifth century BC, which has been a riddle for the density and excellence of intellectual, political, and cultural development in a mere century. In ancient Athens, a citizen, *politis*, was the resident of the city, *polis*, which developed a political culture of democracy, contrasting with earlier but also later periods of the same and other city-states. Renaissance Venice and Florence were enlightened tyrannies or paternalistic societies.

After the classical period, the Macedonian Empire constituted the first pan-Mediterranean empire; it transformed spatialities from city-states and their colonies to empires and their capital cities and introduced multicultural imaginations through interaction with the Orient after the wars, which also shifted the identities of conquerors. Alexander the Great expanded Hellas into Asia and created a Europe with an Oriental thrust, mapping from the Nile to the Indus, and the opposite spatiality of Rome, which soon would face to the West and return to the Mediterranean. Alexander introduced and in fact built capital cities, after living through a functional differentiation among three Macedonian ones: Pella was the main capital, political-administrative seat, and birthplace of the kings; Vergina was the economic-cultural capital; and Dion was the religious one. The seven Alexandrias (named after Alexander the Great), from the Nile through the Persian Gulf to the junction of the Acesines and Indus rivers, were also capital cities in their respective regions. However, the impressive Macedonian Empire was fragmented after Alexander's death at 32 in 322 BC.

As the Roman Empire rose to hegemony, the boundaries of Europe shifted from east to west toward the Mediterranean shores. The Roman Empire had its own capital cities besides the main one of Rome, most notably Constantinople, Cordoba, and Alexandria of Egypt. Although walled borders emerged, like Roman lime, the Hadrian wall in Britain, or that between the Rhine and Danube rivers, there were usually no boundaries. Nevertheless, allegiance to Caesar and later the king or rulers used to divide populations.

City walls were analogous to today's national boundaries before the partitioning of the world into nation-states. In the Roman Empire, they were ritually built, as indicated in examples from Arezzo in Tuscany to Purlbridge in Durham between first century BC and third century AD: A plough driven by a couple of black and white oxen dug the ditch at the perimeter where the city would be built. This

was consecrated by rituals of protection. The city often had a patron god—something still found today—and walls symbolized its status as state and bounded cultural identities, citizenship, migration, and social exclusion of “the other.”

With the fall of the Roman Empire, cities declined and Europe went through a prolonged period of ruralization. The eastern Mediterranean hosted the birth of a new religion at the turn of the first millennium AD in Bethlehem, Jerusalem, Caesarea, Canah, and other towns of Palestine and Israel between Galilee and Sinai, on the west of the Dead Sea and River Jordan. Further to the north, on the Bosphorus, Constantinople was built during 325 to 330 AD, and by the fifth century, it had risen to be the cosmopolitan capital of Christianity named as *the City, Polis*, in discourse and geographical imaginations. It rose to hegemony in the eastern Mediterranean, while in the west, the Middle Ages were preparing the surprise: Since the eleventh century, as culture was reborn (Renaissance), the city-state reemerged in Italy.

Various historians have pointed to different reasons for this sudden and excellent development of a network of cities: Henri Pirenne has stressed commerce; Karl Marx has analyzed transformation from feudal relationships; Max Weber has introduced administration and governance; and Fernand Braudel has admired sea routes and material cultures.

A golden period of Italian city-states followed. During the ninth and tenth centuries, commerce with the East was rudimentary and centered especially in Amalfi, a tiny Italian walled port with colonies all over the Mediterranean. A series of war events and commerce with the East brought other cities to hegemony, alternating cosmopolitan metropolitan leaders: Venice, Florence, then Genoa in the west and Constantinople in the east. Land use and landscapes of these preindustrial cities were first systematized by Sjoberg in 1960 as structured with elite residences in the center and the proletariat outside the walls. This was contested by later urban historians, who pointed to the complexity of guild neighborhoods in the past, and by geographers who argued that there are no preindustrial cities at present. The piazza, the town square, unlike the ancient *agora*, was a place to stroll and watch rather than participate. It was encircled by small niches among colonnades (*stoa*)

for congregation of different population groups, eavesdropping into the private lives of others, according to Pierro della Francesca.

The most prominent historian of the Mediterranean-as-a-bridge, communicating cultural interaction and technological interconnection, was Fernand Braudel. He was writing in the first decades after World War II, partly reacting to the conventional contrast between Christian and Muslim cultures, as were anthropologists simultaneously working in Africa and constructing a view about a unified Mediterranean. During a later period, however, they were all criticized by scholars who considered the Mediterranean as fragmented or as a sort of political counterreference (us versus them) of the “advanced” northern Europe.

In fact, the center of Europe would abandon the Mediterranean after the fifteenth century: The sea became a border and Europe was redefined vis-à-vis the others, the outsiders, after the defeat of the Moors and the Spanish *Reconquista* by 1492. This very year Columbus embarked for America, bringing Spanish and Portuguese ports driving the explorations to hegemony. A new reality emerged around the urban Mediterranean. The shift to the north, away from Africa, followed by half a century the fall of Constantinople and Ottoman occupation of the eastern Mediterranean in 1453. The region was divided into Orient and Occident for about four centuries after that, and this divide became as rigid as the north/south one in the fragmented Mediterranean.

Postcolonial and Modern Cities in the Divided Mediterranean

During the next centuries, all cities of southern Europe were marginalized and surpassed by northern ports in Belgium and Holland (Bruges, Antwerp, Amsterdam), and then London. The remarkable Industrial Revolution pushed the Mediterranean down from core to peripheral status in the global economy in a slow process of decline from the seventeenth to twentieth centuries. The celebrated Industrial Revolution—the factory, the railroad, the capitalist economy—did not take root in the south. Mediterranean civilizations crystallized instead around the urban-oriented cultures, which sought dignity in geographical imaginations of the city as a space for citizenship, synonymous with civilization (*polis/politismos*).

Urbanism has largely accounted for fast urbanization waves irrespective of late industrialization. A process of urbanization without industrialization, or rather, urbanization—triggered by poverty and insecurity in the countryside, informal work opportunities in the cities, the memory of the radiant city-states and the quest for the cultural identity of the urban citizen—made Mediterranean cities among the largest in the world. In 2006, population exceeded 10 million in Cairo (15.8) and Istanbul (11.6); 5 million in Madrid and Alexandria; close to 4 million in Algiers, Casablanca, and Milan; and 3 million in Barcelona, Athens, Rome, and Naples.

While divisions continued to be emphasized, scholars also saw Mediterranean unity by reference to either ease of communications or common physical features and ecologies. Geographers and urbanists who have analyzed the Mediterranean during the twentieth century consider the sea as a single entity (or a bridge) only within the orbit of environmental studies. EU cooperation programs did not have much success or duration and hardly touched the cities. They have tackled diplomacy and politics, or economy, considering peripherality and underdevelopment, but they mostly dealt with the environment, desertification, water pollution, and energy sources.

There are also tourism cooperation projects. Although tourism differs radically among Mediterranean regions and cities, especially after September 11, 2001, the tourist gaze is inspired by memories from the period when the Mediterranean was a bridge among cosmopolitan cities and captured by cultural hybridity. Arabian ruins are protected in both Africa and the Iberian Peninsula, contributing to Andalusian cultural identities; antiquity is recycled in Greek and Italian Christian churches, which are often built with stones and columns from ancient temples. Although secular and speculative building has since surrounded Mediterranean sacred spaces and ruins, it has never eradicated their presence or attractiveness to residents as well as global tourists.

Speculation includes illegal building and squatting, which constitutes a massive urban social movement. Precarious but popular owner occupation in illegal self-built shacks ensures that poverty does not automatically lead to homelessness; shacks may improve as the family income grows into more solid popular housing, sprawling onto cheap suburban land. In this and other ways, modernity has been diluted in informal modes of living and working.

Popular suburbs also surround postcolonial Mediterranean cities in North Africa, which animate Orientalism and the division between secular or European and Islamic cultures. Middle Eastern cities, from Morocco to Iran and from Turkey to Sudan, have incorporated social control or divine law rather than economic rationale in the city-building process. Medina, the Arabic name for the old city, is extended into the Rabad, that is, its later suburbs, while the Kasbah, attached to the Medina, has long served as a refuge in case of defeat. The Medina is built according to various schools of law, among which the Maliki is the most influential in Morocco and Algeria and the Hanafi is predominant in Tunisia and Libya. The urban building language consists of relatively few elements: a mosque foremost, then a main street and a governor's residence. The bazaar or the herb and spice market constitutes the public sphere of meeting and exchange. Space is sharply gendered (men/women, exterior/interior, public/private), women are not allowed into coffee houses and halls of many mosques, and clothing regulations make them "invisible," as we know from recent tensions since the appearance of veiled women in European public places. Segregation principles in Islamic cities are different from European ones because each *mahalla* houses people of a common ethnic or socioeconomic background under the administration of a mukhtar. Segregation has often been sealed in gated communities guarded at night, not only in the colonial but also in the postcolonial period. Ghettos and migrant quarters in European cities are only pale parallels of *mahallas*.

Postcolonial Middle Eastern cities constitute material evidence of the Mediterranean as a border that hardened with war caused by foreign intervention and civil war. As the cold war walls are being demolished, such as the one in Gorizia between Italy and Slovenia, walled borders are erected in the southeastern Mediterranean. The one erected by the Israelis on the West Bank is the longest and the most notorious—next to the "green line" in Nicosia, Cyprus, yet another divided Mediterranean city. Postcolonial cityscapes of the holy cities themselves, such as Jerusalem, Bethlehem, Canah, but also Ramalla and Beirut, witness the rigidity and violence of ethnic divisions. The post-cold war epoch poses cultures and cultural identities as the main dimensions of social exclusion, fragmentation, and

conflict. In 1997, Huntington published a widely read theory of the clash of civilizations, which has been criticized but endures, gaining relevance from the events of September 11, 2001. In that work, the Mediterranean springs to the foreground as a border between Islamic and Asiatic cultures, on the one hand, and the Western secular culture on the other. However, this border is often deconstructed by European Union cooperation programs, is ignored by tourist cruises, and is trespassed by migrants—usually illegal, floating to small European ports as boat people. Against theories to the contrary, the elements bring multicultural orientations to cities and symbolic borders, animating interaction of cultures in the broader Mediterranean.

A Theory for the Mediterranean City?

If there is a theory for the modern Mediterranean city, which will not exclude postcolonial Islamic social control rather than economic rationale in the Arabian medina (city), it has to do with the interplay of sacred and secular in everyday life, with a patron saint for each city and religious rituals on Easter, Ramadan, saints' feast days, and other occasions; with the attraction of the city, rather than pastoral utopias, and the strong cultural heritage of urbanism; with massive urbanization waves, which are not caused by industrialization but by rural poverty and insecurity, combined with opportunities in the city and the culture of urbanism.

Flows into Mediterranean cities in general consist of refugees, migrants, and illegal migrants from the south and the east; global tourism attracted by landscapes that are theaters of memory and contain conspicuous monuments of world heritage; and of residential tourism by north-south migrants lining the Mediterranean shores beyond cities, especially since the Maastricht treaty, which allowed property purchases within the EU. Spreading from the south of France to Italy and Spain, this urban sprawl is changing the face of Costa Blanca from Barcelona to Alicante, via Benidorm, while in Hellas (Greece), it is now approaching post-Olympic Attica. Finally, Mediterranean city theory has to include spontaneity of socioeconomic restructuring, with the informal economy and housing creating a postmodern collage in the urban landscape and society, before the label was even used in art and academic discourse.

At the level of Mediterranean cityscapes, recurring patterns and structures in postcolonial and south European cities are as follows: (1) the inverse-Burgess spatial pattern, with the affluent classes in the center and the poor on the periphery, undergoing constant gentrification in the center, on the one hand, and spontaneous urban development and popular suburbanization on the other, with less planning than in other world regions; (2) a compact cityscape with tall buildings, narrow streets, small open squares, suburbs quite close to the center, and problems of consequent environmental pollution; (3) social class and ethnic group segregation, vertical as well as horizontal, and (4) mixed land use (horizontally and vertically) rather than zoning of residence and economic activity, as well as bazaars, street markets, and kiosks that house the informal economy within a postmodern collage. In combination, informal work and informal housing or semisquatting challenge public top-down policy, solving problems of unemployment and homelessness by putting all the burden on the family.

Spontaneous popular settlements are now much rarer in the Mediterranean and have been finally controlled in southern Europe except Lisbon (but this is rarely defined as a Mediterranean city). After EU accession (1981 for Hellas, 1986 for Iberian countries) and especially in the postsocialist era, forces of diversification between the north and the south of the Mediterranean speeded up. In the latter, postcolonial cities are often shaken by violence. Cities of Mediterranean Europe are divided between poverty and vulnerability, on the one hand, especially as migrants and refugees keep arriving, and urban entrepreneurialism on the other: a new period of urban competition, which brings about the commodification of the city (or city marketing) for global tourism and transnational capital. In the new modes of urban regulation, neoliberal strategies for visibility through the attraction of international megaevents become a priority, as exemplified in Spain in 1992 with the triple success in Barcelona, Madrid, and Seville. The cultural economy of cities has risen in a smooth transition for the Mediterranean, which has not experienced much of an Industrial Revolution. Southern Europe slides easily from spontaneous urbanization to urban entrepreneurialism, postmodernism, and urban competition, and even influencing the latter to “Mediterraneanize” their landscapes.

Throughout the last century of Mediterranean history, the city has been stamped by cultures of urbanism and by informality or by the concept of spontaneity, coined by Antonio Gramsci, an intellectual of the south, as important for Mediterranean city theory as Antonio Negri. The two intellectuals see the southern metropolis in different ways and illuminate its current transformation. Earlier class structures are by immigrants and interest groups comprising residents, commuters, business people, and also global tourists as neoliberal globalization further reduces the role of the welfare state and as weak or occasional planning in urban design and restoration create environmental problems and vulnerability in a vast diversity of Mediterranean cities among three “continents.”

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See also Athens, Greece; Colonial City; Islamic City; Istanbul, Turkey; Medieval Town Design; Piazza; Rome, Italy; Urban Design

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MEGACITY

See Megalopolis; Urbanization

MEGALOPOLIS

Many academics have coined terms for their phenomenon of study, but few have been successful. But Jean Gottmann’s proposal for *megalopolis* to refer to a string of closely interconnected metropolises was logical and inspired and has

become part of the language. The term is derived from Greek and means simply “very large city.” A group of ancient Greeks planned to construct a large city of this name on the Peloponnese Peninsula; only a small city of Megalopolis still exists. The best contemporary treatment of Megalopolis is a 1998 report by Birdsall and Florin, *The Megalopolitan Region*, which was prepared for the U.S. State Department and is available online.

Gottmann (1915–1994) was a French geographer who for 20 years studied the northeastern United States and published his seminal work in 1961. *Megalopolis* was a massive (more than 800 pages) undertaking, characterized by detailed scholarship and amazing insight; it traces the evolution of the 500-mile-long “main street” of what was then US 1 to the interconnected promise of I-95. Part 1 argues the dynamic role of these core cities in the economic and cultural making and control of the nation, the “economic hinge” of innovation—including suburbs as early as 1850. The bases for the development of the megalopolis include its close position to then-dominant Europe, a diverse coast penetrated by many quality harbors with access to the interior, and a topography providing local water power for industry. New York, a situational geographer would point out, was destined for preeminence because of its superior access across the Appalachians to the interior of the country.


Part 2 concentrates on the structure of population and land use, especially in the suburban fringe, noting the long-standing but now faster-growing penetration of urban uses into the country—that is, sprawl—again long before other parts of the country noticed. Perhaps there was a greater expectation that close-in agriculture would survive than has proven possible. The beginnings of urban decay and of renewal are treated, with a plea for rehabilitation instead of renewal—finally successful in the 1980s and 1990s.

Part 3 details patterns of economic structure and change; the chapter on the white-collar revolution outlining the restructuring to higher-level activities is probably the most important and prophetic analysis in the book, already in 1960 predicting the basic remaking of American society, with the megalopolis leading the way. Part 4, “Neighbors in Megalopolis,” recognizes the diversity and segregation of the population along ethnic, racial, religious, and class lines, as well as the high level of inequality that characterizes creative cities; and finally, it notes the difficulty of coordinating planning

Table I Population in Megalopolitan Urbanized Areas (millions)

<i>Year</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Area</i>	<i>Density</i>	<i>Year</i>	<i>Population</i>	<i>Area</i>	<i>Density</i>
1950	24.5	3283	7315	1980	34.4	8390	4100
1960	29.4	5348	5285	1990	36.6	10185	3590
1970	34.0	7006	4768	2000	42.4	13490	3155

Note: Area in square miles.

**Figure I** Evolution of Megalopolis, 1950–2000

Source: Map created by author, update of classic map by Browning (1974).

across utter jurisdictional complexity. In sum, the essence of the megalopolis is its intense “urbanness,” its high level of investment in transport and communication, and its capacity for renewal to maintain world economic and cultural preeminence.

Gottmann later compared the U.S. megalopolis to other world megalopolitan systems and still later, in 1987, revisited *Megalopolis* in *Megalopolis Revisited 25 Years Later*. He was able to see the validation of his restructuring prediction and the incubator role of the megalopolis, and especially of New York. Yet, he notes as well the pace of deconcentration within the megalopolis.

For urban and population geographers, a wonderful and valuable map was produced by Clyde Browning, in the University of North Carolina *Studies in Geography*, called “Population and Urbanized Area Growth in Megalopolis, 1950–1970.” This was both a quality representation of the megalopolis and an updating of its expansion through 1970. Browning’s 1974 map was quite a large and detailed representation of the megalopolis, tracing its expansion to 1960 and to 1970. The monograph text was a thorough empirical and theoretical discussion of the magnitude and nature of change. Browning provides an overview of urbanized areas and of the megalopolis, and a statistical and graphic summary of the 1950-to-1970 change, noting that most cores had not coalesced and that the wider metropolitan region defined by Gottmann was still less than 20 percent urban territory. (See Figure 1 for an update of Browning’s map.)

Megalopolis was further updated to 2000. The megalopolis now extends from Fredericksburg, south of Washington, D.C., to Portsmouth and Dover-Rochester, New Hampshire, and into southern Maine. The updated map depicts the further expansion of the nation’s largest conurbation, whose constituent parts housed 24.5 million people in 1950 and 42.4 million in 2000, with an additional 8 million in exurban surroundings, in all housing one sixth of the U.S. population.

From Table 1, we can see that the population of the megalopolis has not quite doubled, but the total area has quadrupled, as mean densities have fallen from 7,315 to 3,155 people per square mile.

Consider the first (1950) and last (2000) stages. In 1950, the megalopolis was actually a string of pearls, with Washington, Baltimore, Wilmington, Philadelphia, Trenton, New York, Bridgeport–New Haven, Hartford, Springfield, Providence, Worcester

and Boston, Lowell and Lawrence—all distinct places, separated by some rural territory. These were the core urban places arising in the colonial period, exhibiting an extraordinary linearity, based partly on physical character (the head of navigation at the fall line) and partly on the situation, sea or river ports and early industrial centers, convenient for trade with Europe.

By 1970, Wilmington-Philadelphia-Trenton were merged, as were Boston-Lowell-Lawrence, but perhaps surprising to many, no others, although there had been very significant suburbanization, especially around New York and Washington, D.C. New urbanized areas included Vineland, Danbury, Fitchburg, and Nashua.

By 2000, a continuous urban settlement structure for megalopolis was almost realized, with a smaller Washington-Baltimore-Aberdeen to the south, a giant Wilmington to Springfield and Norwich in the center, with links to formerly independent places like Atlantic City, Allentown, Lancaster, York, Harrisburg, and Poughkeepsie and a northern area from Providence and Barnstable through Boston to Manchester, Portsmouth, and Dover-Rochester. New outlying urbanized areas, not yet quite connected, include Fredericksburg, Dover, Wildwood, Frederick, and Kingston. The map graphically captures the massive urban diffusion from early cores, the gradual coalescence of these expanding cores, and the rise of and reaching out to satellite places.

Forces for Change in Megalopolis, 1950–2000

The second half of the twentieth century was an era of continuing metropolitan expansion in the United States. It is useful to summarize briefly the forces that produced these patterns of settlement change, even though this has been the subject of countless studies in several disciplines.

In the case of the megalopolis the underlying set of cores has been established for a century or more. The settlement processes that have dominated in the last 50 years included (1) sheer economic and demographic growth, (2) physical decentralization in the form of suburbanization, (3) extension of metropolitan commuting fields and the physical coalescence of formerly physically separate areas, (4) rise of or restructuring and reaching out to formerly distant satellites, and (5) restructuring and revitalization of high-level metropolitan cores.

1950–1970: *The Rise of the Suburbs*

Suburban growth was pervasive over most of what is now the megalopolis, fueled by the high fertility and natural increase of the baby boom, as the nation reacted to losses from World War II, and by very large domestic rural to urban migration. Almost all industrial sectors and types of cities grew, as part of postwar recovery—even the older industrial sectors and cities. Metropolitan growth reflected the dominance of both increasing returns to scale and to agglomeration and the proliferation of new products and services. But this growth was spatially expansive, via burgeoning new suburbs, mainly because of sheer population growth. The period was also one of large-scale in-migration of Blacks fleeing the more discriminatory South, which in turn precipitated large-scale White flight to the suburbs.

1970–1990

Megalopolis grew more slowly in population during this period, especially 1970 to 1985, than in the preceding or the following periods, despite continuing suburban growth, because of often declining absolute populations, and often, employment, in the dense, older central city cores. Indeed, the 1970s were rare years of more rapid nonmetropolitan than large metropolitan growth nationally, as the giant cities were beset by racial tension, large-scale White flight to the suburbs, and the decline of traditional industries, including manufacturing and transportation. But the megalopolis did continue to grow in area—from 7,000 to more than 10,000 square miles, up 45 percent, even as population growth was a mere 7 percent, as suburbanization continued and densities fell from 4,768 to 3,590 people per square mile.

Suburban downtowns, termed “edge cities,” arose to challenge central city dominance. Yet, it proved premature to write off the old centers. Especially after 1980, the cities fought back, not by the unsuccessful urban renewal of the earlier period but by deliberate investment in attracting higher-class people and jobs.

1990–2000

Even before 1990, much of the megalopolis experienced a revitalization and resurgence of growth, with a hefty growth of 12 percent in the 1990s alone. Gottmann outlined the dimensions of this new urbanism in his 1985 book, *Megalopolis Revisited*. The

larger downtowns and nearby historic areas were gentrified, as middle- and upper-class households reclaimed parts of the core. Economic restructuring, as presaged by Gottmann, led to massively increased service employment; business services and finance preferred central high-rise venues. Core populations rose, in part from the attraction of young, later, or not-marrying professionals and of empty-nesters. But growth was vibrant in the ever lengthening far suburban fringe as well, far exceeding in absolute population and jobs the revitalization of the cores, with continuing industrial, commercial, and residential expansion. Much of the growth could be termed low-density exurban sprawl, but where smart-growth urban planning came into vogue, some of the growth was concentrated in older, formerly independent satellite towns and cities, now incorporated into the megalopolitan web.

Megalopolis Around the World

The ingenuity of the term and the obvious functional reality and importance of interconnected sets of large cities inevitably led to the proclaiming of similar urban systems around the world. There is a degree of subjectivity in the definition and delineation of other megalopolises, depending on whether the conception is closer to a rather continuous conurbation of urban settlement or to a more loosely related set of metropolitan areas. Gottman’s conception was of large urban centers functionally related by interaction of people and products, and the overlapping commuting fields of these urban cores, which he demonstrated for the Boston to Washington corridor. Equivalent data may or may not exist for other countries and may or may not have been applied consistently; and there is uncertainty about a lower threshold for reaching “mega” status. In the United States, the strongest contenders are the Milwaukee-Chicago-Detroit-Pittsburgh corridor (ChiPitts), greater Los Angeles-San Diego-Tijuana, and perhaps the San Francisco-San Jose-Sacramento urban region and Peninsular Florida. Others are more conjectural or incipient than real (e.g., Charlotte-Raleigh).

Outside the United States, the earliest recognized and the world’s largest megalopolis is surely the Tokyo-Nagoya-Osaka corridor, with up to 80 million people. Other reasonable contenders are the urban regions centered on London, São Paulo-Rio de Janeiro, Beijing-Tianjin-Tangshan, the Pearl River Delta (Hong Kong-Guangzhou), and the Tangtze

River delta (greater Shanghai). Note that this excludes many of the world's largest cities, which are not part of a system of cities, for example, Mexico City, Mumbai, Kolkata, Jakarta, Bangkok, Delhi, Seoul, and Buenos Aires. Similarly functionally related city regions, but of smaller size, are, for example, Randstad (Netherlands-Belgium) and Rhine-Ruhr, Toronto, and Taipei. But if they see themselves as megalopolises, why not? Neil Pierce, in his 2008 opinion piece "The Megalopolis Century," clearly prefers a looser conception; he says that "more than 200 million people, two-thirds of the U.S. population already live in 10 megalopolitan regions."

Conclusion

It is reasonable to conclude, with Gottmann, that Megalopolis remains the main street of America, despite the much faster rate and amount of growth in the metropolitan South and West. California may well be the trend setter of the nation in many ways, but Megalopolis remains the control center of our information economy and the innovator of urban settlement change; it has proven remarkably adaptable in maintaining its preeminence. The area defined as megalopolis housed 42.4 million people in 2000. The exurban area surrounding megalopolis, with high levels of commuting to megalopolitan jobs, housed at least 8 million more people—a microcosm of incredible variance in settlement from utterly rural to the highest density—and land and site values. This amazing conurbation remains the most spectacular and powerful settlement complex and human imprint on the landscape.

Richard Morrill

See also Metropolitan; Metropolitan Governance; Sprawl; Suburbanization; Urban Geography; Urban Planning

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METROPOLIS

Eighty years after its premiere in Berlin on January 14, 1927, Austrian director Fritz Lang's *Metropolis* remains among the most powerful visions of urban modernity and the most famous German film in the history of cinema. It dramatically represented how the conflicts—economic, political, social, familial, psychosexual, architectural, and spiritual—of technological society dominate the prospects for life in the city. Already in its title, an English language word, it suggests a universal urban condition. Depicting the harshly routinized existence of city dwellers earlier analyzed by German sociologist Georg Simmel, *Metropolis* proposed the city as a productive but highly alienating machine.

Prior to Lang's film, which he claimed (falsely) was inspired by his vision of New York's bright lights during a visit in 1924 to promote his *The Nibelungen*, the city had rarely been represented in cinema as physically overwhelming. Dark alleys, criminal gangs, and moral corruption were the principal threats faced by most protagonists in silent movies. By contrast, *Metropolis* revealed the city as second nature, a human creation ultimately more inscrutable and dangerous than first nature, an idea telegraphically conveyed by advertising posters for the film in which masses of skyscrapers resemble mountain ranges. It suggested that the physical disparity between the increasingly vertical and machine-driven built environment and individual human beings resulted in feelings of anxiety

and the sense that one had lost effective control over one's destiny.

Controlling Lang's futuristic city, located in the penthouse of a towering office building, is the cold and ruthlessly calculating industrialist Joh Fredersen (played by Alfred Abel). His son Freder Fredersen (Gustav Froelich) leads a life of indolent pleasure until he encounters the teacher, Maria (Brigite Helm), who one day ascends to his pleasure garden with a group of ragged children.

Metropolis depicts a vertically stratified society, and far below the surface of the Earth, its workers live and tend the Moloch-like turbines that keep it running. Maria preaches a gospel of love to them in an underground catacomb, which leads the threatened Fredersen Senior to approach the inventor Rotwang (Rudolf Klein-Rogge). He creates a robot replica of Maria, who incites the workers to destroy the machines and flood their underground city. Eventually, Fredersen and the machine foreman Groth reconcile themselves on the steps of a Gothic cathedral, according to the slogan "The mediator between head and hands must be the heart."

Evoking contemporaneous sources, such as the anti-urban philosophy of Oswald Spengler expounded in his book, *The Decline of the West*; Weimar architect Bruno Taut's notion of the tall building as "crown of the city"; and playwright Georg Kaiser's drama of an industrial accident *Gas*, *Metropolis* is rife with visual symbolism and intellectual references. Its skyscrapers freely cite modern architectural styles then advanced by Ludwig Mies van der Rohe and Erich Mendelsohn, while the stylized choreography with which its armies of black-clad workers move owed much to expressionist theater and seem to exemplify Siegfried Kracauer's notion of the crowd as "mass ornament." Novelist and screenplay author Thea von Harbou, then Lang's wife, wrote the treacly story that was the basis for Lang's visually haunting images, clearly indebted to the classic 1919 expressionist film *The Cabinet of Dr. Caligari*.

Metropolis spent over one and a half years in production, exceeded its budget by more than three times, and involved the use of 36,000 extras for its elaborate mob scenes. Intended to compete with large-scale Hollywood productions, the film is infused with German attitudes toward American urban civilization, most evidently in its valorization of skyscrapers, which epitomized what many contemporaneous

observers regarded as the American fetishism of technology and mass production.

The splitting of the character of Maria and her re-creation as a robotic clone also finds a parallel in the debates about the arrival of the financially and sexually independent "new woman" in large cities such as Berlin. Despite a gala premiere in a Berlin movie house decorated with metallic silver paint and attended by elite cultural and political figures, Lang's film was a financial flop and received generally poor reviews at the time.

Critics complained that it contained too many ideas, was wildly contradictory, and was marred by an unconvincing happy ending that sidestepped its narrative of class struggle. Young Spanish film director Luis Buñuel was among the first to praise its compelling and original presentation of architecture and the city, a key influence on the development of the science fiction genre and later films such as 1982's *Blade Runner*. *Metropolis* is referenced in cultural products of varied sorts, including the 1973 novel *Gravity's Rainbow*, and it has been reset to music by Giorgio Moroder. More than a quarter of the footage shown when the film was first released has been lost, and the 1996 restoration by historian Enno Patalas now constitutes the most complete version available.

Released six years before National Socialist Adolf Hitler was elected chancellor of Germany, Lang's film is today frequently interpreted as an allegory of the social instability and political convulsions that brought the first German experiment with democracy during the Weimar Republic to an end in 1933.

Exiled film critic Siegfried Kracauer was among the first to develop this argument in his book, *From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film*. As a summation of complex attitudes toward modernity, modernization, Americanism, and urbanization prevalent in Germany at the time, *Metropolis* remains without equal. Despite its frequent inconsistencies and lapses of logic, it has attained the status of a period classic studied alongside the work of master German political, social, and cultural theorists such as Max Weber, Georg Lukács, Walter Benjamin, and Ernst Jünger. Its visceral depiction of the rhythms of labor, workings of giant machines, and a dystopian urban environment have retained their force with the passage of time.

Edward Dimendberg

See also City and Film; Simmel, Georg

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METROPOLITAN

Metropolitan generally refers to a city and the surrounding urbanized area. The term originates in ancient Greece, where a city that had established colonies in other lands was known as a *metropolis* (*meter* "mother" + *polis* "city"; literally the mother city, a city that had offspring). In the Middle Ages, the metropolitan was the seat of the archbishop, with jurisdiction over a specified patriarchal canonical territory. By the nineteenth century, the term *metropolitan* was commonly used in naming new municipal services such as the Metropolitan Police (in London) and civic institutions such as the Metropolitan Museum of Art, although the original meaning of the term (a city with colonial territories) has remained in use in France. In the last century, *metropolitan* was used to signify the growing urban populations in cities around the world, while the shortened *metro-* came to signify modern as well as cosmopolitan features of urban life.

Religious Organization

The Metropolitan was the title given to the bishop of the Christian church in the capital city or metropolis (mother city) of civil provinces in the Roman Empire, first appearing in documents at the Council of Nicea, convened by the Emperor Constantine in AD 325. As the church expanded, following the organizational patterns of the civil government, ecclesiastical provinces (the diocese) were established under the jurisdiction of bishops. This system of administration and control has remained unchanged in the modern Catholic, Orthodox, and Anglican churches. Some metropolitans were also granted the title of archbishop, and the archbishops of Canterbury and York have the three titles of Metropolitan, Archbishop, and primate of the Church of England. In ecclesiastical language of the present day, the term identifies church structures associated with the metropolis: the metropolitan church, metropolitan chapter, and the like.

Definitions

Blake McKelvey describes how American cities mushroomed in the early 1900s, taking on a new shape, new civic responsibilities, and new interrelationships: Larger cities were encircling neighboring towns, establishing new lines of communication, and exploring new sources of social and political power. The cities were rapidly expanding because of immigration, and the increasing urban populations spilled over the city boundaries; manufacturing moved to the suburban fringe because of overcrowded rail lines in the city. In 1910, the U.S. Bureau of the Census sought to capture the dynamic growth of urban areas by introducing a new term, the *metropolitan district*, for those urban areas with a population of 200,000 people, including a central city with a population of at least 100,000. In 1910, there were 15 such metropolitan areas. In 1930, the definition was extended down to include urban areas with a population of 200,000 but with cities of 50,000 or more people, and in 1940, there were 140 recognized metropolitan districts.

New definitions for metropolitan areas were issued in 1949 (for the 1950 census) using a county-based definition for the "standard metropolitan area" (SMA), and later definitions have evolved to *standard metropolitan statistical area* (SMSA),

metropolitan statistical area (MSA), *metropolitan area* (MA), *metropolitan statistical areas* (MSAs), and *consolidated metropolitan statistical areas* (CMSAs) to capture the complexity of ever-expanding metropolitan regions. In each instance, the underlying concept, according to the Metropolitan Area Standards Review Committee of the U.S. Office of Management and the Budget, is that of “a large population nucleus and adjacent communities that have a high degree of integration with that nucleus.” In 2007, nearly 85 percent of the U.S. population lived in metropolitan areas.

Metropolitan areas are used to define urban population concentrations in other countries as well. In Canada, *census metropolitan areas* (CMAs) are defined as having a total population of at least 100,000 people and an urban core of at least 50,000; this included 33 large metropolitan areas in the 2006 census. In India, by contrast, the Census Commission defines a metropolitan city as having a population of more than 4 million people; these cities include Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai, Kolkata, Bengaluru, Hyderabad, Surat, Ahmedabad, and Pune. *Metropolitan* is currently used to refer to a large identifiable area of continuous urbanization, including one or more large urban centers, and in time, this meaning has come to overlap with that of *megalopolis*, first used by Jean Gottman to describe the urban agglomeration of urban and urbanizing communities that stretched from Boston (on the north), through New York and Philadelphia, to Washington, D.C. (on the south).

Metropolitan Initiatives

Rapid urban growth in the last century has created problems in the planning and provision of public services in many countries. Cities alone cannot manage important urban problems in employment, housing, and social welfare because they often are spread across dozens of politically independent municipalities. In the urban studies literature of the 1970s, this would be described as the balkanization of the suburbs. Efforts have been made to create metropolitan service districts and even regional governments.

In Canada, a consolidated governing structure was established for the Toronto metropolitan area in 1952, which originally included 13 municipalities

and a 25-member elected Council of Metropolitan Toronto (currently 35 members from six municipalities); it has established common property tax assessments and tax rates for regional issues including mass transit, housing, schools, water supply, and sewage disposal. Metropolitan governance has also been attempted in the United States with the merger of city and county government (Miami-Dade County in 1957, Nashville-Davidson County in 1963, and other cities mostly in the south) although with less comprehensive powers than in Toronto.

Metropolitan governmental structures are more common in Europe; in Germany, most large cities (including Frankfurt, Stuttgart, Munich, and Dresden) are consolidated city-county governments, and in England six “metropolitan counties” were created in 1974 (Greater Manchester, Merseyside, South Yorkshire, Tyne and Wear, West Midlands, and West Yorkshire) with joint boards for specific governing functions.

In other regions as well, metropolitan planning agencies and governance structures are used. The Tokyo metropolitan government was formed in 1943, with a publicly elected governor and metropolitan assembly; it includes 23 special wards, each with its own elected governing body. In the Philippines, Metro Manila includes the city and 16 surrounding cities and municipalities, each with its own local government; the Metropolitan Manila Development Authority (MMDA) operates as a regional governing body with its main headquarters in Makati City.

Other Uses of Metropolitan

While *metropolitan* has a specific genesis (from the Greek) and specific meanings (in both secular and nonsecular organizational structure), it has also been used in more generic fashion to refer to things urban and, especially, to those things that encompass the larger urban area. In London, the consolidation of essential services such as sanitation, water supply, street paving and lighting, relief of the poor, and maintenance of the peace were managed by the vestries of 90-odd parishes or precincts until establishment of the Metropolitan Board of Works; the establishment of the Metropolitan Police dates from the same period. In Paris, the subway system, opened in 1900, was called the Paris Metropolitan, shortened to Metro.

Metropolitan has also come to take on other meanings derived from the city and urban life, in this case referencing the cultural life of the city. The *Metropolitan Magazine*, published in Great Britain from 1833 through 1850, was intended for a cosmopolitan audience, with travel narratives and literature from around the world; a magazine of the same title appeared in New York from 1903 to 1911, and another with the shortened title *Metropolitan* was published from 1895 to 1925. Metropolitan has also been used as branding for products, including things as disparate as the Nash/Hudson Metropolitan automobile, produced from 1954 to 1962, and the New York Metropolitan baseball team (most often shortened to the New York Mets). In more recent years, the term *metrosexual* has come into use, derived from Mark Simpson's descriptions in *The Independent*: "Metrosexual Man, the single young man with a high disposable income, living or working in the city (because that's where all the best shops are), is perhaps the most promising consumer market of the decade."

In most of these examples, metropolitan refers to a larger urban region, to institutions that serve the urban region, or to cultural attributes associated with urban areas. One additional use, however, remains true to the original meaning of the mother city and colonies, and that is the French designation of Metropolitan France. This dates from the colonial period, when France was called the *metropole*, the mother city to the various territories and colonies where French was spoken (there was a similar usage by other European colonial powers). The term *metropole* is used to distinguish France from the overseas territories; the term Metropolitan France includes mainland France and Corsica.

Ray Hutchison

See also Megalopolis; Metropolitan Governance; Metropolitan Region; Suburbanization; Urban Agglomeration; Urban Politics

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METROPOLITAN GOVERNANCE

Metropolitan governance refers to a two-fold process of consolidating a new political space at the metropolitan scale, which involves intrametropolitan conflicts as well as political transformation through new governing instruments and interest-mediation mechanisms, and consolidating the metropolis as a collective actor in intergovernmental relations, global markets, and international politics. In brief, it entails profound transformations of the role of the city in the political process.

The debate around metropolitan governance is not new. At the turn of the twentieth century, a reform movement in the United States pushed for redefining urban politics, among other ways, by consolidating municipalities to counter a political fragmentation that was seen as fostering inequity, inefficiencies, and failures in the democratic system. In the post–World War II period, public choice theorists proposed instead that political fragmentation was a necessary condition for liberty, efficiency, and democracy. Charles Tiebout privileged the individual right to "vote with one's feet" when dissatisfied with the tax service package offered in a municipality. The ability for people to "shop" their residential location and to choose their neighbors was thought to produce more efficiency in delivering services and more democracy.

On the other hand, early reformers such as Chester Maxey trusted bureaucratic planning more than the aggregation of individual decisions. Planning was viewed as the most efficient means to effective service delivery and the most democratic solution, given that consolidation and tax sharing permitted a more uniform and equitable governance system throughout the metropolitan region.

The resurgence of interest in metropolitan governance in the 1990s came hand in hand with debates on the political effects of global economic restructuring. *New regionalism* is a label that conveys two meanings. First, effective metropolitan governance does not necessarily require municipal consolidation; it may be better to think in terms of a shift from governmental reform to new governance mechanisms. The notion of political territory is thereby replaced by a more fluid concept of political space. Second, the increasing importance of city-regions as collective actors in the global market and within national intergovernmental relations is a sign of a profound

transformation of the political process under the ideological pressure of neoliberalism; that is, the ideological push toward fiscal austerity and the decentralization of governmental programs.

New Forms of Governance

New Political Space

Political territory is commonly understood as the container-like area within which politics unfolds. However, urban phenomena can hardly be conceived as restricted to territorial boundaries; urban politics may be better understood within a multicentered logic of horizontal relations that go beyond the hierarchical and territorial conception of governments. Metropolitan governance, in other words, recasts traditional definitions of the urban political process by insisting on open, overlapping, and fluid conceptions of the space of urban politics and focusing on networks, project-based decision making (rather than rational comprehensive planning), and the collaboration of state and nonstate actors. This constitutes the new political space.

In this context, difficulties of regulation and coordination caused by the unpredictability and chaos of urban life in sprawling and growing metropolitan areas are addressed by transforming the way decisions are made and legitimated, the way conflicting interests are mediated, and the way policies and programs are implemented and evaluated. These approaches replace institutional and territorial reforms such as the establishment of metropolitan two-tier governments.

Decision-Making and Legitimation Mechanisms

In the old debate, metropolitan governance meant consolidating municipalities and creating new governmental structures at a larger scale to ease the coordination of municipal decision making. Elected representatives would be compelled to work together by integrating municipal bureaucracies and pooling resources. In Toronto, for instance, the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto was created in 1953 to equip the metropolitan area with adequate institutional capacity to face the challenges of rapid (sub)urbanization. This territorial reform was legitimated by the broad acceptance of rational and comprehensive planning and the belief that, in the

modern world, a bigger city deserved a bigger governmental structure. Only in that way could it efficiently construct urban infrastructure such as freeways or suburban housing developments.

In the new debate, metropolitan governance mostly means inventing decision-making mechanisms that are not necessarily based on voting and comprehensive planning. Investing in megaprojects such as waterfront revitalization, airport expansion, or commercial street renaissance on an ad hoc basis provides leaders with more visibility and fame. Strategic planning still exists, but compliance mechanisms are more voluntary. The regional plan is often an opportunity to legitimate project-based decisions through controlled visionary exercises where well-known public and private leaders as well as selected citizens are called to imagine the future of the metropolitan area. Public consultations are also used to legitimate decisions that may or may not have been taken by elected representatives. In short, decision making mostly takes place in a debating or a bargaining mode between public and private actors, often leading to public-private partnerships for urban development. This networked, project-based logic of coordination and regulation is more prized than the traditional logic of representative democracy.

Legitimacy in this context comes from sources other than elections. Decisions that resonate with people's everyday practices and with their understandings will more easily be seen as legitimate. This implies more than one model of metropolitan governance, with governance arrangements varying according to the power dynamics and political culture of specific places. For instance, in Montreal, the government has chosen to create new metropolitan institutions (as in the old days) while incorporating practices of the new days (e.g., visioning exercises, performance measures, public-private partnerships, public consultations). In contrast, Toronto followed the lead of economic and other civil society leaders in constructing a metropolitan political space based on networks and specific projects such as the 2008 Olympic bid. These different trajectories can be explained by different configurations of actors and political cultures. Economic actors are more powerful in Toronto than Montreal, for instance, while the history of Montreal has led to a more social democratic state where, by comparison to Toronto, governmental structures are more trusted.

Despite these variations, metropolitan governance today is generally associated with a shared belief in the need for and the virtues of international competitiveness. Most citizens, elected representatives, bureaucrats, and civic leaders have internalized the idea that working together on a metropolitan scale will increase competitiveness in global markets and produce prosperity and happiness. This belief is at the core of the legitimation strategies for metropolitan governance reforms. This is not to say, that no one is contesting this idea. The problem for critics, however, is that transformation in interest-mediation mechanisms have made it more difficult for them to be heard.

Interest-Mediation Mechanisms

Traditionally, political parties, periodic elections, and corporate organizations such as trade unions or boards of trade were the main mechanisms to arbitrate between conflicting interests. Critical voices could thus be heard in an organized fashion. With the transformations under way since the 1980s, points of access to the decision-making process have multiplied at the same time as they have weakened. On the one hand, public consultations, the use of mainstream media channels, the creation of information hotlines by public agencies, and high-visibility urban projects have made urban politics more present in people's daily lives. On the other hand, the channels through which citizens can influence decision making depend more and more on personal networks. Unelected actors make important decisions outside of democratic accountability mechanisms, and access to these decision makers depends on personal networks. To counter these back-corridor decision-making practices, alternative forms of activism such as demonstrations and social justice work have become an integral part of the political life of metropolitan areas.

Policy Implementation and Evaluation

The consolidation–fragmentation debate was centered on the quest for the most effective and equitable service delivery system at the least cost for taxpayers. Programs were considered successful if residents were satisfied. The recent metropolitan governance debate is largely shaped by international transfers of knowledge on best practices,

accompanied by ever more sophisticated performance measures and ranking schemes such as, for instance, Richard Florida's controversial Creative Index, which measures the proportion of educated, artistic, high-technology, and foreign-born population in cities to assess their potential for innovation and economic growth. In addition, authoritative auditing instruments based on legal contracts, norms, accounting categories, and new surveillance technologies aim to control how grant money is spent and how employees work.

City-Regions as Collective Actors

Internally, metropolitan governance refers to a profound transformation of the political process in terms of the multinodal and networked spatial configuration of political exchanges and the emergence of new decision-making, legitimating, interest-mediation, and evaluation mechanisms. Externally, metropolitan governance means the constitution of the city-region as a collective actor on global markets and in international governmental relations.

Seeing the city-region as a collective actor with the capacity to coordinate interests and actors and to represent the city externally implies a sense of common purpose rather than internal conflict. This may give the impression of a depoliticized region where there is a strong agreement on governing priorities. This apparent consensus, however, is usually the result of political struggles between interest-based strategizing practices. In Toronto, for example, the role of coalitions such as the Toronto City Summit Alliance, led by the Board of Trade, United Way, and union leaders, in fostering a common identity for the city-region is central. The dominant role of transnational capital within this coalition, created in 2002, is linked with its interest in making Toronto more competitive and amenable to global business. It also symbolizes the development of new strategies to influence the political process. While transnational banks, finance, trade, and multinational corporations have traditionally not been very involved in metropolitan politics in Toronto, preferring lobbying strategies at the national level, there has been a rescaling of their political activities toward metropolitan politics. They have become the most visible leaders of metropolitan governance in Toronto.

This is just one illustration of why it is important to consider both the internal and external aspects of metropolitan governance. The projected unity of a metropolitan area often hides power relations between actors within the metropolitan region. Simultaneously, the new debate on metropolitan governance has to be understood in relation to wider economic and state restructuring processes influenced by neoliberalism. Indeed, metropolitan governance also refers to the increasing importance of city-regions as collective actors in national and international intergovernmental relations.

Traditionally, in many Anglo-Saxon countries, municipal and metropolitan governments were considered service providers more than full-fledged, legitimate governments with legislative and executive powers. Increasingly, however, metropolitan areas play a significant political role on the national and international scenes, thus rebalancing their administrative and political functions. Toronto has become a central player in what has come to be known as the New Deal for Cities and Communities in Canada. This new political agenda gives more powers and monies to municipalities. Without the influence of coalitions such as the Toronto City Summit Alliance and the mayor of Toronto, this new Canadian urban agenda may have been less prominent. It has been pivotal in redefining immigrant settlement policies, infrastructure funding, and day care services. Similarly, metropolitan regions as collective actors are more and more present in international politics, whether through international cooperation programs, free trade agreements, or peace building. For example, the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade has been active in leading an international agenda to give metropolitan areas a more prominent role in conflict resolution programs in countries devastated by war.

But the role of metropolitan governance in broader restructuring processes cannot be described simply as increasingly proactive. City-regions have also suffered the effects of the transformation of the welfare state. In many ways, the new debate on metropolitan governance demonstrates efforts to cope with the consequences of reforms whereby national and subnational levels of government have made local authorities responsible for the provision of social services. These fiscal and administrative forms of decentralization have had serious consequences for the fiscal health of municipalities, as well as the quality of services. The solution has

generally been twofold. In the case of Toronto, for instance, it was decided in 1997 to amalgamate six local municipalities with the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto. The amalgamation included providing more resources to local authorities so that they could absorb the cost of welfare benefits. The second aspect of the solution has been to cut services while outsourcing them to the private sector. Metropolitan governance is not new, but these (upward, downward, and outward) rescaling processes have recast the terms of the debate.

Metropolitan governance has become a constitutive element of state restructuring and neoliberalization processes. The consequences of these metropolitan reforms on the political process are immense. They affect mechanisms of decision making and legitimation, interest-mediation, and policy implementation and evaluation.

Julie-Anne Boudreau

See also Governance; Metropolitan; Metropolitan Region; New Regionalism; Regional Governance

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METROPOLITAN REGION

The notion of metropolitan region refers to a collection of territories considered interdependent,

some located in the central areas and others on the urban fringe. It is also identified with a plan to constitute a coherent territorial structure operating across several spatial scales. Yet, metropolitan territorial coherence is contradicted by the emergence of peripheral spaces, including “edge” and “edgeless” cities, which deny the predominant role of the center. However, the metropolitan region, a territory experienced as a functional construct by some but an abstraction by others, suffers from a lack of political recognition in most countries.

Scholarship in the area of urban studies views the metropolitan region, first and foremost, as the product of a process of an urban area’s expansion. Thus, it is a territorial entity in perpetual reconfiguration with undetermined boundaries and lacking a well-defined political structure. In contrast, it is simpler to define the city, which remains a product of theoreticians and national statistical offices, than the metropolitan region. Nonetheless, metropolitan region refers increasingly to a social entity that calls on a regional identity and sense of belonging to a vaster territory beyond the neighborhood or municipality.

Thinking Metropolitan: The Theoretical Debates

The question of the legitimacy of the metropolitan region is part of a long-standing debate about size. A number of scholars of democracy, from Socrates to the political scientist Robert Dahl, have considered what the ideal size of the polity (in the democratic sense of the term) should be, however, the overwhelming growth of urbanization in the course of the twentieth century has shifted the debate from the size of the polity to that of the city. Discussion now focuses on the minimal population threshold for new urban forms, whether the city in the strict sense, the metropolitan region, or the megalopolis.

Size remains the lowest common denominator when we seek an objective and universal way to define types of urban areas. This is particularly the case for studies comparing metropolitan regions, which attempt to convey the complexity of urbanization. This process is impossible to capture empirically. Recognition of the significance of the metropolis must be found elsewhere; specifically, in the study of relationships among the activities within the metropolitan area. Interdependencies

between the central city and its hinterland lead us to reexamine our understanding of the metropolitan region from a historical perspective and in terms of the current challenges of metropolitanization.

A more fundamental debate exists between two conceptions of metropolitan space, one based on mobility characteristics, with commuting as an indicator of regional structural coherence, and the other focused on the ecology of social areas and, most recently, on the polarization of socially segregated areas. The goal is to describe an expanded urban area with interdependent parts. The theory of ecological expansion that was developed in the wake of the Chicago School’s first publications is drawn on to understand the meaning of the idea of metropolitan community. This refers to a territory composed of a center along with socially differentiated social areas and suburbs that depend on the center. These intrametropolitan territories are connected, notably by daily commuter journeys, but also through residential trajectories following the invasion–succession model. This theory of metropolitan expansion supposes that the urban area grows to the extent that costs and commuting time decrease, on one hand, and households gain increased capacity for residential choice, on the other. It seeks to determine the limits of the metropolis and its structure, defined as the principal axes ensuring interrelations between the center and the periphery.

In this way, the metropolitan region is defined as a space of flows, specifically in terms of the level of commuting between residential areas and central places. The pattern of these flows is a function of the distance to be covered, accessibility to places, and the structure of economic locations. Residential choices are due to personal preferences as much as to cost rationality and travel times. This space of flows might also be structured by social forces that condition relationships between different parts of metropolises. In regional science, the attraction of different activity centers are considered as masses that differentially generate flows, their direction, and their spatial range. Spatial interactions arise from the structure of economic locations and the effect of the attraction of one sector for another as a function of size and distance. These interactions define the region’s edge by indicating where the flows sharply dissipate.

Emerging metropolitan forms have been influenced by the decentralization of commercial activities, manufacturers, and, more recently, high technology. The debate is therefore about the general tendency of the phenomenon of decentralization and concentration of activities and employment in suburban centers. Is the pattern of contemporary metropolis polycentric or dispersed?

The question is whether suburban spaces are dependent or autonomous vis-à-vis the center. The recognition of a polynuclear metropolitan pattern based on the premise of territorial fragmentation and decentralization of urban activities and jobs shifting toward suburban centers—whether edge cities, technoburbs, or technopolises—affects the cohesion of metropolitan space. The dispersal of activities and jobs erases the boundaries of the metropolitan region, leading to the emergence of “edgeless” cities. *Exopolis* has been proposed to signify the end of the center’s domination and of territorial cohesion. From this standpoint, the question of the centralized or multinuclear metropolitan region arises and whether it would not be replaced by a decentered metropolis. Nonetheless, postmodern urbanism claims that the periphery dominates the center and that the metropolitan region lacks precise boundaries. It is a collection of units, disconnected and closed in on themselves.

Postmodern urbanism offers an interpretation of metropolitan morphology based on the phenomena of decentralization and spatial fragmentation. Individual movements, their trajectories through life, and their daily travels are determined by preestablished frames of reference. The trajectories come to life with daily journeys constrained by distance and available modes of transport, yet also reflecting a real capacity for autonomy and freedom. These journeys form bundles or domains where social interactions, governed by rules, ritual, and conflicts, are exercised. From the perspective of time-geography, the metropolitan region is a structure articulated by the trajectories that individuals move through during their everyday lives.

The gravity and ecological models have, each in their own way, influenced the statistical definition of metropolitan regions. For a dozen years, now, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has statistically delineated metropolitan regions and thus produced an institutional architecture as well as public policies on

urban space. Thus, the great majority of member countries (with the exceptions of Korea, Spain, Japan, Mexico, and Turkey, which have no official definition of metropolitan areas) use commuting conditions (with variations in methods of calculation) to assess metropolitan space. However, this interest in the metropolitan scale in most countries is recent. Canada and the United States have had official definitions for almost 60 years, whereas for other countries, such as Spain or Belgium, metropolitan statistics are relatively novel. The absence or presence of a statistical definition reveals the degree of political interest in the notion of metropolitan region and the efforts of recognition at work in different countries.

Thinking Metropolitan: Political Usage

The ambiguity in definition and the transformation of the concept following its political usage are not unique to discussions about the metropolitan region. However, the particularity of the conflict relates to the political nature of the term and has been exacerbated by globalization and the reorganization of the state. The metropolitan region might well be added to the political agenda as an ideal place for enhancing national economic competitiveness. This can be seen especially in the notion of the city-region.

Thus, the term metropolitan region is not politically neutral. It belongs to a body of discourse on the need to harmonize the functional territory (i.e., the metropolitan region) and the political territory. Therefore, it is a question of imposing a convincing definition of the metropolitan region with the goal of legitimizing an extended perimeter in which urban cohesion can exist, renewing our understanding of living together, and fostering public policy. Borders have always been sources of power. This is why the notion of metropolitan region refers back to a territory of interactions. The validity of political boundaries is always implicit. Basically, the political territory and the lived territory should be one and the same.

The transition from theory to politics is revealed in the importance of census taking and the efforts to define the metropolitan region statistically. From the perspective of size, for example, one of the factors pushing the Québec government in the early twentieth century to merge municipalities in

part of the Montréal region was the threat of seeing the Québec metropolis move from its status as the second Canadian metropolis to fourth place in terms of population. Municipal mergers in Ontario in the 1990s allowed for the demographic enlargement of Toronto. Ottawa acted similarly and was poised to become the third-largest municipality in Canada. These concerns also affected the debate on municipal mergers in Montréal.

From a statistical perspective, a number of cases demonstrate how the definition of metropolitan region, even statistically, remains a matter of political controversy. In the United States, defining metropolitan statistical areas is useful for researchers and encourages elected local officials to recognize their membership in a larger entity. The critical importance of current debates in the United States, as elsewhere, bears witness to the political utility of statistically capturing metropolitan regions. For example, Israel's Central Bureau of Statistics does not define metropolitan space in Jerusalem due to political sensitivities unique to that region of the world.

However, the transfer of theory to the political world is strongly criticized around the use of the term *city-region*, which derives from metropolitan region. While the latter seeks to emphasize functional relations uniting cities and their peripheries, it currently refers to the functionality of metropolitan regions as understood in terms of creativity, innovation, and competitiveness of a global economy. This approach reifies metropolitan regions as key actors in a nation's economic health to the detriment of poorer areas of a country. The redistributive role of the state in building territorial equity is neglected. The attempt of political authorities to establish objective criteria for city-regions is suspect, particularly in Great Britain but also elsewhere in the world. If the pedagogical merits of the metropolitan region are expressed with the goal of preventing local officials from turning their backs on the central city, the search for legitimacy at the metropolitan level instead benefits certain metropolitan regions to the detriment of less favored territories. The metropolitan region is a contentious notion.

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See also Chicago School of Urban Sociology; Edge City; Exopolis; Journey to Work; Los Angeles School of Urban Studies; Metropolitan Governance; New Regionalism; Urban Geography; Urban Politics

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MEXICO CITY, MEXICO

Mexico City is the capital of the United States of Mexico; it is the country's largest urban center, the largest city in Latin America, and the third-largest megacity in the world. Mexico City generally refers to the whole metropolitan area, which not only covers the Federal District (*Distrito Federal*, or D.F.), but also parts of the states of Mexico and Hidalgo. At the beginning of this century, its metropolitan area stretched over an area of 5,122.86 square kilometers (about 2,000 square miles), of which the Federal District accounted for 28.6 percent, and in 2005, Mexico City had a population of 19,331,365, equivalent to almost 20 percent of the national population. The city sits at an altitude of approximately 2,250 meters and is located within a closed basin, which has resulted in a number of ongoing environmental challenges, particularly relating to water and pollution management.

Mexico City is a vibrant, modern city with a rich heritage, yet it is also one of stark contrasts, with

opulent districts to the south and west of the city standing in stark contrast to the vast tracts of poverty concentrated toward the north and east, where many settlements lack even basic services. The larger of these municipalities, such as Nezahualcoyotl, have populations of a similar size to many important cities in Mexico. Today, while outlying areas of the city continue to grow, the central areas have been steadily losing population. In fact, the Population Council (*Consejo de la Poblacion*, Conapo) insists that the city has become a net population exporter. While throughout its history the city has traditionally been a symbol of the centralization of power, in recent years, decentralization policies have gone some way to reducing the country's heavy economic and political reliance on the capital city, and much heavy industry has been relocated, signifying a major shift in the city's economy toward the service and financial sectors.

History of the City

The ancient city of Tenochtitlan was founded by the Aztecs in AD 1325, and despite being built on a small flood-prone island, within a few centuries, it would become the capital of the powerful Aztec empire and the political, economic, and religious center of Mesoamerica. When the Spanish arrived in 1519, they found a thriving city at the center of what was at that time probably the largest and most densely populated urban area in the world. The Spanish conquest of the city in 1521 left much of Tenochtitlan destroyed, and on these ruins, the Spanish chose to build the capital of the viceroyalty of New Spain. In 1524, the municipality of Mexico City was established, known as *México Tenustitlán*, and officially known as *Ciudad de México* from 1585. The city soon became the most important in the Americas. Gradually, the dried lake bed was built on, such that by the seventeenth century, the city was a substantial agglomeration of houses, public buildings, and churches.

Mexico gained independence from Spain in 1821, after an 11-year civil war, and in 1824, the nation became a federal republic. In the 1840s, the capital was invaded and occupied by U.S. troops, which culminated in Mexico being obliged to cede a large amount of its northern territory to the United States. From 1865 to 1867, Emperor Maximilian I headed a brief monarchy, after which

the 35-year dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz saw (on the positive side) significant improvements to the infrastructure and left a notably French mark on the architecture of the city. Popular discontent with Diaz led to the Mexican Revolution, which began in 1910. The postrevolutionary government prioritized the capital as the core of the country, and particularly from the 1940s onward, the city began to stabilize and prosper.

In 1968, Mexico City hosted the Olympic Games, which left some lasting positive legacies for the city, such as the metro system. However, the event was marred by the massacre of hundreds of students a few days before the games began, following months of political unrest and protests.

On September 19, 1985, an earthquake measuring 8.1 on the Richter scale devastated the city, leaving between 10,000 and 30,000 people dead and 50,000 to 90,000 homeless and causing untold physical damage: In three minutes, 100,000 homes were destroyed, and \$4 billion of damage was caused. A strong aftershock measuring 7.5 struck 36 hours later causing further damage and widespread panic. As a result of the quake, and the fact that buildings such as the Torre Latinoamericana (which had in-built technology to withstand tremors) survived the earthquake, seismic technologies, particularly for large constructions, have since been prioritized (the Torre Mayor, for example, is built to withstand an 8.5 earthquake). In addition, there is now an early warning system in place, which sends alerts to Mexico City via sensors in the coastal subduction zone off the coast of Guerrero State.

Geography and Environment

The city is located within central Mexico on an ancient lake bed in a basin measuring about 9,600 square kilometers, surrounded by mountains. In 2005, the Metropolitan Zone of Mexico City (*Zona Metropolitana de la Ciudad de México*) was formally established as constituting the 16 delegations of the Federal District, plus 40 municipalities from Mexico state and one from Hidalgo state. The traditional center of the city is the *Zocalo*, or main square, now officially called the *Plaza de la Constitución*, housing the Metropolitan Cathedral and the National Palace, which is built on the ruins of the ancient Aztec emperor's palace.

The Conservation Zone

Peripheral urbanization is placing extreme pressure on the immediate environment of the city and even jeopardizes its sustainable future growth. Although peripheral expansion of the city is numerically greatest in the northern and eastern regions of the metropolitan area, expansion to the south of the city has particularly significant environmental impacts. There is a large conservation area to the south of the Federal District, which is a vital environmental resource for a city so burdened with environmental problems, but which is threatened by illegal settlement. It has been estimated that between 1967 and 1995, urban sprawl in the southern periphery of the metropolitan area grew from 1,427 hectares to 11,896 hectares, which has implied a loss of 10,469 hectares of conservation land. This is in spite of government programs established to protect the conservation zone.

During the early twentieth century, the wealthy elite began gradually to move from the center toward the southern and western zones of the city, a process that continued throughout the century.

The island location of the original city meant that its expansion had depended on the Aztecs creating artificial land masses traversed by a system of canals. While the expansion of the city under such difficult conditions led to the development of very advanced water treatment and sanitation systems, a range of environmental difficulties inherent to the relatively inhospitable terrain have plagued the city as it has developed and grown. The decimation of the city of Tenochtitlan by the Spanish included the destruction of much of the original infrastructure, which had been designed to prevent flooding. From the colonial period onward, poor land management and consequent frequent flooding, together with demands for expansion, made it necessary to gradually drain the basin, such that present-day Mexico City is built on top of much of the ancient lake bed.

The construction of a deep drainage system and the drying out of the ancient lake beds meant that the subsoil, which had been strengthened by groundwater, became too weak to support the city above it, and between 1910 and 1987, the city center sank by about nine meters. The weakness also proved catastrophic during the earthquake of 1985. In addition, a lack of water continues to present a major problem for the city.

Another serious environmental concern is air pollution, whereby geographic and climatic factors hamper the dispersion of high levels of industrial and vehicle pollution. Yet, a reduction in heavy industry in Mexico City in recent years (itself in

fact partly a result of government incentives to relocate away from the city), together with local and federal government action to reduce levels of pollution, have certainly had some effect.

Urban Planning and Administration

At the beginning of the 1970s, a shift toward metropolitan expansion emerged as a new form of urban growth in Mexico, which particularly affected Mexico City. There was a massive rural–urban migration flow, with about 3 million migrants moving to Mexico City in the 1960s. This translated into an annual growth rate of 5.7 percent, which was an historic high at this time.

As the city has grown, it has absorbed many old towns within its limits, particularly in the postrevolution period from the 1920s. This process continues to the present day, with more outlying towns becoming absorbed into the sprawl of the city. These ancient centers serve to provide the surrounding population with an alternative to the city center, in terms of supplying services, affordable goods, and informal employment opportunities. Thus, the growth of the city has been decentralized to some extent, which has reduced the population's reliance on the city center, making the city more efficient in meeting people's basic needs. Indeed, toward the end of the 1970s, support and development of these alternative centers became an intentional part of urban planning. Among the middle classes, this has meant that the city center—once the preferred shopping district—is losing out to an increasing number of suburban shopping centers, further challenging the relevance of the city center.

Santa Fe

The modernizing ambitions of the controversial President Salinas (1988–1994) are nowhere more evident than in the ostentatious Santa Fe financial development, located away from the center in the west of the city. Planned during his presidency and during a time of great economic optimism in Mexico, it was to be a world-class, ultra-modern business, residential, and commercial district. Although the economic crisis of the mid-1990s put plans on hold, the development was revived in 2000, and today it hosts many major multinational corporations including Nokia, Sony, General Electric, and the Ford Motor Company, along with key Mexican companies such as Televisa and Grupo Bimbo and three universities and colleges. However, it has been a controversial development from the outset and has arguably fallen short of expectations. Its location has meant displacement and disruption for the low-income population of Pueblo de Santa Fe, particularly those who lived near and around the rubbish dump on which the new development was constructed: This poor community has been totally dispossessed. Furthermore, in terms of the development itself, it has been criticized for being extremely car-centric, yet lacking sufficient access roads, as being both isolated and isolating by design, and as lacking commercial success.

Despite positive aspects of this growth in terms of localized urban management, the fact that the city has now spread over three different states means that it has been increasingly difficult to manage and plan a city so administratively divided. Moreover, systematic urban planning was nonexistent until the 1970s, with restrictions on urban growth and land use determination being dictated by individual policies or politicians. Since then, plans for national urban development have largely been concerned with decentralization and the creation of development poles away from Mexico City. Despite continuing administrative challenges, developments in urban planning over this period have been largely positive in terms of decentralization, a plurality of political parties, and governments willing to experiment. This in fact has been reflected by national government policy, such as the decentralist New Federalism introduced by the Zedillo government (1994–2000), which has given greater autonomy to individual states.

At a national level, perhaps the most important political change in recent years in Mexico has been the ousting of the long-ruling PRI in the presidential elections of 2000, which was the culmination of a series of state-level victories for rival parties since 1989. In terms of the political administration of Mexico City, a hugely significant development was the reform in 1997 of the anomalous law that allowed the residing government to choose the governor of Mexico City, rather than its people as was the case in other Mexican cities. Since they

were given the right to vote for their governor, the people of Mexico City have elected the left-wing PRD party in every election. As of 2000, each of the delegations in Mexico City is headed by an elected representative. While still nascent, it can be said that a more pluralistic democratic political system both in Mexico City and the country as a whole has developed in recent years.

Economy

Despite the emergence of regional economic hubs, Mexico City remains the country's most economically important center and the wealthiest urban agglomeration in Latin America. Today, the city relies less on traditional industry and more on the service and commercial sectors, accounting for about 45 percent of the country's commercial activity. Financial services are also concentrated here, with all the main banks, the country's stock exchange, and the central bank, the Bank of Mexico, all being located in the city. At the beginning of the 1980s, the city absorbed more than a fifth of national labor power.

An import substitution industrialization strategy was implemented in Mexico in the 1940s, creating conditions of stability and prosperity that made Mexico City the most important industrial center in the country. In the second half of the twentieth century, heavy industry began to be relocated away from the city, although some plants still remain in the northern district. The most important industries

are chemicals, plastics, cement, and textiles, although light industry is becoming increasingly important.

Although over recent decades Mexico (and particularly Mexico City) has been hit by a series of economic crises, not least the devaluation of the peso and subsequent financial-sector crisis in 1994 to 1995, the economy has proved surprisingly resilient and has continued to grow.

In Mexico, the informal sector accounted for 12.1 percent of GDP in 2006. An estimated 11.5 million people work in this sector, which is equivalent to 27.2 percent of the country's economically active population. This parallel economy takes place in public space, through the sale of goods and services, and has become a dynamic and essential practice among the most disadvantaged sections of the population and an alternative supply system for the general population. Thousands of products and services are offered both in a flexible (such as mobile vendors, street markets, car washing) and fixed (such as eateries) way. Although local and municipal authorities are responsible for regulating this activity through issuing permits to street vendors and receiving associated levies, this has led to some degree of collusion between the authorities and vendor representatives, who then exert pressure on the authorities to allow commerce in the most lucrative sites. Whether this sector is seen as one of entrepreneurial flair or pure necessity, it supplies a huge demand among the low-income population of Mexico City for low-cost goods.

Population

Demographic change in twentieth-century Mexico City can be divided into three main periods. From 1900 to 1940, the city was recovering from the upheavals of the revolution and trying to modernize and establish a firm base for economic growth and lasting social peace. From 1940 to 1970, the city experienced a phenomenal growth rate, due largely to economic and industrial expansion, with growth rates in each decade exceeding 5 percent. As such, the population of the metropolitan area grew from 1,644,921 in 1940, to 8,623,157 in 1970. The maximum population concentration was reached in 1980, when 19.4 percent of all Mexicans lived in the capital. This figure has slowly reduced to 18.8 percent in 1990 and to 18.4 percent in 2000.

After a decade of transition in the 1970s when the birthrate began to fall (the last phase of the demographic transition) and migration began to reverse, the final two decades of the twentieth century saw a reduction in population growth to near natural levels. In the 1980s, the city's growth rate at 1.67 percent fell below the national rate of 2.02 percent. It has remained below the national level ever since, marking the start of demographic stabilization.

An interesting aspect of migration to Mexico City is that throughout the twentieth century, it was predominantly women who moved to the city, suggesting improved job prospects for women in the capital compared to other regions. This leveled off slightly in the 1990s, perhaps due to increased demand for female labor in the *maquilas* in the north of the country.

Overall rates of human development in Mexico are relatively high, with a global human Development Index (HDI) ranking of 57, which classifies it as a country with high human development. Nevertheless, there are significant subnational and subregional differences and inequalities. There are marked differences in poverty between urban and rural areas. For example, the urban population unable to meet the basic food needs of their family stood at 11.4 percent in 2002, compared to 38.4 percent of the rural population. Indeed, Mexico City, despite its vast inequalities, has on average the highest HDI of all regions of the country, highest average incomes, highest levels of gender equity, and unsurprisingly also scores highest in the education and health indices. Furthermore, the delegation of Benito Juárez in the Federal District has the highest HDI of any municipality in Mexico (0.91); if it were to be compared to national HDIs, it would be similar to Italy or Hong Kong. The lowest HDI is in Metlatónoc, Guerrero State (0.38), a similar level of development to Malawi or Angola. There are also marked differences within the metropolitan zone. Financial crisis and structural adjustment policies during the 1980s led to a decrease in earnings among the poor and an increase in extreme poverty: The proportion of the population considered to be in extreme poverty as a proportion of the total poor population increased from 37.1 percent in 1984 to 53.9 percent in 1992, which even then was still lower than the national average of 66 percent in 1992.

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See also City Planning; Deindustrialization; Globalization; Growth Management; Metropolitan Governance; Social Exclusion; Sprawl; Sustainable Development; Urban Planning

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within the incorporated area of the city, Moscow is one of the ten most populous cities of the world and the most populous city in Europe. It is one of the two (with St. Petersburg) "cities of federal importance," cities that are separate subjects of Russian Federation; it is administratively separate from the Moscow Region (*Oblast'*). The history of Moscow spans more than eight centuries of growth from a tiny trade settlement to the capital of a world superpower throughout much of the twentieth century. At one time an iconic socialist city, on the verge of the third millennium, Moscow is still going through rapid transformation.

Moscow Before 1917

The region of Moscow was inhabited at least since Neolithic times. In the eleventh century, the region was populated by several Slavic ethnic groups, prominently *Viaticchi* and *Krivichi*. The first record of Moscow (as *Moscov*) in church chronicles is dated 1174. *Moscov* was mentioned as an outpost in the domain of Suzdal Prince Yuri Dolgoruki, who is popularly held to be the founder of the city. However, archaeological research shows that a small fortified settlement already existed at the inflow of the Neglinnaya River into the Moskva River. It specialized in trade and handicrafts and enjoyed merchant connections extending at least as far as Kiev (at that time the center of *Kyivan Rus*).

The political position of the Moscow Principality strengthened during the thirteenth through fifteenth centuries. By the fourteenth century, Moscow emerged as the center of the Grand Duchy (*Knyazhestvo*) of Moscow. In the late fifteenth century, Moscow became the capital of the centralized Russian state. Its symbolic status was crystallized under the reign of Tsar Ivan the Terrible (1547–1584), the first tsar of the Tsardom of Russia. In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, three fortification lines were constructed, the *Kitai-Gorod* (Trade City, the ancient territory of Moscow), the *Belyi Gorod* (White City, named after the white plastering of intricate fortifications roughly corresponding to contemporary Boulevard Ring roads), and the *Zemlyanoi Gorod* (Earth City, an earthen rampart that later became the Garden Ring roads). These fortifications essentially created the Moscow center region and its structure as we know it today.

MOSCOW, RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Moscow is the capital of the Russian Federation. With more than 10 million inhabitants living

Despite the decision of Tsar Peter I the Great to move the capital to the newly established Saint Petersburg in 1712, Moscow retained its importance and continued its growth. A modern education system started to focus on Moscow in the late seventeenth century. In 1755, the Decree of Empress Elizabeth established Moscow State University. In 1812, when Napoleon's army entered the city, Moscow suffered a devastating fire. French forces held Moscow for less than 40 days and were routed to leave the smoldering ruin of city buildings that had been mostly wooden. Moscow was swiftly rebuilt, and the fire opened the way for the first massively implemented urban planning effort.

The Scotsman William Hastie developed the first postfire plan in 1813, but it was rejected and a more feasible project plan was approved in 1817, written by the Commission for the Construction of Moscow led by famed architect Osip Bove. The plan was largely implemented under Moscow Governor-General Fyodor Rostopchin. Landmark developments included dismantling the obsolete Earth City and White City fortifications as well as many other defensive structures and constructing several prominent buildings such as the *Manezh* (Riding Arena) near the Kremlin.

Socialist Moscow

By the end of the nineteenth century, Moscow converted from a center for nobility and merchants to a capitalist manufacturing city specializing in light industry, prominently textiles and machinery. It was the key locus of revolutionary events during 1905 liberal revolution and during the 1917 socialist revolution that created the Soviet Union.

After the October revolution, the country was torn by civil war. Threats of foreign interventions led to returning the capital to Moscow in 1918. Yet, the newly installed Soviet authorities took seriously the question of urban planning in Moscow. The city was to become the capital of new communist world. Throughout the twentieth century, the governance of Moscow, formally in the hands of Moscow Soviets, was directly controlled by the party; its general secretaries personally approved major planning decisions.

Early Soviet planning was heavily influenced by European utopian thinking, notably by Ebenezer Howard's garden cities. Moscow's symbolic landscape was massively altered by eradicating all

references to monarchy, religion, and capitalism in street names and architectural landmarks. Nevertheless, limited conservation efforts prevented the proposed destruction of several landmarks (notably churches of the Kremlin complex).

The new economic policy of the twenties prompted a quick boom of Moscow's population. At this time, modernism and constructivism became important trends in architecture and planning, fused with communist ideology. A lasting modernist imprint on Moscow is the *Tsentrosoyuz* building (1929–1936), designed by Le Corbusier.

Gradual abandonment of the new economic policy and setting on the course of industrialization and collectivization in late 1920s brought new planning policy for Moscow. The building that then dominated the Moscow skyline, the Cathedral of Christ the Savior on Sparrow (Lenin) Hills, was blown up in 1931. It was to be replaced with a monumental Palace of Soviets, but that was never completed beyond a foundation pit; in 1960, that pit became a heated open-air swimming pool. Several other landmarks were also destroyed.

In 1935, the Central Committee of the Communist Party adopted the new master plan of Moscow. The construction of a subway (*Metropoliten*, or *Metro*) commenced in 1931, and in 1935, the first line was opened. Metro was the symbol of Soviet achievements and a project for the entire country. Despite the close approach of German forces in 1941 and 1942, Moscow was not occupied, and, thanks to an advanced air defense, it suffered relatively little direct damage.

Among notable postwar developments are seven high-rise buildings (the *Vysotkas*, including the Moscow University main building at Sparrow Hills), designed in "Stalin classicism" style and vaguely reminiscent of the Empire State Building. All commenced in 1947 to celebrate the 800th anniversary of the city; they were to establish the new urban skyline.

However, behind the apparent progress, there was an immense dualism: Showcase projects were grossly incapable of improving living conditions of the majority of population. Many residents (principally workers at the new factories) inhabited wooden bunkhouses and barracks, suffering from overpopulation and lack of sanitation. Under Secretary Nikita Khrushchev, a massive housing construction program was launched. The *khrushchevskas*, cheap standardized concrete panel housing

(with a projected service life of 25 to 30 years), brought long-awaited relief to bunkhouse dwellers throughout the Soviet Union. In Moscow they constituted the bulk of residential units built in between 1960 and 1985. A typical two-room single-family flat had 45 square meters. For many people, this was a significant improvement in living conditions. Other important developments include the *MKAD*. Constructed in 1961, the outer circular highway has formally designated the administrative boundary of Moscow.

A new 20-year master plan was adopted in 1971 under Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to incorporate a target population of 8 million (with about 7 million in 1970) and with a goal of improving living conditions, particularly living space per capita, removing dirty industry, and implementing stricter zoning policies. In 1980, Moscow hosted the Summer Olympics, and the Moscow Soviet executed a redevelopment program. Events of the late 1980s made the master plan for the most part impracticable, and Olympic construction essentially remained the last Moscow reconstruction before 1991.

Soviet Moscow endured the radical sweeping away of the old social and cultural fabric of the city and an immense population increase. State-led development and forced imposition of artificially created symbolic landscape were coupled with destruction of old local communities, including the erasure of whole districts of the old city. Formation of new localities was strongly discouraged in favor of allegiance to the Communist Party. Nevertheless, the core of old Moscow as well as the radial pattern of development survived and, in 1991, entered the new epoch.

Moscow After Socialism

Moscow was the locus of many events surrounding the fall of the Soviet Union and the beginning of post-Soviet Russia. The current system of Moscow governance came into being in 1993. The legislative branch is the elected Moscow *Duma* (parliament). The Moscow government is the executive branch. Since 2004, the mayor of Moscow is no longer elected but nominated by the president of the Russian Federation for appointment by the Moscow Duma. Following the short tenure (1991–1992) of Gavriil Kh. Popov, Yuri M. Luzhkov was appointed the city mayor in 1992 and still held the post in 2009. The present city consists of ten

wards (*Administrativnye Okruga*, AO). Each is divided into several districts (*Rayons*). In 1991, Zelenograd, a city of 200,000 people established in between 1958 and 1962 as a center of microelectronic research and industry, was incorporated into Moscow as the 10th *Okrug*, becoming an exclave.

In the 1990s, the profile of Moscow has drastically shifted. Widespread industrial decline coincided with booming growth of the service economy, particularly financial and business services linked to Russia's natural resource exports. A showcase development is the Moscow City, a cluster of state-of-the-art skyscrapers in the center of Moscow near the White House. It is planned to become one of the largest business centers in the world. While employment and wages in science and high technology industry plummeted in the 1990s, higher education swelled, with hundreds of establishments providing education in newly popular professions such as economics, law, and finance.

Acute polarization in lifestyle and income between Moscow and the rest of Russia and abolishment of official residence restrictions (replaced by a semilegal registration system) led to further population increases. Official statistics indicate that, between 1990 and 2006, the population grew from slightly less than 9 million to 10.5 million people. Moscow traditionally was home to significant populations of ethnic Belarusians, Ukrainians, and Jews as well as Armenians, Georgians, and many other ethnic groups. The recent inflow of guest workers of non-Slavic origin (including migrants from ethnic regions of Russia and from ex-Soviet countries of Central Asia) has increased ethnic diversity and led to growing tension and recent outbreaks of hate crimes and ethnic violence. It is likely that ethnic enclaves will eventually form on the fringes of the city. However, no reliable data are available on the real size of newly immigrant population and its ethnic constitution. According to some estimates, the metropolis may actually house more than 14 million people.

A number of terrorist acts occurred between 1999 and 2004 (notably the Chechen separatist fighters taking hostages in a theater in 2000). These added to the usual list of security threats such as crime, ethnic violence, and civil unrest. Security measures were tightened in response, to the extent that in the late 2000s, special police forces were routinely deployed for patrolling important public places, subway, and transportation hubs.

Tripling of the Moscow population and incorporation of a very large territory into the city radius between 1930 and 1990 led to the continuation of a radial–concentric pattern of development coupled with incoherence of landscape and structure of the city districts. The established central city region inside the three- to five-kilometer (about two- to three-mile) radius from the Kremlin (the old Earth City radius and its surroundings populated in the eighteenth century) with its dense symbolic pattern became the meeting point of radial developments along major traffic ways. The outer central radius became crystallized in the late 1990s to early 2000s with the construction of the Third Circular Road. The area between the fringes of the central city and the MKAD was mostly built up throughout the twentieth century in a patchy pattern of planned districts and zones interspersed with stripes of marginal and sparsely developed land outside planned areas. In recent years, the differences in regulation and taxation between Moscow and the Moscow region led to proliferation of large trade complexes just outside the administrative boundaries. These include several large malls (frequently housing international retail chain outlets such as IKEA and Auchan). A new stage of housing construction put modern flat complexes in place of dilapidated *khrushchevkas*. However, real estate inside MKAD is often bought for investment and left uninhabited while displaced residents are forced to move to newly incorporated areas outside MKAD with insufficient transport connections and lack of amenities.

Moscow houses nine major railroad terminals, three international airports, and a domestic airport. The railroad carries relatively few daily intracity passengers, and mostly serves commuters from the Moscow region. Mass transit services in Moscow are predominantly publicly owned and include streetcars, buses, and trolleybuses (although several private companies offer bus services to complement regular routes). The cornerstone of Moscow mass transit is the subway. Currently transporting up to 9 million passengers per day, the subway since its inception has been the focal point of transport planning. Gradually, mass transit became geared to transporting passengers to the nearest subway station. Traffic jams skyrocketed after 2000 because of growing private car ownership and lack of planning for car traffic, virtually stalling all mass transit services except the subway.

Separation of Moscow and the rest of Russia grew throughout Soviet times and, owing to polarization of living standards and to the popular perception of Moscow as a culturally separate (globalized) place, continued after 1991. It was given further impetus with the recent strengthening of governmental vertical power. The city is separated internally, as well, with the historic center being symbolically in opposition to the greater part of Moscow territory; this indicates a Russian-doll reproduction of center–periphery patterns of spatial organization on different levels of Russian society.

Postsocialist Moscow, Global Moscow, Capitalist Moscow?

The rapid decline of traditional industry and expansion of business services, the retail economy, and education in the 1990s and 2000s was not followed by the rise of a real information economy. Quantitative expansion of education services was accompanied by a drastic reduction in their quality. While state power was in decline in 1990, the urban governance system under the all-powerful mayor crystallized in a machine-type coalition of business, administration, and shadow economy. In the 2000s, state power returned to manifest itself in ever-present policing of urban space and shrinking of public political freedoms. The real estate market suffers from lack of stable legal practices and the prevalence of shadow and criminal activities as well as the failure of the mortgage system. Paralysis of the overburdened transportation system leads to an increase in everyday stress for ordinary inhabitants of the city. The reverse side of boomtown increasingly reveals itself as a playground of negative consequences of the postsocialist transition and urban globalization processes.

Moscow is capable of both impressing and confusing an urban researcher. Foundations of the current spatial structure of the radial city were laid in the very beginning of Moscow's history. This structure has been repeated and consolidated ever since. Radial expansion from the central trading district toward the outer residential areas, coupled with the absence of major natural obstacles, tempts one to see the classical Chicago concentric model virtually imprinted into the rings and radii of Moscow landscapes. Yet Moscow defies traditional models and concepts such as the all too widespread labels of global, world, capitalist, or

post-socialist. Their hasty application to Moscow reveals their weaknesses and limitations.

Overpopulation, traffic collapse, growing ethnic and civil tensions, precarious management and governance, mounting pollution, and ecological strain—these are only some challenges that Moscow has for its citizens and authorities. Before 1991, Moscow was one of the key sites of the great socialist experiment. After 1991, it underwent an experiment in forced construction of capitalism. In the coming years, it will likely remain an immense laboratory where important processes and pressing urban problems could be observed in their ongoing development. Hence, it will also be of lasting interest to urban research.

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See also Global City; Subway; Tenement; Urban Planning

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MOSES, ROBERT

Robert Moses (1888–1981) was one of the most influential figures involved in the planning and construction of urban infrastructure in the twentieth century. He has been both celebrated for his accomplishments—the completion of public works on a scale unrivaled by any other public official in

American history—and sometimes vilified for the manner in which he achieved them. Most notably, among the projects that he oversaw were three enormous initiatives that changed the face of New York City: an extensive metropolitan network of highways and bridges that adapted the nation’s largest city to the automobile age; dozens of public housing and urban renewal projects throughout the city; and new parks and recreational facilities in all five boroughs, including numerous public swimming pools, playgrounds, and the fairgrounds in Queens used for two world’s fairs. Over his 50-year career as a public official, he earned a national reputation, such that he and his staff were sought after as consultants and expert advisers by many other cities across the United States.

Moses was not an architect or an engineer, nor was he formally trained as an urban planner, and all of his projects were designed and planned by others, but he is nevertheless widely regarded as the single individual most responsible for the shaping of modern New York City. This was a result of his remarkable ability to gather power, take advantage of ever-changing funding streams, and cut through bureaucratic red tape to complete public works projects that others could only imagine.

Early Years

Born in 1888 in New Haven as the son of a department store owner, Moses had a comfortable middle-class upbringing. When he was nine years old, his family moved to Manhattan, where he attended private school before returning to New Haven to attend Yale as a 16-year-old in 1905. When he graduated in 1909, he was one of only five Jews in his class. An avid reader and reportedly brilliant student, he continued his education, first at Oxford and then at Columbia University, where he was awarded a PhD in political science in 1914. In England and New York, Moses investigated the inner workings of public bureaucracies, writing a dissertation on *The Civil Service of Great Britain*, while also completing a detailed assessment of New York City’s civil service system for the Municipal Research Bureau, a nonprofit reform organization. This work led to a job in the administration of incoming New York Governor Al Smith in 1919, the first of the dozens of appointed positions in state and local government that Moses eventually held.

His civil service reform efforts failed to achieve any notable results. Governor Smith recognized Moses talents, however, and after reelection in 1922 made him a key member of the administration. At this point, Moses first got involved with large-scale public works. Smith relied on Moses' expert knowledge of government bureaucracies to loosen the rusty cogs of government and produce a visible and tangible record of accomplishment, starting with parks projects. Moses used his arcane expertise to draft legislation creating two new agencies, the Long Island State Park Commission and the State Council of Parks. Smith's electoral mandate ensured passage, and Moses was installed as chair of both entities. As he would do often over the course of his career, Moses paid careful attention to all the details of the enabling statutes to assure that these new agencies would be as flexible, durable, and powerful as possible.

Moses first big public works project was Jones Beach State Park, a brand-new public recreational facility, which opened to the public in 1930. As head of the Long Island State Park Commission, he used state funds to convert swampy, sparsely settled, and inaccessible dunes on the south shore of Long Island into elaborate bathhouses, fountains, monuments, and long pristine stretches of sandy beach, laced with landscaped paths and served by acres of new parking lots.

At the same time, to provide public access to the remotely located facility, Moses began work on a network of parkways spanning Long Island. The first of these were the Southern State Parkway (1927), the Wantagh State Parkway (1929), Ocean Parkway (1930), the beginnings of the Northern State Parkway (1930), and the Meadowbrook State Parkway (1934). These parkways, which earned Moses nationwide acclaim, were the product of his blend of ambition and pragmatism. They were *parkways* because he had not been put in charge of highways or roads, which were tightly controlled by the engineers at the State Highway Department and the federal Bureau of Public Roads. Instead, he had carefully written his commission's enabling statute to include the authority to build paths and access roads within parks. So, to build motorways throughout Long Island, he created ribbonlike parks with landscaped roads within them (i.e., parkways).

The idea was first demonstrated in nearby Westchester County, where the first modern

American parkway, the Bronx River Parkway, had opened to great acclaim and public accolades in 1924. Heralded as a harbinger of a future where automobiles would enable the urban masses to drive through the countryside and escape the overcrowded city, the Bronx River Parkway invited duplication. Moses quickly stepped in, not only because he recognized the transformative social force of such transportation corridors, but also because he recognized that this type of project would garner the public and political support that civil service reform never had. In a pattern repeated often in his career, Moses adapted his activities to available funding streams, even while borrowing state-of-the-art planning and design ideas, like the modern parkway, that had been innovated or advanced by others.

As an opportunistic builder of public works, Moses was in the right place at the right time, partially by design but also somewhat by random chance. The unprecedented public spending initiatives of the New Deal coincided with the success of his first parks and parkway projects. His new reputation as a man who could get things done could not have come at a better time.

New York and the New Deal

In 1933, he was put in charge of New York's Emergency Public Works Commission and in 1934 incoming Mayor Fiorello La Guardia appointed him City Parks Commissioner. In these new roles, Moses used federal work-relief grants, alongside state and city park funds, to go on a massive city-wide building spree: public swimming pools, new sports and recreation fields, and hundreds of new playgrounds throughout the five boroughs. He extended the network of Long Island parkways, completing the Interborough Parkway (now known as the Jackie Robinson Parkway) in 1934, the Grand Central Parkway in 1936, and both the Belt Parkway and the Long Island Expressway in 1940.

Furthermore, his highway-building activities were no longer limited to Long Island. In Manhattan, he oversaw the completion of the last stages of the West Side Highway and spearheaded the West Side Improvement Project. This latter project included an extensive relandscaping of Riverside Park as well as the construction of the Henry Hudson Parkway, which upon its completion in 1937 extended along

the Hudson River waterfront for seven miles before weaving through the Bronx to the city line. In suburban Westchester County, he helped to supervise the Saw Mill Parkway in 1935 and the Hutchinson River Parkway in 1941. To knit all of these routes together, Moses oversaw a number of crucial bridge projects, including the Triborough Bridge and the Henry Hudson Memorial Bridge, both of which opened in 1936, and the Bronx-Whitestone Bridge, which he brought to completion in 1939.

Moses drew extensively on New Deal grants and available state funds, and on many of these projects, he also installed toll booths to bring in additional money. This enabled him to borrow against these revenues, either to complete underfunded projects or to fund subsequent initiatives. The biggest such revenue generator, by far, was the Triborough Bridge, the keystone of Moses' growing empire. Moses was able to use the toll revenues from the Triborough Bridge Authority, combined with the revenue streams flowing into his other bridge and parkway authorities, to continue building even after the end of the Depression-era work-relief programs. This strategy, using public benefit corporations to build and perpetuate his power, was—like his earlier emulation of the innovations of the Bronx River Parkway—modeled after the Port of New York Authority run by Austin Tobin, which had established precedents that Moses would adapt to his own purposes. Similarly, the Triborough Bridge itself had also been conceived, initiated, and approved by others before Moses completed the job. Construction had proceeded haltingly and had finally stopped altogether at the onset of the Depression, but Moses' opportunistic administrative and resource-gathering skills rescued the endeavor.

A few years later, Moses expanded his reach even further. When the NYC Tunnel Authority ran out of money part way through the construction of the Queens-Midtown Tunnel in 1938, he rescued the project, completed it by 1940, and took over the controlling agency, eventually merging it with Triborough to form the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, his main base of operations for the next quarter century.

Moses' Depression-era reach extended well beyond parks and parkways. In 1936, because of his proven track record of successfully pushing projects through to completion, Mayor LaGuardia

put him in charge of the newly created New York City World's Fair Commission. To prepare for the fair, which would be held in 1939, Moses oversaw the construction of the Flushing Meadows Park on a waterfront site in Queens formerly occupied by ash dumps. In addition, he supervised the construction of new access highways and parking lots and the erection of the exhibit buildings—including GM's famous Futurama and the iconic Perisphere building, which housed the Democracy display, both of which presented fairgoers with visions of cities of the future not unlike the one Moses was trying to build for New York, far-flung and expansive, yet held together by a web of highways and bridges. In Moses' vision, and in the World's Fair exhibits, there was an underlying assumption that everyone would be dependent on private automobiles for transportation.

Postwar Power

After the end of World War II, Americans did, in fact, increasingly turn to automobiles for routine transportation, not just for recreational excursions. As a consequence, toll revenues steadily increased on Moses' bridges and parkways, fueling the growth, stability, and reach of his empire. For certain, he was no longer dependent on park funds, as he had been when he started. So, his highways no longer emphasized the carefully landscaped borders and medians of his earlier *parkways*, instead becoming more like *expressways*—less scenic, wider, and more efficient. After 1956, when federal interstate highway grants began to flow freely, Moses abandoned parkway design aesthetic entirely.

This gradual transition can be seen by comparing his earlier parkways to the highway projects he worked on in the postwar era, including the Van Wyck Expressway (1950), the Sprain Brook Parkway (1953), the Prospect Expressway (1955), the Major Deegan Expressway (1956–1961), the New England Thruway (1958), the Cross Bronx Expressway (1963), the Whitestone Expressway (1963), and the Staten Island Expressway (1964). His overall approach did not change, however, and even while the design of his highway projects shifted to adapt to the constraints and objectives of state and federal grant programs, he nevertheless continued to expand his own independent revenue base by building toll bridges, including the Throgs

Neck Bridge (1961) and the Verrazano Narrows Bridge (1962).

With steadily growing funding from toll collections, Moses became less and less dependent on the political support of mayors and governors. In fact, they soon became dependent on him and his stellar public works record, his flush bank accounts, and his easy access to the capital markets that arose from the ever-growing stream of toll revenues. Furthermore, they discovered that they could not control him. His various official positions were for staggered, overlapping, or even perpetual terms, and he was in charge of so many different agencies that he had made himself indispensable. In fact, his list of positions actually lengthened as politicians continued to ask for his help on a widening array of tasks. In 1946, he took on three important new posts. He was asked to chair the Mayor's Committee for a Permanent World Capital and was centrally involved in the process that eventually brought the United Nations to its current site in New York. He was also appointed to the newly created position of City Construction Coordinator and designated the chair of the Emergency Committee on Housing.

Moses' next wholesale citywide initiatives, slum clearance and urban renewal, serve as another example of his shrewd and opportunistic approach to public works. He seemed to be at his best in situations that called for someone to rapidly and efficiently draw down federal and state funds for ambitious undertakings. To alleviate the postwar housing shortage and poor conditions in many urban neighborhoods, the federal government was prepared to devote enormous sums to the twin goals of slum clearance and public housing construction. Yet again, Moses was the right man at the right place and time. His repertoire expanded to encompass this new activity under the auspices of the Slum Clearance Committee, which he chaired on its creation in 1949.

Moses knew that a key to success in this endeavor would be preparation. Accordingly, he tried to anticipate each successive federal initiative so that he could be ready and waiting with turnkey plans and applications. Ultimately, he would oversee numerous low- and middle-income housing projects throughout the city as well as huge redevelopment efforts for educational and civic institutions. Best-known among these are the New York

Coliseum, which was completed in 1956 and has since been replaced by the Time Warner Center at Columbus Circle, and the Lincoln Center for the Performing Arts, which opened in 1962. The largest performing arts complex in the world, Lincoln Center provided new and modern state-of-the-art facilities for the New York Philharmonic, the New York City Ballet, the New York City Opera, the Metropolitan Opera, the Public Library for the Performing Arts, and the Juilliard School.

Moses' activities had the greatest impact in the New York City metropolitan area, but his power also reached across the farthest corners of the state. In 1935, he arranged for the construction of two bridges connecting Grand Island to the mainland near Buffalo. He was also responsible for the Thousand Islands Bridge to Canada, near Massena, which opened in 1938. Later, as chair of the New York State Power Authority, he presided over the financing and construction of a hydroelectric power dam on the St. Lawrence and Niagara rivers in 1958 and 1961, respectively. In both instances, he simultaneously created new state parks, and the scenic parkway he built at the Niagara site is now known as Robert Moses Parkway.

Declining Years

In the late nineteen fifties and early sixties, even as his power was extending into these new areas and his responsibilities grew to encompass an ever-larger range of public works activities, Moses ran into a series of setbacks that eventually led to his ouster. Granted, he had experienced occasional defeats earlier in his career, interspersed among his many high-profile successes. The most visible of these were his failed run for governor in 1934 and his attempt to build a Brooklyn-Battery Bridge in the forties. The later defeats, however, were more frequent and more damaging. This was partially because some of his later initiatives were inherently more controversial, but it was also a consequence of his imperious manner. As his power and activities expanded, he demonstrated little patience or sympathy for those who opposed his projects, nor for those who would attempt to supervise him. From the grassroots to the backrooms at City Hall and the State House, opposition to Moses was quietly growing.

The newspapers first turned a consistently critical eye toward Moses' projects when a crowd of stroller-pushing Manhattan housewives blocked a team of his bulldozers on their way to build a new parking lot in Central Park in 1956. This was followed in 1959 by another public relations disaster when he tried to prevent Joseph Papp from offering free Shakespeare performances in city parks. That same year, he was ensnared in ongoing scandals involving contractors and developers working on his slum clearance projects. Moses himself was never implicated in the improprieties, but the bad publicity tarnished his reputation nonetheless.

To make matters worse, his next round of major highway projects ran into stiff and well-organized opposition. He urged the construction of two huge cross-Manhattan Expressways that had been on the drawing boards since the twenties, one through midtown and one across lower Manhattan. His latest bridge project, an enormous effort to cross Long Island Sound, also faced powerful resistance. Each of these proposals carried the prospect of considerable disruption. The expressway projects in particular seemed to threaten the urban fabric of Manhattan, the heart of the metropolis. The resultant stream of bad publicity and public outcry provided an opportunity for elected politicians to chip away at Moses' power.

Gradually, he was forced to give up his many positions. In 1960, he relinquished most of his New York City positions in exchange for a seven-year contract as head of the 1964 World's Fair. The 1939 site in Queens would be reused for this return engagement, but Moses took charge of the extensive renovation and expansion of many of the park and highway facilities in the area, as well as the construction of Shea Stadium (1962). At the state level, Governor Nelson Rockefeller began to reclaim power from Moses starting in 1962, appointing new officials to take Moses' seats on state agencies, one by one. Finally, in 1968, Rockefeller merged the Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority into the newly formed Metropolitan Transportation Authority and in so doing removed Robert Moses from power altogether.

Moses died in 1981 in West Islip, Long Island.

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See also Jacobs, Jane; New York City, New York; New York World's Fair, 1939; Parks; Public Authorities; Transportation; Urban Planning

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MOTEL

See Hotel, Motel

MULTICULTURAL CITIES

At the beginning of the third millennium, more than half of the global population lives in cities. In addition, the United Nations reports that 3 percent of the global population lives outside of their country of birth. That is, 191 million people worldwide are classified as migrants. Patterns of international migration, economic integration, and globalization are said to fuel cultural diversity within urban centers. The ramifications of these processes, which are by no means new phenomena, unfold at the local level, meaning that neighborhoods and urban communities are transformed by the social, cultural, and economic diversity of their new arrivals. This richness also poses dilemmas and challenges. Examining what multicultural cities implicate, then, is central to urban social scientists. The multicultural city as a unit of social scientific study, however, is not without its limitations. These will be discussed first. Next, some cities that narrate themselves as multicultural will be described. Last, integration as a means of multicultural urban production will be reviewed.

Concepts in Multicultural Cities

In the social sciences, multicultural cities are conceptualized in a couple of ways. Multicultural cities that follow melting-pot models develop policies that target homogeneity. It has been said that this is a common model in the United States. Multicultural cities that follow mosaic models target the preservation of pluralism and difference. This has been a model that Canada has made famous. The latter is sometimes said to be preferable because it allows individuals and groups to retain and practice their identity. These models are somewhat problematic, however, as it is observed and experienced in some cities with a long history of immigration, such as Toronto, that classification is impossible and futile, if not implicitly or explicitly racist. A demographic and descriptive meaning of multicultural refers to the coexistence of a heterogeneity of cultures within a specified area. As Vince Marotta has noted, too, demographic–descriptive meanings raise some curious questions about multicultural cities in general. At what point is a city multicultural? How many supposed cultures must be present before a city can appropriately label itself as such? Are there any homogeneous cities in the world at all?

Central to the concept of multiculturalism is the notion of difference. All models of multicultural cities require a categorization of difference at some level. Marotta also observed that the demographic meaning of multiculturalism posits difference along a problematic continuum spanning from heterogeneity toward homogeneity. Kanishka Goonewardena and Stefan Kipfer have noted the hybridity or creolization of Torontonians, and the resulting nonexisting plurality. Plurality cannot exist if members of so-called ethnic groups do not replicate their cultural norms. Zygmunt Bauman has also written extensively on the liquid character of modern cities. The category of culture, then, is a myth, similar to the mythical categories of sex and gender as discussed by poststructuralist Judith Butler. From a radical poststructural stance, then, the multicultural city is nothing more than a social construction.

All of the objectives of a multicultural city are about confrontations with, and attempts to resolve, otherness. This interaction among others is also what Marotta noted as the difference between

what he calls multiethnic (having a lot of different ethnic groups) and multicultural (having some appreciable level of interaction among these groups). As socially constructed as the category of other may ultimately be, it may still be a useful tool in identifying social disparities and locating conflict, as well as resolutions and fusions, among various identity groups.

The Multicultural Narrative

Labeling a city is also ultimately an urban narrative. It involves capturing a snapshot representation of any given urban space, at any given point in time, and describing it, interpreting it, and attaching values to it: a café latte to go; a lecture given by a second-generation Tamil professor; perogies in Thai sauce for lunch; a workshop with fellow students, none of whom speak English with their parents; a subway home to Little Greece for a break; and a relaxing evening with a friend over a Heineken or a piña colada at an Asian-techno dance club. This might be one such personal narrative in a multicultural city. This particular one is a story of consumption.

An infinite number of trajectories can be dreamed up or experienced in a multicultural city. In light of globalization and transnationalization of economies and peoples, city administrations around the world—particularly in countries of the capitalist democratic tradition—promote and celebrate their social diversity. At official city home pages and in tourist guides, the demographic multicultural narrative is often marketed as an attractive feature of the city. Goonewardena and Kipfer, however, argue that such metanarratives are dangerous. They are—especially in the consumption and commodification suggested by the narratives above—top-down identification processes.

Enter the words “multicultural city” into the Google search engine and information about Toronto is the first link to appear. Also easy to find are New York, Los Angeles, Sydney, London, and Amsterdam as among the most multicultural cities in the world. By visiting the official web pages of these cities, one can easily get a picture of their demographics. The categories used in this section are those chosen by the respective city administrations.

In the Greater Toronto area, a population of more than 5.5 million speaks more than 140 languages.

More than 30 percent speak a language other than English or French at home. After English, the five most common languages are Chinese (Cantonese or Mandarin), Italian, Punjabi, Tagalog, and Portuguese. Five percent have no knowledge of the official Canadian languages, French or English. Forty-seven percent report themselves as members of a visible minority. More than half of Toronto's residents were born outside of Canada. Twenty percent of Canada's immigrants have settled in Toronto, and between 2001 and 2006, about 55,000 new immigrants were received annually.

Sydney, a city of 4.3 million, celebrates its cultural diversity and declares that multiculturalism is one of the main factors contributing to the city's social, cultural, and economic success. Most commonly, newcomers immigrated from the United Kingdom. Others came from China, New Zealand, Indonesia, South Korea, Thailand, Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Vietnam. In 2006, Mandarin was the second most common language after English, followed by Cantonese, Indonesian, Korean, Greek, Russian, Spanish, and Vietnamese.

More than 300 languages are spoken in London, and migrants are reported to have originated from more than 160 countries. In 2005, the Greater London Authority reported census findings to affirm that the city had become more diverse in recent years. In 2001, the percentage of Whites had declined to 71.2 percent from 79.8 percent in 1991. The remaining 28.8 percent included Blacks, Chinese, Asians, and people of mixed race. The Oxford Economic Ltd. reported that the foreign-born population increased by 546,000 from 1991 to 2001. At the time of the 2001 census, London's population was 24.8 percent foreign born. More than half of the population is Christian, but London is also home to 40 Hindu temples, 25 Sikh temples, and more than 150 mosques.

On continental Europe, Amsterdam and Berlin are two cities that celebrate their diversity. Amsterdam is home to residents representing more than 170 nationalities, and 45 percent of its residents are classified as belonging to ethnic minorities. The classifications were Surinam, Antillean, Turkish, Moroccan, other non-Western foreigners; Western foreigners; and native Dutch. Of Berlin's 3.4 million people, 13.7 percent carry a non-German passport. The most common country of origin is Turkey, followed by Poland, Serbia, and

Montenegro. In total, 80 nationalities are represented in Berlin.

Turning to American examples, Los Angeles and New York stand out. Los Angeles, an enormous city with an estimated population nearing 10 million, is 46.5 percent Hispanic, 29.7 percent White/non-Hispanic, 10.9 percent African American, 9.9 percent Asian, 2.4 percent multiracial, 0.2 percent American Indian, 0.2 percent other, and 0.1 percent Pacific Islander. Of New York's 8 million residents, 36 percent are foreign born. Those born in South or Central America numbered more than 1.5 million. The second-largest group was those born in Asia. They numbered 687,000.

There are some immediate observations that one might have to these demographics. First, direct comparison is difficult because of the different data sets collected by each city. Some city administrations use "foreign born" to identify immigrants. These overlook second-, third-, fourth-, or fifth-generation immigrants. Some city administrations measure their population according to citizenship. This classification overlooks the already naturalized. Some use language. Some use religion. Some use the rather dubious classification of skin color.

Second, simple statistical diversity reveals little about the interactive character of the city. Is there segregation? Are there social disparities? If so, along what demarcations does this fragmentation occur? Although it celebrates its diversity, for example, Los Angeles has had the worst race riots in American history. The various communities are also geographically isolated and segregated. Optimistic liberal demographic narratives, then, can easily overlook real existing social disparities, which emerge, according to Goonewardena and Kipfer, through bottom-up social struggle and self-identification. Multicultural urban formations cannot merely refer to a static composition of identities collected within a certain territory. Rather it needs to call to mind the transformatory and shifting condition of urban spaces where interactions transpire between and across differences.

Integration as a Means of Multicultural Urban Production

In 2005, the Berliner Senate concluded the document titled *Encouraging Diversity—Strengthening Cohesion*, which was written as a guideline for

integration policy for Berlin. In practice, integration is the mechanism through which multicultural cities are produced, which is reached when no systematic differences can be identified along distribution of social position, status, and resources (e.g., money, appearance, occupation, living standards). That is, when everyone is not necessarily the same but equal. It is perhaps overly idealistic and simplistic to believe that this is possible, but if this goal is ever to be met, certain objectives need to be addressed in policy and in social praxis. Among other things, there must be (1) a general acceptance of newcomers and encouragement of their participation and upward mobility, (2) recognition of multiple citizenships, (3) the possibility of public communication in a variety of languages, (4) the acceptance of alternate codes of attire, and (5) a political means of participation that is conscious of difference. Most cities that promote themselves as multicultural address at least some of the aforementioned factors. All still have many obstacles to overcome.

Segregated Communities

The acceptance of difference and co-presence of newcomers is a goal of just about all of the cities mentioned. How this plays out, however, is varied. The formation of ghettos or the presence/absence of xenophobic practices may be indicators of general acceptance of newcomers. In Los Angeles, the various groups are concentrated into particular corners of the city and constitute African American ghettos, Latino and Mexican barrios, and middle- and upper-class Anglo-Saxon gated communities. This extreme segregation is not conducive to exchange and enrichment through diversity and difference.

In Berlin, newcomers are overrepresented in the neighborhoods of Kreuzberg, Neuköln, and Wedding. Toronto is also divided up into a variety of neighborhoods, such as Little India, Little Italy, Little Portugal, or Chinatown. In the cases of Berlin and Toronto, however, the respective neighborhoods are well connected to and serviced by the wider city. Residence in these neighborhoods is a result of neither economic nor violent pressure. These areas do not, therefore, constitute ghettos in the social science sense. In Berlin, certain districts, on the other hand, are viewed as dangerous to people with darker skin color. Violent crimes committed

by neo-Nazis became commonplace enough that some were willing to publish warnings to prospective visitors.

During the summer of 2006, Germany was host to the World Cup. Shortly before it began, the Africarat in Berlin circulated 10,000 flyers that warned of no-go areas in Berlin. This sparked massive public debate. Yet despite recognition of the problem in the public discourse that newcomers felt unsafe in some areas, in 2006, Berliner citizens voted members of the National Democratic Party of Germany—seen by some as the direct successor to Adolf Hitler's National Socialist German Worker's Party—into four district parliaments across the city. Obviously, such currents are not favorable to diversity and equality.

Citizenship and Language

Recognition of multiple citizenships is essential so that immigrants can maintain economic as well as social transnational ties. This issue, however, is also handled differently among the various nations. Newcomers may retain multiple citizenships in the United States, Canada, Australia, and Britain. About 85 percent of Toronto's population retains Canadian citizenship. Newcomers to Amsterdam, in contrast, must renounce former citizenships to obtain Dutch citizenship. Former passports must also be renounced when applying for German citizenship—unless the former nationality was within the European Union. Children born in Germany, who have one German parent, are also permitted to keep the nationalities of both parents. Germany actively campaigns for the German passport and urges landed residents to assume citizenship. Despite its efforts, however, rates of naturalization have not increased. As a result, German politicians have begun reviewing the laws governing immigration and looking for ways that might ease the process.

To overcome language barriers, the city of Toronto has a language service hotline that is ready to translate more than 150 languages. Public documents and notices are published by the city administration in 10 languages. Street signs are written in different alphabets. The city administrations for London, New York, and Sydney also offer translations in various languages. Los Angeles offers Spanish, Cantonese, or

Mandarin translation services for council meetings. To acquire these services, the Los Angeles Council and Public Services must be contacted at least 72 hours in advance.

Dress Codes

There are two strategies of dealing with codes of attire. The first is a strategy that adopts acceptance of a diversity of appearances. The second strategy demands a condition of neutrality. Sikh men, for example, have been confronted with this problem and have fought to be able to wear a turban and carry a *kirpan* (a ceremonial sword)—symbols of their Sikh faith—in schools and in the workplace. In Canada and England, this attire is permitted. Employers and schools must align their dress codes to accommodate the religious freedom of their workers. Thus, Canadian Mounted Police of the Sikh faith may wear a turban in place of the traditional broad-rimmed cap, and Sikh school boys may carry a kirpan to school despite the regulations of some schools to ban weapons. In the United States, Sikhs have been fighting for this right on a case by case basis. Between 2001 and 2007, there were more than 20 successful court cases—including one in Los Angeles and four in New York City—in which Sikh men won the right to wear their religious symbols.

In Germany, dress codes are governed at the state level. Berlin, a city-state, has taken the route of the second strategy. Wearing religious symbols in workplaces where neutral clothing is demanded, such as in civil services and schools, is not permitted. This applies to Christian crosses, Jewish yarmulkes, Muslim tschadors or hijabs, or Sikh turbans and kirpans—all of which are prohibited.

Models of political discourse are perhaps one of the hottest topics facing multicultural cities today. They are discussed widely in twentieth-century political theory. A famous debate between Jürgen Habermas and Nancy Fraser illustrates two essential poles to the discussion. Habermas argued that one open public sphere in which all members participate on equal footing was the ideal political forum. Fraser, in response, argued that this was impossible. For a variety of reasons, women—or others in general—could not expect to compete on an equal basis. The outcome would be that alternative discourse would inevitably be drowned out by

so-called common interest topics. To account for difference, then, Fraser argued for alternative public spheres. These were forums targeted for specific groups, who could then meet in an exclusive sphere to discuss their ideas and develop their counterdiscourse, which could later be brought back to a common wider forum. Habermas and Fraser then represent two models of participation: the melting-pot public forum and the plurality of forums.

In practical terms, the Province of Ontario in Canada in 2006 overturned the use of shari`ah law as a form of family arbitration. It was decided that it would not be acceptable because the code of ethics existing under shari`ah law would undermine Canadian Muslim women. Muslim women who did not have the means to hire a lawyer would have little choice but to turn to a Muslim-based tribunal, which would disadvantage them. Their access to the equal treatment of individuals guaranteed under the Canadian constitution was thereby severely hindered. This decision immediately called into the question the legitimacy of Roman Catholic, Jewish, and Aboriginal arbitration, which too were rendered legally unbinding.

The openness to, and recognition of, diversity and self-proclaimed difference is most certainly a positive response to increased urbanization and international migration. It is more, however, than the self-image of a city as spatial agglomeration of articulated social segments, as suggested by demographic multiculturalism. On a conceptual level, careful thought needs to be given to the consequences of classification and essentialization of individuals and social groups into mythical categories of otherness, and to the risk of getting caught in the liberal-pluralist trap that the commodification of culture ensures. Multiculturalism addresses a nonstatic, dynamic interplay of differences through time. On a practical level, integration as a mechanism of building multicultural spaces is a very complex process. Measures must carefully address social, political, and economic needs of residents, as well as compensate for, and respond to, social spatial and temporal urban transformations. It will remain a constant project for residents of multicultural cities, therefore, to keep up with social changes and to promote and encourage social diversity, inclusion, and equality.

Constance Carr

See also Berlin, Germany; Creative Class; Cultural Heritage; Ethnic Enclave; Ethnic Entrepreneurship; Ghetto; Global City; Globalization; Racialization; Urban Culture; World City

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MUMBAI (BOMBAY), INDIA

Mumbai, formerly known as Bombay, is an island city located on India’s west coast; with a population of 18 million people, it is one of the largest cities in the world. Mumbai is responsible for more than half of India’s foreign trade, has become a center for the country’s global dealings in financial and producer services, and constitutes 40 percent of the state’s annual direct central revenue. Since India’s economic liberalization reforms in

1985 and 1991, Mumbai’s economy, particularly the southwest area of Nariman Point, has increasingly globalized.

Mumbai occupies a key site in the Indian modern economic and cultural imagination. The city has often been described as inevitably cosmopolitan, given its economic and cultural diversity, drawing Hindus, Muslims, Parsis, Christians, Sikhs, Jains, and others. The city is home to Bollywood, the Hindi film industry, which produces more films than any other film industry in the world, films that combine dancing, simple melodies, and extravagant spectacles with narratives of everyday life. Mumbai has a varied cultural life beyond Bollywood, evidenced, for example, in its large Marathi or Gujarati literary history.

Historically, Mumbai has been a focus for global trade around the Arabian Sea and beyond, owing in large part to its endowment with one of the largest natural harbors in South Asia. Originally a collection of seven fishing islands, Mumbai was established as a Portuguese outpost in the early sixteenth century and was passed to the British crown in 1662 as part of a marriage dowry. From the mid-nineteenth century, it was transformed into a booming industrial city, especially in textiles. The city’s first textile mill was established in the 1850s; and when the U.S. Civil War cut off cotton imports from America, Bombay became Britain’s principal cotton supplier.

The colonial city was split between a walled fort to the south, well supplied with housing and infrastructures, and a neglected native town. The city’s geographical extent advanced through massive programs of land reclamation from the sea. By the 1860s, it had been established as one of the leading ports and manufacturing centers of the British Empire, and south Bombay had assembled much of its famous Bombay Gothic British–Indian architecture, most notably the spectacular train station, Victoria Terminus.

Contemporary Mumbai is the capital of the state of Maharashtra, the state with the highest-ranking per capita income in India; it constitutes 20 percent of the state’s GDP. Despite the city’s generally impressive economic statistics, there was a drop from 7 percent to 2.4 percent in the city’s GDP per annum between 1994 and 2002. Often referred to as India’s maximum city, Mumbai is the country’s most unequal city. More than half of

the city's population lives in informal settlements of varying infrastructure, income, economy, ethnicity, and religion, squeezed into whatever space can be found, from bridges and railways to pavements and shantytowns.

The growth in informal settlements reflects both the spectacular and ongoing rise in real estate prices during the 1990s, driven by the city's economic growth and orchestrated through an often corrupt coalition of the state, builders, developers, and the city's infamous underworld, along with the inadequacy of the state's social housing commitment. Most people in informal settlements lack security of tenure, live in poor-quality housing vulnerable to monsoon rains, suffer from frequent bouts of state or private demolition, lack access to sufficient and clean water and sanitation facilities, and live in highly polluted environments vulnerable to illness and disease. Given that there is often a weak relationship between income and access to basic services and infrastructures in Mumbai's informal settlements, it is unlikely that economic growth itself could be a solution to these issues.

If Mumbai is often described as India's most modern city, this discourse has taken a new turn with the emergence of a new managerial and technical elite associated with the growth of global financial services in particular parts of the city. Radjani Mazumdar charted the increasing escape of Mumbai's urban elite from the "city of debris" to the "city of spectacle"—that is, from the city of informal settlements, dense neighborhoods, street hawkers, traffic congestion, construction debris, and refuse to the city of elite design and consumption of high-end housing, entertainment, shopping, and associated service industries. Despite a bitter union struggle, the mills have all but closed.

In this context, recent years have witnessed intense debates around the transformation of public space. Two recent controversial rulings by the Supreme Court are instructive: one would transform two-thirds of the vacant mill lands in the center of the city not into social housing as many had hoped but into shopping malls and corporate entertainment; and a second allows the redevelopment of 19,000 of Mumbai's dilapidated buildings—often *chawls*, the traditional double-story 100-square-foot tenements used to house mill workers—which many commentators worry will create more elite housing enclaves with little public space.

Much recent research on Mumbai focuses on the nature and effects of economic liberalization and deindustrialization and the breakdown of class-based affiliations—these followed, in particular, the 1982 textile strike—and their replacement with collective identity rooted in ethnic and religious chauvinism. The idea of the city as cosmopolitan is a constant feature in narratives of its recent decline. Most discussions of cosmopolitanism in Mumbai focus on communal tension, tolerance, and violence, and a range of commentators have remarked on a decline of the cosmopolitan city, marking as a watershed the communal riots and bombings that occurred in the early 1990s.

This is due in particular to the mass riots that took place in late 1992 and early 1993, which followed the destruction of the Babri Masjid in Ayodhya in north India by Hindu extremists. The events spurred existing local tensions, resulting in the worst riots in the city's history: 900 people were killed and the psychosocial geography of the city was drastically altered. The riots were followed by 13 bomb blasts on March 12, 1993, the most destructive bomb explosions in Indian history, which killed more than 250 and left 700 injured. The bombs targeted key political and economic structures in the city, including the stock exchange and the political headquarters of the Hindu extremist party, the Shiv Sena (Shivaji's Army), and were widely interpreted as retaliation by Muslim gangs in response to the riots.

Tensions between Mumbai's different groups were, of course, present in the city before these riots. In 1984, the city witnessed the first major communal riots since independence. In many of these cases, the Shiv Sena played a crucial mobilizing role. One of the most xenophobic regional parties in India, the zenith of the Sena movement arrived when the party made it into power at both the city and state level in Maharashtra in 1995. During its time in state government, the party renamed Bombay as Mumbai. This renaming should not be viewed as a straightforward effort to shake off a British colonial heritage; it is an active attempt to reinscribe the space of the city as Hindu, to the exclusion, in particular, of Muslims.

In recent years, a mass program of demolition of informal settlements has been driven not just by ethnicity, but by politico-corporate Mumbai's self-declared trajectory to become the next

Shanghai by 2013. As part of this, an estimated 90,000 huts were torn down during the winter of 2004 and 2005, leaving some 350,000 people homeless and without alternative accommodation. This agenda is caught up with a variety of processes in the city, including a current effort to demolish Dharavi, one of Asia's largest slums, and construct a world-class cultural, knowledge, business, and health center in its place; the proliferation of securitized and high-end shopping malls, gated communities, and gentrified neighborhoods; the growth of Special Economic Zones (SEZs); and even a new town—*Maha Mumbai*—planned and built by the huge infrastructure firm Reliance Energy—explicitly aimed at imitating rival global locations like Dubai's Jebel Ali and the SEZ phenomenon in China.

If urban conflict has been one focus of research on Mumbai, narratives of violence resurfaced following bombings on July 11, 2006, when 200 people were killed and more than 700 injured when seven bombs exploded within the space of 11 minutes during rush hour on the city's commuter rail network, the busiest domestic rail system in the world. The police claimed the bombings were carried out by Lashkar-e-Toiba and Students Islamic Movement of India, both Islamist militant organizations banned in India. Lashkar have also been blamed for the street terrorism of November 2008, in which at least 173 people were killed. However, events have shown that in the face of violence or crisis, Mumbaikers often exhibit generosity and a determined spirit. After the bombings, people scrambled to assist the emergency services in treating victims and transporting them to hospitals. Within hours, the wreckage had been cleared, and the railway system was up and running again.

Mumbai has seen similar responses to adversity from its citizenry. For example, when the 2005 monsoon floods killed more than 1,000 people, predominantly in informal settlements, and left thousands stranded in floods that covered one-third of the city's surface and that reached almost five meters in depth in low-lying areas, there was no looting, theft, or violence but rather an outpouring of spontaneous acts of kindness and generosity. While state authorities were in disarray and largely abdicated responsibility, media reports were full of stories of slum dwellers rescuing those

stranded in cars, offering *chai* and biscuits and in many cases a room to sleep in.

Colin McFarlane

See also Colonial City; Global City; Kolkata (Calcutta), India

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MUMFORD, LEWIS

Lewis Mumford (1895–1990) is widely recognized as a major American intellectual, who, despite his self-definition as a “generalist,” is known primarily as an authority on technology, architecture, and urbanism and secondarily as a scholar of American culture. Yet, he remains a somewhat misunderstood figure in the twenty-first century, especially regarding cities. He was the most committed American disciple of both Patrick Geddes and Ebenezer Howard, advocating consistently for the creation of interconnected garden cities within a regional framework. Especially in later years, Mumford was labeled anti-urban, but more correctly, he was antimetropolitan in the manner of

Howard. Cities must reach a critical mass before they could sustain a viable culture, he argued; however, if too large, they would choke on their own successes.

Early Years

Mumford was born in 1895 in Queens County, New York. His mother, a widow, had become pregnant unexpectedly, and she raised her young son on Manhattan's Upper West Side. What could have been a solitary childhood was happily relieved by the close bond Mumford forged with his stepgrandfather, who introduced him to the teeming metropolis. Mumford attended the prestigious Stuyvesant High School, but his academic record was mixed.

Lacking the credentials to gain admission to a traditional college or university, he enrolled at the City College of New York's evening program in fall of 1912. He toyed with the idea of pursuing an advanced degree in philosophy, but when he transferred to the more formally organized day program, he foundered academically once again. After being diagnosed with incipient tuberculosis, he withdrew from City College altogether; as a result, he would never earn his baccalaureate degree.

Although Mumford was already something of an autodidact, what truly saved him from spiraling into an unfocused adulthood was his reading of *Evolution*, a book cowritten by Patrick Geddes and J. Arthur Thomson and published in 1911. Mumford immediately grasped the implications of Geddes's essential thesis: that humankind's cultural evolution was akin to its biological evolution and that the former could be subjected to as careful a scientific scrutiny as the latter. The investigative tool that Geddes proffered was the regional survey, a sociocultural study of a region and its myriad inhabitants. Mesmerized, Mumford devoured other books by Geddes, and in the process, he determined to model his own career path after Geddes: not to become a specialist in one discipline, but rather, to embrace all disciplines. The city, as the summation of all of man's intellectual and practical activities, would become for Mumford, as it had already for Geddes, the subject around which he organized his myriad interests.

Not long after encountering Geddes's writings, Mumford read Ebenezer Howard's seminal planning

treatise, *Garden Cities of To-morrow*. That Howard's Garden City neatly complemented Geddes's regionalism became almost immediately apparent to Mumford. With pen and notepad in hand, Mumford began to comb the city of his youth with his eyes freshly attuned to sights ranging from geological formations to real estate development patterns. The next several years proved to be a period of intensive urban study for Mumford, interrupted only briefly by a stateside tour of duty with the U.S. Navy near the end of World War I.

Mumford recognized the need to earn a living, especially after his 1921 marriage to Sophia Wittenberg, and thus, he began expanding his notes into published essays, articles, book reviews, and, eventually, books. As a freelance writer and critic, he explored such topics as architecture, literature, sociology, and politics in such publications as the *Journal of the American Institute of Architects*, the *Dial*, and the *New Republic*. In the early 1930s, Mumford began his long tenure as the *New Yorker's* art and architecture critic, a position that permitted him to continue his regional surveys while earning a substantial income. As an architecture critic, he disavowed romantic revivalism while embracing such progressive currents as the organicism of Frank Lloyd Wright and the functionalism of various European modernists.

Writings and Advocacy

Two interrelated themes predominated in Mumford's early writings: the role of utopian ideals in the reconstruction of post-World War I society and the rediscovery of America's pre-1900 cultural roots as a means of reinvigorating creativity in the present. The first theme found a receptive audience via the publication of Mumford's first book, *The Story of Utopias* (1922). The first part of the book surveyed utopian writings from antiquity to the present, while the second part examined what Mumford called "collective utopias," essentially the social, political, and economic constraints that reified class boundaries. One might have expected Mumford to conclude his book with a call to Marxist revolution, but he instead imparted gentler prescriptions derived from Geddes's regional survey and Howard's Garden City. Mumford defined this new world order by the ancient Greek term *Eutopia*, roughly translated as "the good

place,” and he urged his readers to strive toward this goal when converting ideas into practice.

Although *The Story of Utopias* garnered positive notices, Mumford felt compelled to break free of Geddes’s ideological hold in his next several books by exploring a new theme: America’s cultural heritage. *Sticks and Stones* (1924) examined America’s past from an architectural perspective and *The Golden Day* (1926) from a literary angle. *Herman Melville* (1929), a biography of the well-known author, and the *Brown Decades* (1931) amplified and corrected many of the observations contained in the earlier works. In all four books, Mumford presented evidence of a significant cultural efflorescence led by a distinguished group of writers, architects, artists, and other creative types in the mid-to-late nineteenth century. Moreover, in Mumford’s view, some key figures—notably Alfred Stieglitz and Frank Lloyd Wright—had effectively bridged the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. These were the exemplars that Mumford challenged his contemporaries to emulate.

Even as Mumford’s profile as a writer and critic rose significantly during the 1920s, so did his profile as a housing and community advocate. In 1923, he became a founding member of the Regional Planning Association of America. The association’s membership was small and based largely in the New York metropolitan area but included some of the most progressive minds of the era: architects Clarence Stein, Frederick Ackerman, and Henry Wright; editor Charles Harris Whitaker; and conservationist Benton MacKaye. Mumford served as the association’s secretary and general spokesman. Due in part to his influence, the association broadly embraced both Geddes’s regional survey and Howard’s Garden City. Geddes’s imprint may be seen on the association’s most famous project, the Appalachian Trail, a public–private wilderness easement along the mountainous areas of the eastern United States, which was conceived by MacKaye.

Howard’s imprint may be seen in the association’s focus on solving the nation’s affordable housing shortage in the years following World War I. Toward this end, the association formed a subsidiary, the City Housing Corporation, to undertake the development of two planned communities: Sunnyside Gardens (1924–1928) in the New York City borough of Queens and Radburn (1928–1932) in northern New Jersey. Mumford and his

wife moved to Sunnyside Gardens following the birth of their son, Geddes, in 1925; 11 years later, they made the rural village of Amenia in upstate New York their permanent home.

As the association’s spokesman, Mumford wrote numerous articles and essays extolling its regionalist ideals. In May 1925, Mumford edited a special graphic issue of *The Survey* that featured essays on regional planning by many of the association’s members; notably, it was Mumford’s introductory essay, titled “Planning the Fourth Migration,” that set the issue’s ideological tenor. What he deemed the first migration was the pioneers’ westward journey across North America. The second migration saw the clustering of settlers from farms into industrial towns, while the third migration saw an even greater movement of people from smaller towns into major cities. In Mumford’s view, the fourth migration would reverse this flow. Improvements in transportation, communication, and the electrical power grid would negate the magnetic pull of the metropolis, making it possible for Americans to enjoy the benefits of big city life in smaller towns and even in the primeval wilderness. Mumford was essentially updating Howard’s rationale for the Garden City, but advancing it to its logical conclusion: Evolving technology might make the Garden City itself obsolete. Six years later, he coauthored an influential article with Benton MacKaye on the “townless highway,” in which Radburn’s separation of traffic would be extended into the countryside via limited access highways to link similarly planned towns.

Master Works

By the early 1930s, Mumford was ready for new intellectual challenges. Eutopia, the overarching theme of his first book, returned to the forefront of his writings, and it would ultimately define the rest of his career. His next major project was a four-volume study of Western civilization known as *The Renewal of Life*. The series’s expansive scope owed a great intellectual debt to Geddes, with the first volume, *Technics and Civilization* (1934), corresponding to Geddes’s sociocultural category of work; the second, *The Culture of Cities* (1938), to his category of place; and the third and fourth, *The Condition of Man* (1944) and *The Conduct of Life* (1951), to his category of folk. On a more profound

level, the project's core thesis was predicated on what Geddes's termed insurgency, a word that has, of course, unpleasant associations with war, but which Geddes used to describe a life force in the throes of renewing itself.

Of the books in the series, *The Culture of Cities* earned Mumford particular acclaim. *Time* magazine placed Mumford on its cover, and *Life* magazine ran a multipage photographic spread on the book. Invitations to consult on city and regional plans soon followed: Honolulu and Portland and the Pacific Northwest region in 1938, and London in 1943 and 1945, all resulting in significant essays. Mumford was not content to rest on his laurels, however. He became more politically active, writing two books that urged American involvement in World War II: *Men Must Act* (1939) and *Faith for Living* (1940). Outraged by the Allied bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945, Mumford penned an article in March 1946 for the *Saturday Review of Literature* titled "Gentlemen, You are Mad!" becoming one of the first American intellectuals to warn of the perils of the nuclear age.

In 1945, he collected the Honolulu and London essays, along with several others, in an anthology titled *City Development*. The following year, he wrote a new introduction to *Garden Cities of Tomorrow*, re-presenting Howard's vision just as the British parliament passed enabling legislation for the construction of garden-city-style satellites known as the "new towns." Yet, when Mumford visited several of the new towns in person in 1953, he was disappointed by their general sprawl. Lansbury, a redeveloped, more compact neighborhood in East London, proved more to his liking. Other major cities, including Rotterdam, Marseilles, Rome, Athens, Philadelphia, and New York, endured his critical scrutiny during the 1950s.

Still, as Mumford aged, his relationship with cities in general changed. Although he would live intermittently in New York and other major cities, he became more an urban visitor than an urban resident. He was also slow to recognize how rapidly cities were being transformed, directly on the ground by the automobile and indirectly from the sky by the airplane, but once he did so, he sounded the alarm repeatedly. Subsequently, he would also rue the dismantling of the nation's passenger railroad system. Ironically, the man who had embraced

and had urged the mastery of technology in the 1920s and 1930s became in later years rather confounded by it. The regional surveyor slowly evolved into the regional oracle, quick to make solemn pronouncements on planning mishaps, but reluctant to give practical planning advice based on firsthand experience.

Mumford's disconnection with the modern city became glaringly apparent when, in 1962, he wrote a scathing review of Jane Jacobs's *Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961). To Jacobs, the ideal neighborhood evolved over time, with a variety of functions, buildings, and residents, as represented by her own city block. Her essential thesis was, in fact, rather similar to Geddes's line of thinking a half century earlier, but Mumford failed to see this connection. Jacobs's book turned the planning profession upside down, paving the way to a more pluralistic—even post-modern—approach to revitalizing America's cities in the decades to come.

Nevertheless, the 1950s and 1960s proved to be extraordinarily productive for Mumford as a writer. He updated and revised several of his earlier books on American culture, and he collected many of his previously published articles and essays on architecture, planning, and other subjects into convenient anthologies. His most pressing concern, however, was the pall cast over modern civilization by the nuclear arms race and the cold war. *The Transformations of Man* (1956) was his attempt to condense the message of *The Renewal of Life* into a single, more accessible volume, but he recognized quickly that the original message would need to be expanded and bolstered for a new generation of readers.

The City in History (1961), arguably Mumford's most famous book, began as a revision of *The Culture of Cities*. Although the core chapters of the book remained essentially intact, Mumford bracketed them with wholly new sections on prehistoric and ancient cities and a new, rather pessimistic conclusion colored by the impending prospect of nuclear annihilation. Dire as its pronouncements were, *The City in History* was a critical and popular success, garnering Mumford the coveted National Book Award for Nonfiction in 1962. Mumford's last major work, the two-volume *Myth of the Machine* (1967, 1970), revisited the thesis of *Technics and Civilization* but

posited an even bleaker world outlook in which scientific and military leaders were conspiring to bring civilization to its untimely end. In his view, Eutopia, the good place, would inevitably be bested by Utopia, the perfect place. Still, Mumford did not relinquish his faith in the ability of humankind to renew itself.

Were Mumford alive today, he would undoubtedly be in the forefront of the sustainability and green movements, advocating cleaner power, organic farming, and wilderness protection. To his small, somewhat isolated farmhouse, he would likely have welcomed the Internet and the television satellite, even as he would likely have cursed the superabundance of misinformation they sometimes deliver. Last, he would almost certainly be urging his readers to learn from their collective past while taking control of their present and future: to let shared human values guide their hopes and dreams rather than the machine and its empty materialistic promises.

Robert Wojtowicz

See also Geddes, Patrick; Intellectuals; Utopia

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civic, metropolitan, and postmodern museum complexes, with the latter in the context of urban renewal initiatives, and examines how museums are embedded in cities and what urban cultures they support. It draws in the wider development of museum and preserved districts—as in the museum-ification of parts of cities. It connects the changing ways the world is presented in museums with our understandings of the world and the museum as a technology of cultural governance in the city.

The Birth of the Civic Museum

The modern civic museum emerged in the late eighteenth through nineteenth centuries. It emerged with the democratization of preservation from royal collections and princely *studiolo*, *wunderkammer* and cabinets of curiosities and their replacement with public collections. Key moments are often pointed to in different nations, be it Hans Sloane's donations initiating the British Museum in 1754; the purchase of the Angerstein collection of painting in 1824 to start London's National Gallery; James Smithson's bequest to found the Smithsonian in Washington, D.C., in 1854; or the postrevolutionary opening of royal collections using the former palace of the Louvre in Paris. Museums became vehicles for public education and civic improvement. We might determine two phases here, opening the collections and then developing the museum as an architectural form to house them. In terms of the latter, the nineteenth century is marked by the creation of built forms deemed able to carry through a civic mission.

Museums are technologies for producing social effects, tools of governance that as Tony Bennett argues operate in registers that are both civic and epistemological. That is, museums organize objects to be viewed and at the same time they organize the viewing public. Where formerly the intended viewer saw through the eyes of the monarch and the museum thus encoded royal power, civic arrangements created the viewer as the urban public. Museums helped create a sense of shared views on the world and knowledge about the world. They worked to categorize and order the world, positioning object and self in the rapidly changing world of the modern city. Museum displays deployed categorizations and classifications of objects in ways that appeared to convey universal secular truths. The typologies

MUSEUMS

The museum has been bound up with the emergence of urban civic cultures over the last two centuries. This entry looks at the emergence of the



The British Museum in London houses both national and world art and antiquities from ancient to modern times.

Source: Rachel Buyan.

and classifications made cultures and histories legible to the public.

Thus, the Louvre offered a survey of the development of art, categorized by periods and schools that it served to define, leading to the pinnacle of then contemporary (French) art. In the British Museum, the classification of ethnological artifacts served to help support the idea of races, peoples, and their evolutions and relationships. The national story becomes sublated into the great chain of being, where the march of civilization takes us ineluctably toward the pinnacle represented in the current city. The epistemology of the disembodied, depersonalized gaze of visual knowledge was transformed into physical form, where rooms and buildings spatialized categories and set material objects out as visual proof of the logic behind the museum.

This became a form of cultural governance inscribing identities through viewing positions—as a national public—and also a technology for mass instruction, where the democratic use of objects was intended to inculcate civic virtues via civic rituals. Thus, the visiting of galleries and museums became both an expression of civic belonging and a means of inculcating it.

As well as their internal organization, one can chart the ornamental exterior of museums as secular temples to learning and the celebration of national virtues. Over the nineteenth century, the hegemony of the neoclassical portico and form set the museum up as a shrine but to secular values of state and nation. Its pretensions to universal knowledge are symbolized by the debate between universal classical forms, exemplifying values of

order through symmetry and geometry, and competing national built forms, such as mock Gothic in Britain, seen as celebrating the specific history of the nation. The entwining of universal and national values can be seen, for instance, in the British Museum's main south entrance which is a neoclassical frontage whose pediment by Sir Richard Westmacott interprets the Progress of Civilisation; within the entrance are memorials to staff who gave their lives in two world wars.

Metropolitan Museums

If museums individually used their internal spaces to discipline objects and make them useful for social narratives, then cumulatively they formed part of what Bennett called the emerging exhibitionary complex in the modern city. Thus, alongside zoos, world fairs, arcades, and department stores, museums are an arena for displaying objects to the public. They thus become a means for appealing to and managing urban attention as spectacles of modernity. They also framed the world as something to be seen and, more fundamentally, as something that could be seen—treating, in Mitchell's phrase, the world as exhibition.

The connection can be exemplified in the construction of Albertopolis as a complex of museums, knowledge establishments, and exhibitionary spaces in South Kensington in London. It is named after its inspiration, Prince Albert, who was the patron of the first Great Exhibition in 1851. When the exhibition closed, permanent exhibitions were built on the site, including the Science Museum and the Victoria and Albert Museum. Driver and Gilbert suggest this forms one point of what became an imperial display triangle anchored on Kensington, Whitehall, and Trafalgar Square creating a symbolically charged zone in the city. They formed part of a self-consciously imperial metropole. Promotional campaigns in the early twentieth century advertised the ability to take the underground to see all of the empire—botanical specimens at Kew, colonial embassies around the Strand, through to the Victoria and Albert museum with the reconstructed Gwalior Gate from India framing its oriental exhibitions entrance and the Imperial Institute offering “all the empire under one roof” in South Kensington.

Museums and collections created a sense of metropolitan centrality. They became technologies of global knowledge and power and centers of representation and calculation for the world. Artifacts and specimens were relocated from peripheral and exotic locations around the planet and placed together in these metropolitan centers, through networks of exchange and collection among artifacts and knowledge.

Postmodern Museums and Museumized Cities

Recently, there has been a shift away from the ideals of the civic museum with its implied educative goals and national or imperial subjects. Instead, museums have become connected to audiences by providing entertainment and emotional encounters—with reconstructions and dioramas and a profusion of new forms designed to attend to the demands of a more variegated public. The public addressed is no longer a singular mass audience but one splintered by age, taste, cultural identity, and so forth, with more specialist museums catering to different fractions. There has been significant new investment and formation of museums. Major initiatives now often speak not to a national mission but a global art and celebrity culture.

Brands of museums such as the Guggenheim have emerged, which can be coupled with spectacular architectural forms to offer hallmark developments in urban regeneration. The most celebrated example is the Guggenheim in Bilbao, which has transformed the image of a deindustrializing steel town into one of a cultural and tourist center through a globally iconic museum—whose architectural form is as potent in image as its contents. The museum's much emulated interlocking planes and curves speak of anything but a temple to civic ritual. Moreover, the location in a regional capital rather than a national one speaks to the ability of regional elites to use new institutions to renegotiate their political relations and the urban cultural hierarchy.

Museum developments have become part of a calculus over the value of culture as a means of economic redevelopment. Examples of parts of cities being refashioned from derelict industrial quarters and uses into museums and heritage centers are plentiful. In the United States, for instance,

Monterey, California, refashioned former canneries and docksides to resemble the cannery row depicted in Steinbeck's novel—the depiction the indignant city council at the time of publication had dismissed as almost entirely fallacious and misleading in its portrayal of the seedy side of life. In Lowell, Massachusetts, textile mills were refashioned as art spaces. In Britain, the Albert Docks in Liverpool became a restored complex hosting the art gallery Tate North; the Baltic Flour Mill in Gateshead became an art gallery; and the former Quays at Salford, just outside Manchester, now host the Lowry museum and the Imperial War Museum North. Or districts may be conserved as museum spaces themselves as in Australia where a derelict former working-class harbor district in Sydney is redeveloped to contain “the Rocks” or in Singapore, where the *godowns* and shophouses along the river are preserved as bars, restaurants, and clubs.

The museum developments often form state-led initiatives, which are intended to attract visitors while anchoring cultural quarters for media industries and the creative class. Salford Quays, for instance, is now the planned location for much of the BBC's production work. But such initiatives blur from specific museums being created to more general preservation districts, with mixtures of public and private control. From new museums in the city to the city as museum, all speak to the public through the market—as techniques of governance, they sell leisure experiences and urban environments as commodities rather than media of civic improvement.

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See also Bilbao, Spain; Creative Class; Cultural Heritage; Heritage City; Historic Cities; London, United Kingdom; Manchester, United Kingdom; Singapore

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NATIONAL URBAN LEAGUE

See Urban League

NECROPOLIS

According to Lewis Mumford, the necropolis was the first form of permanent human settlement and thus, it serves as the very foundation of urban life. In many respects, the construction of a necropolis is a matter of practical necessity, as death leaves the living with the material problem of the remains, but the problem of death extends beyond mere disposal. Death is a unique event in that it occurs within time and space, but it only happens to others (an individual cannot experience his or her own death), and when it has passed, the content or meaning of it is purely interrogative. The interrogative quality of death conditions the living city as it is forced simultaneously to commemorate those who have passed and to face the inevitability of death for the living. The funereal practices, religious ceremonies, and burial customs of each particular culture represent a set of possible responses to death (e.g., *Día de los Muertos*, *Commemoratio omnium Fidelium Defunctorum*, and the *Bon Festival* in Japan).

The necropolis is thus stretched between the temporal extremes of the past and the future as it must act as both a monument to those who have passed and a marker of the future for those who remain. The question of the future returns us to Mumford's

work, as he uses the term *necropolis* to refer to both the cemetery and the ruin. Mumford uses the example of the decline of Rome to argue that, much like the individual citizen, the living city can become pathologically infected and die. This latter form of necropolis is the abandoned city or ruin, and it serves to remind the living of the precarious nature of urban life. As such, the necropolis defines both the past and the future of the city. Yet, within the living city, the necropolis retains its meaning only through the construction and maintenance of a distinct set of boundaries. These boundaries serve to form places of sanctified burial (the church yard, catacomb, mausoleum, etc.), which retain their meaning by being defined in opposition to the unsanctified or simply unmarked grave.

Burial Beyond the Pale

The unmarked grave can exist either outside of or concealed within the codified space of the city. The possible motivations for such a radical form of exclusion are generally either to conceal or to condemn, but the general purpose is simply to forget. The English phrase "beyond the pale" effectively captures the relationship between the necropolis and the unmarked grave. In the most general sense, to be beyond the pale is to be outside of the boundaries of a defined space. The etymology of the English word *pale* is interesting, as it is taken from the French word *pal*, meaning stake, and as such, it is indicative of a territorial marker both literally, as an actual physical marker, and figuratively, as a symbol in heraldry.

The French is in turn derived from the Latin word *palus* (a wooden post used by Roman soldiers to represent an opponent during fighting practice), which is related to *pangere* (to fix or fasten) and *pacere* (to agree, or form a pact). The connections between boundary, law, and enemy are significant here as those whose bodies are buried beyond the pale constitute a second order among the dead. The first order of death is the death that is structurally commemorated; it is the death of the citizen and is marked by structured rituals and ceremonies. The second order of death is the death of one whose memory is to be forgotten: the condemned. For this second order of death, the pale is the stake of capital punishment; through its impalement, crucifixion, or immolation at the stake, the body of the criminal marks the boundary of the law.

These two orders of death serve as markers that define the boundaries of the city, and as such, their aim is to answer the question that death opens, yet, this question remains structurally embedded in the burial site. This gives the actual places that are used to conceal and condemn the dead a peculiar dynamism in that these anonymous sites are often hidden (either literally or by the fear that they inspire) only for a time; when they are uncovered and deprived of their former power, they become memorials to the dead. The most obvious examples of this phenomenon are death camps (Auschwitz-Birkenau, Dachau, etc.), execution sites (the Tarpeian Rock, the Gemonian Stairs, Golgotha, etc.), and prisons (the Bastille, the Tower of London, the Soviet Gulags, Robben Island, etc.).

The treatment of the corpse serves to emphasize the spatial distinction that is made with burial. Of course, this treatment varies in accordance with the type of lethal violence that is employed, but even in the most secretive and secluded disposal, it serves to mark a form of boundary, whether personal (as in the case of murder) or public (the mass grave). In regard to lethal forms of punishment, the treatment of the body both prior to and after death serves as an object lesson in the force of law. Both the death and the body are displayed in a particular manner. Unlike a corpse at a wake or funeral, these corpses are exposed, and their exposure effectively marks the limits of the city as both a physical and a politico-legal entity. By seeing the exhibition of death beyond the pale, the subject internalizes the division that the law proclaims. The structural arrangement of the corpse effec-

tively strips it of any suggestion of transcendence; it is pure body, a *corpus sans spiritus*, and as such, it acts as a final marker between the inside and the outside. What emerges in this limit figure (the *corpus sans spiritus*) is not the clear and final division of the outside and the inside but rather the radical crisis of the possibility of clearly distinguishing between what is outside and what is inside.

Burial Within the City

The question of death is also reflected in the structure of the sanctified burial ground, but the configuration of this structure is decidedly different. In the death that occurs beyond the pale, the corpse is exposed in a radical sense; it is discarded like an empty husk, stripped of any residual shred of human significance, and in this exhibition of its nudity, it becomes an object of disgust. Its presentation is structured to reveal its nonsignificance in terms of the good life. In the death of the citizen, the corpse is the site of an elaborate set of rituals and ceremonies that affirm its spiritual identity. The nudity of this corpse is hidden in the mortuary; it is remade in the image of the one who lived, but this cosmetic façade is unstable. The presentable corpse, dressed and painted, is a disturbing sight; no doubt, this disturbance is muted by the façade and the rituals that aim to stabilize the image, but we cannot escape the paradoxical appearance of the one we once knew as they never were.

This paradoxical disruption does not end with the burial of the corpse; it remains embedded in the architectural edifice that commemorates the dead citizen as an emblem of the good life. The burial ground is conditioned by the question of death; this question threatens to disrupt the utopian project and the good life that it prescribes. To compensate for this threat, the utopian project is put into operation. As a result, the built environment is shaped by the desire to avoid death. This desire to close the question of death or at least structure its expression in a socially useful manner is clearly displayed in the discourse that surrounds the development of the modern cemetery.

In *A Celebration of Death*, James Curl notes that the large cemeteries that were constructed in the nineteenth century were effectively the result of a more general movement toward the civilizing of urban man. For figures such as John Claudius Loudon (an influential nineteenth-century Scottish

city planner and landscape architect), the burial ground serves two basic objectives. The first is practical, as it primarily involves questions of sanitation, but the second objective is to develop and refine the moral sentiments of society. The aesthetics of the cemetery was of great concern to Loudon, as he saw its form as the primary means through which the public's moral sentiments could be shaped. Landscape architecture thus operates on the burial ground by refining it into a useful tool of social instruction. This conversion of the churchyard into a useful social object involved a meticulous form of microengineering in which all of the details of the cemeteries layout become relevant.

The necropolis is a combination of pragmatic hygiene and social engineering; it is a tool to instruct and improve the moral form of the masses, but to be effective, its built façade must effectively remove any and all suggestion of disturbance. Functionally speaking, the cemetery is an integral part of the city, yet the relationship between this unquestionably necessary urban artifact and the remainder of the city is one of tension. This tension is the result of the disruption (the question death and the corruption of the corpse) that the place of the cemetery is supposed to let rest, to *inter*; the disruptive event of death resists the sign of the tomb that marks it. To an extent, this disruption is an effect of the pathogenic nature of the corpse, a manifestation of the pragmatic hygiene of urban planning, and yet, the regulations that surround the place of burial extend beyond these practical concerns and are indicative of other motivations. These other motivations center on what Loudon calls the amelioration and instruction of the moral sentiments. Effectively, the cemetery as the sanctified burial ground of the city must accomplish the impossible. It must, through its very structure, provide an answer to the question of death and by doing so give shape to the good life. But, as we have noted, the answer that is offered and the structural form that it is given is always already under the threat of the question of death. As a result the cemetery exists as an uncanny site within the urban fabric. That is to say, the cemetery is an urban artifact that is both estranged from the city and at the heart of it. This spatial tension is evidenced in the typical placement of the necropolis on the periphery of the city; or as the city expands over time and encloses it, the necropolis forms a type of silent peripheral pocket within the fabric of the city.

Funereal architecture exists as an attempt to answer the question of existence. It does not provide this answer in a final and comprehensive sense; rather, it points the way to the afterlife by offering the subject a reassuring signpost on the road of the good life. This promise is conditional; to achieve this end, the subject must keep to the path of the good life. The burial site strengthens the bars of the soul that shapes and conditions the body; it must "live thus." The funereal artifact does not close the question of death. It gives shape to the question. The architectural structure of the necropolis gives this anxious energy a trajectory. But, this site traffics in the uncontainable, in the nonsensical, in death, and as such, tension and instability pervade its structure. The regulations that govern the use of this space, which are in effect regardless of the topographical positioning, are indicative of this tension. This tension manifests itself in the compulsion to regulate the place of the burial, yet while the boundaries of the cemetery are strictly demarcated, it is not, strictly speaking, contained. The place of the cemetery determines the use of the spaces that border it. The contaminative effect of the cemetery is regulated under the guise of a reverence for this place as sacred, as hallowed ground, but the ridged constraints of ritual and ceremony cannot suspend the uncanny effect of the sign of the grave. Despite the strict regulation of the various ceremonies and processions, which surround the internment of the dead, the union of the sign (the grave) and the event (death) is fundamentally incomplete.

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See also City of Memory; Mumford, Lewis

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NEIGHBORHOOD REVITALIZATION

One of the most noteworthy and controversial urban phenomena since the late 1970s has been the upgrading of central cities and urban neighborhoods, which has attracted middle-class households back to the city. This trend started in the older metropolitan cities of the United States, followed by the cities of other Western countries, and later, to varying extents, expanded to cities and towns of all sizes and characters throughout the world. Neighborhood revitalization involves investments that upgrade the properties and services, which, in turn, attract higher-income people who appreciate and enjoy the amenities and quality of life that the rehabilitated neighborhood offers. Those areas where neighborhood revitalization has occurred had previously lost significant proportions of their populations and businesses, to the point that they became areas of low-income households, a dilapidated building stock, and a decaying physical environment. Neighborhood revitalization has been hailed as the key to bringing life into otherwise struggling inner cities. With investment, households with higher disposable income and better taste move to the inner cities and attract the kinds of businesses and services that the new demographic profile demands. Consequently, the property market rises and business activity expands.

Historical Evolution

The preference of households for urban as opposed to suburban living became an important topic in the urban literature in the last quarter of the twentieth

century and has led to controversy over its motivations and consequences. Such a preference was contrary to the suburbanization trend that started after World War II and became widespread, particularly in U.S. cities. During the 1970s, however, a reversal of this trend occurred as households with unconventional needs and tastes looked for opportunities to settle in cities. In some cases, this happened simultaneously with reinvestment in central business districts, meant to strengthen them in the competition with suburban malls.

The phenomenon of neighborhood revitalization manifests itself in different ways, and various terms have been used, with each considering a different aspect. Among these, *back-to-the-city movement* emphasizes the role of households' preferences and implies a reverse movement toward cities; *incumbent upgrading* focuses on the physical improvements of buildings, referring particularly to those cases where the original property owners undertake the work; and *gentrification* implies, together with physical upgrading of the neighborhood and the improvement of services, a considerable transformation in the social and economic composition of the neighborhood in favor of a higher-income population. Neighborhood revitalization focuses more on the physical and environmental improvement side of the phenomenon rather than the motivations behind these interventions and their social and economic implications.

As the above terms also indicate, neighborhood revitalization has a number of dimensions. First is the presence of a building stock with architectural character and potential for renovation. Second is the enthusiasm of households to live in inner cities and their willingness to invest in upgrading their properties. The third aspect is the availability of public policies and subsidy programs that encourage investment in older buildings and that facilitate the involvement of various actors, individual and institutional. The fourth is the existence of a dynamic property market into which renovated properties can easily be integrated.

An inevitable quality that accompanies neighborhood revitalization is the change in the physical conditions of the neighborhoods. Such neighborhoods frequently have a stock of run-down buildings that are worthy of renovation. In many instances, these neighborhoods are areas with historical character both in relation to the setting and

in terms of architectural features. Prototypical examples are neighborhoods with row houses that are directly accessible from the sidewalk and built along streets lined with trees, as well as buildings with cozy interiors, decorated with features like fireplaces, stained glass windows, and elaborate facades. As opposed to the standard suburban settings that are criticized for lack of identity, the sterility of daily life, and a sense of placelessness, historic inner cities are apparently more authentic and attractive and have more character, qualities desired by people who engage in renovation activities.

Impetus for Change

Different actors and agents are involved in neighborhood revitalization, and their involvement takes diverse forms. Especially in bigger cities, artists and marginal households with limited capital and a need for large yet affordable spaces became pioneers who entered the inner-city neighborhoods and grasped the opportunities offered by urban living. This was the case in New York's SoHo district, where designation to preserve historic buildings made it the location of choice for artists and their studios and, later, for galleries and upscale restaurants and stores. Another group of actors were the yuppies, single or newlywed young professionals with high disposable incomes and expensive tastes, who favored the vitality of central cities over the suburbs and became the initiators of revitalization efforts in some inner cities. In general, the changes started with middle-income households, which bought properties in declining neighborhoods. The purpose of renovation, in all these cases, was to make run-down properties fit the needs of the new owners. What followed were the area's increasing popularity and the subsequent influx of new waves of buyers who invested money in renovations.

In more than a few cases, the processes were facilitated by deliberate public policy decisions and actions, as was the case in Philadelphia's Society Hill. For example, city administrations provided public financing to help homeowners renovate their properties, as occurred in the Mexican War Streets area of Pittsburgh, where the scale and speed of the improvements remained modest. In others, dilapidated historic areas became sites for privately financed large-scale redevelopment projects as part of the efforts to promote a city's

emerging identity. Early examples of these were seen in American cities like Baltimore, Boston, and San Francisco and later spread out to European and Australian cities.

In addition to launching such project-based interventions, local and central governments played a vital role in the initiation of revitalization in inner cities through other policy measures, such as providing low interest loans or tax incentives. Indirectly, this encouraged property owners to invest significant amounts of monies in their properties. The policy decisions that make neighborhood revitalization possible may have motives that go beyond physical upgrading. The agenda may be to sanitize an area of its social problems supposedly related to the concentration of poor or minority populations. The arrival of higher-income households and the subsequent provision of facilities and services that appeal to this new population trigger other changes such as increases in the tax base. The neighborhood thus becomes less and less affordable for the original residents, eventually leading to their displacement. Displacement has been the most controversial social consequence of neighborhood change, particularly in discussions about gentrification.

The real estate market plays a significant role in promoting revitalization. In addition to pursuing investment opportunities—both residential and commercial—in these neighborhoods, private investors promote inner-city living as a lifestyle decision in the mass media and present revitalizing urban neighborhoods as an alternative to the sterile settings offered by suburban living. This publicity has had significant effects on urban restructuring.

These urban changes have initiated theories to explain them. Classical theories of neighborhood succession cast the changes in the housing market in terms of a residential ladder of housing quality, with housing units becoming obsolete over time and “trickling down” to lower-income households. This model has been used extensively to explain the move to the suburbs. It involves two parallel processes: (1) the accumulation of wealth, such that households could afford larger and newer houses on the periphery, and (2) the aging of the building stock in the central cities. However, the model is ineffective in explaining the preference for inner-city living by relatively affluent households, as is the case in neighborhood revitalization.

Opposed to this consumption-side approach based on neoclassical economics, the Marxist explanation, for which the cycles of investment in the urban land are the essence of urban transformation, emphasizes the production of areas that attract reinvestment. Consequently, revitalization is a mechanism for attracting reinvestment and maximizing rent, making the run-down and otherwise unprofitable areas profitable again. In this model, the intent is to attract people and capital to particular urban areas that had deteriorated because they had become obsolete in terms of their previous functions and rent-gaining capacities. Accordingly, living in rehabilitated inner cities is encouraged through investment decisions that are structurally built into the capitalist land market. The production of areas for revitalization is emphasized but attention is also given to the production of consumers. Structural changes in society, the labor market, and new lifestyle trends have promoted the assets of urban living among young professionals.

Debate persists on the significance of neighborhood revitalization as a trend, the extent of its influences on the identity of cities, and the degree to which it characterizes the locational choices of households. It does seem that its place in the literature has been larger than what actually occurs across urban residential areas. Yet, the significance of the phenomenon lies not in its being a prevalent tendency but in the way it counteracts previous trends. In essence, neighborhood revitalization represents another instance where cities have become an arena reflecting people's decisions to respond to changing economic, social, and political conditions.

Zuhul Ulusoy

See also Back-to-the-City Movement; Community Development; Gentrification; Housing; Real Estate; Urban Planning

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NEW DELHI, INDIA

See Delhi, India

NEW REGIONALISM

The *new regionalism* is a term that first made its appearance in U.S. scholarly journals in the mid-1990s. It describes widely varying approaches to addressing major urban metropolitan problems including economic competitiveness, social equity, and sustainable land use and infrastructure development. Although various activities are associated with the new regionalism, it is neither an organized political or advocacy movement. What most clearly distinguishes it are the scale and types of problems it addresses and how it differs from traditional regionalism.

The Old Regionalism

The traditional approach to regionalism in the United States developed out of the political reform movement that began toward the end of the nineteenth century. One of the principal objectives of that movement was to develop alternatives to the control of city governments by political machines, which reformers characterized as corrupt and inefficient.

Reformers started by crafting a model city charter, then a model county charter, and by the late 1920s, they began focusing on the issue of metropolitan regional governance. Initially, reformers advocated city-county consolidations or agglomerations as the preferred solution for the development of metropolitan government. Consolidations involved merging the central city and its surrounding county into a single government. The first such consolidation was the city and county of Philadelphia in 1854. Agglomerations consist of a city taking parts of one or all or parts of more than one of its surrounding counties to create a city-county or a city containing counties within it. The

most significant example of an agglomeration is Greater New York, which was forged out of five boroughs (counties) in 1898.

Through consolidation, agglomeration, and the unilateral annexation of suburban municipalities and unincorporated areas, reformers proposed to give central cities administrative control over their urban region. They believed that such unitary administration would assure orderly and efficient land and infrastructure development, greater accountability, and increased economic competitiveness. But by the 1920s, affluent suburban municipalities had gained enough political influence with their state legislatures to reduce or eliminate unilateral absorption by their central cities. Consequently, reformers shifted their strategy to emphasize the coordination of local governments and the development of voluntary comprehensive regional plans. At the same time, reformers opposed addressing regional challenges through the creation of special districts and single-purpose authorities, which they felt would aggravate metropolitan jurisdictional fragmentation.

The regional agenda of the reformers, specifically, the idea of coordination to overcome fragmentation, was adopted by the Progressive movement at the federal level beginning in the 1930s. But the aggressive implementation of this reform commenced only in the late 1950s when federal programs began attaching requirements for regional coordination to the granting of funds for a wide variety of programs. In addition to advocating coordination to achieve greater efficiency, coordination was employed to address the growing social and fiscal inequities between declining central cities and their increasingly affluent suburbs and to deal with problems of environmental pollution. Assuming coordinating responsibilities, Associations or Councils of Governments (COGs) and Metropolitan Planning Organizations (MPOs) formed in virtually every region of the country. By the end of the 1970s, there were 37 such federal programs and additional state programs requiring some form of regional coordination.

Federal policy promoting regionalism through coordinating councils reversed sharply in the early 1980s during the Reagan administration. In place of policies requiring coordination, it was argued that market competition could sort out regional issues more effectively. Consequently,

many coordination-based programs were eliminated or funds were significantly reduced, especially in those programs addressing social equity issues. At the same time, the federal government advocated devolution, leaving states and local governments to determine how or whether to organize at the regional scale.

Emergence and Characteristics of a New Regionalism

Even though the old regionalism of the reform and Progressive movements had lost much of its political momentum by the mid-1980s, issues requiring a regional response seemed even more challenging. In the economic arena, regionalism had always been advocated on grounds of enhancing economic competitiveness. However, the challenge of competitiveness was now reframed by globalization. In this new order, polycentric regions rather than regions with a single dominant central business district were becoming the new units of economic competition. In the environmental arena, preventing pollution continued to be a concern, but the more holistic challenge of achieving sustainable environmental development had subsumed it. In the arena of social equity, concentrated poverty in central cities was still a challenge, but increasingly, this was seen as an issue for older inner-ring suburbs as well. Social equity concerns were also broadened to include workforce housing, transit, job creation, and education, all at a regional scale.

The scope, scale, and complexity of the new regional challenges were well beyond those addressed under the old regionalism. In addition, the difficulties of overcoming the growing political fragmentation of metropolitan areas seemed even more daunting. By the early 1990s, political scientists and policy analysts recognized the emergence of new approaches to regional challenges. Unlike the reformers, the practitioners of the new regionalism were not part of a single movement. Rather, they worked on a region-by-region basis tackling specific challenges. Nevertheless, several characteristics define the new approach in contrast with the old.

Regional Versus Metropolitan. Earlier reformers analyzed regions from the perspective of the central cities. Regions were to be designed to support the vitality of the central business district where

suburbanites found employment. By contrast, new regionalists treat the central city as an integral part, but not as the controlling center, of a region. In fact, many practitioners of the new regionalism are working in areas where there is no dominant central city.

Multiple Versus Single Boundaries. Reformers preferred to define a region with a single jurisdictional boundary. Ideally, regions should function like general governments meeting a variety of planning and service needs within one territory. But defining a single boundary for a region is politically difficult and functionally questionable. Regional boundaries based on water issues are not necessarily the same as those for dealing with air quality or transportation, housing, or any number of other functional concerns. Because new regionalists typically are not advocating for the creation of general government, they are willing to let the definition of a region's boundaries fluctuate depending on the specific issues being addressed.

Governance Versus Government. Reformers advocated for regionalism that would result in a distinct layer of government between the local and the state levels. This layer of government would set policies and deliver services. By contrast, the new regionalists draw a distinction between government and governance by suggesting that what is needed at the regional level is an enhanced ability to shape policy. This can be achieved by organized interest groups within a region, which can in turn influence the development of regional policy independent of creating a formal structure of government. This is not to suggest that there are never times when new regionalists advocate for a new government capacity, such as the creation of a regional authority, but this occurs as a strategic implementation decision rather than as a general solution to be applied to all issues.

Collaboration Versus Coordination. The old regionalism, from the late 1950s to the mid-1980s, emphasized coordination among the governments of a region as the chief means for achieving effective policy formulation and implementation. The new regionalists place greater emphasis on collaboration, which relies on high levels of trust rather than on the authorized use of power.

Multisector Versus Public Sector. For reformers, the development of regionalism was a challenge falling to the public or governmental sector. By contrast, for the new regionalists, development of the capacity to govern regions is a concern for all sectors: public, private, and nonprofit. In fact, most efforts of the new regionalism are led by interests outside of the public sector. Because a broad range of multisector partners tends to be involved, their relationship is not structured hierarchically (by scale and levels of power) with formal obligations to one another, but rather in the form of a network in which relations between organizations are collaborative and often voluntary.

These initiatives are not necessarily found in all regions. Rather specific regions tend to employ those approaches that pragmatically meet their needs. Whether the new regionalism will prove more effective than the old is yet to be demonstrated. What is clear is that this new approach is increasingly evident in the United States.

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See also Governance; Metropolitan Governance; Regional Governance; Urban Planning

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NEW URBANISM

The new urbanism is an urban design and planning movement that began in the United States of

America in the 1980s. It advocates changing the form of human settlements by reviving the urban planning tradition nearly abandoned after World War II. Thus, we may consider it the old urbanism updated to accommodate metropolitan evolution during the twentieth century. The Congress for the New Urbanism (CNU) supports it formally.

The new urbanism unites an interdisciplinary group of practitioners and scholars who deplore the ravages of metropolitan sprawl. Sharing best practices across disciplines, they promote open-space conservation, the development of transit, compact walkable neighborhoods, and green building. The new urbanism applies lessons from historical urbanism to contemporary urban and regional concerns. The movement relies heavily on peer review and open-source methods sustained by Listservs and regular meetings. Although critics sometimes object that it is artificial, several organizations promote its principles. Both the development community and governments increasingly accept it.

History

Well before they coined *new urbanism*, new urbanists had built several communities and had started several initiatives. Beginning in the 1970s, designers and critics in the United States and Europe, including Leon Krier, Christopher Alexander, Robert Stern, Colin Rowe, Vincent Scully, Jacqueline Robertson, Gordon Cullen and others, called attention to enduring urban design and architectural principles. Especially in the United States, they sought to continue the traditions of the Garden City movement, the Anglo-American suburb, and the City Beautiful movement. Seaside, Florida, the first community generally recognized as new urbanist, broke ground in 1981. It was designed by Duany Plater-Zyberk & Company with developer Robert Davis. While we may consider much of the work of these practitioners to be postmodern, Seaside was a resort community that appealed to a broad sector of the public. RTKL's State-Thomas project in Dallas, Texas, built in 1985, and the IBA competitions for rebuilding Berlin in 1979, 1984, and 1987 reintroduced traditional mixed-use projects into urban settings. The renovation of the Diggs Town public housing in Norfolk, Virginia, by Urban Design Associates in 1990 gave residents

clear, socially legible porches and front doors—a tangible benefit of traditional design.

In 1988, His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales, with Leon Krier, started planning a new village called Poundbury in the Duchy of Cornwall in the United Kingdom. Since its groundbreaking in 1993, it has grown incrementally and arguably has the most successful mix of incomes and uses—including workplaces—of any new urbanist development. Kentlands, Celebration, and other developments of the late 1980s and early 1990s were among the first new urbanist developments to compete directly with suburban subdivisions. These traditional neighborhood developments include neighborhoods and town centers. One, Laguna West near Sacramento, California, designed by Calthorpe Associates, broke ground in 1989. It mixed conventional suburban practices with new urbanist ones and provoked discussion about the need for a common language and principles.

The new urbanism's peer review process has depended on a common terminology. New and recovered terms have helped it develop ideas with a consistency unusual in planning movements. One such early term, *pedestrian pocket*, coined by Peter Calthorpe, denoted a compact urban center around a rail transit stop. A collaborative competition among designers published its results in *The Pedestrian Pocket Book: A New Suburban Strategy*, edited by Douglas Kelbaugh and published in 1988. It solidified the meaning of the term, popularized it, and used it to illustrate appropriate development around transit. Since 1998, Andres Duany, in both the unpublished but circulated book *The Lexicon of the New Urbanism* and the *SmartCode* has insisted on consistent terminology to promote new and recovered ideas.

Form-based codes have long guided new urbanism. Such codes prescribe building form to characterize public space and to ensure compatibility among building uses. The first codes, such as Seaside's in 1981, let developers impose requirements on buildings in their own developments. Later form-based codes, such as Dover-Kohl's *Columbia Pike Special Revitalization District Form Based Code*, regulated streets as well. The *SmartCode* is the most widely used form-based code today; it can regulate at scales from the region to the building, and governments can adopt it as an optional overlay or as a mandatory regulation.

In October 1991, Judy Corbett, executive director of the Local Government Commission, presented the Ahwahnee Principles to 100 mayors. She, Peter Calthorpe, Michael Corbett, Andres Duany, Peter Katz, Elizabeth Moule, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, Stephanos Polyzoides and Steve Weissman wrote the principles, which describe resource-efficient communities. New urbanists then realized that they must set out their own principles in full if they were to wield influence. The Seaside Institute, founded in 1992, provided an early venue for sharing tools and information. The first Congress for the new urbanism in 1993 was an invitation-only gathering of like-minded professionals. It coincided with the publication of Peter Katz's book, *The New Urbanism*, which described and illustrated the movement's principles. In this seminal publication of the new urbanism, Katz and Vincent Scully defined the terms of the new urbanism. The CNU emulated the Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne, which promulgated modernism in the mid-twentieth century. The CNU's Charter of the New Urbanism, adopted in 1996, refashioned and extended the Ahwahnee Principles. It sought to reverse disinvestment in cities, shape regions, preserve open space, and make transportation more efficient. The charter was also more explicit in its call for a neighborhood structure that is sensitive to history and the landscape.

New urbanist principles put a high priority on the repair of existing urbanism, a fact often overlooked by critics. DPZ's Stuart Florida Redevelopment Master Plan and its Mashpee Commons redevelopment in Mashpee, Massachusetts, date to the 1980s. By their very nature, such urban redevelopments were incremental. By the mid 1990s, however, terms such as *brownfield* and *greyfield* were entering common usage, and transit-oriented design had become well known (especially through Michael Bernick and Robert Cervero's 1997 book, *Transit Villages in the 21st Century*). Urban extensions, such as DPZ's Cornell in Ontario and Stapleton in Denver, designed by Peter Calthorpe and Cooper Robertson (breaking ground in 1997 and 2001, respectively), joined the older, pioneering large infill developments on unused or underused land, such as Harbor Town in Memphis, Tennessee, by Looney Ricks Kiss. It had broken ground in 1989.

New urbanists' interdisciplinary collaboration continues. The number of New Urban developments

has increased steadily from the mid-1980s, and most of them have required some form of variance from zoning or a revision to conventional specialists' standards. New urbanists have collaborated across disciplines to effect reforms—first on a project-driven basis and then through CNU initiatives and summits. HOPE VI, a U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) standard for restructuring its housing projects, followed a proposal by the CNU. HUD adopted it under Henry Cisneros in 1996. (Secretary Cisneros is a signatory to the charter.) Beginning in 2001, the CNU began to hold specialized councils on issues such as transportation, green building, and retail. It has also pursued joint projects. Two current ones are Context-Sensitive Solutions in Designing Major Urban Thoroughfares for Walkable Communities—a CNU/Institute of Transportation Engineers—proposed recommended practice released in draft form in 2006—and the U.S. Green Building Council's (USGBC) LEED for Neighborhood Development rating system, which entered its pilot phase in 2007.

Smart growth and the new urbanism have worked toward the same goals. In 1996, Harriet Tregoning of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency helped organize the Smart Growth Network—an umbrella network of environmental, preservation, and development groups as well as state and local governments. The CNU helped to seed Smart Growth America (SGA) in 2000, which has taken up many of the policy initiatives and political positions imperative to good urbanism. These organizations share the same intent and techniques as the new urbanism but tend to be policy oriented and government initiated rather than market oriented and developer initiated.

After Hurricane Katrina, the CNU brought about 140 architects, planners, and engineers to the Mississippi Renewal Forum under the auspices of the Commission on Recovery, Rebuilding, and Renewal. The movement's unusual cohesion allowed it to respond quickly. Just six weeks after the storm, the CNU convened about 50 local public officials and local professionals to plan for rebuilding 11 cities and towns. Many Gulf Coast communities have adopted or calibrated SmartCodes as that forum proposed, and a parallel planning process was sponsored by the Louisiana Recovery Authority. At the same time, several new urbanist architects

developed Katrina cottages—a new, modest but dignified prototype for emergency housing.

Recently, the new urbanism has been entering the mainstream. Celebration, developed by the Walt Disney Company in Orlando, Florida, is arguably the first corporate new urbanist traditional neighborhood development and is complete after several phases. In 2004, a high-volume builder, Whittaker Homes, began development of New Town at St. Charles, Missouri. The CNU is growing steadily, and at its 2008 Congress, its new chairman of the board announced a platform of green principles that align it even more closely with European urban movements and with the smart growth movement.

Values and Characteristics

The new urbanists share a generalized vision of sustainable metropolitan organization and compact walkable communities. They operate through a self-critical peer review process through vehicles such as congresses, listserves, publications, councils, awards, and local chapters. Most of these are within the CNU itself, but some operate independently—notably the Form-Based Codes Institute and the National Charette Institute. The swarm-like process supports initiatives and innovations that respond to practical needs.

The Region: Metropolis, City, and Town

The new urbanism promotes the elements of healthy metropolitan form. This includes (1) polycentric metropolises organized so as to produce a coherent whole of nature, farmland, and a hierarchy of communities: villages, towns, and cities organized along transportation routes; (2) investment in cities and their infrastructure; (3) limits to encroachment onto natural and agricultural open space; (4) jobs and correspondingly priced housing linked by a transportation network that incorporates transit; (5) regional cooperation to coordinate growth; and (6) communities composed of identifiable neighborhoods and districts.

The Neighborhood, the District, and the Corridor

The new urbanism organizes public infrastructure and private development into neighborhoods,

districts, and corridors, which in turn combine into towns and cities. Characteristics include (1) compact, pedestrian-friendly, and mixed-use fabric; (2) a pedestrian shed, reflecting the distance people will willingly walk (5–10 minutes), organized so that daily destinations and transit are easy to reach on foot; (3) a continuous street grid laid out so that local traffic can avoid arterials, in a pattern that responds to local topography, climate, and history; (4) a mix of building types and uses that includes dwellings and business quarters, with sufficient density to justify conveniences within walking distance; (5) respect for historic buildings, neighborhoods, and landscapes; (6) environmental practices, open spaces, parks, and infrastructure that are adjusted to the intensity of the urbanism and that promote natural methods of climate control and water conservation; (7) recognizable types of civic open spaces molded by urban buildings; and (8) urban design regulated through graphic design and/or zoning codes.

The Block, the Street, and the Building

New urbanism considers the block, street, and building to be the fundamental components of urbanism. Guiding principles include (1) blocks that average a quarter mile or less in perimeter to provide frequent intersections and slow traffic and give pedestrians more choices; (2) streets designed and sized for the comfort of cyclists and pedestrians, with wider sidewalks, and narrow lanes to keep vehicles at safe speeds; (3) buildings with facades that align to bound public spaces physically—rather than stand as objects in the landscape; (4) building types whose proportions enable them to be organized into a harmonious ensemble—regardless of style; (5) parking on streets and behind buildings; (6) a system of familiar and appropriate public and private boundaries, such as fences, hedges, gates, porches, and doors; (7) civic buildings designed to be more prominent than ordinary buildings, by siting if not by size; and (8) historic buildings preserved whenever feasible and emulated when they form an urban fabric.

Organizations

The CNU is the leading new urbanist organization, founded in 1992 by Peter Calthorpe, Andres

Duany, Elizabeth Moule, Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk, Stephanos Polyzoides, and Daniel Solomon, with Peter Katz as its first executive director. In 1993, Andres Duany and Dhiru Thadani convened the first invitation-only CNU in Alexandria, Virginia. The second and third were organized in Los Angeles and San Francisco by Moule, Polyzoides, and Katz, and Calthorpe, Solomon, and Katz, respectively. From this tight-knit group, the organization has grown to a membership of about 20 countries. Its charter, signed at its fourth congress in Charleston, South Carolina, documented its core principles. Since its fifth (and first international) congress in Toronto, it has had an open membership. It holds congresses, annual summits, and topic-oriented councils, and it has local chapters as well as next-generation and students for the new urbanism organizations. Each year, the CNU gives its charter awards to outstanding new urbanist projects, and it awards Athena medals to people whose work paved the way for new urbanism.

Under the patronage of the Prince of Wales, a series of European organizations with similar goals have formed, including the Prince's Foundation for the Built Environment (INTBAU) and the Council for European Urbanism (CEU). Each of these organizations has as an explicit part of its mission the recovery of traditional urbanism and a strong emphasis on environmental, urban, and brownfields issues. Other like-minded organizations, such as the Australian Council for the New Urbanism and the Council for Canadian Urbanism (CCanU), are local to particular countries. Partnerships among these groups have been essential to the new urbanism's ability to take on emerging issues such as global warming with agility.

Critiques of the New Urbanism

Critics of the new urbanism often suggest that it is artificial, denies modernity, or is coercive. Some critics compare New Urban development to Disneyland. They point out that the movie *The Truman Show* used the carefully redressed Seaside as a set. Andrew Ross's 1999 book, *The Celebration Chronicles: Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Property Values in Disney's New Town*, explored the tension between real estate realities and the idealism inherent in founding a community. New urbanists concerned with such issues, such as

attorneys Dan Slone and Doris Goldstein (authors of *A Legal Guide to Urban and Sustainable Development for Planners, Developers, and Architects*), seek ways to ensure that new urbanist developments have the tools to govern themselves as communities.

Reed Karloff, like many critics, worries that new urbanism's highly controlled urban form sacrifices creativity. While traditional architects will cheerfully agree to use a code, modernist architects, who place a high value on originality, balk at even a modernist code. The critique suggests that a high degree of control over physical form is not necessary for a robust urbanism. Some, notably John Kaliski and Margaret Crawford—authors of *Everyday Urbanism*—champion the vital, informal urbanism of squatter settlements and improvised commerce. Although they insist that the urban fabric should be harmonious, new urbanists—notably Andres Duany—sometimes design explicitly modernist projects such as Prospect or Aqua or propose permit-free zones inspired by informal settlements.

Randal O'Toole, a senior fellow at the Cato Institute, has written extensively on transit and urban development issues. He suggests that the new urbanism and smart growth will force everyone into high density and extract high subsidies for transit. O'Toole has engaged smart growth and new urbanism in several venues, including debates in conjunction with the CNU. Like most such critics, his is a libertarian critique rather than a conservative critique. Conservatives are not unanimous in opposing transit and compact development; in fact, the Free Congress Foundation is supportive. Smart Growth America and the CNU counter that transit subsidies merely level the playing field, as road building is heavily subsidized. Similarly, new urbanists point out that those regulatory reforms—particularly opt-in form-based codes—legalize new urbanism that otherwise remains illegal in many jurisdictions with conventional suburban zoning codes.

Although critics often refer to the perils of dogma, new urbanists can point to principles and techniques that continue to evolve from their engagement with critics.

Elizabeth Plater-Zyberk and Bruce F. Donnelly

See also City Planning; Local Government; Metropolitan Region; New Regionalism; Placemaking; Sprawl; Suburbanization; Urban Design; Urban Planning

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NEW URBAN SOCIOLOGY

The new urban sociology is a major paradigm developed in the 1970s and 1980s to challenge the fundamental assumptions and explanatory schemes of mainstream urban ecology and sociology. Although there are differences among the various theories that constitute new urban sociology, several major assumptions define the paradigm. First, it eschews strict demographic and variable-oriented analyses and focuses attention on the centrality of human agency and conflict in the determination of cities and urban life. The primary role of powerful economic actors, especially those in the real estate industry, in building and redeveloping cities is a predominant theme and topic among proponents. Another core assumption of the new urban sociology is that metropolitan development and patterns of spatial segregation are not inevitable but result from the conscious actions taken by individual decision makers in various class, race, gender, and community-based groups, acting under particular historical circumstances. In addition to the stress on human agency, the new urban sociology focuses on urban space as a constitutive dimension of social relations and a material product (e.g., the built

environment) that can affect social relations. Moreover, the new urban sociology stresses the importance of symbols, meanings, and culture in shaping cities. This urban semiotic approach involves the exploration of sociomaterial objects and their constructed meanings as mediated through a constellation of signs and symbols they evoke and convey. Finally, the new urban sociology emphasizes the importance of global transformation as central to shaping life in all urban and metropolitan regions. This global approach is concerned with the influence of global political and economic forces as well as national and local patterns in shaping life in urban and metropolitan regions. The new urban sociology seeks to illuminate the web of complex relationships and interconnections that constitute the interplay of the local and global in the building of metropolitan space.

Historical Evolution

The new urban sociology begins with critical urban sociologists of the 1960s and 1970s, who became dissatisfied with urban ecology and mainstream urban sociology and developed a distinct approach to urban problems. During the 1950s and 1960s, urban sociology was dominated by structural–functionalist assumptions and major ecological themes and approaches. In the early 1970s, several Marxist social scientists including Manuel Castells, David Harvey, and Henri Lefebvre, among other scholars, began to revise Karl Marx’s ideas to explain uneven metropolitan development, urban industrial decline, gentrification, and suburbanization, among other urban phenomena.

Castells proposed that urban scholars focus on the collective consumption characteristic of urbanized nations and the way in which political and economic conflicts within cities generate urban social movements for change. David Harvey, in contrast, argued that the central issue in making sense of cities was neither collective consumption nor class struggle but capital accumulation. Influenced by Lefebvre, Harvey argued that investment in land and real estate is an important means of accumulating wealth and a crucial activity that pushes the growth of cities in specific ways. Processes as diverse as urban disinvestment, suburbanization,

deindustrialization, urban renewal, and gentrification are part and parcel of the continuous reshaping of the built environment in pursuit of profit. According to Harvey, powerful real estate actors invest, disinvest, and reshape land uses in a process of creative destruction that destroys communities and produces intense social conflicts and struggles over meanings and uses of urban space.

Despite their different emphases, the work of these critical scholars helped focus scholarly attention on the capitalist system of for-profit production generally, and class struggle and capital accumulation specifically, as analytical starting points for understanding the nature of urban redevelopment and disinvestment. Although there was disagreement among these scholars, they all rejected the possibility of rational planning becoming the solution to urban problems because the latter are intertwined with class conflict and constituted by relations of capitalist domination and subordination.

The 1980s and 1990s witnessed phenomenal growth and institutionalization of the new urban sociology in the United States and Europe; at the same time, the paradigm became more heterogeneous and interdisciplinary. In the 1980s, the work of Joe Feagin and Mark Gottdiener together developed a systematic conception of the new urban sociology as a new approach to theorize and analyze the interconnections between urban life and wider macrolevel processes. A central characteristic of Feagin and Gottdiener's approach was a sharp criticism of existing urban sociology in the United States and a call to designate social conflict and change as issues of special importance.

In the 1990s, Gottdiener and Hutchison developed the term *sociospatial perspective* to describe the new urban sociology paradigm, a term that accents the society-space synergy and emphasizes that cities are not simply population aggregates but forms of social organization composed of antagonistic social relations. They also use the term to distance themselves from older Marxist approaches that focus on processes of capital accumulation and class struggle as major drivers of urban organization and development. In particular, the sociospatial perspective is eclectic and attempts to take what is best from the several different critical urban theories and avoid the endemic reductionism that has characterized both traditional ecology and Marxian political economy.

The sociospatial perspective does not seek explanation by emphasizing a principal cause such as transportation technology, capital circulation, or production process. Rather, it takes a holistic view of cities and metropolitan development as the linked outcome of economic, political, and cultural factors.

Although scholars recognize that the new urban sociology has largely supplanted human ecology, they have disagreed over the years over whether the two approaches are totally antithetical and incompatible. Overall, the work of new urban sociology in the 1980s and later provided solid theoretical foundations for empirically based urban scholarship, which began to proliferate in the 1990s, including research on urban tourism and culture, urban politics, and studies of how cities serve as arenas and expressions of broader crisis tendencies within national and global regimes of capital accumulation.

Issues of Race and Real Estate

In the 2000s, scholars such as Feagin, Gotham, and Squires and Kubrin argued for a more nuanced and explicit consideration of race and racial inequalities within the new urban sociology paradigm. These scholars maintain that urban development is a manifestation of the logic of capital accumulation and can be traced to the continuing significance of racial discrimination and segregation as major organizing principles of cities. This new analytical focus examines the ways in which people are sorted into racial categories, how resources are distributed along racial lines, and how state policy shapes and is shaped by the racial contours of society. Central to the concept of race within new urban sociology is the idea that race has an emergent and variable quality rather than being a fixed or immutable group characteristic; social groups are politically constructed and exist as the outcome of diverse historical practices (e.g., programmatic organization of social policy, modes of political participation) that are continually subject to challenge over definition and meaning.

Of key importance for urban scholars are relations between race and ethnicity and other bases of social inequality, solidarity, and identity, such as gender, sexuality, nationality, religion, generation, language, and spatial location in the constitution

of urban space and uneven development. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, it is clear that cities and metropolitan areas are organized along racial lines as well as shaped by socioeconomic inequalities.

One of the major accomplishments of the new urban sociology has been to reconceptualize the real estate sector as a secondary circuit of investment that is relatively autonomous from the primary circuit of manufacturing. Initial work by Henri Lefebvre and David Harvey drew attention to the use value and exchange value of real estate and the crucial distinction between the primary and secondary circuits of capital investment. The primary circuit involves capital moving in and out of manufacturing and industrial production, whereas the secondary circuit refers to capitalist investment in land, real estate, housing, and the built environment. Over the decades, the theoretical richness of Lefebvre's and Harvey's arguments have inspired scholars to investigate capital flows into and out of the real estate sector, identify the crisis tendencies and contradictions of the secondary circuit, and fashion new theoretical and analytical tools to examine real estate processes and their linkages with uneven metropolitan development.

Recent research on the secondary circuit eschews a conception of real estate as a by-product or outgrowth of industrial capitalism and theorizes the real estate sector as having an intrinsic quality or *sui generis* character that forms an independent sector of the economy. Conceptualizing and analyzing the dynamics of the secondary circuit suggests a theory of circulating capital that emphasizes the irrationalities of the circulation process and the systemic crises that periodically affect real estate markets and cities. On the one hand, real estate can aid capital accumulation, if it is a profitable avenue for commercial investment and a source of mass consumption in the case of homeownership. On the other hand, real estate can be a barrier to capital accumulation, when its enduring qualities render it outdated and anachronistic, or when financing needed to construct, sell, and rehabilitate it are unavailable.

Insofar as possible, capital seeks to eradicate local peculiarities and place distinctions that characterize the buying and selling of commodities and thereby eliminate the spatial barriers to the circulation of capital. It is this duality, or inherent

contradiction, between immobile properties and mobile capital that defines modern capitalist urbanization and uneven development that is a central topic of theoretical and empirical research within the new urban sociology paradigm.

Contemporary Challenges

Today, the new urban sociology is at a crossroads. Diversification, specialization, and fragmentation define urban research as a variety of new approaches and paradigms call attention to the novelties of current urban trends and upheavals. The open and variegated theoretical landscape is transforming urban studies from a field dominated by a few paradigms and their delimited theories to one in which heterogeneity and intellectual fragmentation dominate the paradigm wars. In addition, a plethora of turns, including the postmodern turn, the cultural turn, and the linguistic turn, have emerged as major challenges to the dominance of the new urban sociology paradigm. Some theorists have asserted that paradigm-based research is largely irrelevant in a world dominated by hybrid theories and interdisciplinarity. Others argue that the passage of time and the heterogeneity of the new urban sociology have made it impossible to define the paradigm, given that it is not clear what is "new" about the paradigm because many of its theoretical assumptions were formulated in the 1980s and before. Two principal forecasts for the future of the new urban sociology emerge from these critiques.

One pessimistic view is that defining questions that are the distinctive domain of new urban sociology is an essentially fruitless and theoretically outmoded endeavor. This view celebrates fragmentation, discontinuity, and diversification trends and argues that the most interesting research is likely to emerge at the interface of disciplines. In contrast, an optimistic interpretation is that the new urban sociology will continue to animate urban studies, drive new research agendas, and influence debates on globalization processes and change in cities. For proponents of this perspective, the new urban sociology paradigm should take new directions and seize the opportunities afforded by interdisciplinarity while acknowledging that disciplinary boundaries are still important.

On the one hand, then, the future of the new urban sociology is bright because of the continued importance of globalization processes, race and class inequalities, and critical theorizing on cities. On the other hand, we may be entering a postdisciplinary era where distinctions between sociological, geographical, anthropological, and political interpretations and debates have less relevance to understanding urban phenomena. There are clearly a variety of interesting futures for the new urban sociology because of the paradigm's multidimensionality, theoretical and analytical diversity, and conceptual richness. Based on past trends and proven strengths, the utility of the new urban sociology lies in reclaiming and refreshing conventional approaches that are sensitive to urban inequality and that recognize the importance of nuance and sophisticated empirical research. Urban sociologists can respond to the challenge of interdisciplinarity and fragmentation in urban studies by focusing on perennial issues and topics including sociospatial divisions, poverty and segregation, the interplay of the global and the local in the development of cities, and the nexus of capitalist development and urbanization.

Kevin Fox Gotham

See also Castells, Manuel; Chicago School of Urban Sociology; Gottdiener, Mark; Harvey, David; Uneven Development; Urban Ecology (Chicago School); Urban Sociology; Urban Studies; Urban Theory

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NEW YORK CITY, NEW YORK

Urbanist approaches to New York remain deeply fragmented. The Russell Sage Foundation studies of the impact of the September 11, 2001, attacks, edited by Nancy Foner, John Mollenkopf, and Howard Chernick in 2005, appeared in three

volumes (social impact, politics of recovery, economic impact) with only minimal cross-referencing. Nuanced individual research projects are often praiseworthy, but the whole is in effect a heap of disconnected analyses, using different languages and addressing different readerships. The city's story remains many stories. It seems that readers do not expect, and may actually distrust, any attempt at larger coherence. Edmund G. Burrows and Mike Wallace's *Gotham* (1999) awaits completion. Narrative history regularly threatens to make a comeback but seldom seems capable of holding this complex metropolis in clear view.

The History of Change

Change, diversity, and fragmentation have been dominant themes in the interpretation of New York City as a community. Instability has been a way of life, a New York tradition. If change expressed the powerful social, cultural, and economic forces at work in the city, change was also an occasion for wounded regret. In 1839, the former Mayor Philip Hone noted in his manuscript diary the "rage for pulling down" in the city. Older structures hallowed by association with the city's past were heedlessly demolished. Gazing helplessly at the ruins of a house on John Street once owned by his father, Hone "mourned over the departure of an old acquaintance." As he memorably put it, the impulse to "Overturn, overturn, overturn!" seemed to express the spirit of New York.

But so, too, did a willingness to resist change. The historic preservation system, created with the passage of the landmark law in 1965, identified and sought to preserve some of the city's older buildings. Historic preservation became a potential counterforce to unrestricted real estate development. The struggle between the forces of change and the resistance to change, with intermittent community activism and sophisticated political campaigning, restates the city's dynamic—at once to welcome modernity, to tear down and glorify change, and yet to seek to conserve the traces of the past and sometimes to mourn their loss. But the labels we fix on such figures and groups are tendentious. It is not at all settled who are wearing the white hats and who the black, and this adds interesting ambiguity to the struggles and the outcomes.

Sanitary Reform

The oft-told story of sanitary reform in New York City stands as a dynamic model of experiment and social mobilization, which led in time, and with the advances of the scientific understanding of contagious disease, to a vastly safer urban life. Yet such campaigns often seemed far from an unmixed blessing to contemporaries. The nineteenth-century city was a notoriously unhealthy place, and there was little opposition to the calls by sanitary reformers for the city to collect accurate information about birth and deaths. The compilation and interpretation of statistics became a central tool in the management of urban sanitary policy. Physicians, often drawing on the pioneering work of Edwin Chadwick, author of the influential 1842 report on the sanitary condition of the laboring population of Great Britain, pushed for similar approaches to New York and its grave sanitary problems.

Dr. John H. Griscom (1804–1874), serving briefly as city inspector, had been in correspondence with Chadwick before he published a powerful report on the *Sanitary Condition of the Laboring Population of New York* in 1845. Griscom showed the scale of the problem: the immense amount of sickness, disability, and premature mortality in the city's slums. He argued that poor housing conditions were a major contributory factor in the city population's ill health and called for sanitary regulations to alleviate avoidable causes of ill health. "Teach them how to live," he wrote of the poor, "so as to avoid disease and be more comfortable, and then their school education will have a redoubled effect, in mending their morals, and rendering them intelligent and happy."

Griscom's call for universal vaccination, however, and his advocacy of enhanced powers for health inspectors, who would enforce "domiciliary cleanliness" were regarded as tyrannical. Griscom's demands for tenement reform encountered resistance from the owners of slum real estate, always tenacious in the defense of the rights of private property, and from tenement dwellers, who feared that his reforms would raise rents. Griscom went on to play a significant role in sanitary reform in New York, but his 1845 report lay stillborn.

Two decades later, Griscom's "failure" seemed a heroic precursor to the generation of sanitary

reformers who contributed to a large-scale survey of the city's tenements, *The Report of the Council of Hygiene of the Citizens' Association of New York upon the Sanitary Condition of the City*, published in 1865. Their statistics were the capstone of the campaign to create the Metropolitan Board of Health. The enemies of reform, the vested interests, political machine, bribed legislators in Albany, and the entrenched ignorance of the masses in the slums, remained much the same.

Central Park

The housing crisis, which led to a rapid growth of tenements, and the health crisis caused by disease, poor ventilation, and overcrowding were repeatedly cited by the proponents of a large park in the city. For every two New Yorkers in 1830, there were eight inhabitants by the time of the Civil War. But the idea of a park was greeted with doubts that the park would be built honestly and alarm that the park would become a "beer garden" for the city's riotous working-class. Merchants in lower Manhattan objected to paying taxes to create an amenity miles from where they lived and worked. Seeking to use social fears in the cause of social improvement, advocates suggested that a park would make the city more beautiful and also more orderly. Andrew Jackson Downing suggested that parks would "soften and humanize the rude, educate and enlighten the ignorant, and give continual enjoyment to the educated."

Frederick Law Olmsted applied for the job of superintendent of construction of Central Park in August 1857. Nine months later he won, in partnership with Calvert Vaux, the design competition for the park. Underlying the Olmsted-Vaux plan was the belief that design could do much to enhance the lives of the visitors, while averting the many social evils of urban life. Within two years, at a time of economic hardship, he had employed a workforce of 3,000. Olmsted's park was a place for contemplative pleasures. No provision was made for long straight drives, fearing the opportunity they would give for trotting matches and gambling. The park's gently curving paths were ideal for walks; its arbors, frequent benches, and rustic amenities made ample provision for solitary rambles. To Olmsted, Central Park was a heroic vindication of democracy, a model of how things could

be done efficiently and honestly in a democracy. It was also a victory of humanitarianism and social reform. Few of the utopian aspirations for the park were realized. It became and remained a wonderful amenity, but one not exempt from pressures on the city's tax revenues, vagaries of political opportunism, and changing patterns of crime and disorder.

Slum Housing

Despite the creation of Central Park in the 1850s and health measures put in train when the Metropolitan Board of Health was created after the Civil War, New York showed few signs of becoming an orderly, tranquil, or contemplative community. The progressive deterioration of conditions in the slums was known to a small group of clergymen, social workers, and journalists. The Association for Improving the Condition of the Poor employed "visitors" to distribute relief and to encourage the poor to reform their ways. Identifying many social wrongs, the association had an increasingly secular understanding of poverty.

Charles Loring Brace, a Yale graduate and friend of Olmsted, founded the Children's Aid Society in 1853. Opposed to the institutional care of children, Brace established industrial schools, summer camps, and a newsboys' lodging house. His major ambition was "moral disinfection," the removal of New York's orphans and vagrant children to homes with rural families. But it was only in the late 1880s when a detailed picture of the slums was brought to the attention of the wider public. It took a journalist, Jacob Riis, to bring the full glare of modern publicity to the plight of the poor. He was a combative evangelist who wanted to change the environment, while calling on the poor to change their ways. Riis's slide talks, employing two projectors which created images 10-feet square, showed scenes from the tenements that had an immediacy and shed startling light on the problem of the slums. Projected on such a large scale were individuals, not abstractions.

Invited to turn his lectures into a book, *How the Other Half Lives* appeared in 1890. Riis drew upon material provided by the Association for Improving the Care of the Poor, the Children's Aid Society, and a statistician of the Health Department. His text was a call for attention. "I have read your book and I have come to help," wrote Theodore

Roosevelt on a card left at Riis's office. When Roosevelt became chairman of the Police Commission of New York in 1893, Riis became a major informant and supporter. In his clear-eyed and somewhat prejudiced way, he was able to transcend the public's fear and indifference toward slum dwellers. He spoke earnestly for humanity. It was an exceptional moment when New York City responded as though it really was a community.

Throughout the nineteenth century, there was little effective resistance to the "rage for pulling down." The sale of the private St. Johns Park by the Vestry of Trinity Church in 1866 suggests the absence of countervailing force to urban development. Cornelius Vanderbilt wanted the park for a train depot for the Hudson River Railway Company. Long drawn-out negotiations followed with the residents, who were part owners of the park. There was no vociferous public campaign mounted against the sale. The mouths of residents were stuffed with greenbacks to the value of \$13,000 each. Within a year, the trees of St. Johns Park were cut down. The residents departed for better neighborhoods uptown.

By 1892, Trinity Church proposed to discontinue worship at St. Johns Chapel. Consecrated on Varick Street in 1807, it had a cherished organ, which was seized by the Royal Navy on its way from London during the war of 1812. (It was ransomed by a payment of \$2,000.) Proposals to sell the chapel were renewed in 1908, to be greeted by a campaign of elite mobilization. Letters were sent to the press signed by politicians, local dignitaries, architects, editors, writers (William Dean Howells), and financiers (J. P. Morgan). Richard Watson Gilder, editor of the *Century Magazine*, published a poem regretting the proposed demolition. The health of the parish was affirmed, numbers of baptisms cited, to no avail. The campaign resulted in a reprieve. But dwindling numbers of parishioners, the poor condition of the chapel's structure, the widening of Varick Street, and the absence of money to support alternative uses, led to its demolition in 1918. Two eight-story fireproof warehouses were erected on the site.

The Rage to Pull Down

There is a sign here of the beginning of a deeper change in sentiment in New York. The loss of the

Beaux-Arts Pennsylvania Station in 1963 was widely regarded as the watershed event in that transition. But victories were seldom final. A campaign was waged by community groups in Greenwich Village opposing the demolition of a small red brick house at 85 West Third Street, where Edgar Allan Poe once lived. New York University School of Law, who proposed to build an eight-story building on the site, successfully had the lawsuit dismissed in the State Supreme Court but offered a negotiated settlement in 2001 in which the law school agreed to reconstruct the façade as it appeared in the nineteenth century. Publicity could be effective, especially where the law offered no remedy.

The landmark structures that survived in such tumultuous struggles were small in number and required significant money. But the mechanism of mobilization and protest emanating from civil society characterized, with significant variations, historic struggles in New York for larger social causes: abolition, universal franchise, sanitary reform, honest government, economic and racial justice, and women's rights. Each of these campaigns in varying ways shaped a tradition of resistance. We are perhaps in danger of losing sight of the fierce contestation surrounding these reforming causes. The campaigns were not won easily and never by default. Out of the struggles against certain kinds of development (a new skyscraper, an incinerator, a mall) and for social reform emerged new ideas about community, social responsibility, the role of government, and the understanding of the diversity of social relations in a large metropolis, which have set agendas for a deeper understanding of urban life.

It is hard to say whether such campaigns represented a simple resistance to change or were themselves proponents of complex forms of accommodation with the fragmented reality of urban life. The lines in these struggles were seldom clear-cut, and the city's reputation for liberalism is at best a half-truth. The vein of social conservatism in New York has been substantial and enduring. Mayor Rudy Giuliani found much support for his decency campaign in early 2001 against the excesses of contemporary art.

But real estate developers and their large headline deals are more interesting figures because they have had a more complex influence. The giant real



New York: global city? Dual city?

Source: Steven K. Martin.

estate interests in New York were mighty proponents of change. The seductions offered by their deals, the jobs, iconic buildings, increased tax revenue, were hard to resist. They were also silent enemies of sentimental attachments to the smaller scale of an older New York. Thus, in the public sphere, Robert Moses, the great constructor of parks, highways, and bridges, was also the proponent of a scheme to extend Fifth Avenue south through Washington Square.

A Global City

The New York that struggled over local real estate developments was not a global city as that term began to be understood in the 1980s. But since the days of John Jacob Astor, there was a subclass of globalized wealthy men in New York who were only occasionally engaged with local issues. The great industrialists and financiers of the Gilded Age had even weaker local ties. Their ventures

were international in scope, tying New York financial institutions to financial markets in London and Hamburg. Urbanists have argued that great cities in the global economy tend, in part, to “disconnect from their region.” That process has long been visible in the development of New York, which made a failed bid for independence from New York State in 1860.

If the horizons of the very rich were steadily detaching themselves from the city and its daily preoccupations, in a different way, the city’s swirling immigrant and ethnic population retained memories and loyalties to the old world, whether to Ireland or Poland or Sicily, which could sometimes find its way into the street-level concerns of employment, politics, and culture. It was a city of deeply divided identities and loyalties.

The global city as described by Saskia Sassen in 1991 and others, and the widening horizons of transnationalism, seemed to point toward a future for New York City, or, specifically, for Wall Street,

rooted in free trade, open markets, the waning of governmental regulation, an explosion of new circuits of information, and vast capital flows across the globe. Then, in 2008, these global financial institutions nearly collapsed. The proud investment banks of Wall Street were found to be drowning in an ocean of “toxic debt” and went bankrupt, were taken over, or were nationalized. The job losses in New York City for 2009 were estimated to approach 200,000.

The city's resilience, warmly praised in the Russell Sage Foundation's 2005 research on the impact of 9/11, suggests that New York can again draw on an increasingly impressive entrepreneurialism in the city's immigrant communities. But the sharp polarization of the “dual city,” analyzed in a 1991 volume of that name edited by John H. Mollenkopf and Manuel Castells, confirmed the basic portrait of a deeply fragmented city drawn by Tom Wolfe in 1987's *Bonfire of the Vanities*. The dream of a globalized city, a place of limitless aspiration, power and wealth, is not dead, but it lies broken, in tatters.

Eric Homburger

See also Global City; New York World's Fair, 1939–1940; Parks; Urban Health; World Trade Center (9/11)

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NEW YORK WORLD'S FAIR, 1939–1940

The 1939–1940 New York World's Fair was one of the largest world fairs of all time. Its cultural legacy has massively contributed in shaping the mass culture of post–World War II America and the world.

Opening a decade after the stock market crash of 1929 and the following economic depression, the New York fair was launched with the aim of uplifting the spirit of Americans while at the same time promoting a financial upturn by stimulating a culture of collective consumption through the display of new technologies and new consumer products.

Massive sponsorships came from the big corporations of the time (Eastman Kodak and AT&T, among others) and especially from the automobile industry, with General Motors and Ford in the front line. The emphasis on consumerism and on new technologies helped develop a new type of average American consumer.

The fair covered more than 1,216 acres in what once had been a wasteland in the Flushing Meadows area of Queens, also the location of the 1964–1965 New York World's Fair. Its main theme was “The World of Tomorrow,” a utopian future of high-speed mobility, optimism, individual freedom, and mass consumption. Yet, by the time the fair reopened in 1940, World War II had already begun, and its second season was characterized by a much less optimistic climate.

The fair provided a prominent stage for experimentation in architecture, planning, and industrial design. If the celebration of the machine age was its underlying context, its main stylistic vocabulary

was that of modernism, coupled with futuristic and visionary architectures. Among the members of the Board of Design were modernist architects Alvar Aalto and Skidmore & Owings and designers Norman Bel Geddes, Raymond Loewy, Henry Dreyfuss, and Walter Dorwin Teague. Working closely with the fair's committee was also Robert Moses, New York City parks commissioner, who had for some time planned to transform the whole Flushing Meadows area into a park; he widened the freeways leading to the fairgrounds for the occasion.

International-style modernism was imposed over a classic layout made of panoramic axes and wide boulevards. The fair was articulated into seven geographical zones (communications and business systems, community interests, food, production and distribution, transportation, government, and amusements) revolving around a pivotal axis named Theme Center, designed by architects Wallace Harrison and Max Abramovitz. This was dominated by two monumental buildings: the Trylon and the Perisphere. The Perisphere housed a vast diorama designed by Henry Dreyfuss, called "Democracy," which visitors could enjoy from a moving elevated walkway.

However, the most popular pavilion was Futurama, sponsored by General Motors. The 36,000-square-foot exhibit designed by Norman Bel Geddes gave visitors an aerial ride through an immense diorama that envisioned the world 20 years into the future—1960. This model world was carefully designed with an incredible array of miniature towns, individually designed houses, 50,000 miniature moving vehicles, waterways, and a million miniature trees of diverse species. This landscape was dominated by a revolutionary superhighway that connected urban and rural areas, allowing individually owned vehicles to maneuver at 50 miles per hour. At the end of the ride, visitors reentered the present, reaching the General Motors' exhibit of cars for sale.

Futurama was attended by more than 26 million visitors in the two seasons of 1939 and 1940. An updated version of Futurama, portraying the future in 2024, returned to New York City on the occasion of the 1964–1965 New York World's Fair.

The utopian auto-based future envisioned in Futurama, together with the idea of the single-family home envisioned in "The Town of

Tomorrow," left a long-lasting legacy on the American way of life and affected transportation politics in the years to come: Its promise of a society of automobile owners and publicly funded highway systems soon became a reality for most Americans. By promoting the idea of the automobile as a means of personal freedom, Futurama paved the way for the spread of suburban sprawl.

The futuristic utopias depicted at the 1939–1940 New York World's Fair massively influenced the collective imagination of the average American in the post-Depression era. The fair's cultural legacy lasted well into the late twentieth century, shaping a new consumerist middle class and setting the agenda for U.S. transportation policy in the post-war period.

Alessandro Busà

See also New York City, New York; Transportation; Urban Planning; Utopia

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NIGHTLIFE

Nightlife is largely shaped by darkness and the rhythms of the day and is associated, like city life in general, with both danger and freedom. Cities are different at night as activities and populations change. Some commercial areas become entertainment districts, while others are largely deserted;

residential areas stir before settling down for the night, although their daytime inhabitants might well be enjoying themselves elsewhere. Wolfgang Schivelbusch and Joachim Schlör have suggested that a number of developments came together to shape the idea of urban nightlife in European cities from the 1830s onward: the extension of street lighting, the parallel expansion of commercial and festive lighting associated with a burgeoning night-time economy, and the growth of an enormous curiosity concerning what went on in cities during the hours of darkness.

Important Contrasts

Cities were dependent on the natural rhythms of daylight and moonlight until the end of the nineteenth century. Medieval European cities operated a curfew, and walkers carried torches after dark to identify themselves as much as to light their way. Although the modern city is associated with light, with street lighting introduced to European cities in the sixteenth century, it was not until the seventeenth century that what Schivelbusch calls the lighting of order became well established in some large European cities. The establishment of a regular grid of street lanterns that lit streets (rather than individuals or buildings) was part of the policing of the absolutist state, and London retained the older system into the eighteenth century (much as it relied on night watchmen until the nineteenth century).

Street lighting is a key aspect of modernization, along with the provision of water and other key services. Although technological developments play a significant role in the history of nightlife, particularly the advent of gas and then electric lighting in the nineteenth century, these did not necessarily make cities better lit. The reflector lamps introduced to Paris in the 1760s were much brighter than the old lanterns, but there were fewer of them, placed further apart, so the streets became darker. Gaslights might be bright and modern, but their waning, flickering light also painted shadows, as Lynda Nead points out; later, electric arc lights made adjoining streets lit by gas seem gloomy.

These geographies of illumination marked and reproduced social divisions after dark, as they still do today. International differences can be seen in

images of the world at night, which show concentrations of well-lit urban centers in places like North America, Europe, the North African coast, and India, compared to gaps in much of sub-Saharan Africa, despite the fact that it is estimated that there will be about 300 million city dwellers there by 2010. Although the history of nightlife has often been told through the history of illumination, the link between the two is complicated.

The relationship between lighting and festivity was well established in the early modern city, and the illumination of the town's windows was a common way of celebrating national success or political upheaval. Gas and electricity also encouraged the expansion of commercial lighting: illuminated shop fronts and interiors, the gaslights of places of entertainment like London's gin palaces in the 1830s, and later the electric cinema marquees and signs of sites like Times Square (from 1904) and Piccadilly Circus (1910). These "bright lights" became synonymous with city life.

After darkness and light the second most important characteristic of the night is its contrast with the day. Arguments persist about the history of time consciousness, but it is often thought that modern time-discipline brought a stricter division of day from night, associated with work and rest (or pleasure), respectively. Making use of artificial light, this time-discipline began to make the working day independent from the hours of daylight. George Augustus Sala's *Twice Round the Clock, or The Hours of the Day and Night in London*, published in 1859, begins "READER, were you ever up all night?" It is organized by the clock, with a chapter for each hour; this way of timing and structuring the exploration and representation of the city would prove to be popular elsewhere.

Commercial and festive lighting allowed urbanites to shop, dine, and entertain themselves, but only as long as the city authorities allowed them to do so; the length of the night was determined by state controls over the closing times of entertainment venues. In 1839, London's pubs were made to close between midnight on Saturday and 4 a.m. on Sunday, and by 1864, English pubs were closed between 1 a.m. and 4 a.m. every day. The privilege of staying out late was restricted to patrons of aristocratic sites like eighteenth-century London's

Vauxhall at first, but it was gradually extended to the bourgeoisie, who used a late night to distinguish themselves from those who had to retire early to recover for work, like Thorstein Veblen's late nineteenth-century leisure class. (Although these classes were usually time-segregated, rarely meeting each other because of the different lengths of their working days, they sometimes met at day-break, one heading off to work, the other heading home.)

The English licensing laws reflect these distinctions. The plebeian beerhouses established in 1830 were made to close on weeknights 30 years before pubs had to close, whereas the private clubs and restaurants of the wealthy were subject to much more lenient legislation. Yet, these attempts to enforce a clear end to the night were not always successful, as Schlör points out. In Berlin in the 1870s, the police admitted that drinking places that were meant to close at 11 p.m. were often open until midnight, and by 1900, observers noted that the city's nightlife seemed never to slacken or end.

The opening up of the streets, and the bright lights of late-opening cafés and theaters intensified the association of the city night with pleasure and possibility. The excitement of nightlife was always tinged with danger, the unpredictability of urban life exacerbated by the shadows of the night. From Vauxhall in the 1730s to the Palais Royale in the 1780s, Coney Island in the 1900s, and Berlin in the 1920s, the city at night was an exaggerated version of its daily self, with a heightened sense of loneliness and sociability, fear and pleasure. The successful nighttime economies that established themselves in many cities during the nineteenth century were based on this complex knot of connotations.

This boom saw the number of premises licensed to sell alcohol in England and Wales outstrip population growth: In 1820, there were about 35,000 pub licenses, but by 1870, there were nearly twice as many, plus nearly 50,000 beerhouse licenses. Similarly, W. Scott Haine tells us that there were 4,500 cafés in Paris by the late 1840s and 22,000 by 1870; by the end of the century, this figure was closer to 30,000, giving the city more drinking places per head of population than London or New York. Other attractions also boomed, like the music hall, of which there were

perhaps as many as 300 in London in the 1850s, or the cinemas of the early twentieth century.

The Night Economy

This nighttime economy was founded, as Erika Rappaport suggests, on the parallel development of shopping districts like London's West End, so that an evening out naturally followed a day's shopping. It was also based on a successful balance between pleasure and profit, like Joseph Lyons's description of his restaurant business as a "free trade in pleasure." Music hall managers, fair owners, and other entrepreneurs cleaned up the livelier aspects of their businesses not because they had to, but because ultimately it meant higher profits. Other forms of entertainment, like the Victorian pub, resisted temperance and government efforts to close or regulate them for decades because there was so much money in drink. The breweries and publicans were checked only by the slow growth of a more home-centered working-class culture toward the end of the century. In many cases, the cleanup of nightlife was due to commercial pressures rather than state regulation.

The bright lights did not illuminate every corner, obviously. Crime, sedition, prostitution, and drunkenness were not restricted to the nighttime but seemed to flourish after dark, and the development of gas streetlights coincided with the rise of the modern police and a passion for the investigation of urban life by journalists, statisticians, reformers, and pleasure seekers. They often sought out problem areas after dark, and as a result, the nineteenth-century rediscovery of the city and its problematic masses was also usually a rediscovery of the night. One of Gustave Doré's illustrations from 1872, "The Bull's-eye," sums this up neatly; a policeman holds up the lantern of the title to illuminate the dark corners of London.

This fascination not just with the problems of the modern city but with their nighttime manifestations prompted efforts to curb the excesses of nightlife. Control over closing time, the curfew on drinking and entertainment places, has already been discussed. Other campaigns, driven by a mix of genuine concern, fear for the health of the workforce, and moralizing disgust, sought to control prostitution, crime, homelessness, and drunkenness by regulating the places where these activities

went on, improving the urban fabric to make it less hospitable for them—often opening up alleys and courtyards to let in air as well as light—and above all, by careful surveillance by the police and others, aided by well-lit streets.

This concern for the apparent lawlessness and immorality of the city at night was compounded by the sense, from the 1840s onward, that if the night was to be given to leisure, then it should be of the right sort: improving, sober, and pious. The rational recreation movement studied by Peter Bailey and others was particularly concerned with providing alternatives to pubs and bars like coffeehouses, parks, museums, and libraries. Even better, the streets were to be abandoned for the comforts of home, once the working day was done.

Contemporary Issues

Many of these characteristics of nightlife are still with us today. The night is still associated with pleasure and fear, despite more certain and better distributed lighting in many cities. In the eyes of some observers, the contemporary nighttime economy is stronger than it was in the nineteenth century, remaking declining industrial and waterside areas, commercial centers left empty at the end of the working day, and inner residential areas abandoned by middle-class whites in the middle of the twentieth century. Describing these revitalized centers as “fantasy cities,” John Hannigan notes that in the United States they are characterized by branding and sponsorship, the use of themes in design (heritage or popular cultural themes, like Disney), a commitment to nightlife, and isolation from neighboring parts of the city, among other things. Like other commentators, Hannigan is worried by the extent to which this nightlife promotes a fake liminality or “riskless risk” that seems dangerous but is thoroughly standardized and sanitized. From this viewpoint, the fantasy city is a form of gentrification for nonresidential areas.

Paul Chatterton and Robert Hollands have identified similar characteristics in the United Kingdom’s urban nightlife, against the context of the domination of brewing and retail by a small number of large companies and a state that seems happy with a neoliberal combination of liberalization and control (the 2003 Licensing Act relaxed the rigidity of the existing licensing hours, while other strategic

policies sought to punish rowdy drinkers and minimize the consequences of alcohol). However, there is more to the nighttime economy than a partnership between capital and state, and these developments are sometimes unpredictable.

It was property speculation, not morality campaigns, that closed down London’s Cremorne Gardens in 1878, and contemporary fantasy cities can also be threatened by residential development. Westminster City Council—responsible for a large proportion of London’s entertainment venues and the largest licensing authority in Britain—is becoming increasingly sensitive to complaints of noise and nuisance from local residents, particularly those who have to work the next day. In Bristol, residents’ associations successfully challenged licensing policies, and this is expected to become more widespread and successful under the 2003 act. In Barcelona, Dublin, Ibiza, and Thailand residents and revelers have come into conflict.

Cases like these suggest that cities are complex organisms and that it is risky to assume that there is only one form of nightlife. Geographical and historical differences matter, as do definitions of sociability and sociality. In the first case, it seems unwise to reduce nightlife to a simple alliance between neoliberal policies and the nighttime economy. It is certainly not the case that the fantasy city has been rolled out from the United States; other countries possess different urban forms and cultures, different economies, and different ways of enjoying the night.

Second, there are specific histories of nightlife to match this geographical variation. In Britain, for example, the revival of the nighttime economy and rise in going out over the last 20 years has to be put against the century-long decline in alcohol consumption that preceded it. In Spain and France, however, current concerns revolve around the decline of wine consumption and the rise of beer drinking because this drinking without eating seems to be becoming more central to nighttime entertainment; attempts are being made to revive older forms of café sociability that do not revolve around alcohol in Madrid.

Third, our evaluation of a city’s nightlife reflects our ideas about urban life in general. If we are interested in revanchism and the rights to the city, then we will see this in our analysis of nightlife. If we see urban sociability as something produced in everyday encounters between strangers and the

casually acquainted as well as close-knit communities, then even the most apparently soulless city center bar is of interest to the student of nightlife.

James Kneale

See also Cinema (Movie House); Discotheque; Night Spaces; Urban Life

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NIGHT SPACES

The concept of night spaces describes the social production of space within certain spatiotemporal parameters: specifically, the socially mediated dynamics of darkness on the places of human interactions and relationships. Night spaces are evident, for example, in the (attempted) control of socially improper or illegal behaviors in dark places across the cityscape, subversive or criminal acts that contravene the normality of social order; they are also evident in the canalizing of activities into socially acceptable places (e.g., the home or places for the consumption of leisure) and in social movements to “take back the night” from

oppressive practices that exclude some, like women, gays, and lesbians, from enjoying the same places as others. Night spaces thus come to influence life chances in terms of race, gender, class, sexual orientation, age, and physical ability. The idea of night space illustrates the dialectical dimensions of social space.

Night itself has been investigated by scholars in disciplines that include sociology, history, political economy, and urban studies. Of particular note is Henri Lefebvre, who in *The Production of Space* wrote of “night-time spaces.” He sought to explain how, amid the abstract, atomized, and administered spaces created by capitalism, certain activities (especially illegal ones) came to be permitted at night in particular areas. Scholars like Bryan Palmer have examined the history of night in terms of social dimensions and consequences. Dick Hobbs and colleagues, among others, have researched the nighttime economy and how globalization generates pressures to compete in a business and financial world that is never completely turned off or closed. Studies of the diverse and sometimes pulsating rhythms of nightlife include the works of Bastian Bretthauer on Berlin, Mark Caldwell on New York City, Paul Chatterton and Robert Hollands on youth activities, and Murray Melbin on the night as frontier.

Night spaces can be approached conceptually via the process of territorialization and its associated idea of territory. Territorialization involves the social practices, norms, and representations of space that seek to establish some sort of legitimate and compulsory order on the landscape. However, territories as areas of (attempted) social control are not temporally stable across the 24-hour day. As Michel Foucault wrote of the European Enlightenment, there was, and there remains, a fear of darkness because it obscured from human vision the events and behaviors taking place. Any presumed temporal stability of a territory is undermined by the spatial practices of individuals and groups and by the varied meanings and representations that the night holds for humans and their imagination. Although the physical landscape possesses the same basic topographic and architectural features across the 24-hour cycle, the darkness deterritorializes society whenever—and wherever—it impedes the deployment of techniques, strategies, and technologies that reinforce social order

and its instrumental rationality. The danger for society is potentially acute: Under the cover of darkness, transgressive behaviors (e.g., criminal acts, unconventional lifestyles of marginalized groups, social movement organizing) can occur with an impunity that usually does not happen in the light of day.

At night, societies implement various strategies and techniques to bring darkness under control in an effort to reterritorialize the night, so to speak. Examples include the illumination and surveillance of areas for protection of life and property, as well as the lighting of places of consumption during the hours of darkness. Three typically interrelated modalities of reterritorialization can be set forth: channeling, marginalization, and exclusion.

The channeling modality orients our activities and desires into places deemed socially acceptable and thus helps to reconstitute order on a darkened landscape. Channeling typically entails discourses conveying the right places to be at night as well as the use of technologies like illumination and advertising. It also involves the implementation of official zoning policies. The social codes of night emphasize home and/or leisure activities, thereby establishing norms of behavior that discursively constitute night spaces via channeling our intentions and desires toward particular locales. Technologies such as street lamps assist by lighting the paths to home, restaurants, shopping malls, and late shifts at work. Floodlights enable surveillance for purposes of individual safety and property protection. Advertising technologies, such as illuminated billboards or uniquely lit architecture, point the way for consumers of goods and services in the darkness of the night: the brighter the lights, the better to attract customers and to out-compete rivals. In addition, zoning ordinances serve to channel people and desire by attracting the types of businesses considered to be economically valuable.

The reterritorializing modality of marginalization serves to categorize people in terms of their perceived social inferiority or potential for dangerous behavior; it spatially segregates such persons from others and from certain parts of the city. In its consequences, marginalization establishes and maintains subordinate places for so-called undesirables. Historically, curfews and patrols have been used to keep people in their places in the darkness. Other techniques of marginalization include zoning

ordinances and informal social codes of conduct. Zoning can be used to prohibit or otherwise restrain businesses deemed less appropriate to an area. Informal codes of conduct will include prejudicial designations of people by class, race, gender, sexuality, and so forth, all intended to isolate some people or groups into particular places at night.

The reterritorializing modality of exclusion constitutes night spaces by establishing superordinate places of security or consumption, even within marginalized areas. Similar to marginalization, the modality of exclusion entails spatial segregation, but it is a segregation that erects barriers to construct a protected enclave for the people inside. Examples include physical walls, human or canine patrols, key-card access control, and alarm systems, all designed to create spaces of exclusivity via defensive technologies and techniques. With gates open during the daylight hours, housing complexes are welcoming, but with the coming of dusk, the gates can be closed, thereby constituting night spaces via exclusion. However, walls and alarms are not the only ways that exclusion is created. Exclusionary techniques, such as the employment of bouncers at nightclubs or cover charges at bars, reinforce a particular atmosphere and attract a particular clientele for some businesses during the nighttime.

The three modalities of reterritorialization can involve both formal governmental or business policies as well as the informal codes of conduct accepted and practiced by individuals and communities. The modalities can reinforce each other and hence can enhance the probability of effective social control. However, the modalities can also be contradictory: marginalization can reduce the number of customers in stores that are nevertheless safe within their zones of exclusion. The modalities also can create unintended situations because the administered night spaces may be challenged.

Night spaces result from the temporal-spatial articulation of social conflicts between and within class, cultural, gender, racial, and sexuality groups, among others. In their dialectical turn, the spaces influence those conflicts via structuring the context and resources available for action and reaction. The night spaces created by reterritorializing government policies or business strategies attempt to exercise a power of physical control over personal actions and also a power over human desires and perceptions.

Yet, the creation and enforcement of hegemonic night spaces can be, and often will be, challenged by individuals or social groups, such as criminals or youth subcultures. Those groups and others in the community embody the capacity to conceive of and to promote less conventional uses of the places of the night. Such “transgressions” also may incorporate socially progressive activities and egalitarian values and thus seek to establish spaces of difference at the interstices of society. Transgressive practices and representations of the city at night, whether progressive or not, can exacerbate the concerns of other, perhaps more traditional citizens. As a consequence, governments and other institutions formulate and implement countervailing policies, which in themselves could generate further transgressions that increase fears and thereby prompt still more reterritorializing responses—a dynamic that characterizes the ongoing production of night spaces.

Robert W. Williams

See also Globalization; Lefebvre, Henri; Nightlife; Social Space; Spaces of Difference; Surveillance; Urban Space

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NON-PLACE REALM

The concept of non-place arises out of a particular set of dialogues relating to the relationship mobility plays in the organization and perception of space in modernity. Non-place is not a location, rather it is a mode of moving through space that privileges certain aspects of the relationship of gaze and landscape, consequently reorganizing the social relationship the individual has with place. It has become an important concept in urban studies, sociology, and cultural studies as people’s lives are increasingly experienced in transit. Some have argued that the increased mobility of the globalizing world has led to a new supermodernity, in which sociality is no longer organic, deriving from lived historical relationships with place; rather, it is solitary and contractual and often wordless.

The term *non-place* was first coined by Michel de Certeau in a seminal book, *The Practice of Everyday Life*, to describe the state in which places are turned into something other by virtue of being named. A simple example of this can be seen in tourist spaces, in which locations are marked with particular cultural and historical significance. This naming severs the everyday life of a place (previously defined as relational, historical, and concerned with identity), reordering it within the realm of representation. The place becomes a non-place—a point of itinerary and part of a regime of consumption.

Marc Auge, developed de Certeau concepts in *Non-places: An Introduction to an Anthropology of Supermodernity* (first published in 1992 as *Non-Lieux, Introduction à une Anthropologie de la Surmodernité*) and hypothesized that non-places were becoming a dominant spatial mode in a world that is becoming supermodern. For Auge, the airport, the mall, and the highway that cuts through the landscape, bypassing the village square or the main street are exemplary of this new spatial mode of being in the world, whose topos is primarily symbolic and transitory, its sociality solitary and contractual.

Non-places are mediated spaces that facilitate movement. They are full of signs, instructions, and regulations. One navigates a non-place by following the signs that designate where one is in terms of a system of organized public movement. Alphanumeric signs designate destinations and distances (for instance, Gate 6, Homewares on the 2nd Floor, London 20kms) and also provide conditions of use (for instance, speed limit 100k, no smoking, automatic consent for surveillance). In this mode of spatiality, people experience each other anonymously. They may see the same people every day on the same bus or at the same shopping mall, but they never know the other's name socially. In non-places, people tend to be identified only for purpose of verification. As Auge famously noted, there will be no anonymity without identity checks.

In the late capitalist context, spaces of transit, like airports, shopping malls, and highways, are becoming ubiquitous as urban forms, and as a consequence, the concept of non-place is gaining prominence and relevance.

Gillian Fuller

See also Airports; Shopping Center; Tourism

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NON-SEXIST CITY

It has long been established, from research in the fields of urban geography, history, sociology, philosophy, and urban planning, that the city is sexist. Change is not easy to achieve because the city is the outward manifestation of deeply held assumptions about women's role in society. These are transmitted onto the design of towns and cities through the urban planning system and through the decision-making powers of planners, architects, surveyors, engineers, and city managers. All these

professions remain male-dominated, and so few women have a voice at the policy-making level. Indeed "more women" does not necessarily mean "better policy," such are the powers of professional socialization and the need to conform to succeed.

Women at a Disadvantage

So what is the problem? Although planning is for people, it has been shown that women suffer disadvantage within a built environment that is developed by men, primarily for other men. Women make up the majority of public transport users, the elderly, the disabled, shoppers, care providers, and the ethnic minority population. Much of urban sociology, social policy, and urban criminology has traditionally focused on the experience, work, and problems of men, not least on the problems experienced by the male aggressor as against the female victim within the inner city. Women have been seen stereotypically as suburban housewives or bored wives, or simply as invisible, whereas, in reality, the female population includes a wide range of social-class groups, incomes, and levels of education. Women live in all sorts of places of residence: just like men, who are also not a unitary group. Women were categorized according to the social class of either their father or their husband and failed to capture the true position of women in society, economically, socially, and culturally. This was the custom until feminism began to reshape sociological study and to demonstrate the differences between women's and men's experience of work, the city, and life itself.

Women have distinct roles and responsibilities in society, all of which generate different usage of urban space. Fewer women than men have access to the use of a car, and thus, most public-transport users are women whose daily travel patterns are more complex than men's because many are combining work with child care and other home-making commitments. This has implications for all levels of policy making, including the citywide macro level of overall strategic policy, the district meso level of local planning, and the detailed micro level of daily practicalities, as explained below.

At the macro level of overall urban form and structure, cities have traditionally been zoned and the land uses divided according to male life experience, on the basis of separating out home and

work by creating separate residential and employment zones and building an extensive car-based transport system to get male workers to their jobs on time. Zoning was undertaken in the name of public health and efficiency, but it was heavily influenced by historical attitudes about the proper place of woman within the city of man, that is, separate and at home. Modern women have lives and work that take place outside the home while still being predominantly responsible for child care, shopping, and homemaking. For example, a woman may set off from home; stop off at the child care facility, then at the school, and finally at work, returning via the school gates, grocery store, and child caregiver, resulting in a complicated trip rather than a simple mono-purpose commute.

To create a non-sexist city, such differences would be taken into account in planning transport policy, parking policy, congestion charging, and public transport needs. It is virtually impossible to carry out such complex journeys by bus because the routes in many cities are still predominantly radial from the suburbs to the center, not tangential, linking up out-of-town employment with retail locations, suburban school sites, and residential areas.

Cities were torn apart in the past to make way for man and his motorcar; nowadays, the pendulum has swung in the opposite direction, and the aim is to control the motorcar and restrict movement in the name of environmental sustainability. This concept is not so holy that it should not be above gender critique, as little consideration is given to women's journeys. There is very limited public transport availability in many areas, so women's car journeys constitute a form of "private" public transport escorting family members around the city, an extension of their caring role.

The Implications of Zoning

The roots of modern-day secular land use zoning, which has so shaped our cities, derive from previous sacred periods of city organization that were based on the separation of male and female domains. In the classical-era cities of Greece and Rome, if a woman stayed within the private domestic realm of the house and accepted her role as wife and mother, she was to be given honor and praise, but if a woman was seen out on the streets

on her own, she was assumed to be a prostitute and out of control. These attitudes were transmitted down to urban form and embodied in the layout of the city; for example, in Mediterranean cities, men could freely roam around the plaza (public square), but women were restricted to the patio (internal courtyard of the home). Under Islam, the seclusion of women became even stronger, in divisions between *halal* and *harem*, that is, clean and unclean, and thus by association between public/private and male/female spaces within the city.

Manifestations of such divisions were to be found in northern Europe too and thus flow into the Anglo-American world. For example, the Béguinage of medieval Christian Europe were lay religious communities where women could live together and pursue intellectual and spiritual development; one example is the still extant community at Bruges, Belgium, founded in 1244, and now a UNESCO World Heritage site. While special places for women within the city of man provided both protection and respect and a certain level of autonomy and authority for women, they also enforced the concept of separate (and maybe lower) spheres for women as against men and thus a separation of women from the mainstream male world of public affairs.

An etymological investigation of the word *zoning* reveals the murky roots of this apparently scientific planning principle. In ancient Greek, the word *zona* refers to loins, that is, the children, the fruit of a woman's loins, and thus by association, it is linked to house and home. Marilyn French points out that the Hebrew for *prostitute* means "she who goes out of doors" (outside the marital home), that is, she is in the wrong place, *zonah* (harlot) being the specific cognate of *zanah*. In Latin, *zonam solvere* means "to lose the virgin zone," that is, to get married or lose one's virginity. It is only a short etymological leap from *zana*, to *sana*, to *sanitary*, and thus to the obsession with sanitation and hygiene in the modern secular city. While infrastructural development of sewerage and drainage systems is vital, social hygiene appeared to be more about controlling women than actual disease, especially the perceived dirtiness of working-class women and men (dirtiness being as much a euphemism for unbridled sexuality as for lack of washing).

Modern scientific Anglo-American town planning, which developed in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century was obsessed with the need for zoning, for keeping land uses separate, supposedly in the interests of public health and efficiency, with particular diligence being given to separating out residential and employment zones, that is, home and work. For example, Patrick Geddes, one of the fathers of Anglo-American town planning, clearly saw women as inferior and in need of control. Geddes was enamored with Freud's association of the mother principle with stagnation. Likewise, Le Corbusier, one of the champions of both the European urban planning movement and the international high-rise style of modern architecture, who coined the phrase, "a house is a machine for living in," drew his inspiration from ancient occult and Masonic sources in seeking to codify and control space and women's place within the city of man.

Subsequently, the zoning mentality, which is manifested in the division of work and home, employment and residential zones, and thus male and female territories, contributed to the development of mono-land use residential suburbs in North American cities, where "bored middle-class, college-educated housewives" sat restlessly, in this modern-day manifestation of the *harem*, being overwhelmed and depressed by "the problem that has no name" and awaiting the clarion call of second-wave feminism to set them free into the public realm of work and the city of man.

But such male/female divisions are also found in the modern urban world in many other cultures, for example, a clear separation of work and home is still to be found in Japanese society, where it is unusual for male business colleagues ever to meet each others' wives socially. The lack of acknowledgment of women's different requirements in the course of the rapid urbanization and modernization of China may also be related to the historical marginalization of women within the wider society, while internationally, women's lack of land and property rights gives them little power or influence over development issues.

Alternative Strategies

As an alternative to spread out, zoned, low-density cities, European women planners would like to see

the "city of everyday life," the non-sexist city, which they define as the city of short distances, mixed land uses, and multiple centers. The emphasis would be on the district (meso) level, with localized facilities, shops, schools, child care facilities, and amenities. This would reduce the need to travel in the first place and create sustainable, accessible, and equitable cities while fulfilling many of the criteria of the new urbanism, too.

At the detailed (micro) street level, many small changes are needed to create a non-sexist city. To enable more women and men to travel by public transport, to walk and cycle, a range of supporting services and infrastructural changes would be needed. Public transport systems would need to be greatly improved and made more accessible. Women with pushchairs (strollers), people with disabilities, and those with heavy bags find their way blocked by steps, narrow entrances, and inadequate sidewalks (pavements). More seating, bus shelters, and most of all more public toilets (restrooms) are essential if people are expected to leave their cars at home. If you want to know the true position of women in society, look at the length of the line/queue for the women's toilets.

To create the non-sexist city, all policy topics should be critiqued from a gender perspective, not just child care and personal safety but also policies concerned with transportation planning, employment, sports, and other ostensibly male issues, which in fact have a substantial impact on women. For example, it is extremely sexist to undertake a major urban regeneration program that provides a large number of new jobs in the area, if women can't reach them because of lack of public transport and local child care and inconsiderate access and landscaping details that create a threatening environment, particularly after dark.

How can the urban policy be changed? Nowadays considerable store is being put on methods that ensure the mainstreaming of gender considerations into all aspects of policy making and implementation. At international level, the United Nations millennium goals stress the importance of all governments taking into account gender considerations in all developmental and infrastructural projects. Within the European Union, member states, including the United Kingdom, are expected to integrate gender considerations into all public policy-making activities including urban spatial

planning. Ideally, this process should eventually result in non-sexist cities being created, but adoption of recommendations has been slow so far.

A series of methodologies have been developed to enable local governments to better carry out this task, such as the Royal Town Planning Institute toolkit, which sets a series of questions that need to be asked at each stage of the planning process to raise gender awareness and ensure that women's as well as men's needs are taken into account as follows:

1. Who comprises the policy-making team?
2. What is the representation of men and women? Minority groups?
3. Who are perceived to be the planned? Men, women, workers, minorities?
4. How are statistics gathered? Are they disaggregated by gender?
5. What are the key values, priorities, and objectives of the plan?
6. Who is consulted, and who is involved in participation?
7. How is the plan evaluated? By whom? On what basis?
8. How is the policy implemented, managed, and monitored?

Emphasis is put on the institutional context and changing the composition of who is making the decisions. For example, urban renewal and regeneration decision-making bodies tend to be drawn from the male-dominated commercial property development sector. There is no shortage of interested women, but they tend to be found working in community groups, which need to be involved, too. Changes also need to be made to the statutory planning system, planning law, funding, and administrative processes, all of which can restrict the implementation of non-sexist urban spatial policy. Women's issues are often deemed "not a land-use matter" because they do not fit into existing concepts of what planning is about. Further barriers to creating change are presented by other departments and professions that exercise a measure of control over the built environment, especially technical officers in the fields of engineering, highways, and building control. Such staff members generally possess limited social or gender awareness, but their decisions can derail the best of intentions by introducing physical barriers to women's access and movement around

the built environment. To change the city, one needs to change the education, worldview, imagination, culture, awareness, priorities, and gender composition of those who shape it.

Clara Greed

See also *Béguinage*; Gendered Space; Gender Equity Planning; Urban Planning; Urban Space; Women and the City

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NUCLEAR WAR

The specific influence of thermonuclear weapons on urban systems and urban design has received little attention in urban studies despite the importance of

the city, urban forms, and urban economics in strategic nuclear planning. In the 1960s, Yale political scientist Bernard Brodie calculated that cities of over 100,000 population were the only targets of sufficient economic value to justify the use of atomic weapons. Accordingly, the nuclear arsenals of the United States and the Soviet Union were aimed at cities, and the only use of nuclear weapons so far has been on cities: Hiroshima and Nagasaki, in August 1945.

Both economics and the physical form of the city figure in strategic nuclear planning. Hiroshima was selected, in part, because it is relatively flat for a Japanese city and the absence of hills would permit the “effects of the blast to run out” for maximum effect. In the argot of the scientists who develop the weapons, they are called “city busters.”

Discussing war plans in the 1950s, Matthew Jones noted that the United States anticipated an intense global war with the Soviet Union and its allies involving nuclear weapons. The logic of what came to be called the cold war determined that defense against nuclear attack must be the threat of overwhelming retaliation in kind, a nuclear counterstrike. Accordingly, there are only two ways to prepare for a nuclear exchange. The first option is to harden the city, that is, build deep shelters and some kind of missile shield. In the United States, this option was considered a non-starter until the end of the cold war. The technologies involved in making a shield were sketchy at best. U.S. strategic planners warned that hardening of the American city (building deep shelters) would have the effect of increasing the intensity of some future nuclear attack. The only deep shelter built in a city during the cold war was the Washington, D.C., subway.

The second option is to reduce the value of the target. Under the doctrine of limited survivability, strategic nuclear planners saw the large American city as a defensive weapon. Its role was to absorb a nuclear strike in such a way as to minimize damage to surrounding (suburban and small town) survivability areas. In 1966, Wolfgang Panofski warned, “a large civil defense program would only raise the level of armaments on both sides . . . to a higher level without an increase and possibly a decrease in our security.”

During the second half of the twentieth century, until the collapse of the Soviet Union in

1989, the program of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) adopted by strategic nuclear planners openly stated that to win a nuclear exchange, the United States had to articulate a willingness to sacrifice its great cities, not as a bluff. Its leaders had to mean it. This willingness had to be public and visible to Soviet strategic planners, as it clearly was in a number of high-profile symposia. Some have suggested that American urban policy in the cold war period was designed to transform the American city into the lower value target suggested as desirable by nuclear strategists. This epoch was marked by White flight to the suburbs and demographic shifts resulting in a majority of poor, ethnic minorities in the inner city. The characterization of inner-city residents as dysfunctional, psychotic, or homeless—as welfare cheats, violent gang members, and crack addicts—became accepted in political discourse at all levels. In 1959, former Harvard University President James Bryant Conant, who also headed the Manhattan Project (i.e., built the first nuclear bombs used on Japan), wrote a Carnegie Foundation Report on *The American High School Today*. In it, he argued that inner-city schools should be defunded and the investment in high school education be moved to the suburbs and small cities.

David Krugler’s recent study of Washington, D.C., during the cold war explores the connections between the attempted dispersal of vital government offices to distant suburban sites and the widening gap between the capital city and its racially divided population. During the same period, the city of Milwaukee pursued an aggressive annexation policy to decentralize strategic targets and make the city less vulnerable to nuclear attack.

These macrostructural arrangements might seem to be intractable, but they have proven, in fact, to be quite malleable. Two years after the Berlin wall was taken down, a group of architects, planners, community activists, and lawyers got together at Ahwahnee Lodge in Yosemite National Park and laid out a conceptual framework in 15 easy-to-understand points for revaluing the American city. This movement would become the new urbanism. In little more than a decade, gentrified high-quality and high-density new urban neighborhoods for the upper middle class effectively reversed White flight and dramatically


changed the demographics of the American city. Today, with fears of the nuclear destruction of the urban core vanquished, it is the poor and ethnic minorities who are being displaced into farthest suburbs.

Dean MacCannell

See also Hiroshima, Japan; Suburbanization; Urban Planning

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OTHER GLOBAL CITIES

The concept of the global city typically refers to those cities that function as command and control sites in coordinating transnational finance, production, and information processes integral to the global economy. As an object of analysis, the global city highlights the importance of spatial analysis and the local for the study of globalization and destabilizes the primacy given to the nation-state's role in governance over global processes. Yet, this paradigm has been criticized for its overly economic and reductive approach to the study of cities and the urban and its tendency to generalize the global city as an urban form based on advanced capitalist cities in the North. As a result, alternative theorizing about the global city is emerging based on "other cities" of the South and alternative urban forms, often spaces of exclusion and poverty, such as the camp and the slum. This alternative approach represents a significant contribution to the study of urban and global politics. First, it raises questions about whose knowledge and experiences of the city count in defining the global city as an object of analysis. It theorizes these other urban spaces from the experiences of those excluded from the processes of global capitalism and industrialization heralded by more traditional global cities literature. Second, it engages with these other spatial locations, not merely as spaces of exclusion but also as sites of engagement. In response to living in conditions of marginalization and poverty,

new subjectivities and new ways of engaging emerge, including strategies for making claims to rights to the city. Within this critical interdisciplinary approach to other global cities and "urban" forms, two general trends can be distinguished: theorizing these other spaces as sites of exclusion and as places of resistance and cosmopolitanism.

Globalization, Urbanization, and the Global City

The literature describes global cities as nodal points of accumulation and organization in the grid of globalization. Typically, global cities are portrayed as either urban centers of advanced production and capital accumulation in the world economy or as a network of flows from urban spaces based on linkages between advanced services, production, and markets. Seminal in developing the concept, Saskia Sassen's work depicted the global city as a command and control center in the global capitalist economy. It was a place where financial capital and a transnational class of skilled professionals concentrated together with a large pool of immigrant (often female) low-wage labor, engaged in the informal, service and care economies. Consequently, Sassen saw global cities as places where identity became "unmoored" from territory, with new transnational forms of politics emerging as a result. Global cities thus initially represented a reconfiguration of the dominant collective geographical and political imagination such that it was no longer possible to discuss "first" and

“third worlds,” “North” and “South,” or “core” and “periphery,” simply as if they belonged to separate geographical spaces. Rather, they now resided together as part of the same space. As an analytical concept, then, global cities provided a site of analysis into how global power relations were being reconfigured.

Yet, the concept was criticized for generalizing the city as a universal form, operating identically between the global South and global North. As well, characterization often relied on modernist assumptions about the development of advanced capitalist societies, with global cities likened to isolated containers of space, operating hierarchically within a network of global power. Against such critiques, interest emerged in studying alternative urban spaces through which to rethink the global city and the notion of the global. Recognizing that urbanization takes multiple forms, theorizing turned to the variety of new urban spaces arising with globalization alongside this network of global cities. These other global cities arise in the forms of cities of the South and other urban forms such as the *favela*, the slum, the detention center, the refugee camp, the *zones d'attentes*, and the export-processing zone. These are the spaces of Woomera, Sangatte, Guantánamo, and Dharavi (Mumbai), in which increasing numbers of people now find themselves living. Often designed as temporary and exceptional spaces to the city, they have become permanent features of settlement in the global system and a permanent way of life for millions. These other spaces are like global cities in that, first, they take on many of the features typically associated with city spaces. For example, urban planning of refugee camps resembles the planning of cities with similar requisites for food storage and distribution, hospitals, meeting places, schools, markets, and cemeteries. Second, like global cities, these other spaces are points of concentration operating in relation to one another as a network of spaces, albeit one of abjection, poverty, and exclusion rather than of wealth and power. Yet, the study of these spaces also interrogates the way in which global cities are more conventionally understood, for such spaces do not just exist alongside global cities. Rather these other spaces of marginalization make possible—and are constitutive of—global cities as sites of power and wealth.

The Global City as Site of Exclusion

Giorgio Agamben's theorizing of the camp has been particularly influential in research on alternative spaces of exclusion. Agamben argues that the power of the sovereign lies in the “ban” or the exceptional power to shun a person from the political community. Through the ban, a person is forced to live the life of *homo sacer* (i.e., one who can be killed but not sacrificed). Excluding the individual from the political community forces one into a condition of what Agamben calls “bare life,” a way of living based on the simple biological existence shared with other living species. This way of living differs from the more desirable, qualified life a person lives in political community as a political subject with rights. Agamben argues that those banned from the political community or *polis* (the city or city-state) find themselves living in a “state of exception” but one that becomes permanent through the spatial organization of the state of exception in the form of the camp. Here the camp refers not just to the concentration camps of the past but to an ideal form that materializes in such arrangements as the *zones d'attentes* of French international airports or “guest houses” for asylum seekers. For, as spaces of exception, these camps are not just exceptional spaces but part of the normal order in that they are constitutive of the political community (the “city of men”). They are, in other words, the unacknowledged foundation upon which the global system rests.

Agamben's ideas about the centrality of the camp in relation to the city have been influential in spawning social theory investigating the camp and camp-like spaces as proper objects of analysis in their own right. These sites emerge not just incidentally alongside global cities but are integral to their continued existence as centers of knowledge and command, infrastructure, production and capital. These “other global cities” are, however, spaces of marginality and exclusion, where those lacking status, rights, and recognition find themselves servicing the global economy of the global cities network, not just as cheap labor but as expendable labor. Thus one strand of theorizing, most predominant in politics and sociology, investigates alternative spaces in the forms of refugee camps, immigration detention centers, and borderlands. Here investigation tends to center on exploring the

exceptionality of the space in relation to the state and the law. Representations of the camp in its ideal form as an exceptional and depoliticized space have been criticized, however, for ignoring the specificity and historical material reality that such camps take and the various social, political, geographic, and economic relations that constitute them.

A second strand of theorizing, more predominant in sociology and urban geography and anthropology, involves researching other global cities of the South and the precarious urban spaces within these cities, such as the slum or shantytown. Here research often centers on providing alternative theorizing to questions of globalization and global cities and notions of modernity and urban development. Additionally, this strand highlights the socio-cultural-political, and not just economic, dynamics of these city-spaces, investigating them as particular lived political, social, cultural, and economic places. Taking as its starting point the perspective of those marginalized within these spaces, this strand of theorizing investigates these other urban forms as important objects of analysis in their own right but also, in doing so, casts critical analysis back onto the more traditional notion of the global city from the perspective of those excluded from, and yet also central to, its functioning and the concentration of wealth and power that accumulate. Finally, both strands of theorizing have generated interest into questions of how those resigned to reside in these other urban spaces actually live by accepting, negotiating, and often resisting the conditions of these spaces, not as passive victims, but as political agents of change. This is the focus of a third strand of research that centers on other global city spaces as sites of resistance and cosmopolitanism.

The Global City as Site of Resistance and Cosmopolitanism

As noted earlier, Saskia Sassen understood global cities to be, not just sites of wealth and power accumulation, but also places where new forms of transnational politics emerge. In the 1960s Henri Lefebvre argued that “the right to the city” (having presence and participating in the city, in part, by appropriating and using its space) was a first right prior to being able to claim other rights. Echoing Lefebvre, Sassen argued that it was through global

cities that marginalized peoples, nevertheless, acquired “presence” in the city and could thereby engage as political actors and make claims to rights to the city. By contrast, “other global cities” are spaces of exclusion that rely on exactly the opposite spatial logic described by Lefebvre and, later, Sassen. These other spaces deny presence to people by hindering the visibility, association, recognition, status, and rights that come with being of the city. However, as Engin Isin’s work on citizenship and the city has demonstrated, “being political” may owe less to the citizens of the city than to those excluded from it and the multiple ways they find to engage and claim belonging and rights to the city.

Such ideas have generated interest in researching other urban forms as social and political spaces and the politics of citizenship emerging from them. Within more activist theorizing, this interest has inspired the creation of new cartographies from the perspective of noncitizen migrant and refugee rights groups (such as Migreurop’s map of Europe, with foreigners’ camps replacing cities as the focal points, or Humane Borders’ map of the U.S.–Mexico border drawn around points of known water stations and deaths). In this activist theorizing, spaces of exclusion are understood not simply as containers of space but as processes. As with traditional global city literature, spaces of exclusion (such as detention centers and camps) are connected as part of a global network of spaces but one based on processes of exclusion, expulsion, and containment (e.g., through processes of incarceration, deportation, border policing, and the extraterritorialization [or externalization] of asylum and visa processing).

Alongside this, a different trajectory has focused on theorizing spaces of exception informed by a logic of hospitality and reception rather than exclusion. Here, Jacques Derrida’s concept of a “city of refuge” as an autonomous city, independent from other cities and part of a network of allied cities that share a commitment to exercising an ethic of hospitality to the Other, has been influential. Research in this vein investigates such alternative spaces of hospitality as sanctuaries, sanctuary cities, refugee welcome zones and towns, and hate-free zones. It has also invigorated theorizing about alternative forms of urban politics particularly in relation to displaced peoples, migrants,

and refugees, such as work done on nonstatus, irregular, and *sans-papiers* movements as well as grassroots organizing in shantytowns and in relation to new types of citizen subjectivities such as “the squatter citizen.” These places are theorized as spaces that produce new cosmopolitanisms, or what Peter Nyers has called “abject cosmopolitanism,” and new cultures of globalization where culture becomes more than a commodity but a mode of agency. Given this diverse and interdisciplinary scope of research, clearly, the concept of global cities has undergone a major revision to reflect on new spaces of power, politics, and justice—key issues of our times.

Kim Rygiel

See also Citizenship; *Favela*; Global City; Globalization; Lefebvre, Henri; Right to the City; Sassen, Saskia; Social Exclusion; Squatter Movements

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P

PARIS, FRANCE

Paris has always been France for most Francophiles, and even those who have had no special love or even liking for France. In nineteenth-century Paris, it was acknowledged that this capital of a country was far from being only a regional center: it was, or certainly it seemed, the center of the European world. (That is, of course, to those to whom Europe *was* the world.) It is a mythology, perhaps, but one that has endured. That fame has spread out beyond the borders of the nation and earned a place in the hearts and minds of multitudes. In the world of fiction, which often, in Paris, seems to be the real world, it was clear how the following statement was equivalent to truth: “Paris is an ocean whose depth, when you plumb it, you will never touch the bottom.” (“Paris est un océan, jetez-y la sonde, vous n’en connaîtrez jamais la profondeur.”) Honoré de Balzac’s statement, in the mouth of the policeman arresting the great criminal Vautrin in *Le Père Goriot*, speaks for the city, as it speaks of it, and over the ages. No one has ever claimed—with any verifiability—to know the depths or the width of Paris. To continue with the fictional truth about the great city, as Gustave Flaubert put it in his *Dictionnaire des idées reçues*, “Ne plus aimer Paris, marque de décadence. Ne pouvoir s’en passer, marque de bêtise.” (“No longer to love Paris, a mark of decadence. Not to be able to do without it, a mark of stupidity.”)

In Literature and Life

To be sure, nineteenth-century Paris has remained in all its mythical glory, to which the world-renowned novelists Balzac and Flaubert contributed much, but there was much else, both in literature and in art. Romanticism, besides its extraordinary flowering in Germany and England, gave to the world the poems of Alphonse de Lamartine and Victor Hugo; they may have lived elsewhere, but their political lives were tied up with the capital and its events. The all-important Charles Baudelaire, the bridge between romanticism and symbolism, was the author of unforgettable poems about Paris, about its outcasts and degradation (“A une cadavre” or “To a Corpse”), about its misfits like the poet himself (“L’Albatros” or “The Albatross”), and about its passersby and the possibilities of encounter they offered (“A une passante” or “To a Passerby,” with its yearning: “You, whom I would have loved . . .”) have marked poetry ever since. His writings about art in his reporting on the various salons yield the surest sense we have of what was going on in the artistic circles of the time. Baudelaire’s wanderer or *flâneur* was the epitome of the urban wanderer—from the store window to the park, from the banks of the Seine to the dance hall, this figure floated or walked or strode. The idea of the Paris walker was endemic to the poetry of the nineteenth century and continued through the twentieth and even now. To be sure, one could walk in the countryside, but the city walker was another phenomenon and an exciting one.

And as for the later literary movement of symbolism, its unchallenged leader, Stéphane Mallarmé, held his own salon every Tuesday, leaning on his mantelpiece (wonderfully captured by the great painter of ballerinas and bathers, Edgar Degas, with Auguste Renoir in Mallarmé's living room). These gatherings and Mallarmé's discourse remain the source of the movement in its social and community aspect.

Literature became as important as life: In fact, it was difficult to tell them apart. The urban historian Lewis Mumford once wrote, "Living by the record and for the record became one of the great stigmata of urban existence, indeed life as recorded—with all its temptations to overdramatization, illusory inflation, and deliberate falsification—tended often to become more important than life as lived." So Paris had to be recorded, and that was—and is—the job of the writer, whether novelist or poet. The hero of the fiction as it was imagined and lived was the arrival of the young man from just anywhere or then nowhere—the same thing, when it was not Paris—who would come to the big city of Paris and make his mark on it, as it would make its everlasting mark on him.

The French Revolution nourished this myth and its reality: The young hero was often haunted by Napoleon Bonaparte, the revolutionary personality making good. Anything might happen, politically and personally, in this space of transactional excitement and exchange. One's fortune and class could be upgraded, one's intellect challenged, one's whole being transformed. Where else but here?

The transformation of the individual, in literature as in life, was mirrored in the actual transformation of the city by the Baron Haussmann, who leveled entire neighborhoods of narrow winding streets of the medieval city to create the wide avenues and neoclassical facades of the modern city. Paris was transformed above ground as well as below, creating a national icon and metropolis of imperial ambitions and proportions. The Second Empire plans remain in effect to the present, as the *alignement* law requires new building facades to match predetermined street widths of Haussmann's earlier plan. The city as opportunity and challenge invariably ends as disillusion and defeat.

As Christopher Prendergast puts it in his article on *Literature and the City in the Nineteenth Century*, "The city as opportunity and challenge

invariably . . . tries to slow down and master input from the environment, distinctively via the figures of the strolling *flâneur* and the impassive dandy, 'sniffing' rhymes on street corners . . . appropriating novel stimulus and random encounter as a source of poetic nourishment." In any case, the stroller is confronted with the crowd, as in Edgar Allan Poe's *Man of the Crowd*, and subject to the aggressions of the city.

Since the early days of the city of Paris, of course, there has been a veritable crowd of country inhabitants to the city of Paris, looking for work and themselves subject to the chance of history. Some of them, of course, settled down in the artists' haunts, as did the painters from elsewhere about to become famous, like Pablo Picasso and Max Jacob, along with other painters and poets, in the *Bateau Lavoir* or the broken-down buildings once the site of the women doing their wash—these were the inspiration for such tales as the opera *La Bohème*, where starvation and cold mingle with outpourings of affection. Crime had poverty as its source, and much of the literature and art were based on this conjunction of the underworld and the rise of revolutionary thought.

Perfect for Display

Paris was the perfect place not just for revolution, but also and always for display: The invention of electric light further encouraged the pride of citydom. But a certain feeling of community was definitely lost, and the painters and poets huddling together in such places as the *Bateau Lavoir* were holdouts against the overtechnicalization and commerce of the big world beyond. The fear of losing one's self and one's identity increased. So in a sense, the Exhibition of 1900 was a nostalgia trip, modernity on display, but with it, a simulation of Old Paris ("le vieux Paris," as we find in so many cities: "old Berlin," and the like). Kitsch indeed, but touching in what it says about what is lost.

At the opening of the twentieth century, the cubist movement—with Juan Gris, Pablo Picasso, and Georges Braque—found its fullest expansion in Paris. Never mind that the first two were of Spanish nationality, descent, and—to some extent—inspiration. It was nevertheless a movement felt as deeply French, and, therefore, Parisian. Parisian like the subway or metro. If the Paris subway or

metro stretched north to south (from Montmartre to Montparnasse), then that would christen the foremost literary journal of the second decade of the twentieth century: *Nord-Sud*. Transportation mattered immensely in this immense city, as in all cities, and this symbol of Paris transport became, like much else in and of Paris, what mattered everywhere. The theory of the image that Reverdy proclaimed in that journal named after that metro spread to England and America, as elsewhere. Paris was, as so often, the source of much. What happened in Paris happened all over.

Paris has always represented whatever was most French about Frenchness—when there was a revolution against the bourgeois spirit, it was the provincial import to the big city who would inspire it. The great creators among the French—Balzac, Henri Beyle (Stendhal), and Flaubert in the nineteenth century and then Guillaume Apollinaire, Paul Claudel, André Gide, Pierre Reverdy, and André Breton for literature in the early part of the twentieth century, before André Gide, André Malraux, and the existential crowd of Jean-Paul Sartre, Albert Camus, and Simone de Beauvoir, on to the writers of present-day literature—like the artists of then and now, have centered their works and lives around the big city. Its cafés have been their meeting places, well known and much loved. Most important, from the beginning, the Paris café has represented the very crux of civilization, the place where things are discussed, political arguments are carried on, literary and artistic movements nourished, and the differences between classes and talents and fortunes somehow smoothed over. Sartre and Beauvoir carried on their existentialist discussions in the Flore and the Deux Magots—and during the war, the cafés served as warming places as well as writing places for the inhabitants of heatless hotels and apartments.

Everything echoed from Paris out. The events of May 1968—called *les événements* or simply “May” (the appellation of the far left)—were echoed in other countries, most particularly in New York, with the occupation of Columbia University, for example. The upheaval, which stirred students and workers alike, seemed about to overturn the country, but the excitement petered out, and things seemed to resume almost normally. Not quite, however. In the universities, professors were marked by their role in the events,

and the fidelities and betrayals were not easily forgotten.

In more recent times, as never before, there has been a problematic relation between the slums or *bidonville* of Paris and the government. The influx of immigrants from Algeria—the *pieds noirs*—and the settlers from North Africa as from many other Francophone territories has led to conflagrations of an increasingly violent nature. In this context, alas, the party of, and the influence of, Jean-Marie Le Pen cannot be overlooked. Racism prevails in some parts of the country, and no less in Paris, as various incidents over these past few years have proved. This is especially true in *la France profonde*, or the nonmetropolitan parts of the country.

There has been undeniably, over the years, between the centralizing power, not just of Paris but of the country France, and the French-speaking inhabitants of other countries, outside “the hexagon”—the shape of metropolitan France (*France métropolitaine* or *la Métropole*, are terms used to differentiate France from the French colonies). In 2007, a movement sprang up of interest to all Francophiles, which expressed itself in a manifesto called *Littérature-Monde*, rebelling against the term and concept of *la Francophonie*, or French-speaking parts of the world, conceived of as a sort of otherness or non-hexagonicity. The idea of the marginalized other has fallen into grave disrepute, and the term *Francophone* seems to stress that. No one, says the manifesto, speaks Francophone, and no one writes it either. This manifesto was occasioned by the awarding of the Nobel Prize to Le Clezio, himself not a hexagon product and the excitement about this kind of revolution in literary imagination.

While Paris is not mentioned in what has become the iconic work on world cities, pushed to the side by Tokyo, London, and New York, the Paris metropolitan region is the fifth-largest urban economy in the world (and the largest in Europe). It is home to UNESCO and to 37 of the *Fortune* Global 500 companies, and it is visited by some 45 million tourists each year. To better position itself in the global competition for world city status, new skyscrapers (1,000 feet and higher) have been approved in the business district of La Défense, scheduled for completion in the next decade, and City of Paris authorities have said that they will relax restrictions on building heights within the

city itself. As Paris goes, so goes France, but at the moment, the triumph of expansion seems almost sure. Paris will always be Paris, of course, but France will not necessarily always be as centered as it has been in the past and the recent present.

Mary Ann Caws

See also Banlieue; Capital City; Flâneur; Haussmann, Baron Georges-Eugène

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PARKS

Public parks are now ubiquitous features of the landscape of most cities in the developed and developing world. They are more or less taken-for-granted and familiar social spaces in towns and cities, providing opportunities for a variety of leisure and recreational functions and activities in the everyday lives of most urban inhabitants. The historical origins of modern urban parks lie in a complex of social, economic, and political factors that coalesced in the nineteenth century around the need to address the perceived problems of the degradation and pollution of the environment of cities. It was considered that this dilapidation and deprivation was having deleterious consequences on the medical and moral health of expanding urban populations and thus contributing to the creation of potentially revolutionary conditions. Bringing nature to the city in the form of urban public parks was one attempt at ameliorating the negative consequences of industrialization and urbanization; it was contemporaneous with the development of other social, medical, and physical urban infrastructures and services.

Historical Background

The history of gardens includes traditions, practices, and forms that originate among the ancient

Persians (The Hanging Gardens of Babylon) as well from those in the Islamic world, Japan, and China. The word *park* normally refers to a bounded area of land, usually in its natural or landscaped seminatural state, that has been set aside for some purpose, typically for recreation. The first parks consisted of land set aside for hunting by royalty and the aristocracy in medieval Europe, bounded by walls or thick hedges to keep the animals in and the peasants out. These game preserves evolved into the landscaped estates set around aristocratic houses and also served the purpose of proclaiming the owner's wealth and status.

Parks in Britain

An aesthetic of landscape design developed in these parks to reflect elite values and tastes where nature was considered enhanced by the interventions of landscape architects such as Capability Brown (1716–1783) and his successor, Humphrey Repton (1752–1818). Some of these original private estates and royal hunting grounds eventually opened to public use and form some of the most important green spaces in particular cities. In London, the former royal parks of Regents, St. James', Hyde, and Richmond Parks are now open to the public. In other European cities, formerly aristocratic gardens or royal parks (Lazienki Park, Warsaw; the Tiergarten, Berlin; Luxembourg Gardens, Paris; Gorky Park, Moscow, which was created by merging the gardens of the Neskuchny Palace and the old Golitsyn Hospital) are now open and accessible to the public. In London and elsewhere, there were commercial pleasure gardens such as those of Vauxhall, Cremorne, and Ranelagh; of these early examples of the amusement park, Tivoli Gardens in Copenhagen (opened in 1843) is the longest-serving survivor. All offered amusements and distractions that were often considered disreputable or based on the principle of a commodified culture of pleasure.

The development of the urban or city parks as they are known today—as areas of open green space that provide for free and accessible recreational use by the public and are usually owned and maintained by local government—have their origins in the nineteenth century. As the first industrial and first predominantly urban nation, Britain was also the first to consider the need for and to



Regents Park in London

Source: Karen Wiley.

develop public parks as necessary green social spaces in towns and cities. As towns and cities expanded demographically and spatially to meet the needs of a burgeoning industrial sector, the cumulative result of inadequate sanitation, pollution, poor housing, and lack of medical services was documented by various studies, the most famous of which was by Edwin Chadwick (1800–1890), published in 1842.

In 1833, however, the Select Committee on Public Walks recognized the need for green spaces of nature as “lungs of the city” and as places for rational recreation and healthy exercise in contact with nature and in places where the air was relatively clean. The enclosure of common lands, the building over of green space, and the increasing spread of towns and cities made access to and the possibility for recreation in and enjoyment of nature difficult for the majority of the urban population. From the early decades of the nineteenth

century, these problems led to the development of the public parks movement, an umbrella group of garden designers, social and religious campaigners, politicians, and philanthropists who advocated for urban parks to benefit the physical and moral health as well as the quality of life of an increasingly urban population.

The landscape gardener and architect J. C. Loudon (1783–1843) is credited as the first to call for the creation of public parks at public expense. Loudon was also responsible for laying out the first park designed specifically for the public to use. In 1839, Derby Arboretum was given to the city by a wealthy benefactor but maintained at public expense by the local council. It represents the first truly public park as well as a trend toward private philanthropic benevolence that was eventually matched by a municipal commitment to the purchase and laying out of a large number and variety of public parks in cities and towns across Britain.

Industrial cities such as Glasgow, Liverpool, Manchester, and Birmingham developed networks of public parks of various shapes, sizes, and designs in an attempt to ameliorate the worst conditions of urban air pollution and to offer the opportunity for more healthy and rational recreation. Public parks also provided the means for local authorities to demonstrate their success, wealth, and status to the world. Among these highly landscaped, prestige parks were Birkenhead Park, the first publicly funded park (opened in 1847) in Liverpool and Kelvingrove Park (opened in 1853) in Glasgow, both designed by Sir Joseph Paxton (1803–1865) of London's Crystal Palace fame; others were Philips Park in Manchester (1846) and Stanly Park in Liverpool (opened 1870), providing the location for significant municipal museums and art galleries.

These Victorian parks ranged in size, design, layout, and features. They were constructed in different areas of the city serving different populations. Sporting activities and children's play parks, alongside specimen planting and water features, became almost universal elements of most urban parks. The nineteenth-century parks were perceived as ideal landscapes that would benefit urban society. However, this philanthropic and paternalistic concern had as much to do with enlightened selfishness as altruistic benevolence; the provision of public parks always reflected a number of discourses (medical, moral, political, economic, cultural, gender, etc.) concerning the need to improve not just the environment of cities but the behavior and condition of the predominantly male urban working classes.

Parks Around the World

American cities from the mid-nineteenth century began to experience similar problems of expansion and growth as those in Europe. Urban public parks in the United States owe a great debt to the influence of Frederick Law Olmstead (1822–1903). Inspired by the parks he visited on a tour of Britain in the 1850s, as well as the ideas of the City Beautiful movement, Olmstead went on to design Central Park in New York and a network of parks in Boston known as the Emerald Necklace, as well as parks in Chicago, Detroit, Milwaukee, and Mount Royal Park in Montreal. Olmstead not only designed a number of landmark parks but

also cemented the idea that mixed-use green space, accessible and available for all urban citizens, was a right that would benefit all classes as well as cities as a whole.

In France, the redevelopment and renovation of Paris between 1852 and 1870 under Napoleon III was directed by Baron Georges Eugène Haussmann (1809–1891). The new boulevards, squares and buildings, and metro and sewerage systems are rightly acknowledged as fundamental to Paris's claims as the capital of modernity. Not as well known is the role of Jean-Charles Adolphe Alphand (1817–1891), an engineer and the landscape architect responsible for the design and construction of many new parks, which added more than just a green embellishment to the concrete landscape of the new Paris. The public parks he contributed as an intrinsic element of this modern designed and planned city include the Bois de Boulogne, the Park Monceau, the Bois de Vincennes, Buttes Chaumont, Montsouris, and the gardens of the Champ-de-Mars below the Eiffel Tower.

The tradition and history of park building in cities throughout the world varies to some extent with culture and politics. The influence of colonization has had an effect on the spatial and architectural landscape as well as economic, social, and political development of cities in Latin America, such as Rio de Janeiro, Santiago, and Mexico City, all of which have historic green spaces as well as more recent urban parks to provide some access for their expanding populations. Nonetheless, authorities in cities as diverse as Tokyo, Dubai, and Johannesburg express similar sentiments in attempts to expand the number of parks as well as their variety and distribution across the social and physical landscape of the city, with the aim of creating a greener environment for all the current communities as well as future generations.

A General Rationale

The creation of networks of urban parks in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Europe and the United States represents a concerted attempt to enhance not only the lives of the expanding urban populations but also to make cities more attractive and beautiful places to live and work. For cities to be successful, they needed to be more healthy and sustainable as human habitats,

as social as well as physical environments. There was thus an element of environmental determinism in much of this. Creating more healthy and beneficial environments meant more healthy and productive citizens.

With the development of town planning, public parks as intrinsic designed spaces became essential conditions for successful urban living. Alongside the somewhat utopian ideas of Ebenezer Howard's (1850–1928) Garden City movement, two key proponents of urban green space were Patrick Geddes (1854–1932) and Thomas Mawson (1861–1933), both of whom were key figures in the development of town planning and landscape design.

The interwar and post-World War II reconstruction and development of new towns and suburbs took account of the need for green spaces as fundamental for social well-being. Although the large-scale parks of the nineteenth century proved to be difficult to replicate because of cost and the lack of available land, urban parks and green space were and are still being built and maintained in cities throughout the world. This includes neighborhood and small-scale pocket parks as well as the use of brownfield sites left over from deindustrialization. Similarly, canal and river banks and disused railway tracks and sidings have provided the opportunity for developing linear parks, longer thin strips of green urban space. Further developments in park building include areas of natural beauty set aside as national or regional country parks to prevent uncontrolled urban development (sprawl) and country parks on the outskirts of large conurbations. All of these allow contact to a more unstructured and planned natural landscape, made accessible through the development of private automobile ownership and use.

Contemporary Discourses

Many of the roles and functions of public parks in the nineteenth century remain as crucial elements in contemporary discourses concerning the social and environmental health of cities and their populations, particularly the need for parks as sites for passive (quiet contemplation of nature) and active recreation (sports, playgrounds, games) for urban populations. However, changes in leisure pursuits and activities have led to a decline of and some changes in park use and activities associated with

them. Combined with a restructuring of many park departments amid the economic changes of the late 1970s, many parks suffered a decline in both their physical fabric as well as their status. As such, they became associated in many instances with criminal activity and antisocial behavior and became perceived as “no-go” areas, particularly after dark.

More recently, policymakers have recognized both the need for public use and access to public green space and the consideration of public parks and other green space as a vital element in reducing the ecological footprint of cities. This has led to a renewed commitment to urban parks in many cities. New investment in lighting, maintenance, policing, and infrastructure has led to a new invigoration in the park life in many cities. The most explicit example of this is the reclamation of Central Park in New York as a truly public space, open and accessible to all and not the preserve of gangs, muggers, rapists, drug dealers, prostitutes, and pimps, as it has been perceived and experienced in the recent past.

While there is the potential for conflict between different groups of users (whether intergenerational or interethnic) as well as between different groups and the park authorities (the distinction between the representation and policing of appropriate or sanctioned use versus the vernacular, everyday lived experience of green social space), urban public parks are still considered by local and national governments as an essential part of an overall strategy for creating and maintaining socially and environmentally sustainable cities. Parks are also vibrant, popular social spaces that attract loyalty, affection, and support when threatened by building or road construction or commercial intrusion; they play a crucial and vital part in the lives of city dwellers throughout the increasingly urbanizing world.

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See also Landscape Architecture; Sustainable Development; Urban Design; Urban Planning

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PATCHWORK URBANISM

With more than half the world's population having gravitated to urban environments and so much of this urbanization taking place in recent decades, it is little wonder that city landscapes across the globe are being transformed rapidly and dramatically. The form and character of these transformations are continuously reflected in urban scholarship from a variety of subdisciplines, through detailed case studies of particular cities and their comparisons, and also through a range of metaphors and conceptualizations variously heralding a postmodern urbanism, postmetropolis, 100-mile city, polycentric city, quartered city, and splintering urbanism, to name but a few. A key premise of these contributions is the contention that cities are becoming increasingly fragmented in

terms of their physical, economic, social, and political shape, whether through the formation of edge cities, the mushrooming of gated privatized housing developments, or the reconfiguration of essential infrastructures. Indeed, at times, one is given the distinct impression that contemporary metropolitan landscapes constitute an increasingly decentered but intensely uneven patchwork of microspaces that are physically proximate but institutionally estranged. Moreover, in defying a traditional sense of how a city should look and feel, this patchwork urbanism calls into question established intellectual categories and mappings of urban settlement while also unsettling conventional definitions of urban, suburban, hinterland, countryside, and rural. This fragmentary urbanism also offers some profound challenges to individuals and organizations charged with the planning and political governance of contemporary metropolitan regions.

Mapping a Patchwork Urbanism

In looking to describe and interpret the patchwork character of contemporary metropolitan landscapes, it is important to acknowledge that throughout history, cities have been unfolding in a relatively chaotic fashion. In terms of geographical location, the mercantilist era helped to stimulate many urban settlements around major seaports and the subsequent onset of industrialization and railroad transportation, which partly fostered the industrial city. The latter became quickly characterized by a strict division between the domiciliary spaces of the bourgeoisie and workers' quarters, which were often adjacent to the factories and workhouses. The consolidation of the industrial city in the twentieth century via the rise of Fordist mass production and mass consumption saw a notable division emerge between a concentrated downtown—with its cosmopolitan central business district; arts, cultural, and shopping facilities; and handsome townhouses—surrounded by a rapidly expanding periphery of largely low-rise suburban tracts. An extension and deepening of state power also saw formal urban planning emerge to shape much of the geography of development and land use. If clearly representing a spatial imaginary of a U.S. urbanism (and one reasonably captured by the Chicago School of Urban Sociology's concentric

ring model), this modernist metropolitan landscape also did something to capture the shape of many towns and cities across much of the globe, from Brazil to Australia.

Patchwork Urban Economy

A retrospective reading of this urban form throws into sharp relief the less orderly, more chaotic metropolis of the early twenty-first century. Indeed, the urban planning scholar Ed Soja explicitly contends that the mid-twentieth century modern metropolis has been usurped by a *postmetropolis*. In a process that can no longer be simply described as suburban sprawl, postmetropolitan landscapes are being stretched out ever further and punctuated by a range of economic and social trends that are decentering the city to form an increasingly complex and polycentric urban geography. The sociologist Manuel Castells also considers how virtually all contemporary city economies are undergoing some fragmentation as they become enmeshed in the variable geometry of the globalizing network society. This can be seen in rapidly developing cities in China and in a globalizing city like Kuala Lumpur, where the state-led development of premium high-technology spaces appears to be more directly networked into global flows rather than toward their local contexts.

Newly forming economic spaces are mushrooming everywhere. For example, a growing proportion of America's wealth is now generated within 200 so-called edge cities. Also known as technoburbs and boomburbs, such places are connected by locomotives and subways as well as freeway interchanges, satellite dishes, and international airports, themselves stretching into extended low-rise high-technology corridors. Edge cities and boomburbs represent self-contained urbanizing nodes permitting millions of people to live, work, and consume in the same place, thereby differentiating it from either the downtown or the traditional suburb. Classic examples include Irvine in Orange County south of Los Angeles and Tyson's Corner in Fairfax, Virginia, but they are increasingly a global phenomenon.

The extension and growth of such urban peripheries is intimately bound up with the mass diffusion of the automobile and a whole system of supportive infrastructures including beltways,

service stations, drive-through fast-food centers, megamalls, office parks, warehouses, and anonymous industrial sheds. The flipside is that such zones are often not incorporated into the main arteries of public transport and, in turn, are increasingly viewed to be wholly unfavorable to environmental sustainability and lag behind many city center spaces in the provision of public infrastructure and services. While they offer opportunities for low-grade employment for the working poor, they are generally a hostile environment for the homeless, unemployed, and dispossessed.

While these developments, not surprisingly, have left some gaping voids in the deindustrializing downtowns, the rise of a so-called new economy is in turn helping to refashion certain inner-city districts. Enhanced information and communication technologies and creative industries exemplified by Internet design, computer graphics and imaging, and multimedia industries, publishing, and architecture are all helping to form buzzing urban villages. Moreover, stimulated by public-private growth coalitions and initiatives like business improvement districts, many erstwhile disinvested and dead downtown zones have been dramatically resuscitated in the form of themed consumption spaces, high-rise corporate plazas, hotels and convention centers, and cultural citadels, while there has also been a renaissance of redundant docklands and industrial zones into creative cultural economic quarters and heritage sites. Developers' utopias like these extend the frontiers of many central business districts while simultaneously gifting a new imagery for cities to compete on international stages.

Unsurprisingly, perhaps, this landscape ignores the spaces untouched by today's dominant circulations of economic wealth: the derelict warehouses, redundant docklands, disused railroad yards, wastelands, and other empty and void spaces grassed over following malign neglect. Far from being truly empty, however, these are often the spaces that street hawkers, the homeless, prostitutes, and those chronically addicted to narcotics inhabit; a living reality from which the dominant elites and the comfortable majority are conveniently shielded. The lives of the marginalized are more often than not absent from the iconography of tour-guide maps, glossy in-flight magazines, the heritage trail, or Hollywood films. Picture postcards of a

city's signatory bridge fail to include the homeless people inhabiting their infrastructural underbelly: The dispossessed have been shunted away from the tourist-entrepreneurial gaze. Similarly, while enjoying a monumental success as "the feel-good film of the decade," *Slumdog Millionaire* has caused shockwaves among audiences in Europe and the United States, who had never imagined they would be so willingly invited onto the streets of Mumbai's slums.

Patchwork of Domiciliary Spaces

The landscape of domiciliary space is also undergoing dramatic transformation. The traditional suburb has long been proclaimed as an aesthetic marriage of town and country and as embodying an ideal of family life, but in recent decades, a range of habitats are challenging the traditional suburb as the archetypal utopia. One example is the growing number of gated developments near major metropolitan areas across the world, although perhaps most prevalent in North and Latin America, Asia, and South Africa; often, these are adjacent to, or indeed part of, an edge city. Invariably, such master-planned communities are premised on the privatization of what would ordinarily be public space such as roads and sidewalks and are gated in a double sense: physically in the form of high walls, moats, guarded gates, security cameras, and on occasion an armed response; and institutionally via regulatory practices dictating the age range of residents, hours and frequency of visitors, house décor, and so on. They are also increasingly run by residential private governments that privatize civic responsibilities like police protection and services like street maintenance, recreation, and entertainment. For some commentators, these communities are part of a private world that shares little with its neighbors or the larger political system. Such fragmentation can be viewed as undermining the ethos of an urban way of life, producing what the Marxist geographer Don Mitchell defines as SUV-style citizenship. Perhaps this is brought to life most vividly in claims that in many cities today, only the working poor and dispossessed will choose to travel by public transport.

As part of the revitalized downtown, inner-city domiciliary space in many countries is also experiencing a makeover as gentrification has become

global in scale and diverse in scope. While the classic block-by-block renovation of formerly working-class neighborhoods in mercantile and industrial cities continues, there is also a seemingly ubiquitous fashioning of new-build gentrification, often on erstwhile brownfield sites and increasingly in cities of the global South and North. The resulting inner-city and waterfront condominiums are also, however, increasingly protected by an architecture-assemblage of human and nonhuman technologies and thereby orient the resident inward rather than out onto the streetscape, which is presumably deemed to represent a fiercely hostile, dystopian environment around and through which dangerous others roam. The heterogeneous worlds that provide cities with their characteristic diversity and intensity appear to be increasingly premised on social indifference, detached lifestyles, and a growing ecology of fear, all of which require careful management and perhaps innovative approaches to planning.

Some commentators are in little doubt that the rush by urban elites and wealthier middle classes to pull up the private drawbridge and to insulate themselves behind gated communities and enclosed office, shopping, and leisure quarters represents a spatial logic of the growing social polarization that prevails throughout the world's major metropolitan regions. Moreover, if the character of gentrification varies across national boundaries, then so too does that of those neighborhoods most vulnerable to what sociologist Loïc Wacquant terms *advanced marginality*, not least Mexico City's *barrios*, São Paulo's *favelas*, the United States' *hyperghettos*, France's *Banlieues*, and the wider planet's *slums*. While this is unfolding in many inner urban landscapes, and in concert with the rise of new economic zones, so many longer-established suburbs are also facing considerable challenges in terms of their physical upkeep, essential infrastructures, and access to services from doctors to decent grocery stores. Indeed, some inner urban and suburban communities are choosing to retrofit their neighborhoods with gates and barricades, primarily out of a heightened fear of crime and a perceived urban dystopia outside.


As if to further complicate the existing patchwork of spaces available for urban, suburban, or exurban living, the past 10 to 15 years have seen the preeminence of a distinctly new urban/suburban

form. Self-styled the *new urbanism*—and intended as a direct antidote to the uncontrolled automobile-dependent sprawl outlined above—it advocates the creation of compact, ecologically sustainable towns and urban spaces where residents can walk or cycle to workplaces, shops, schools, and leisure, cultural, and entertainment venues. Buildings and recreational areas are arranged in street grids, viewed to foster an enriched public realm that enables social groups to share plazas, squares, cafés, and parks, leading to enduring land values, the promotion of security, and a sense of community.

Sensitive to local architectural styles, the new urbanism is vehemently opposed to the dominant twentieth-century planning practice of subdividing land into isolated zones, which is considered to result in traffic congestion and the all-too-familiar sprawling landscape of car lots, homogeneous suburban cul-de-sacs, jaded shopping malls, office parks, and the urban problems described above. Although the new urbanism has struck a chord with many planners and progressive urbanists in recent years, some critics have highlighted how such communities are deeply punctuated by class and racial divides and indeed serve to represent a novel way of extracting profits for developers.

Interpreting a Patchwork Urbanism

One scholar who has made explicit reference to the idea of a patchwork urbanism (and to whom the current authors are thereby indebted) is the Marxist geographer David Harvey. Harvey warns of how the new urban political strategies of city governments and the associated neoliberalization of urban space have created some deeply entrenched geographical disparities in wealth and power, fashioning a metropolitan world of chronically



Downtown Los Angeles's Bunker Hill area has been redeveloped to include new business complexes and loft residences. This photo shows offices and convenient dining in a concentrated area, ideal for people working in adjacent districts.

Source: Tracy Buyan.

uneven geographical development. Wealth moves to exurban spaces that explicitly exclude the poor and the marginalized, or it encloses itself behind high walls, in suburban privatopias and urban gated communities. For Harvey, the effect is to divide up the urban realm into a patchwork quilt of islands of relative affluence, struggling to secure their precarious prosperity in a sea of spreading decay, leading to a profound division and fragmentation of metropolitan space and a localized defensive posture toward the rest of the city, with

potentially fractious consequences for urban politics.

A particularly powerful example of such unconcealed division is the redevelopment of Los Angeles's downtown Bunker Hill area, which houses a number of billion-dollar megastructures including the Bonaventure Hotel complex; it has severed virtually all traditional pedestrian arteries to the city center. This was to appease the city's major developers, who were concerned about the devaluation of property they saw as a consequence of Bunker Hill's proximity to public transport, and especially its heavy use by the African American and Mexican poor. Bunker Hill has subsequently been largely unlinked from the streets outside and insulated from exposure to the city's working classes. This represents an example of what Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin define as a hermetically sealed "secessionary networked space," leading to an increasingly splintered urban condition, connecting built environments such as malls, business parks, gated communities, and international airports, which are, in turn, intimately intertwined with dedicated networked infrastructures including road and light rail systems and customized energy, water, security, and information super-highway services. Such processes alongside the others described above would seem to herald a city that is very different from that which came to predominate throughout much of the twentieth century. It also invites one to disavow conventional mappings of the city and, in turn, perhaps to reconsider the nature of the built environment alongside the geography and sociology of the city, and indeed the very nature of urban life, the urban condition, and urban governance.

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See also Divided Cities; Downtown Revitalization; Edge City; Gated Community; Los Angeles School of Urban Studies; Megalopolis; Revanchist City; Sprawl

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PHOTOGRAPHY AND THE CITY

Because the technology of photography and the rise of the modern city coincided almost exactly, both temporally and spatially, the emergence of modern visual culture is closely associated with cities and city life, and photographic imagery in all its forms is central to the field of urban studies. From the earliest experiments in the 1830s to the latest developments in digital imaging on websites, the art of photography—whether by professionals or amateurs—has become an important way that people explore, analyze, document, and celebrate the urban environment and one of the key modalities by which the modern city explains itself to itself.

In examining the relationship between photography and the city, it will be useful to keep in mind that photography generally falls into three broad traditions of practice: the aesthetic, the documentary, and the popular.

The aesthetic tradition attempted to mimic or even surpass the preexisting traditions of the visual arts, emphasizing formal composition, evocative patterns of light and shade, and the frequent use of atmospheric blurring and soft focus. The documentary tradition, on the other hand, directly followed the precedents established by the graphic illustration in the popular press from about 1850 to 1900. Some urban documentary photography was commercial in nature, producing postcard, stereoscope, and travelogue images of cities worldwide; other, mostly journalistic documentary photographs assumed a tone of committed social activism and muckraking advocacy. Finally, the popular or



"Teaching the Young Idea," photograph by Lewis Hine, October 1908, Morgantown, West Virginia

Source: Library of Congress.

snapshot tradition of photography began as early as the 1880s, when the Eastman Kodak Company created an inexpensive system that combined an easy-to-use camera with widely available film and film processing. Today, with the wide availability of digital cameras often built into Internet-connected cell phones, an entirely new phase in the democratization of visual culture has emerged as an integral and ubiquitous feature of global-urban civilization.

Photography and the Early Modern City

In the early modern period of urban industrialism, photography became instantly popular, and images of urban life—cityscapes, portraits, architectural views, street scenes, and the details of industrial processes—grew in importance as rapid urbanization became a worldwide phenomenon.

Some of the very earliest photographs are urban only because their makers tested their cameras by pointing them out their studio windows. Nicéphore Niepce's "View from His Window at Le Gras" of 1827 is a very early example, using the crude heliograph process. In 1838, Louis Jacques Mande Daguerre produced "Two Views of the Boulevards of Paris," and by 1843, William Henry Fox Talbot had made numerous calotypes of the streets and landmarks of London and Paris. During the rest of the century, photographers throughout the industrial world and beyond began making pictures of the rapidly growing urban centers.

Among the most popular images of cities in the illustrated press and in inexpensive chromolithographs were so-called bird's-eye views, and the early photographers attempted in various ways to achieve a similar effect. Some cities were small

enough to be photographed whole in a single image. Charles Fontayne and William Southgate Porter pictured all of Cincinnati in a single shot in 1848, and the great portrait photographer Nadar (Gaspard-Felix Tournachon) took sweeping views of Paris from a balloon in 1868. Another popular technique was to take a series of photographs and string them together in a panoramic montage.

Urban photographers, as well as graphic artists, quickly discovered that views of whole cities gave only limited and highly distanced information. Real city life was in the streets, in the buildings, and in the faces of the people of the city. From about 1840 on, the mass popularity of stereoscopes—hand-held viewing devices that allowed people to see three-dimensional views of city scenes, as well as natural wonders, from around the world—greatly contributed to the average citizen's knowledge of the planet and its peoples.

In 1853, photo-illustrated journalism made a major advance when John Barnard took a picture of a factory fire in Oswego, New York, and published a notice in a local newspaper that copies of the photograph could be obtained at his studio. Press illustrations based on photographs rather than drawings soon followed, as did surveys of urban street life, particularly the lives of the poor and working class, much like the reports of the philanthropic researchers and government commissioners that were being published in cities like London, Paris, and New York. In 1873, John Thomson published his four-volume *Illustrations of China and Its People*, intended as a handbook for European traders and industrialists. This was followed by *Street Life in London*, published in parts in 1876 and 1877, a pioneering study that concentrated on the lives of the working class, the poor, and the downtrodden.

Thomson's work opened the floodgates of modern urban photography. In 1890, the American journalist and social reformer Jacob Riis published *How the Other Half Lives*, a volume of text and photographs that revealed the shameful and socially dangerous conditions of the urban poor and the squalor and moral corruption of the slums and tenements. Riis began a rich tradition of the urban photographer as social critic and activist. From 1904 to 1909, sociologist and social reformer Lewis Hine took thousands of pictures of immigrants being processed through Ellis Island in New

York, thereby visually documenting one of the great urbanizing migrations of modern times. Later, he worked with the National Child Labor Committee and produced images of children working in Southern textile factories that still touch the heart today. Together, Riis and Hine did with photographs what Friedrich Engels had done in prose in *The Condition of English Working Class in 1844* and what Upton Sinclair did in *The Jungle* of 1906.

If documentary street-life photography revealed how people lived in the modern city, portrait photography showed the people of the city close up. Commercial portrait photographers set up studios in virtually every major city of the world, and by the 1860s or 1870s, the city directories of cities large and small listed hundreds of establishments where the wealthy bourgeoisie could have photographic portraits made. When the tintype process was perfected, the cost of a sitting went down so dramatically that almost any city resident could afford a cabinet photograph. Some of the best photographic portraits of the urban bourgeoisie are extraordinary works of art. Steichen's "J. P. Morgan" (1903) famously captures the fierce ruthlessness of the Wall Street financier, and Robert Howlett's "Isambard Kingdom Brunel" (1857) evokes the matter-of-factness of an engineer turned industrial entrepreneur—top hat, hands in pockets, smoking a cigar and standing in front of the massive iron launching chains of his steamship, Great Eastern.

The period from the 1890s through the early years of the twentieth century was a particularly rich time for a kind of urban photography that combined a documentary purpose with the visual sensitivity of the aesthetic tradition. One notable example of this trend is the work of Eugene Atget, who took up photography in 1899 and began a decades-long project of documenting the streets of Paris. He carried out his project with such insight and sensitivity to pictorial composition that he was befriended by many in the artistic avant-garde and hailed as the very embodiment of the *flâneur* tradition—Baudelaire's conception of the intellectual who participates in urban life by strolling the streets of the city as a disengaged observer.

Another photographer of this period was E. J. Bellocq, who photographed the prostitutes and bordellos of the notorious Storyville district of New Orleans, Louisiana, from about 1912 to

1917. These photographs provide a visual record of a world and a society that was even then fast disappearing. In a sense, all the great *fin de siècle* urban photographers were engaged in a similar nostalgic project: documenting a city of memory, an urban reality that was soon to be swept aside by a newer phase in the history of modernity.

Photography and the City of High Modernism

The city of high modernism is largely of the twentieth century, especially from the 1920s onward, and is dominated by skyscrapers, office work, and the technologies of electricity and stainless steel. What dawned so optimistically, of course, was an urban century that was to suffer mightily through the crises of worldwide economic depression, the rise of totalitarianism, and the devastation of two world wars.

In the 1890s, photography began to replace graphic art in newspaper and magazines, but the advent of motion pictures arguably represented the most important technological advance in the history of photography in the twentieth century. In 1878, the eccentric Eadweard Muybridge had set up a series of cameras to scientifically record the gait of a horse in motion. Then, in the 1890s, both the American Thomas Edison and the French brothers Auguste and Louis Lumiere created “movies” and began the business of distributing and exhibiting them to mass audiences. The history of photography—most especially the representation of the city in photography—had taken a major step forward.

Perhaps the single most characteristic image of the twentieth-century city is the cinematic establishing shot that identifies the locale of the story about to unfold in a motion picture entertainment. In *Metropolis* of 1929, German director Fritz Lang used a fantasy vision of overwhelming skyscrapers, with airplanes flying between them, to introduce his narrative of urban class warfare. In some respects, the image resembled the revolutionary modern towers of Le Corbusier’s *City of Tomorrow*, which the French architect published in 1924. The classic high-modernist image of the Manhattan skyline has always been used to represent New York in cinema, at least since King Vidor’s *The Crowd* of 1926.

In still photography, the aesthetic tradition followed the lead of the fine arts. As abstraction and cubist formalism took over from realism and impressionism, the artistic photographers often abandoned subject matter entirely, or at least rendered it secondary in importance, in the attempt to capture images of pure form and underlying structure. Even in urban photography—pictures like Charles Sheeler’s “Ford Plant, Detroit” of 1927, with its dominant crisscrossing of conveyor belts, or Hungarian constructivist Laszlo Moholy-Nagy’s “From the Radio Tower, Berlin” of 1928, with its exaggerated aerial perspective revealing only a geometric pattern below—the values of formal structure and pictorial composition overwhelm the urban-industrial subject matter. Similarly, the cover of the first issue of *Life* in 1936 was an almost purely cubist image of the Fort Peck Dam in Montana by Margaret Bourke-White.

The interest of the aesthetic urban photographers was not solely in formal composition and abstraction. Berenice Abbott produced photographs of New York storefronts strikingly similar to those of Atget, and Bourke-White took many street scene pictures, including the extraordinary “Breadline in Louisville” of 1937, showing people waiting for food in front of a billboard proclaiming, “The World’s Highest Standard of Living.” But the documentary tradition took on a life of its own during the 1930s and produced some of the real masterpieces of twentieth-century urban photography—for example, Manuel Alvarez Bravo’s documentation of the people of Mexico City or James Van Der Zee’s images of the unique combination of oppression and glamour in the African American community of New York’s Harlem.

Responding to the Great Depression in America, photographers in the documentary tradition focused on poverty, often rural poverty. Walker Evans, who had photographed street scenes in New York during the 1920s, joined the Farm Security Administration and depicted the poverty-stricken lives of Southern sharecroppers in photographs that were published, along with a text by James Agee, in *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men* (1939). Also working for the Farm Security Administration was Dorothea Lange, whose pictures of Dust Bowl migrants helped visually define the experience of a generation whose story was told by John Steinbeck in *The Grapes of Wrath*. All

these images of rural poverty had clear implications for urban life. The urbanization process has always been driven by rural-to-urban migration, and Lange made that point with special force by using the title “End of the Road: The City” for the final chapter of her book, *An American Exodus* (1939).

In the 1940s and the postwar 1950s, photography adopted a gritty, cynical attitude toward urban life. In cinema, this was known as *film noir*, and in still photography, no one embodied the *noir* sensibility more than the photojournalist Weegee (Arthur Fellig). Weegee took flash photographs of dead bodies, crash victims, and horrified onlookers, which he freelanced to newspapers and weekly tabloids. Some of his best work was published in 1945 as *Naked City*, an extraordinary collection of images that revolutionized the art of street scene photography. Many of the great urban photographers of the second half of the twentieth century—notably Diane Arbus and Richard Avedon—found inspiration in Weegee’s unique vision.

In the postwar years, the popularity of television, with its combination of entertainment, news, and advertising seamlessly intermingled, replaced movies and newsreels and vastly increased the reach of urban visual culture, bringing it inside the home in a way that had never been imagined before. At the same time, central cities began to be rebuilt after years of wartime devastation and neglect, but a new kind of city was also developing in the postwar years—a new kind of middle-class suburban land use pattern that was to transform the urban landscape, first in North America and then other parts of the world. Middle-class suburbia, however, attracted little serious attention from either the aesthetic or documentary photographers. *Suburbia* (1971) by Bill Owens presents images of bland cul-de-sacs, housewives in curlers, and empty rooms with TV sets left on that fails, perhaps purposely, to engage the humanity of the suburban environment. Most other images of suburbs tend to be aerial images of sprawl uniformity or street-level views of cookie-cutter houses that dismissively tend to deny any complexity or nuance to the lives of suburbanites.

If both the aesthetic and documentary traditions in urban photography seemed to weaken as the century came to a close, the popular tradition grew stronger and more ubiquitous. Millions of people

had taken up the hobby of photography to document their families and communities. In the end, twentieth-century popular photography created a kind of snapshot democracy that liberated visual imagery from the professional elites in both journalism and the arts. Today, collectors and researchers ponder the albums full of photographs that document the otherwise anonymous millions of ordinary citizens who lived their lives as the great events of history unfolded. Sometimes, their photographs record aspects of those great events—soldiers coming home from war, families moving into postwar housing or watching television as men walked on the moon—but the perspective is usually distinctively different from the work of the professional photographers. The popular tradition in urban photography is intimate, direct, and free of pretense. Perhaps no single image has any great significance, but collectively, they reveal the lives of individuals and communities from the inside out.

Visual Culture in the Postmodern City

In the still-emerging postmodern city, many of the distinctions that characterized modern urbanism began to dissolve. At the local level, public space became increasingly privatized, and the relationship between suburb and central city changed as more and more business enterprises and cultural facilities moved away from inner-city locations and created a new kind of urban place, which the journalist Joel Garreau called “edge city” and historian Robert Fishman termed technoburbia. At the global level, there was a complete international restructuring of the relationships between cities and nation-states, driven by a new technological order based on computer-based telecommunications and a globalized economy. Those same technologies of communication became highly personalized with the advent of desktop and laptop computers and globally networked cell phones. People could now belong to and interact with online communities with people from all over the world. Urban life began to enter, at least partially, the realm of virtuality.

In postmodern urban photography, the popular tradition becomes triumphant. In cities where whole buildings have become electronic billboards, photographic artists and photojournalists are more

important than ever, but with the widespread availability of digital cameras, almost everyone can take pictures and transmit them to their friends or the world at large through the Internet. The professional/amateur distinction becomes irrelevant as more and more of the established outlets of visual mass communication become web-based and actively seek submissions from anyone who wishes to participate in the collective process of visual documentation.

It is perhaps still too early to say definitively what constitutes the cityscape of the postmodern urban order. In the real world, it could be the post-9/11 skyline of New York without the twin towers of the World Trade Center, or it could be the featureless sprawl of the postsuburban technopoles of Europe and North America, or even the endless peripheral shantytown slums surrounding global cities throughout Asia, Africa, and Latin America. But in the virtual world, the postmodern city is perhaps best expressed visually by the homepage of MySpace or YouTube, by the mean streets of computer games like *Grand Theft Auto*, or even by the participatory alternate reality of SecondLife. At some point, the distinction between visual culture and urban reality fades, and the image of the city becomes the city itself.

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See also Architecture; Cinematic Urbanism; City and Film; *Flâneur*; Globalization; Metropolis; Urban Design

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PIAZZA

Squares form an integral part of the urban fabric, and open spaces like the square are deemed paramount for the liveability of our cities. This entry traces the historical roots of squares in the urban and subsequently unpacks how they improve the quality of urban life.

The word *piazza* refers to the Italian word for an open square in the city and at the same time hints at the historical antecedents of modern-day squares. In most urban settings, squares are public spaces, that is, they are generally open to the public although in some cases heavily controlled. The square in the public imagination and as manifest in many planning policy documents is intended to be an all-inclusive open-air living room from which people accrue economic benefit and improved mental and physical health; also, the square is often designed for children and young people and is thought to reduce the fear of crime.

But squares are about more than living up to the aspirations of those who write policy guidelines. First, these living rooms are ordered spaces, made and maintained by certain people and guided by specific rhetoric and often direct interests. Second, these spaces are made and remade through different usages by different people, making the living room a contested terrain. Last, the force of this contestation resides not only in scripted or determined political projects of those who order space and the different users of that space but also in the very materiality of space, so that the square holds within its very materiality the force of its own transformation, whichever direction this transformation may take. The piazza, evoking images of bustling Mediterranean life that one might enjoy over a cup of cappuccino, a sunbathed living room, also entails urban political life, from the very smallest to the very grandest of confrontations.



A piazza in Rome

Source: David Ferrell.

Historical Roots

To understand why the square as open space, available for the public, is deemed so important by many planners, politicians, and academics, it is necessary to look to the past. A traditional starting point for much discussion about Western civilization is ancient Greece, and here the birth of democracy in the city-state of Athens will be the starting point. The Greek *agora* was an assembly of all free-born males where matters, secular and religious, could be deliberated and judicial powers exercised with appointed jurors of the public. Similarly, the heart and birthplace of the Roman empire was the *forum Romanum*, in which all decisions were made concerning the empire. Most

Roman cities were modeled on the Greek city form. The *forum* was laid out as an open square for the public, but later numerous administrative and religious buildings were made on and around it, as in the case of the *agora*. Today, many speculate that the agoras and forums of old were similar to the open street market in North Africa, called *souk*.

In the Middle Ages, Roman and Greek city planning inspired European counts and bishops who were building new cities. These established medieval cities are commonly known as *bastides*, with a regular street plan and a central square, usually dominated by a cathedral or church. This layout, focused on a central square, spilled over into the New World with both *bastide*-type towns and towns built according to the planning decree

of the Law of the Indies issued by the King of Spain in 1573, which was inspired by the Roman tradition. In these cities, the rigidity of the street plan was even more pronounced, and the square played a key role as the focal point of the city. This rigid street plan can be observed in most Latin American cities and some in North America, with the squares as focal points and the dominance of religious and secular administrative buildings. Later, the planned cities of the so-called English Renaissance carried forth the role of the central public square in the urban plan. In this context, it must be noted that squares are to be found in ancient cities in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East, but most of those cities today bear the mark of transformation through colonization and thus imposed planning that adheres to the historical lineage briefly sketched above.

In all the historic transformations of city planning, the square played an important twofold role. First, it was considered a place where the public could meet and mingle; in a way, it was a commons for citizens. Second, the square was the city's focal point, where commerce would take place; most of the administrative functions of the city or state, along with key religious institutions, would circle it.

The square is part and parcel of the structure of urban space, which in general dictates how we move, thus structuring encounters and our lives. The square is a site of cultural practices and geographical knowledge. It is the terrain of social encounters and contestation imbued with meanings of liveability and social conviviality that it is meant to foster. To reveal the latent politics of the square, it is necessary to uncover how it was designed and built, by whom and for what purpose, and how it is being used. In other words, the square conveys meaning of the greater forces at large in every society and how these shape and are shaped by people's everyday lives. Placing a large open public space in the center of the urban fabric entails recognition that citizens and their activities are central to the city and concerns about how meaning can be conveyed to and inscribed by the citizen. What is at stake here is how the democratic citizen is constituted through progressive politics based on interaction through being together. The implication for public spaces is that they should be maintained at all cost as a forum

for this interaction. In these spaces, politics and deliberations of matters, worldly or not, take place, along with commerce and entertainment—these are open marketplaces where people sell their produce and interact.

Reinventing the Public

The square as public space has always existed in one form or another, imbued with secular or religious meaning, and it functioned as a place of assembly for numerous purposes. Latin American cities are a pertinent example; as a result of the rigidity of their layout, the square has played a key role as a site of gathering and social conviviality. In modern times, importance has been placed on the open square as it is conceived to foster democracy, harkening back to ancient Greek times. This conception rests on the idea that all people can communicate in an unproblematic fashion, irrespective of modes of expression, dress codes, languages, and the like. This is the idea of communicative rationality, whence emerges a romantic notion, or ideal, of public spaces as a universal abstract sphere where people freely interact and ideas are exchanged. Thus, modern planners have started to view the square as a living room, an unproblematic place of rest and recreation for all, where all voices can be heard; as such, it is necessary for the well-being of the city. Hence, they plan for open spaces, where cafés line the open expanse and events take over the open space.

The city square is viewed as a forum for individual or group interactions based on what Habermas termed *communicative action* or *deliberative democracy*. The model of deliberative democracy states that the constitution of the democratic citizen is best done through institutionalizing debates on how to enhance democracy, a debate that takes place through benign rational reasoning and is thus based on communicative rationality but, most important, takes place.

Space is never only abstract, however, or to be managed by top-down planning directives. Avoiding this spatial fetishism, the square receives a role as a site where people can be present and thus seen, a determinant of being heard. In this formulation, democracy is forged in the square through confrontation, where different groups confront as friendly enemies or in agonistic ways. Many theorists,

especially those of Marxist persuasion, offer a critique of communicative rationality, arguing that what constitutes the rational and abstract often disguises tangible interests and agendas of the powerful, which are promoted as rational or even common sense. In this living room, they argue, there is no rational consensus or universal to be relied on, and the promotion of politics is accomplished through the empowerment of conflicting and different voices. The implications for the square is that there is little chance of a common meaning to it, unless with reference to ideals of either communicative rational or romantic notions of respectful tolerance. The square is thus a heterogeneous space with open borders; it gains meaning from its appropriation through conflict.

Whether for the sake of communicative rationality or confrontation, the argument is that the square must be open to appropriation; that is, the rights of the citizen to take to the streets must be guaranteed, condemning segregation but advocating the freedom to cluster. Thus, planning and making the square, where it is assumed that free association takes place, cannot be done through abstraction—or some enlightened planning directive—alone; it must come through the dialectics driven by the confrontation of people taking to the streets and squares of the city. The understanding of the square as a produced space in terms of dialectics creates a relative space of constant movement, as nothing can come into being unless through a relation, through contradiction and negation. What this means is that people take to the streets, making themselves visible, and thus both demand space and create space, but rarely under conditions of their own choosing.

Demanding space is based on the premise that those demanding need to be heard. One can be actively heard or seen as undermining the symbolism or representations of the dominant order, and this warrants attention to the symbolic nature of the square. A semiotic reading of the square views it and its buildings, architecture, and art as representative of the ordering of the society. Here, the square is viewed as text; reading it involves recourse to aesthetic philosophy and psychology to unveil the underlying orderings and powers manifesting themselves, along with complementary attention to the struggles that take place in space.

In a similar way, Harvey argues that spatial practice should be informed by ideals and imaginings

of what one wishes space to become. Thus, in his reading, one should counteract the prevailing order through a reading of space as it is and then consciously reimagine it. In addition, there are those who, through being and using space in their everyday life, unconsciously subvert the determined functions of space merely through being there or acting in inappropriate ways. These two kinds of subversion are what Lefebvre highlighted, with special emphasis on the latter, when he talked about the appropriation of space.

To many, the Marxian understanding, which lays emphasis on the struggles of appropriation of the square, is reductive of the role of the individual and space. Poststructural critics, some drawing on Lefebvre, argue that the square must be seen as simultaneously material and mediated. They argue that the events of appropriation do not give much insight into the mediation of space; they see the square more as a material stage set for this appropriation. Thus, it is rather the lived spaces that are manifest every day there, playing a more active, albeit smaller-scale role in the mediation and production of the square and in the making of the citizen. In this way, the very space of the square is constitutive of the political; along with the individual mediating space, it exhibits different facets of identity, not all necessarily allowed to mediate space at all times. What needs to be understood when analyzing the square in this way is the microscopic: people's actions and the stories they tell about their lives and actions, placing importance on walking as a way of being in the city.

Focusing on the mediation of space and seeing it as continually lived, the disjunction implicit in confrontation is brought to the fore. With a firm focus on the relations themselves and on how only those relations are able to generate more relations in the now-moment of apprehension, the reductive critique of dialectical thought is countered through soliciting or unpacking the infinite seriality of confrontations through their very own relationality. The implication here is that the square's material in its myriad of mediated fashions starts to receive a role as co-constitutive of urban politics.

How Public Is the Square

The above discussion allows for contemplations as to how public the square is. When sitting at the café

at the square sipping a cappuccino, basking in the sunbathed living room that so many cities at high latitudes try to emulate, how does one contribute to politics? Many believe that the traditional role of the square as a site of deliberation and confrontation, thus forging the democratic ideal, has eroded. One of the main erosion factors is that the commercial role of public squares is disappearing from many urban settings, and planning directives dictate what belongs and what does not. Commerce has been moved off the streets and squares into designated buildings—for example, malls, where real estate prices dictate the composition and nature of commerce taking place. In addition, many squares are designed and built with a very special purpose in mind and thus with a very specific set of uses in mind, most often suiting middle-class standards of conduct and appearance. With this, and for a host of other reasons, many squares are left void of their publicness.

Earlier in the entry, it was argued that the world is ceaseless and ongoing through the seriality of confrontations. So although having settled into balanced states, which need to be meticulously mapped out in terms of their materiality and struggles over use, squares need to be opened up to future potentials. In other words, how can these “sinkholes of stability” change and be reformulated, but not necessarily according to the cognized ideals or determinations formulated under the terms of social power struggles or planning directives, but also in terms of the space itself.

The piazza is, thus, not just a square, a mere setting for sipping cappuccino and living the Mediterranean ideal of unhindered conviviality, as a blinkered view of ancient Greece might have it. The square itself has a role to play; it is at one with its own continual reformulation.

Edward H. Huijbens

See also Acropolis; Agora; Citizen Participation; Citizenship; City Planning; Forum; Harvey, David; Medieval Town Design; Mediterranean Cities; Right to the City; Shopping Center; Social Production of Space; Urban Planning

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PLACEMAKING

The term *placemaking* generally refers to the processes by which a space is made useful and meaningful. This may include manipulations of the physical landscape, including land development and building construction, or the attachment of meanings or sentiments to places through shared understandings. These more or less tangible processes usually occur in tandem, as dimensions of the landscape come to be understood by residents and others who interact with a place. Placemaking may reflect the work of elites who steer the interpretations and uses of a place to support their own financial

interests. Placemaking may also occur more routinely, as individuals live, work, and interact in a given locale, shaping its uses and associations through everyday activity. The degree to which these meanings persist over time reflects another element of placemaking, the struggle to associate particular memories or identities with a place.

From Space to Place

All placemaking involves the conversion of space into place, or the conversion of one type of place into another. In the prior, land that has previously been unused or unrecognized by humans is made into land that suits their material, economic, and social needs. For instance, a forest or desert that has known little human habitation offers space, or geographic area, but is not yet a place in the sense that it is useful or meaningful to human beings. Such spaces are relatively rare in current times and have likely been rare since the dispersion of human populations across the globe. However, in the colonial era and other periods of intensive conquest, lands populated by groups labeled as inferior to the conquering peoples were often seen as unused or underused, and the meanings that indigenous peoples associated with these areas were disregarded. Thus, for example, European settlers understood much of the land in North America that had been occupied by Native Americans as space available for development and “improvement.” Exploring, demarcating, and naming newly discovered lands can be considered preliminary processes of placemaking. The development of towns and cities is perhaps the ultimate example of such work, as spaces become the sites of intensive commercial and cultural activity, as well as home to thousands or even millions of individuals.

Beyond development of open space and agricultural land, a second form of placemaking involves converting a place with one use or meaning into another. Redevelopment projects including urban renewal, brownfield conversion, and, in some instances, neighborhood gentrification provide opportunities for transforming both the uses of spaces and the meanings associated with them. These placemaking processes may be rapid and deliberate, as is the case with large-scale urban renewal processes (for instance, when a low-income neighborhood is razed and replaced with a

stadium, convention center, or other radically different use). Alternately, these efforts may be incremental, as when more affluent individuals buy and renovate homes in poor neighborhoods and thus changing the area’s demographic composition as well as how the area is understood.

A key element in the conversion from space to place is that places are distinct. Places are distinguished by official and unofficial boundaries (e.g., city limits, neighborhood borders, natural features such as waterways), but they are also distinguished by the unique meanings that people associate with them and the specific uses to which they are put. Thus, although space is relatively plentiful, the territory associated with any particular *place* is more fixed. Perhaps most famously, the island of Manhattan encompasses only 23 square miles, and those who wish to live or do business there must pay a premium to access this place. Although new territory within the place cannot be created (the use of fill or pilings to create new waterfront parcels is one limited exception), other places may instead be touted for their adjacency to this place or their similarity to this place.

Elite Placemaking Strategies

The work of transforming space in its more natural state into places that humans will use and revere is often undertaken by elites, or those with ready access to resources and power. Typically, these individuals have vested interests in the transformation and development of land; for instance, they may own the land and wish to increase its value by making it more desirable. This in turn depends on developing unique or popular land uses in a given space, or imbuing that space with positive associations. Elites often work toward these ends in tandem with place professionals including architects, planners, and engineers who design alterations to physical spaces and marketers and boosters who promote specific projects and places.

The early development of Los Angeles, California, provides a useful illustration of elite placemaking. Los Angeles lacked the types of natural resources and geographical attributes generally associated with urban development. It lacked a quality harbor, timber, mineral resources (until the discovery of oil there in the 1890s), and, most important, adequate fresh water. Yet, these shortcomings did

not deter urban elites, including the owners of local banks, utilities, newspapers, and railroads, from promoting Los Angeles and Southern California as ideal destinations for migrants to the western United States. Creating Los Angeles as a place required work to define its hot, dry weather as something desirable rather than a breeding ground for disease, a task achieved by referring to the climate as Mediterranean. Similarly, the place was imbued with a mystique associated with Spanish and Mexican culture through associations with Helen Hunt Jackson's *Ramona*, a widely read novel that romanticized *Californio* life. Advertisements in national and international publications touted the benefits of living in the Los Angeles area, relying upon the images of oranges, palm trees, snow-capped mountains, and ocean surf that would become heavily identified with the area.

Placemaking in Los Angeles also required physical manipulations of space, most notably importing fresh water from the Owens Valley via a 223-mile aqueduct. A public bond measure funded construction of the aqueduct, and local elites worked to promote public support for the project. The owners of the *Los Angeles Times* were especially well poised for this work, and the newspaper vigorously promoted funding the aqueduct. In turn, they benefited when an increased water supply facilitated urban growth and increased newspaper circulation. The owners of local companies including the *Times*, a regional streetcar company and electric utility, and several banks and title companies also benefited directly when the aqueduct allowed development of arid land in the San Fernando Valley that they had purchased in anticipation of the water's delivery (the film *Chinatown* dramatizes these events). Together, these efforts helped transform a small city in a dry inland basin into a growing metropolis known nationally and internationally for its climate and quality of life. Although pronounced growth has replaced these associations with visions of traffic, poor air quality, and crime, elites still work to create positive impressions of Los Angeles.

While placemaking in Los Angeles is particularly dramatic, the processes involved are similar to those seen in other locales where elites seek to increase the demand for land. These elites work to alter land to make it more useful and desirable,

often directing public funds toward these ends. They work with boosters to ensure that the meanings associated with places are positive and to publicize the advantages of their place vis-à-vis others. Chambers of commerce and economic development bureaus often aid landowners and other urban elites in these efforts.

Placemaking in Everyday Life

In addition to overt efforts to construct places, the work of placemaking occurs more subtly and routinely as individuals make their lives. We live, work, and interact in places, and in doing so, we make and remake those places. For instance, we routinely alter places through direct action when we build or remodel a home, contribute our labor to a community park, or pick up litter in the street. Just as important, we routinely construct and reconstruct the meanings associated with places, and these meanings in turn motivate how we act toward places.

Language is a fundamental and routine tool for placemaking. As we talk about places, they become visible and comprehensible and thus distinct from more abstract or meaningless spaces. Residents, visitors, journalists, and others routinely describe and evaluate places in terms that reflect and reinforce popular understandings of a locale. Places may be characterized in shorthand phrases that capture salient demographic, geographic, or economic aspects: for instance, college town, industrial city, or mountain hamlet. Other descriptions may be deeper and more complex, such as when residents reflect on why they moved to a given place or compare their own city to a seemingly similar place nearby.

Scholars and artists take their own turns at narrative placemaking as well. Consider the visions of Chicago contained in Carl Sandburg's poem (stacker of wheat, player with railroads) or the accounts of that city provided by Chicago School sociologists (e.g., *The Hobo*, *The Gold Coast and the Slum*, *Black Metropolis*). The position of their authors has allowed these narratives the power to endure and to continue shaping perceptions of the city.

The work of narrative placemaking becomes quite pronounced when places are perceived as threatened with unwanted change, often from new

economic enterprises or land uses. This is especially common in response to locally unwanted land uses, such as prisons, industrial operations, or waste facilities, but it may also occur when culturally or socially important sites are threatened by land use changes. In such instances, public debate becomes an opportunity for individuals to articulate how they understand those locales. In letters to the editor, hearing testimony, and other public pronouncements, place sentiments that usually remain latent are actively articulated. Furthermore, when such proposals require individuals to contrast a place-as-it-has-been with the place-as-it-would-be, they may come to realize what it is that they value about a place.

Language is not the only means by which places are imbued with meaning and distinction. Local cultural distinctions such as food preferences, celebrations, norms of sociability, and architectural styles contribute to places' identities. Many of these dimensions suggest the connection between physical and social aspects of placemaking. For instance, distinctive local architecture and planning can visually distinguish one place from another: Brick tenements fronted with fire escapes announce Manhattan's Lower East Side, just as red-roofed adobes do Santa Barbara, California, or the constellation of historic squares does Savannah, Georgia. These physical structures are then routinely used in ways that further distinguish places where they are found.

The distinctive qualities that individuals associate with places constitute what scholars refer to as sense of place. Sense of place can perhaps best be understood as combining those aspects of placemaking that relate to meaning, including how a place is perceived, conceptualized, spoken about, and remembered. Although these actions are relatively intangible compared to the more concrete dimensions of placemaking, local sense of place can have tangible impacts to the extent that it motivates political action. For instance, in outlying areas of the Los Angeles conurbation, where agricultural land uses are rapidly being supplanted by tract homes and strip malls, county fairgrounds have become sites of pronounced struggles over land use. Because fairgrounds generate little revenue and are used only sporadically during the year, they may be slated for redevelopment or relocation. For those who use these parcels, however—the fairgoers and fair volunteers—fairgrounds

serve an important purpose in affirming places' distinction from Los Angeles and symbolize their place's rural and family-oriented character. Locals have called on their sense of place to rally support for fairgrounds in their historic locations, thwarting urban redevelopment proposals of the type that routinely occur in other cities.

The preservation of culturally important sites is one means by which the meanings associated with places endure. When preserved or reconstructed, historic structures serve as evidence of past events and lifeways. Monuments commemorating historic events remind current populations of what may have occurred in a place or recall individuals from an area who committed noteworthy acts. These structures and monuments often contribute to conceptions of local heritage and sense of place and may indicate just what about a place is to be preserved or defended. An important question is which past, or whose past, will be commemorated or preserved. Scholars have noted that the powerful are more successful at articulating their versions of the past than are the powerless and that the contributions of working people, racial and ethnic minorities, and women are often erased when places important to their histories are destroyed.

Conscientious Placemaking

Contemporary architectural and planning conventions are often criticized as eroding the distinctions between places and lending a certain sameness to the built environment. The predictable architecture of chain stores and restaurants takes much of the blame, as does planning that facilitates automobile travel at the expense of pedestrian access. A number of place professionals, including those identified with the new urbanism, are now seeking to capture local culture and sense of place as they engage in the physical aspects of placemaking. Drawing on local history, architectural norms, and community needs, they attempt to create places that encourage mixed uses and social interaction. The term *placemaking* is often used in the planning literature to describe this specific process.

The conscious work of placemaking also occurs on a more incremental level as individuals work to make their communities more meaningful and useful. This may occur through community development projects such as the construction of parks,

community centers, gardens, and other amenities. Subcultures including immigrant communities and sexual minorities have engaged in placemaking projects throughout the United States, developing places that provide shopping, dining, and entertainment that meet the needs of community members. San Francisco's Castro District, Orange County's Little Saigon, or New York's Chinatown are a few particularly well-known examples, although such places exist on a smaller scale in many cities. These neighborhoods are often rich with symbolic resources such as monuments, iconography, and signage that affirm the group's identity, and they host festivals and celebrations that draw nonresident members of the community to these places.

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See also Community Development; Growth Machine; New Urbanism

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PLANNING THEORY

Planning theory addresses key issues in planning practice such as the management of the planning process, inclusion and communication in planning, and power and conflict in planning and urban development. It developed into an academic discipline during the latter part of the twentieth century, as the physical and architectural understanding of the city was complemented with the social sciences and geography. All developed societies have an institutionalized planning system determining the roles, rights, and obligations of different stakeholders such as the public sector, private entrepreneurs, organizations, and individual citizens. Therefore, understanding the planning process and its role in urban and regional development is essential for urban studies. There are local and national variations in planning practice and legislation, however, and thus, no general theory has been developed. Rather, different schools of planning theory have highlighted different aspects of the practice of planning.

Planning theories can be divided in different ways: Often-used dichotomies are those between *substantive* and *procedural* theories and between theories *of* and theories *in* planning. Substantive theories address the planning object (e.g., the city or the community), whereas procedural theories address the planning process. Theories *of* planning describe and explain planning as process and as institution, whereas theories *in* planning are the various scientific theories (such as urban economics, urban sociology, and urban ecology) that can be used in the process itself to understand the impacts of various planning solutions.

Planning theories can also be divided into four categories according to whether they are descriptive or normative and substantive or procedural (see Table 1). Because planning is itself a normative discipline, meant to create a better environment for citizens, both the object of planning and the planning process are subject not only to description, but also to further development, which means that

Table I Dimensions of Planning Theory

<i>Dimensions of Planning Theory</i>	<i>Substantive</i>	<i>Procedural</i>
Descriptive	Describing the planning object (city, community, etc.)	Describing the planning process in various local and national contexts
Normative	Developing norms and ideals for planning objects (ideal cities, functional regions, etc.)	Developing the planning process (managing the process, including stakeholders, making convincing argumentation, etc.)

there are often implicit normative assumptions. In recent decades, normative and procedural theories have dominated other types of planning theories, but there has also been a renewed interest in substantive issues (such as the sustainable city and creative city) partly related to a cultural turn in planning.

Rational-Comprehensive Planning and Critiques

The rational-comprehensive theory of planning was once a dominant school of planning theory. It incited various challenges, such as incrementalism and advocacy planning and transactive planning theories. Developed in the 1950s, its early advocates included Martin Meyerson and Edward Banfield in their 1955 book *Politics, Planning, and the Public Interest*. According to the rational-comprehensive theory, planning should be seen as a decision-making process in which the planner functions as an expert. In this role, the planner studies different action alternatives and their consequences, both sought or unsought and wanted or unwanted. The action with the maximum expected utility is deemed preferable to the other alternatives. In addition, planners are usually taken to be politically neutral, fulfilling the objectives determined by the political institutions. Their task is to find the “best” means to predetermined ends. Because rationality is believed to increase with knowledge, the expert should gather as much information as possible on the relevant options and their probable consequences. During the 1970s, this general view was connected with a systems-theoretical view of society, with Andreas Faludi as one of the major advocates. Although rational-comprehensive planning theory has since been much criticized, it is still considered a viable

alternative by many contemporary planning scholars, and it is also applied in actual planning practice.

Incrementalism

Incrementalism was derived from one of the earliest critiques of rational-comprehensive planning and appeared first in Charles Lindblom’s influential 1959 paper, “The Science of Muddling Through.” Lindblom juxtaposed what he called the root method (i.e., rational-comprehensive planning) with his own branch method in planning. According to him, the idea of scanning all the available options and their consequences is not only practically impossible in day-to-day practice, it is not even rational. Many of the action alternatives are relevant only for a short time, and problems may arise suddenly. It is also politically unrealistic to change everything at the same time, starting from the roots. Instead, planners and politicians should react to immediate problems and challenges, accepting their insufficient knowledge, and confine their analysis to successive and limited comparisons. Many urban practitioners can be said to apply incrementalism, without necessarily naming it so.

Advocacy Planning

Another criticism of rational-comprehensive planning was related to the assumed political neutrality of the planning expert. In 1965, Paul Davidoff published his influential article, “Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning,” where he rejected the idea of the planner as a representative of the public interest. Many individuals and groups have different and often conflicting interests related to land use and urban development, he said, and they should have experts as advocates, just as in criminal or civil justice. Not even the research and analysis that

underlies planning can be seen as politically neutral because the type of knowledge deemed relevant in a situation is already a value judgment requiring political commitment and resource allocation. Instead of one official plan, Davidoff proposed having many plans with knowledge and arguments supporting them and a court determining which course of action is more justified than others.

The idea of advocacy planning has been influential particularly in liberal societies with weak public authority. It has also led to more open participation in planning. However, the suggested institutional reform has not been realized; the public authority remains the principal agent producing plans. In cases of conflict, however, administrative courts are generally used to devise a solution.

Transactive Planning

In rational planning theory, knowledge is usually assumed to be unproblematic; that is, an objective and disinterested gathering of reliable information takes place. However, in epistemology (theory of knowledge) and in the sociology of knowledge, knowledge is much more complicated and often inherently connected to human agency, culture, and politics. One of the early critiques of objective knowledge in planning was published in John Friedmann's theory of transactive planning published in 1973. According to Friedmann, a gap exists between the processed knowledge of the planning expert and the knowledge based on experience that practitioners have. Experts rely on science and calculation, whereas practitioners rely on earlier examples of what is possible and what is not. Instead of resorting to scientific methods and professional identity supported by their peer group, Friedmann suggests that planners should strive for real human interaction, accepting the radical otherness of other agents. Knowledge should not be abstracted from the human being but seen as part of the totality of communication, including feeling. Transactive planning theory can thus be seen as one of the roots of what was later called the communicative turn in planning.

Strategic Planning

Strategic planning has its roots in warfare, first, and second, in private business planning. It has

also been applied in public administration and planning, although these professions have been reluctant to adopt a strategic perspective. This is partly due to the welfare state ideology and partly to the monopoly of jurisdiction of planning agencies. During the 1980s and 1990s, however, as entrepreneurialism and regional and global competition increased in urban politics, planners and planning theorists started to take strategic thinking more seriously. The most important change in public planning is the awareness that action alternatives are not good or bad per se, but their success is dependent on the results of the game that is played locally, regionally, and globally. As a late-comer in strategic thinking, theories of public planning have not contributed much to the development of strategic theorizing in other fields. Most often, existing concepts and theories have simply been adopted: visioning, mission statements, and SWOT analysis that pinpoints the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and threats of the organization, city, or region in question. Strategic thinking in planning has also been criticized for its inability to accommodate traditional ideals of public planning such as accountability, participation, and the transparency of public administration.

Alternative Planning Theories

Communicative Planning

Communicative planning theories have their roots in the 1960s' democratic movement in Europe and the United States, but they are also informed by more recent developments in the social sciences and philosophy. One of the most important sources was the German sociologist and philosopher Jürgen Habermas, who published his influential theory of communicative action in 1981. Habermas, a disciple of the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, wanted to show that instrumental and strategic actions were special cases of human action that were oriented only to success (thus representing instrumental rationality). Real communicative action that determined human interaction, on the other hand, was based on the ability of human beings to coordinate their action on the basis of a common understanding of reality and a common set of accepted norms. The latter were arrived at discursively in discussions where

the stronger arguments prevail. Habermas's view of society was pessimistic, however; the growth of both bureaucracy and the market (where instrumental and strategic action prevailed) tended, he believed, to colonize what he called the Lifeworld.

In planning theory, the Habermasian dichotomy of instrumental and communicative rationality was widely adopted, although it was also seen to be problematic and utopian. Most theorists who can be labeled communicative (such as Patsy Healey, Tore Sager, or John Forester) usually agree that the planning process should be opened to all stakeholders and that both objectives and solutions should be arrived at through open discussion where asymmetric power relations are avoided. From the 1990s on, communicative planning theorists have also adopted other methods and theories from social sciences and philosophy, such as argumentation theory, discourse analysis, and rhetoric. The so-called communicative or textual turn is a common feature in contemporary social sciences and planning theory.

Planning and Power

If communicative theories of planning can be criticized for their utopian assumptions, an alternative route can be found in theories and philosophies that have made power their focus. In his influential 1998 book, *Rationality and Power: Democracy in Practice*, Bent Flyvbjerg argued that planning theories have concentrated too much on the normative ideals of planning and ignored the political power struggles that determine planning and urban development. Instead of the Enlightenment tradition leading to Habermas, he suggested another line of thought from Machiavelli and Nietzsche to Michel Foucault. According to these writers, knowledge and expertise are inherently connected to power relations, with existing power regimes dependent on systems of knowledge. Combined with the sociology of professions, planning theory from this perspective has addressed more directly the social and political position of planning expertise.

Cultural Planning

In addition to the communicative turn, recent developments in both planning practice and theory

have given priority to culture and meaning. If most of the earlier theories were at least implicitly functionalist, seeing the city as a welfare-generating machine, the cultural theories of planning highlight the fact that all decisions and actual physical changes in the environment have cultural implications that create differences and identities in the city. Equally in planning practice, local and regional authorities have understood that culture is a necessary part of public spending and an important asset in local and regional development. Creating residential areas with strong local identity and public spaces combined with cultural activities and events has become commonplace in contemporary urban development. If earlier planning theories had mainly concentrated on the planning process, cultural planning theories have provided an important contribution by highlighting the final outcome and the meanings it generates. They have also been combined with design theories that have emphasized spatial and formal properties of the urban environment.

Planning Theory and Planning Practice

As a practical discipline, planning is not necessarily using its theories in a systematic way in day-to-day practice. Some of the theoretical traditions, such as rational planning and incrementalism, may be implicit in the activities of many practitioners. Other theories, such as advocacy planning and communicative planning, have been used to criticize the dominant practice. More recent developments, such as cultural theories of planning, are meant to contribute to the development of more creative and innovative cities and regions. Although established as an independent academic discipline, planning theory remains dependent on a working relationship with practice to make a real contribution to urban and regional development.

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See also Advocacy Planning; City Planning; Urban Planning

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POLITICAL MACHINE

During the later nineteenth century and early decades of the twentieth century, most large U.S. cities were governed by political organizations called political machines. Political machines were hierarchically organized political parties whose leaders strove to dominate local politics. In cases when one person controlled the party, he was referred to as the "boss"; when several shared the leadership, they were called a "ring." Beneath the boss or ring were the ward leaders who, in turn, were above the lowest level in the hierarchy, the precinct captains. Examples of strong machines that coalesced in major cities were the Pendergast machine in Kansas City, Missouri; the Cox machine in Cincinnati, Ohio; the Hague machine in Jersey City, New Jersey; the Reuf organization in San Francisco; and the Tweed Ring in New York City.

The political machine relied heavily on patronage to gain and retain power within the city. This entailed establishing a reciprocal, although generally unequal, relationship with some of the citizens and businesses in the community. Patronage, the exchange of favors for political support, characterized these relationships. Some of the exchanges involved significant financial resources. For example, businesses might receive large contracts for building infrastructure, such as paving the streets

or constructing municipal buildings. In return, these business owners would deliver votes for the machine and provide significant financial resources to party leaders. More commonly, citizens in the community, often immigrants, were asked to vote for the party candidates and to persuade family and friends to do the same in exchange for municipal jobs with the city. Jobs, however, were limited, so often all the party activists had to offer the immigrants were "social benefits," such as friendship, flowers at weddings and funerals, and perhaps advice on how to cope with the various problems they encountered.

Leaders of many of these machines were corrupt, often stealing public monies and pocketing bribes from businesses that received contracts. Many bosses were by no means ashamed of these practices, referring to them as "honest graft" or resigning themselves to the fact that sometimes politicians must "rise above principle." Some bosses and their underlings were prosecuted for their illegal activities. For example, both William Marcy Tweed in New York City and Abe Reuf in San Francisco were convicted and served jail terms.

Robert Merton, a sociologist, presented a functional explanation for the rise of political machines that related the structure and functioning of machines to the political institutions that preceded them and to the needs of the different elements of the growing cities' populations. He contended that most cities lacked a centralization of political authority in the decades following the Civil War. Therefore, the public sector was ineffectual, and the political machines developed to fill the void. Machines centralized power under the bosses and rings and were able to fill the needs of businesses and immigrants moving to the cities. In spite of their espousal of the ideology of business competition, most businesses, Merton argued, wanted to negotiate with the party for contracts that would enhance their profits. Machine leaders were willing to oblige. They were often just as willing to address the concerns of leaders of criminal enterprises as of legitimate businesses.

Machines were also vehicles of upward mobility for immigrants and other working-class citizens; they provided jobs with city government and with private-sector businesses allied with the machines. And just as machines personalized politics by working closely with businesses, they provided a

personal touch by becoming friendly with immigrants, helping them to adapt to their new communities, loaning them money, interceding when they faced legal problems, and serving as a friend in exchange for political support.

Merton has been criticized on a variety of grounds. One critique focuses on the theme that machines filled a void left by the decentralization of power. Alan DiGaetano argues that most political structures at the time of the rise of political machines were already centralized. This structure then made it easier for the machines to seize control of the city governments. American federalism contributed to the rise of machines by giving local authorities significant authority and resources to build party organizations that took over the reins of the expanding and centralized political apparatus.

Raymond Wolfinger suggests that Merton inadequately distinguishes between machine politics and centralized political machines. Machine politics, essentially the use of patronage to secure political support, existed even when no machine managed to centralize power. Therefore, centralization was unnecessary in the response to the needs of the immigrants and businesses. Furthermore, in cities where the supposed need was prevalent, neither machine nor machine politics were present. Therefore, other explanations, such as regional differences, are necessary.

Some authors argue that machines were less common in Sunbelt cities, which were most often controlled by professional and business elites rather than by political machines. Machines did, however, organize in some Sunbelt cities. Memphis and Nashville, Tennessee; New Orleans, Louisiana; and Augusta, Georgia, all had machine politics at various times. In the Southwest, a strong machine coalesced in Albuquerque, New Mexico.

Martin Shefter criticizes Merton's explanation as belonging to a more general class of analyses that emphasizes the importance of the characteristics and presumed preferences of the population (needs of the subgroups) as the basis for machine support. Shefter's historical analysis of the rise of political machines in New York City argues that scholars should not assume that one can infer any preference for machine rule from the characteristics of the population. Rather, one must examine the efforts of political entrepreneurs to build machines, the competition among these entrepreneurs and their allies,

and the dynamics of the city's economy, which give rise to new groups that can be mobilized into political organizations and activities. Machine organizations differed in a variety of ways, and only careful case studies can elucidate the reasons for their rise, consolidation, and demise.

Furthermore, many analysts have doubted whether the machines provided benefits to the immigrants at anywhere near the scale that Merton suggested. The number of municipal jobs in cities was far fewer than the number of immigrants, so most did not benefit from this form of patronage. Also, many of the available jobs offered few opportunities for upward mobility, a supposed function of the political machines. Often, the machines were primarily wedded to one particular ethnic group (e.g., Irish) of the many that inhabited the city. The machine did help some immigrants assimilate to urban life by providing them with guidance, jobs, and favors, but this personalization of politics offered relatively few material awards. Steven Erie concludes that the Irish-dominated machines contributed to political assimilation but less so to economic mobility. In fact, only when machine governance weakened after World War II did the Irish population of many formerly machine cities gain significant upward mobility.

Until the New Deal era, machines often opposed labor unions, the dominant institutions that strove to improve the wages and collective influence of the working class. If the unions were successful in organizing workers, the workers might switch their allegiances from the party and its community activities to the union and its workplace activities. From this perspective, machines were viewed as conservative institutions, providing individualistic benefits to some but reinforcing or at least not challenging the class system that emerged with the growth of industrial capitalism.

Although machine politics exists to some extent in contemporary cities, the era of the big city machine is gone. No singular factor led to their demise, but the strengthening of civil service requirements for hiring employees for municipal jobs was a major contributing factor. In addition, due to changed legal requirements requiring bidding on public contracts, it is more difficult for political leaders to systematically steer contacts solely to political supporters. The reform movement that took hold early in the

twentieth century also weakened machines in some cities.

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See also Local Government; Progressive City; Urban Politics

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PRIMATE CITY

A primate city is the largest and most dominant city in a country or region and often functions also as a financial or political center. In the 1930s, the geographer Mark Jefferson developed the law of the primate city to explain the phenomenon of cities that capture a large proportion of a country's population as well as its economic activity. He wrote that "a country's leading city is always disproportionately large and exceptionally expressive of national capacity and feeling." In fact, a primate city is usually twice as big in population size as the next largest city and, correspondingly, more significant.

Primate cities are frequently but not always the capital cities of the country. An excellent example is London; in 2001, it had a population of 8 million people, whereas the second-largest city, Birmingham, had about 970,000 residents. France

in 2000 had Paris as its primate city at 2 million residents, while Marseilles, the second largest, had a population of 795,600. Mexico and South Korea also have primate cities, Mexico City and Seoul, respectively.

Not all countries have a primate city; that is, a largest city that is twice the size of the next-largest city. India's largest city in 2000 was Mumbai, which has more than 16 million people; second was Kolkata with more than 13 million people; and third was Delhi with less than 13 million people. Canada, Australia, and Brazil also lack primate cities. In the case of the United States, the largest city in 2000 was New York City with 8 million people, second was Los Angeles with 3.8 million people, and third was Chicago with 2.8 million people. But when we use the population of the metropolitan area rather than of the central city, we find that the United States lacks a true primate city. The New York City metropolitan area had a population of 18.6 million, Los Angeles 12.8 million, and Chicago 9 million.

The degree of primacy refers to the dominance of the largest city over the rest of the country. In developed countries where the degree of primacy is low, the population, along with political and economic power, has dispersed. Various social and economic functions are linked to one another across cities by well-integrated, efficient, and reliable transportation and communication systems. In these city-regions, even the smallest villages are connected in a web of trade, transportation, and communication networks. In contrast, in developing countries in Latin America and Southeast Asia that have a single primate city, that city has preeminent influence on the politics, economics, and culture of the country. Moreover, in terms of transportation and communications links, the primate city might be better connected to the outside world than to other regions or to other cities within the country.

Such primate cities often attract overseas investment and benefits. They also use up a disproportionate amount of resources and create serious problems such as shortages of goods and escalating land prices that make them less attractive places in which to live. The spatial concentration of resources also creates regional disparities of wealth and income and political influence.

Generally speaking, several factors encourage primacy: for example, favorable initial advantages

for a site; advantages maintained and enhanced through investments; magnetic attractions for businesses, services, and people (called a cumulative effect); and disproportionate growth. These factors increase the potential for a primate city to emerge.

To measure primacy throughout a country's system of cities, researchers use the rank-size rule, which captures the relationship between the ranks of cities and their populations. It was advanced by George Zipf in 1949 and builds on Mark Jefferson's observation. Zipf asserted that "if all the settlements of a country are ranked according to population size, the sizes of the settlements will be inversely proportional to their rank"; that is, the second-largest city will be half the size of the first, the third-largest one-third the size, and so forth. The formula he used to represent this is $[P_n = P_1/n]$, where P_n is the population of n th-ranked city, P_1 is the population of the largest city, and n is the rank of n th city. Zipf further developed this as a general formula $[P_n = P_1/n^q]$ where q is an adjustment factor that is different for every country because different countries have different degrees of primacy. The stronger the primacy of that country, the bigger the q value. When the largest city of a country has more than twice the population of the second-largest city, when q is greater than 1, that country is considered to have a primate urban system.

Eun Jin Jung

See also Megalopolis; Urban Agglomeration

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PROGRESSIVE CITY

Gaining prominence in the United States during the final decades of the twentieth century, the term

progressive city refers to an urban political and developmental strategy that emphasizes public planning, social equity, and neighborhood participation. Such an approach is often counterposed to downtown-oriented growth strategies that accentuate market-led development and that restrict the role of the public sector to tax incentives and the provision of basic services. In progressive cities, municipal governments pursue a more ambitious agenda—from public ownership and fair taxation to land use regulation and community development partnerships—to promote rational economic development, distribute the benefits of growth more widely, and involve a broader range of constituents in urban governance.

Principles and Characteristics

The urban progressives of the late twentieth century did not explicitly derive their principles from the reformers of the Progressive era. Yet, the political impulses of the two projects were similar. Just as the earlier movement had sought to build cross-class reconciliation and public institutions to harness the destabilizing energies of unbridled capitalist development (and thereby also offer a political alternative to corporate plutocracy and labor radicalism alike), late-twentieth-century visions of the progressive city searched for a middle ground between the stark alternatives offered by Marxist urbanism (capitalist versus socialist city) and laissez-faire capitalism (entrepreneurial versus welfare city). Articulating a set of governance principles that balanced private- and public-sector interests, growth and equity, efficiency and reform, these conceptions of the progressive city also repositioned the urban planner in an important yet intermediary role. Neither the elite technical expert associated with postwar urban renewal nor the activist planner borne aloft by the populist energies of the 1960s movements, the progressive planner was now seen as an inventive but pragmatic professional who sought to balance economic imperatives, social equity, and the public interest.

This notion of the progressive city achieved its fullest empirical development in the work of Pierre Clavel. Like many observers of U.S. cities, Clavel argued that the post–World War II political coalitions that once had united developers, construction

unions, and middle-class residents behind federally supported urban renewal and executive-style mayoral leadership were eventually undermined by economic and demographic changes. The movement of jobs and mobile residents to suburbs and newer cities, along with the northward migrations of Black and Hispanic populations, resulted in older-city populations of the 1970s that were smaller, poorer, and increasingly dissatisfied with the shrinking economic returns and interest-group politics of the established liberal coalitions. Whereas mounting economic problems and fiscal constraints encouraged many cities to reemphasize private sector-led business strategies, a number of urban leaders during the 1970s and 1980s—Nicholas Carbone in Hartford, Connecticut; Dennis Kucinich in Cleveland, Ohio; Gus Newport in Berkeley, California; Ruth Goldway in Santa Monica, California; Bernard Sanders in Burlington, Vermont; and perhaps most visibly, Harold Washington in Chicago, Illinois—used government ownership or planning capacities as well as citizen participation to expand the benefits of economic development for constituents less well served by market processes and interest-group bargaining.

These progressive administrations varied considerably, as Clavel and others acknowledged, both in the type of initiatives they pursued and in the results they achieved. In Hartford, Carbone's early efforts focused on enhancing public control over the building of the civic center, initially to direct jobs to local and minority residents but ultimately to create taxing and leasing mechanisms that might enhance the city's leverage over real estate development. In Berkeley, the emphasis was on support for housing cooperatives and for neighborhood collectives that provided social services, along with shifting the local tax burden to businesses and higher-income users. Burlington's progressives were stymied at first by political opposition, but Sanders eventually gained sufficient support to expand the city's subsidized housing programs and to enlarge neighborhood participation in waterfront development. Santa Monica's major initiative was rent control. It was enacted in response to escalating development pressures, although later measures also focused on tourist-sector development to generate jobs and revenues.

Progressive experiments in the largest cities proved to be short-lived: Kucinich, crippled by the

withholding of finance capital from the government by business interests, lost his reelection bid after a stormy two-year term, and Washington died in office after finally gaining control over a recalcitrant city council. Mayoral administrations in several other cities (Boston, San Francisco, New York, Minneapolis) also seemed to take on, at least for brief moments during the 1980s and 1990s, a number of progressive attributes.

Planning and Participation

The conception of the progressive city accords considerable importance to planning and participation. While economic forces and political mobilization are recognized as enabling conditions, professional planners occupy a central role in the practical design and implementation of progressive initiatives—although here, as well, situations have varied. In several cities, planners have developed sweeping proposals for community ownership or for socially responsible comprehensive planning; more often, strategic planning focuses incrementally on exerting public influence over (or extracting redistributive opportunities from) particular development projects. Progressive planners have not typically been hostile to market processes, despite the accusations of *laissez-faire* critics; indeed, several prominent progressives (e.g., Nicholas Carbone, Norman Krumholz) came from business backgrounds, and most of them saw planning as, in part, a rational means to enhance the economic productivity of the capitalist city. What seems to have united their efforts was a pragmatic interest in making cities work better for local residents; a professional orientation toward the pursuit of social equity through research-informed practice; and an expanded conception of the public interest, one that might lead not only to new policy tools but to a greater balance among the prerogatives of the market, government, and communities.

Participation has also been a major emphasis of the progressive city. Swept to power in part by neighborhood mobilizations, progressive officials initiated procedural reforms intended to open up city governance to resident involvement. These officials changed administrative commissions into elected bodies or staffed them with community members; they decentralized municipal agencies (police departments, school boards) to make them

more responsive to constituents; they forged political alliances or service delivery partnerships with neighborhood-based organizations and shared information more freely with the public. At times, these reforms collided with efforts to enhance planners' roles or to professionalize administration, and the emphasis on greater openness and participation often clashed with business preferences for private deal-making.

Bringing community leaders into administrative positions also incurred costs that were less immediately visible, such as siphoning off talent and energy from the progressive political base. In other instances, a failure to follow through on participatory promises—or an inability to manage the fractious racial politics that ensued—led neighborhood interests to turn against the progressives they had elected. Yet these procedural reforms, unlike the policy innovations, often outlived the administrations that launched them. Indeed, many of the participatory experiments of the progressive city (such as neighborhood self-help initiatives and community-based service delivery) set the stage for the networks of consent and durable public austerities that would soon characterize its neoliberal successor.

A persistent challenge to progressive cities was their vulnerability to changes in the broader urban environment. Late-twentieth-century restructurings made corporations more mobile, unraveling the economic infrastructures of many older cities. Deindustrialization spurred constituent demands for new sources of growth and employment, yet fiscal constraints and federal retrenchment tended to limit local options for U.S. cities. Pressures to reap short-term gains from interurban competition encouraged firms and cities alike to converge on narrow notions of self-interest; economic expectations were typically symbolized by corporate tax incentives, along with other conventional indicators of a friendly business climate. Environmental constraints and economic orthodoxies thus heightened the risks for alternative strategies, discouraged expansive commitments to the public interest, and suppressed a participatory politics that might unleash strongly mobilized local claims. In the face of such obstacles, progressive activists and policy advocates pressed for community development strategies and for linkage policies that tapped a small portion of the city's private economic activity to fund a public good or neighborhood benefit.

Yet, the relative modesty of these measures, along with their narrowly technical quality, suggested the sharply diminished potential of local progressivism as a political project.

Over time, there were also concerns about the utility of the term itself. As academic studies influenced by regime theory began to attach the label *progressive* to an expanding number of policies and political stances, a certain definitional drift ensued. This slippage obscured the extent to which social-equity measures offered by local leaders were becoming more symbolic than real. The conceptual drift also discouraged analysts from recognizing the role of community mobilization in spurring genuinely ambitious experiments in planning and participatory democracy; perhaps certain kinds of urban movements, not cities, were progressive. More fundamentally, the status of the central concept remained unclear. Was the progressive city a historical phenomenon? a theory of urban practices? a normative vision of the good city? Meanwhile, a growing array of critics (feminist, radical-democratic, poststructuralist) challenged its basic substantive assumptions, from economic conceptions of social equity and planner-centered notions of policy development to the local as a site of emancipatory participation.

Nevertheless, the potential relationship between cities and progressive politics endures as a subject of interest, both within the United States and beyond. European integration, for example, has drawn attention to the possibilities inherent in urban autonomies as well as to the challenges of building local democracy. In other parts of the world, the innovative planning and participation efforts developed in certain cities (e.g., Porto Alegre, Johannesburg) have been seen as pathways to alternative modes of urban governance. Recent proposals for a redistributive regionalism in the United States, meanwhile, seem to echo, at a metropolitan scale, many of the basic themes of late twentieth-century urban progressivism. And the emerging linkages between planners, unions, and community organizations in cities such as Los Angeles have even resuscitated localist visions of the progressive city.

William Sites

See also Community Development; Community Organizing; Growth Machine; Regime Theory; Social Movements; Urban Politics

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PROSTITUTION

See Sex Industry

PUBLIC ART


Public art is a specialist field of contemporary art; it has grown considerably since it began in the late 1960s. The term has a wide range of uses, embracing artworks such as sculptures, mosaics, and murals for public places; the design of street furniture; the integration of arts and crafts skills in the design of public spaces and buildings; and the intervention of artists in public debate and socially challenging situations. Its use is specific to the industrialized world and only since the 1980s in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Its history is largely connected to urban rather than rural public spaces and issues.

The antecedents of public art include nineteenth-century statues and monumental sculpture, twentieth-century public works and community arts projects, late twentieth-century sculpture parks, and periodic reintroduction of decoration in modern architecture. Among more remote precedents cited by public art advocates are Egyptian temple decoration, stained glass in medieval cathedrals in Europe, Renaissance wall paintings, and baroque ceilings, as well as the more relevant Mexican murals, art projects of the Works Progress Administration in the United States in the 1930s, and Bauhaus architecture.

The diversity of these antecedents and precedents has produced tensions within public art, for example, between a public service ethos and commercially led expansion of the art market; between conformity to social norms and engagement in issues of gender, ethnicity, and social justice; and between a retention of the modern artist’s claim to autonomy and acknowledgement of the role of users in public space. The rhetoric of government arts funding tends to revolve around widening access to contemporary art, and some artists’ groups developed collaborative practices in the 1990s aimed at introducing urban dwellers into coauthorship of projects.

Since the 1960s, public art has given rise to further specialist terms reflecting positions in response to these tensions. These include site-specific art (used since the 1980s), site-general art, art in the public interest (a term favored by more radical artists in the 1990s), new genre public art (to denote acts of social intervention), the art of the local (for a broad range of approaches), and dialogic art (where citizen engagement is a priority). Each denotes a different attitude to the making of art for public spaces.

Public art has spawned an expansion of cultural bureaucracy, as intermediaries and agencies take on roles of advocacy, fund raising, contractual negotiations, legal matters, and public relations for artists. This reflects an increasing adoption of public art in urban redevelopment, alongside the use of redundant industrial buildings for arts uses, designation of cultural quarters, and use of visual culture to spearhead city marketing. But this expansion of cultural management has produced little evaluation of the social or economic impacts of public art. Public art remains distinct from art in galleries and museums, is less covered by art magazines than gallery art (and does not produce the glossy



Inukshuk sculpture at English Bay in Vancouver, Canada. Constructed originally by Alvin Kanak of Rankin Inlet, this monument was commissioned by the Government of the Northwest Territories for its pavilion at Expo 86 and given to the City of Vancouver.

Source: Karen Wiley.

advertising of gallery art), yet is now ubiquitous in efforts to revive urban economies. Public art is seen by developers and city authorities as bringing the universal value of culture, identified traditionally as a public good, to schemes to improve the appearance and safety of declining city districts.

Beginnings

Public art began in the United States in 1967, when the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA) instituted a fund specific to the support of

commissions for art in public places. The first commission was for Alexander Calder's sculpture *La Grande Vitesse* for Grand Rapids, Michigan. A two-dimensional representation of this is now the city's logo. This set a tone for public art as big sculpture, the kind of work that few collectors or museums could accommodate but that suited open city squares. Following this, cities from New York to Chicago and Seattle commissioned works from well-known European and North American artists including Marc Chagall, Joan Miró, Pablo Picasso, Jean Dubuffet, Richard Serra, and Jonathan



Sculpture in the Anhui Garden culture park in Hefei, the capital of Anhui province, China

Source: Eric Mathiasen.

Borofsky. Seattle developed one of the more extensive programs, integrating art into the design of the urban landscape and taking commissions to neighborhoods as well as the downtown area.

In Britain, there were public sculpture projects in the late 1960s, and a major expansion of the field, based largely on North American precedents, took place in the 1980s in cities such as Birmingham and Newcastle. In Europe, there was a history of public-sector arts support, including Percent for Art policies under which a fixed percentage, usually 1 percent, of the capital budget for a new building

was allocated to art. In France, a centralized policy provided for contemporary art in provincial cities. In West Germany, the siting of contemporary sculptures was seen as affirming the country's post-war allegiance to Western values. Meanwhile, the arts remained an adjunct of state policy in the countries of the Eastern bloc, where artists were supported by provision of public monumental commissions as well as studios through artists' unions.

In a parallel but unrelated history, 1967 was the year of the first Black power murals in Chicago.



Public art as fountain in Chicago's Millennium Park. The Crown Fountain was designed by Spanish artist, Jaume Plensa.

Source: Erin Monacelli.

These were less aesthetic statements (although many of the murals were accomplished) than attempts to express concerns for civil rights and social justice, especially for people of color and women. In Britain, there was a widespread practice of mural painting in the 1970s, of which the gable-end murals in Glasgow are the best-known cases. Today, such efforts to gain an audience for a marginalized group are more likely to use public-access broadcasting and the Internet.

Issues

The emergence of public art as a new specialism was problematic in two ways: from a concern for the integrity of studio practice and from awareness of the complexities of working in the public realm. On one hand, then, critics were uncertain that working in public spaces, with the complications of a brief and budget for the project, could be compatible with the aesthetic integrity of art; on the other hand, critics more sympathetic to public art were unsure that artists working in public spaces were fully cognizant of the immaterial and nongeographical aspects of the situation. Some artists, such as Mierle Laderman Ukeles and Martha Rosler in New York, worked to address issues of power and ownership directly; and the Guerilla Girls, a group of women artists retaining anonymity by wearing gorilla masks (their name punning on the idea of urban guerrilla fighters), exposed the exclusion of women from the art world. Other artists, such as Richard Serra, refused to compromise what they saw as the integrity of a work's aesthetic. Serra's *Tilted Arc* was removed, however, from Federal Plaza in New York after a court case in 1989. Between the polarities was a

practice of artist-designed street furniture, in which the artist retained creative autonomy but worked closely with urban designers. Its practitioners included Scott Burton and Martha Schwartz in the United States and Tess Jaray in Britain.

A divide opened between artists and agencies favoring the pragmatic over the philosophical and taking public art's sites as physical spaces, on the one hand, and those who saw urban spaces as locations of contested values. This echoed the departure of artists from the production of art objects for gallery exhibitions in the late 1960s, a desire to merge art and everyday life, and a refusal of art's commodity status combined with political engagement. For most artists, gallery shows and art magazine reviews remained crucial for recognition. The tension between conformity to the requirements of the art world—in which art is validated as art through such institutions—and aspirations to engage in social issues and identity formation continue to inform discussion on public art.

Among the foremost critics commenting on such issues have been Patricia Phillips and Rosalyn Deutsche in New York and Grant Kester in San Diego. Kester adopts the term *dialogic art* for projects that seek the direct engagement of citizens, individually and in groups, on current social issues. Critical debate on public art has tended to be broader and more prominent in North America than in Britain, although considerable critical attention has developed in Germany since the late 1980s.

The changing issues facing public art are illustrated by two commissions managed by the Artangel Trust in London. Both were controversial but in different ways. In 1985, Artangel commissioned California artist Les Levine to produce billboard posters and an exhibition at the Institute of Contemporary Arts dealing with religion and conflict in Northern Ireland. Levine adapted photographic images of troops, policemen, bystanders, and gunmen for the posters, with bold captions such as Attack God, Blame God, and Execute God. The work aroused public and press comment, much of it negative and shocked at the overt link between conflict and religious intolerance. For Levine, the controversy was part of the project, although he did not see his work as political art. The posters stood out, nonetheless, from the apolitical position of most public art at the time, including Antony Gormley's cruciform, cast iron

figures sited on the walls of Derry in Northern Ireland in 1987.

In 1993, Artangel commissioned British sculptor Rachel Whiteread to produce one of her characteristic casts of the negative spaces of objects from a house about to be demolished in east London. The outcome, titled *House*, was a concrete cast of the building's three-story interior, with apertures of fireplaces, windows, and doors. This, too, was controversial. The project was always seen (and contracted) as a temporary work, but on winning the annual Turner Prize, presented at London's Tate Gallery, Whiteread took the opportunity to protest the sculpture's impending demolition, calling it one of her best works and gaining widespread media attention and the support of most arts institutions. Whereas Levine's work used an explicitly public medium—the billboard—to make a subtle point about a specific conflict for multiple publics, accepting negative responses as part of the work, Whiteread portrayed herself as a victim of a bureaucratic planning system.

Practices in the Early Twenty-First Century

Following public art advocacy in the 1980s, the practice became commonplace in urban redevelopment schemes in city after city. Although Whiteread's "House" was demolished in 1994 to make way for an urban park, a majority of commissions have been for long-term works of art or craft. Increasingly, these are integrated in the design of new urban development sites and public spaces. Barcelona is often cited as a case in which the provision of new public spaces and public art commissions from internationally known artists such as Claes Oldenburg and Roy Lichtenstein was instrumental in the city's renewal around the time of the 1992 Olympic Games. This is a simplistic view, and the city's policy to encourage cultural tourism based on its modernist heritage, its redevelopment of part of the waterfront as an Olympic Village, and public-sector investment in a Catalan cultural infrastructure were probably more important. For city authorities, marketing agencies, and developers, however, public art remains a visible emblem of urban renaissance.

Public art, which departed from the mainstream in the 1960s and 1970s, was thus subsumed into it in the 1980s and 1990s. In a converse development,

independent curators began to introduce increasingly questioning art into new kinds of art spaces. It may be that the public issues hitherto espoused by the more radical of public art projects are today encountered in independent galleries and associated nongallery projects. The boundaries between gallery art and public art are thereby collapsed, just as some artists seek to introduce the public to coauthorship, blurring the boundary between art and its audiences.

Parallel to this shift has been a growth of what might be called dissident public art, often using temporary interventions to comment critically on contemporary public issues or the values of the art world in a consumerist society. In some cases, arts funding is used to support such work. This follows the historical precedent that early-twentieth-century avant-gardes in art remained within art's institutional structures at the same time as they sought to challenge the values of those structures.

A key issue for artists working in nongallery situations today is whether they are complicit in the aims and strategies of urban redevelopment or seek to subvert them. For many artists seeking to make a living from work in the public domain, the response is a pragmatic acceptance of agendas. But some artists' groups have devised tactics to explicitly challenge the market-led basis of redevelopment and question public cultural and urban policies. Critical Art Ensemble has proposed electronic resistance, for instance, and the Institute for Applied Autonomy has developed a robotic graffiti writer. In Britain, groups such as PLATFORM in London, Locus + in Newcastle, Free in Sheffield, and Littoral in rural northwest England have evolved ways to engage specific publics or take the art world as a constituency, in a renewal of politicized practice. Andy Hewitt and Mel Jordan brought an ironic wit to the situation when they offered themselves as the prize in a raffle at the annual conference of Public Art Forum—the U.K. national association of public art intermediaries—in 2003. The outcome was a commission for a billboard in 2004 that stated, “The economic function of public art is to increase the value of private property.”

Further billboards were produced on the aesthetic and social functions of public art, one exhibited at the 2005 Venice Biennale. A billboard on

the imperial function of public art, produced by Hewitt and Jordan with artist Dave Beech, was exhibited at the Guangzhou Triennale in 2006. Although the implied public for these projects is the art world itself, the artists see intervention in art's systems as leading to discussion of wider social issues among arts professionals, seen as among society's opinion formers and image makers.

Looking to wider social agendas, the Austrian art collective WochenKlausur uses dialogic practices to bring different constituencies into common concern, involving students in the redesign of a school classroom and bringing politicians, journalists, and sex workers together in a series of voyages on Lake Zurich. Dialogic art of this kind goes beyond the community-based arts of the 1970s. Rather than facilitating the making of art by community members, it seeks to enable the determination of public issues by empowered and mobilized members of multiple and intersecting publics. This seems appropriate when it is increasingly accepted that place-based communities are not constituted by the conditions of postmodern cities and that an art of material production tied to a geographical site in conventional constructions of place identity may in the end appeal to no public at all. A key influence in this tendency is German artist Joseph Beuys, who proposed the idea of social sculpture as a fusion of art, politics, and everyday life in the 1960s. Perhaps this is the direction the most interesting public art will follow in the next decade. The difficulty will be that, as art merges into everyday life as a quality of creative and possibly critical imagination, at times a means to foresee a new society, it will no longer be definable as the separate aesthetic category known as art.

Malcolm Miles

See also Architecture; City of Memory; Museums; Public Realm; Urban Planning

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PUBLIC AUTHORITIES

Public authorities, also known as public or government corporations, are business-like organizations that manage, maintain, or regulate the major capital assets of governments such as highways and mass transportation, water and sewer passages, and construction of universities, hospitals, and other public buildings. They also fund projects by providing investment capital for private economic development. Although they may act like businesses, they are subject to neither laws governing private corporations nor municipal regulation in managing public assets. Public authorities are provided with a broad range of powers that are defined via state statute; they are viewed as instruments of government designed to pursue a specific purpose. Used mainly at the state and local levels of government, public authorities have a voluntary board of directors appointed by the state's governor to manage staff and monitor daily operations. Authorities can be interstate corporations that regulate shared assets between two states (such as the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey and the Tennessee Valley Authority).

Public authorities are provided with the power to levy taxes and tolls, create contracts, condemn property, and loan money, but their financial actions are not considered a part of the state budget. Moreover, authorities have the privilege of developing and controlling budgets that are not subject to public approval. Funds are procured via fees (e.g., bridge tolls) or through government bonds. Revenue bonds, for example, are sold to private investors for a certain project by the public corporation, and the debt is paid from proceeds generated by the project. The debt is viewed as the legal responsibility of the corporation, not the state, and is therefore not considered a part of the state budget. The sale of bonds also allows for public investments without having to raise taxes. Projects created by public authorities provide the state with much-needed public assets, and some facilities may be sold to corporations, giving the government an infusion of cash from the sale.

A public authority can incur three types of debt: backdoor, project revenue, and debt for private entities. Backdoor debt is debt issued to state and local governments outside the legal, constitutional

borrowing limit and is backed by tax revenue. Project revenue debt is issued for projects that the authority is undertaking. Debt for private entities is accumulated for economic development purposes. In New York, the state government cannot borrow money unless voters approve the purpose and amount. Most of the time, voters are reluctant to accede to projects that will incur debt and raise taxes. Therefore, the creation of a public authority is a method for circumventing public approval.

In the United States, during the early nineteenth century, many states were focused on developing and building the country. A large amount of money was spent on funding large infrastructure projects such as railroads and canals. When the Great Depression of 1830 hit, state governments ended up defaulting on guaranteed debt. The result was a rewriting of state constitutions to restrict state credit. The restrictions included a ceiling on how much could be borrowed in relation to the assessed value of the project and a requirement stating that a referendum must be held to allow borrowing. This was the first introduction of revenue bond financing for development purposes, with the responsibility of handling such funds given primarily to government agencies.

One of the first authorities on record is the Port Authority of London, which was created in 1908. In the United States, the first public authority was the Port of New York Authority, established in 1921 to manage the port and its wharves. It later became responsible for the bridges and tunnels connecting New York and New Jersey. In 1972, the name was changed to the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey to reflect the partnership between the two states in managing the area. Austin Tobin, former director of the Port Authority, believed that authorities were "designed to put public enterprise on their own feet and on their own responsibility; to free them from political interference, bureaucracy and red tape, while at the same time retaining adequate controls." Public corporations, therefore, combined the powers of a private business with public permission to do what government could not accomplish. They were meant to have the management strengths of the private sector and to be free from the slow-moving bureaucracy and political scandals of government.

Authorities were uncommon until after the Depression of the 1930s, when states could no

longer support public projects. President Franklin Roosevelt then endorsed public corporations for the pursuit of revenue-producing public projects, along with revenue bonds for generating public investment capital. Many states subsequently created public corporations.

Debate continues as to why public authorities have become a popular tool of government. Some argue that it is the ability to raise money that makes authorities indispensable, while others believe it is the method by which they efficiently manage public assets. The broad range of powers provided to public authorities has led to critics questioning how much autonomy should be granted to them. Too much autonomy has led to the mismanagement of resources and finances and questionable ethical behavior. Yet others argue that a lack of independence can lead to cronyism. In response, many states have established commissions to reevaluate the status of public corporations.

The amount of debt a public corporation can accrue has also been regarded as a problem. In 2004, New York State public authorities managed a debt of about \$120 billion, of which \$44.6 billion was state-supported debt. The concern is that many existing public corporations are not needed and are increasing state-funded debt through unnecessary expenditures. Even if a public authority abuses the powers it has been entrusted with or has a large amount of debt, many cannot be shut down as they provide the public with necessities such as railroads. With the loss of a public authority, a local government would not only lose a public service but also suffer a decrease in its credit ratings.

Recent efforts have called for public corporations to have more accountability and greater transparency as to how funds are managed. One proposal is for the creation of a state monitoring agency to regulate them. Strides have already been taken toward reforming how public authorities operate and are managed in New York State through the Public Authority Governance Advisory Committee, the New York State Commission on Public Authority Reform, and the Public Authorities Accountability Act of 2006. The act will codify the model governance principles for public authorities, create a new Public Authorities Budget Office, establish an independent inspector general, and provide rules for how to dispose of public authority property. Despite the issues, public corporations

have long provided municipalities with a method of supplying citizens with much-needed public facilities without accruing a vast amount of debt. The hope is that a combination of the aforementioned initiatives will create a more viable and trustworthy base from which corporations can continue providing the public with necessary assets.

Nadia A. Mian

See also Local Government; Moses, Robert

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PUBLIC-PRIVATE PARTNERSHIPS

Public-private partnerships have a long history in American cities, and since the early 1970s, they have become increasingly important to urban policy making in both the United States and other capitalist democracies. A variety of factors explain the salience of public-private partnerships: the limited fiscal, technical, and bureaucratic resources of American local governments; the American progressive reform tradition with its emphasis on governing arrangements insulated from political control; business political power; national government policies of devolution and privatization; and a widespread belief in the superiority of markets over governments. Recently, public-private partnerships have been advocated as strategies to enhance both the civic engagement and policy coordination essential for more representative and effective urban governance.

Urban policy analysts and scholars employ the term *public-private partnership* to encompass a wide range of government and nongovernmental, for profit and nonprofit organizational collaborations. Studies of partnerships focus on interactions

as diverse as informal cooperation between public and private actors; direct or indirect public funding of private organizations or projects; private funding of public organizations or projects; formal, often legally chartered, multisector organizations; special districts, public authorities, and other “quasi-public” agencies. More specific definitions clarify the kinds of relationships at work, for example, differentiating between partnerships embodied in project-specific, time-limited deals and organizations with ongoing institutionalized commitments. On the other hand, partnerships might be defined only as continuing relationships with shared responsibilities among public and private actors, each of which has the authority to negotiate on its own behalf and each of which brings resources to the partnership. Others confine the term *partnerships* to long-term relationships codified in legal or financial contracts. Public-private partnerships usually do not include arm’s-length contracts based on competitive bidding for specific products or services and generally associated with privatization strategies.

Historical Evolution

If partnerships are considered in the broadest sense as public-private collaborations, their origins can be traced to the close relations between political and economic elites in the expanding nineteenth-century city. Where political machines dominated, local government utility franchises and building contracts attracted investors who were sources of campaign contributions, jobs, and tax revenues. Nonmachine cities, too, had their public-private partnerships, as evidenced in various city planning and municipal reform organizations.

The origins of contemporary partnerships, whether defined as project-focused, long-term, or legally chartered collaborations, are generally traced to federal urban renewal policies (1954–1974). The urban renewal program required an institutionalized local capacity to plan and implement redevelopment projects in order to receive federal grants and loans. Because many cities lacked that capacity, this requirement prompted new government-business alliances. In some cities, business organizations and committees took the lead in policy planning and project execution; the local government’s role was its exercise of eminent

domain and project funding. In other cities, local urban redevelopment authorities, quasi-independent public agencies overseen by appointed, public-private boards of directors, were in charge. Yet even here, business organizations typically determined the parameters of downtown revitalization plans.

Subsequent federal government programs have continued to foster an expanding array of public-private partnerships for urban revitalization. President Jimmy Carter’s 1978 national urban policy emphasized that governments alone could not solve urban problems and needed the active assistance of the for-profit and nonprofit sectors. The federal Community Development Block Grant (1974–) and, more especially, the Urban Development Action Grant (1977–1989) encouraged local governments to leverage public monies through incentives such as subsidized loans and land write-downs as well as infrastructure spending to stimulate private industrial and commercial investment, create jobs, and generate new tax revenues. The Reagan administration’s enterprise zones and the Clinton administration’s empowerment zones also required alliances among governments, firms, and local community-based organizations to attract jobs and investment to poor urban neighborhoods.

Although federal funding for urban programs dried up in the 1980s, the competition for new investment continued, and many state governments became active promoters of public, for-profit partnerships. State governments fostered deal-specific and more expansive government-business alliances through special districts, business improvement districts, and tax increment financing as well as tax incentives, below-market interest rate loans, and enterprise zones. Improving the efficiency of government programs in light of policy devolution also became a key objective. For their part, local governments developed entrepreneurial strategies to attract investors and enhance their competitive advantage. The goals of partnerships with firms extended well beyond downtown redevelopment. For example, partnerships with business were established to restructure New York City finances after its fiscal collapse in the 1970s, to plan and manage the Atlanta Olympic Games, to rebuild Los Angeles after the 1992 civil unrest, and to help implement a massive highway project in Boston in the 1990s.

Despite the overwhelming importance of business to partnerships and the major focus of

public-private partnerships on economic development, city government partnerships carry out a variety of important policy tasks with a broad variety of nonprofit organizations. Starting in the 1960s, community development corporations have been key actors in inner-city revitalization, especially housing development. Federal funding reductions and program devolution have increasingly made nonprofit organizations, as well as for-profit firms, central to many policy interventions. While no inventory of city-based public-private partnerships exists, one study of the 555 largest cities, published in 2001, found that community-based organizations including community development corporations were most likely to work with city governments on affordable housing, homelessness, and public safety issues. The extent of collaboration appears to be growing. Local governments now regularly work with social services organizations, universities and community colleges, employer organizations, and for-profit firms to deliver traditionally public goods and services such as job training, welfare assistance, education, health care, corrections, and highway construction and management.

Partnerships Abroad

Governments in other capitalist democracies have also promoted partnerships as vehicles for achieving economic development, urban regeneration and, perhaps more than in the United States, social inclusion. Although policies promoting public-private partnerships date from the 1970s in some European countries, as in the United States, the importance of public-private partnerships has grown since the 1980s. In part, national governments have turned to partnerships as a strategy to enhance decentralization of policy making and implementation.

At the same time, in Europe, a major impetus to public-private partnerships is supranational: the European Union (EU). The EU has long required public-private partnerships for the receipt of structural funds (that is, policies aimed at alleviating regional disparities) and encouraged numerous types of territorial social pacts for a range of regional, urban, economic development, employment, and social policy goals. Studies of European partnerships suggest a few critical differences from their U.S. counterparts. First, governments are the

dominant actors, even in economic development partnerships where private, for-profit actors are most evident. Second, European partnerships tend to be more “top-down”; national and supranational actors play greater roles in funding, policy design, and implementation. Third, despite EU concerns over social exclusion, particularly in inner-city areas, and although voluntary-sector associations are actively engaged in the provision of housing, job training, and other social services, community organizations tend to be less important. Fourth, party ideologies matter to the goals and balance of power within partnerships. Governments where social democratic or labor parties wield power are more likely to work with public and voluntary-sector partners, less likely to work with for-profit partners, and less likely to emphasize purely market objectives.

Japan, too, has a history of public-private partnerships dating from the end of World War II. In contrast to Europe, Japanese partnerships focus overwhelmingly on economic development and involve national, regional, and local government relationships with private firms. Often aimed at attracting private investment to projects with significant public benefits such as transportation, these partnerships typically involve joint funding of projects as well as organizational collaboration. Similar forms of partnership have been used to support technological innovation, research and development, and even welfare provision.

Despite their growing importance, the consequences of partnerships for urban policy making, urban governments, and urban citizens remain a subject of debate. While partnerships can be credited with successful urban development projects, evidence is mixed on the extent to which, and when, partnerships achieve broader goals of economic development, social inclusion, and citizen participation. Because the goals, procedures, and accountability mechanisms of organizations in the public, for-profit, and nonprofit sectors differ greatly, crafting workable and effective partnerships can prove difficult. One study of 105 U.S. cities with partnerships between government and community-based organizations found that these partnerships enhanced city officials’ awareness of community needs but that accountability problems, poor communications, and a lack of trust continued because of differing organizational

practices. The fear that partnerships remain a strategy for eliminating public programs rather than improving them also plagues partnership relations.

Public-private partnerships also raise issues of representation and accountability. Whether nonprofit organizations (including community-based organizations) represent their constituencies, rather than their funders, professional staff, or the demands of their partners affects their capacity to serve as mechanisms of citizen participation, empowerment, and community revitalization. European cases in particular suggest that public actors dominate partnerships with nonprofit organizations, especially those representing historically excluded groups.

Collaborations with for-profit entities on economic development policies, the prevalent form of public-private partnership in the United States, present other problems. For-profit firms operate with very different objectives from city governments; they also control the information and financial resources essential to partnership success. Given the competition among local governments for such investment, the limited knowledge public officials have of investment alternatives, and the incentives for firms to extract the best deal, city governments are in a weak bargaining position and hence may offer unnecessary incentives to their for-profit partners. This dilemma makes it likely that many public-private partnerships may not increase governmental efficiency but rather waste public funds. The historic focus of these partnerships on downtown, as opposed to neighborhood revitalization raises the question of whether these arrangements embody true collaboration aimed at broad-based economic development or simply reinforce existing power relationships.

More generally, it remains unclear whether public-private partnerships can be understood as signifying new forms of urban governance that embody new relationships between governments, the economy, and civil society. Despite that uncertainty, public-private partnerships will likely become more important to cities, given national government strategies of decentralization and privatization.

Cynthia Horan

See also Governance; Regime Theory; Urban Policy

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PUBLIC REALM

The public realm refers to all aspects of society and the social world that are not exclusively private (e.g., private property, private life). As a result, the public realm is composed of multiple overlapping dimensions that have each given rise to distinct theories and modes of investigation, often within the boundaries of specific academic disciplines. Geographers examine the spatial dimensions of the public realm by exploring the built and virtual environments as places for public life to play out. Political philosophers conceive of the political public realm more abstractly as the discursive space where the state and civil society are enacted, reproduced, and negotiated. The economic public realm, which includes the valuation of public goods and the management of public

finances, is the concern of economists. Finally, sociologists address the social public realm as the location of everyday interactions where identities and shared meanings are constructed. Within each of these dimensions, attention is often focused on the erosion of the public realm and the shift toward a more private society.

These several dimensions are closely related and influence one another directly and indirectly, bringing them together into a single framework: (1) the spatial public realm provides a location for (2) discussion in the political public realm (3) about resources in the economic public realm by (4) individuals and groups that have constructed shared understandings in the social public realm.

Spatial Public Realm: Built and Virtual Environment

When investigating the spatial dimensions of the public realm, the term *public space* is commonly used. Public space refers to those spaces that are, in principle, open and accessible to all members of the public in a society. The most obvious examples include such places as parks, streets and sidewalks, and government buildings. However, not all public spaces are physical; the concept is often expanded to include virtual gathering places such as online chatrooms, blogs, and social networking websites. In many cases, places that are technically private but practically public—shopping malls, restaurants and bars, or entertainment venues—are also included under the umbrella of public space.

Despite their definitional openness and accessibility, public spaces are not unregulated spaces. They are all governed by informal social norms of interaction and frequently by specific rules of use, as when glass bottles or loud music are prohibited in a park. Of particular significance in the regulation of public space in the United States is the public forum doctrine, established by the U.S. Supreme Court decision in *Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association* (1983), which defined three tiers of freedom from regulation: traditional public forum, limited public forum, and nonpublic forum. Similar legal classifications of public space have developed in other countries.

Public spaces are used for a wide and overlapping range of activities. As social spaces, parks and

plazas offer groups and individuals an opportunity to gather and socialize. As cultural spaces, they are often sites of artistic performances, ranging from formal performances like concerts in the park to informal activities like sidewalk chalk drawings. They can also function as political spaces where grievances against the government can be raised and struggles against power and authority take place. These uses, again, can range from the formal and organized, like a proceeding in a government courthouse, to the unplanned, like a skirmish between local authorities and the undesirable occupants of a park. Finally, public spaces can often take on a commercial character. Genuinely public spaces often serve as locations for public markets (e.g., farmer's markets, craft fairs), and private spaces such as shopping malls and restaurants are frequently used as public spaces as well.

Both academic research and popular media frequently address the erosion of these spaces' publicness by a variety of forces. Local police, private security guards, and closed-circuit cameras are often employed to overtly regulate the use of certain public spaces. In other cases, regulation is achieved through indirect means, as when coffee carts were introduced in New York City's Washington Square to attract a more affluent crowd and create a less hospitable environment for drug dealers and vagrants, through a process Sharon Zukin has called "pacification by cappuccino." The design of public spaces also plays a significant role in how they are or are not used and by whom. Gated communities, which appropriate such traditionally public spaces as streets and sidewalks for the exclusive use of residents, involve the use of physical barriers. More subtly, developers often intentionally make plazas uninviting spaces to linger by limiting access to seating or to the space itself.

Political Public Realm: The State and Civil Society

Whereas the spatial dimension of the public realm focuses on the actual locations where public life plays out, the political dimension is more concerned with the abstract space where individuals come together to form opinions, build consensus, and pursue mutual goals through collective action. The political public realm, therefore, encompasses

individuals' beliefs and behaviors concerning how society ought to function and be structured as well as those institutions that grow out of such concerns: the state and civil society.

Jürgen Habermas, using the term *public sphere*, viewed this dimension of the public realm as a specifically discursive space where individuals, without regard to social status and without any constraint, engage in political participation by discussing matters of public interest. The European coffeehouse of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is frequently offered as an example of the public sphere; the coffeehouse itself reflects the spatial dimension of the public realm, and the political talk that took place within it reflects the political dimension. While this discursive activity continues to define the public sphere, it is increasingly electronically mediated, for example, through television and the Internet. Using the term *public realm*, Hannah Arendt formulated a similar but more active view of this political dimension, viewing it as a stage on which not simply political talk but also collective political action could take place.

Two key institutions are born out of, and draw their legitimacy from, the political public realm: the democratic state and civil society. The state refers to the organization that, through consent generated in the public sphere, holds a monopoly on the legitimate use of coercive physical force. As such, it functions as the supreme authority within a territory, creating and enforcing rules (i.e., laws), which provide a formal structure for the continued existence of the political public realm. Civil society includes those organizations that form around shared interests, but lack the legitimate use of force reserved by the state. These organizations provide an arena for discourse and collective action aimed at influencing or challenging the state. The openness of the political public realm varies widely throughout the world and is virtually nonexistent under some totalitarian regimes.

Many have theorized the erosion of the political public realm. Richard Sennett argues that the vibrant and active culture of public political interaction that once characterized cities has given way to a culture of privacy and individualism, thereby reducing participation in the political public realm to the role of spectator. Similarly, Robert Putnam suggests that as participation in activities like bowling shift from groups to individuals, the opportunities to

form shared understandings or pursue mutual goals are reduced. Others, however, contend that the political public realm is not eroding, but rather is simply being transformed by technologies like the Internet and cell phones, which allow the discourse and collective action of public life to take place without regard to physical proximity.

Economic Public Realm: Public Goods, Public Finance, and the Market

The economic dimension of the public realm is complex because it is inextricably linked to the private realm and in particular to notions of private property and ownership. It is useful to consider three components of the economic public realm. Public goods are publicly held resources that can be consumed by anyone, including such things as air or network television. Public finance is concerned with the provision and management of public goods, typically through taxation. Finally, the market is a public institution that exists to orchestrate the exchange of private resources.

First defined by Paul Samuelson, a public good is a resource that individuals cannot be prevented from consuming (i.e., nonexcludable) and for which an individual's consumption does not decrease its potential consumption by others (i.e., nonrivalrous). Air is a common example of a public good because it is unlimited, and all can freely consume it, but many of the public spaces that constitute the spatial public realm are also examples. This basic conception is often expanded to include goods that do not meet these strict criteria because they involve costs. Natural resources like water and government services like national defense have large (but not unlimited) supplies and are difficult (but not impossible) to exclude people from consuming. Such situations give rise to the "free-rider problem," wherein rational, utility-maximizing individuals do not contribute to the production of public goods because they can consume such resources at no cost, regardless of their contribution.

One solution to the free-rider problem is to make individuals' contribution to the provision of public goods involuntary by funding them through taxation. This is, in part, the purpose of public finance. Public finance exists at multiple levels, from national to local and municipal, and at each level, there are multiple interests competing for a

portion of public funds, contending that the resource they will provide is essential to the public good. Some expenditures, like the provision of public education and public health, are relatively uncontroversial. But conflict can arise when there is an incomplete overlap in who pays and who benefits, as for example with wealth redistribution programs like welfare or with incentive policies like those that provide subsidies to developers. The extent of state involvement in the provision of public goods, and indeed the concept of what should be a public good, varies dramatically between socialist and market economies, with the former adopting a more inclusive approach.

Although it exists to facilitate the exchange of private property, the market is a component of the public realm because it is in principle open to all members of the public. That is, it provides a public institutional structure within which anyone may participate in the role of either buyer or seller. The form of the market varies widely around the world, ranging from a highly formalized and electronically mediated stock exchange in some places to an open-air bazaar, with goods being sold or bartered directly out of barrels and cages.

Whatever its form, the market provides a public mechanism by which the value of goods and services is established, where its publicness depends on the state's involvement in its regulation. Guided by consensus generated in the political public realm, the state typically maintains some form of regulation over otherwise free markets, for example, through the imposition of a minimum wage or the enforcement of antitrust laws.

Discussion of the erosion of the economic public realm often highlights the increasing gray area between public and private resources. Some public goods, like water, are so essential to the maintenance of life that attempts to privatize their provision, especially in developing countries, have met with harsh criticism. Other goods, like education, have a long history of public provision but increasingly are recognized as having characteristics of private goods (i.e., they are both rivalrous and excludable) when their funding is based on the value of other private goods like housing. Public-private partnerships also contribute to this gray area, as when a municipal government and private landowners collaborate on a development project, rendering the publicness of the result ambiguous.

Social Public Realm: Identity and Social Construction

The social dimension of the public realm is perhaps the most amorphous because it involves the totality of everyday life, ranging from dining in a restaurant to working in an office. The social public realm is where shared understandings are constructed, which in turn structure interactions with others (e.g., behavioral norms), permitting the cultivation of individual and collective identities and the emergence of culture.

The seemingly straightforward public activity of dining out in a restaurant requires that the diner understand how to interact with the various people and objects that will be encountered. For example, the diner must understand that an order for food cannot be placed directly with the chef but must be transmitted through the waiter or that it would be inappropriate to order nothing but a glass of water. These understandings do not arise from decisions the diner makes; they emerge from the diner's interactions with others, which must be interpreted and answered. As shared understandings emerge from individuals' interpretations of repeated interactions with others, they serve to provide structure to social situations, through what Herbert Blumer termed *symbolic interactionism*.

The existence of a social public realm, within which such shared understandings can be constructed, is especially important for city life because interactions in the city are frequently with strangers and require an agreed on structure to go smoothly. The building blocks of this social structure are social roles such as diner or chef, employee or employer. Understanding what one's role is in a given situation provides a script for interaction that allows strangers to carry out social exchanges without having any knowledge of those with whom they are interacting. In essence, the social public realm provides a stage on which social roles are performed.

Through the performance of multiple overlapping roles, individual identity emerges. By simultaneously performing the roles of chef, employer, and female, an individual can convey to other occupants of the social public realm a very specific identity that signals not simply what she does for a living but also how she understands her own position in the public realm. Groups, by performing a set of roles, or simply by being viewed by others as performing a set of roles, cultivate a collective identity

in a similar way. Individual identity plays a key role in how one may engage in the political public realm, as do collective identities when members of the group become aware of their shared identity (e.g., class consciousness). Finally, it is on the back of these individual and group roles and identities that distinct cultures and cultural practices emerge.

Zachary Neal

See also Non-Place Realm; Public–Private Partnerships; Social Space; Urban Space

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R

RACIALIZATION

Racialization refers to the process by which social space is associated with various population groups. The Venetian ghetto was a racialized space associated with the Jewish population that lived in the Ghetto Nuovo. In the United States, inner-city neighborhoods are racialized spaces associated with minority populations, street gangs, drug trafficking, and crime, while in France, the *banlieue* has similarly become associated with overcrowded public housing, people of color, new immigrants, and crime. Racialization affects everyday life on many levels; for residents living within racialized spaces, a stigma is attached to the address that they include in applications for employment; for residents living outside the racialized space, the neighborhoods (and their residents) are to be avoided. The racialization of urban space is also important for understanding particular patterns of development across the metropolitan region.

Urban spaces have specific and sometimes contradictory meanings to people within and outside of the local community. Racialized space is also contested space, as groups struggle to define these spaces in a particular way. In the United States, inner-city neighborhoods, housing projects, and business areas have become associated with minority populations and with violent crime. Kevin Gotham describes how racialization was a fundamental part of the debate over urban renewal and the future development of Black and White space

in Kansas City. When downtown areas of cities become defined as racialized space, there is a decline in business of all kinds. The redevelopment of the Chicago Loop required the elimination of downtown movie theaters that featured Black films and the removal of other businesses that served this population. This was followed by the development of a new arts district, new Borders and Barnes and Nobles stores, the development of Millennium Park, and a rebirth of commercial shopping in the Chicago Loop. The project has been viewed as a success as the area has become deracialized.

Although the racialization of space most directly brings to mind the image of inner-city neighborhoods, the concept has been used by scholars in Europe to study ethnic populations in the multicultural city (*banlieue* in France, Roma communities in the United Kingdom) and by scholars in the United States to study ethnic neighborhoods and populations. One of the most visible and long-lasting of these neighborhoods is the ubiquitous Chinatown; other areas such as Little Italy and Poletown were also prominent features of the American urban environment. In many cases these neighborhoods were defensive—Chinese, Italian, and other immigrants confronted prejudice and discrimination when they first arrived in the United States, and more recent immigrant populations in Europe may be similarly excluded from public life. The racialized space of the ethnic enclave may provide a safe haven and opportunity for minority populations.

The racialization of space has focused on negative labels given to urban communities by urban

planners, suburban residents, and other people living outside of these spaces. But racialized spaces may be created from within the neighborhood as well. Gang graffiti advertises the presence of groups competing for control of urban space and creates racialized spaces that may appear dangerous and mysterious to the outsider. Racialized spaces may also be positive. In many ethnic neighborhoods, murals and museums create a racialized space that becomes a source of pride and identity for the group. Tourist bureaus in major cities supply maps that show the location of ethnic neighborhoods, such as Chinatown in New York and San Francisco, along with lists of restaurants and stores. The example of Chinatown is interesting in this respect, showing how a racialized space that for a long time held negative meanings (opium dens and prostitution) in the popular imagination has now been given a positive meaning (an important tourist destination) that becomes part of the city's advertising campaign.

As the following examples demonstrate, it is important to expand the discussion of the racialization of space beyond the usual reference to negative labels given to an area by people or agencies of greater social position and to recognize that racialized space may be created from above or below (by state agencies or by people within local communities) and that it may have positive as well as negative meaning.

Insiders and Outsiders

We normally think of racialized spaces as located somewhere "over there"—in other words, racialized spaces are places where groups of people different from ourselves live, literally, the space occupied by "the other." Racialized spaces are seen from the outside as spaces that we can name, that we have the authority to name. At the same time, people who occupy racialized space recognize that the area where they live occupies a specific niche within the larger community. They may have a definition of the racialized space very different from that of the outsiders—their others. This dialectic can be seen in two classic illustrations from the Chicago School of Urban Sociology.

The first illustration is Ernest Burgess's well-known diagram of the growth of the city (see the Chicago School of Urban Sociology entry). This

model of concentric zones surrounding the central core of the city formed the basis for all later Chicago School studies and continues to influence urban ecology to the present day. The diagram notes the location of particular ecological niches within the city, for example, a small area on the northwest side of the city is labeled *Little Italy*. This is the area of settlement for Italian immigrants—the slum neighborhood in Harvey Zorbaugh's *The Gold Coast and the Slum*. Stretching south from the Chicago Loop in the center of the diagram is an area labeled the *Black Belt*. This refers to the dense settlement of African American families in the Federal Street slum, a rectangular area created following their migration to the city to work in wartime industry. Housing discrimination and violence directed at Black families that tried to move into adjacent neighborhoods established the boundaries of the Black community in this narrow corridor, which would remain intact for nearly two decades. For those who live in other areas of the city and suburbs, the Black Belt is a racialized space that signifies an area of slum housing and a part of the city to be avoided.

St. Clair Drake and Horace Cayton's study of *Black Metropolis* was published some 20 years after Burgess's diagram of the growth of the city. *Black Metropolis* is a neglected classic in urban sociology and represents one of the most significant pieces of social science research on African American life in the American city in the twentieth century. The growing Black community on Chicago's south side had rejected the label of Black Belt and referred to their community as Bronzeville (just as Joe Lewis was known as the Bronze Bomber and Dinah Washington as the Bronze Nightingale). Drake and Cayton created a map, labeled "the lower class view of Chicago," that presented a view of the city from the Black neighborhoods on the south side of the city. The Black Belt was shown as an area distinct from other parts of the African American community. One might suggest that within the larger Bronzeville community, the Black Belt has become a racialized space.

In addition, there are several referents to other ethnic communities outside of the community: a note that indicates where the Mexicans live to the west and a note further north, where the Dagos, a pejorative term for Italians, live. From within the

racialized space occupied by the African American community, we observe two important processes: first, a rejection of the label imposed on the community from the outside and a redefinition of the community as Bronzeville, and second, a further racialization of urban space when references are made to other areas of the city occupied by other ethnic populations.

Chinatown

Chinatowns are found in major cities around the globe. In the Philippines and other Southeast Asian communities, the Chinatowns date to earlier centuries when trade in the region was dominated by Chinese merchants; in the United States, they developed following the large-scale immigration of cheap Chinese labor needed by mining and railroad interests in the 1880s. These areas were regarded with an element of suspicion and fear by the local population, coupled with a curiosity and desire to indulge in the pleasures and vices thought to exist within this racialized space.

San Francisco's Chinatown has intrigued tourists from the very beginning. One of the main attractions toward the end of the nineteenth century was a series of opium dens that flourished in the warren of underground passages beneath the houses, shops, and restaurants there. In 1877, Miriam Florence Leslie, wife of the publisher of *Leslie's Illustrated Weekly*, toured one such den with a group of her friends and recorded her impressions in her book, *California: A Pleasure Trip from Gotham City to the Golden Gate*. The tour guide was a local police officer.

During that period, the overcrowded Chinatowns were seen as places of vice and cultural insularism where "unassimilable foreigners" congregated—a negative racialized space. In recent decades, there has been a transformation of these neighborhoods in many cities, and many have emerged as centers of commercialism and tourism; some also serve as centers of multiculturalism (espoused in Australia, Canada, and the United Kingdom) and racial harmony (especially in Malaysia and Singapore). The Chinatown example demonstrates that racialized space may have negative or positive meaning within the metropolitan system and that the negative racialized space of the past may emerge as a

positive generator of growth and multiculturalism in the future.

Ray Hutchison

See also Chicago School of Urban Sociology; Chinatowns; Multicultural Cities; Social Exclusion

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RAILROAD STATION

Railroad stations are simultaneously urban monuments, workplaces, processing devices that choreograph mobility, and emotionally charged spaces of arrival and departure. The significance of railroad stations to cities can be considered from a number of different perspectives. First, and from a functional perspective, this entry considers the place of railroad stations in relation to the urban tapestry. Second, and from a practical perspective, it considers the configuration of railroad stations and how they organize movement. Third, and from a phenomenological perspective, it considers the embodied experience of railroad stations for users.

The Place of Railroad Stations in the City

Considering the relationship between railroad stations and the wider urban environment, railroad stations are embedded into complex, intersecting networks of mobility and constitute important



A railroad station on the Asian side of Istanbul, Turkey. The station was a gift from the German Kaiser to the Ottoman Sultan.

Source: Elizabeth O'Brien.

transport interchanges. Railroad stations as mechanical devices perform an organizational role through the way in which they order and process the movement of people through the city. Railroad stations often include bus stops, subway or tram stations, taxi ranks, and car parks, which enable people to transfer between trains and other modes of both public and private urban transport.

Large urban areas often have a terminus station that constitutes the start or end point of a significant proportion of all railroad journeys. Some cities, such as London, have multiple termini that are the historical product of rival railroad companies vying for power. Indeed, many large urban areas at the meeting point of major railroad lines were themselves a product of the railroad. Many of these terminals, such as Grand Central Terminal in New York, are

imposing and monumental in stature. The scale of terminus stations often prompts parallels with other immense buildings in the urban environment, such as cathedrals. Both the exterior and interior architecture of terminus stations was designed to project a series of ideologies associated with grandeur. For some stations, such as Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus in Mumbai, this is demonstrated through particularly intricate and elaborate iconographic and symbolic design. For other stations, such as St. Pancras International in London, this is evident through the sheer scale of the interior spaces and often-imposing facades that proclaim the gateway to the city.

During the nineteenth century, these large terminus stations tended to be built at the edge of cities, but as urban areas expanded, in part because of the railroad, terminals began to constitute significant



The ornate interior of the Antwerp railroad station in Belgium.

Source: Karen Wiley.

spaces within the urban tapestry. As such, railway terminals and the parallel emergence of associated facilities such as railway hotels generated a series of new social spaces and helped transform the experience of modern urban life. Yet, the urban landscapes surrounding large railroad stations have often been perceived as places of danger, associated with lawlessness and suspect activity. Furthermore, the decline of manufacturing industry within many Western cities, often located near the railroad, has exacerbated the deterioration of many railroad station quarters. However, contemporary trends in urban planning, which more fully integrate railroad stations into the wider urban fabric, have led to a

renaissance of railroad station quarters in many cities. Multifunctional redevelopments that often include a mixture of residential, retail, commercial, and leisure functions, together with enhanced pedestrian and public transport access to the rest of the city, have helped regenerate what were often areas of great socioeconomic deprivation. As such, the emergence of new spaces of sociality has transformed the place of the station in the city. Large railroad stations with accompanying retail malls such as Leipzig Hauptbahnhof have become destinations in their own right rather than merely conduits for movement.

Owing to their contextual and physical diversity, it is also important to acknowledge the problems of alluding to railroad stations in a generic way. Whereas terminal stations at the end of railway lines may be large and multifunctional, there are often a multitude of smaller “passage-point” railroad stations within the city. Many of these intermediate railroad stations are located in residential areas, primarily for the benefit of commuters traveling into city centers. Furthermore, some stations serve specific functions within the urban environment, such as shopping malls, sports stadia, ports, and so on. Similarly, the relationship of railroad stations to the rest of the city varies across different national and cultural contexts.

The Form and Function of Railroad Stations

Although the precise configuration of space differs, most large urban railroad stations have a series of connected spaces that are designed for different functions. A large entrance typically opens out onto an expansive and relatively uncluttered concourse area, which facilitates the efficient movement of people between different parts of the station. Accessible from the concourse are a series of functions integral



The St. Pancras International station in London includes access to both commuter trains (the Tube) and long-distance trains, such as the Eurostar line that crosses into France and Belgium.

Source: Karen Wiley.

to the process of traveling by train, such as ticket office, information kiosk, left-luggage facilities, and waiting rooms, together with a range of retail outlets. Beyond the concourse are the individual platforms where train services arrive and depart.

To organize pedestrian movement within the station, arrival and departure screens on the concourse display the platform number and details of each train service, such as departure time, destination station, intermediate stations, and other service-specific information. While passengers often have knowledge relating to train times through online or paper timetables prior to arriving at the station, and increasingly through mobile wireless devices or embedded in memory through repeated journeys, the concourse is the place where

timing information about journeys is reconfigured. Where a train service has been delayed, the arrival and departure screens become crucial objects that convey real-time service updates, which help passengers organize their time.

Passenger movements through railroad stations are complex because of the multiplicity of potential trajectories. Yet, they are also highly probabilistic, owing to the way that the form of stations organizes these movements. Finding one's way through railroad stations is often facilitated by standardized sign systems, where easily recognizable pictograms, arrows, and large sans-serif labels combine to help passengers navigate through space. Furthermore, perceptual cues are often engineered into the architecture to encourage different types of movements

to occur. In part, this might be achieved through different surface textures; smoother, uncluttered surfaces encourage passengers to move faster and without stopping. However, while particular acceptable movements are facilitated, railroad stations are also highly disciplining spaces, turning bodies into objects under surveillance. Where the visibility of station staff together with police is designed to reassure and discipline, pedestrian movements through railroad stations are closely monitored by technologies of surveillance such as CCTV. The securitization of railroad stations is often accentuated by announcements instructing passengers to maintain awareness of others and to report any suspicious behavior.

In part, the imperative for such securitization emerges from the threat of terrorist attacks to both stations and trains because of the high density of people converging into a narrow space. As such, operational procedures at larger railroad stations increasingly mirror those of airports, where passengers are held in specific waiting areas until called to board their train. Governmental agencies often consider that more thorough screening of passengers tightens security; the concourse and platform spaces parallel the land and air spaces of the airport, where passengers can move through only on production of a valid ticket. Other sorting of passengers might occur through dedicated spaces designed for privileged passengers who hold expensive premium tickets.

The Embodied Experience of Railroad Stations

Tensions that emerge between experiences of freedom and control in railroad stations assist in generating a series of feelings, behaviors, and associations that are specific to this quasi-public-private realm of the city. In part, these socialities emerge from the diversity of people who converge to form crowds at railroad stations; crowds that demonstrate particular diurnal rhythms choreographed by the arrival and departure of train services. Regular commuters, one-off business travelers, day trippers, and backpackers move between and mingle with railroad staff, homeless people, cleaners, railway enthusiasts, migrants, shop workers, and opportunist thieves to form what many have argued constitutes a microcosm of urban life.

Such diversity also accounts for the multiple ways that railroad stations are experienced. Passengers who use the station during their everyday commute may generate embodied tactics and strategies so that moving through space is habitual, requiring no thought. Conversely, a one-off traveler unaccustomed to a particular station may have to pay more attention to navigation through space. Similarly, a passenger burdened by traveling with luggage may experience greater discomfort moving through the station compared to an unimpeded luggage-free passenger. Depending on personal itineraries, movements through the station might be rushed or leisurely, involving different durations and experiences of waiting.

Important from a phenomenological perspective are the intangible affective and emotional experiences of these spaces that connect the urban with other spaces: the city with the country, the proximate with the distant. Although the securitization of these spaces may induce particular anxieties, the romance of the rails and the promise of travel, encapsulated perhaps most powerfully by the series of places listed on the departure board, also serve to make railroad stations places of uplift and excitement. At railroad stations, people meet and part company, and as such, they can be places of intense affective encounters. Indeed, this charged atmosphere, overlain with the incessant buzz of station announcements, the smell of fumes, and the sound of wheels jarring against steel, has provided the evocative backdrop for many a film scene.

David Bissell

See also Airports; Journey to Work; Public Realm; Social Space; Surveillance; Transportation

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REAL ESTATE

Real estate is a physical and a financial asset. As a physical asset, it is fixed in a given place, thereby grounding the economic, political, and social relations that create real estate. As a financial asset, it is mobile and tradable: A real estate project might be sold on completion with additional transactions (e.g., sales) likely. Real estate is an important sector of the economy as large amounts of private and corporate capital are invested in it. The financial nature of real estate and its economic importance make it a theme explored largely by economists and financial analysts who are interested in analyzing and understanding real estate performance. Nonetheless, real estate has major physical or spatial dimensions that are best exemplified by the mantra used to describe the source of real estate's value: location, location, location.

Theoretical Approaches

Research on real estate has relied on quite different approaches: neoclassical, structural, and institutional. The neoclassical approach focuses on the demand–supply aspects of real estate development and was dominant until about 1970. Beginning in the late 1960s and the early 1970s, another set of approaches emerged. Scholars, drawing on the writings of Karl Marx, became interested in the logic of capitalist accumulation as a major factor in the production of real properties. The forces of capitalism and its monolithic nature were unpacked in the 1980s by political economy analyses and institutional approaches that dealt with the actors who produce and sustain real estate markets.

Researchers relying on neoclassical approaches have studied real estate by focusing on market forces. According to this perspective, in a market economy, the exchange of products takes place on the basis of prices determined by the interaction of supply and demand. In the case of real estate, rent is the price a tenant pays for occupying a particular space. The interaction of demand for real estate and the supply of rental properties determines the level of rentals. Price is determined by demand, and supply follows rather than influences demand. Agents engaging in the real estate process are assumed to act in unison and react automatically to

the structure of demand. The model implies the existence of a perfect market and the rapid elimination of any price differences. Both consumers and producers seek to maximize utility and profitability and do so within social, legal, or local constraints.

Authors relying on neoclassical frameworks have increasingly recognized urban specificity as a major condition shaping the supply of and demand for land and property. Thus, markets are actually segmented into submarkets, such as downtown and suburban. Moreover, property itself is not homogenous but is instead heterogeneous. Neither is it easily divisible into small or uniform units; it exists on unique different sites, each having its own characteristics.

According to the neoclassical approach, the density of real estate development is shaped by the land value gradient or a series of land value gradients. Transportation lines, which converge at one location, give rise to what has been referred to as the peak land value intersection. As a result of maximum accessibility, land values at the peak land value intersection are the highest in the city. Demand for space results in high land costs, which reflect the potential value of the land if built on to the maximum allowable extent. In these locations, the cost of land is the major component of real estate development. Capital is substituted for land as large amounts of capital are invested in the erection of more intensive land uses to compensate for high land values.

The initial argument of the political economy approach suggests that, in the long run and in the absence of profitable investments in the primary (manufacturing) circuit of capital accumulation, capital will flow into the secondary circuit, where capital is deployed in the production of the built environment. This approach acknowledges the important role of the state in facilitating real estate development. Within the political economy approach, issues of landownership and rent are emphasized. Instead of the perfect-competition assumptions built into neoclassical land use models, this approach emphasizes the power of landowners. It is suggested that land has a monopolistic character. This enables landowners to manipulate or control the land market by charging monopoly rents.

Advocates of institutional approaches argue that it is essential to understand the institutional forms, relationships, and practices of the real estate sector. The starting point is its institutional articulation

and the networks and relationships between agents. What is needed is a thick understanding of real estate that identifies the type and composition of agents involved in the real estate sector and reveals the interests and strategies they adopt. The nature of the relationships between actors, their actual roles, and their relative influence in the negotiation of particular projects are analyzed in turn.

These works focus on agents and differ from the neoclassical and Marxist approaches in being concerned with the details of how the development process takes place, rather than making generalizations and engaging in abstractions. Agents are not treated as homogeneous entities but are clearly differentiated. Institutional scholars have noted the importance of how developers interact with other intermediaries within the development process.

Classifications of Real Estate Assets

As a whole, urban real estate assets form markets that are stratified according to type, quality, and location. Real estate includes several key classifications. First, a prevalent classification divides the real estate sector into residential and commercial assets. Residential assets include multifamily housing and detached houses, whereas commercial assets are made of three major property types. These are retail (e.g., shopping centers), industrial (factories and warehouses), and office buildings. A second classification takes note of the quality of properties. Properties have diverse qualities; some properties are of top quality in terms of age, facilities, and architecture, whereas other properties may be older, less equipped with contemporary facilities, and of poor architecture. Top-quality office buildings are known as Class A and command much higher rents than lower quality ones (Class B or C). Finally, location is of critical importance. In spite of evidence of globalization, real estate remains a local business. At the metropolitan scale, office buildings located in the central business district are different from those in suburban locations. Land scarcity and agglomeration tend to drive up land prices, producing taller buildings that dominate the urban skyline (e.g., lower and midtown Manhattan, Chicago's Loop). On the other hand, land in the suburbs is more easily available and is also less costly, a fact that makes development less dense (sprawl) and less tall. The

different types of real estate do not negate interdependencies between different property types. For example, the concentration of office buildings attracts residential development for office employees who wish to live nearby; the concentration of office buildings may also attract hotel development that caters to business travelers.

Agents, Time, and Space

Real estate involves numerous agents, such as developers, architects, engineers, and brokers, all of whom are vital in the functioning of real estate markets. The developer is a pivotal agent who initiates and coordinates the development process. Developers conceive opportunities for development when others are unaware of them. As property owners, they also engage in the buying and selling of properties. Landowners are important because they hold the product without which real estate development cannot exist. Leasing agents and real estate brokers bring together buyers, renters, and sellers; they match demand and supply. In addition, city planners and local authorities decide which projects to approve and thus are capable of steering property development to different locations and uses.

Similar to many economic processes, the performance of real estate markets is cyclical. This is best described by building cycles. As a result of the time lag between initiation and completion of a project, demand and supply are not fulfilled instantaneously. Extensive real estate development for a specific period usually results in an oversupply, leading eventually to a decline in new development as the surplus is absorbed. The 1980s building cycle resulted in massive real estate development in many cities across the world. Enormous amounts of office space were completed in cities such as London, New York, and Tokyo. This cycle was followed by a severe downturn during the 1990s; for a substantial amount of time, office buildings experienced high vacancy rates, and development was anemic. More recently, stagnant demand for downtown office space and an increased demand for housing have led to the upsurge in residential development in downtowns and in near-downtown areas.

Real estate markets have been studied at multiple spatial scales because real estate has both

global and local dimensions. The growing openness of the world economy has paved the way for some integration of real estate markets. The prominent example is that of the Canadian firm, Olympia & York, which during the 1980s conceived and pursued major real estate complexes in New York (Battery Park City) and in London (Canary Wharf). On the other hand, property markets and particularly property development is a local business, which is segmented even at the city and metropolitan scales. Property developers tend to work in specific places, those that are most familiar to them. For example, suburban developers tend to work in the suburbs and within the suburban realm in several specific locations. On the other hand, downtown developers rarely engage in development outside the downtown.

Conclusion

The urban fabric of our cities is made of numerous real estate properties having different shape, architecture, and meaning. Tall office buildings like the Empire State Building and Sears Tower define their cities' skylines, shopping centers are the definitive consumer spaces, and houses make neighborhoods and residential landscapes. In spite of being largely a local business, real estate development has made cities look more alike. It follows fundamental rules enhanced by the spread of capitalism and thus increases the tendency of cities to converge.

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See also Developer; Growth Machine; Land Development; Rent Theory; Urban Economics; Urban Planning

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RED-LIGHT DISTRICT

Red-light districts are areas in cities or towns that are themed around sex. They consist of clusters of activities or individuals and can be widely known outside the immediate area. The definition of red-light district has varied by place and time. They may be characterized by prostitution alone, but some districts have few or no visible prostitutes and consist of entertainment or other services. They can be characterized by entertainment of a sexual nature or by ancillary services related to sex, including the sale of books and videos, sexual aids, and clothing of a sexual nature.

The origin of the term is uncertain, but even today, districts in some cities, such as Amsterdam, are characterized by red lights in shop windows occupied by prostitutes, which are lit to indicate that the shop occupant is working, but busy. The nature of the district depends on the cultural and legal context. In some countries and cities, prostitution is legal, but authorities restrict open prostitution to just a few areas. In others, it is tolerated but illegal, and in some, it is strictly forbidden. Red-light districts have often been associated with ports, railway and bus terminals, or hotel districts, particularly those visited by large numbers of single males.

Historical Development

Throughout history, red-light districts have been features of cities. For example, in seventeenth-century Japan, the Tokugawa Shogunate created special districts for prostitution in cities, including Yoshiwara in Tokyo, Shimbara in Kyoto, and Shinmachi in Osaka. By the end of the nineteenth century, the one in Tokyo had some 9,000 women; it finally closed in the 1950s. Sociologists and their precursors have written about red-light districts since the nineteenth century. In 1925, Park and Burgess included a "vice zone" in their description of Chicago. Red-light districts were (and are) often

distinctive, well known, and persistent. They include Times Square in New York City; the Reeperbahn in Hamburg; Pigalle and Rue St. Denis in Paris; London's Soho; Zeedijk in Amsterdam; Kings Cross in Sydney and London; and East Colfax in Denver. In San Francisco, a red-light district—the Tenderloin—has been present since the city's founding. Such areas are also found in developing regions. In preindustrial Japan, prostitutes were referred to by place names associated with them, such as Fukagawa or Akasaka *geishas*.

Red-light districts have been called Bohemian districts, but not all such districts are red-light districts. In 1882, McCabe wrote that life in New York's Greenwich Village "is free from most of the restraints imposed elsewhere, and so long as the denizens of the neighborhood do not actually violate the law, they may do as they please" (p. 276). The district in Belo Horizonte, Brazil, was even known as Zona Boemia. Like McCabe, many argue that red-light districts are "moral regions," and often fulfill important social and economic functions. Thus, Park wrote in *The City*, "We must accept these moral regions and the more or less eccentric and exceptional people who inhabit them, . . . as part of the natural, if not the normal, life of a city (p. 45), adding,

It is not necessary to understand by the expression "moral region" a place or society that is necessarily criminal or abnormal. It is intended rather to apply to regions in which a divergent moral code prevails, because it is a region in which the people who inhabit it are dominated, as people are ordinarily not dominated, by a taste, or by a passion, or by some interest which has its roots directly in the original nature of the individual. (p. 151)

In some cities, red-light districts have been synonymous with skid rows, located in former business districts, along waterfronts, or in semi-industrial areas. Skid rows are characterized by low rents but, as Ward noted, are often highly accessible by public transport or car. Ward's description of the development of skid row resembles explanations for the existence of red-light districts. They develop in a spatially restricted city where most commercial activities cling to central areas. They remain where they are because of inertia. The major passenger

arrival points are (or were) located near the central business district and were the initial entry points for early skid row residents, so that services competing for their custom located in the area. Like Park, Ward described the skid row area as a moral district in which residents felt territorially secure, adding that "further tolerance of this spatially selective tolerance is manifested in the presence of commercial activities such as adult bookstores and girlie shows that frequently cluster on the edges of skid row districts. They do not cluster there in response to a demand for such services from the skid row inhabitants, but rather in response to the high tolerance threshold."

One could also argue that red light districts are specialized entertainment districts or clusters, economically similar to theater districts, hotel districts, and cultural districts in many cities. If one were to summarize the characteristics of a traditional red-light district, they would include centrality—as close to the business core as possible. They are often alongside the central business district, frequently between it and major gateways or transport terminals serving that district. They might seem to be peripheral to the social and economic life of the city, but they are often characterized by a high throughput of people, high anonymity, and in many cases a large number of single-occupancy rooms. They may be located in areas with a relatively low permanent residential population but with a high population of transients. In Tokyo, the modern red-light district, Kabukicho, is located near several railway stations and underground stations. Known as "the city that never sleeps," it has some 3,000 establishments, including bars, nightclubs, and specialist "love hotels." The area is also said to house a number of criminal enterprises.

Red-light districts can be in a zone of discard but equally can be in an area into which the central business district is expected to expand—what is effectively a holding zone, where landowners and speculators are reluctant to invest in upkeep because they expect to sell out or undertake substantial redevelopment in the future. For example, Reckless suggested that red-light districts were located in zones of transition, alongside the central business district. He argued that "vice" was found in slums ("The slum as the habitat of the brothel"), but in slums characterized by high population turnover where "social life tends to be unregulated and disorderly." He added that such neighborhoods were often

characterized by population decline, suggesting that there was generally a correlation of high land values and low rents in areas that were in a “direct line of business expansion” and therefore allowed to deteriorate—that is to say, in zones of acquisition rather than zones of discard. However, he noted that some activities were migrating away from city centers and accessible only by car or taxi. In 1994, the New York City Department of City Planning similarly argued, “Adult entertainment businesses tend to be transitional, and locate in areas that are ‘moving upwards’; they are rarely found in poorer neighborhoods.” It was even suggested that “some major real estate developments owe their existence to the ability of landlords to warehouse property by renting space to adult businesses that are willing to accept high rents and short leases during the period when a major assemblage is underway” (p. 26).

Although the initial concentration may be accidental, successful activities may attract similar ones, leading to clustering like that described by Hotelling’s Law. Retailing depends on information: Customers and clients need to know what is on offer and where. This is particularly true of red-light districts. In contrast to most forms of retailing, adult entertainment has been characterized by an information deficit. Until recently, merchants could not (or would not) publicize their wares or location. They had to locate where customers were, rather than waiting to be found. Most customers went to places where they knew shops or prostitutes were located, forcing adult services to locate in places that customers patronized. These clusters attracted like services. They often repelled nonconforming businesses by creating a moral atmosphere that discouraged other kinds of retailing and entertainment and by driving up rents for stores. In such districts, competition for customers is fierce, and turnover among shops is often high. In New York City, in the early 1990s, the Department of City Planning found that about 15 percent of all outlets in the city disappeared within six months. High turnover is another reason for clustering: Although individual stores may disappear, the district’s overall orientation remains the same.

Contemporary Issues

Planners, local governments, and property developers have argued that a reputation as a red-light

district causes blight: people fear crime, contamination, stigmatization from being associated with adult entertainment by proximity, lower property values, and lack of custom. However, red-light districts can bring benefits. They are often located in neighborhoods that might be described as incubation districts: relatively central but underdeveloped, with small manufacturing and retailing spaces that also include adult entertainment outlets and shops selling sexually oriented products, such as videos, magazines, clothing, and accessories. Such districts can attract a mix of business start-ups. Many will fail, but some may succeed. More recently, Richard Florida and others have suggested that such neighborhoods are both a product of and foster diversity, which leads to innovation and growth. The implication is that the different moral setting in the district can itself stimulate innovation and that moral districts can be assets as well as liabilities.

Since 1945, there has been a global expansion of adult entertainment. Although partly due to changing values, reflected in declining censorship of films and publications, it was also due to increasing living standards; lower publishing costs, particularly for color printing; and the rise of videos. These substantially transformed the industry. The rise of the cinema caused the decline of live theaters, and television fostered the decline of cinemas. In 1930, 65 percent of the U.S. population went to the movies at least once a week. By 1966, the figure was 10 percent. Unable to attract viewers to traditional films, many theater owners turned to adult films, particularly in relatively tolerant cities like New York. In the 1960s, relaxed censorship caused an explosion of publications and the opening of new clubs and bars featuring sex, but the rise of the adult video further altered the adult entertainment industry. The New York City Department of City Planning found that in 1984, New York had no adult video shops, but by 1993, it had 64. Bookstores and peepshows declined from 29 to 22, and cinemas and live theaters fell from 23 to 11, a phenomenon replicated in other cities. By contrast, topless bars and nude bars increased from 23 in 1976 to 54 in 1984, and to 68 by 2000, in line with nationwide trends. Overall, in New York City, the total number of adult entertainment outlets increased from 131 in 1984 to 177 in 1993—the increase being among video stores and topless entertainment.

As well as red-light districts, many cities have specialist districts that embrace sexual activities or looser sexual norms without being primarily focused on sex, such as New York City's Greenwich Village. As noted, McCabe described different "vice" districts in New York City, mentioning Greenwich Village, as catering to markedly different kinds of moral communities and sheltering different kinds of vice aimed at different customers and income groups. Whereas specialist districts like Greenwich Village were once rare, today they are found in most major cities. Some have a particular sexual orientation but offer a wide range of services. In the United States and Canada, recognizable districts exist in Denver, Colorado; Columbus, Ohio; San Francisco; Miami Beach; Chicago; Philadelphia; Washington, D.C.; and Atlanta. Identifiable districts exist in London (Soho), Hamburg (the Reeperbahn and the area behind the Main Station), and in Zurich, Paris, Cologne, and elsewhere.

In some cities, red-light districts have become conflated with gay districts. By the 1940s, Greenwich Village had become one of several centers of gay life in New York. In Toronto, the gay district extends into what was once skid row, east of Yonge Street. Specialist districts often include other activities, such as clothing or furniture, clubs, bars, and other venues. For example, beginning in 2002, a London Fetish Map identified a cluster of outlets in Camden Town and Vauxhall, as well as Soho, London's traditional vice zone. Often, different zones serve different socioeconomic groups, as well as people with different sexual interests and sexual orientations.

The future of red-light districts is uncertain for several reasons. To the extent that the lack of information leads to clustering, one might hypothesize that increased information about where stores are and what services they provide will encourage the dispersal of adult entertainment activities. Their increasing dispersal also reflects increased mobility and decentralization of population. Some products, once only available from specialized outlets, are now widely sold, and others are available through the Internet. In the United States, Germany, and Poland, for example, adult magazines can be purchased from newsagents. Red-light districts are increasingly rare in cities with a population under 250,000. Also, particularly in the United States and

Britain, a changing moral climate has threatened their future. Curb crawling is often illegal even where prostitution is permitted.

Red-light districts are also threatened by changes in licensing laws, land use controls, and the use of land use zoning to control their growth. Many jurisdictions have enacted legislation limiting the number of adult outlets in any one area, restricting proximity, and even banning them completely. Red-light districts have also been affected by changing travel and transport patterns, which include the decline of traditional port areas due to containerization and the removal of ports to the urban fringe, as well as a reduction in the number of people needed to crew ships. Increased car use and a decline in traditional mass transportation have reduced concentrated flows of people, reduced the centrality of red-light districts, and led to less concentrated demand. As well, as has been the case in retailing in general, the number of shops and services has declined due to the concentration of outlets among a few large retailers and the rise of national and international firms that produce their own videos and other products and sell them through their own outlets or the Internet.

Red-light districts are also threatened by the rise of specialist holiday resorts, such as Cap d'Ag in the south of France, where part of the resort is entirely clothes-free. There are also fetish resorts where rather than spending a short time watching a film or buying a video or magazine, visitors can spend several days pursuing sexual fantasies. Many cities now have specialist clubs that are open to members only or friends of members. Often, such establishments deliberately locate away from existing outlets, so as not to draw attention to themselves. However, red-light districts are perhaps most threatened by the rise of the Internet, which obviates the need to visit a particular area for services or goods. Internet use has reduced sales of videos, books, magazines, and other goods in shops. A 2002 study by Datamonitor found that in the United States, between 1999 and 2002, CD-ROM sales increased by an estimated 93.8 percent and online sales by 89.1 percent, whereas magazine sales fell by 6 percent. Sales of CD-ROM and online material rose from 12.2 percent of the total spent on adult entertainment to 19.1 percent of an estimated \$13.2 billion. The share of magazine sales, strip

clubs, and DVD/video sales (most of which were then sold through fixed outlets) fell from 70.6 percent to 63.9 percent. Online meeting services abound, as do online video services and chat rooms and online escort and massage services. This has fostered the rise of Internet red-light districts in which sales and other activities have clustered around key words and phrases, capturing the casual Internet browser just as traditional red-light districts enticed passersby in the past. The rise of Facebook-type Internet sites devoted to particular sexual activities or fetishes has created new online communities of like-minded individuals who can meet online or arrange to meet at private venues and can buy and socialize in a world free of spatial constraints. In the future, haptic technology may even permit a close approximation of interactive sex in the home. Effectively, new technology has brought the red-light district to the customer's door and into the home or hotel room.

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See also Bohemian; Chicago School of Urban Sociology; Exclusionary Zoning; Gay Space; New York City, New York; Sex and the City; Sex Industry; Suburbanization; Urban Planning; Urban Space

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REDLINING

Redlining is the denial or limiting of business services to a spatially defined community based on the racial, ethnic, or income composition of that community. Pertinent to the field of mortgage lending, community organizers in the 1970s suggested that banks had developed maps with red lines identifying communities in which mortgages would not be provided. In instances where maps were absent, the redlining metaphor refers to the mechanisms by which institutional lending biases create either disinvestment or discriminatory investment outcomes, contributing to the persistent racial and economic isolation of communities.

From its origins, the long-term, self-amortizing mortgage encouraged lenders and real estate appraisers to assess risk and attach values to communities based on their social composition. Architectural and racial homogeneity as well as newer housing were associated with higher-valued neighborhoods; conversely, non-White or non-northern European communities were devalued. Appraisal maps created by the Home Owners Loan Corporation during the Depression of the 1930s linked negative stereotypes of communities to color-coded neighborhoods—red for those least valued through yellow to blue to green for the most highly valued neighborhoods. Subsequent to World War II, another federal agency, the Federal Housing Administration (FHA), limited its insured mortgages to White borrowers who were purchasing newly constructed homes.

Contemporary research has suggested that the federal role in redlining and the creation of segregated communities was real, but it may not have been as significant as lenders' institutionalized attitudes of value and risk. Major empirical studies of mortgage applications, rejections, and differentials

in both the amount and terms of mortgage loans have confirmed the persistence of racial bias in the data reported under the terms of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (1975). Many communities have used aspects of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 to develop pools of investment funds that can be combined with neighborhood renewal and thereby promote the “greenlining” of previously disinvested communities.

In recent years, the concept of redlining has been broadened. Some have argued that the growth of predatory lending represents a case of reverse redlining, as some credit-starved neighborhoods have become the target of lenders using illegal practices in providing high-cost, high-return products. Redlining has also been used to describe real estate-related practices in homeowners’ insurance and in marketing practices and to describe the absence of insurance availability in areas that overlap investment-redlined areas. The term has also emerged in the context of retail services, which have been charged with limiting their services on the basis of the race or income levels of communities.

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See also Divided Cities; Disinvestment; Housing Policy; Jackson, Kenneth T.; Neighborhood Revitalization; Real Estate; Social Exclusion

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REGIME THEORY

Regime theory provides an explanation of how public- and private-sector interests come together in ways that allow for the governance of a city. As such, it represents a significant contribution to the urban politics literature. First, it presents a richly nuanced perspective on power, governance, and policy at the local level. In so doing, it also provides a necessary corrective to the earlier power elite, pluralist, and city limits theories of urban politics. Finally, the nuances of regime theory, stemming largely from its careful integration of agency and structure, paved the way for further refinements, thereby increasing its applicability. These refinements can be found in the typology of regimes developed to demonstrate the relationship between a specific policy orientation of a regime and the coordination tasks needed to successfully carry out that orientation.

Power, Governance, and Policy

Regime theory responds to the thorny question: How does anything get done (i.e., how do you govern) in a system where power, authority, and critical resources are fragmented across the public and private sectors? According to regime theorists Stephen Elkin and Clarence Stone, a key distinguishing feature of the American political economy is the fundamental division of labor between state (political authority) and market (economic power). Government wields significant official authority by virtue of constitutions, laws, and the like, most of which are subject to popular control, but the market is where most economic wealth and jobs are generated. There, the majority of control rests in private hands. Each party needs the other to achieve its desired ends (private interests want economic growth; public officials seek governing capacity), but there are no formal mechanisms for coordination. This division becomes even more problematic at the local or municipal level, where

elected officials have to wrestle with the fragmentation of the federalist system in which cities are merely creatures of the state with no legal authority beyond what their respective state government grants them.

This fragmentation between economic and political resources and between levels of government led regime theorists to focus on the informal processes whereby elected officials and private actors (typically those with significant economic resources) come together in mutually beneficial ways to further their ends of governance and economic gain. Clarence Stone refers to these as the informal arrangements that develop so that governance can be conducted and policy developed and implemented. What distinguishes a regime from a coalition, which can also be described as an informal collection of stakeholders, is its purpose and its staying power. Coalitions develop around a certain candidate or issue and then dissolve when the election is over or the issue resolved. Regimes, by contrast, are formed for the express purpose of governing and, thus, are stable through at least one mayoral administration and typically through many administrations, as in the now-classic case of Atlanta, which Stone popularized.

Because cooperation is critical to this public-private relationship but by no means automatic, the questions of who is cooperating and on what terms become central to understanding how a particular city is governed and its overall policy orientation. Regimes stay together because of the internal accommodations through which regime members receive benefits. These benefits will vary depending on the regime's composition but may include public-sector support for economic development projects, favorably placed real estate developments, and the like. In return, the public sector benefits from private economic investment in the city, which translates into jobs, tax revenues, and an improved overall viability of the city. Policy is the result of this accommodation process. Thus, the composition of the governing regime and its accommodation processes are two critical components of regime analysis.

The emphasis on cooperation also presents a different perspective on power. Stone distinguishes between the more classic definition of power as social control (power over) and his conception of power as social production (power to). Regimes, he

contends, operate on the social production model of power and thus render the accommodation process central to regime maintenance and stability.

Power Elite, Pluralist, and City Limits Theories

Regime theory also provides a necessary corrective to the earlier and dominant theories of urban politics. Between the 1950s and 1970s, the two contenders for scholarly prominence were the power elite and pluralist theories. Power elite theory, as articulated by Floyd Hunter, posits that economic elites, by virtue of the resources they command, essentially call the shots in urban policy. Pluralist theory, as developed by Robert Dahl in his research on New Haven (Connecticut), responds harshly to the notion of elite dominance, arguing instead that power is both fluid and widely dispersed, that coalitions form and dissolve, and that there are no permanent winners or losers in the urban political setting.

Without engaging in individual critiques of the two theories, suffice it to say that there are many holes in the logic and methodologies employed. The theories, however, share two major flaws. First, neither theory considers the impact of the economic system on the city. Second, both theories treat the city as if it were an autonomous actor, free from state and federal constraints and directives.

Responding to the shortcomings of these two theories, Paul Peterson developed his city limits thesis in 1981. This theory brings the economic system and the federalist structure back into the urban equation with a vengeance. According to Peterson, the overarching constraints imposed by these two external factors render cities nearly impotent in terms of impacting their environments. However, cities are, he maintained, rational actors with a unitary interest in economic growth. Hence, the limited capacities that they have will be directed toward policies that promote economic growth, which typically translate into large-scale economic development projects.

Regime theory acknowledges the contributions of the city limits thesis in bringing in structural factors (i.e., economic and federalist systems) but solidly rejects the notion that cities should be viewed as rational actors with unitary interests. In the place of consensus, regime theory sees conflicting interests. The question for regime theory thus

becomes: How are those interests reconciled in a way that governance is possible? This question returns us to the composition and accommodation processes of governing regimes. By focusing on these two aspects, regime theory puts the agency and, thus, the politics back into urban governance and policy. In restoring agency and politics, regime theory also restores accountability. If city governments are not on a deterministic path but, rather, do have and do make choices, then we can hold decision makers accountable, and we can pursue alternative policy directions.

Regime Typologies

Linking regime composition to policy outcomes, Stone identifies different types of regimes, so different that he develops a typology to distinguish them. The logic behind the typology is to underscore the relationship between policy agendas, on the one hand, and resources and levels of coordination necessary to execute those agendas on the other hand. In ascending order of complexity, we have maintenance regimes, developmental regimes, middle-class progressive regimes, and finally, lower-class opportunity expansion regimes.

Maintenance regimes, which are essentially caretaker administrations, tend to the basic service delivery functions of municipal government and not much more. Consequently, they do not require much in the way of coordination of actors or resources. Developmental regimes, which are the most typical, are organized around the deliberate alteration of land use patterns to facilitate economic growth or forestall economic decline. These regimes are characterized by significant controversy; a need to coordinate institutional actors and resources; the generation of selective incentives such as contracts, jobs, and the like; and the insulation of as much decision making as possible to dampen conflict.

Middle-class progressive regimes are centered around quality of life issues of the environmental and aesthetic variety, economic issues such as affordable housing and affirmative action, and social programs geared toward the less well off. All of these concerns require regulation or concessions from private-sector interests. Thus, the cooperative model that characterizes developmental regimes is

replaced by a more coercive posture. Given the ability of business to exit, middle-class progressive regimes rely heavily on the attraction of place (i.e., good investment site) and active popular support. The more attractive an area is to business, the more leverage the city has in extracting benefits. Similarly, the more active the public is, the more power the elected officials have in monitoring the activities of business. These two requirements, being an attractive site for investment and having active public support, render middle-class progressive regimes in the minority.

The most complex of the regime types is the lower-class opportunity expansion regime. Such a regime is committed to a redistribution of resources for purposes of improving education, developing the human capital of its citizens, and expanding local business and homeownership opportunities. The coordination function in such a regime includes significant regulation of private-sector behavior. Unlike the case with middle-class progressive regimes, the cities most in need of lower-class opportunity expansion regimes are often unattractive sites for investment, and elected officials cannot engineer the kind of mass mobilization necessary to keep them in office and to take advantage of the opportunities if and when they are provided. As desirable and necessary as this regime is, it remains, as Stone suggests, "largely hypothetical." Consequently, much still remains to be researched.

Although the development and continued refinements of regime theory have advanced our understandings of governance and policy making at the local level, the nuances of power and coalition building provide ripe avenues for additional research into the workings of local government.

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See also Governance; Growth Machine; Local Government; Public–Private Partnerships; Urban Politics

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REGIONAL GOVERNANCE

Regional governance comprises a system of structures, institutions, and processes through which groups organize and act to pursue purposes at the regional scale. Broader than regional government, with which it is sometimes confused, regional governance involves actions by formal units of government, such as municipalities, counties, states, and provinces, and by private entities (e.g., individuals, firms, business associations) and third-sector groups (e.g., nongovernmental organizations, civic groups, labor, faith-based associations). Often, this occurs through partnerships or associations with one another. As a focus of urban study, regional governance has garnered special attention during several eras of metropolitan change in the twentieth century and is currently a subject of active interest and commentary in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

Because *region* refers to a wide range of territories, the scale of regional governance varies. The label region may denote a small group of communities (e.g., East Bay towns), a city and its surrounding metropolitan area (the San Francisco metropolitan area), a subnational territory (the Pacific Coast region), or a multinational territory (the Pacific Rim). In the context of urban studies, regional governance usually refers to metropolitan-scale governance.

The need for regional governance originates in the mismatch between the scale of policy issues

and the scale of formal political units to address those issues. Many urban concerns—such as economic development, environmental protection, traffic, urban growth, public health, workforce training and mobility, the quantity and distribution of affordable housing, infrastructure development, public safety, spreading poverty, and social equity—transcend the borders of municipal government and create impacts ("externalities") that defy resolution by a single unit of government.

For example, protection of a region-scale environmental resource such as a watershed may occur through the organization and action of multiple groups, including local, state, provincial, and national governments; special-purpose water authorities or natural resources districts; nongovernmental interest groups such as a local parks conservancy or branch of an international environmental organization, such as the Sierra Club; and private interests, including individual property owners, land developers, a fishing club, or homeowners associations. Groups involved in regional governance may operate together through formal or informal agreements, or they may operate independently, sometimes in opposition to one another. Regional governance is also shaped by state and federal policies, rules, and incentives that direct or influence how regional actors operate. Also playing a role in regional governance are media, whose commentary on regional affairs shape popular understanding and influence action.

Evolution of Regional Governance

Approaches to regional governance and problem solving are as old as regions themselves. (The word region, derived from the Latin root *regere*, meaning to rule or guide, signifies an indefinite territory, such as that under the command of a regent or governor.) In the United States, because colonial and early local governments from the 1600s through the mid-1800s had relatively dispersed districts and limited powers, the dominant approach to addressing regional problems was laissez-faire individualism. Notwithstanding instances of regional structures to address regional problems—in 1790, for example, Philadelphia and its neighboring suburbs formed a joint board of prison inspectors and subsequently collaborated on other regional boards for health, help for the

poor, port wardens, and other services—for the most part, urban households acted independently or through private businesses or voluntary organizations to obtain needed metropolitan services, from police and fire protection to public welfare and recreation. Merchants, factory owners and, later, larger industrialists often laid out and built their own roads, in many instances after unsuccessful attempts to compel town and county governments to take the lead. The same was true for many railroad and canal companies, which received legal permission and modest subsidies from state and local governments to build but rarely garnered the significant public investment more recently associated with large-scale infrastructure improvements.

Forces of urbanization, industrialization, and immigration through the last half of the 1800s brought greater size, diversity, and complexity to the metropolis. In response to urban changes, local governments increased their size and more aggressively assumed control over the public safety, public health, infrastructure development, and urban service delivery functions that had previously been left to private or nonprofit actors. The home rule movement reinforced local governments as the primary locus of power in metropolitan areas. From the 1870s through early 1900s, anti-urban, rural-controlled state legislatures greatly restricted municipal annexation powers while simultaneously enacting permissive laws for municipal incorporation. Hundreds of small towns adjacent to or near cities incorporated to defend against unwanted annexation and to gain autonomy over local affairs.

Organizing and acting at the regional scale meant securing interlocal cooperation among autonomous local government units. One common response was for local governments to lobby state legislatures for the formation of regional special districts to which the localities ceded authority. Among the regional districts formed during this era were the Chicago Sanitary District, the Metropolitan (Boston) Transit District, Cleveland Metropolitan Parks District, the Baltimore County Metropolitan District, and the East Bay Municipal Utility District, serving more than 1.2 million people in the San Francisco Bay region.

Escalating industrialization and urbanization, coupled with major advances in transportation and communication from the late 1800s through

the 1920s, accelerated the decentralization of urban activity. As the metropolis spread across political border lines, so did the need for region wide attention to service delivery, employment, housing markets, transportation systems, and social relations. Emerging from these conditions were dozens of Progressive era campaigns—in St. Louis, Pittsburgh, and Cleveland, for example—to centralize metropolitan governance through city-county consolidations or metropolitan federations.

Driven by a coalition of downtown business interests, civic “good government” groups and academic research bureaus, the reform view of metropolitan governance held that the best way to respond to the economic, demographic, and service challenges of the metropolis was through a regional government. Centralized regional governance, advocates argued, would coordinate and standardize service delivery, achieve economies of scale, improve political accountability, attract economic growth, and avoid the pathologies of a politically fragmented governance system. Coalition members were also driven by hope that a metropolitan government would weaken powerful urban bosses and their ethnic bases; facilitate administrative reforms, such as civil service rules and city manager systems; and, particularly for downtown elites who lived in the suburbs but worked and held property in the city, protect their economic interests.

Most regional reform efforts of the Progressive Era failed at the polls. The achievement of regional governance required cooperation across independent local governments or action by special-purpose governments formed specifically to regionalize service delivery.

The Great Depression of the 1930s altered this landscape as local governments lost financial means and found themselves unable to deliver services. The federal government bailed out local government by taking on infrastructure projects and assuming control over major regional policy areas including housing and transportation. By stipulating that federal aid would go only to county- or region-level agencies or independent public authorities, the federal government motivated regional governance structures and processes. Through the middle of the century and continuing to the present, many state governments and courts likewise used financial or legal levers to

motivate region-scale governance, notably for environmental protection, land use, metropolitan planning, school desegregation, housing, and regional infrastructure, such as airports, transit systems, and sewer and water facilities.

Since the 1980s, in response to politically divisive and typically unsuccessful campaigns to create regional governance through local government consolidation, regional governance efforts have downplayed regional structural change in favor of formal and informal cooperation in regional decision making and action. For many regions the result has been cross-sector, cross-border, and cross-interest umbrella groups or alliances advocating for stronger regional governance for complex regional environmental, equity, and economic concerns. These alliances often include religious organizations, environmental associations, private business groups, labor unions, educators, foundations, academics, and nonprofit service delivery organizations as well as local or county governments. Through the 1990s and early 2000s in Chicago, for example, a network of organizations, including Chicago Metropolis 2020 (the implementing arm of the business-oriented Commercial Club), the nonprofit Metropolitan Planning Council, the Chicago Community Trust, the Campaign for Sensible Growth, the Leadership Council for Metropolitan Open Communities, the Metropolitan Alliance of Churches, the Gamaliel Foundation, and the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation altered the dialogue on regional coordination and brought reform to regional systems in transportation, planning, and land use. One manifestation of this approach to regional governance has been the emergence or strengthening of national organizations, such as the Alliance for Regional Stewardship, the Gamaliel Foundation, Redefining Progress, and Smart Growth America, which promote and support a networked approach to regional governance.

Modes of Regional Governance

The historical review reveals four basic modes of regional governance, which vary by the locus of power and the dominant approach to regional decision making and action. These are (1) a centralist mode, (2) a localist mode, (3) a market-driven mode, and (4) a networked mode. Although regions can be categorized according to their

predominant regional governance mode, aspects of each mode may be present in a single region simultaneously. The Akron, Ohio, metropolitan region, for example, may use centralized governance for transportation services, localized governance for provision of affordable housing, market-driven governance for health care, and networked governance for workforce training.

In the centralist mode of regional governance, a single or a few entities operating at the regional or higher scale hold primary decision-making authority over key regional functions. These entities include consolidated city-county governments or federations, strong counties, multipurpose regional governments, regional public authorities, and state bodies and typically set policy, raise revenues, allocate resources, and deliver or arrange for delivery of public services. In the United States, centralized regional governance is most common in states where municipal government is relatively weak, such as in Hawaii, Alaska, Delaware, and several southern states—Maryland, North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee—with strong counties. Examples of comprehensive centralized regional governance at the metropolitan scale are consolidated city-county governments in Honolulu, Anchorage, Indianapolis, Jacksonville, and Louisville; the two-tier federation of Metropolitan Dade County (Miami, Florida), in which the county and 27 municipal governments share power; and multifunction regional agencies in Portland (Oregon), Minneapolis–St. Paul, and Seattle.

In the localist mode of regional governance, municipal governments generally have strong home rule powers to control local affairs, with regional governance achieved through voluntary cooperation and service-sharing agreements. This model is common in New England states, with their strong traditions of town government and weak or non-existent counties (although state governments have important powers in the smaller states), as well as in the mid-Atlantic region of New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania and in Midwestern states such as Ohio, Wisconsin, and Illinois, which have strong cities and unincorporated larger surrounding townships. Although virtually every metropolitan region in these states has some elements of centralized regional governance, including regional planning councils or special-purpose governments, interlocal agreements across relatively strong local

governments are the rule. Metropolitan areas with localist modes of regional governance include Boston, Buffalo, New York City, Chicago, Pittsburgh, Cleveland, and St. Louis.

The market-driven mode of regional governance shares the local mode's antipathy to higher-level government control of regional affairs, but it also opposes powerful local governments as the primary locus of regional authority and action. In this mode, regional governance authority rests predominantly in the hands of the area's individual property owners, developers, farm interests, businesses, homeowners associations, and nongovernmental interest groups, whose aggregate decisions shape regional outcomes. Market-driven regional governance is most common in states with relatively permissive regulatory and land use planning controls, traditions of individualism, and strong private-property rights movements. These states include Arizona, Texas, Montana, Idaho, Louisiana, and Washington. Strong private-property rights movements have also emerged in a diverse range of states including New Hampshire, Georgia, Missouri, and California. Metropolitan regions characterized by market-driven governance include Phoenix, Houston, and Boise.

The newest of the governance modes, networked regional governance, likewise shuns reliance on government entities for regional decision making and action but replaces it with intentional cross-sector and cross-issue partnerships seeking to shape regional governance outcomes. In the networked governance approach, private, nonprofit, faith-based, and civic groups have a more substantive role and influence in, if not responsibility for, addressing regional challenges such as urban sprawl, city-suburban disparities, and workforce training. Regional processes enable or mandate input from nongovernmental groups and strong private-public-nonprofit relations typify regional advocacy campaigns and dialogue. Networked governance is most evident in metropolitan regions with strong civic and business capacity, such as Chicago, Los Angeles, San Jose, and Charlotte.

Unresolved Debate

An unresolved debate in the urban literature and practice is whether or how one or another mode may be more effective in achieving service delivery

efficiency, environmental sustainability, regional economic growth, equity, political accountability, and civic engagement. Early empirical work linking the number of local governments in a region to regional outcomes has given way to comparative case study analyses focused on the role of regional actors (e.g., federal, state, and local governments; business leaders; nonprofit and civic groups; labor; landowners), policies (e.g., taxation, housing, land use, transportation, workforce development, immigration, government structure), and culture (e.g., strength of regional identity, attitudes toward governance and private property, norms of political participation, fiscal habits). In short, current knowledge embraces alternative pathways to effective regional governance. Places with different demographics, industrial histories, political cultures, and asset bases are expected to develop different modes of regional governance.

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See also Annexation; Growth Management; Metropolitan Governance; Metropolitan Region; Regional Planning; Urban Planning; Urban Politics

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REGIONAL PLANNING

Regional planning is a type of land use planning aimed at achieving a balance between issues of

economic growth, social well-being, and the environment within a region. It is often linked with a regional authority, be it a formal regional government or a coalition of local governments or other stakeholders. Regional planning may involve efforts to guide urban growth. It may also stand for efforts to improve infrastructural links or to establish international competitiveness for a large city region. In fact, there are many different kinds of regional planning. This entry will set out to explain this variety through a discussion of three important sources of inspiration for regional planning: (1) the regional and garden city, (2) regional science and economic geography, and (3) new regionalism and metropolitan governance.

Regional planning can be defined simply as planning for a region. John Glasson has offered a more substantive definition, arguing that regional planning is a response to contemporary regional issues such as metropolitan growth, rural/industrial decline or underdevelopment, and regional imbalance. Yet other definitions emphasize the intermediate level of scale at which regional planning usually operates. Regional planning, then, implies the planning of the region surrounding a city or of a large natural region (for example, a river basin), thereby crossing the boundaries of local authorities. Regional planning may also be defined as a kind of policy making trying to integrate different issues at the same time: the integrated management of the economic, social, and physical resources of a spatially bounded area.

But if regional planning takes place within regions, or is meant to serve regions, what does the word *region* imply? In general terms, region is a flexible term, referring to an area intermediate between national and local levels of scale. It is often used to refer to a piece of land that is uniform, homogeneous, or functionally coherent in some way (based on natural, physical, economic, social, or political criteria). It can also be defined, in a formal way, as a layer of government administration directly below the nation-state. The discussion below will show how three key sources of inspiration, or traditions, accentuate these definitions in their own, unique way.

The Regional and Garden City

At the historic basis of regional planning is an approach known internationally as the Garden

City approach, established by Ebenezer Howard. In line with the Garden City approach, as Peter Hall describes so well in his book titled *Cities of Tomorrow*, regional planning stood for the need and possibility to establish an alternative society, relying on self-governed communities outside of larger cities. A basic idea was that new conurbations (city groups) of about 100,000 inhabitants needed to be created. The rebuilding of Chicago after a major fire in 1871 was an important source of inspiration. Chicago was rebuilt for low population densities, good housing, wide roads, underground rail connections, and sufficient open space.

Another influential set of ideas for regional planning was developed by Patrick Geddes, who worked in Edinburgh, Scotland, about 1900. In his work, regional planning moved beyond the Garden City notion. The answer to congestion of the giant city, he asserted, was a vast program of regional planning. Cities were considered subordinate to the region, part of a wider regional strategy. Patrick Geddes used the term *Social City* to emphasize a future of polycentric urban regions. Another important thought was more environmental of nature: Every region was to be developed on the basis of its own natural resources and with respect for the ecological balance and renewal of resources.

With the ideas offered by Howard and Geddes and others, regional planning became a field of policy making in the course of the twentieth century. Some of their ideas were adopted internationally, for example, in the Amsterdam *Algemeen Uitbreidingsplan* from 1934. Patrick Geddes's thoughts were interpreted in the United States by the Regional Planning Association of America (RPAA). During the 1920s, Lewis Mumford was a key figure here.

For American regional planning, Mumford emphasized pragmatic, metropolitan improvements to solve urban congestion, inefficiencies, and loss of the competitive edge for cities such as New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Boston. Like Geddes, the RPAA was interested in a cluster approach to planning. Regional planning in the United States at that time had a stress on issues related to transport and suburbanization. Expansions of metropolitan areas were preceded by the elaboration of the transport system. A central aim was

to find a rational distribution of population and economic growth in each region. David Johnson has made clear that some of these beliefs were taken by Franklin Roosevelt's New Deal, including the Tennessee Valley Authority, which included concepts of integrated resource development and regional planning. Another famous example for American regional planning is the 1929 Regional Plan of New York and Environs.

A further prominent example is Greater London. The Greater London Regional Planning Committee presented a regional plan in 1929 suggesting, among other things, open-space planning, and a "green girdle" around London for sports and recreation. The emphasis on green returned in later plans for the London region. Patrick Abercrombie was the influential planner here, introducing a green-belt ring (mainly meant for recreational use) and an outer-country ring (mostly agriculture).

A final, but highly important set of examples emerge from German regional planning, which began in the early twentieth century, when larger city growth (particularly Berlin) and the emergence of larger industrial regions (like the Ruhr area) had to be coordinated. Some of the first planning initiatives included the establishment of the so-called Greater Berlin collaboration (*Zweckverband Groß-Berlin*) in 1911, which was aimed at preparing highways and tram and railway infrastructure. For the Ruhr area, an effort was made to identify regional problems like natural protection, disordered settlements, and conflicts between residential and industrial land uses. A special organization was set up, the *Siedlungsverband Ruhrkohlenbezirk*, in 1920.

Regional Science and Economic Geography

In the period after World War II, regional planning became less a matter of regional urban form and environmental concerns. Instead, more prominence was given to regional economic geography. Authors like John Friedmann, William Alonso, and Walter Isard discussed economic issues related to regional development. Issues like the location of industry were central to Alfred Weber's least cost approach. Notions on the spatial structure of regions were given by Walter Christaller in his central-place theory. Another characteristic approach was the locational rent notion by Johann Heinrich

von Thünen. The central idea was that the cultivation of certain crops depends on their distances from the city and that this could be calculated through assessments of the cost of the land and transport costs. These approaches have been criticized for their economic modeling and assumptions such as singular linkages between a city and its agricultural area or that the cost of transport would be directly proportional to distance.

Regional planning efforts based on early regional science involved studying causalities between physical, social, and economic variables in a regional context. The emphasis relied strongly on quantitative methods. It also often implied primarily a governmental activity aimed at the scientific production and review of a regional plan, applying regional development theories. France has a particularly rich history in a regional economics approach to planning, principally in the 1960s.

At a more recent date, the emphasis on economic issues in regional planning continues to be important. People like David Harvey and Manuel Castells have sought to add the importance of social networks and patterns of power in regional economic development. Regional planning clearly includes social and political realities as well. For example, the control of urban sprawl and mobility is impossible without social awareness and some form of regional political consensus about its necessity. It implies regional coordination involving multiple authorities and relevant stakeholders.

New Regionalism and Metropolitan Governance

These remarks bring us to a more recent view on regional planning, bringing issues of new regionalism and metropolitan governance to the fore. In essence, new regionalism claims that the regional level is crucial for economic development and that the region should be the prime focus of economic policy. The idea is that nation-states are inappropriate for economic policy as they are too small to deal with capitalism in a global system and too large to respond effectively to local changes. Authors like Michael Keating have shown that, as a consequence, the nation-state has been forced to devolve its powers to regional bodies.

There are also some functional reasons why the region has become central. The territorial range of

the labor market, the housing market, and the mobility market has increased to a regional level. Increasing mobility and telecommunication have led to notions about the network city or the regional urban network. The idea is that urban form has transformed into a complex variety of regional urban constellations, such as Thomas Sievert's *Zwischenstadt* (areas that are neither city nor countryside). As a result, formal and informal cooperative arrangements have been established between municipalities, between regional governments, and between local and regional governments, and in coalitions of private and public-private networks.

Regional planning then becomes a governance activity, where planning involves the coordination of social networks and public-private partnerships at the regional level. Authors such as Ash Amin, Nigel Thrift, and Michael Storper have introduced terms like *institutional capacity* and *institutional thickness* to indicate whether networks of interpersonal relations, trust, and cooperation are strong and well developed. The assumption is that if a region is equipped with institutional capacity and institutional thickness, it would be more effective in developing innovative policies and responding to international competition.

This discussion on new regionalism is related to an approach called strategic spatial planning. Louis Albrechts and Patsy Healey have established some important insights for strategic planning or strategy making at the regional scale. It is an approach aimed at creating an integrative view on planning issues and providing regions with institutional capacity. This emphasis includes notions on trying to advance the various levels of government to work together and in partnerships with actors in diverse positions in the economy and civil society. A more strategic approach highlights the importance of the active development of projects by means of a comprehensive regional plan and views the regional plan as a stimulator for ideas and private investment.

Clearly, the urban region, or the metropolitan level, is increasingly seen as the regional scale at which the important planning challenges occur. Metropolitan planning has been in the interests of many Western cities, particularly during the 1990s. The Paris Master Plan from 1994, for example, presents Paris as *une région polycentrique*. A growth-reducing strategy is combined with an

enlargement of the metropolitan area to include all cities accessible from Paris within an hour train ride in a so-called Paris basin.

As another example, the New York Regional Plan Association presented its third regional plan, focusing on improving the international competitive position of the region. Another great example of new metropolitan planning is the so-called *deltametropolis*, an intensely urbanized area situated in the western part of the Netherlands. This initiative has brought together cities such as Amsterdam, Rotterdam, The Hague, and Utrecht in one sphere of influence, developing a common perspective on external competition. For regional planning initiatives like these, globalization trends play a central role. International competition is a day-to-day reality for many regional planners.

Another set of key points are international environmental pressures and changes through climate change and following developments such as the importance of reducing carbon emissions and anticipating urban floods. Sustainability has also become a key interest point for regional planning. Nature and habitat protection, wetlands, and cultural heritage qualities are all of great importance.

Conclusion

This entry has pointed to some basic descriptions of regional planning and its three main sources of inspiration (i.e., the regional and garden city, regional science and economic geography, and new regionalism and metropolitan governance). It has become clear that the focus in regional planning has shifted over time. Some earlier types of regional planning have emphasized functional problems such as population growth, urbanization, mobility, or congestion. This approach is usually oriented on planning issues within a region but at a higher level than the city. It is mainly a land use- or spatial planning-oriented approach. An economic approach to regional planning leans more toward issues of inequality in regional development and the interregional allocation of growth. More recent regional planning efforts focus on the international competition of urban regions and recognize the sociopolitical realities of planning.

It should also be clear that all three approaches toward regional planning have had their fair share

of criticism over the years. There are some common strands of critique we can distinguish between here. One disagreement has been whether regional planning efforts should mainly emphasize regulations aimed at protection and setting restrictions (toward the environment, open space, natural resources, etc.) or whether it should be directed toward stimulating new development and growth (for example, through lists of projects or incentive zones). Another critique has been about the comprehensive nature of regional planning. Regional planning efforts typically feature long-term views about a variety of policy issues and for larger (supra local) areas, thereby making links with actual implementation problematic.

A more important conclusion, however, is that, in the light of these critiques, the three traditions are essentially concurrent. Regional planning practice worldwide will display different blends of all. Current regional planning, for instance, still links to certain thoughts set out in the early twentieth century. Some ideas on urban containment are popular again in discussions on growth management in the United States and on the compact city in European spatial planning. Issues similar to Patrick Geddes's Social City can be recognized in recent notions such as new urbanism, which has emphasized the need for livable and sustainable communities. Also, levels of scale are shifting. Policy efforts by international regimes such as the European Union, the North American Free Trade Agreement, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are, essentially, regional planning, emphasizing the larger regional level of scale and trying to promote and develop interregional cooperation and cultural, economic, and social partnerships between regions.

Johan Woltjer

See also City Planning; Edge City; Geddes, Patrick; Growth Management; Growth Poles; Hall, Peter; Metropolitan Governance; Metropolitan Region; Mumford, Lewis; New Regionalism; New Urbanism; Sprawl; Sustainable Development; Urban Planning

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RENAISSANCE CITY

In panoramic praise of his native city, Coluccio Salutati, the Florentine humanist chancellor, asked the rhetorical question: "What city, not merely in Italy, but in all the world, is more securely placed within its circle of walls, more proud in its palazzi, more bedecked with churches, more beautiful in its architecture, more imposing in its gates, richer in piazzas, happier in its wide streets, greater in its people, more glorious in its citizenry, more inexhaustible in wealth, more fertile in its fields?"

For fourteenth- through sixteenth-century humanists, the Renaissance city was more than simply a classical revival of Greek and Roman architectural styles, cast in the new one-point perspective space; it was an embodiment of civic virtues, ideals of public life, of good government, a “refoundation” of city life itself. Modern economic historians recognized that the Renaissance city of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries was based on the commercial revolution (i.e., revival of trade, cities, merchant-class values) in Europe and the Mediterranean world from the tenth and eleventh centuries. The crisis of the fourteenth century began with bank failures during the Hundred Years’ War between England and France in the 1330s, followed by the devastating Black Death (bubonic plague), which swept through Europe during the summer of 1348, almost halving its population. What once brought wealth and splendor along the caravan silk and maritime spice routes from China, Malaysia, and India, the source of Eurasian luxury trade and urban revival, now brought pandemic apocalypse from Asia, arriving in the West on trading Genoese galleons from the Black Sea, described in the macabre opening pages of Boccaccio’s *Decamerone* of Florentine pestilence and suburban retreat to redemptive paradisaic cloister garden for pious and lustful storytelling.

Renaissance World System

Salutati’s humanist tribute to Florence of 1403 was as much about the Renaissance city as a revival of the late medieval city as the ancient city, part of a much larger global development. What Pirenne and Braudel called the Roman Mediterranean lake (*mare nostrum*, a sea of cultural interchange rather than barrier or border), more recent economic historians have envisioned as part of a global history of cultural interchange between Asia and the Mediterranean world, with Islamic trade and science as crucial intermediaries in this worldwide transformation. The Renaissance city of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries played a crucial role in a worldwide network of imperial trading cities and cultural–economic–political–religious interchange.

The Renaissance city began the modern world in global relations, an epic urban plotting of mathematical grid on geographical natural space, a

nascent panoptic global space. The Renaissance Age of Discovery began our modern global society, and the Renaissance city was pivotal to this cultural urban redefinition of space and time. In Italy, the classic touchstone for this Renaissance (i.e., early modern) redefinition of space in the European tradition, there were feudal courts and commercial republics, following Aristotle’s (*Politics*, Bk. 3) classic distinction between monarchy, oligarchy, and *demos* (rule of the people). Duke Federico da Montefeltro and Duchess Battista Sforza ruled Urbino, “jewel of Renaissance courts,” from their medieval to Renaissance church and palace complex on the hill.

Dynastic portraits by Flemish court artist Joos van Gent and Italian artist–perspective theorist Piero della Francesca celebrated the duke and duchess as Roman imperial (emblematic) profile portraits, remote, facing each other, in front of a panoramic framed window view landscape or within courtly artistic–scientific “cabinets of wonder,” *exempla* of virtue and triumph over world. The Palazzo Ducale represented the two interpenetrating faces, public and private, of the Renaissance prince, celebrated by Vespasiano da Bisticci’s *Life of Duke Federico da Montefeltro* (1480s) through Machiavelli’s *The Prince* of 1513 and Castiglione’s *The Courtier* of 1528, a humanist portrait dialogue on princely virtues and courtly manners, governed embodiments in the politics of appearance, set in Urbino of the early sixteenth century—theater for European early modern. Prince, palace, city, and landscape became one and the same, while projected urban views balanced classical and Christian monuments and civic virtues in ideal one-point perspective space, imagined utopian Renaissance city types. The Renaissance made the state a work of art, a prelude to the early modern state; and the Renaissance city imagined this art of governing.

In Renaissance Florence, the city became a work of art through humanist description and visual representation. The Florentine goldsmith, sculptor, and architect, Filippo Brunelleschi, painted two demonstration panels about 1419, setting out the new one-point perspective system of spatial representation and panoptic control over and within the medieval city, with a central vanishing point, receding orthogonal, and transversal lines of spatial diminution and proportional

mathematical beauty, based on the human eye and classical body measure within an ideal rational grid space. Taking the imagined linear geometry of light, eye, and optics as primary, Brunelleschi represented (and redefined) the two foundational monuments and spaces of medieval Florence—the eleventh-century Romanesque Baptistery of Florence and the late-thirteenth-to-fourteenth-century Piazza Signoria, Christian religious and political centers—that framed the ancient grid center while projecting a new paradigm of Renaissance to early modern civic space. This was a Renaissance refoundation of classical city, ancient urban life, ideal “new town” optical grid space—a refoundation of *Florentia* (city of flowers, Venus-Flora), based on the humanist eye and moral civic character. It took a humanist to imagine, but an artist to see and to make, the “Renaissance city.”

From the portal of the Duomo of Santa Maria del Fiore (Virgin Mary of the Flower), across the Paradiso, the traditional (eschatological) space between Baptistery and Cathedral, Brunelleschi refigured the Baptistery in Renaissance one-point perspective, setting the classical domed polychrome marble building block (Christianrecreation of the Pantheon in Rome) in a centralized grid space, a civic theater, seen from a single focal point on a two-dimensional, illusionistic salvational plane. The ancient Roman grid of three dimensions became the Renaissance one-point (not converging, but focal) perspective, framed window view of two dimensions. This was fundamentally different from earlier transcendent unitary to multiple human viewpoint medieval civic views, such as Ambrogio Lorenzetti’s “Allegory of Good Government,” seen from the perspective (according to Jack Greenstein) of the central reclining

classical allegorical figure of Peace (*Pax*) on the end dais wall of Aristotelian Justice in the Council Chamber of the Nine (thus Sala della Pace) in the Palazzo Pubblico of Siena (1338) or a dense medieval bird’s-eye view of the Florentine Baptistery in a fresco fragment from the Loggia del Bigallo of 1342. This was a singular view from a human vantage point, an altogether different kind of representation.



The Duomo Santa Maria del Fiore in Florence. The dome was created by Brunelleschi and built in the early fifteenth century.

Source: Sarah Quesenberry.

Brunelleschi and Ghiberti

Seen from outside, in framed classical window view, Brunelleschi's (now lost) panel was soon answered in humanist dialogue from across the Paradiso of Baptistery to Cathedral space by his chief competitor in the Baptistery doors' competition of 1401, Florentine goldsmith Lorenzo Ghiberti. A sculptor of the Calimala (all-powerful wool refiners) guild, Ghiberti created an epic refoundational "Gates of Paradise," in which the central (horizon line) gilded pictorial bronze reliefs of Jacob and Esau and Joseph imagine a "golden age" biblical Renaissance. The one-point perspective of the classical arcaded communal urban space is in apparent response to Brunelleschi's panel of 1419. The last Old Testament Genesis panel in the lower right of Ghiberti's cycle represents "Queen Sheba and King Solomon" in Gothic space, a conjunctive replica of Arnolfo di Cambio's interior of the Cathedral of Florence, making Florence not only a new Athens and Rome but a new Temple of Jerusalem. Baptistery and cathedral, Brunelleschi and Ghiberti, united in medieval to Renaissance perspective, visual conceptions of the Renaissance city, while complementary classical *clipeata* (roundel) portraits honor the two Renaissance founders on paradisaal gates and within the cathedral doors, on the right, a new Architectus and Daedalus (artisan to artistic inventor).

Brunelleschi went on to win the cathedral dome competition, the same year (1419), applying this Renaissance (internal) self-supporting perspective grid matrix and Roman herringbone brickwork to medieval Gothic-ribbed dome-ascendant structural profile to complete Arnolfo di Cambio's and Francesco Talenti's cathedral project of 1298 to 1448, capped by a sculptural Ionic temple lantern belvedere, illuminating and overseeing this new Periclean Athens like a lighthouse, a culmination of the medieval to Renaissance city "dome of heaven" spanning civic space, not achieved in Italy since Rome's imperial Pantheon, casting (as Alberti said in tribute) "a shadow across all of Tuscany."

Brunelleschi recast the medieval to Renaissance city in that shadow, creating the classical refined arcaded modular Hospital of the Innocents (1419) and a piazza to the northeast on visual axis with the cathedral dome on Via dei Servi, "refounding" the Roman classical grid city of *Florentia* (now the

city of fertility, identified with Florence as city of the Lily of Blessed Virgin Mary and Her Purity). The Cathedral of Santa Maria del Fiore was united with the Annunziata, urbanistically and visually, sacred origin to fulfillment in incarnational time, the Florentine year beginning March 25, feast day of the Annunciation. The Renaissance city was a "work of art" based on classical and medieval foundations—from Roman military orthogonal, to expansive medieval diagonal trading radial, to Renaissance one-point perspective orthogonal refoundation, framed window-view optical projection—a city lived in to one viewed.

Brunelleschi's Medici church of San Lorenzo realized this Renaissance one-point perspective interior civic space in converging *pietra serena* (grey stone) lines on a central Medici high altar (choir and flanking dynastic sacristies) with modular classical arcades, proportional elevation, and an outlined grid plan with surrounding associated individual family neighborhood chapels. The result was a Renaissance rational corporate religious space that, as contemporary Florentine humanist chancellor Matteo Palmieri said in his *Vita Civile* (1430s), made "Christian mysteries as clear as mathematical theorems." Brunelleschi's collaboration with Florentine artist Masaccio on the "Trinity Fresco" (1426) in Santa Maria Novella, demonstrated the Renaissance civic space in painting, elevating the Florentine donor Lenzi family (shown as *Gonfaloniere*, red-cloaked civic standard bearer of the Council of Nine Priors of the Republic and blue-cloaked religious gendered protectors) to monumental status at the entrance to a fictive Renaissance Calvary Chapel, a Renaissance replica (*translatio*) of the Holy Sepulcher (from skeletal remains and memento mori address to ascension) in Jerusalem. The Renaissance city remade the holy in its own image—now viewed (and understood) from an artificial single perspective—from God's eye to human eye (or "I").

Brunelleschi's disciple Michelozzo built the fortified rustic block of the Medici Palace, in civic imitation and reform of the towering Palazzo Signoria, framing the center of Florence on the Via Larga with a processional façade of classical temple proportions and details outside and refined courtyard within, demonstrating the public and private faces of the leading family in the Renaissance city. This was (as Machiavelli would

put it) “a state within the state,” where visiting dignitaries would pay homage on their way to the communal center. The humanist architect-theorist Alberti designed a Vitruvian pilaster facade, modeled on the Colosseum in Rome, which consolidated the irregular building fabric of the Palace of Giovanni Rucellai, merchant family relative of the Medici by marriage, with displayed heraldic interwoven decoration opposite a triumphal classical family triple loggia. The Renaissance city was filled with such civic and familial scenography.

Outside Florence, a ring of Renaissance villas re-created ancient Roman villas in Brunelleschian refined block form with perspective control over nature in grid space. The Renaissance city commanded both urban and natural views, the life of *negotium* (i.e., negotiation, politics) and *otium* (contemplative ease). Brunelleschi's diagonal view of the Piazza Signoria, his second refoundational perspective panel of 1419, became Giorgio Vasari's frontal perspective street and piazza of the Uffizi in the 1570s, a grand ducal panoptic consolidation and subordination of the guilds under triumphal centralized state control on the Arno. A private *corrodoio* from Palazzo Signoria, the grand ducal residence after 1548, to Palazzo Pitti and Boboli Gardens made the separation and transformation of medieval commune and merchant-class city to grand ducal capital complete. With the royal palace and suburban villa becoming interconnected classical theaters for the early modern city of ceremonial display and spectacle.

From Florence to Venice, Genoa, Milan, Naples, and Rome—from the Renaissance courts to republics—the Renaissance city gave refoundation to the classical and medieval city, to city life in the new perspective and urban theater. Rome's expansive radial triads of scenic classical domes, palace facades, and axial streets with terminal trophy obelisks (symbolic rays of light) at the vanishing points would inspire Andrea Palladio's Teatro Olimpico in Vicenza. The pilgrimage relic city of medieval and Renaissance Rome would gradually become the grand tour cultural-pilgrimage city of sights in the baroque and modern. Rome's axial Renaissance papal city of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries would explode the confines of Renaissance perspective space to the infinite expanse of the baroque and modern. From Rome

to Louis XIV's radiant Versailles to Baron von Haussmann's open tree-lined boulevards of Paris, City of Pleasure and of Light; from Islamic intimate paradisaal axial water gardens and courtyards of the Alhambra and Generalife to the expansive Mughal Taj Mahal dynastic tomb and British colonial New Delhi, and Pierre-Charles L'Enfant's federal Washington, D.C., plan, the Renaissance city gave rise to a new monumental classical city and global perspective space, central to the modern and postmodern.

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See also Architecture; Florence, Italy; Urban Planning; Venice, Italy

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RENT CONTROL

Rent control is a general term for the regulation of the rents charged by owners of residential property. Imposed mostly during times of war or rapid inflation, rent controls are intended to protect tenants from steep increases in housing costs. In addition, rent controls can also cover other rights of tenure, such as protections against arbitrary eviction.

A *bête noir* in economics, rent control is criticized on many counts. It is alleged to distort the normal functioning of the private housing market by creating perverse incentives for landlords and tenants. Because it restricts the amount of rent that landlords may charge, rent control might reduce the incentive to invest in residential property, thereby leading to inadequate maintenance and consequent physical deterioration. Similarly, rent control might inhibit development of new rental housing. Because rent control gives tenants financial incentive to stay in place, it discourages families from moving to more suitable housing in line with changes in household size and circumstances. This reduces the fluidity of the housing market. Rent control can also promote a black market in illegal sublets. Moreover, the existence of rent control generates inequities by favoring residents in rent-regulated housing over other renters, especially younger and minority households.

Rent control is far less monolithic than one would presume from the critiques leveled against it. While the earliest forms of rent control imposed during World War II were quite stringent, most were repealed or liberalized by the 1950s. Subsequent rent control laws are far more moderate. They allow for higher rent increases as well as for decontrol, in which specific apartments are no longer regulated and additional rent increases are permitted when units are vacated. Many of these regulations exempt new construction and small or owner-occupied buildings. They also often allow landlords to amortize capital improvements through additional rent increases. As a result of these variations, it is very difficult to provide statistical support for the negative effects commonly associated with rent control.

A 2007 study of rent regulation in the state of New Jersey, which compared rent increases in the 76 rent-regulated municipalities with populations

over 10,000 with those in 85 nonregulated cities of similar population found no significant difference in rents or in the amount of new rental housing development. At most, moderate rent control seems to dampen sudden increases in rent, but over the long term, it does not make rents substantially lower than what would otherwise be charged.

Debates over rent control's efficacy, equity, and efficiency are becoming increasingly moot in the United States. The number of localities with rent control has diminished over time. Where rent control remains in effect, the number of housing units subject to rent regulation is declining. At present, the great majority of rent-regulated housing units, more than 1 million in total, are located in New York City, which has had rent regulation since 1943. About 100 of New Jersey's 566 municipalities have some form of rent control, and rent control remains in place in a handful of California jurisdictions. In the 1990s, Massachusetts passed a voter referendum abolishing rent regulation in the three cities where it was in effect, and California passed a law mandating decontrol when a vacancy occurs. The New York State legislature introduced luxury decontrol—decontrol when apartments reach a certain rent level—in the mid-1990s, which along with other factors, caused New York City to experience a net loss of nearly 100,000 rent-regulated units from 1994 to 2005.

Alex Schwartz

See also Affordable Housing; Housing Policy; Rent Theory; Social Housing; Urban Economics

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RENT THEORY

Land rent refers to the payment of a tribute to a landowner. As an institution or social relation, it regulates the use of land. Because the total sum of capitalized future rent payments constitutes the land price, land rent has an impact on the distribution of income between different classes or groups in society. In classical political economy, it was a crucial concept for understanding the relative income of landlords, capitalists, and workers. In current debates, land rent is used to explain the location of productive activities as well as the spatial segregation of different social groups within the urban and regional context. In general, land rent is crucial to the explanation of spatial development and its articulation with economic and social processes.

Classical Political Economy

The main concern of the classical economists was to understand the overall dynamics of economic accumulation and growth and to explain the distribution of income among different social classes. Adam Smith, David Ricardo, and Karl Marx lived in a social environment that was heavily dominated by the weight of agricultural production in the economy and, hence, by the relatively important social power of landlords. One of the main questions was how landlords were affected by economic growth and whether their existence was a barrier to a dynamic accumulation of capital. Smith represents, by and large, a rather harmonistic perspective regarding the interests of landlords and capitalists. Both are supposed to benefit from economic growth, capitalists in the form of increasing profits and landlords in the form of higher rents.

Taking a different tack, Ricardo focused primarily on differential rent. This brought him to a rather pessimistic perspective on the role of land rent and to an antagonistic view with regard to the relationship between landlords and industrial capitalists. The concept of differential rent is based on the idea that the source of rent is different qualities of land, such as the type of soil and the distance to market. Better-quality land should yield a higher rent. The price of goods produced is determined by the conditions of production on the worst land, that

is, land that yields no differential rent. Ricardo argued that a further expansion of capitalism would lead to the inclusion of land of inferior quality, thereby increasing differential rent and reducing the profits of the capitalist, who has to pay higher wages to workers to allow for their reproduction. He assumed that wages are determined by a subsistence level, which in a simplified case consists of a certain amount of wheat. If additional land of inferior quality is used for production, productivity falls. This lower productivity means that the costs of production of the amount of wheat necessary for a worker's subsistence increases, and therefore, capitalists have to pay higher wages. At the same time, differential rent for all other landowners is increasing. Decreasing profits ultimately reduce investment and cause economic stagnation and crisis.

Using differential rent, Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels further developed the concepts of monopoly rent and absolute rent, which were also included in a rudimentary way in the work of Smith. Their concepts were based on the idea that rent is nothing natural but a historically developed institution or social relation. They also defined land as a fictitious commodity that is not produced within the capitalist system of production. Rather, private property rights are assigned to nature in order to make land a commodity.

Heinrich von Thünen and New Urban Economics

Heinrich von Thünen, a forerunner of neoclassical reasoning, developed his model of the isolated state in 1826. It was based on differential rent, which was further developed into a model of marginal productivity. The model explains rents in terms of transport costs to a city center and the specific production conditions for goods. In fact, the rent mechanism determines the type of agricultural goods produced at different distances from the center. In von Thünen's theoretical perspective, land rent is based not on social institutions but on the conditions of production and transport costs. Neoclassical theory may be understood as the application of differential rent in the form of marginal thinking and, hence, the application of scarcity to all types of economic resources.

Nevertheless, in the 1960s, the Cambridge Controversy in Capital put neoclassical theory and

its understanding of capital into question. In the debate, Pierro Sraffa from Cambridge in the United Kingdom and other critics argued that neoclassical marginal theory was unable to explain the distribution of income and, hence, the distribution of profits between rents and wages, without already assuming a given distribution of wealth. This means that profits are not determined by marginal productivity but rather that the social conditions of production determine the rate of profit. Hence, a rent theory based on a neoclassical understanding of capital is problematic.

Despite these theoretical problems, in 1964, William Alonso combined land rent theory with a neoclassical framework and applied it to the urban case. He was inspired by von Thünen's work in which the costs of transportation determined rents. Alonso linked this idea to the neoclassical assumption of individuals engaged in maximizing their utilities. Based on this, he posed the bid-rent function as that amount of money a household pays for rent at different locations. In general, land rent is supposed to lead to an optimal allocation of different types of usage to urban spaces. Therefore, political interventions in the form of zoning or rent control are opposed.

The Alonso model has been refined by relaxing some assumptions and including transaction costs and externalities. This leads to different policy conclusions and opens a space for active intervention in the control of rental contracts. Notwithstanding, the societal fundamentals of the land rent mechanism are not in question; the theory is based on a neoclassical understanding of capital, and the income distribution is based on marginal productivity. Therefore, the explanation of the absolute level of land rent—that is, the income of landlords—and the role of institutions that shape land rent are problematic. In addition, the rigidity of formal models, deriving all spatial phenomena from the marginal utility of maximizing individuals, is frequently critiqued.

Political Economy Perspective Today

Land rent theory in the political economy tradition differs substantially from neoclassical approaches. Since the 1970s, an upswing in critical political economy has taken place and, within this context, land rent theory has been developed further. Based

on Pierro Sraffa's systematization of David Ricardo's classical economics, land rent is understood as intensive and extensive differential rent. Intensive differential rent is caused by a more intensive use of a plot of land. That means that a higher amount of capital per unit of land is used. For the urban case, the introduction of multistory buildings represents a typical example of a more intensive use that leads to an increase in intensive differential rent. Allen J. Scott applies extensive and intensive rent to the urban context and shows, in contrast to Alonso, that it is not marginal utility but land rent and transport costs that determine the use of land.

In addition to this neo-Ricardian line of theoretical development, work in a more general political economy perspective based on Marx and Engels has developed. This broadened the field of study. Land rent and its urban function were considered not only within a given social and economic structure but also as contributing to the formation of social structures. Attention was given to the role of agricultural rent; that is, rent for resources. Based on the concept of absolute rent—a category related to the value theory of labor—considerable attention was given to the organic composition of capital, and hence, the concrete conditions of production as well as the struggle over surplus value between landowners and capitalists. The challenge was to apply concepts such as differential rent, monopoly rent, and absolute rent, which were originally developed for the analysis of agricultural questions, to the urban context. Whereas absolute rent and differential rent are directly linked to the process of production, monopoly rent is usually assumed to be dependent on the purchasing power of households. The higher capacity to pay for socially more privileged space results in higher monopoly rents at those places favored by higher-income groups.

The main emphasis of the work in a political economy tradition has been on the causes of rent and its relationship with the capitalist production. Besides the work of David Harvey, innovative contributions were made among others by Alain Lipietz and Christian Topalov in France. One key argument put forward by Harvey was that land was increasingly becoming a financial asset. Hence, a merger between landlords and capitalists was supposed to abolish the specific behavior of the landed class. Land rent was not considered an

obstacle to the accumulation of capital but was supposed to fulfill a coordination function.

In other works, emphasis was put on the active role of landlords. Nevertheless, different authors often used the same terms in a very different and even contradictory way. Since the 1980s, Anne Haila has proposed distinguishing broadly between two lines of thought in land rent theory: an ideographic and a nomothetic tradition. The ideographic tradition is characterized by its opposition to the development of general laws and emphasizes the singularity of historical situations. The notion of rent is limited to the act of payment and, hence, to the circulation of revenues. Based on this, no universal theory of rent exists. The nomothetic tradition focuses on the search for universal laws. While Haila suggested a further development toward the nomothetic tradition, Johannes Jäger criticized this and proposed going beyond the separation of the nomothetic and the ideographic tradition. He conceptualized land rent within regulation theory and thereby established a link between the capitalist process of accumulation, its regulation and the specific institutional embedding of rent. By distinguishing different types of rent, urban spatial phenomena, such as segregation and the location of industry as well as spatial impacts of speculative land development, can be analyzed against the background of both capitalist accumulation and social struggles concerning surplus, wages, and urban space.

Johannes Jäger

See also Alonso, William; Harvey, David; Location Theory; Real Estate; Urban Economics

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RESORT

A resort is an urban space that provides accommodation, natural and built attractions, and other services and that is used by international and domestic visitors and local residents for the purposes of tourism and leisure. Resorts are complex, multifunctional urban environments that differ greatly in terms of their location, purpose, size, development, morphology, and economic performance.

A resort is perhaps most often associated with the coast, the beach being the main attraction, and within the United Kingdom, this led to the term "bucket and spade" seaside tourism. Initially, such resorts developed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and catered to a wealthy clientele seeking to take advantage of the health benefits of drinking seawater and sea bathing. Early resorts to develop include Exmouth, Torquay, Teignmouth, and Budleigh Salterton (southwest England); Bournemouth and Brighton (southern England); Scarborough (northeast England); and Margate (southeast England). The continued expansion of seaside resorts throughout the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was facilitated by improvements in road and water communications, but it was the advent of the railway during the 1830s and 1840s that provided the direct stimulus to U.K. resorts.

In particular, through increased accessibility and the creation of a new day-visitor market among low-income groups, the railway stimulated the development of resorts adjacent to the industrial cities of Lancashire (northwest England), such as Southport, Blackpool, and Morecambe; near Birmingham, and Bristol, such as Weston-Super-Mare; and within other resorts near London, for example, Folkestone and Hastings. Such a dependency of these often peripheral destinations still exists today, most notably evidenced by the continuation of Wakes Week, a tradition originating from the Industrial Revolution. This involves the closure of factories for one week across Scotland, northern England, and Wales, providing workers with the opportunity for an annual summer break; many of them still opt to spend this time by the seaside.



Whistler, British Columbia, is a winter resort town catering to skiers, snowboarders, and cross-country skiers. It is also host to some of the 2010 Winter Olympic events.

Source: Blake Buyan.

The growth of the resort during the Victorian era, however, was not limited to the United Kingdom as a similar pattern of development stimulated by urbanization may be observed also in other countries such as British India. In this instance, during the legacy of the Raj in India, colonial hill stations developed in the lesser Himalayas and elsewhere, near to the large urban centers of administration, and provided an escape for the British from the heat of the plains in May and June as well as a summer seat of government. Such hill stations incorporated many features of seaside resorts including bandstands, the most famous being Simla located close to Kolkata (Calcutta), while others include Poona near to Mumbai and Ootacamundie situated by Chennai (Madras). Although once the preserve of the colonial administrators, these hill stations have become popular resorts for wealthy Indian middle-class families, who migrate to them for

the same reason and at the same time of year (May–June) as their predecessors.

More recently, with the internationalization and arguably the globalization of the tourism industry, Agarwal and Shaw note that coastal resorts have become a global product since they have been developed around the world. Examples include Malia (Crete), Torremolinos (Spain), Pattong (Thailand), Sharm-el-Sheik (Egypt), Cancun (Mexico), Cairns (Australia), and Goa (India). Moreover, many other types of resorts have been developed in different geographical environments. Gilbert charts the historical evolution across Europe of one of the oldest types of resort, this being the inland spa town, which, from the early seventeenth century on, attracted visitors wishing to improve their health by drinking or bathing in the mineral waters. Examples include Leamington Spa, Harrogate, and Tunbridge Wells (England); Baden-Baden, Aachen, and Stuttgart (Germany);

Aix-les-Bains and Aix-en-Provence (France); Bad Aussee, Bad Kreuzen, and Bad Waltersdorf (Austria); and Budapest (Hungary).

By contrast, resorts have also been developed in alpine locations to cater to ski tourists in the winter and hikers in the summer. Examples include Chamonix, Tignes, Meribel, and Val d'isere (France); St. Anton, Innsbruck, and Kitzbuhel (Austria); Verbier and Zermatt (Switzerland); Aspen (United States); and Whistler and Banff (Canada). Moreover, resorts have been developed in rural woodland locations across Europe, perhaps the most famous being Centre Parcs holiday villages located in Elveden, Longleat, Whinfell, and Sherwood (England); Les Bois-France and Les Hauts de Bruyeres (France); Do Vossemereen and Erperheide (Belgium); and Bispinger Heided and Park Heilbachsee (Germany).

More recently, however, new types of resorts are being developed that are differentiated by purpose rather than geographical location. All-inclusive resorts have been developed around the world, but particularly in developing countries such as Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Jamaica, and Brazil. Poon describes such resorts as those that include everything in the prepaid price, from airport transfers, baggage handling, government taxes, rooms, all meals, snacks, and drinks to the use of all facilities, equipment, and certified instructors, thereby minimizing the use of cash. Luxury or exclusive resorts are another type being developed in countries such as Antigua, Bahamas, Maldives, Dubai, Mauritius, and the Seychelles. These are aimed at the upper end of the tourist market, boasting many visitor attractions including golf, water sports, and spa and beauty facilities. Meanwhile, there are many purpose-built health or golf resorts being developed around the world such as along the Costa Adeje (Spain); the Karikari Peninsula (New Zealand); and the Estoril (Portugal).

As well as varying in environment and purpose, resorts also differ in terms of their size and morphology. Some may be small and relatively isolated, whereas others may occupy extensive tracts of land, for example, Benidorm (Spain), Magaluf (Majorca),



This resort, located in Punta Quepos, Costa Rica, is modeled after European boutique hotels and offers fine dining, water recreation and tours, spa experiences, and other luxury amenities.

Source: Erin Monacelli.

or Cancun (Mexico). Moreover, some are the result of spontaneous development, whereas others have been planned. Barbaza, for example, based on surveys of the Mediterranean and Black Sea Coasts, identified three main types of development: (1) spontaneous resorts (e.g., Lloret de Mar, Costa Brava); (2) planned and localized development (e.g., Mamaia, Romania, and Zlatni Pjasac, Bulgaria); and (3) extensive planned developments (e.g., La Grande Motte, Languedoc-Roussillon, coast of France). In addition, Barbaza's study highlighted the fact that differences in the type and degree of resort development was the result of demand- and supply-led pressures. In the case of spontaneous resort development along the Costa Brava, this was due to the need to control rampant private development, while in the other two types of development the state (along with the private sector in Languedoc-Roussillon) played a vital role in developing *ex nihilo* functional resorts.

Such pressures are incorporated into Preau's study of alpine environments, which identified two main types of resort development, these being (1) the Chamonix model, where outside influences are gradual and complementary, and (2) the Les Belleville model, where development is conceived by outside promoters based on technical and constructive criteria for ski development. This approach was later developed further by Pearce, who attempted to recognize development processes that

could be applied to a range of environments using the concepts of integrated and catalytic types of resort growth. In both cases, single promoters are involved but within the catalytic type, the process of development also becomes strongly related to a number of secondary developers.

Other attempts to capture the morphology of resorts include those by Miossec and Gorse. These stress a far greater number of variables as well as being grounded in a wider range of case studies. Miossec's model illustrates the temporal and spatial growth of a resort, postulating that resorts pass through four main phases of development. Phase 1 sees the establishment of a pioneer resort based on very limited transport networks and used by tourists with global perceptions of tourism opportunities. This is followed in the next phase by a multiplication of resorts, increased transport linkages, and a greater awareness of the place. By Phase 3, a resort hierarchy begins to develop, and some resorts begin to specialize. Finally, in Phase 4, the resort hierarchy is complete as is the specialization of functions. Smith later applied this model to Pattaya, Thailand, and developed a tentative beach resort model that illustrates minimal development to full resort development over time and space.

Gorse also presents a spatial-evolutionary model but one that describes resort development at an international level. This model focuses on three factors: (1) the nature of holiday accommodation, (2) levels of local and nonlocal participation in tourism development, and (3) the social structure of tourists. The model is framed in the historical evolution of European tourism and identifies four main types of resort regions, which Gorse terms *tourism peripheries*. Periphery 1 encompasses Channel and Baltic coast resorts; Periphery 2, Mediterranean Europe; Periphery 3 the North African coast, and Periphery 4 more distant resorts in West Africa, the Caribbean, South America, and the Pacific. Each periphery passes through a sequence, the early stages of which are characterized by external development, wealthy tourists, and mainly hotel accommodation. Later stages show more local involvement, a greater diversity of holiday accommodation, and a wide range of social classes using the resorts.

It is clear that resorts vary in the rate at which they develop, and it is this difference in particular that has contributed to increasing concerns regarding their sustainability. In the Mediterranean,

Swarbrooke, for example, argues that coastal resorts epitomize the worst aspects of development. The reasons for this relate to negative environment (e.g., inappropriate development that is out of keeping with local conditions, disturbance of habitats and species, and pollution), economic (e.g., inflation, economic leakage, and higher land prices), and sociocultural impacts (e.g., loss of cultural traditions and social change). Alpine development has also been associated with similar negative environmental, economic, and sociocultural impacts, as have rural resorts. More recently, the sustainability of all-inclusive resorts has been heavily criticized. This is because few benefits accrue to local economies and host communities because they are often foreign owned, and tourists rarely stray outside of the resort confines unless on organized excursions.

Finally, the economic fortunes of resorts drastically differ. Many coastal resorts, particularly in the United Kingdom, are experiencing economic, social, and environmental difficulties as discussed by Agarwal and Brunt. However, it also appears that the fortunes of some Spanish resorts are also flagging, as noted by Priestley and Llurdes, as are some alpine resorts, particularly those situated at low altitudes due to climate change and the uncertainty of snowfall. But it is important to note that there is spatial variation in their economic performance with some performing extremely well and others less so.

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See also Mediterranean Cities; Tourism

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RESTRICTIVE COVENANT

The term restrictive covenant is used to describe limitations placed in deeds (contractual instruments) that specify how property can and cannot be used. A restrictive covenant might be applied to a group of homes within a subdivision or a single lot and is generally put in place by a developer or homeowner. Its purpose is to provide the development with a standardized appearance and protect property values. Covenants can include, but are not restricted to, the following: setbacks, easements, minimum size of residence, number of homes on a lot, and the type of home that is constructed.

In 1926, racial restrictive covenants became common in the United States after the U.S. Supreme Court legalized them. They were used to enforce racial and ethnic segregation by placing clauses in deeds and bylaws that prohibited people of various colors, ethnicities, and religions from living in certain neighborhoods. They were upheld by planning authorities, and banking institutions often refused to provide loans without such restrictions in place. In 1948, the Supreme Court overturned its decision and declared that racial deed restrictions could not be enforced. However, racial restricted covenants were still being executed in private agreements between developers and home buyers.

It has been argued that such covenants helped create ghettos in inner cities. Exclusionary practices

such as racial restrictive covenants and redlining by banks and insurance companies forced racial and ethnic minorities to live in dense quarters in disadvantageous areas of the city. Not until the rise of the civil rights movement in the 1960s were these discriminatory tactics stifled. While the ruling by the Supreme Court decades earlier made racial restrictive covenants unenforceable, the enactment of the Fair Housing Act in 1968 made them invalid and state law made them void.

Regardless, it took many years after the law was passed for areas to open up housing to racial and ethnic minorities. Although they cannot be legally enforced, racial covenants can be found today in some deed restrictions. Restrictive covenants are now viewed as a method of providing uniformity to and control over the activities that occur within a development and are generally regarded as harmless.

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See also Divided Cities; Exclusionary Zoning; Fair Housing; Social Exclusion

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REVANCHIST CITY

To understand what is meant by the revanchist city, it is instructive to look back to the birthplace of revanchism: late-nineteenth-century Paris.

Revanchists (from the French word *revanche*, meaning revenge) were a group of bourgeois nationalist reactionaries opposed to the liberalism of the Second Republic, the decadence of the monarchy, and especially the socialist uprising of the Paris Commune, where the working classes took over from the defeated government of Napoleon III and controlled the city for months. The revanchists (led by poet-turned-soldier Paul Deroulede and the Ligue des Patriotes) were determined to reinstate the bourgeois order with a strategy that fused militarism and moralism and claims about restoring public order on the streets. They hunted down enemies (the Communards) with a noxious blend of hatred and viciousness, intent on exacting revenge on all those who had stolen their vision of French society from them.

In the 1990s, urban geographer Neil Smith identified a striking similarity between the revanchism of late nineteenth-century Paris and the political climate of late twentieth-century New York City, which emerged to fill the vacuum left by the disintegration of liberal urban policy. He coined the concept of the *revanchist city* to capture the disturbing urban condition created by a seismic political shift: Whereas the liberal era of the post-1960s period was characterized by redistributive policy, affirmative action, and antipoverty legislation, the era of neoliberal revanchism was characterized by a discourse of revenge against minorities, the working class, feminists, environmental activists, gays and lesbians, and recent immigrants. These were declared the “public enemies” of the bourgeois political elite and their supporters. New York City in the 1990s became an arena for concerted attacks on affirmative action and immigration policy, street violence against gays and homeless people, feminist-bashing, and public campaigns against political correctness and multiculturalism. Just as the bourgeois order was perceived as under threat by the revanchists of 1890s Paris, in 1990s New York, a particular, exclusionary vision of civil society was reinstated with a vengeance—an attempt to banish those not part of that vision to the urban periphery.

According to Smith, two important factors fuelled the fire of revanchist New York City. First, the economic recession of the late 1980s/early 1990s triggered unprecedented anger among the White middle classes; marginalized populations of the city soon became scapegoats, the supposed source of urban unease. Second, (re)productions of

paranoia and fear by the media amplified and aggravated extant sentiments among middle-class voters seeking to affix blame for their perceived lack of safety in urban public spaces. It came as no surprise to many that, in 1993, Rudolph Giuliani was elected mayor on the promise of offering a better “quality of life” for “conventional members of society.” Smith pointed out that revanchism under Giuliani was sharpened by blaming the failures of earlier liberal policy on the marginalized populations such policy was supposed to assist.

Giuliani identified homeless people, panhandlers, prostitutes, squeegee cleaners, squatters, graffiti artists, reckless bicyclists, and unruly youth as the major threats to urban order and the culprits of urban decay. A particularly repressive attitude towards these so-called culprits, as exemplified by the well-publicized zero tolerance policies of the New York Police Department under Giuliani’s administration, can perhaps be taken as the hallmark of the revanchist city. As the city’s economy recovered in the mid-1990s, the crime rate dropped further (contrary to popular perception, it had been falling *before* Giuliani’s tenure), public spaces such as Times Square and Bryant Park were privatized and commodified, New York City became a major tourist destination, and gentrification accelerated and diffused into neighborhoods bypassed by previous waves of the process. The fanfare of success attributed to a charismatic mayor squashed concerns over those who had to be swept away or incarcerated to allow these changes to take place.

In the United States, revanchism goes much further than political ideology and moral crusade; it has worked its way into municipal legislation. Laws against begging, panhandling, and sleeping or urinating on sidewalks and in other public spaces are increasingly used to cleanse the public spaces used by tourists, the middle-class, and wealthy residents and visitors. As cities compete aggressively to make themselves attractive places to live in and in which to invest, they are more willing to impose harsh penalties on those people seen as undesirable by tourists, shoppers, commuters, and investors. Municipal ordinances have been mobilized to criminalize behavior that is offensive or unpleasant to the resident and visiting middle classes. Furthermore, the punitive strategies to deal with unruly citizens are usually put forward by their architects as common sense, a *fait accompli*, even sacrosanct.

Smith's revanchist city thesis has proved to be one of the more influential in urban studies in recent years. He stated that revanchism was not something unique to New York or American cities but something common to the restructured urban geography of the late capitalist city. This invited other researchers to take up the issue of the applicability of revanchism to other urban contexts. In 2002, MacLeod traced the extent to which revanchism has permeated the recent renaissance of central Glasgow, Scotland, and argued that the dismissive treatment of Glasgow's homeless during the city's 1990s economic recovery suggests that the city bore the imprints of an emerging politics of revanchism. He stopped short, however, of saying that full-fledged revanchism is present there, due to the existence of a range of policy schemes designed to assist marginalized populations in that city.

In 2003, Atkinson argued that certain strands of revanchism have infiltrated urban policies addressing control and safety in Britain's public spaces, even if outright vengeance was hard to detect. In 2008, Uitermark and Duyvendak found that the revanchism of populist parties in Rotterdam, Netherlands, was qualitatively different from the revanchism identified by Smith. It was directed in large part to ethnic minorities and especially Muslims (an attempt to discipline marginalized ethnic groups), and most supporters of revanchism were among the lower classes.

Finally, recent scholarship on cities of the global South has detected extreme forms of revanchism occurring in Quito, Ecuador, and Mumbai, India, as city managers, under pressure from elite urbanites and business leaders, attempt to sweep the symptoms of poverty and homelessness out of sight.

Tom Slater

See also Displacement; Exclusionary Zoning; Gentrification; Governance; Homelessness; New York City, New York; Social Exclusion; Surveillance; Urban Policy

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RIGHT TO THE CITY

The concept of the right to the city is most closely associated with Henri Lefebvre, the Marxist philosopher of space and everyday life, in his classic polemic *Le Droit à la ville* (1968/The Right to the City). The right to the city, for Lefebvre, was, first, an abstract claim—what he called the right to the *oeuvre*, or work, that is, the right to belong to, and to determine the fate of, that urban world that urban dwellers had created: the right *not* to be alienated from the spaces of everyday life. Second, it was a concrete claim to social, economic, and political goods: housing, culture, work that develops workers rather than destroys them, the rights of the elderly and children, and especially, the rights of all people to a space in the city.

As Eleonore Kofman and Elizabeth Lebas note in their 1996 review of Lefebvre's urban writings, the right to the city develops in both Lefebvre's work and in the urban uprisings of 1968 as the highest form of rights. It was defined by Lefebvre in 2003 as the summation of other crucial rights: liberty, individualization in socialization, environs (*habitat*), and

way of living (*habiter*). For Lefebvre, therefore, “*the right to the city* is like a cry and a demand”: a cry for those rights of man that are—or ought to be—inalienable, and demand for those concrete rights that might make human rights in the city obtainable, not as a once-and-for-all good, but as an oeuvre (work, but especially a participatory project). The city as oeuvre, however, has as its end *la Fête*, a “celebration which consumes unproductively, without other advantage but pleasure and prestige and enormous riches in money and object.”

Context and Argument

Le Droit à la ville was written on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of the publication of Marx’s *Capital*. Having been expelled from the French Communist Party in 1958 after seeking reform in the wake of the Khrushchev’s revelations of Stalin’s atrocities and the 1956 Soviet invasion of Hungary, Lefebvre both deepened his engagement with Marx’s writings (as opposed to communist orthodoxy) and refocused his attention on questions of everyday life, ideology, and alienation, both in rural studies and increasingly in an analysis of the urban. *Le Droit* thus stands as a commentary on *Capital* in a number of ways, but primarily through a close analysis of how the oeuvre is alienated within and through the space of the city and why it is necessary to continually contest that alienation.

Le Droit was clearly also inspired by the events of 1871 in Paris—which Lefebvre referred to in *La proclamation de la commune* (1965) as “the biggest celebration of the century and modern times” (p. 389) and the “only crack at a revolutionary urbanism” (p. 394)—and stands as Lefebvre’s first attempt at theorizing the oeuvre within or as part of the urban. As such, it led the way for several more, including *La Révolution urbaine* (1970/*The Urban Revolution*, 2003) and most important, *La production de l’espace* (1974/*The Production of Space*, 1991).

Lefebvre’s urban analysis came at a time when urban research was in need of theoretical development. Urban research in the social sciences remained descriptive, relying more on empirical generalizations than on theory as such; it was strongly technocratic. Postwar social theory, on the other hand, tended to avoid urban concerns, despite earlier models of theoretical urban analysis in Durkheim and Simmel that grounded some urban sociology.

As for Marxist theory, at the time, it tended to deny that the urban constituted a specific social realm and argued instead that it was largely superstructural. Reformation of Marxist theory, thus, was Lefebvre’s primary target.

To pierce this target, Lefebvre returned (if not entirely explicitly) to a critical arsenal of concepts from Marx: the dialectical relationship between use value and exchange value. The right to the city was a right to use, the right of appropriation (clearly distinct from the right to property). Rights-in-the-making—at first customary, but later codified—have the effect of “changing reality if they enter into social practice: right to work, to training and education, to health, housing, leisure, to life.” These are rights of appropriation and use, and Lefebvre drives the point home:

Among these rights in the making features the *right to the city* (not the ancient city, but to urban life, to renewed centrality, to places of encounter and exchange, to life rhythms and time uses, enabling the full and complete *usage* of these moments and places, etc.). The proclamation and realization of urban life as the rule of use (of exchange and encounter disengaged from exchange value) insist on the mastery of the economic (of exchange value, the market, and commodities) and consequently is inscribed within the perspectives of the revolution under the hegemony of the working class.

At base, this was an argument for the right *not* to be excluded and especially for full political participation in the making of the city. It was an argument against expropriation and alienation.

Crucially, then, the right to the city required the right to space—the right to be present and to inhabit, as well as the right to use space. These are themes Lefebvre took up more fully in *La Révolution urbaine* and *La production de l’espace*. But in the meantime the “cry and demand” of the right to the city was picked up on the streets of Paris, which exploded with revolutionary fervor in May 1968, soon after *Le Droit* was published. *Le Droit*, like the *Society of the Spectacle* (1967/1994) published about the same time by Lefebvre’s interlocutor Guy Debord, became one of the rallying manifestos of the student and worker uprising.

Both Lefebvre and the situationists often traded in the same vocabulary of urban analysis, most

important, focusing critical attention on the situation. Derived from existentialist philosophy the situation might be defined as a structured space-time—the space-time structures that establish the limits of possibility (for everyday life or for inhabiting no less than for the circulation of capital or the expropriation of labor). Strategically, Debord argued, situations needed to be upended. Taking a cue from the surrealist playbook, situationists sought to harness the power of displacement and dislocation (literally, the being-out-of-place) to expose, upset, or perhaps just maneuver around structured space-time and in doing so to create a new situation—a new space-time structure that opened up new possibilities for living. Differing more in terms of strategy than at the level of philosophy, Lefebvre sought to expand the notion of a situation and to generalize it, to understand, for example, how modernity itself was a situation (if of a particularly broad and deep scale).

For Lefebvre, therefore, a central task of revolutionary philosophy was to reveal that situations were always produced—and how. This is the major argument he was moving to in *Le Droit*, and which he brought to fruition in *La production de l'espace*. Its importance cannot be underestimated. In Debord's words, "the proletarian revolution"—recall Lefebvre's invocation of the working class when he referred to the right to the city as a cry and a demand—"is that *critique of human geography* whereby individuals and communities must construct places and events commensurate with the appropriation not just of their labor, but of their total history." For Lefebvre, however, more than critique was necessary: Even more vital was the creation of new spaces, new situations—a nurturing of the (unalienated) oeuvre—and this in turn required a struggle for the right to the city: a revolutionary urbanism. As Marx's *Capital* was an analysis seeking to point the way to the production of a new political economy built not on the expropriation and alienation of the working classes (so as to create a world in which humanity could flourish), then *Le Droit à la ville* was designed as an analytical intervention that might point the way toward the production of a new space of fully urban humanity.

Intellectual Influence

In English-language urban studies, the right to the city has probably had more of an impact as a

slogan than as a worked-out theoretical or philosophical position. Although published in 1968 and clearly influential in the urban uprisings of that year, *Le Droit à la ville* was not translated into English until 1996, and then not completely. Even in its full version *Le Droit* is more an outline or (literally) an abstract. This was intentional. As Lefebvre states at the outset, his goal is to open up ideas rather than shut them down through systematic analysis. As such, he took what he called a cavalier attitude toward analysis and exposition.

The fuller development of Lefebvre's urban analysis had already been published in English, with the 1991 translation of *The Production of Space* and through the work of Edward Soja (1989), David Harvey (1973), Neil Smith (1984), and, after 1991, countless others, his contributions to a spatialized social theory were well known. With the publication of an English translation of *Le Droit à la ville*, this spatialized social theory was quickly applied to (and critically examined within) arguments about urban transformation and the role of rights in social struggle. Even so, the notion of a right to the city as developed by Lefebvre was not so much scrutinized as invoked. Don Mitchell borrowed the title for his 2003 book on public space, for example, but with the exception of a few pages of explication of Lefebvre's ideas focused his analysis not so much on the city as an oeuvre, but instead on the more narrow questions of how public space in the city is structured, who has access to it, and why this matters for political action and urban social justice.

Similarly, most of the papers appearing in the 2002 special issue of *GeoJournal* on the "Rights to the City"—papers previously presented at a May 2002 conference in Rome, Italy—elucidate specific struggles across various cities over, for example, urban planning and redevelopment, community gardening, neighborhood revitalization, and citizenship within the neoliberal "shadow state." They spend little time interrogating the concept of a right to the city itself. Papers by Eugene McCann and Mark Purcell in 2002 were exceptional in this regard. The latter argues that the right to the city remains underdeveloped politically and theoretically but then oddly reduces the theoretical and political weight of the concept to what he calls "the urban politics of the inhabitant." In essence, Purcell advocates a politics of "living in" rather than actively producing urban space, thus zeroing in on one narrow aspect

(albeit a crucial one) of Lefebvre's radical political position and essentially erasing from consideration the notion of the city as an oeuvre.

More satisfying because more fully engaged with the range of Lefebvre's thinking, therefore, is Mustafa Dikeç's 2001 examination of the right to the city as a reclaiming of the city from overbureaucratization and a thoroughgoing reliance on consumerism. Indeed, this is precisely one reason why the right to the city, as a slogan, has such resonance now. The 1999 World Trade Organization protests in Seattle and the various campaigns against the International Monetary Fund/World Bank, G8, and World Economic Forum summits in the following few years have thrown into striking visibility the increasing corporatization, commodification, and bureaucratization of urban space supported and promoted by these international bodies. Therefore, understanding the right to the city as a critique of a world in which the exchange value of urban space comes to dominate use value has immediate resonance and suggests a clear political program (and one that is more broad than that signaled by a politics of inhabiting, even if the latter is a precondition for the former).

Thus, David Harvey argues, the right to the city is not only a right of access to a city already defined by property speculation and state planning, "but an active right to make the city different." The difficulty, of course, is that we now truly live in the society of the spectacle. As Debord argued in 1994, "The spectacle corresponds to the historical moment at which the commodity completes its colonization of social life. It is not just that the relationship to commodities is now plain to see—commodities are now all that there is to see; the world we see is the world of the commodity." And yet—and therefore—as Harvey in 2003 argues, "we cannot live without utopian plans and ideals of justice," especially because there are severe contradictions in the capitalist property rights through which commodities are defined, and for which the right to the city as the right to the oeuvre can provide a powerful alternative. The right to the city has thus recently become a powerful rallying cry and demand among social movements struggling for social justice.

Social Struggle and Urban Change

Outside the trenches of academia, the right to the city has been picked up by social activists,

nongovernment organizations, and the United Nations to demand the concrete rights of all citizens to the spaces of the city. The World Charter on the Right to the City," created during the Social Forum of the Americas in Quito and the World Urban Forum in Barcelona, both in 2004, has as its main objective the recognition of a right to the city as a central international human right. The World Charter served as the organizing basis for UNESCO/UN-Habitat-sponsored meetings examining "Urban Policies and the Right to the City" in Paris (2005) and Barcelona (2006) and for the second World Urban Forum in Vancouver (2006). The charter and subsequent meetings have emerged as a result of what organizers see as the increasing urbanization of poverty and social exclusion and the increasingly active role played by the private sector in the planning of cities. Ironically, these three meetings on the right to the city rarely directly included the presence of those being denied access to the everyday spaces of the city. Instead, those subject to social exclusion and the urbanization of poverty tended to be represented by NGOs such as Metropolis, the United Cities and Local Governments Association, the Commonwealth of Local Governments Forum, Focus on the Global South, the International Alliance of Inhabitants, and representatives of local governments, private enterprise, and the United Nations. Mainly concerned with the management and governance of cities, housing, and mobility, these organizations—and the conferences—tended to define the right to the city more in line with Purcell's notion of the urban politics of the inhabitant than with the city as an oeuvre—as a creative and participatory production of the city.

The institutionalization of the right to the city through international meetings, although laudatory in many respects, also runs the risk of depoliticizing this right as the discourse of experts gains sway. There is a clear gap between Lefebvre's revolutionary philosophical and sociological insights and the more limited goals of the nongovernment organizations. For, as Lefebvre wrote in the sequel to *Le Droit à la ville*, "It is clear that only a big increase in social richness, and profound modifications of social relations (in the mode of production) can allow the entrance into practice of the right to the city and many other citizens' rights. Such a development presupposes an orientation towards economic growth, whose end will not be the accumulation of

capital as an end in itself, but would yield superior 'ends.'" The right to the city, Lefebvre concludes, is "the right of citizens-city dwellers, and the groups that they constitute (on the basis of social relations), to be central to [figurer] the resources and circuits of communication, information, and exchange." The right to the city is thus the right to *be*—to be an integral part of the city. "This does not depend on an urban ideology, nor an architectural intervention, but of an essential quality or property of urban space: centrality," he said. The right to the city is a right to produce that centrality—the right not to be marginal—as an oeuvre.

Don Mitchell and Joaquín Villanueva

See also Harvey, David; Lefebvre, Henri; Revanchist City; Social Production of Space

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RIIS, JACOB

Jacob Riis (1849–1914) was a crusading journalist who brought New York City's overcrowded, decrepit slums to the consciousness and conscience of middle-class America. Best known for his photograph-filled 1890 book, *How the Other Half Lives*, Riis spurred housing, school, and neighborhood reforms in cities throughout the United States.

Riis was born in Ribe, Denmark, a schoolmaster's son. His modestly comfortable childhood and its rural village were roots of his later advocacy of urban housing reform, as was his Christian faith and sense of morality. Riis's fondness for stories, particularly those by Charles Dickens, motivated him to learn English, but he disliked school and pursued carpentry. Crushed by romantic rejection and angling for adventure, Riis left for the United States in 1870.

Work in short-term carpentry, construction, and mining jobs and then as a traveling salesman was sporadic, and Riis experienced days of hunger and homelessness. One cold night, Riis and his adopted dog turned to a police station for shelter. For years, New York City police stations had served as shelters of last resort for homeless men and women, providing planks of wood for sleeping on the station's cellar floor at night. That night, Riis's locket was stolen, and a disbelieving officer beat Riis's protective dog to death. Riis attributed his drive to improve the lives of the poor and restore respect for life in the slums to this incident.

By 1873, Riis turned to newspaper work, moving through jobs at a Long Island City weekly, a

Manhattan news agency, and finally as editor for the *South Brooklyn News*. He eventually bought the *News* and, doing every job himself, turned it into a profitable independent paper featuring righteous editorials against deadbeat grocery customers and neighborhood boarding houses. Finally successful, Riis married his beloved Elisabeth, sold the paper, and in 1877 joined the *New York Tribune*.

Exposing How the Other Half Lives

Riis's work as a police reporter for the *Tribune* and Associated Press launched his career as an investigative journalist and publicist of slum conditions. His office was in the heart of Manhattan's East Side slums. In pursuit of newsworthy stories, Riis often trailed police officers through the tenement district at night and accompanied sanitation inspectors by day.

Riis was moved and outraged by the conditions of life in the slums. By 1880, more than a million people, many of them immigrants, were crammed into New York's dark, filthy tenements, both older wooden structures and newer, four- to six-story stone buildings. Apartments doubled as sweatshops; cellars doubled as lodging. Tenants often took in additional boarders to pay the rent, further taxing plumbing and waste systems. The stench, Riis wrote, was often unbearable.

In 1888, to garner more notice for slum conditions, Riis began taking photographs for slide lectures, using a new flash technique for the dark interiors. The photographs did indeed draw attention, leading to an article in *Scribner's*, which was then expanded into *How the Other Half Lives*. Riis's book was not unique in revealing the environment of the urban poor, but his passionate prose, his anecdotes backed by statistical data, and especially the photographs made it a bestseller.

Riis continued his investigative reporting, moving to the *Evening Sun* in 1890. In 1891, he discovered a health report noting nitrates in the Croton Reservoir. Riis tracked the source: human and animal sewage dumped into streams flowing into the Croton River. His articles and the furor they provoked led the city to protect its water supply by buying land around its reservoirs.

Creating Light Where There Is Darkness

Riis's greatest passion was slum reform. In newspaper columns, articles in the *Atlantic Monthly*, *Century*, *Scribner's*, and *Harper's Weekly*, and his subsequent books, he called for playgrounds and parks in slum neighborhoods, better school facilities and the noncriminalization of truants, development of model tenements, and enforcement of stricter housing, health, labor, and safety laws. Riis also encouraged private reforms from organized charities to model housing investments.

Riis blamed greedy landlords and neglectful—if not corrupt—government for perpetuating tenement slums, and he targeted the slums themselves as breeding grounds for disease, depravity, and disorder. His writings expressed his dislike of tramps, disdain for paupers (alms seekers), and sometimes disparaging views of Blacks, Jews, Italians, and Chinese amid a full range of ethnic generalizations, yet his portrayals of the poor were sympathetic. An immigrant himself, he excluded no one from the American dream of social mobility, provided the conditions were amenable. Like other Progressives of his time, Riis held the slum environment, rather than the residents themselves, responsible for drunkenness, truancy, youth gangs, and moral turpitude.

Contagion was a recurring theme. Epidemics that began in the tenements quickly spread throughout the slums and sometimes into the rest of the city. Riis specified moral contagion as well—pure young rural migrants drawn into lives of licentiousness and crime, innocent children corrupted by vice and disrespect for life. Perhaps most dangerous, slum conditions were ripe for fomenting revolution. It was in society's best interest to improve tenement life, he argued.

Riis made much of the physical and moral health ramifications of darkness, arguing that bringing sunshine and fresh air would go a long way to solving the slum's problems. Laws regulating tenement building mandated minimal airshafts in 1867 but even the improved "dumb-bell" tenements resulting from the 1879 law allowed in little light or circulating air beyond the building's front and rear rooms. Parks and playgrounds would provide all residents with healthful air and space and give boys (specifically) an outlet other than the mean streets. Riis lobbied successfully for new

schools to be built with adjoining playgrounds. He envisioned schools as community centers to be used after hours and in summer for community enrichment and play. His greatest concern was for the children of the poor (the title of his 1892 book) and he advocated for the enforcement of child labor laws; schools with proper ventilation, heating, desks, and playgrounds; free eye examinations for students; kindergartens; and vocational training and schools—rather than jails—for truant boys.

Public and Private Partnerships

Riis made alliances with like-minded advocates in and beyond his role as a journalist and was an active member of several government advisory committees. His coverage of lectures by Dr. Felix Adler, founder of the Society of Ethical Culture, pushed the state legislature to establish the 1884 fact-finding Tenement House Commission, which led to laws creating small parks, school playgrounds, and safer, cleaner buildings—“New Law” tenements. His collaboration with the King’s Daughters, an Episcopalian women’s service group, led to the development of a neighborhood settlement house, renamed for Riis in 1901. Theodore Roosevelt was so moved by *How the Other Half Lives* that he enlisted Riis’s counsel when Roosevelt became president of the New York City Board of Police Commissioners in 1895. Under Riis’s influence, Roosevelt had a hundred cigar-making sweatshops shut down. Roosevelt also eliminated the scourge of Riis’s homeless days by closing the police station shelters in 1896. Homeless people were then compelled to apply for public shelter on a barge in the East River or try for charity lodging.

Riis adored Roosevelt, campaigned for his gubernatorial and presidential runs, and wrote a flattering biography. Riis had struggled against the corrupt Tammany Democratic machine, which maintained the status quo in the slums as its main base of political support. Yet, he was disappointed in Republican administrations that were slow on reform. Still, he would work with anyone in any position of power. In 1896, the Council of Good Government Clubs recruited Riis and with his assistance secured the condemnation of nearly a hundred rear-yard tenements.

One of Riis’s proudest achievements was the elimination of nearly three acres of tenements and alleys in Mulberry Bend, notorious for its high crime rate and a death rate 50 percent higher than the rest of the city. The bend was eventually replaced by today’s Columbus Park, near what is now Chinatown. It was not the city’s first slum clearance effort—several blocks in nearby Five Points had been reclaimed in the 1830s—and the process took more than a decade, but it was one of the first major projects of the period. For all his drive to eliminate offending slums and shelters, however, Riis brushed off concerns about where residents and lodgers would go.

Riis did not address poverty systematically. Although he was aware of the precariousness of the economy and the vastly uneven distribution of wealth and resources, he attacked only landlord greed. He had no interest in theory, preferring practical solutions to immediate problems, and felt alienated from the scientific management professionals who eclipsed him in the early twentieth century.

Although Riis did not invent tenement reform, he was the nation’s most successful publicist of slums and agitator for improvement. He harnessed city and state government as well as private organizations to alleviate the conditions of urban poverty. Riis’s legacy includes several small parks on the Lower East Side of Manhattan, substantial school buildings with playgrounds, the Riis Settlement House (now in Queens), and over a hundred years of clean, unfiltered drinking water.

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See also Housing; New York City, New York; Parks; Tenement

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ROME, ITALY

Throughout its 3,000-year history, the city of Rome has been both a key administrative center and the scene of notable artistic achievements. In the ancient world, it was the capital of the vast Roman empire and was the largest, most architecturally sophisticated city of antiquity. Reaching a size of 1 million inhabitants who were supported by an elaborate infrastructure, Rome became one of the first great metropolises of history. Although the city's size declined in the Middle Ages, its influence on Western civilization continued unabated as the seat of the popes and the headquarters of the Catholic Church. During the Renaissance and baroque periods, Rome was physically transformed by the work of great architects and artists such as Michelangelo, Bramante, Raphael, and Bernini. During the nineteenth century, after shaking off French occupation, Rome became the capital of the newly united Italian state. In the first half of the twentieth century, a number of grandiose building projects were constructed in the city by the Fascist regime of Mussolini. Today, Rome remains the capital of Italy, the site of the Vatican, a major transportation node, and one of the most popular global tourist destinations. Rome is significant in urban studies chiefly because of the prominent role the city has played in Western history and for its widely influential architecture.

Physical Setting

Rome owes much of its importance to its strategic location on the western side of the Italian peninsula, 22 kilometers inland from the coast along the banks of the Tiber (*Tevere*) River, which links the city with the Mediterranean Sea. The earliest settlement at Rome arose at the first natural ford across the Tiber when moving inland from the coast, thus giving Rome control over the lucrative north-south salt trade. This site had considerable

topographic variety, consisting of a mixture of small hills and escarpments interspersed with swampy valleys and plains, all enclosed within several bends of the Tiber. The hills provided useful defensive refuges while the flat areas, such as the Roman Forum and Forum Boarium, although prone to flooding, developed into natural market zones. With its easy access to the sea and its central location within Italy, and given the central position of Italy itself within the Mediterranean, Rome was well-suited by geography to be the seat of an empire that would dominate the entire Mediterranean basin. Rome today lies within the modern district (*comune*) of Lazio, which is roughly equivalent to ancient Latium.

Ancient Rome

According to tradition, the city of Rome was founded on April 21, 753 BC by the twins Romulus and Remus. Archaeological evidence indicates, however, that there were minor settlements at Rome for at least 300 years prior to this date. For the first several hundred years of its history, Rome was a small, relatively insignificant city, often under the domination of its powerful neighbor, the Etruscans. During this monarchical period of Roman history (753–509 BC), Rome was ruled by kings, who undertook a number of public works projects, such as the building of the Cloaca Maxima (Great Drain), to render the site more habitable. This era ended in 509 BC when the Romans expelled their Etruscan overlords and established the Roman Republic (509–31 BC). The subsequent centuries were a time of rapid growth for both the city and its empire, as the city extended its political control over the entire Italian peninsula. In 390 BC, Gauls from the north invaded Italy and sacked the city of Rome, and the Romans were spurred by this event to enclose the city within a circuit of fortifications known as the Servian Wall. By the end of the fourth century BC, Rome's infrastructure was emerging with the construction of the first aqueduct, the Aqua Appia, as well as the Via Appia, a road that linked Rome with southern Italy. This was the first of what would develop into an extensive network of high-quality roads connecting Rome with the entire Mediterranean, leading to the truism (at least in the ancient world) that "all roads lead to Rome."

After surviving the crucible of the Punic Wars fought against Carthage, Rome began to extend its power outside Italy through a series of conquests that brought enormous wealth to the Romans and exposed them to Greek culture and civilization. Both of these developments had important effects on the physical city, as ever more impressive monuments were erected at Rome and Roman art and architecture were influenced by Greek models. The political heart of Rome throughout its history was the open space of the Roman Forum, which was surrounded by many of the most venerable structures in the city. During the late Roman Republic (133–31 BC), the population of the city swelled to unprecedented levels, approaching, if not surpassing, one million inhabitants, a level that it would sustain for several centuries. Even as Rome consolidated its control over the Mediterranean, internal tensions caused the breakdown of the Republic, and a series of civil wars erupted between powerful generals, such as Julius Caesar and Pompey, for control of the state.

The ultimate winner of the civil wars was a relative of Caesar's who became known as Augustus, the first emperor. He reorganized the state and set the model for subsequent rulers during the third phase of Roman history, the empire (31 BC–AD 476). He also famously claimed that he had "found a city made of bricks and left one made of marble," and there is considerable truth to this boast; Augustus and his agents substantially altered the city. They rebuilt and expanded the infrastructure of Rome, cleaning out the drains and adding several new aqueducts. They renovated dozens of existing temples and erected high-profile new ones, including one to the deified Julius Caesar and another to Mars the Avenger, enclosed within the massive new Forum of Augustus. This complex, as well as other famous monuments such as the Ara Pacis (Altar of Peace), exemplifies Augustus's clever manipulation of art and architecture as forms of propaganda to glorify himself and legitimize his reign.

Subsequent emperors continued to adorn the city with impressive structures, among them the Flavian Amphitheater (popularly known today as the Colosseum) and the Pantheon, both of which have been repeatedly imitated by later architects. The high point of the Roman Empire came during the second century AD, when the city presided

over an empire of 50 million inhabitants stretching across three continents from Britain to Mesopotamia. The urban populace were the recipients of a wide array of benefactions, including a monthly distribution of free grain (to adult male citizens only), and they were also provided with an assortment of public spectacles and entertainments such as gladiator games, beast hunts, mythological reenactments, theatrical shows and, most popular of all, chariot races in the Circus Maximus, a marble stadium that could accommodate a quarter of a million spectators. In addition, Rome's inhabitants could stroll through and enjoy lavish public baths and extensive public gardens.

Despite these amenities, there were many negative aspects to life in ancient Rome. The Tiber frequently flooded, and fires were a nightly menace, culminating in the Great Fire of AD 64, which burned for a week and leveled three quarters of the city. There were frequent food shortages, and the majority of Rome's populace was crammed into squalid high-rise apartment buildings, whose shoddy construction caused them to topple and collapse with alarming regularity. Much of the city's sewage and refuse was simply dumped in the streets, and the poor sanitation resulted in high levels of mortality from disease.

Rome and its distinctive structures served as a model for all other cities throughout the Roman empire, and provincial cities vied with one another to imitate both its buildings and its urban rituals. The city went into a sharp decline during the later Roman Empire, when it lost its role as political center. Constantinople became the new capital, and the western emperors abandoned Rome to take up residence in the more easily defended city of Ravenna. In AD 410, Visigothic barbarians under the leadership of Alaric sacked Rome, and the final collapse of Roman power followed soon afterward.

Medieval Rome

Successive waves of barbarian invaders continued to menace the city, and the last official Roman emperor was deposed in AD 476. During the Middle Ages, the city was reduced to a shadow of its former glory, with the population plummeting to a low of perhaps just 10,000 to 20,000. With the failure of the aqueduct system, this reduced

populace abandoned most of the city and clustered in the Campus Martius near the banks of the Tiber. Ancient Roman ruins were plundered for building materials. Innumerable precious statues along with vast quantities of marble were stripped off monuments and burned in lime pits, some of which were set up in the Forum itself. A few structures were preserved by conversion to new purposes. Thus, the Mausoleum of Hadrian was transformed into a papal fortress, the Castel St. Angelo, and the Pantheon was consecrated as a Christian church and acquired two awkwardly affixed bell towers.

Despite these depredations, the city continued to have wider importance as the seat of the Popes. Pope Gregory the Great (AD 590–604) laid the groundwork for the political influence of the popes, and throughout the medieval period, they engaged in a series of uneasy and constantly shifting alliances with various powerful European kings. Rome also endured several more occupations and sacks, including one by a Moorish fleet in AD 846. The political turmoil was intensified by constant infighting among the powerful noble families of Rome, such as the Colonna and Orsini, frequently over the selection of papal candidates. During the later Middle Ages, there were sporadic attempts to establish a secular authority over the city, such as the establishment of a *comune* through the efforts of Arnold of Brescia in the twelfth century, and the short-lived republic of the “tribune” Cola di Rienzi in the fourteenth. During this period, the papacy also experienced great instability, and the popes were removed to Avignon in France from AD 1309 to 1377; this was followed by the great schism, during which there were two (and even three) rival popes. Order was finally restored in 1420 with the reestablishment of unified papal authority at Rome, where it has remained until the present.

During the Middle Ages, the most noteworthy new additions to the physical city were a number of significant churches, including Santa Maria in Cosmedin, the basilica-style San Paolo fuori le Mura, the Romanesque San Giovanni a Porta Latina, and the Gothic Santa Maria sopra Miverva.

Renaissance and Baroque Rome

From the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries, the papacy dominated Rome politically. Under the

energetic patronage of popes such as Julius II, an array of brilliant architects, artists, and sculptors utterly transformed the city and produced some of the greatest works of art in the Western tradition. One focal point of these efforts was the Vatican itself, where the old St. Peter’s Basilica was demolished and a spectacular new basilica and square were erected over the course of several centuries, incorporating design elements from a succession of gifted artists including Bramante, Michelangelo, and Bernini. Michelangelo also painted the famous frescoes of the Sistine Chapel, and Raphael similarly adorned other spaces within the Vatican.

In this period, the public streets and spaces of the city acquired much of their modern form as many of the grand boulevards were laid down, replacing winding medieval alleys. These roads culminated in ornate public squares frequently sporting fountains, and notable spaces such as the Piazza del Popolo, Piazza Venezia, and the Piazza Spagna, and fountains such as the Trevi, date to this era. Contributing to Rome’s general adornment, the great Roman families built magnificent palaces for themselves such as the Palazzo Barberini, Palazzo Farnese, and Palazzo Chigi, which continue to serve today as museums or government buildings. Many of Rome’s churches also were either built or rebuilt and decorated with the works of artists such as Caravaggio and Bernini. While this period when the papacy dominated was marred by notable instances of decadence and corruption, it also gave form to the streets and spaces of the modern city, and produced an influential artistic legacy.

Roma Capitale

At the dawn of the nineteenth century, Rome and the papal states were captured by the armies of Napoleon Bonaparte, and the French continued to play a key role in Italian affairs for much of the century. One consequence of this occupation was that many of Rome’s artistic treasures were looted and sent to France. Starting in the 1820s, there were movements led by men such as Garibaldi and Mazzini to unite the various Italian states and establish a new, unified Italy. These conflicts flared sporadically for decades, with several abortive attempts to establish a republic, and the French often siding with the popes against Italian forces. The Kingdom of Italy under King Vittorio Emanuele



St. Peter's Square (Piazza San Pietro), which leads to St. Peter's Basilica, near the Vatican.

Source: David Ferrell.

It was finally declared in 1862, although Rome itself, under control of the popes backed by French troops, held out until 1870.

The city was promptly declared the capital of the new, unified nation and thus became Roma Capitale. The desire to make Rome an impressive national capital comparable to Paris and London resulted in several significant projects, including the construction of a continuous series of embankments along the Tiber, which rendered Rome safe from floods for the first time in its history. Another product of this impulse was the erection of the immense and overblown neoclassical monument to Vittorio Emanuele II, which now dominates the Roman skyline (earning it the pejorative nicknames of “the wedding cake” and “the typewriter”) and whose construction obliterated the northern face of the Capitoline Hill.

Mussolini and Rome

In 1922, Fascists led by Benito Mussolini seized Rome. Mussolini dreamed of establishing a new modern Roman empire and undertook a vigorous rebuilding program to make the city conform to

his vision. Reflecting Fascist rationalist theory, he rejected the city's historically organic pattern of growth and planned to impose a rigid, structured style of concrete architecture. This style can best be seen today at a huge complex of buildings erected on the southern outskirts of Rome known as EUR. To create a wide, straight boulevard on which to stage Fascist parades, he also had the Via dei Fori Imperiali bulldozed through the heart of the city, ironically obliterating much of the remains of the ancient Roman imperial fora. More beneficial legacies from this period include the beginnings of the national highway system centered on Rome, the draining of nearby malarial marshlands, and the founding of Cinecittà Studios in 1937 on the outskirts of the city.

After the fall of Mussolini during World War II, Rome was occupied by the Allies, eventually leading to the establishment of the modern democratic Italian state with Rome as its capital.

Rome Today

Postwar Rome witnessed considerable growth in population, which has ballooned to 2.5 million

inhabitants, and the city has greatly expanded beyond its traditional borders of the old Aurelian Wall. The modern city is a key transportation node within Italy and is the center of administration and government. The University of Rome (known as La Sapienza), founded in the fourteenth century, is now Europe's largest. Tourism has become a major source of income, and the city ranks among the top tourist destinations worldwide. The Vatican and its museums are especially popular sites, and since 1929, it has been firmly established as an autonomous state within the city. Among the challenges that the city faces today are overcrowding, preservation of the city's innumerable monuments, and preventing their degradation by pollution and tourism.

Rome has been a continuously occupied, significant urban center for nearly 3,000 years, and the city's history has been characterized by a constant process of rebuilding and recycling of earlier structures and models. This long, constant occupation has resulted in a complex city of overlapping layers both literal (the central city rests on a layer

of artificial fill that in places is up to 20 meters deep) and symbolic. In Rome, as exemplified by current spaces such as the Piazza Navona, which precisely mirrors the form of the underlying Roman Circus of Domitian, the presence of the past is inescapable, and the ancient city continues to influence and shape the modern one.

Gregory S. Aldrete

See also Capital City, Mediterranean Cities; Piazza; Renaissance City; Urban Planning

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SANTA FE, NEW MEXICO

Santa Fe, New Mexico, is located in the upper Rio Grande Valley of the southwestern United States. The state capital and an important tourist, arts, and culture center, it has a population of approximately 63,000 people and is part of a metropolitan area of more than 140,000. The present site of Santa Fe has been home to human beings for longer than 12,000 years, and initial Spanish settlements began there in the early seventeenth century. The community officially recognizes 1610 as the year Governor Don Pedro de Peralta founded the new capital city of *La Villa Real de la Santa Fé de San Francisco de Asís*.

Annexed to the United States in 1848, Santa Fe has a long history of cultural, economic, and political importance. It is often noted for its role as the center of the Pueblo Revolt (1680–1692), an important trading community on the Camino Real and Santa Fe Trail, and as America's longest-serving governmental capital. But it is Santa Fe's history from the late nineteenth century onward that is often studied by researchers of cities for its prototypical examples of tourism development, culture and art-centered economic development, historic restoration and design regulation, and lifestyle marketing. It was then that northern New Mexico began to attract boosters, artists, scientists, and a growing American intelligentsia.

Early Attractions

In the late 1800s professionals and amateurs came to study the native peoples of the region. There

was particular interest in the Pueblos, whose terraced, multistoried earthen and stone buildings were often erected into, or reflected, grand landscape forms—as evidenced at locations such as Taos and mesa-top Ácoma. Numerous archeological sites, and particularly the Ancestral Puebloans' large abandoned complexes at Chaco Canyon and Mesa Verde, were attractions as well. The work of individuals such as ethnologist Frank Cushing and archeologist Adolph Bandelier, and institutions such as the joint Museum of New Mexico/School of American Archeology (1909), headed by Edgar Hewett, and the Laboratory of Anthropology (1927), funded by John D. Rockefeller, Jr., turned Santa Fe into an early center for archeological and Native American research.

Native peoples, the distinct local Hispanic culture, Santa Fe's dramatic natural setting, and a climate thought to be healthy, also attracted artists, intellectuals, the affluent, and developers of health resorts and sanatoriums. By the 1920s, preceded by Taos, Santa Fe emerged as a full artist colony, home to photographers, painters, sculptors, writers, and many more who came for the creative environment, came to convalesce, or were brought by patrons. Of the painters, early pioneers such as Carlos Vierra were followed by countless others, from visiting modernists such as Marsden Hartley, to groups that established themselves locally such as *Los Cinco Pintores*, to contemporary icons such as Georgia O'Keeffe (who lived in Abiquiu). Of the writers, Mary Austin made her home in Santa Fe, Willa Cather used it as a setting for her novel *Death Comes for the Archbishop*, Governor Lew Wallace wrote *Ben*



Santuario de Guadalupe is an adobe-style mission in Santa Fe built in 1781 that is now a museum.

Source: Karen Wiley.

Hur there, and D. H. Lawrence used the region as a retreat.

The physical city was likewise an important attraction. By the 1800s Santa Fe's architecture was a unique mixture of the formal and folk traditions of Spain and the Valley of Mexico which had, in turn, overlapped and blended with those of the Pueblo. Simple structures, courtyard homes, mission church complexes, and government buildings (such as the Palace of the Governors, begun in 1610) were built with thick walls of adobe brick, flat roofs of wood, and earth covering full logs (*vigas*) whose ends protruded to the exterior; broad porches (*portales*) often were attached. Santa Fe's equally hybrid town form represented a mixture of the local demands of the landscape and agricultural needs of the population with the Laws of the Indies (1573). The laws, which comprehensively guided the administration, land uses, and form of new towns built in Spain's conquered

lands, notably shaped the design and original uses of Santa Fe's plaza area. Americans brought to this architecture neoclassical design elements and mass-produced materials and, in 1862, a plaza re-landscaped as a New England-style town green and surrounded by commercial establishments.

Promoting Santa Fe

Politically isolated given New Mexico's delayed statehood (achieved in 1912), and left geographically isolated when it was bypassed by a main railroad line in 1880, Santa Fe did not follow the standard path of rapid industrial expansion. Starting in the 1890s it began to synthesize its three emerging roles as a center for those with an interest in Native American and Hispanic cultures, an artist colony, and a romantic/exotic urban/natural landscape into a unified, marketable identity with a unique, replicable aesthetic.

Chris Wilson has noted that early promoters of the Southwest such as Charles F. Lummis “cultivated western writers and painters to help wrap boosterism in a mantle of art, poetry, scholarly history, and ethnography.” In a similar way, to promote Santa Fe, the Atchison, Topeka, and Santa Fe Railway Company (AT&SF) employed painters such as Thomas Moran and writers such as Zane Grey and acquired works of local artists, placing images and descriptions of the region on its promotional materials. The AT&SF, as well as the Fred Harvey Company and local boosters, endeavored to promote a Santa Fe that was ancient, picturesque, and unchanging, home to a multicultural mix of Native American, Hispanic, and American peoples, colorful festivals (such as Santa Fe Fiesta), and a healthy and beautiful natural landscape.

Prominent citizens applied equal effort to shaping the city itself. In 1912, fearing a loss of Santa Fe’s picturesque qualities, a distinct architectural style was purposefully sought. In time two revival architectural styles came to comprise “Santa Fe style” as it applied to buildings, and both were later complemented by the development of a regional interior design aesthetic by individuals such as Mary Colter.

The first architectural style, Spanish Pueblo Revival, was defined by the simulation of thick adobe massing in walls, use of large timber *vigas* as well as lintels, use of deep-set windows and doors, and replication of local architectural elements such as *portales* and regionally iconic elements from New Mexico missions and Pueblo structures. Developed initially by Isaac H. Rapp, the style came to be defined by the Santa Fe Museum of Fine Arts, built in 1917 by the firm of Rapp, Rapp and Hendrickson; the Harvey Company–owned La Fonda Hotel (1921) demonstrated the style’s application to large-scale tourist lodging. The second, later-developed style, Territorial Revival, was largely created by John Gaw Meem, a well-known practitioner of Spanish Pueblo Revival. Territorial Revival adapted the straight lines, pediment-topped windows, and neoclassical (specifically Greek Revival) elements dominant during New Mexico’s years as a territory and combined them with adobe walls and coloring of earlier structures.

In 1912 a proposed city plan combined City Beautiful elements with this eclectic romantic

architectural revivalism. It called for the protection of narrow, winding streets, holding building permits to Santa Fe Style, and considered the entire city as a picturesque, compositional whole. Although never legally binding, a community consensus was achieved on new buildings, and preservation was advocated by prominent organizations such as the Old Santa Fe Association in 1926 and the Historic Santa Fe Foundation in 1961. In 1957 the Historic Ordinance codified the two architectural styles and regulated construction within a new district.

Cultural Destination

Today Santa Fe has suburban and exurban growth patterns common to the twenty-first-century interior West. But, unlike many western U.S. cities, Santa Fe benefited from virtually every wave of railroad, automobile, and air tourism over the past century and now draws between 1 million and 2 million visitors annually. More importantly, Santa Fe’s early efforts to convert the attractions of the region into a basis for an economy, and to enshrine its local identity into something unique and aesthetically complete, have made this community emblematic of multiple trends in cities across the United States.

Santa Fe is now an international center for folk, contemporary, and fine arts, as well as for performing arts, and is a vibrant Native American and Hispanic cultural center. An early model of what is often called “creative class” development, today Santa Fe is home to more than 300 galleries, is one of the nation’s largest art markets, and one of nine UNESCO-designated Creative Cities in the world. Santa Fe’s approach to design controls and historic restoration (often criticized for simultaneously leading to the destruction of certain historic structures) influenced the development of Colonial Williamsburg in the 1920s and is noted as an early example (both positively and negatively) of theming. The unique 1957 ordinance, one of the nation’s oldest, has influenced national trends in historic restoration, district creation, and urban design regulations. By the ordinance’s 50th anniversary in 2007, there were five districts protected at the heart of the city, and additional regulations addressed archeological resources and landscape preservation.

With a globally marketed identity as “The City Different,” a famous architectural and interior design style iconic of this identity, and controlled

areas where Santa Fe as an idea and an image can embody a complete experience encompassing everything from cuisine to daily activities, Santa Fe Style has come to represent a lifestyle as much as a physical location or aesthetic, and the name *Santa Fe* is now evoked to sell a vast array of products well beyond the Rio Grande Valley.

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See also City Planning; Creative Class; Themed Environments; Tourism; Urban Planning

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SANTIAGO DE COMPOSTELA, SPAIN

Santiago de Compostela, located in Finisterre in northwestern Spain, was named a UNESCO World Heritage City in 1985. It is the cultural city par excellence in Galicia, as demonstrated by the fact that it was declared a “European City of Culture” in 2000. The cultural offer is broad and diverse due to the wide variety of buildings and spaces located within the city to house different kinds of shows and events: the Auditorium of Galicia, theaters, the Congress and Exhibition Centre, and the Multiusos do Sar sports hall, in

addition to private halls and galleries devoted mainly to artistic innovation and new Galician artists. One of the most important sites in Christendom, the city was named a Holy City by Pope Alexander III (alongside Rome and Jerusalem). Modern-day Santiago de Compostela has a population of 94,000 persons; another 30,000 university students and regional government employees spend most of the day in town but are not registered in it.

Medieval City

The origins of the city of Santiago de Compostela as a shrine date from the discovery of the relics of James the Apostle in the ninth century AD, this heralding the beginning of the arrival of pilgrims from the north of the Iberian Peninsula and the Frankish Kingdom. However, it would not be until the eleventh century that this pilgrimage acquired great popularity, leading to the creation of a structured network of towns and cities in the north of the Iberian Peninsula, a network of Christian towns and cities of which the most important were Pamplona, Logroño, Santo Domingo de la Calzada, Burgos, Sahagún, León, Astorga, Sarria, and Santiago de Compostela, around which the Christian kingdoms of the north of the peninsula were founded. These towns and cities were connected with others, further to the north and on secondary pilgrim routes, such as Oviedo or Bilbao.

The Camino de Santiago, or Way of St. James in English, provided the basis for an economic and social network stretching between Compostela, the north of the Iberian Peninsula and the rest of Europe. The most significant towns and cities along the French route were Tours, Le Puy, Vézelay, Toulouse, Nimes, Bordeaux, and Paris. Various ports in the British Isles were also points of departure for the sea routes leading to Santiago, among them Plymouth, Canterbury, Portsmouth, Cork, and Dingle, as were cities belonging to the Hanseatic League, such as Hamburg, Kiel, Gdansk, Riga, Bergen, and Copenhagen.

As Goethe once said, Europe made itself by walking to Santiago, and much of its urban network was interconnected thanks to the pilgrim routes to Compostela. What is more, the towns and cities along the various routes, to a large extent, share the same kind of urban structure.

They are longitudinal in nature, with a generally regular pattern of criss-crossing side streets articulated around a main street in which the church dedicated to St. James and the cathedral occupy a prominent symbolic position in the city center. Another common characteristic is the high density of commercial establishments, due to the fact that for centuries the Way of St. James was the main artery for the exchange of goods in medieval Western Europe.

Contemporary City

Much of the urban life takes place in two adjacent areas: the Old Quarter and the Ensanche (new expansion area). The Old Quarter—declared a National Historic Site in 1941—is a former walled area, of which only a door remains, and has an irregular layout with medieval streets coming together at Obradoiro Square. Every building around this square offers an overview of the whole Galician history: the Xelmírez Palace, proof of the Romanesque and an example of civil art; the Reyes Católicos Hotel, a Gothic-Renaissance building with a plateresque facade, a former hospital, and now a Parador hotel; the San Xerome Palace, presently the office of the vice chancellor of the University of Santiago; and the classicistic Raxoi Palace, converted into the town hall. The cathedral prevails at this site. It is of Romanesque origin and here lie the remains of James the Apostle, which turned the city into one of the main pilgrimage destinations in Europe.

The increasing enrollments reached by the university in the 1960s and 1970s led to the creation of the Ensanche, which has a more regular layout but without the octagonal layout. A closed block framework in the courtyard with heights of around six to eight floors stands out here.

Both town sectors demarcate the city center, where business and leisure activities are concentrated and on the margins of which are the university campuses. The Southern Campus is the most remarkable. Its construction began in 1930 and it provides a harmonious and organized space where green spaces, faculty buildings, student residences, and university facilities are combined, as well as cultural and administrative facilities. The University of Santiago is one of the most traditional in Europe. In 1995 it celebrated its fifth centenary. However, it defines itself as an

enterprising institution with campuses that comprise 40,000 students and 2,000 professors.

*Rubén Lois González and
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See also Medieval Town Design; Tourism

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SÃO PAULO, BRAZIL

São Paulo is one of the largest metropolises in the world and is characterized by broad social and spatial inequalities. It is the largest and most important metropolis in Brazil and in South America, with an estimated 11 million inhabitants in the municipality and 20 million in the metropolitan region by 2010, distributed across 7,944 square kilometers (3,067 square miles). In 2005, the city produced 12.5 percent of the Brazilian gross domestic product and, as a sample of Brazilian inequalities, concentrated

both a significant part of the most modern productive activities associated with globalized businesses and a large poor population who tend to live in widely segregated spaces, mostly deprived of the benefits of urbanity and with low access to public policies and services. More recently, although living conditions have been improving, urban violence and a broad sense of insecurity have become central features of local sociability.

Those attributes are a product of a complex history, and the city was a provincial and unimportant center for centuries.

From Jesuit School to Modern City

The origins of the city date back to 1554, when members of the Society of Jesus founded a Jesuit school on a hill near the Anhangabaú River. Six years later São Paulo received the status of *Vila* and, in 1681, became the capital of the *capitanía* of São Paulo, a subnational unit governed hereditarily by appointees of the king of Portugal. Because the soil was not suitable for agricultural production, São Paulo was, for centuries, the point of departure of the *bandeiras*—inland expeditions in search of Indians to enslave, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and in search of precious metals and stones, during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In 1711 São Paulo became a city, but in 1748 the *capitanía* was incorporated into Rio de Janeiro. In 1765, the city returned to its earlier status, as part of a strategy by the Portuguese Crown to prevent the loss of territory to Spain, which ruled over the rest of South America.

São Paulo grew very slowly throughout those early centuries. With the Brazilian independence in 1822, the city became a provincial capital and five years later a law school was founded there, turning São Paulo into a relatively important intellectual center. During the second half of that century, coffee plantations became a highly profitable economic activity in the interior of the state. Those regions were connected to the Port of Santos by a railway in the 1870s, providing an export corridor that passed through the city. Unlike other Brazilian plantations, coffee in São Paulo was based not on slave labor but on immigrant labor, brought from Europe and Japan in several waves of institutionalized migration organized by the private producers and financed by the government. That was the

reason why the local economy did not change much after the abolition of slavery in 1888 and the inauguration of the republic in 1889. By that time, the city experienced its first period of intense demographic growth, jumping from 30,000 inhabitants in 1872 to nearly 240,000 in 1890, almost 85 percent of them of foreign origin. This ethnic and cultural mixture remained—the foreign population grew 13 times between 1890 and 1920—and is still a central feature of the city today.

The new century brought large urban transformations as well, including the development of exclusive areas for the so-called coffee barons. They were located near the old center and around the newly developed Avenida Paulista, built in 1891, and later in highly exclusive neighborhoods developed by a British company incorporating Garden City design elements. At the same time, the first skyscrapers were built in the historical center. Not far from there, tenements were being built in large scale to house the ever-growing population of low-paid workers. Although foreign companies contracted by the state government covered part of the city with services such as piped water, sewage, and electric tramways, a large part of the population remained without access, which caused the seasonal spread of infectious diseases.

A new cycle of economic growth started in the first decades of the twentieth century associated with some early industrial activities benefiting from a crisis of the coffee economy, as well as by the forced isolation caused by World War I, which contributed to industrialization through import substitution. In fact, the contribution of the city of São Paulo to the industrial added value of Brazil jumped from 8.3 percent in 1907 to 21.5 percent in 1928. This was accompanied by rapid demographic growth—the city reached 580,000 inhabitants in 1920—and by intense political conflicts, such as the 1917 urban strikes associated with anarchist labor movements, strongly repressed by the state.

The decades of 1920 and 1930 also witnessed intense cultural transformations. Similarly to other cities of the period, São Paulo housed an important cultural vanguard that had the *Semana de Arte Moderna de 1922* (Week of Modern Art of 1922) as one of its main manifestations. Brazilian modernism was engaged in a rupture with the academicist art expressions valued by the Brazilian elites and would

lead to the construction of a Brazilian tradition based on popular and vernacular cultural expressions.

From Modern City to Metropolis

The 1930s brought intense political change to Brazil. In 1930, Getúlio Vargas, a former congressman, minister, and state governor, led an armed movement of the elites of more peripheral states aiming to dislodge from the federal government the political and economic elites who had controlled Brazilian politics since the end of the empire. In 1932, the São Paulo elites resisted claiming autonomy, but were militarily defeated, in what became known as the *Revolução Constitucionalista*. In the following 15 years (8 of them under explicit authoritarian rule), Vargas centralized power and promoted a wide transformation of governmental structures and policies. In economic terms, the government intensified industrialization through import substitution, a policy that brought about the fast and continuous development of the Brazilian industrial sector, including heavy and infrastructure industries.

São Paulo was host to a significant part of the industrial plants associated with this effort, especially the automobile industry in the 1950s, which led to the increase of the participation of the metropolitan region of São Paulo in the national industrial production to 37 percent in 1959. This happened especially in the so-called ABC paulista region, which, in the next decades, became the most important center for Fordist industry and unionized labor force in Brazil.

The city received large public works during those decades, in part proposed by the master plan known as Plano de Avenidas, including a radial road and avenue system that replaced tramways with buses as the main public transportation and prepared the city for the private automobile. This urbanization based on tires forged the urban scenario of the past 50 years.

This period was also marked by intense growth and by the consolidation of a large metropolitan region. The population of the region grew 6.1 percent and 5.4 percent per year in the decades of 1950 and 1960, reaching 4.7 million inhabitants in 1960, mainly because of low-income migration from northeast Brazil. The 1964 military coup reinforced this pattern, as economic growth was intensified in an exclusionary way and political unrest strongly repressed.

Living in harsh economic conditions and with no low-income public housing policies, the majority of the population ended up living mainly in irregular settlements in the outskirts of the metropolis—the *periferias*—segregated regions produced by private developers with no state regulation, no infrastructure, and little access to public services. Although at present, tenements and shantytowns (*favelas*) are less important in São Paulo than in some other Brazilian cities, since the 1960s the most prevalent precarious housing solution has been the irregular settlement, which is not based on the invasion of empty plots but on the irregular (and sometimes illegal) sale of plots by private developers.

The resulting segregation pattern is concentric, as a joint result of infrastructure distribution, selective state regulation, and the land market. In the center lies the so-called *Centro expandido*, inhabited almost exclusively by richer social groups and concentrating the large majority of jobs, amenities, and activities. The outer regions correspond to extended and highly segregated *periferias*. In 1980, when the metropolitan region already housed 12.6 million people, the distance from the most remote regions to the center had already surpassed 40 kilometers (25 miles), which would consume as long as three hours to be crossed by bus. This urban feature of the exclusionary Brazilian development model became to be known as *urban espoliation*—the combination, under intense economic growth, of increasing poverty, high macro-segregation, and lack of urbanity for the majority of the population.

Return to Democracy and Economic Restructuring

The Brazilian transition to democracy was long and slow, but in 1985 the civilians returned to power and the 1980s were marked by intense political mobilization. By 1980, the labor movement had already returned powerfully, thus becoming an important actor of the transition, together with urban grassroots movements. The elections for governor and mayor returned in 1982 and 1985, respectively, pushing for more participation, accountability, and the reform of public policies, with intense pressure from below and from technical communities. A significant part of the recent improvement in social indicators is due to the effects of those changes.

But although the 1980s were politically strong, the economy was characterized by high inflation, high public debt and low economic growth. In fact, the period represented a large crisis in the import substitution model. After several failures, an economic plan—known as Plano Real—managed to control inflation in 1994. At the same time, the federal government substantially opened the Brazilian economy, leading to an important economic restructuring. As a result, wages decreased and unemployment, precarious jobs, and informality increased. São Paulo's share in the national industrial economy was reduced from 35.9 percent in 1990 to 25.7 percent in 2005, while tertiary positions became more relevant. Several studies, however, showed that if an area of 150 kilometers from the city is considered, the deconcentration almost disappears, in what the literature called *concentrated deconcentration*. The relative rise of service activities, however, was substantial, although the city still houses a significant Fordist economy. Since 2003, the already restructured local economy has returned to growth, based on secondary and tertiary activities, consolidating a new kind of centrality that combines old and new activities and enlarges its hinterland to a substantial part of South America. As part of this process, the city has received a new wave of international migrants, this time from Peru and Bolivia, who have come to work mainly in sweatshops in the garment district of the city.

As a result of the degrading labor market conditions, poverty increased substantially in São Paulo in the late 1990s, combining traditional forms of deprivation with new types of poverty associated with the lower levels of the globalized service economy. At the same time, however, social indicators and the access to public services improved in most areas of the city. In fact, basic services and social services—especially health and education—were almost universalized, although still with low quality. Urban violence, and different types of crime, grew. In the periferias, this urban experience, with its combination of daily contact with violence and hopes for a better future, led to the rise of vibrant cultural expressions, mainly in graffiti and music, including hip hop and rap. These expressions have been paralleled by the dissemination of representations of the periferias and the shantytowns in popular culture and in cultural production more generally, such as in the movies

and in the literature, in a recent social discovery of those spaces by society.

However, the sense of insecurity has become widespread, leading to the appearance of gated communities, even in lower-middle-class developments. In some regions, urban developers have created wealthy enclaves inside specific periferias. This process, also experienced by other cities in the world, restricted public space and created situations in which social distance and spatial proximity coexist, forging a spatial metaphor of Brazilian social inequalities. Although large gated communities are still localized phenomena, the sense of insecurity has changed buildings and public spaces all over the city through the spread of fences, gates, and surveillance equipment.

In spatial terms, the periferias and the shantytowns have become increasingly heterogeneous socially and territorially. Nevertheless, regardless of the improvements in public policies and in social heterogeneity, the center of the metropolis remains highly exclusive, and so does the spatial concentration of opportunities and amenities. The structure of macro-segregation, therefore, remains almost untouched and appears to be the most resilient and durable of the high social inequalities that characterize São Paulo, opposing well-located and -equipped spaces that house increasingly sophisticated service activities and high-income social groups, to very distant and relatively isolated peripheries, inhabited by the large majority of the population.

Observed at a distance, this historical trajectory turned São Paulo from a small and provincial center to the largest metropolis in South America, the home of vibrant cultural movements and economic activities that influence the whole region. Marked by segregation and social inequalities in both social and spatial terms, the city has retained and reproduced in new and more complex ways its exclusionary character, regardless of the important improvements achieved in the past decades. This large-scale combination of cosmopolitan and modern facets with old and new poverties, understood both socially and spatially, is what makes São Paulo one of the possible urban futures for many other cities.

Eduardo Marques

See also Buenos Aires, Argentina; Crime; Divided Cities; *Favela*; Gated Community

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SASSEN, SASKIA

Saskia Sassen (1949–) is widely recognized as a preeminent scholar in the field of global city theory; indeed, she is credited with having coined the term *global city*. Her early works in particular are considered seminal contributions to the understanding of global cities. They have provided a foundation for subsequent theoretical and empirical explorations of the links between globalization and urbanization, and the sociospatial impact of capitalist economic restructuring.

Sassen was born in 1949 in the Netherlands and moved as a child to Buenos Aires. Her undergraduate studies were undertaken at universities in Argentina and Italy. In 1973 she earned an MA from the University of Poitiers, France, and in 1974 Sassen completed a PhD in economics and sociology at Notre Dame University in Indiana.

She has held many academic posts, including professor of urban planning at Columbia University in New York City and professor of law and sociology at the University of Chicago. She currently is the Robert S. Lynd Professor of Sociology at Columbia University and Centennial Visiting Professor in sociology at the London School of Economics. Sassen is a much sought-after policy advisor and is a member of the Club of Rome, a prestigious international think tank.

Her early books, *The Global City* (1991) and *Cities in a World Economy* (1994), followed the work of John Friedmann and Wolff Goetz in the 1980s on “world cities.” In them, Sassen argued against the intuitive supposition that in a world of flows—of flexible, globalized production and instantaneous electronic communication—place would no longer matter. Instead she demonstrated that while much economic production was being dispersed around the globe, there was at the same time a parallel concentration of other economic activities in a network of special places—some 30 or 40 global cities that acted as command and control centers of the global economy. These global cities were not just the location of transnational corporate headquarters but included a vast supporting complex of financial and business services.

Sassen’s research led her to conclude that global city formation resulted in a dual and highly polarized labor market. On one hand a global corporate elite earned high salaries and enjoyed an extremely high standard of material well-being; on the other hand the work of the elite was supported by a class of low-wage service workers, many of them immigrants. Thus, her work revealed two essential contradictions in global city formation. The first is that while global cities command and control the “placeless” flow of capital, they themselves are very place-bound. The second is that the formation and growth of the global city entails the linked enrichment of some of its residents and the impoverishment of others. The two groups live and work in the same city, yet have vastly different experiences of it.

Sassen argued that global cities are linked in a transnational network of places. That insight represented a break from earlier urban studies that viewed cities as being embedded in national economic systems and mainly linked to other cities

within the nation-state's boundaries. The network of global cities she describes is a hierarchical one, with the most intensely linked cities forming an alpha group that manage the world's economy. Whereas *The Global City* dealt solely with three "alpha" cities (New York, London, Tokyo), *Global Networks/Linked Cities* (2002) discussed the "beta" cities in the global South, among them Mexico City, Beirut, and Buenos Aires. These mid-range global cities, Sassen believes, play an important role in connecting regional economies to the global economy.

In later works Sassen further developed her understanding of the unfolding of economic restructuring in global cities by looking at immigrants and migration, mechanisms of governance, and the role of technology in cross-border flows of capital, information, and people. Sassen's perspective on global city formation is critical, particularly of its concomitant social polarization. Thus, her more recent interest in the regulatory governance of economic globalization is directed toward finding "a new governing architecture" that is socially and environmentally just. In that regard, her work considers the multiple scales at which we are governed in an age of increasing globalization and cross-border flows. The movement of goods, money, people, and ideas, she points out, is subject to myriad regulations imposed by supranational bodies like the European Union and the World Trade Organization, by nation-states, and by sub-national governments and agencies. One of her key assertions is that although the authority of the nation-state is being "unbundled," it has not been eliminated; the rise in importance of urban regions does not inevitably lead to the "hollowing out" of the nation-state.

With respect to technology, she has shown that global technology networks have created a new geography in which the financial centers of global cities are more tightly connected to each other than to their own regional peripheries. Her research also explores the potential of new technologies to create new political spaces. For example, she believes the Internet provides an opportunity for even poor people to organize at a global scale.

Sassen contends that economic restructuring and global city formation make necessary the development of new methods of research and analysis to capture and understand the changes

under way around the world. This is reflected in a major research project she directs at the University of Chicago, the Transnationalism Project. It has two major components: Global Governance and Migration. The goal of this interdisciplinary project is to link general theoretical concepts to more detailed and specific empirically grounded research. In this project, Sassen and her coresearchers hope to determine whether or not new regimes of global governance are emerging.

Sassen considers herself a global citizen, having lived and worked in several countries. This has led her to put enormous store on belonging in many places. "My life does not allow for exclusive loyalty to one single country or nation-state." Clearly, Saskia Sassen is a scholar to whom the "global" is not just the object of research but also a way of living.

Douglas Young

See also Global City; Globalization; Urban System; World City

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SAVANNAH, GEORGIA

Savannah boasts one of the most celebrated urban plans in the United States, and the city is

often cited as the country's most beautiful. Its downtown area in particular has successfully balanced the needs of architecture and open space, pedestrians and automobiles, in a harmonious manner that is seen as a model for redefining urban design principles in the twenty-first century. Beyond its downtown and ring of historic street-car suburbs, however, Savannah has witnessed the same unremarkable urban sprawl that characterizes most other American cities.

The city was founded in 1733 by General James Oglethorpe, the leader of a philanthropic corporation of English gentlemen granted trusteeship of the colony of Georgia. They sought to establish a charitable colony for England's urban poor and continental refugees of religious persecution. Oglethorpe's urban plan for Savannah provided a map for this egalitarian idealism, rooted in Christian charity and the growing spirit of rationalism of his day. Oglethorpe sited his colonial capital 17 miles inland from the Atlantic Ocean on the south bank of the Savannah River, where the ground rose about 40 feet above the water—truly high ground in a coastal region dominated by tidal marshes and low-lying barrier islands.

The Original Oglethorpe Plan

Oglethorpe devised a plan linking the region to the city in which each freeholder received a roughly 45-acre farm lot, a 5-acre garden lot, and a 60-by-90-foot town lot. His city plan comprised a cellular network of six wards, configured in two rows of three. Each ward centered on a public square flanked the east and west by pairs of "trust lots" reserved for public buildings as determined by the trustees. To the north and south of the square and trust lots lay four residential "tything" blocks, each comprising ten lots set in two rows of five divided by a lane. The 1733 plan also incorporated a graduated hierarchy of impressively wide civic streets and narrower utilitarian streets, each in full and half-width versions. Civic streets make contact with the central square in each ward—the 75-foot-wide streets aligning with the center of the square and the central east-west street (now Broughton Street) dividing the two rows of wards, along with the 37½-foot-wide streets skirting the edges of the squares, while the utilitarian streets make no contact with the squares and (at first) had no buildings

fronting them—that is, the 45-foot-wide north-south streets dividing the wards and the 22½-foot-wide lanes dividing the tything lots. These distinctions between civic and utilitarian streets persist to the present day.

Historians have cited an impressive range of potential sources of inspiration for the Oglethorpe plan. The appearance of multiple squares in Savannah strongly resembles the network of squares developed in London's west end, beginning in the late seventeenth century. The specific configuration of streets and public space, however, may derive from the Renaissance town plans or the Forbidden City in Beijing. Freemasonry may have influenced the specific size of the streets.

Expansion of the Plan

The evolution and incremental growth of the city plan distinguished Savannah from other planned cities of the period. In founding Savannah, Oglethorpe laid out a relatively modest town of six wards. He initially plotted out only what was necessary, but he allowed for growth as needed by surrounding the town with a common. The expansion of Savannah's plan into the common through a series of at least six separate phases illustrated the remarkable flexibility of Oglethorpe's ward system. Unlike a typical grid with fixed dimensions, the specific dimensions and even the relative proportions of a Savannah ward could be elongated or compressed without removing any components or detracting from its inherently human scale. For example, the wards added in the 1790s to the east and west of the original six wards were modified to fit the available common land by diminishing the size of the square and reducing the number of tything lots.

The planning logic inherent in the Savannah plan guided architectural development in the city's downtown area since Oglethorpe's time. Public buildings were allocated prominent sites on trust lots in each ward, effectively distributing institutions of government, commerce, and religion throughout the town and thereby stemming the emergence of a dominant center of power. Over time, the end tything lots facing the square became desirable for prominent mansions and commercial buildings.

The configuration of residential building lots in Savannah resulted in a distinctive housing form. In

Savannah, the relatively small 60-by-90-foot residential lot backing onto a rear laneway encouraged builders to fill the front half of the site for the principal house and situate a smaller carriage house at the rear fronting the lane. The presence of rear lanes eliminated the need for private side driveways. Savannah houses front the civic streets and, by the 1820s, sought greater grandeur by raising the main living space a full story above the street accessed by a prominent staircase and porch. The rhythmic pattern of exterior residential staircases became a defining architectural feature of downtown Savannah.

The relatively small block size defined in the Oglethorpe plan, however, limited the scale of architectural development. By the twentieth century, large developments were accommodated by consolidating a pair of trust lots and the street between into a single building site, such as the 1930s expansion of the 1895 U.S. Post Office at Wright Square.

Urban Beautification in the Early 1800s

By the late eighteenth century, Savannah's city council began taking action to improve the health and beauty of the growing town. The council passed ordinances regulating the planting, care, and protection of trees along the city's streets to provide shade and absorb the "noxious vapor" from nearby marshes. Quite remarkable for the time, visual concerns prompted regulations that calibrated the distance a tree should be planted from the lot line with the width of a street.

The continued expansion of the city into the commons during the early 1800s presented an opportunity to enhance the civic grandeur inherent in Oglethorpe's plan. Upon laying out a third row of wards, the city created a new east-west avenue, at double the width of earlier major streets and divided by a grassy tree-lined boulevard. Almost immediately, public institutions and private citizens alike recognized the potential prestige of fronting this grand avenue, which functioned much like a linear square. The creation of South Broad Street demonstrated the flexibility in the Savannah plan to accommodate changing scales and hierarchies. In the 1830s, the city added a second broad avenue with a boulevard (Liberty Street).

By the early nineteenth century, the principally utilitarian role of the squares gave way to a greater emphasis on civic beauty, as the erection of monuments and fountains signaled the new stature of the city's green spaces. Beginning in 1825 with the monument to General Nathaneal Greene, a 50-foot-tall obelisk designed by noted Philadelphia architect William Strickland, a series of monuments was erected in the squares along Bull Street over the next 80 years. The other monuments commemorated Count Casimir Pulaski, William Washington Gordon, Sergeant Jasper, and General James Oglethorpe.

The arrival of the railroad along West Broad Street rapidly changed the social complexion of the city's west side from a desirable address for the city's elite to an increasingly industrial character. Founded in 1833, the Central of Georgia Railway rapidly grew into one of the country's largest railroad companies, with tracks extending throughout the southeast. The company's extensive complex of industrial and administrative buildings (remaining today as one of the best preserved nineteenth-century railroad complexes in the country) transformed West Broad Street into the principal conduit of freight to the city's bustling port. A second railroad complex, the Savannah, Florida and Western Railroad, fronted East Broad Street. The two complexes encouraged the development of affordable one-story worker cottages along the east and west edges of the city, whose clapboard construction and placement at grade differed notably from the raised brick residences that defined the more central area of the city.

One of the most remarkable and unusual urban features of Savannah is its complex of riverfront warehouses connected to the city by terraced lanes and numerous iron bridges. Unlike the predominantly flat and low-lying surrounding landscape, Savannah's riverfront facilities straddled a steep 35-foot bluff. Warehouses erected at the base of the bluff rose five stories above the river but only two stories above the top of the bluff facing the city. A series of cobbled ramps and stone retaining walls installed in the 1850s using ballast stones from incoming ships solidified the bluff into a distinctive set of terraced lanes, spanned by iron bridges to provide at-grade access to the upper commercial stories of the warehouses—collectively called Factors Walk. This unique urban landscape stands as one of the

best preserved ensembles of nineteenth-century port architecture in the country.

Late-Nineteenth-Century Suburbs

Savannah's suburban expansion after the Civil War (1861–1865) extended mainly southward, constrained on the east and west by industrial complexes and marshy land. South of Gaston Street, where the system of wards utilizing Oglethorpe's planning formula ends, the city's development employed a fairly regular grid of streets, yet included one Oglethorpe feature—the east–west service lanes bisecting major blocks, which remained an integral component of the city's suburban development well south of downtown until the 1950s. As in downtown, the lanes carry the burden of utility services, allowing the principal streets and fronts of properties to remain free of telephone and electricity wires and garbage receptacles.

In the early 1900s, the City Beautiful movement influenced a series of suburban developments—Baldwin Park, Ardsley Park, and Chatham Crescent. Broad tree-lined avenues, numerous squares, and large houses characterize all of these neighborhoods. Most ambitious was Chatham Crescent, where a central grand axis follows Atlantic Avenue, broadening into a palm-tree-lined green mall for a half a mile of its length with its axis terminated by the enormous 1929 Savannah High School. Two crescents curving in opposite directions straddle this axis, leading to secondary streets that in turn lead to a pattern of squares farther south. To the east, the city laid out Daffin Park in 1907, an 80-acre park designed by landscape architect John Nolen. Its symmetrical pattern of axial and diagonal streets provided a framework for a diverse range of Progressive-era recreational functions.

The increasing importance of the automobile during the early twentieth century not only facilitated further suburban expansion, as in other cities, but also directly impacted the integrity of the city's celebrated downtown plan. Local automobile enthusiasts lobbied to cut streets through many of the downtown squares to provide more direct and rapid movement. In 1935, the U.S. Department of Transportation routed U.S. Highway 17 through the city along Montgomery Street, bisecting Franklin, Liberty, and Elbert Squares. The destruction of the three squares paved the way for

several later urban renewal developments along this corridor that would further erode the plan in the 1960s and 1970s.

Preservation Movement

The most significant factor influencing Savannah's urban form since the mid-twentieth century has been the successful historic preservation movement. Following World War II, the demolition of many empty historic houses to salvage their highly valued Savannah grey bricks for use in new suburban construction typified the mixed regard for the city's heritage. Typical of the time, city politicians and businessmen believed modernization, and especially more parking for cars, would help stem the gradual demise of the city's downtown core. To that end, the venerable 1870s City Market building in Ellis Square was demolished in 1954 to be replaced by a parking structure. The fight to save the market, although ultimately unsuccessful, galvanized local citizens, concerned about the increasing loss of heritage buildings, to create a more effective preservation organization. The following year, the Historic Savannah Foundation was established, and in the following years the foundation spearheaded the preservation of hundreds of houses, utilizing a revolving fund that became a national role model.

Immediately following World War II, downtown Savannah experienced a brief resurgence with the construction of several movie theaters and the International-style Drayton Arms Apartments, the first air-conditioned apartment building in the state of Georgia. Despite such developments, Savannah experienced many of the same urban pressures that affected other American cities as a result of growing suburbanization and the decline of its inner city. Significant institutions and White residents relocated to the southern suburbs, while the opening of Oglethorpe Mall in 1969 precipitated the gradual closure of all major retail stores downtown. The city employed conventional urban renewal strategies to stem the decline of downtown Savannah, most conspicuously with the enormous Savannah Civic Center erected on the west side of downtown along Montgomery Street and opened in 1974. Citizens and politicians alike had insisted on a downtown location, even though the Civic Center and its large parking lot obliterated nine city blocks and parts of eight streets.

The founding of the Savannah College of Art and Design in 1978 greatly enhanced preservation efforts in the city. The college created a campus by rehabilitating historic buildings, especially institutional and industrial buildings that are otherwise not easily converted to new uses. Beginning with the Savannah Volunteer Guards Armory building on Bull Street, the campus has grown to comprise over 60 historic buildings in downtown and midtown Savannah. The designation in 1966 of downtown Savannah as the nation's largest National Historic Landmark District, comprising more than 1,500 historic structures, testified to the remarkable success of the preservation movement. In 1996, the city adopted a comprehensive set of zoning ordinances, called the Chadbourne Guidelines, to protect and steer future preservation and development efforts in this district.

Better than most other historic cities, Savannah has retained a balance between preserving its architectural and urban heritage and accommodating the changing needs of a living city. The city has become a model of humane urbanism and urban beauty.

Robin Williams

See also City Planning; Parks; Suburbanization; Urban Planning

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SERT, JOSEP LLUÍS

Josep Lluís Sert (1902–1983) was born in Barcelona, Spain, the son of a successful textile manufacturer. Sert studied architecture there in the 1920s and, along with some of his classmates, became dissatisfied with then-mainstream classical design. Under his leadership they invited Le Corbusier to Barcelona, giving him an airplane tour of the city. This was the beginning of a lifelong friendship between Sert and the influential Paris-based modernist architect.

Sert began designing apartment buildings and a jewelry store in Barcelona, and in 1931, around the same time as the establishment of the Second Spanish Republic, Sert and his Catalan associates began publishing an avant-garde journal, *Actividades Contemporanea*. They also participated in the first meeting of the Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM; International Congress of Modern Architecture) to take place outside of northern Europe, held in Barcelona in 1932. One outcome was the group's production of the Macià plan for Barcelona, developed with Le Corbusier. Along with the Amsterdam General Extension plan from the same time by CIAM President Cor van Eesteren, this plan was the first to use the CIAM four functions of dwelling, work, transportation, and recreation to reorganize a metropolitan environment to improve working-class living and health conditions. This plan had the official support of the Catalan government and generated considerable enthusiasm in Barcelona, where it remains an object of fascination. It called for the further extension of the city with new "redent" superblocks similar to those of Le Corbusier's *Radiant City* (shown at the third meeting of CIAM in 1930 and published in 1935), new highways and rail infrastructure, the modernization of the port, and the construction of a new "leisure city" for workers south of the city along the coast. Only the Casa Bloc, a single housing block, was actually

built from this plan, although Sert also designed a tuberculosis clinic in Barcelona and some schools for the Catalan government at this time as well.

In July 1936, Sert began living mostly in Paris, where he worked for the Spanish government's tourist board and continued his CIAM activities. He became friends with the Zagreb CIAM émigré Ernest Weissmann and with Le Corbusier's interior design associate Charlotte Perriand. The three worked on a planned "popular" publication of the results of the famous fourth CIAM meeting, held between Athens and Marseille in 1933, a version of which was later published by Sert as *Can Our Cities Survive?* (1942). At this time Sert was commissioned, along with Madrid architect Luis Lacasa, to design the Spanish Pavilion at the 1937 Paris Exhibition. This important work housed propaganda exhibits and artworks like Picasso's *Guernica*, and Alexander Calder's *Fountain of Mercury*. With the fall of the Spanish Republic, Sert and Moncha left Europe, sailing first to Havana, and from there arriving in New York in June 1939.

Once in the United States Sert practiced briefly with Weissmann, who had also emigrated to New York, and then in 1941 joined another émigré, Paul Lester Wiener, in founding the firm Town Planning Associates. Wiener had connections with the U.S. State Department and he and Sert began to be commissioned to plan new towns in Latin America; the commissions in Latin America formed the bulk of the firm's work until its dissolution in 1959. With the help of Harvard Chair of Architecture Walter Gropius, Sert lectured and taught on urbanism in American modernist design schools. In 1944 he signaled a new direction in his CIAM thinking with the essay "The Human Scale in City Planning," in which he followed Lewis Mumford in emphasizing the cultural importance of pedestrian civic centers and calling for new cities to be built in the form of compact, walkable "neighborhood units." These ideas were demonstrated in Sert and Wiener's Brazilian Motor City project of 1944, which was exhibited at the Museum of Modern Art in New York in 1947. The firm was then commissioned by a democratically elected government in Peru for a plan for the new industrial port of Chimbote and a master plan for Lima, the latter designed with Ernesto Rogers, an important Italian CIAM member. After a military coup in Peru, Sert and Wiener began working extensively in Colombia, where

they were commissioned for master plans for Tumaco, Medellín, Bogotá, and Cali. They established a local CIAM group and advocated, as they had in Peru, new urban planning legislation, much of which was then enacted. In 1949 Le Corbusier joined Sert, Wiener, and Colombian CIAM members in developing a master plan for Bogotá. Sert's Medellín (1948) and Bogotá (1949–1952) plans were significant in attempting to limit the physical spread of these rapidly growing industrial cities while accommodating much higher population densities and planning for efficient vehicular and pedestrian circulation. Unlike Le Corbusier's plans, such as that for the new Indian provincial capital of Chandigarh (1950–1960), which used some elements of the Bogotá plan, including the "7V" categorization of the highway routes, Sert's plans did not place the main emphasis on the monumental core but instead sought to increase pedestrian circulation throughout the city, retaining what are now usually called "urban" qualities, while still advocating the use of Corbusian modern architecture.

At the sixth meeting of CIAM in 1947, Sert was chosen as president of CIAM, and at the seventh CIAM in 1949, held in the historic town of Bergamo, Italy, Sert began to advocate the importance of the pedestrian core of the city, contrasting the high urban quality of Bergamo with what he called the "chaos" of modern industrial cities. For the eighth meeting of CIAM, held in 1951 in Hoddesdon near London, Sert selected the theme "The Heart of the City" and in his opening address insisted on the political as well as cultural importance of urban spaces for face-to-face discussion and demonstration, presciently pointing out the dangers of new mass media-based politics. Unfortunately, none of his urban projects in Brazil, Peru, or Colombia was built as designed (although some elements of the Colombian plans were implemented later), and his work in Venezuela (1951–1953) for industrial towns along the Orinoco and Caroní rivers (the site of the later Ciudad Guayana) did not materialize.

In 1953 Sert was appointed dean of the Harvard Graduate School of Design at the suggestion of Walter Gropius; while there he began to restructure the curriculum to focus on what he began to call *urban design*. This term had been used occasionally by Eliel Saarinen at his Cranbrook Academy of Art in the 1940s, but Sert was the first

to make it into a professional discipline that sought to link architecture with planning and (to some extent) landscape architecture. At Harvard he began a series of urban design conferences in 1956, and these had a large and continuing impact on the field, though his efforts to alter the direction of postwar American urbanization patterns proved to have only a limited impact, much of it evident in his campus architecture and planning. His campus projects include major works for Harvard University, Boston University, and the University of Guelph, Ontario. His and Wiener's ambitious plan for Havana (1955–1957) was not carried out because of the Cuban Revolution in 1959.

Sert's unpublished writings of this time reveal that he had rejected what he called the "functionalist dream cities of the 1920s" and instead admired the active street life of cities like Bogotá and New York. Related ideas would soon be developed by Jane Jacobs into a full-fledged rejection of Le Corbusier and modernism, though this was a step Sert was never willing to take. Jacobs, then an architectural journalist, first voiced her ideas about the importance of pedestrian urban street life at the first Harvard Urban Design conference in 1956. In 1960 Sert launched the world's first professional Master of Urban Design program at Harvard. This was a joint degree program in which all the students were also professional master's students in architecture, landscape architecture, or planning. Sert hired Willo von Moltke to head this program in 1961; von Moltke was a planning associate of Edmund N. Bacon in Philadelphia who had overseen the urban design plan for the Society Hill area and the work of I. M. Pei within it. Various faculty taught in the program, including the landscape architect Hideo Sasaki, the historian Eduard Sekler, and the planner Jaqueline Tyrwhitt. It also included Fumihiko Maki from 1962 to 1965 and various visitors such as Shadrach Woods. Sert also introduced the use of computers into urban design at the Harvard Graduate School of Design in 1966 and chose the architect of its new building, John Andrews, before his retirement there as dean in 1969. By this point, however, the modernist planning direction he represented was under challenge from a variety of directions, and his efforts at the Harvard Graduate School of Design are still often criticized as elitist and insensitive to the demolition of historic

buildings. In the early 1970s his firm was commissioned by the New York State Urban Development Corporation to design housing at the "new town in town" of Roosevelt Island and in Yonkers, New York. These projects attempted to soften the usual image of high-rise housing and to include more communal facilities within them.

In the 1970s Sert was active in efforts to promote the UN focus on human settlements, which resulted in the Habitat II conference in Vancouver, British Columbia, in 1974. These efforts also included architects Nader Ardalan and Moshe Safdie. He also worked on an unfinished book, *Balanced Habitat*, and continued to practice architecture in Cambridge, Massachusetts, and Ibiza, Spain, until his death in 1983. In subsequent years much of his work has been neglected and is usually now seen as part of mid-century brutalist modernism. Until recently there has been little awareness of how Sert's urbanistic ideas differed from those of Le Corbusier and how important his role was in advancing the set of ideas that are now identified with the term *urban design*.

Eric Mumford

See also Architecture; City Planning; Le Corbusier; Urban Design

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SEWER

The city constantly produces liquid waste; as a result, sewers exist as a necessary element of urban structure. In general terms a *sewer* is an underground carriage system that transports *sewage* from its source to disposal or treatment facilities. This network is distributed throughout the physical structure of the city, and it functions by constantly collecting and transporting waste from one area of the city to another. Despite the fact that *sewage* is often understood to be synonymous with human waste the actual content and composition of sewage varies depending on both its origin (i.e., industrial, household, storm drains, etc.) and the type of sewer system that is in place (i.e., sanitary, storm, or a combined system). Taken as a basic structural problem for any form of urbanized space, the sewer falls under the combined purview of civil engineering and public health. Whereas the need for some form of waste management system is undoubtedly a prerequisite for the lived existence of the city, the precise nature of this "need" requires careful analysis.

The sewer is the spatial expression and localization of the need for sanitation, but this need is not strictly pragmatic. In fact the demand for sanitation extends beyond the limits of biological need and relates to a set of moral principles and regulations that govern and define the "good life." This moral dimension is evidenced in urban topography as the sites that are set aside for the processing and containment of waste paradoxically contaminate their surroundings, lowering property values, and promoting the formation of slums. This moral dimension shapes both the various practices and interpretations that operate both in and on the sewer. For instance the Cloaca Maxima in Rome

(one of the world's earliest and largest sewage systems) served as the interment site for the remains of both the Roman Emperor Elagabalus and Saint Sebastian (the seventeenth-century Italian artist Ludovico Carracci commemorates the disposal of the latter in his famous painting titled *The Body of St. Sebastian Thrown into the Cloaca Maxima*). Disposing of the remains in the city's sewer system expresses a form of absolute moral condemnation. The association between the condemned or marginalized social groups in general and sewers is extensive. The role of the physical structure of the sewer in this relationship is dynamic, as it acts as the site of both exclusion and resistance. While any one of the numerous historical associations between urban poverty and sewers can serve as an example of the former, an effective example of the latter is provided by both the Warsaw Ghetto Uprising and the Battle of Stalingrad. In each conflict the sewers became a key strategic point in the struggle to control the city. The conflictual nature of the moral dimension of the sewer extends into the various representations of the sewer in popular culture, which range from moralistic tracts against the poverty and crime to the lurid and fantastic representations that are found in literature and film.

Sewers, Sanitation, and Morals

The sewer exists at the intersection of pragmatic needs and moral demands and, as such, it is both a necessary public utility and a material expression of a desire for purity. It is a site within that city through which the idea of human life is simultaneously formed and articulated. The complicated nature of the sewer and its relationship to the city requires a diverse set of theoretical tools. Authors such as David L. Pike and Donald Reid draw from a diverse set of theoretical resources (ranging from critical theory to psychoanalysis) to form sophisticated readings of the history of sewers. In addition to the question of sanitation, purity and human (as opposed to animal) life are directly connected to the concept of biopolitics in the work of thinkers such as Michel Foucault and Giorgio Agamben. From this perspective the sewer operates within a network of associated technologies and techniques that are used to define life within the state. By focusing on the shifts in the various rhetoric(s), knowledge(s), and practice(s) that surround the

sewer and define its place within an episteme, it is possible to question the role of the sewer in the constitution of subjects (i.e., Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann's modernization of Paris involved a radical expansion and modernization of the city's sewer system, which by 1878 was approximately 600 kilometers long). This in turn brings us to critically analyze the associations that connect sewers and waste to specific groups of subjects (e.g., the untouchable caste [or Dalit] in India and South Asia and the homeless in Western societies). Referring to the work of Michel Foucault and Ian Hacking this approach can be characterized as a form of historical ontology or dynamic nominalism that focuses on how the interaction between the practice of naming and what is named shapes the lived world. By regarding the sewer as the intersection of a set of dynamic discursive and technological processes with the material world, it is possible to open up the critical space that is necessary for social critique and social change.

The Sewer as Underworld and Dreamscape

The sewer is hidden below the foundations of the city. This fact alone brings with it a whole series of metaphysical associations with what can broadly be referred to as the underworld. The stigma of its spatial location is further compounded by what the sewer both conceals and transports, yet, despite the fact that it traffics in the offensive by-products of urban life, its labyrinthine passages remain the object of a forbidden sense of wonder. There is an almost irrepressible curiosity that is associated with the sewer. It is this curiosity that compels us to wonder what exactly is under the manhole. This sense of wonder gives rise to the diverse representations of the sewer in both literature and film. In our imaginations we discover a vast underworld swarming with a seemingly infinite variety of criminals, outcasts, and monsters. From Victor Hugo's description of the sewers of nineteenth-century Paris in *Les Misérables*, to the giant alligators of Thomas Pynchon's *V.* and the elaborate underworlds found in the work Haruki Murakami, to films such as *Them!* (1954), *Alligator* (1980), and *C.H.U.D.* (1984), the sewer is the site of the impossible, the monstrous, and the transgressive. In literature and film the sewer acts as the stage where our transgressive fantasies can be played out.

Within the lived city the sewer plays a similar transgressive role as it provides us with a space in which the imaginary excess of our desires can be freely deposited. In this sense the dense network of sewers and service tunnels that reside just below the surface of the city exist as a nostalgic remnant of the first architectural object: the labyrinth. Like the labyrinth, the sewer is built to both conceal and contain. Yet, this still leaves us with the question of what is being contained and who it is being concealed from. With regard to the labyrinth, this answer is simple: Minos commissioned Daedalus to build the labyrinth to contain the Minotaur and therefore conceal his shame (the Minotaur was the progeny of Minos's wife Pasiphaë and a bull). The Minotaur—unlike its close relatives the centaur and the satyr—shares none of man's nobility precisely because its head is bestial and thus it serves as the paradigmatic symbol of the uncontainable and unthinking desire of the unconscious. Much like the labyrinth of Greek mythology the sewer conceals the lower and shameful aspect of life. Its function is to contain this bad form of life and thus separate it from the good. As such, it is the site of a perpetual and compulsive expulsion, but the expulsion is always necessarily incomplete. It contains the shame of the body's base functions, but it is incapable of eliminating these functions altogether. Despite all of the intricacies of containment, filtration, and treatment, there is still waste and contamination. The sewer is thus an irreducible site of both revulsion and transgressive fantasy.

Based on a psychoanalytic approach, Jacques Lacan argues desire becomes evident at the point at which the demand for sanitation extends beyond the need for it. This desire is not a relation to an object but to a lack. It is the desire to close the gap that is constitutive of subjectivity and, by extension, the city. It is the desire for an ideal city and the ideal form of life that it promises to contain. It is the desire for this ideal that compels the subject to designate a form of life that is a "waste" and to thus extend the contamination of the sewer by associating it with areas of human waste. The sewer and its contamination thus become an attempt to define and localize the gap that exists between the actual and ideal. The subjects that live in or near the sewer become a lower form of life or, to borrow Walter Benjamin and Giorgio Agamben's terminology, they become "bare" life. Yet, despite

all efforts to contain and sterilize, the gap between the actual and the ideal remains within the image of the “good” life. This gap is concentrated in particular sites within the urban fabric, but it is distributed throughout the body of the city; without it the sanitary order of the city is impossible. As Peter Stallybrass and Allon White suggest, we cannot analyze the psychic domain without examining the processes that connect the body, topography, and the social formation. Thus, the sewer and other contaminated sites open up the possibility of a psychoanalytic approach to the built environment.

Joshua Ben David Nichols

See also Rome, Italy; Urban Planning

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SEX AND THE CITY

Cities both constrain and enable diverse forms of sexual pleasure. The links between sex and the city have been theorized in relation to the sexual lives of urban inhabitants and the erotic potential of city landscapes. The majority of sexual relations that take place in cities are heterosexual, and yet much of the work that has explicitly addressed urban sexual life has focused on lesbian and gay lives, sex work, and other “deviant” sexual practices. This entry charts how certain forms of sexuality and certain urban spaces in a minority of cities have come to dominate debates about urban sexualities. It concludes by considering how these debates might be extended by attending to a wider range of urban sites in cities around the world.

Eroticized Space

Cities have been vilified as morally dubious places of iniquity for much of human history. The great wave of European and North American urbanization that followed the Industrial Revolution disrupted older forms of kinship and family life as people migrated to cities in search of work, lived in new forms of dwellings, and adjusted their quotidian lives to the clock-time of industrial modernity. These new forms of urban life and the anonymity and freedom afforded by large, concentrated populations enabled unorthodox sexual practices and the development of new subcultures based around minority sexualities. In this way, cities themselves have become eroticized—there is the possibility of sexual adventure to be found in the circulation of the crowd, the comingling of different classes in public space, and the spectacle of the electrified city at night.

Initially identified by the poet Baudelaire on the streets of *fin de siècle* Paris, the flâneur, or gentlemanly stroller, has become emblematic of the erotic tensions underpinning the enjoyment of urban life. The nineteenth-century flâneur strolled the streets of Paris, idly observing the city and its inhabitants and engaging his senses with all of the pleasures the

city had to offer, including its women. Despite his heterosexual origins, the figure of the flâneur has been adopted by writers who have explored the possibilities for homoerotic pleasure in the city. Although usually perceived to be male, the flâneur is a frequent figure in lesbian novels and is often used as a mechanism for exploring the performance of female masculinities. Nevertheless, in negotiating the city's streets, the lesbian flâneur must also negotiate the many ways in which heterosexism and patriarchy constrain women's use of public space.

There are certainly similarities between the flâneur's pleasure-seeking strolls through the city streets and the act of homoerotic cruising. Cruising exploits the ambiguities of encounters on the city streets—the cruiser's glance can easily be interpreted as a modest interaction intended to enforce anonymity and separation, rather than an invitation for connection. Given this ambiguity, cruising is more effective in those urban sites where the cruiser knows he (or she) might find others looking for similar encounters. Consequently, cruising is enacted through an embodied understanding of the erotic potential of specific (urban) sites. Through cruising, the gay flâneur not only seeks sexual adventure but can find community and solidarity (often across social divisions, such as class boundaries and sexual identity).

Sexual Minorities

Although city life shapes the sexual habits and desires of all inhabitants, studies of urban sexualities continue to focus on the lives of those who belong to sexual minorities. Some of the earliest geographical theorizations of sexuality identified that although urban public spaces, from supermarkets to streetscapes, were saturated with expressions of heterosexuality, these practices and representations were so common and hegemonic that they went unnoticed and unremarked. All space is sexualized, but only spatial practices that express minority desires tend to stand out. Consequently, such mundane expressions of same-sex affection as kissing a lover and holding hands are marked as deviant, "other," and often subject to some form of policing. When urban expressions of heterosexuality have been considered, the focus has tended to be on sex work and red-light districts, or on BDSM (some combination of bondage/discipline,

dominance/submission, sadism/masochism) and other forms of kinky play. There continues to be a dearth of investigations that examine mundane heterosexuality in city spaces and the reproduction of normative lives.

The heteronormativity of urban space can be challenged by individualized public displays of (same-sex) affection, as well as larger-scale collective events such as lesbian and gay pride festivals. The earliest lesbian and gay pride marches were political protests that sought to contest the criminalization and social marginalization of homosexuality. In some places, such as Poland and Serbia, they continue to fulfill this function. However, in more politically liberal contexts, these festivals are increasingly becoming incorporated into cities' place-marketing strategies. Recent pride festivities in Sydney, London, and Manchester have come under critical scrutiny for their commercial focus and the apparent replacement of politics with hedonism. As flamboyant, public displays of alternative sexualities, these events have been read as carnivalesque spaces that have the potential to transgress social norms and reveal them to be contingent and socially constructed.

Yet it is not just in the extraordinary that spaces have been claimed for lesbian and gay sexualities. The growth of employment in service industries since the 1970s, and employment opportunities in these sectors of the economy for men and women who did not conform to dominant gender roles, has been associated with the growth of distinct lesbian and gay neighborhoods (primarily in many major North American and European cities). Certainly this period seems to have coincided with a renewed migration of sexual minorities to tolerant metropolitan centers, in search of the freedom these cities could afford them. There is a political geography to how scholars have considered the growth of these neighborhoods. North American writers have emphasized how sexual minorities have claimed territory in the city from which to build political representation and inclusion. In Europe, gay and lesbian space has been considered in terms of resistance and transgression, and this has meant a focus on marginalization and the spatial exclusion of lesbian and gay lives from quotidian cityscapes. Whatever the political reading of these sites, studies of inner-city concentrations of lesbian and gay leisure venues and residential

clustering abound. Studies of these spaces have contributed to debates about migration, gentrification, cosmopolitanism, and the branding of cities. Through their work on the creative class, Richard Florida and his associates have developed a “gay index” to measure the extent to which cities are socially tolerant places that might be attractive to the class of socially liberal, creative people who he identifies as the motors of innovation in the cultural and high-tech industries. This index calculates the presence of (presumably out) gay men and lesbians as an indicator of a city’s level of economic development and its potential as a site for the accumulation of profit.

Geographies of Sex

Whereas the role of urban space in (re)producing sexual identities has increasingly been debated by scholars, much less attention has been paid to the geographies of sex. It could be argued that this is because most sex occurs in private, domestic places and only becomes visible and commented on when it transgresses the boundaries of public and private. However, as the earlier discussion of cruising illustrates, sex also regularly occurs in public urban space. Indeed those urban sites, such as parks and public restrooms that are appropriated as cruising areas have come under close scrutiny from academics and urban authorities. In Britain and other countries, there has been particular concern for the sexualization of public spaces associated with drinking, loss of control, and disorder. If sex in the city is a public as well as private affair, it has also long been a commercial concern. The sex industry is big business: As well as sites of prostitution, cities are home to a range of sex-related commercial sites, such as dating agencies, sex shops, fetish clubs, and erotic dance venues. In recent years urban theorists have begun to examine the messy embodiments of sex itself within the spaces of lap-dancing clubs and lesbian and gay bathhouses. Although such sites are numerous, they are also highly contested and subject to surveillance of various kinds. Trends toward the privatization of urban public space have curtailed and altered public sexual cultures, and some cities have reconfigured their planning regulations to disperse sex-related business out of city center locations. Such processes, alongside the development

of the Internet and mobile technologies, have reshaped the geographies of sex in the city, and, by enabling new forms of public sexual encounters, such as “dogging,” may be reconfiguring erotic desires and reconstituting what and where can be erotic.

Future Directions

The focus of studies of urban sexualities on concentrations of gay leisure venues and the sex industry within city centers has tended to mean that the relationship between “normal” sexual lives and cityscapes remains overlooked. There remains a need to broaden studies of urban sexuality to attend to all sexualities, all cities, and all parts of those cities, including the suburbs. To some extent, it is not that this work does not exist; rather, it does not acknowledge it is studying the spatial expression of sexuality. For example, some feminist writings on women’s lives within cities are infused with assumptions of heterosexuality, such that they do not explicitly address how heterosexual relations shape women’s daily routines and negotiations of city spaces. In rendering this mundane heterosexuality visible, such work would question which women are studied and how their sexual practices and lives (including reproduction and childrearing) shape the provision of city services and the rhythms of urban life—from the ante-natal class to the school run. Sex is often seen as marginal to the study of cities; however, sex, sexuality, and assumptions about the functioning of normative romantic and familial relationships are implicated in urban economics, architecture, planning regulations, and service provision, as well as the experience of inhabiting urban space.

Gavin Brown and Kath Browne

See also Creative Class; *Flâneur*; Gendered Space; Gentrification; Nightlife; Non-Sexist City; Red-Light District; Sex Industry; Social Exclusion

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SEX INDUSTRY

Although commercial sex work has never been a solely urban phenomenon, it has been most visible in specific areas of towns and cities, creating the phenomenon of the red-light district (e.g., De Wallen in Amsterdam, Soho in London, Pigalle in Paris, and Patpong in Bangkok). In most cases, these areas are particularly associated with female prostitution, though in some instances, they are also characterized by an agglomeration of off-street work in the form of adult-oriented businesses, sex clubs, cinemas, sex shops, and peep shows. In some cities, these areas may coincide with spaces of male prostitution and gay venues (though there is often tension between gay urban entrepreneurs and those who profit from commercial sex). In most cases, however, the term *red-light district* is reserved for areas catering primarily to the desires of heterosexual men.

The concentration of vice and prostitution in specific areas has long fascinated urban geographers and sociologists, with the pioneering work of the Chicago School of Sociology including several detailed ethnographies of the lifestyles of those occupying these areas. A key idea emerging from such studies was that sex work tended to occur in marginal or "twilight" areas of cities, with

prostitution deemed to be one of the pathologies associated with areas where residents had not assimilated into the dominant social and moral order. In Ernest Burgess's classic zonal model, sex work was thus located in the inner-city "zone in transition"—a relatively deprived area typified by high numbers of immigrants and houses in multiple occupation. In one sense, the concentration of sex work in marginal and deprived urban districts should not be surprising, as sex work has proved a vital urban survival strategy for many existing on the edge of poverty (not least migrant women who may be poorly served by social security systems). Yet neither the workers nor the clients who frequent red-light landscapes necessarily reside in these deprived areas, and a growing literature on city sex suggests these areas cannot be understood merely as the outcome of supply and demand economics, but also as the product of historically layered moral codes, legal strictures, and policing practices that have combined to encourage the containment of "vice" in inner-city areas away from the more affluent suburbs.

Historical Geographies of Vice

Conventionally represented as the oldest profession, prostitution did not emerge in its contemporary sense until the introduction of money forms that allowed for the buying and selling of sexual services. As numerous histories of sex work have demonstrated, while prostitutes have always been subject to forms of moral censure, it is dangerous to assume they have always been socially marginalized: In fact, sex workers have sometimes enjoyed privileged positions at the heart of society. Nonetheless, sex workers (especially street prostitutes) have frequently found their occupation of urban space subject to regulation: For example, medieval cities often forbade prostitutes living or working within the city walls. Outwardly, this blatant spatial exclusion implies there was no place for prostitution in medieval cities, yet the uneven enforcement of such laws reveals a more fractured geography of tolerance and intolerance. In fact, the religious authorities who held sway in the medieval city displayed a remarkably pragmatic attitude toward commercial sex, arguing that female prostitutes fulfilled a valuable service by providing an outlet for male sexual energies and

hence helped to maintain the sanctity of family life. In some instances, this encouraged the formation of officially sanctioned brothels, bawds, and stews, so that, for example, most medieval French towns had a *maison de ville* or bathhouse where prostitution was subject to legal control.

This pattern of officially tolerated prostitution began to change in the modern period as the increased distancing of home and workplace drove a wedge between the feminized suburbs and the masculine realms of the city center. Associated with a range of pleasures and dangers, the city center was regarded as no place for an unaccompanied woman: There was thus no female equivalent of the streetwise *flâneur*, only the prostitute. In this sense, the street prostitute's presence in the public realm was a reminder to the city fathers that their mastery of the metropolis was not as complete as they might have wished it to be. Furthermore, urban governors expressed concern that the sight of prostitutes on the street would corrupt innocent women and children while undermining the moral values normalizing the heterosexual family unit. For such reasons, the female prostitute came to constitute a central figure in the modern social imagination, becoming subject to increasingly elaborate forms of surveillance and containment designed to restrict the visibility of sex workers and express the state's disapproval of prostitution. New prohibitionist legislation was thus passed throughout the urban West with the intention of allowing the forces of law and order to eradicate prostitution; however, the impossibility of this task frequently led to the state instituting forms of regulationism predicated on systems of enclosure and surveillance. For example, French regulationism brought about the establishment of *maisons de tolérance* in designated *quartiers réservés*. In some instances, anxieties about disease also justified the institutionalization of demeaning medical inspections for suspected prostitutes, with the English Contagious Diseases Acts of the 1860s providing the basis of a spatialized form of control that was replicated throughout the empire.

Collectively, historical geographies of prostitution thus highlight the forms of spatial governmentality inherent in different forms of regulation, with tactics of spatial confinement, surveillance, and exclusion essential to practices of policing prostitution in modern cities. Mapping out these changing geographies thus reveals the distinctive

spatial formations—for example, the *maisons de tolérance* of nineteenth-century Paris, the *tippelzones* of postwar Dutch cities, or the roadhouse brothels of Nevada—associated with particular modes of control and policing. Alongside these heavily regulated sites, however, street prostitution has continued to flourish in the “twilight areas” of cities, with the discretionary policing of street sex work serving to push street prostitution away from wealthier and whiter areas of cities toward areas where residents have been insufficiently motivated or insufficiently powerful to oppose the presence of prostitutes on their streets. The fact that such areas of street sex work may also be associated with drug dealing, deprivation, and criminality has become highly significant in the media representation of prostitution, cementing the associations between sexual immorality, violence, disease, and poverty. This marginalization of prostitutes, not only in moral discourse but also geographically in “streets of shame,” thus creates a distinctive *moral geography*, implying that some sexual behaviors are acceptable only in certain places.

Hence, the literature on the legal and social regulation of prostitution in the urban West is now well established, having documented how the nation-state seeks to influence both on- and off-street prostitution through evolving laws, statutes, and policies. Far from asserting that these laws determine the shape and form of prostitution, such literature suggests the law is a productive force that shapes a whole range of social institutions that go well beyond the state, impinging on the actions of social actors in a variety of ways. Such literature demonstrates that regulation of prostitution is spatially variegated, to the extent that some forms of prostitution may be regarded as legitimate work in some cities yet are thoroughly criminalized in others. Furthermore, major distinctions are often made between legal and illegal forms of sex work *within* given jurisdictions, and commentators and advocates alike are thus beginning to tease out the implications of sex work legislation for the health and well-being of prostitutes in different cities.

Beyond Prostitution: Regulating Commercial Sex

Laura Agustín has argued that, studies focusing on prostitution often ignore the wider social, cultural

(and, by implication, legal) context in which “goods and services of an erotic and sexual kind” are consumed. Developing this, she contends that while there is considerable discussion about the regulation of prostitution, the vast majority of sex businesses are not recognized as spaces of prostitution and may be unaffected by prostitution laws. In the current context, for instance, it is important to note the sale of sexual goods and services occurs across sites including, Agustin lists, “bars, restaurants, cabarets, clubs, brothels, discotheques, saunas, massage parlors, sex shops with private booths, hotels, flats, dungeons for bondage and domination, Internet sites, cinemas and anywhere that sex is offered for sale on an occasional basis.” Regulating this diverse range of sites presents a number of legal and logistical challenges, and many forms of commercial sex slip through the net, subject to no specific forms of licensing or surveillance. Nonetheless, most nation-states have adopted laws and policies that aim to confine sexual acts and nudity to specific private spaces, and many forms of sexual display are subject to obscenity acts, which attempt to limit the circulation of materials with sexual content in both public and private spaces. Here, it is worth noting the most important consideration in the regulation of sexual goods and services has traditionally been to protect those deemed vulnerable to corruption. In this respect, it is notable that middle-class White men have tended to protect their access to materials deemed pornographic while limiting the availability of these materials to those “less-civilized” individuals who might more easily be seduced and depraved by explicit images. This was explicit in the mid-Victorian period, when the rhetoric surrounding the 1857 Obscene Publications Act (England and Wales) emphasized the potentially “deadly” impact of pornography on the working classes, not least working-class women. Subsequently, access to pornography has become more democratized—thanks in part to Internet access—with the protection of children becoming the dominant justification for the regulation of pornography in the urban West. Here, the influence of religious groups has often been considerable, with the anti-pornography movement drawing sustenance from fundamentalist worldviews that emphasize the dangers associated with “an open marketplace of morals.” The desire to protect “family values” has thus

encouraged the introduction of a rich and diverse range of legislation intended to control the content of and access to, for example, pornographic materials, with legislators constantly seeking to refine the boundaries between what is suitable for general consumption and what only (consenting) adults can access. One manifestation of this is attempts by the state and the legislature to limit the sale or display of pornographic material to specific spaces that are evidentially not part of the public realm (i.e., are inaccessible to minors) yet are accessible to the public (whether freely or by way of payment).

Describing the evolution of adult entertainment districts, Andrew Ryder highlights the role of civic leaders and urban governments in trying to control adult entertainment activities through a variety of “command-and-control” techniques, including obscenity laws, licensing, zoning, and planning powers. For instance, in the United States, licensing and zoning ordinances have been widely used to control the number and location of sexually oriented businesses. Whereas the former place limits on the way a premise advertises, opens, and admits customers, the latter tend to identify which districts are appropriate for sexually oriented businesses. In U.S. cities, zoning regulations typically prevent sexually oriented businesses from operating within a certain number of feet from residences, schools, and religious facilities, characteristically pushing adult businesses toward the fringes of cities and away from middle-class census tracts. In most instances, zoning laws also prevent the co-location of sexually oriented businesses; several U.S. city ordinances prohibit such businesses within 1,000 feet of one another on the basis that clusters of such businesses are associated with nuisance and criminality. Despite the contested evidence for such nuisance, U.S. courts have tended to uphold zoning ordinances, overruling claims they conflict with First Amendment rights to commercial rights of expression as long as ordinances leave adequate alternative sites for adult businesses. This type of judgment has also been extended to nude dancing, with attempts by municipalities to prevent the opening of nude dancing venues through antinudity ordinances, which are challenged by owners who argue that dancers are expressing a message and their conduct is therefore protected as symbolic speech. Yet although the federal courts have

thus stressed it is not permissible to ban nonobscene nude dancing entirely, they have allowed municipalities to introduce restrictive ordinances that treat nude dancing differently from other forms of live entertainment (citing evidence that such clubs have negative neighborhood effects and may be associated with prostitution and drug use).

Such spatial strategies of regulation and zoning can be interpreted as serving a number of purposes. For instance, it has been argued that maintaining a separation between “family-friendly” spaces and spaces of commercial sex helps construct a divide between good and bad femininity. Stephanie Lasker argues that zoning protects “good women with family values” from adult entertainment land uses by “zoning such uses as far away from single-family, detached home neighborhoods as possible, and into neighborhoods that lower income women call home.” Further, she argues that by protecting women from danger, this zoning “conceptually and semiologically separates women from experiencing parts of the city that remain open to exploration by men.” At the same time as it reproduces such gendered assumptions, the containment and isolation of spaces of adult entertainment conversely enhance the commercial value of erotic goods and services by granting them scarcity. Indeed, the history of pornography suggests isolating commercial sexuality within marginal locations does not serve to devalue it: Rather, the opposite is true, with spatial marginalization bringing sex work within the ambit of a *restricted economy* that hoards desire to capitalist ends. Thus the segregation of family spaces from commercial spaces serves to valorize both the family (as an idealized sociosexual relation) and commercial sex (as an illicit but sought-after commodity).

Displacing Vice in the Contemporary City

Reflecting on the relationship of sexuality and space, Michael Brown insists the production of urban space cannot be understood solely by reference to the “the prevailing structures of heterosexuality” that dominate society nor for that matter the “crises-resolution function of spatial fixes and their flexibility in the context of post-Fordism.” Accordingly, the association of commercial sex with immorality and neighborhood nuisance appears an extremely effective strategy

for reasserting the sexual values that lie at the heart of the nation-state and—at the same time—displacing sex work from valuable city center sites. On this basis, it is possible to interpret ongoing attempts to regulate commercial sex as simultaneous strategies of *capital accumulation* (i.e., enhancing the value of specific tracts of land or communities) and *social reproduction* (i.e., normalizing assumptions that pornography should not be consumed by minors or visible in the public realm). This is evidenced in recent zero tolerance approaches to commercial sex in potentially lucrative real estate locations, with zoning laws and police powers being used to displace sex work, ostensibly to protect local communities but often with the intention of prompting the gentrification of areas blighted by sex businesses. Zoning laws adopted in New York City in 1993, for instance, have been interpreted as attempts to displace adult businesses in the interests of corporate developers, with the redevelopment of the 42nd Street Precinct and Times Square by multinational corporations proceeding only when X-rated businesses and prostitution had been removed from the area.

In an era when many Western cities are seeking to rebuild themselves around a postindustrial, service-based economy, this attempt to clean up spaces of sex is perhaps not surprising. What is certainly significant, however, is that whereas certain forms of sex work have become unpalatable to the real estate companies, property developers, and entertainment conglomerates keen to profit from the new boom in the cultural economy, others are depicted as entirely appropriate. Hence, at the same moment red-light districts are being planned out of existence and street prostitution is being pushed to the margins of cities, “upmarket” lap-dancing and gentleman’s clubs are becoming a familiar part of the leisure landscapes of Western cities. Coupled with the tendency for clients to contact sex workers via the Internet and mobile phone, this corporatization of adult entertainment is thus producing very different landscapes of commercial sex. Hence, although red-light districts may be disappearing, this does not mean sex work is becoming any less important in the production of urban space.

Phil Hubbard

See also Amsterdam, the Netherlands; Paris, France; Red-Light District; Sex and the City

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SHANGHAI, CHINA

Shanghai is the largest city in China and one of the largest metropolitan areas in the world. Although Shanghai is an atypical Chinese city, its development history crystallizes the trajectory of Chinese urban transformation. It demonstrates the process

of the change from a walled city, semicolonial city, socialist city, to a city of transition. Rhoads Murphey suggests that Shanghai is key to modern China, but Shanghai also is key to postreform China.

History

Despite the common wisdom of Shanghai growing from a fishing village to a global city, Shanghai was designated a market city during the Song Dynasty (AD 960–1279) and a county (*xian*) during the Yuan Dynasty (1271–1638). A city wall extending some nine miles and with six gates was built in 1553 during the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), and in 1602 the city temple (Cheng Huang Miao) was constructed. In the first century of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912), the Emperor Yongzheng established a customs office in Shanghai, giving the city exclusive control over customs collections, and by 1735 Shanghai had become the major trade port for the lower Yangzi River region.

Under the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, Shanghai became a major treaty port. Foreign capital sped up Shanghai's early industrialization. Shanghai played a metaphorical role of the "bridgehead"—a channel through which foreign products were distributed to the Yangtze River region and domestic agricultural and mineral products processed and exported. With the unprecedented trade prosperity, Shanghai became truly a cosmopolitan city. It served and controlled its environs. In its great prosperity of the 1930s, Shanghai witnessed a high concentration of banks and foreign trade.

After 1949, Shanghai was transformed from a consumption city to production-oriented city through state-led industrialization. Services such as trade, finance, and distribution dwindled. Nevertheless, Shanghai developed a comprehensive industrial system and became a "locomotive" of industrialization. Shanghai turned over a significant proportion of its revenue to the central government, while the system of planned economy guaranteed the cheap supply of resources from other provinces.

In 1990 Shanghai's Pudong was designated a new development area. In 1992, Shanghai was granted a role of "dragonhead" to drive the development of the Yangtze River delta and the take-off of the whole region. Shanghai thus entered the



Shanghai has become a cosmopolitan and global city, with other Chinese cities following its lead.

Source: Blake Buyan.

fast track of building into a global city and aims to become one of international economic, finance, and trade centers. Foreign capital flowed into Shanghai. But Shanghai's reglobalization is driven by the state's development strategy.

Because Shanghai has a history of *entrepôt* and immigrants, its culture—Shanghai genre (*haipai*)—presents the trait of secularism, pragmatism, and cosmopolitanism. Urbanism (in the sense of urbanism as a way of modern life) first appeared in Shanghai and then spread over to the rest of China. Leo Ou-fan Lee describes the flowering of a new urban culture in China from 1930 to 1945 in his book *Shanghai Modern*. On the other hand, because of its significance to the national economy and national industries, the planned system was more developed and codified in everyday Shanghai than in many other Chinese cities. Shanghai developed a more established regulatory control. This is manifested in the

management of rural to urban land conversion and regulation over service industries. But from time to time, Shanghai served as an alternative political and cultural base to counterbalance the mainstream trend in China.

In the 1990s onward, Shanghai nostalgia emerged with the rediscovery of colonial Shanghai in its golden era of 1920s and 1930s. By remembering Shanghai's identity as "Paris in the Orient" and its petite-bourgeoisie life, Shanghai nostalgia tends to re-create a life in China's modern metropolis, re-creating or reusing 1930s-style calendars and commercial advertisements, Western-style bars, cafés, restaurants, cinemas, theaters, and dancing halls.

Urban Life

Old Shanghai is characterized by lane housing or alleyway housing (*nongtang* or *linong*). The stone-portal gate style of housing (*shikumen*) is thought to

be a Chinese vernacular style, but in fact it is a hybrid of terraced housing and Chinese courtyard. To improve privacy, the garden of terrace housing was enclosed and became an internal courtyard.

Shanghai's dialect distinguishes residential areas into upper ends (*shang zhi jiao*) and lower ends (*xia zhi jiao*). The upper ends roughly correspond to the areas of international settlement and French Concession area, while the lower ends include the places under Chinese control, industrial areas, and concentrated areas of manual laborers. Geographically, the upper ends are located in Jing'an, Luwan, and Xuhui districts in the southwest and the lower ends mainly in the north of Suzhou Creek. Although the division of upper and lower ends is gradually diminishing, the traditional concepts still exist with residents and to some extent are reinforced by real estate development. For example, high-quality apartments and villas tend to be located in the southwest. The area near Gubei in the Southwest sees a high concentration of expatriates.

If work-unit compounds are a typical landscape of socialist Beijing, Shanghai sees more development projects organized by the municipal government. Thus, the phenomenon of compound is not typical in Shanghai. Residential districts exist in addition to living quarters built by state-owned enterprises. In the 1950s, the government launched the "20 Thousand Workers Units" program. Workers' villages such as Caoyang Xingcun were built. The rationale was to build more housing using less money. These units therefore have a relatively low standard and are now deteriorating. But at the time of construction, the program greatly improved the living conditions of the working class.

There was virtually little redevelopment of old Shanghai before the 1980s. The central areas of Shanghai were very congested, and investment in the old city was limited. Population growth was accommodated through densification. Many families have to share the property previously used by a single family. The return of urban youth from the countryside exacerbated congestion.

Urban redevelopment began to accelerate in the 1990s, which has shifted from residential renewal to property-led redevelopment. The project of Xintiandi ("new heaven and earth") preserves the *shikumen* style of housing. The terraced houses were converted into bars and restaurants and fashion shops, forming a fashionable entertainment and shopping place.

Compared with other cities in southern China, Shanghai maintains a rather strict land use control. When land is acquired from farmers, the city government usually gains the overall control. Therefore, Shanghai does not see the phenomenon of villages in the city (*chengzhongcun*), which are the villages encircled by urban expansion. In these villages farmers maintain the control over land and develop properties for rent. Rural migrants in Shanghai live in the ring of suburban private rentals, surrounding the city proper, because they find it difficult and more expensive to live in the central area.

Many new commodity housing estates are built into the compounds of condominiums, like those in Hong Kong. More expensive villa styles are in the outskirts of the city. But the most expensive one is Tomson Riviera in Pudong. Shanghai has seen significant property price inflation in the early and mid-2000s, leading to greater residential differentiation. A recent exaggerated saying suggests this trend of differentiation as "those in the central area speak English, those within the middle ring speak Putonghua (Mandarin), and those outside the outer ring speak Shanghai local dialect."

Shanghai continues to attract innovations in urban life. It will host the World Expo 2010. The slogan for the World Expo is "Better City and Better Life," showing that the Chinese city is becoming the center of promoting new urban life. Along the Huangpu River, former industrial and warehouse areas are being redeveloped. Shanghai also hosts sport events, such as the Formula One Grand Prix. The world's first eco-city is claimed to be built in Shanghai: At the tip of Chongming Island at the estuary of the Yangtze River, Dongtan aims to become a city of carbon neutrality and zero emission.

Economy and Industry

Shanghai is located in the economically most developed region of China. The lower Yangtze River delta is a densely populated area. The delta had seen the emergence of local handicraft industries, such as the textile industry, before the treaty port era. These industries were tightly integrated into rural society. The internationalization of Shanghai attracted initial industrialization spearheaded in Shanghai and developed close links with other cities in the region.

Cities such as Suzhou, Wuxi, and Changzhou are so close to each other and to Shanghai that they virtually form a megacity region. In the planned economy, Shanghai began to develop a comprehensive system of industry. The development of iron and steel in Baoshan and petrochemistry in Jingshan expanded Shanghai's industrial sectors. Shanghai has designated six strategic industrial sectors: electronic, automobile, petrochemistry and fine chemistry, fine steel, automatic control equipment, and biotechnological pharmaceutical industries. These sectors in total account for more than 60 percent of industrial output values.

The medium- and long-term goal for Shanghai is to develop international economic (manufacturing), trade, finance, and logistics centers. But Shanghai's ambition to develop an international finance center is hampered by the fact that the headquarters of the Chinese central bank and major commercial banks are in Beijing. There is some competition between Shanghai and Beijing to become the finance center. On the other hand, the Shanghai Stock Exchange is one of the two stock exchanges in China (the other is in Shenzhen). Shanghai is also a leader in high-tech research and development because of its cluster of universities, research institutes, and foreign-funded labs. In the Zhangjiang high-tech park, biotechnology clusters emerge as an important economic sector.

Together with Beijing, Shanghai is setting new trends in the development of creative industries in China. Along the Suzhou Creek former warehouses were spontaneously converted into artists' workshops. Such a process is sped up by the planning and development of sites for cultural projects along the Huangpu River for World Expo 2010. Such a trend is captured by real estate developers, who combine their property development with cultural projects, leading to the question whether these are cultural projects or property projects.

Conclusion

Shanghai is atypical; it is the most liberal city in China but also has an established regulatory tradition because of its significance in the planned economy. It is the most globalized city in China, but its reemergence is driven by state strategy and strong state support. Shanghai is the most

forward looking city, but it has developed "Shanghai nostalgia" and leads in restoration of historical buildings and promotion of heritage as an industry. As one of the culture centers in China, Shanghai is known for the Shanghai school of painting (from the mid-nineteenth century) and from time to time serves as an alternative base for political thoughts and social movement, but its fate is not self-determined but rather closely associated with national politics. Shanghai can always act at the frontier, capture the newest trend in the world, and develop new practices that later appear in other Chinese cities. Shanghai is a city of immigrants from other places in China and increasingly from the world. Being a brand, Shanghai attracts experiments of new ideas, such as the world's first eco-city. Old Shanghai was the paradise of Western explorers, and new Shanghai is not only China's Shanghai but also the world's Shanghai.

Fulong Wu

See also Asian Cities; Global City; Shophouse

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SHOPHOUSE

The shophouse is a hybrid architectural form commonly found in the historic centers of towns

and cities in Southeast Asia. They are typically two-story terraced buildings (although buildings of three or more stories may be found in more densely populated areas) divided into numerous units. Most shophouses have narrow frontages but extend to considerable depth inside. Shophouse design and ornamentation range from early, largely functional shophouses built by the first waves of impoverished Chinese migrants to a later “Chinese baroque”—highly ornate traditional Chinese motifs juxtaposed with grand European classical columns, French windows, and Corinthian capitals—as well as art deco styles associated with the Depression years. As suggested by its name, the shophouse is multifunctional; the first story is occupied by businesses and stores ranging from grocers, clinics, and workshops to clan association halls. The upper floors are commonly residential quarters for the family and employees working in the shop below, although this is not necessarily so, as it was common for sleeping space to be rented out to tenants.

The hybrid word *shophouse* is likely to be a literal translation of the Chinese term *dian wu* (“shop” and “house” in Mandarin). Building forms similar to the Southeast Asian shophouses in terms of floor plans, construction, and iconography have been found in the treaty ports of southern China, suggesting that the urban form was transplanted to Southeast Asia by migrants from Fujian and Guangdong provinces in the nineteenth century. Colonial conditions, such as the new town planning regulations of the British (in Singapore and Malaya) and the Dutch (in Batavia, now Jakarta), also influenced the evolution of the shophouse form, producing what scholars have termed an “Anglo-Chinese urban vernacular.” The original commercial row house found in Guangzhou and other southern Chinese cities was thought to have been an easily imported style that fit well with the gridlike nature of streets in the urban plans of some Southeast Asian cities, where they underwent further transformation. In Singapore, for example, the British founder of the town Stamford Raffles decreed in 1822 that shophouses should have uniform frontages and a covered walkway (known as the “five-foot-way”) running the length of the block for the convenience of pedestrians seeking shelter from the tropical weather and the disorderly street traffic.

In the late nineteenth and twentieth centuries, as the expanding colonial urban economies of Southeast Asia absorbed large numbers of labor migrants, the shophouse form in central areas of the city provided accommodation for the laboring classes in increasingly overcrowded conditions. Neither the colonial state nor private enterprise was willing to shoulder the cost of providing houses for the laboring classes, for such investments yielded far lower returns compared to those from rubber, tin, and commerce. Given the unremitting pressure of rapidly growing populations and acute housing shortages, living space in shophouses was subdivided into cubicles to accommodate the people. Shophouse areas such as the Chinatowns in Southeast Asian cities became associated with gross overcrowding, insanitary conditions, and disease.

In the immediate post–World War II period, shophouse areas continued to be perceived as slum quarters characterized by insanitary and dilapidated buildings. As Southeast Asian nation-states gained independence in the 1960s and began modernization efforts, urban renewal of the city core led to the bulldozing of shophouse areas—considered obsolete architectural forms that had outlived their purpose—to make way for modernist, high-rise residential and commercial structures signifying efficiency and rationality.

Urban conservation is a relatively new (and still limited) phenomenon in Southeast Asian cities. It is best observed in Singapore, where conservation efforts since the late 1980s began to target the remaining shophouse areas, resulting in the designation of some of these areas as historic districts (such as Chinatown and Little India) and the conservation of distinctive shophouse rows as part of urban heritage. In several Malaysian towns and cities, shophouse areas hang in the balance as the relative merits of conservation vis-à-vis redevelopment continue to be debated.

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See also Asian Cities; Chinatowns; Housing; Singapore

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SHOPPING

Shopping is a basic activity of urban life, structured by a market economy and institutionalizing, in turn, the cultures, rhythms, and social hierarchies of small local communities and the city as a whole. The places in which shopping is carried out—from neighborhood shops to downtown department stores and suburban shopping malls—provide microcosms of public space while confirming a shifting geography and scale of capital investment and changing demographics. Shopping streets and stores have always been important places of display as well as sources of excitement. If cities are sites of modernity, shopping is a way in which all city dwellers become modern.

Place, Identity, Sociability

Urban shopping begins in ancient times, with marketplaces that develop around the exchange of goods that are brought into town by farmers, on the one hand, and long-distance traders, on the other. Although rural households may be self-sufficient, producing food, making clothing, and building tools they need to survive, town dwellers depend on markets for both basic necessities and occasional luxuries. The need for daily provisioning shaped routine patterns of life in towns of North America and Europe until electricity and household refrigerators made less-frequent shopping trips possible in the early twentieth century, but daily food shopping continues to be important in many regions of the world today. In modern times, shopping for food and clothing has often been considered women's work. Nonetheless, the gendered division of shopping varies according to divisions of labor in other activities as well as cultural norms. Women who work long hours in the fields or in offices do not have time to shop every day, and, in some cultures, men do not permit women to go out unaccompanied in public places. The employment of women in marketplaces—as traders in farmers' markets, and as sales clerks in stores—also varies. Whereas in some shopping activities, men may predominate as both traders or merchants and shoppers, in others—such as modern department stores, supermarkets, and boutiques—women outnumber men on both sides of the counter.

Shopping activities easily establish a sense of place. The large stores in central shopping districts create a crowded place that feels like the center of the world, especially because they are important nodes in the global distribution of fashion. Fifth Avenue or 34th Street in New York, Oxford Street in London, the Boulevard Haussmann in Paris: The scale and range of shopping in these places symbolizes a capital city. Because some agglomerations of stores specialize in specific types of products, residents and visitors alike identify those sites in terms of the kind of shopping—and kinds of shoppers—that cluster there. Some cities, like Amsterdam, still retain traditional markets for fresh products like flowers or fish, although these have been diminished by the removal of wholesale markets to peripheral areas, often near airports, and by competition from indoor stores and supermarkets. Weekly and other periodic markets for a variety of goods shape a ritualized, festive sense of place, where shopping is a means of producing collective identity, and both shoppers and merchants ignore the usual markers of social status and transgress social norms. This is especially true of local street markets where shoppers loyally patronize the same vendors every week and value the joking relationships they develop with them. Shopping in these markets is a means of social integration.

On the other hand, shopping for specific ethnic, religious, or occupational products can reinforce a special sense of place that reflects an exclusive group identity, which may be at odds with dominant cultures. In a predominantly Christian culture, the *halal* or kosher butcher offers shoppers from Muslim and Jewish religious minorities an opportunity to affirm their group identity, but the very presence of these shoppers, and the concentration of the butcher shop with other stores that cater to the same clientele, may disturb others. In the historic centers of cities like Berlin or Dublin, African and Asian street traders—and the shoppers that they attract—have ruptured the previous sense of ethnic homogeneity. New kinds of shopping in these places make multiculturalism visible.

In addition to gender, ethnicity, and place, shopping also helps to form collective identity around social class and status. In every city, expensive stores and shopping streets mark elite districts, often adjacent to prestigious cultural institutions and upper-class residential neighborhoods. Shoppers

develop cultural capital by knowing what these stores and districts offer, and they talk to their friends about what they saw at Bloomingdale's or on Madison Avenue, for example. By the same token, low-price and discount stores mark lower-class districts, including districts that are mainly used by working-class shoppers from ethnic minorities. In this way shopping informally confirms social class and racial distinctions; by providing a public space that low-income men and women find comfortable, low-price shopping streets also provide social capital. For individuals, these effects are not entirely predictable. When shoppers enter an exclusive store whose prices they cannot afford or where they are visibly out of place by how they look or dress, they may feel as though they are transgressing social boundaries—with good emotional effect, if they are treated well, or with devastating effect, if they are treated rudely by the sales clerks and harassed by security guards. Shopping places the burden of social norm enforcement on individuals apparently acting alone, yet it also creates zones of informal segregation and exclusion.

Although people often shop alone, many are accompanied by friends and family. Shopping thus offers an opportunity for a social excursion—more so, if time and money are not a problem. Teenagers, the elderly, and anyone who doesn't have much spending money often congregate on shopping streets, where passersby and shop displays present an ever-changing panorama. By the 1960s, widespread automobile ownership in the United States created a more mobile public and reduced the appeal of such a street-corner society. But until television, computers, and air conditioning increased the desire to stay indoors, shopping streets provided a great means of urban entertainment. Shopping remains a popular way to be “in public”: The more people shop, the more important shopping is as a public sphere.

But shopping doesn't require much social interaction. In supermarkets and department stores, in contrast to street and farmers' markets, shoppers rarely speak to each other. They experience copresence rather than interdependence. Social integration in a neighborhood, however, often reflects frequent interaction between shopkeepers and residents; Jane Jacobs praised the “ballet of the street” for this interdependence. Yet bonding between shoppers and storekeepers, or between shoppers and clerks, is more typical of smaller communities than of big cities, and of regional cultures that

maintain personal traditions. The disappearance of personal ties between shoppers and merchants also reflects the gradual elimination of small, individually owned stores and their replacement by large, national and transnational chains.

Spaces and Forms of Distribution

Like other forms of organization, the distribution of consumer goods has expanded in both scope and scale while coming under more centralized control. These changes make shopping both more pervasive and more formal, and expand the visibility of shopping in city streets. Although the earliest markets in history were held outdoors, they moved into permanent structures or stores when trading became more complex and merchants held a sizable inventory.

In modern times, London was the first city to develop a large-scale, full-time, cosmopolitan shopping center. Indoor stores with shop windows became common there around 1600, although the extensive use of large sheets of plate glass did not follow until the late nineteenth century. Fixed prices replaced bargaining in stores in England and the United States during the 1870s, with the rise of the department store and the five-and-ten-cent store (“five and dime”). These new kinds of stores capitalized on industrialization that made mass-produced consumer goods available at steadily lower prices, and on the completion of national railroad lines that reached all regions of the country. Department stores and five and dimes offered more variety than the country or general stores where rural residents shopped. Yet after the postal service established Rural Free Delivery, farm dwellers also shopped in mail order catalogs sent from Chicago by Sears Roebuck and Montgomery Ward. Through both stores and catalogs, shopping spread city culture—at least, a modern consumer culture that developed first in cities—to a national population.

Department stores were a force of modernity. They offered a safe public space for middle-class women, who had not been allowed to circulate freely, unaccompanied by men, outside their homes. Within decades, they also offered women many jobs. At the same time, department stores offered so many attractive products to buy, in such a stimulating, stunningly decorated décor, that men complained that women spent too much time and money shopping. To lure shoppers, the

biggest, most elegant department stores used innovative theatrical lighting and display. Like theaters that were also built during the late nineteenth century, and movie theaters, that grew during the 1920s and 1930s, department stores were places of entertainment for masses of people, stoking their desire to buy with neon light, lots of plate glass, and a multitude of colors. Strolling along Main Street or Fifth Avenue to gaze at the displays in department store windows became a seasonal thrill. Moreover, just as men and women in those days dressed up to go to work in offices, so they dressed up to go downtown for shopping.

Shopping helped make downtown a city's major commercial center. From the late 1920s, merchants and real estate developers understood that the more foot traffic (especially that of women shoppers) downtown drew, the bigger businesses would grow. More shoppers also led to higher rents, a dynamic that encouraged local officials to enact zoning laws that further concentrated high-price and high-volume stores in the center. As a result, department stores, five and dimes, and eventually chain stores were located downtown while small, individually owned, "mom and pop" stores were spread out in residential neighborhoods.

From the 1920s, however, downtown's fortunes began to change. Shoppers who drove downtown to shop created too much congestion, and there were too few parking spaces for so many cars. During the Great Depression, little investment capital was available to modernize stores; when the Depression ended, after World War II, investors turned to new construction in the suburbs. By the 1950s, middle-class shoppers had massively moved to the suburbs, where real estate developers built shopping strips and malls that they could reach by car. Department stores and larger boutiques followed shoppers to the suburbs, opening branches in the malls and ignoring the needs of their downtown flagship stores. While land values sank downtown, shops became less exclusive, and cheaper chain stores expanded. Ethnic minorities of color, who were not welcome as homebuyers in most suburban developments, remained in the city and began to dominate the downtown as shoppers. This in turn lowered the social status of shopping downtown.

Shopping malls were anchored by two major tenants, usually branches of department stores that still had headquarters in the city. Small stores, which were also increasingly branches of larger

chains, filled the "street" between the anchors, with the whole set of stores surrounded by huge parking lots. By the 1960s, many malls had enclosed the "street" in an air conditioned shell, installed landscaping, and built an indoor parking garage. This provided an almost completely privatized physical environment: Shoppers drove to the mall in their own car, shopped indoors in the "gallery," and returned to the privacy of their home. But they clearly preferred the convenience and sense of exclusivity of shopping among like-minded suburbanites. The malls, although privately owned and subject to their owners' rules, offered another kind of safe public space for modern sociability. Until women returned to the paid workforce in great numbers in the 1970s, malls were primarily women's and children's spaces, especially on weekdays—both isolating and isolated from the city's clamor.

Yet the mall concept won overwhelming acceptance. When, after the 1970s, developers became interested in rebuilding downtowns, they seized on the idea of transforming them into urban malls. In San Diego, a developer closed off downtown streets to create Horton Plaza; its enclosed space, visually coherent theme, indoor parking, and private security guards led to remarkable success. In Boston, another developer rehabilitated old warehouses to create a waterfront shopping mall, Faneuil Hall, and in Baltimore, the same developer used a mix of new and old construction to establish a "festival marketplace," Harbor Place at Inner Harbor. These mixed use developments joined stores with hotels, convention centers, art museums, sports arenas, and aquariums, drawing tourists and suburbanites as well as city residents. This strategy suggested that shopping was too important a development tool to cater only to a local population, or alternatively, that downtown shopping required a larger customer base.

Despite the success of some of these fantasy environments, department stores lost their power to anchor development. Shoppers preferred the low prices of discount chains like Wal-Mart, whose giant stores were initially located far from urban centers, and the rapidly changing fashions of specialized, small boutiques. In retrospect, shopping at a department store seems like a golden mean before markets broke into many different segments and tastes became polarized.

Technology poses another problem. Department stores, like all brick-and-mortar stores, have been severely challenged from the late 1990s by Internet shopping. Shoppers can compare prices online, at work or at home, 24 hours a day. Although this seems to provide more flexibility to shopping, it also intensifies feelings of privatization.

Social Geography and Public Space

Much urban upgrading since the 1980s reflects the spread of gentrification. Higher incomes in dual-earner households, where both earners work in the city, create demand for more stores and services, especially food stores and restaurants, that cater to higher-class tastes. Although most gentrified neighborhoods at first lack such amenities and are typically “understored,” or at least provided with low-price stores selling low-status brands, small entrepreneurs soon scout them out and open specialized shops. Gentrification then brings types of shopping that require, and replenish, cultural capital: designer clothing, locally crafted furniture, and imported foods. The small scale of shops, at least in the first wave of new stores, revives a small town sociability in which residents and shopkeepers know and greet each other by name—and often the shopkeepers live in the neighborhood too. Shopping reinforces a sense of both community and exclusivity, although now these reflect the experience of shopping itself rather than prior group membership or family ties.

The flow of investment capital into certain areas of many cities emphasizes the differences between them and other neighborhoods that have not benefited from high-income jobs and globalization. But globalization also brings even more branches of large chains that drive rents higher. This creates pressure on the small, more distinctive stores, which either move to a cheaper location or close. The net experience of shopping may be an endless pursuit of a dream, not of products, but of sociability and community, in a safe, convenient space where shoppers can feel at ease in public.

Sharon Zukin

See also Downtown Revitalization; Gentrification; Jacobs, Jane; Shopping Center

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SHOPPING CENTER

A shopping center is simply a single building or collection of buildings containing multiple retail units. Strictly speaking this can be either a wholly planned center developed all at once and owned and operated under a single management (e.g., a shopping mall), or a semicohesive shopping area that has evolved over time, such as a town or neighborhood center. Technically, shopping *malls* are usually enclosed, whereas shopping *centers* are open. Because most of the interest in urban studies regards the planned type, this will receive most of the attention here. The literature on planned shopping centers is not central to one area of study but is spread out over a wide variety of disciplines and professions, depending on the object and method of inquiry. Economics and marketing texts generally view shopping centers as the mere loci of retail trade, whereas real estate and architecture texts concentrate on the structures themselves and their values. In contrast, urban and regional planning texts generally focus on the development process or the impacts that new developments may have

on the existing urban structure. Finally, the social sciences (psychology, anthropology, sociology) are primarily interested in the relationship between shopping centers and behavior and identity formation, often making liberal use of concepts borrowed from postmodernist philosophy.

To provide a description of the phenomenon of shopping centers and their implications for the built environment, this contribution will first provide a classification of planned shopping centers, mentioning some of the differences in terminology used where appropriate, particularly between the United States and Britain where the writing on shopping centers is most abundant. Next, these types will be contextualized in time by providing a short chronology of shopping center development. Finally, a number of contemporary issues will be mentioned for further reading, such as the impact of shopping centers on the urban structure and modern society and the implications this may hold for the future.

A Taxonomy of Shopping Centers

A common misconception is that all shopping centers are essentially the same. This view is generally linked to the *déjà vu* that accompanies visiting a particular center whose layout, materials, and even tenants are unnervingly similar to other centers—even if they happen to be on the other side of the globe. Indeed, when looking for distinguishing features for shopping centers, the location within a particular country or a particular city is less important, or in some cases practically negligible, than other factors. These factors include the physical size and morphology, its orientation in terms of purpose (grocery shopping, comparison shopping, or leisure shopping), market niche (discount, luxury), and its position in the urban fabric (urban center, out-of-town).

One distinguishing feature is physical shape. Shopping centers are comprised of either a collection of buildings or a single building. In the first category are centers where a number of individual one-story retail outlets share a parking lot. Because these types are usually offset from a commercial road or strip, they are commonly called *strip malls* (U.S. terminology). According to the International Council of Shopping Centers, the smallest of multiple-building centers focus on daily goods

(strip or convenience centers, depending on the configuration); larger centers (30,000- to 150,000-square-foot total shop floor space) carrying the same kinds of goods are called *neighborhood centers*. These are usually situated on (former) commercial roads in residential areas and may have a supermarket as its most important attractor, or *anchor* in retail jargon. *Community centers* (between 100,000 and 350,000 square feet) offer a slightly wider assortment of goods, such as office supplies, home improvement items, and furniture and are often anchored by a *superstore* (or “category killer” [United States] specializing in one particular kind of merchandise, like shoes or toys) or a *hypermarket* (which offers a wide range of merchandise [United Kingdom and France]). When the emphasis is on bargains, these centers may be called *discount centers*, or *lifestyle centers* when the emphasis is on leisure shopping. In both cases, the morphology remains, for all intents and purposes, the same. The very largest shopping centers of this kind are called *power centers* (United States, Canada) and comprise multiple big-box stores, strips, and parking lots. As these serve a large market area, they are usually located at well-accessible edge-of-town or out-of-town locations.

The other kind of shopping center is essentially a single structure that is planned, developed, owned, and managed as a unit. In this case, retailers pay rent to an owner or manager responsible for collective goods such as parking, security, sanitation, upkeep, and marketing. This is far from a new concept: enclosed markets and bazaars (e.g., in Tehran and Istanbul) date back to the Middle Ages. The nineteenth century saw the advent of the arcade or galleria, which was a pedestrianized shopping street covered by a glass ceiling. In its archetypical modern form, a shopping mall is comprised of two anchors (usually major department stores) linked by a galleria; this basic layout is adapted as the number of anchors increases, but the principle generally remains the same. Most malls include a centrally located *food court* consisting of various fast-food restaurants to entice visitors to lengthen their stay. In terms of merchandise, malls focus on leisure-oriented goods like fashion; rarely do they include grocery shopping. Malls that reach sizes of approximately 400,000 to 800,000 square feet are usually multistory and referred to as *regional centers*. Even larger malls



Factory outlets, such as this one in southern California, offer countless storefronts in one location, with discounts on otherwise pricey items.

Source: Tracy Buyan.



are called *super-regional centers* or *megamalls* if they exceed a million square feet. These gigantic structures enclose myriad facilities such as multiplex cinemas, post offices, discos, hotels, ice-skating rinks, and even entire theme parks under a single roof. The largest megamalls have an international allure, drawing people from around the world. Much of the academic literature has focused on the Mall of America (United States) and West Edmonton Mall (Canada) as the ultimate example of the genre, but now seven of the ten largest malls are to be found in Asia. The largest mall in Europe is Cevahir in Istanbul, Turkey, while the largest in the European Union is MetroCentre in the United Kingdom. Due to size constraints and accessibility requirements, shopping malls are frequently found in out-of-town locations on or near highway interchanges.

Malls have also been built in city centers. In the United States these are often called *downtown malls* or *festival marketplaces*. In these cases, mall design is generally adapted to the local circumstances. In many European city centers, shopping malls are part of a wider shopping area and often smaller and more compact than their North American counterparts. In many cases, they were planned as part of postwar reconstruction and

urban renewal efforts. Malls linked to plazas are also commonplace in Asian city centers such as Manila, Bangkok, Jakarta, and Kuala Lumpur. A major mall in the Philippines has a Catholic church as its main anchor. In Japan, dense multi-story and multifunctional shopping centers containing hundreds of small tenants are seamlessly integrated into the urban fabric and public transport system. Transport-oriented malls in major subway stations, train stations (e.g., Leipzig and Utrecht), and airports have also become a global phenomenon.

From Shopping Center to Megamall

Although the shopping mall contains elements from the past, it is very much a twentieth-century phenomenon: the first half of the century being devoted to perfecting its form and the second half in disseminating it worldwide. Due to differences of definition, there is some disagreement about which development qualifies as the first shopping mall. Highland Park, Dallas, 1931, is often identified as the first prototype for the shopping mall, but this position is debatable as its interior was not car-free, whereas earlier projects like Farmers Market in Los Angeles were. There is consensus,

however, on the place of origin: the United States.

The most important predecessors to the shopping mall were built in the interbellum period in places like the outskirts of Baltimore, Lake Forest, Los Angeles, and Kansas City. The earliest examples were variations on the strip mall and show a gradual evolution toward insularity through innovations such as site integration, pedestrianization, escalators, enclosure and climate control, and the positioning of storefronts and parking. A great deal of attention has been paid to the life, ideas, and accomplishments of the developer and urbanist Victor Gruen. Gruen's motivations were at once commercial and ideological: Following thinkers like Luis Mumford, Gruen believed that the private car was largely responsible for destroying community coherence in suburban environments. His solution to the proliferation of soulless commercial strips was a novel one:

By affording opportunities for social life and recreation in a protected pedestrian environment, by incorporating civic and educational facilities, shopping centers can fill an existing void. They can provide the needed place and opportunity for participation in modern community life that the ancient Greek Agora, the Medieval Market Place and our own Town Squares provided in the past.

The first suburban malls powerfully emulated city centers; the plan for Northgate Shopping Center (1950) in the Northgate area of Seattle, for example, was based on downtown Seattle. Following several major successes, the form, content, and structure of the mall was honed, perfected, and later reproduced at a dizzying rate, first across North America, and later globally. During the lucrative "golden age" of mall development, 28,500 malls were constructed in North America alone and soon claimed over half of all retail sales there. Meanwhile, the first out-of-town shopping centers started to appear on the European continent (town center and district centers had been built since the 1950s), often after a prolonged planning struggle.

As shopping malls permeated every corner of the American suburban environment and saturated the retail market, success could no longer be taken for granted. Toward the end of the golden age, new malls were built increasingly larger and with more

facilities in order to lure customers away from existing ones: regional and superregional malls overpowered their smaller counterparts and were themselves trounced by the megamalls. In the hunt for new markets, shopping center developers also turned their attention to downtown locations, strongly encouraged by city officials. Since the 1990s, factory outlet centers, the Internet, and especially big-box retailing—signaling a return to the strip mall concept—dealt yet another blow to the traditional shopping mall. Since this time, the mall has repeatedly been proclaimed dead, as "grayfields" (underperforming or derelict retail units) are becoming a more familiar element of the retail landscape. Ironically, it is about this time that North American-style shopping malls and strip malls began penetrating further into Europe, Latin America, and Asia, and to a lesser degree, the Middle East and Africa.

The most visible and rapid transformation has occurred in Central and Eastern Europe, where the mall was embraced as a symbol of the transition to modern capitalism and consumer culture. Often containing a hypermarket rather than a department store as an anchor and usually linked to entertainment facilities and public transportation, malls have sprung up in the outskirts of cities like Moscow (Mega Mall), Prague (Palác Flóra), Warsaw (Blue City), Lodz (Manufaktura), and Budapest (e.g., Capona, Duna Plaza). In rapidly developing parts of Asia and Latin America, North American-style shopping malls have accompanied suburbanization and the construction of edge cities and gated communities.

Critique

The shopping mall has been the object of sustained and vehement attack in academia for most of its existence. Despite Victor Gruen's intentions of building a new community space and fostering democratic virtues in suburbia, malls have become a symbol for its vacuity and lack of social structure. Gruen lamented in his later writings that his "environmental and humane ideals were not only not improved upon—they were completely forgotten." In the end, malls may replicate the appearance of public space, by inserting common town-center elements such as plazas, fountains, gardens and historicized facades, but they remain tightly controlled private environments in which all human activity

occurs at the discretion of the center's management. Some malls tolerate their semipublic space being used by the elderly for morning walks or by teenagers as a meeting place, but most prohibit activities such as voter registration or panhandling. Downtown malls in particular have been criticized for their privatization of formerly public space where the desire to ensure suburban-level safety translates itself into tight surveillance regimes. This criticism is voiced in other countries with high levels of social stratification and segregation. In South Africa and parts of Asia and Latin America, shopping malls are considered a refuge of the middle class and often relatively inaccessible by the lower classes, either by their physical distance or by their exclusive interior design and security regimes. Conversely, a mall in Saudi Arabia is operated solely by foreign women and prohibits men from entering; this allows the female patrons to shop freely without wearing veils.

In the academic literature, the estrangement between shopping centers, and the mall in particular, and the wider urban environment is also considered problematic. Most developments display a profound lack of respect for their immediate surroundings; luxury and opulence on the inside, but plain concrete boxes surrounded by an ocean of asphalt on the outside. To a large extent, the success of the mall has come at the expense of the traditional city center. According to mall specialist Paco Underhill, "The mall is a monument to the moment when Americans turned their back against the city." The Faustian price paid for the mall was often the downtown, whose only chance for survival was to become a mall itself. Bearing witness to the North American experience, most European countries have actively sought to control, and in some cases forbid, out-of-town shopping center development. In some cases, this reaction has affected shopping center design. In Germany, for example, size restrictions intended to curb big-box development has resulted in the production of slightly smaller units (*Fachmärkte*) in strip malls, while in the Netherlands, regulations limiting out-of-town retail development to shops selling bulky items have produced *meubelboulevards*: shopping centers specialized in home furnishings. Even in more recent markets, resistance seems to be growing toward shopping center development. Various Central and Eastern European countries are considering restrictions, and in Chile mall developers are now required to obtain an environmental certificate. It is

likely that as shopping centers penetrate further into developing countries, this will be followed by calls for their regulation.

David Victor-Harmen Evers

See also Arcade; Edge City; Shopping; Suburbanization

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SIENA, ITALY

See Allegory of Good Government

SIMCITY

SimCity, the product of a California software firm called Maxis, grew in tandem with the personal computer industry in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Since that time, it has been released in many upgraded forms; won a number of awards; and spawned a number of popular spin-offs, such as SimEarth and The Sims. The original simulation was created by an entrepreneur named Will Wright, whose motives—apart from those associated with commercial profit—are often said to have included a wish to demonstrate that a latent market exists for cerebral and nonviolent video games.

From the perspective of urban studies, what makes the game interesting is its political content. SimCity is based on several commonplace premises: that cities ultimately are physical and material (as

opposed to civic or spiritual) phenomena, that urban infrastructure plays a key role in stimulating development, and that cities are all about real estate (“location, location, location”). In addition, SimCity assumes that citizen–consumers (the “Sims”) are rational economic and political actors (save for their love affair with the private automobile), that they can be counted on to act on the NIMBY (Not In My Back Yard) reflex whenever their interests are directly threatened, and that they will “vote with their feet” if urban services fall short of expectations.

Other premises of SimCity are more contestable. For example, given the role of private developers in city building, especially in the United States, the extent to which the game privileges the state, generally, and municipal authorities—especially the mayor—specifically, is somewhat surprising. And it frequently has been pointed out that the homogeneity of SimCity’s citizen–consumers is unrealistic; whereas real American cities are riven by racial and ethnic diversity, the Sims come in only one flavor.

Regarding the last point, it has been suggested that the homogeneity of the population renders SimCity incapable of simulating the dynamics of urban decay, which is presumed to be the consequence of “White flight.” And yet, when tax bases erode in SimCity, rates of unemployment increase, ratcheting up the pressure for government services and generating a rust-colored smudge—“blight”—that spreads across the city like crabgrass. SimCity is not the only computer simulation that is “politically incorrect” in this respect.

Over the years, SimCity has become increasingly sophisticated by the addition of variables and powerful logarithms that make the game more realistic but harder to play. As in real life, SimCity is not strictly linear: Winning a race against the clock is not the whole point, and political success will necessarily be limited and contingent rather than definitive and final. SimCity mayors learn to be content with maintaining modest levels of security and prosperity and with providing competent relief in the face of various natural and artificial disaster scenarios.

SimCity has inspired the development of a distinctive genre of computer simulations—sometimes known as *God Games*, because they are all about creation, as opposed to death and destruction—many of which are seen to have pedagogical value.

The official SimCity website claims more than 10,000 classroom adoptions.

Kenneth Kolson

See also Urban Design; Urban Planning

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SIMMEL, GEORG

Georg Simmel is considered one of the founders of sociology, and his contribution to the origins and development of urban studies is increasingly recognized as pivotal and fundamentally significant. The scope and range of Simmel’s work spans over 20 volumes and some 300 essays and encompasses not only sociology and urban analysis but also philosophy, literature, art, aesthetics, social psychology, and cultural analysis.

Early Years

Simmel was born the youngest of seven children on March 1, 1858, in what would become the very center of Berlin, at the corner of Leipzigerstrasse and Friedrichstrasse. His father, a prosperous Jewish businessman, was a partner in a chocolate factory; he had converted to Christianity and died when Simmel was young. A friend of the family, Julius Freedlander, the owner of a music publishing house, was appointed the boy’s guardian and subsequently helped him through his studies and bequeathed him a substantial legacy.

After graduating from the *Gymnasium*, Simmel began his studies at Berlin University in 1876 where he initially studied history and philosophy with some of the most important academic figures of the day. His initial doctorate, titled “Psychological and Ethnographic Studies on Music,” was rejected and he subsequently received his doctorate in philosophy in 1881 (this time titled “Description and Assessment of Kant’s Various Views on the Nature of Matter”) by which time his field of knowledge extended across a variety of disciplines. He was awarded his *Habilitation*

in January 1885, which allowed him to become a *Privatdozent* (an unpaid lecturer dependent on student fees). However, whether Simmel suffered from incipient anti-Semitism or the jealousy of academic colleagues, he remained a *Privatdozent* for 15 years until 1901 when, at the age of 43, he was finally awarded the honorary title of *Ausserordentlicher Professor*. Despite being recognized as an eminent intellectual with an international reputation (in Europe as well as the United States) and with an extensive list of publications, Simmel struggled to gain a senior academic promotion at one of the German universities.

Although rejected by the academic authorities and some of his colleagues, Simmel was not entirely the outsider he is, at times, portrayed. He was not only a very popular lecturer, giving public as well as academic lectures, but, along with his wife Gertrude (a philosopher in her own right, who published under the pseudonym Marie-Luise Enckendorf), whom he married in 1890, he participated fully in the social, intellectual, and cultural life of the capital, which included philosophers, sociologists, writers, poets, artists, critics, and journalists. Simmel was, along with Weber and Ferdinand Tönnies, a cofounder in 1909 of the German Society for Sociology. Those who studied under, and were influenced by, Simmel during his time in Berlin included Robert Park, Siegfried Kracauer, Georg Lukács, Ernst Bloch, and Walter Benjamin. Simmel finally received a full professorship at the University of Strasbourg in 1914 but, because of the outbreak of war, was limited in his lecturing opportunities. He died of cancer of the liver on September 28, 1918.

Urbanization and Social Interaction

The investigation of apparently mundane, everyday interactions and the subjective experience of them as well as their cultural manifestations were a fundamental part of Simmel's formal sociology and his conception of society as a "web of interactions." In his various writings Simmel's focus is on the minutiae of everyday life (individuality, identity, sociability, games, conversation, flirtation, social gatherings, the family, mealtimes, rendezvous, etc.), and it is the city of modernity that provides a plethora of opportunities for their investigating.

Simmel's sociology of the city, and in particular his essay "The Metropolis and Mental Life," was

an attempt to describe and explain the effects of the social processes of urbanization on modern individuals. Simmel sought to explore the fleeting, transitory, and fragmented nature of modern metropolitan existence and was thus fundamentally interested in investigating the consequences of urban modernity on the inner emotional life of individuals. In this famous essay Simmel presents the city as a web of interactions, a complex labyrinth of interwoven social relations in which the individual is constantly bombarded with images, signs, sights, sounds, smells, experiences, and other people. He emphasized the speed, variety, quality, and quantity of sensory and social experiences and interactions in urban life that mark a key distinction between urban and rural life. The sheer size of the city and the numbers of people who live in it mean that individuals must protect themselves against this "intensification of nervous stimulation." He argues that what develops are forms of psychological defense mechanisms or stratagems that are necessary to survive such an onslaught. Simmel suggests that individuals engage in a process of intellectualization in which they use their head rather than their heart in their interactions with others. The city forces us to repress our emotional involvement with others and instead to use formal, more logical criteria in our interactions with others. To explain this Simmel points to a contradictory aspect of city life: a physical and spatial proximity to hundreds or thousands of other individuals yet at a social distance from those same individuals. Simmel thus explores the idea that modern cities generate conditions that predispose individuals to be reserved in their relationships with one another.

Simmel then is concerned with the impact of the city on the individual or how the individual is formed within and by an urban world. The increased rhythm of life—and "the rapid and unbroken change in external and internal stimuli" that is the everyday experience of life in the modern metropolis—leads concomitantly to the creation of a self-preserving blasé, urban-metropolitan personality. The blasé personality is an attempt to preserve identity, integrity, and individuality in the face of such an assault on the senses, on experience, and on the increased opportunities offered in the city. This sensual experience is, in part, a consequence of the potential and possibility that we have come to understand as being characteristic of the city in modernity.

Concept of the Stranger

In this sense Simmel's insight is that we are all, in modern urban societies, strangers. For Simmel the *stranger* is a social typification that he uses as a means to explore the interactions of being both close to and remote from others, from strangers that are always on the edge or margins of our consciousness, our experience, and our understanding of predominantly urban forms and experiences of modern, social interactions. Simmel explicitly identifies the stranger as a figure that epitomizes a state of being in-between (between coming and going, being known and unknown, of belonging or being detached, of familiarity and impersonality, etc.) that reflects aspects of his spatial and urban analysis (that of nearness and remoteness, of fixity and mobility, inside and outside, etc.). Simmel applies an analysis that reflects the need to conceptualize fundamental qualities of space in order to characterize social forms that he views as indicative of urban modernity. Thus he considers how the concentration and density of large numbers of people in the new spaces of urban modernity provided the possibility for the emergence of crowds in novel and potentially dangerous space. That is, an assembled crowd can be impulsive, enthusiastic, and susceptible to manipulation that is related to the sense of freedom of being anonymous as well as reciprocally the sense of belonging, of being immersed in and part of, a larger social collectivity or mass.

Philosophy of Money

For Simmel, what was also fundamental and indicative of modernity was the creation and experience of the mature money economy. This is rooted in his analytical perspective on the importance of everyday life, which is expressed, experienced, and determined in and through the interactions and spaces of urban modernity. It is not the sphere of production that Simmel focuses on but that of the sphere of circulation, exchange and consumption, of individuals as customers as well as commodities, which are concentrated in the metropolis. This is because it is in the metropolis that the money economy and the reification of the social world of objects and of people have their greatest impact upon individuals. In *The Philosophy of Money* Simmel documents the increasing reification of social relationships

through the medium of money and the concomitant decline of subjective culture at the expense of an increasingly objective culture dominated by monetary transactions.

Simmel also identified spaces of circulation and exchange as increasingly characteristic of the mature money economy of urban modernity. Whether in the new spaces created for consumption, such as the department store, or the increasingly fleeting and fragmented relationships that occurred in everyday transactions, money was the medium through and in which the increasing movement and circulation of people, goods, and services was accomplished. It was the medium and the means by which the structuring of the space of the city and one's experience of it was increasingly organized. Money is a leveler that flattens everything to a single dimension such that anything can be bought and sold, including people, and this for Simmel found its expression and concentration most acutely in the modern metropolis as the location for the mature money economy. Simmel is thus concerned with providing examples to establish the effect or consequences of money as an end to human values. These include what for Simmel were "two processes that are almost endemic to a money culture—cynicism and a blasé attitude."

Cynicism is induced when both the highest and the lowest aspects of social life are for sale, reduced to a common denominator—money. This leveling of everything leads to the cynical attitude that everything has its price and everything can be bought and sold. Cynicism is thus born out of an indifference to the evaluation of things. The blasé attitude, by contrast, arises out of indifference to the nature of things themselves, as the money economy induces the view that all things are of an equally dull and gray hue, not worth getting excited about. The blasé personality has lost completely the ability to make value judgments about all that is on offer for purchase and thus seeks compensation in a craving for excitement, for extremes of impressions, speed, and stimulation.

The increasingly impersonal relations among people take place within larger networks of social circles and are based on specific roles rather than the qualities of the individuals themselves. Instead of dealing with individuals with their own personalities, identities, biographies, and so forth, people are increasingly likely to deal solely with positions—the

delivery person, the shop assistant, bus driver, ticket seller, and so on—regardless of who occupies those positions. In the modern division of labor characteristic of the money economy, there is the paradoxical situation that while people grow more dependent on other positions for their survival, they know less about the individuals that occupy these positions. The specific individual becomes increasingly insignificant. People thus become interchangeable parts. Money becomes the means by which any emotional or personal relationship is detached from the individuals involved in the exchange of goods or services that constitutes an increasingly larger part of social relationships.

The increasing influence and dominance of objective over subjective culture characteristic of urban modernity and of money is addressed by Simmel in essays on fashion, adornment, and style. This analysis reveals the increasing importance and role of capitalism in metropolitan modernity. Seen as the compromise between the desire for stasis and the desire for change, fashion allows one to follow others and to mark oneself off from them as a member of a particular class or group. In societies where there is little differentiation, fashions change slowly: In modern societies where there is a danger of obliteration of the individual, fashion becomes much more important. Fashion is necessarily transitory and always carries with it a strong sense of being in the here and now. Being fashionable and demonstrating publicly a sense of style can be a statement about both status and value. There is thus a paradoxical juxtaposition of the desire to make oneself and one's social environment more pleasing while at the same time receiving recognition for doing so: altruism in wishing to please opposed by the desire to distinguish oneself from others. People want to be recognized as different individuals yet at the same time to feel part of a group, an in-crowd, with status and value.

The concentration and density of people and services, of production and consumption, of transportation and communication, all of which become concentrated and located in the city, create a rhythm and pace of life in the city that is often viewed as a characteristic feature. Simmel's exploration of micro-sociological phenomena takes place within the everyday life and spaces of the city of modernity and the sometimes negative consequences of this for the human condition. Simmel suggests a need also

for spaces and places where the rapid circulatory system of the city operates at a slower tempo, allowing an albeit temporary withdrawal from the pressure and strains of work time and the domination of experiences mediated by money. Simmel therefore also explores as a necessary correlate and extension, the need sometimes to escape from this overwhelming intensification of interactions and the sensory stimulation of an increasingly objectified culture, as he describes in his essays "The Alpine Journey" and "The Adventure."

Simmel's early contribution to the social theory of space as a fundamental feature of the analysis of modernity raises important factors for the analysis and understanding of both the city of modernity and the consequences for human social interaction. His essay "Sociology of Space" is an early contribution to the social theory of space which, in keeping with his conception of society as reciprocal interaction, presents his five aspects of space (exclusivity, boundaries, fixity, mobility, proximity–distance), as a means for investigating the significance of space for social forms. These provide important insights into the manner in which space shapes and is shaped by the forms of social interactions that occur within it. Social forms affect and are affected by, the spatial conditions in which they occur; therefore many "forms of sociation" can only be understood by a consideration of their spatial context. This is a dynamic symbiotic relationship between social construction and environmental, that is geographical, determinism, which has significance for subjective experience as well as the structural and spatial organization of the city as a whole or specific spatial forms within it, whether they are streets, squares, buildings, or places and spaces of consumption and of leisure and recreation.

Simmel's five aspects of space therefore suggest conceptual avenues for the development of the analysis of such specific spatial forms and people's subjective experience and use of them within the metropolis; in other words, how social relations and interactions are molded, shaped, and given form by the quality and arrangements of delimited and defined, organized, structured, and regulated urban spaces. But this is not a one-way street. Space, particularly forms of public and social space, accrues meaning, significance, and value through the forms of interaction and experiences,

the popular activities and habitual usage that occur in and through them, and thus people mold or shape space by the way in which they use or abuse it.

Legacy

Simmel's concern with the distinctive qualities that made the modern city a new phenomenon with consequences for the individual and for the organization, maintenance, and regulation of modern society was focused on everyday, microsociological phenomena. The city provided Simmel with the raw material for his theoretical analyses and investigations. In particular, Simmel's influence on American sociology (and the development of the Chicago School, biologically based metaphor of the human ecology model of urban development and competition in particular) is well documented. Simmel also explored the increasing reification, exchange, circulation, and consumption of social relations and interactions dominated by money, which is of continuing importance to contemporary urban and social analyses. The impersonality, cynicism, and blasé character of city life; the commodification and objectification of culture; fashion, style, and adornment as emblems or signs of identity and status; and social distance and spatial proximity to strangers are still important and relevant factors in the analysis of increasingly complex, mobile, and multicultural urban concentrations. Simmel's theory of modern society and of the city is therefore of continuing value and affinity not only to historical analyses of the development of cities of modernity but also to late or postmodern and contemporary studies of the consequences and experience of urban expansion throughout the world in an era of globalization.

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See also Urban Sociology; Urban Theory

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SIMULACRA

The word *simulacra*, or *simulacrum* in the singular, is often associated with the idea of the "fake." *To simulate* means to feign or to pretend; *simulation* refers to the practice of simulating; and *simulacrum* refers to something that has the appearance of another thing but supposedly not its "essence." The French philosopher Jean Baudrillard was the first to elevate "simulacra" to one of the central concepts of postmodern cultural analysis and contemporary urban studies. However, the simulacrum is a philosophical problem with a long history dating back to the ancient Greek philosophers. Plato (ca. 360 BC) argues—using the famous allegory of the cave—that the immediate sensory perception is an illusive reflection of the actual metaphysical reality. In the twentieth century, Gilles Deleuze explains that the essential difference between the copy and the simulacrum is that whereas the first is authorized by resemblance, the latter implies corruption by disguise and difference. He advocates that the simulation is not a copy of the second order; on the contrary, it possesses a productive power in and of itself. For example, an insect may use the strategy of camouflage to temporarily mimic the appearance of the surrounding environment in order to protect itself. Interpreted in this way, the power of

simulacrum lies in its capacity to transcend the duality of the original and the copy.

Baudrillard acknowledges, with pessimism, that simulation threatens the difference between the original and the copy. For example, he who simulates an illness may also suffer and display the symptoms of that illness. This may be interpreted as a “liquidation,” wherein it is no longer possible to tell the difference between an original and a copy to the point of rendering the very distinction irrelevant. As narrated in a famous short story by Jorge Luis Borges in 1935, the drive for exactitude in science results in the production of a map so detailed that it covers the territory it seeks to represent and becomes indistinguishable from it. At its extreme, the map becomes the territory, forcing a reversal of this traditional relationship into the new concept of hyperreality. Hyperreality, in this case, is the idea of simulating something that never really existed. Baudrillard defines a genealogy for the development of simulacra through successive phases of the image, from the reflection of a reality toward its masking, to its absence, and finally arriving at no relationship with reality at all. Disneyland masks the absence of a “real” country outside the boundaries of the theme park. The America outside this theme park is a simulacrum created by competing signs and simulations. This analysis provides a historical dimension to the philosophical issue and provides an opening that makes simulacra relevant to urban studies because it connects discussions of consumption, media (Marshall McLuhan), discipline (Michel Foucault), and urbanism (Edward Soja).

The concept of simulacra has emerged in recent practices as a fundamental aspect of contemporary urbanism. Film and advertising were the media through which people predominantly experienced and interacted with cities throughout the twentieth century. New media in the twenty-first century, such as computer role-playing games and the Internet, have joined the older twentieth-century “mass” media in shaping urban experience. Despite admonishments by Frankfurt School critics and later others, it is no longer possible to consider media simply as a panoptic system received by a passive mass audience. As McLuhan has argued, the medium and message are indistinguishable. Virtual, reel, or screen cities are not mere representations of the physical environment. One manifestation of this

is that urban governments are increasingly investing in the production of media images and manicuring their built environments to fit their popular virtual images. The examination of the relationship between urban space and “cinematic” form has spawned, in the past decade, a new area of scholarship—cinematic urbanism—that seeks to highlight and analyze the continuum between the real and the reel.

Physical environments around the world are increasingly produced as images. One may distinguish three types that have different relationships with the “real.” The first type is created as an image based on a material past with a documented history. America’s premier public-history site, Colonial Williamsburg, is a good example of this type. It is a highly edited and stylized version of history—one that celebrates the colonial elite of Virginia for patriotism-pitched consumption, without delivering the harshness of slavery, which might make tourists uncomfortable. The second type is dream landscapes that replicate historical settings reduced to their basic representations. Most typically, the Eiffel Tower stands in for Paris in many theme parks. The ultimate example of this type of environment is Disneyland. The third type of environment is produced as an image with much looser ties to history and looser claims and pretensions to the real. In Las Vegas, themed casino complexes do not pretend to have any authenticity. Some may argue that visitors need not see the real Paris because they have seen its simulacrum in Las Vegas. In this case, the copy is so faithfully reproduced within context to the point that allows it to supplant the original. Although it continues to derive its authority from its relationship to the original, the desire to experience the original becomes greatly reduced because of the power of the copy.

Urban geographers eagerly use the concept of simulacra to discuss contemporary urbanism in such sites as Orange County in southern California, which they label with names such as exopolis or postmetropolis. Orange County cannot be considered a suburb anymore because it features all the functions that were formerly associated with the city. This new kind of urbanization lacks history and a sense of place, which leads conservative architects, especially since the 1980s, to come up with nostalgic design

approaches that attempt to reinsert history, even if invented, into urbanism. New antiurban utopian visions, exemplified in new urbanism, encourage the creation of public spaces that resemble small town squares, but which are highly controlled and hence negate the possibility of public assembly. New urbanism is only one aspect of a trend toward nostalgic neotraditional environments. This trend often enlists actual restored environments that are a result of preservation movements. Postmodernism has created a new urban vision based on a populism of highly differentiated signs and symbols. In the production of such urban symbolism, vernacular traditions and the local history of any place can be readily mined and combined with other elements of emerging global forms to create a stylistic eclecticism. Thus the adapted traditions often became associated with media images to take on meanings beyond their former or immediate social or economic context. This is the reality of the simulated urbanism that accompanies the beginning of the twenty-first century.

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See also Cinematic Urbanism; Exopolis; Las Vegas, Nevada; New Urbanism; Soja, Edward W.; Themed Environments

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SINGAPORE

Located at the southern point of the Malay peninsula, Singapore is an island city-state, which gained independence as a sovereign nation-state in 1965. With a current population size of 4.5 million (of which only 70 percent are citizens) and a land area of about 700 square kilometers (of which 10 percent is derived from reclamation), Singapore—with a population density of over 6,000 people per square kilometer—is one of the most densely populated countries in the world. Comprising a majority Chinese population (75.2 percent), the city-state is also home to substantial minority ethnic groups (Malays, 13.6 percent, and Indians, 8.8 percent) as well as a broad diversity of other ethnic, language, and nationality groups (officially classified as Others, 2.2 percent). In the postindependence years, Singapore has been rapidly transformed by processes of urbanization and industrialization under a state-led developmentalist regime, under which the urban built environment has been subjected to a high degree of central planning control.

The Colonial City

A product of British mercantile capitalism, urban settlement in Singapore grew from small beginnings as a trading post established in 1819 by Stamford Raffles, an agent of the East India Company, to become the commercial capital of the British Far Eastern Empire and a clearinghouse for commodities and labor in the late nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. The emergence of a world market and a system of trade oriented toward the needs of the industrializing West in the late nineteenth century confirmed Singapore's position as a premier transaction point for the east–west trade route and a base for trading agencies and merchant houses handling the financial, commercial, shipping, insurance, and other related services connected to the rapidly expanding import–export

trade. In demographic terms, rapid urbanization during the colonial period was fueled primarily by labor migration: Despite the fact that natural increase was negative prior to 1921 (because of gross imbalances in sex ratios and the prevalence of high mortality rates), the population grew rapidly from less than 100,000 in 1871 to over half a million in 1931, and further to over a million in 1951 when Singapore attained official city status. The colonial city of Singapore was essentially a polyglot migrant world constituted by immigrants from China, India, and the Malay archipelago, dominated by a small European imperial diaspora. The plan of the town of Singapore, more commonly known as the Jackson Plan, had been drawn up as early as 1822, designating residential, commercial, and administrative zones and laying out the colony in a grid pattern. Residential areas were ethnically segregated. The Chinese resided southeast of the river (present-day Chinatown), Malay and Arab residents lived in the Kampong Glam and Bugis areas, and Indian residents were located farther north of these areas in Chulia Kampong. European traders and administrators lived in the European town, located adjacent to the administrative and commercial districts such as Commercial Square, the financial and trading hub of the colony with mercantile offices, banks, and trading companies. Apart from a brief interlude under Japanese occupation (1942–1945) during World War II when the city was renamed Syonan-to (Light of the South), urban governance was in the hands of the municipal authority tasked with bringing order and control to the urban environment, including regulating housing forms, public health, utilities systems, public places, and burial grounds. Right through the postwar decades of the colonial period and until independence, the urban built-up area was confined to the south-central part of the island; large tracts on the other parts of the island remained largely rural or forested landscapes. In less than 20 years after independence, however, Singapore became almost completely urbanized.

Urban Renewal

In the 1950s and 1960s, urban problems—overcrowding, dilapidated and insanitary buildings, the lack of public open spaces and community services, road congestion, high land values, irregular

plot sizes, and a complicated mix of residential, industrial, and commercial land use setting a high premium on redevelopment—appeared intractable, especially when fueled by rapid population growth stemming from the postwar baby boom. The first master plan of Singapore had been drawn up by the Singapore Improvement Trust in 1955 and approved in 1958, but its conservative proposals (which assumed a slow and steady rate of economic growth and the maintenance of an inner-city/town/rural ring concept) were later found wanting by a UN advisory team and the newly elected government, which favored instead an active hand in guiding urban development toward other areas on the island, coupled with an extensive public housing program to form self-sufficient, high-density residential towns around the central water catchment as well as from the eastern to the western parts of the island. In the new formulation, the government would play a much bigger role in providing welfare, housing, and a long-term strategy that would impact the shape of urban planning. The high priority placed on housing the nation was facilitated by state powers of compulsory land acquisition for the “public good”; burial grounds, farmland, and rural settlements soon gave way to a landscape of new towns characterized by high-rise public housing. Today, about 86 percent of Singaporeans live in Housing and Development Board apartments, and about 92 percent of these residents own their apartments.

In the early independence years, as part of the state’s bid to secure political legitimacy, to build ideological consensus, and to transform the population into a disciplined industrial workforce, the eradication of slums in the central areas of Singapore also gained prominence on the urban agenda. Comprehensive state-initiated urban renewal was seen as the vital key to giving valuable but slum-ridden areas located in the heart of the city a fresh lease on life. Slum clearance in the central areas of Singapore was followed by redevelopment strategies, including the planning and designing of public housing and other amenities, such as shops, markets, hawkers’ stalls, offices, and open spaces; the sale of repurposed sites to private developers to build residential, retail, or office properties; and the planning of new roads, sewers, drains, water mains, and so forth. The first two decades after independence was hence dominated by a demolish-and-rebuild

philosophy to excise urban slums and rural *kam-pungs*, to optimize scarce land resources for economic development, and to etch into the city the lineaments of technological progress and modernity.

Urban Conservation and Planning

If the first two decades of the nation's development was dictated by the erasure of the past, the next two saw a more concerted attempt to recover memory loss and fashion an appropriate genealogy for the nation. Concerns in the 1980s with recovering the city-state's identity and heritage led to a move toward prioritizing urban conservation of historic districts and built forms of heritage value, as first unveiled in the Conservation Master Plan of 1986. Urban conservation and the creation of heritage landscapes not only provided the nation with a sense of historical continuity but also conferred on the cityscape a distinct visual identity to rise above the homogenizing effects of technology and modernity. The creation of difference through a systematic program of urban conservation was central in giving Singapore a comparative advantage in competing in the global tourism trade. Beginning in the mid-1980s—when it became clear that new economic diversification strategies were needed in response to a slowdown in manufacturing, shifts in the international division of labor, and the erosion of Singapore's competitiveness in labor-intensive operations—strengthening the tourism assets of the city was crucial to Singapore's strategy to carve out a specialized niche as an international business and service center. As the city-state approached the new millennium, restoring “difference” to the cityscape and increasing its aesthetic value remained pivotal to its aspirations to become a cosmopolitan city with the wherewithal to position itself strategically in the globalization race. A key plank in the state's globalizing strategy is to augment its limited workforce and skills base by attracting and retaining foreign talent—transnational elites of the entrepreneurial, managerial, and professional class with the skills to help Singapore compete in the superleague of global cities. In 1992, the Singapore government coined the slogan “Global City for the Arts” to spearhead its vision of cultivating a thriving arts, cultural, and entertainment scene, not only to enrich the local cultural scene and foster national

pride but also to attract tourists and compete for and welcome foreign talent. By the turn of the millennium, the Global City for the Arts vision was further complemented by the notion of becoming a Renaissance city, signifying creativity, cultural vibrancy, and innovation. Central to these visions is the monumental urbanscape launched in October 2002, the Esplanade-Theatres on the Bay, a world-class assemblage of several theaters and performance spaces of spectacular shape and aesthetic design covering six hectares of prime land that visibly transformed the city's skyline, waterfront, and aerial view. In the decades since independence, central planning has been a key ingredient in Singapore's transformation from what has been described as third world conditions to first world standards within the short space of four decades. Successive concept plans (1971, 1991, 2001) drawn up by the Urban Redevelopment Authority function as the central documents for the long-term planning of Singapore's urban development in order to support infrastructural, transportation, and economic growth. Whereas the Concept Plan of 1971 envisioned the development of a ring of high-density satellite towns around the central water catchment area linked by a system of expressways and a proposed mass rapid transit system, the 2001 plan anticipated increasingly sophisticated expectations and the nation's changing strategic goals by providing for more choice of housing and recreational activities (including the incorporation of more “green” and “blue” spaces), encouraging a more flexible environment for businesses and focusing on enhancing cultural identity.

Understanding the City

One framework for understanding the conditions that led to Singapore's distinctive urbanization and urban morphology is the modernization paradigm from the 1960s, which typifies Singapore as the quintessential Southeast Asian port city moving through a cycle from colonial imposition to Western replication. According to this model, Singapore's urbanization is characterized by a dual economic and morphological structure—a firm-centered economy characterized by Western capitalistic forms, such as banks and trading firms, operating from a Western commercial zone, and a

bazaar economy with preindustrial and semicapitalistic forms of economic organization, such as Chinese loan associations and mobile street markets. With the accelerated expansion of the firm-centered sector, bazaar activities decline and the city is gradually transformed by assuming urban patterns similar to the Western city.

Other frameworks have emerged in recent times. In the past two decades, Singapore, with its explicit globalizing ambition, has been the subject of much study within the rubric of the globalization literature, usually cast in the role of the successful non-Western city unique in the way it has been engineered by a strong state operating in an illiberal democracy. The triple designation of Singapore as a nation-city-state renders it an unparalleled laboratory for investigating the processes and consequences of state-driven urbanization wherein the politics of urban landscape—the interplay between the state, capital, and the (often radicalized) citizenry—is framed by ideologies of the nation. More recent scholarship in the vein of transnational urbanism is also beginning to explore the role of migrants and mobile others in reconfiguring the spaces of, and social relations in, the globalizing city.

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See also Asian Cities; Colonial City; Global City; Housing; Urban Planning

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SITUATIONIST CITY

Situationist city is a term referring to radical engagements with urban questions by members of the Situationist International (SI) and their associates during the 1950s and 1960s. As a group of artists, activists, and writers based mainly in Western Europe and seeking to revolutionize contemporary societies, the situationists had a long and multifarious concern with cities. They opposed processes of capitalist urbanization and planning at the time, attacking the ways in which cities were being destroyed and remade within what they called "the society of the spectacle." Drawing on and developing Marxist understandings of urban space and everyday life, and also engaging with the legacies of avant-gardes from earlier in the twentieth century, especially Dada and surrealism, they depicted cities as sites of alienation, control, and segregation through which prevailing capitalist sociospatial relations of domination are produced and reproduced. At the same time, however, they explored cities as sites of potential freedom, believing they could become realms of emancipation and human fulfillment.

Situationist city was not a term employed by the SI and derives instead from writings and exhibitions on the group that have proliferated since the 1990s, as it has been rediscovered within academia and mainstream culture and positioned within histories of the avant-garde as well as Western Marxism. Such references may imply a singular theory or doctrine based on design or planning, but this is misleading because the ideas and practices of the SI were evolving, diverse, and contested, developed in varied ways by the group's 70 members during its formal existence between 1957 and 1972 as well as by a number of forerunners. They also far exceeded any specialist discipline and stemmed, above all, from the desire to change everyday urban life and space. A crucial insight that the SI shared with Henri Lefebvre and with many radical geographers since Lefebvre is that, to change everyday life, it is necessary to change everyday space and vice versa. Their critical concern with cities therefore came out of this appreciation of the social and political significance of space as they addressed how to envisage and construct urban spaces as part of a strategy for social

transformation, so that they might become both the products and the instruments of emancipation.

Situationist Critiques of Urbanism

Vociferous attacks on capitalist urbanism and modern planning ran through situationist texts. The group often depicted cities as being ravaged by developers, planners, and architects. “Paris no longer exists,” stated Guy Debord, a central figure in the SI throughout its existence, in one of his films from 1978 that was made in the wake of a huge restructuring of the city over the preceding two decades that displaced hundreds of thousands of residents along class and ethnic lines and that left the city center increasingly the preserve of the wealthy. The situationists earlier documented, explored, and contested the processes involved. Many of their attacks on modernist architecture and planning had been pioneered in the early 1950s by members of the two main groups that came together to form the SI: the Letterist International and the International Movement for an Imaginist Bauhaus. Although much of their fire was directed at modernist planning as it was impacting on cities at the time, they understood this to be part of the remaking of cities under capitalism. Debord later presented urbanism as an important component of what he called “the society of the spectacle,” a society in which ever more realms of social life and space were colonized by the commodity and in which urbanism functioned as a means of ensuring the isolation and separation of inhabitants through the construction of a banalized environment of abstract spaces and pseudo-communities.

The situationists looked for signs of revolt and struggle against these processes of capitalist urbanization. They saw as one of their main aims articulating and making known forms of revolutionary contestation, for example, addressing uprisings in Los Angeles in 1965 and Detroit in 1967, as assaults on the “spectacle-commodity economy” and as a “critique of urbanism,” respectively. More generally they documented and took seriously a range of struggles such as wildcat worker actions and spontaneous protests among the young in addition to anti-imperialist struggles around the world. In highlighting how everyday spaces and life under capitalism had been colonized, they asserted the

importance of the spatial dimensions of struggles for decolonization and dis-alienation.

In the early years of the SI, its members paid considerable attention to exploring critically their own urban environments through the practice of psychogeography. This was initially developed by the letterists in Paris in the early 1950s, and it involved studying the effects of the urban environment on the behavior and emotions of people, usually through *dérives* (drifts) through the streets in small groups on foot, and seeking to challenge and subvert dominant codes and powerful interests shaping urban spaces. In the latter regard, the letterists and situationists broke up, hijacked, or detoured existing maps of cities and developed new modes of cartography, based on different values and desires, most famously in maps of Paris produced by Debord from 1956 to 1957. They also documented and wrote in defense of areas under threat of urban redevelopment and experimented with forms of “playful-constructive behavior” as a way of living an alternative mode of living in the city in the present. Their aim was not simply to interpret or document the spaces of cities but to change them.

Revolution and Unitary Urbanism

In their efforts to revolutionize space and society, the situationists early on deployed the term *unitary urbanism*. This was not a doctrine of urbanism, they insisted, but a critique of urbanism. Through this distinction they sought to distance themselves from utopian planners who produced schemes for ideal cities. The danger of such an approach, they asserted, was that it could too easily be absorbed into the status quo as a technocratic scheme leaving fundamental social structures unscathed. Unitary urbanism nevertheless had a visionary element as it involved the struggle to envisage and to find ways of producing other social spaces and other ways of living. It anticipated an alternative urban future in which the spaces of the city would be constructed according to the interests and desires of their inhabitants, freely creating their environments as an unalienated *oeuvre*. This would lead to the production of a ludic and nomadic space through a process that, in opposition to the spectacle, would be collective and participatory.

Constant’s New Babylon project, developed through art works, models, writings, and materials

in other media both within the SI and beyond it after his resignation in 1960, was a vivid attempt to develop such thinking. He always insisted that, for all his own efforts to imagine and depict this utopian space, its real builders would be the New Babylonians themselves. Other situationists subsequently charged Constant with technocraticism during the 1960s, as they dropped the language of unitary urbanism and shifted their emphasis toward the political critique of existing conditions. Their concern with transforming urban space as part of a revolutionary struggle nevertheless remained with the group, who addressed the events of the Paris Commune of 1871 and, later, the revolts in Paris in May 1968 in which they participated, as moments of revolutionary urbanism when lived critiques opened up new sociospatial possibilities.

Recent interest in the situationists from within urban studies may be related to two wider trends in this field, namely, (1) growing recognition of the need to excavate the contested historical geographies of modernist urbanism, especially with reference to the previously neglected decades immediately following World War II, and (2) increased interest in a vibrant tradition of heterodox Marxist writings on cities, including those by Walter Benjamin and Henri Lefebvre. Also significant has been the ways in which their concepts of the spectacle, as well as psychogeography, have spoken in compelling ways to certain current critical and exploratory practices. The most striking legacies of the situationist city today lie not in formal architectural or design experimentation, despite the interest in their ideas in those fields; rather it is in the activities of radical political movements to reclaim streets, to assert rights to the city, to transform spaces as part of wider struggles, and thus to take up the quest to change the world that was always at the heart of situationist endeavors although in the different conditions of the present.

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See also Lefebvre, Henri; Marxism and the City; Paris, France; Right to the City; Society of the Spectacle; Utopia

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SKATEBOARDING

Skateboarding is the act of riding on a short, narrow, flat board mounted on four wheels. Skateboarding is a sport, a mode of transportation, a cultural art form, and a recreational activity, especially for youth. The practice probably first began in the beach cities and suburbs of California during the late 1950s and early 1960s. While the waves were calm, many surfers tried to alleviate their boredom by replicating their ocean moves on smooth expanses of tarmac—this they did by standing on a short wooden deck (the riding surface) about 22 inches long and 6 inches wide, connected to a pair of trucks (axle assemblies) borrowed from a roller skate, and rolling on metal or "clay" composite wheels. In 1964, the influential *SkateBoarder* magazine appeared, and by the summer of 1965 skateboarding was a U.S.-wide activity, gaining national television coverage

for the International Skateboard Championships at Anaheim, and even appearing on the cover of *Life* magazine. This first phase of skateboarding was, however, very short lived; the boom in popularity peaked at the end of 1965, leaving many of the new skateboard manufacturers with large amounts of unsold stock. At this point skateboarding retreated back into being a marginal activity, practiced largely in California but also in other surf-related parts of the world, such as South Wales in the United Kingdom.

Skateparks

Around 1972 to 1973, skateboarding entered its second phase of expansion with the introduction of new technologies, including wheels made from polyurethane (introduced by Frank Nasworthy, a former surfer) to allow for greater speed and grip, stronger and more sophisticated “double-action” metal trucks to allow for greater stability and maneuverability and, in the late 1970s, larger decks around 10 inches in width and 30 inches in length to allow for greater stability. Around 1974 to 1975, also fueled by the reemergence of the now reissued *SkateBoarder* magazine, skateboarders appropriated the various concrete architectures of the urban world. These architectures included deserted swimming pools, river and canal drainage channels, and schoolyard banks, and even huge water pipes found out in the Arizona desert. Seeking to capitalize on this new nationwide craze, more than 100 purpose-designed commercial skateparks were built across America, including Pipeline and Del Mar Skate Ranch in California, Kona and Solid Surf in Florida, Apple in Ohio, and Cherry Hill in New Jersey. Similar skateparks were also constructed across the world, including in Australia, Brazil, France, Germany, Italy, Mexico, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. These new skateparks, with their perfectly formed concrete runs and pools, allowed skateboarders to reach new physical heights, including aerial moves where the skateboarder flies beyond the top of a wall, turns around in mid-air, and reenters the pool some 12 feet below.

Once again, however, widespread interest in skateboarding lasted only a few years, and in the early 1980s many skateparks closed down, partly due to ever-increasing insurance premiums and partly due to pressures of land redevelopment. In

response to this loss of urban terrain, many skateboarders built their own “half-pipe” construction—a wooden ramp structure, with a U-section profile and two parallel side walls, usually between 6 and 12 feet high, and often topped with a platform on either side to allow the skateboarder to drop into the ramp from on high. A flat bottom is also normally inserted into the base of the U profile in order to both increase speed and to allow the skateboarder more time between the walls.

Other skateboarders took a different path and, around 1984, extended skateboarding onto the conventional elements of the city. Once again, this new phase of skateboarding was particularly focused on the western seaboard cities of California, such as the Venice Beach area of Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Santa Barbara. Using the “ollie” move, where the front of the skateboard is unweighted to make it pop into the air (first developed by the skater Alan Gelfand at the end of the 1970s skatepark phase of skateboarding), and encouraged by the new magazine *Thrasher*, these new urban skateboarders skated over fire hydrants and curbs, onto bus benches and planters, and down steps and handrails, thus enacting a radical subversion of the intended use of architecture—that is, using architecture in a way different from that originally intended by architects, planners, building owners, and urban managers. As Stacey Peralta, a former professional skateboarder and co-owner of the highly successful Powell–Peralta company, described it, “for urban skaters the city is the hardware on their trip.” In undertaking this much more urban and city center–related activity, skateboarding also assumed a more aggressive attitude than it had during the surf-related periods of the 1960s and 1970s: Firmly opposed to Little League, paternalistic, and school-oriented teenage America, the new street-based skateboarders reveled instead in the role of outcast and rebel. Brightly colored deck graphics, shoes, and clothing helped announce a street skateboarder’s presence and attitude, often reflecting other aspects of urban subculture such as through gang-related graffiti-style logos and designs. Skateboards themselves also changed in shape and design at this time: Now around 8 inches wide, they have a sloped kicktail at both ends, glossy graphics on the underside, and smaller, harder wheels around 55 millimeters or smaller in diameter.

Media Exposure and Commercialization

This new kind of urban skateboarding, relatively free from the constraints of commercial skateparks and organized team sports, and with its own urban subculture and identity, has become enormously popular. Besides famous skateboarding cities like Los Angeles, Philadelphia, and San Francisco (where skateboard spots such as the Embarcadero and Pier 7 have become internationally famous), every U.S. city and town now has its own band of skateboarders—numbers are more or less impossible to fix, but there are probably around 5 million to 7 million serious skateboarders in America today and around 40 million worldwide. Urban street skateboarding is particularly popular in United Kingdom and Brazil, but it is also prevalent in just about every other developed country globally.

As a result, media exposure of skateboarding has also become increasingly common, through Hollywood films like *Back to the Future*, *Police Academy 4*, and *Gleaming the Cube*, and, most importantly, through satellite television coverage of the multiextreme sport “X Games,” the *Dogtown and Z-Boys* film documentary, and the Hollywood follow-up film *Lords of Dogtown*. In addition, there are a multitude of manufacturers’ videos promoting products via their team riders, as well as a tendency on the part of other product manufacturers for skateboarding to be included in advertisements whenever a sense of dynamic adventure is required (skateboarding is often featured in car advertisements to impart a sense of youthfulness and urban adventure). Also of significance, Sony launched their phenomenally successful *Pro-Skater* Playstation video game, endorsed by professional skateboarder Tony Hawk, and then further developed this into the equally popular *Tony Hawk’s Underground* game series. Internet coverage also continues to grow, offering interviews, videos, photographs, skate locations, and music.

Indeed, it is the commercialization and mediaization of skateboarding that often dominates at the start of the twenty-first century: Many seemingly independent and small skateboard companies are in fact often owned by a few large conglomerates, with the whole business being estimated at up to \$1 billion per year. In addition, skateboard shoe and clothing companies such as Vans, Airwalk,

and DC are now sold in mass-market stores worldwide, while hundreds of professional skateboarders reportedly earn six-figure salaries from their product endorsements and guest appearances.

Nonetheless, despite attempts to turn skateboarding into a commodified and media spectacle, it remains at core a resolutely antiauthoritarian urban practice, with many skateboard-related artists, filmmakers, videomakers, and photographers choosing to work outside of the more commercialized arenas of the sport. Most importantly of all, in its actual performative actions, street skateboarding remains highly confrontational toward the city environment: taking over public squares and plazas, scratching benches and planters, gouging out the tops of stone and brick walls, leaving traces of paint on handrails and steps, creating noise and visual surprise, and speeding past pedestrians. Yet, beyond simple accusations that skateboarding causes physical damage to persons and property, there is a more significant dimension to this seeming aggression: In redefining space for themselves, skateboarders threaten accepted definitions of space, taking over space conceptually as well as physically and so striking at the very heart of what everyone else understands of the city. In particular, through their performative and largely untheorized and uncodified actions, skateboarders make an overtly political statement, suggesting that the city is not just a place for work, commuting, or shopping but also a place for play, action, and consumption without spending money. The skateboarding world thus offers a pleasure ground carved out of the city and a modern-day continuous reaffirmation of the situationist-inspired 1968 statement that beneath the pavement lies the beach.

Anti-Skateboarding Legislation

Unsurprisingly, this kind of activity does not go unchallenged. Because skateboarders test urban boundaries, using city elements in ways neither practiced nor understood by others, they face startling amounts of repression and legislation. Negative and heavy-handed reactions to skateboarding have become increasingly commonplace, and many U.S. and U.K. cities have now placed curfews and outright bans on skateboarding. Consequently, skateboarders now routinely encounter experiences similar to those of the homeless,

frequently in areas of semicontrolled space hovering between private and public domains. Like the homeless, skateboarders occupy minimal developments and office plazas without engaging in the economic activity of the buildings and, as a result, owners and managers have treated skateboarders as trespassers and have cited marks caused by skateboards as proof of criminal damage. Skateboarders are frequently fined and banned and have even been imprisoned—in short, they are increasingly subjected to a form of spatial censorship and criminalization.

Now that anti-skateboarding legislation is becoming highly systematic, the nervousness of the status quo when faced with skateboarders highlights a confrontation between hegemonic and countercultural urban social practices and shows how urban managers and legislators are becoming increasingly intolerant toward supposedly nonproductive and noncommercialized activities such as skateboarding.

Ultimately, however, for skateboarding, being banned from the public domain becomes simply one more obstacle to overcome, causing American skateboarders to campaign that “Skateboarding Is Not a Crime.” Alternatively, such repression simply adds to the anarchist tendency within skateboarding, reinforcing the cry of “Skate and Destroy” (a 20-year-old slogan still highly popular as a sticker among skateboarders). Either way, skateboarders are part of a long process in the history of cities: a fight by the unempowered and disenfranchised for a distinctive social space of their own.

Iain Borden

See also Urban Design

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SOCIAL EXCLUSION

Concepts come and go. Concepts in social science not only are influenced by academic debates, but also react to, and are molded by, what takes place in the policy arena. Concepts in social science are value-laden and contested. The concept of social exclusion is no different. First used in France, adopted by Prime Minister Jacques Chirac and the French government in 1974, the concept traveled and became increasingly popular among academics, politicians, and bureaucrats alike. In recent years, the use of the concept by the European Union and by the U.K. government has received a great deal of attention. Many scholars attack the use of social exclusion as a concept, just as many have embraced the concept and highlighted its usefulness in explaining and addressing inequalities.

It was René Lenoir, then Secrétaire d'État à Sociale who in 1974 wrote *Les exclus: Un français sur dix*, in which he identified up to 10 percent of the French population as “the excluded.” They consisted of vulnerable groups who fell through the insurance-based social safety net, for example, single parents, people with disabilities not fully protected under social insurance policies at the time, suicidal people, poor elderly, abused children, and substance abusers. The concept of social exclusion emanates from the French tradition of national integration and social solidarity. Exclusion refers to the rupture of the social bond. During the 1980s the term gained wider currency in France. It was used to refer to various types of social disadvantage, related to a “new” set of social problems: large-scale unemployment, ghettoization, and fundamental changes in family life. Whereas “old” poverty programs focused on the basic needs of the individual or the household, social exclusion programs focused on society and addressed the individual’s ties to society.

In the late 1980s and 1990s, globalization emerged, or at least the Europeanization of the concept of social exclusion, as the term gained use in many European countries, among researchers of the global South (often Europeans) as well as by the European Union and the European Commission. So far, the concept has hardly been popularized in United States. Graham Room has traced the development of the concept from EU antipoverty

programs. The first two (1975–1980 and 1986–1990) were based on the concept of poverty, but the third (1990–1994) was focused on the integration of the “least privileged” and was explicitly discussed as addressing social exclusion. It was under the chairmanship of Jacques Delors and under the influence of the French political debate that the European Commission adopted the language of social exclusion. The European Union included research on social exclusion within its Fourth Framework Research Programme, incorporating the term into the Maastricht and Amsterdam treaties and also in the objectives of the Structural Funds as a commitment to combat social exclusion. For this reason, Jos Berghman argues that it was at the European rather than at the nation-state level that the concept was promoted and operationalized.

Whereas its relative vagueness was a key quality leading EU member states to adopt the notion, the United Kingdom embraced the concept and gave it a British twist. In the United Kingdom, the concept turned out to be a rising star, as almost no social scientist or policymaker used it in 1990, while it was almost impossible not to use, or at least criticize it in the year 2000. Originally the British saw the concept as imprecise and unhelpful, but the election of the new Labour government in May 1997 changed this situation and social exclusion became a key concept in social and economic policies and government-sponsored research. As the United Kingdom took over the concept of social exclusion, the concept also changed in meaning: French solidarist connotations were replaced by British social conceptions of class-based “new” poverty; questions of solidarity and community were dropped in favor of questions of citizenship as well as racial equality. In the United Kingdom, social exclusion came to replace notions of poverty, and Peter Townsend’s relational conceptualization of poverty is almost naturally included in the U.K. concept of social exclusion. In effect, two different traditions provide different conceptualizations of social exclusion. The U.K. tradition seeks to measure and quantify the dimensions of the problem as a fundamental building block of knowledge. Counting the number of households in poverty and categorizing them is not what the French tradition focuses on; instead it looks at the social mechanisms, processes, and elements that lead to exclusion.

Poverty and Social Exclusion

The concept of social exclusion, which is more dynamic in the sense that it does not describe a condition (like poverty) but rather a process. It is often confused with other concepts such as poverty, marginalization, polarization, fragmentation, segregation, unemployment, lack of participation, deprivation, hardship, and ghettoization. It is further used as an umbrella term, or catch-all term, to cover a wide diversity of ideas and is therefore open to multiple interpretations. Social exclusion is also seen as a problematic term by some critics who argue that it divides society into two groups, and this involves a static view of the excluded and the neglected people at the margins; as long as those at the bottom of that structure have some economic, social, or cultural functions to perform in the rest of society, they cannot be totally excluded. This last criticism can be countered by arguing that people can be less or more excluded or included. The umbrella problem is harder to tackle, but it can be asserted that social exclusion was meant as an umbrella term exactly because it aspired to show the multidimensionality of exclusion. Therefore, the “language of exclusion” provides a bridge between research traditions that have developed in their own ways and have grown apart but essentially cover related issues, such as poverty, unemployment, and spatial segregation. The idea of social exclusion has allowed researchers from different traditions to approach one another.

The concept of social exclusion is often contrasted to that of poverty. Defenders of the concept of poverty have often argued that social exclusion is a useless concept, as it is not clear what is meant by social exclusion; different authors adhere to different definitions. This problem is not unique to the concept of social exclusion: *Poverty* itself is a contested term, subject to many definitions and value judgments. The use of social exclusion as a concept in its dominant form becomes similar to the concept of “new poverty,” a concept that encompasses multidimensionality and focuses at least as much on processes as on outcomes. Contrary to new poverty, social exclusion puts institutional processes at the heart of the debate and more than new poverty, social exclusion goes beyond simplified understandings of inequality as

low income, by addressing the multiple dimensions of inequality and deprivation. One could argue that poverty is an important and a possible, but not necessary, ingredient of social exclusion. Social exclusion deals with relational issues, such as social participation, lack of social integration and lack of power, health, housing, education, and training. The focus on processes and institutions becomes clear in Berghman's definition of social exclusion as a failure of one or more of the following systems: the democratic and legal system, for not promoting civic integration; the labor market, for not promoting economic integration; the welfare state system, for not promoting what might be called social integration; and the family and community system, for not promoting interpersonal integration. In addition, Berghman argues that being income poor and multiply deprived can overlap but are not identical, as poverty can be an atypical and temporary position for some households (e.g., students, people changing jobs). Poor people are not necessarily multiply deprived individuals, and they do not necessarily lack social integration. Some critics also argue that social exclusion echoes the idea of an "underclass" or a "culture of poverty," two heavily criticized concepts. Some definitions of social exclusion suggest that the poor are permanently excluded and that French social exclusion policies are built on the fear that a permanent underclass may be formed. Defenders of the concept of social exclusion have argued that social exclusion is fundamentally different from the concepts of underclass and culture of poverty. Rather than "blaming the victim" or proposing cultural explanations, the idea of social exclusion hinges upon more structural, institutional explanations and on issues of participation, redistribution, and rights. Some branches of the social exclusion literature are too close to cultural and blaming-the-victim approaches, but there is a larger part of the social exclusion literature that shows the added value of the concept. Room distinguishes between five different elements, four of which are discussed here, signifying a shift to social exclusion:

1. A shift from financial to multidimensional disadvantage: Financial indicators such as low income are insufficient as providers for general

hardship: multidimensional indicators are needed, directly revealing different aspects of disadvantage. It is important to disentangle different elements of hardship and to identify their interrelationships. Or, in the words of Arjan de Haan, a social exclusion framework goes beyond the analysis of resource allocation mechanisms and includes power relations, agency, culture, and social identity.

2. A shift from a static to a dynamic analysis: It is not enough to count the numbers and describe the characteristics of those who are disadvantaged; it is also necessary to identify the factors that can trigger entry or exit from this situation and to understand how the *duration* of disadvantage shapes how it is experienced and what its consequences are.
3. A shift from a focus on the resources of the individual or household to a concern also with those of the local community.
4. A shift from distributional to relational dimensions of stratification and disadvantage: The notion of poverty is focused primarily upon *distributional* issues: the lack of resources at the disposal of an individual or a household. In contrast, notions such as social exclusion focus primarily on *relational* issues: in other words, inadequate social participation, lack of social integration, and lack of power. Relational approaches also tend to stress the role of the welfare state and welfare state bureaucrats in supporting or (to the contrary) disempowering people more than do distributional approaches.

Room argues that none of these elements is by itself sufficient to justify the scholarly and political interest that the notion of social exclusion has generated, although together they probably can. One could argue that social exclusion focuses on processes and institutions, but it is also close to the idea of "multiple deprivation." The strength of the concept of social exclusion is that it integrates these two ideas, by focusing both on processes of multiple exclusions and on processes and institutions.

Some authors are inspired by the work of Amartya Sen, who stresses that the determinant of deprivation is not what people possess but what they are enabled to do. For Sen, it is not enough to

study the economic resources (income) of people; researchers must also study how this income can be used to attain the social objectives and life conditions held to be necessary. C. J. M. Schuyt, in the tradition of Sen, argues that the core of social exclusion is (1) not being allowed to belong to, (2) not being able to belong to, and (3) not being willing to belong to the larger society. The first refers to people who are discriminated or subtly driven to the margins of society; the second to people who are unable to belong (e.g., people with physical or psychological limitations), but also to people without a good steady job or the ability to maintain such a job and people without equity. In the case of people with clear limitations, alienation is often the consequence (for both the excluded and the included), whereas the “other” groups are often blamed for their own position. In both cases, this increases exclusion and feelings of exclusion; thus, it is not surprising that many people decide to cease to belong to. Self-selection and self-exclusion are often direct results of (a) the experience of rejection and disapproval; (b) earlier exclusion by parents, teachers, police, and other moral gatekeepers; and (c) the exclusion by the “majority.” Self-exclusion and the process of “othering” are inherently linked. Social exclusion is an accumulation of no longer being admitted, no longer being able to, and no longer being willing to, belong. For Schuyt, social exclusion has four dimensions:

1. Moral disapproval of people within society that are different (“otherness”). This leads to putting these people aside, socially, symbolically, and often also physically. Moral disapproval can also be shown by the decommodification (or recommodification) of social services that are forced to work according to commercial principles.
2. People with little economic value. This harsh economic verdict can often be disguised as a moral judgment (lazy, undisciplined, unruly) or as what are actually symptoms of exclusion, such as lack of education.
3. Low social defensibility of the excluded. On an individual level this refers to self-respect. On both the individual and the social level this is attacked by stigmatization and the other dimensions of exclusion. On the positive side this can lead to self-organization and collectively standing up for mutual interests.

4. Weak legal position. This is not just the formal legal position of an individual or group, but also a resultant of the other three dimensions of social exclusion.

It is the collective configuration of these four dimensions that constitutes the exclusion of a group. Exclusion is produced by a system of social inequality. In general, more inequality leads to more exclusion. A system with greater inequality usually ascribes the failure of the system to the excluded groups instead of to the system itself (blaming the victim). Thus people get blamed for being unable to keep up with society, that is, for not having a job, a house, or a steady relationship. However, because of the complicated demands of the risk society with regard to education, comprehension, stamina, and self-control, the risks have increased. What is needed, according to Schuyt, is neither a change in the system nor a change in the excluded groups, but both: a structural change of social institutions as well as a strategy aimed at improving the life chances and conditions of excluded individuals.

Uneven Development and Social Exclusion

In contrast to traditional conceptualizations of poverty, the conceptualization of social exclusion recognizes that people’s living conditions depend not only on their personal and household resources but also on the collective resources they can access. The inclusion of these collective resources in the analysis also opens up the concept of exclusion to a more spatially sensitive approach. Social exclusion includes forms of exclusion other than labor market exclusion and poverty, such as financial exclusion and service exclusion. With such a subdivided conceptualization of social exclusion, it is also easier to focus on exclusion within other markets than the labor market.

The emergence of social and financial exclusion needs to be linked to deeper structural shifts in the affected economies and societies. Hilary Silver points to the global economic restructuring since the mid-1970s and to the emergence of new social divisions within advanced capitalist societies; these developments dictate the need for new concepts such as social exclusion. Social exclusion then becomes an expression of the new tensions resulting from the impact of post-Fordist economic accumulation, based on globalization and the increased

importance of services, the decline in stable employment in big manufacturing firms, and the increasing heterogeneity and instability of households. The roots of social exclusion can only be analyzed adequately by looking at developments occurring on different spatial scales. Globalization and social exclusion are related or, in David Harvey's terms, the excluded are the losers in the game of globalization and flexible accumulation. As Jamie Gough and Aram Eisenschitz argue, social exclusion, by definition, is associated with and concentrated in certain places and located at all scales. This does not mean that all of the excluded live in excluded places or that excluded places are only inhabited by the excluded. Such a dichotomy does not work well in real life. Rather, on all scales, exclusion will be more common in some places than in others.

The role of the neighborhood in exclusion processes, for example, plays a different part in different countries and cities, in addition to being contingent on the physical and social structure of the neighborhood itself. If one takes an individualized definition of exclusion—that is, an older definition of poverty—location is insignificant, as it is merely a place where poor people live. Neighborhoods are then passive: They are places where poor people live, but they have no influence on poverty itself. Yet, there is another possibility, which is that neighborhoods cause, affect, or intervene in exclusion processes in such a way that exclusion becomes exacerbated or limited, depending on what happens at the neighborhood level. The fear of crime, for example, is directly associated with perceptions of the physical deterioration of an area, and this fear may intensify already existing patterns of exclusion. In addition, the concentration of excluded people in a neighborhood may have an influence by itself on exclusion processes, and Paul Spicker therefore rightly claims that the problems of poor areas cannot be reduced to problems of poor people within those areas.

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See also *Banlieue*; Divided Cities; Racialization

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SOCIAL HOUSING

Social housing is a collective term for the public service provision of decent and safe, subsidized shelter for eligible low-income families or other vulnerable groups, such as the elderly and persons with disabilities, in a society. Subsidies may be direct or indirect, in the form of direct housing subsidies, nonprofit housing, public housing, cooperative housing, or rent supplements for people living in private sector housing. There are many variations or forms of social housing. It may be undertaken by a wide range of housing actors, including government, housing associations, and nonprofit organizations. Given the responsibility of governments in social housing, it is sometimes referred to as subsidized housing or public housing. Social housing also includes emergency housing and short-term shelters for specific social purposes.

Social housing forms a significant part of the housing stock in many cities. For example, public housing accounts for about 50 percent of all housing in Hong Kong and over 80 percent in Singapore. Most cities require some form of social housing. Rapid urbanization and population growth have compounded housing problems in many cities. An annual 12 million to 15 million new households, requiring an equivalent number of housing units, are added to cities in developing countries. Many end up in slum and squatter settlements. Governments are faced with the challenge of devising solutions for housing the poor. The United Nations estimates there will be 1.4 billion slum dwellers by 2020, with the majority in Asia-Pacific. There is an urgent need to improve housing conditions for a large number of people, especially the urban poor.

Evolution of Social Housing

Social housing has its origin in the late nineteenth-century cooperative movement and “philanthropic” housing in the United States of America and Europe. The evolution of social housing can be traced to two basic underlying ideas. The first is the notion of collective provision—an idea of welfare. The perspective is that housing is a basic human need but not everyone can afford it. Pooling everyone’s resources can enable everybody to have a home. Thus, social housing is a public service—usually provided by the local authority—for the use of all and paid for by all. The second is the idea of temporary rental housing. The assumption is that all people should buy their own house. Therefore, social housing should exist only to prevent serious hardship at times when some people cannot afford their own home. These two different views have often caused shifts in social housing policies.

As housing needs and political environments differ, each country has evolved its own social housing program and policies, including serving a range of broader public purposes of slum clearance, poverty reduction, economic and urban revitalization, and so forth. Among the many ideas of welfare state, the London County Council developed the first council (public) housing in 1896. By the beginning of World War II, the United Kingdom had more than a million council units, 10 percent of its entire housing stock. Although private

housing production exceeded local authority housing, the experience had established the capacity and principle of public responsibility for housing.

In the United States, government responsibility in housing evolved from an initial introduction of building standards, to socially oriented cooperative housing, to housing for civilian workers in war-related industries during World War I, to local authority housing for people with low incomes. The development of local authority housing remained largely insignificant until the Great Depression of 1930s, when government housing production was increased as part of the antirecession effort to provide construction jobs and stimulate the economy. The U.S. Housing Act of 1937 was enacted, providing local housing authorities with complete responsibility for developing, owning, and managing public housing projects. By 1942, one in eight new housing was local authority housing.

Postwar reconstruction and enormous housing shortages further fueled social housing development in the United Kingdom and other parts of the world. Western colonization helped spread social housing ideology and practices to developing countries in Latin America, Africa, and Asia. The United Kingdom built council housing as “homes for war heroes” and, since the mid-1950s, as part of its slum clearance and rehousing of lower-income inner-city populations. Similar homes for war heroes were built in Australia’s early social housing program. The United States, Australia, the Netherlands, and other European countries also expanded their inner-city public housing as part of the slum clearance–urban renewal program.

Many of the inner-city public housing estates built in the 1960s were high-rise buildings, which were seen as “new architecture for new people.” A decade later, however, these urban high-rises were increasingly ascribed with livability and other problems, leading to a halt of their construction. High-rise public housing development in Asia, particularly in Hong Kong and Singapore, has continued to the present time and is widely celebrated as exemplary examples of public housing programs.

Public Housing

Public housing is the most common form of social housing. Public housing is a form of housing tenure in which the property is owned by a government

authority, which may be central or local. Public housing comes in all sizes and types, from scattered single-family houses to high-rise apartments. It is generally offered to those who have difficulties accessing accommodation in the private property market. Although the common goal of public housing is to provide affordable housing for eligible low-income families and other housing-deficit people, the details, terminology, definitions of eligibility, and other criteria for allocation vary. Generally, tenants must meet specific eligibility requirements, usually household income, family structure, and citizenship or eligible immigration status.

Public housing authority may not rent to tenants whose habits and practices may have a detrimental effect on other tenants or the housing environment. Many public housing authorities encourage homeownership. Through “sales to tenants” programs, public housing tenants have the opportunity to buy the public housing units they are renting. Mortgage financing is a challenge for many families, especially those with low incomes. Financial assistance may be provided to help homebuyers, for example, through mortgage interest tax deduction and mortgage financing assistance programs through special, nonmarket funds. Some 90 percent of public housing residents in Singapore own their apartments through the innovative mortgage-financing scheme utilizing their Central Provident Fund (employment) savings.

In the United Kingdom and Australia, public housing is known as “Council Housing” because of the historical role of district and borough councils in public housing delivery. Public housing is called “state housing” in New Zealand and “municipality building” (*Gemeindebau*) in Austria. In transitional economies and communist countries, *state housing* is also the term for social housing but bears a different meaning. The state controls both the demand and supply side of the housing market. State housing units are allocated according to some merit system rather than housing need. Many of the state housing is built near or within the compounds of industries, production units, or communities. Only those working in the production unit or belonging to the community are eligible for allocation of such housing units controlled by that production unit or community.

Other Types of Public Housing

Social housing is not necessarily government-owned housing. In some countries, for example, the United States, the inclination is toward greater private sector involvement in public housing delivery. This has resulted in a unique American approach of for-profit subsidized housing. The housing is owned and operated by private owners such as for-profit housing developers and non-profit community developers, not the governments. In recent years, not-for-profit social housing providers have developed a more prominent role in providing affordable housing to eligible tenants. They include private nonprofit groups such as religious groups, ethnocultural communities, or housing associations. In the United Kingdom, housing associations have a history that began before the twentieth century. The number of homes under ownership of housing associations has grown significantly since the 1980s, as successive governments have sought to make them the principal form of social housing, in preference to local authorities.

Most nonprofit housing organizations receive private funding and some form of financial assistance from the government to enable them to offer affordable rents for low-income tenants. In the Netherlands, government oversight and regulation help keep rent for the cheaper rental homes low. These homes are known as *sociale huurwoningen*. In practice, nonprofit, nongovernment housing societies (*toegelaten instellingen*) subcontract housing production to profit-making corporations.

Cooperative housing is an early form of social housing development in which individual residents own a share in the cooperative. Managed by a board of directors elected by residents, there is no outside landlord. All residents of the cooperative are members and agree to follow certain bylaws. Residents pay a monthly service charge that is set by the cooperative. In some countries, cooperatives get government funding to support a rent-geared-to-income program for low-income residents. In addition to providing affordable housing, some cooperatives serve the needs of specific communities, including seniors and people with disabilities. The cooperative grants the residents equal access to common areas, voting rights, and occupancy of the dwelling unit as if they were owners.

The subsidy has played an important role in the provision of affordable housing. Housing subsidies are government funding for public housing provision. They may take the form of rent supplements to help lower-income owners and tenants. The supplements make up the difference between rental market price and the amount of rent paid by the tenants. A commonly accepted housing affordability guideline is a housing cost not exceeding 30 percent of a household's gross income. To ensure that households spend the subsidy on housing, some countries (e.g., the United States) give housing vouchers or certificates (in lieu of cash) to eligible families.

Subsidies may also be given to the private sector to assist lower-income households in their housing. For example, in the United States, housing assistance for lower-income people can come in the form of tenant-based subsidies given to an individual household or project-based subsidies given to the owner of housing units that must be rented to lower-income households at affordable rates. Profit-making companies and individuals own over half of all subsidized housing in the United States. These property owners receive various types of tax incentives and public subsidies that reduce rent for residents while assuring profits for investors.

Although its rationale is easy to understand, the provision of housing subsidies is not without controversy. At core are the issues of its effectiveness and sustainability. These issues have led to continued reform in housing lending and in the structure of housing subsidies, particularly to using subsidies to complement and facilitate other housing policies. In the United Kingdom, cuts in social housing subsidies have been supplemented by the so-called right-to-buy scheme, which offers council tenants discounts, sometimes as much as 70 percent off the market value if they choose to buy their units. With the implementation of this scheme, public housing stock is transferred to private ownership. Hong Kong and Singapore have adopted a similar policy in its homeownership schemes of public housing, increasing private ownership and stakeholding of public housing. More and more, international agencies such as the World Bank and United Nations are advocating that governments move away from producing, financing, and maintaining housing to adopting an enabling role of improving housing market efficiency, facilitating

and encouraging housing activities by the private sector, and managing the housing sector as an economic not just welfare sector.

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See also Housing; Housing Policy

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SOCIAL MOVEMENTS

Mobilizations around urban conflicts have a long history, but the social sciences began identifying urban social movements only in the 1960s. The term *urban social movement* was first introduced by Manuel Castells and French researchers to challenge a view then prevalent in urban sociology that social problems were primarily a matter of social integration. In contrast to this sociological view, and inspired by widespread struggles over housing policies, urban renewal, and squatting, these researchers developed a concept of urban conflicts as structured by struggles over (political) power. They saw urban movements as articulating the structural contradictions of late-capitalist societies and as capable of bringing about, together with labor unions and political parties, fundamental change in politics and society. This definition spread across Western metropolises, Latin America, and the newly industrializing countries of Asia, and has become influential in guiding the research of the new urban sociology.

This early concept of urban social movements was more interested in the (potential) function and effects of the movements than in their concrete origins, their forms of organizing and mobilizing, and the ways in which they pursued their interests. Analysis focused on the structural contradictions articulated by the movements, not on their ideologies, action repertoires, and organizational patterns. As a consequence, what was studied were primarily those movements that seemed or promised to bring about social and political change; less promising, localist, or small-scale mobilizations that did not reflect the large structural contradictions of class society were ignored.

By the mid-1980s, as urban conflicts intensified and cities experienced more and more varied forms of protest and mobilization, this narrow definition of social movements was displaced by less-normative views. Castells redefined urban movements in a less-charged way as “urban-oriented mobilizations that influence structural social change and transform the urban meanings.” These movements combine activism around collective consumption with struggles for community culture as well as for political self-management; “transforming urban meanings” implies the undermining of the social hierarchies that structure urban life to produce, instead, a city organized on the basis of use values, autonomous local cultures, and decentralized participatory democracy.

Another neo-Marxist, yet less structuralist, analysis of urban movements developed on the basis of Henri Lefebvre’s writings on everyday life. Lefebvre’s concept of the everyday life connotes both a space of resistance against alienation and the permanent colonization of the life world through the commodity form. While commodification of all realms of life is accelerated by the global process of urbanization of society, it is also urban space which becomes a new productive force. Lefebvre wrote *La révolution urbaine* (1970) under the impression of the 1968 events in Paris, viewing revolution both as technocratic, neoliberal conquest of the world and urban praxis as utopian critique, thus laying the basis for a more ambiguous yet emancipatory concept for interpreting movements for the right to the city.

Distinct from these (neo-)Marxist perspectives on the reality and possibilities of the city, another, more pragmatic strand of urban research emerged,

particularly in North America, to study the protest movements of urban minorities in the context of local political structures, while Latin American authors devoted themselves to empirical investigations of local political actions exploding onto the scenes of newly democratized countries. Both in North and South America, where structuralist traditions have been less influential than in Europe, questions of mobilization, organization, and empowerment of discriminated and marginalized urban groups gained attention. This led to a more open, broader definition, including a wide variety of forms of mobilization taking place within and oriented toward the city. The international debate now speaks of social movements to the extent that collective actors intervene, through mobilization, in processes of social and political change and of urban movements to the extent that their goals and activities concern the city and its decision-making structures and processes.

Thus defined, these movements have not only manifested in different shapes and sizes, they have also undergone significant transformations. To this day, urban movements in the so-called transformation societies follow different patterns than those challenging the urbanism of Western democracies. Within the former, the different Eastern European countries’ movements—though sharing characteristics and concerns, particularly over housing and environmental degradations—exhibit significant differences depending on the strength of their civil societies. Unlike their postsocialist counterparts, the urban movements that emerged in (postmilitary dictatorship) Latin American countries were part of broad popular struggles around issues of consumption and workforce reproduction as well as civil liberties, democratization of daily life, and the organization of cooperatives. Though the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund thrust most Latin American countries into economic crisis during the 1980s and 1990s and homegrown repressive regimes forced social movements onto the defensive, the latter survived these precarious decades thanks to self-organizing barrios, where neighborhood women played important roles nourishing the need for warm food, basic services, and dignity. One after another Latin American countries have since seen new (workers) parties or indigenous movements gain strength and oust the repressive regimes,

creating space for more participatory democracy and empowering local movements against neoliberalism and imperialism. Urban movements in the new growth regions of Asia, on the other hand, have not (yet) been so vocal, and research applying social movement theories elaborated within Western contexts is limited.

Urban Activism

Though these theoretical approaches have been developed mostly on the basis of urban conflict in Western democracies, they fail to account for the changing patterns and dynamics of urban activism. Globalization and neoliberalism have reconfigured cityscapes across the globe. The relatively homogeneous movements of the 1960s and 1970s that were unified in broad coalitions against hegemonic urban elites and their politics of Fordist development have, over the course of the 1980s and 1990s, splintered into different types and directions, creating a fundamentally restructured movement terrain. Consistent, uniform movement patterns have disappeared, and there is hardly a consensus about interpretive frameworks and analytic concepts for how to study them. Yet, the formation of new collective identities and the development and fragmentation of movement strands have followed similar cycles, at least in the so-called advanced metropolises, which may be due to similarities in urban development patterns and convergences in urban governance.

Social movements provoked by housing need (e.g., the tenant strike movements in New York City of the early 1900s), movements struggling for alternative forms of housing (as the cooperative movements in European countries), or movements fighting the unequal distribution of urban services or the political process creating it (as the North American practice of community organizing) have been around for a long time. Still, they were mere sporadic precursors to contemporary urban movements. It was not until the wave of squatting, citizens initiatives, local public transit campaigns, and the struggles for youth and community centers in the wake of the 1960s movements that a genuine field of urban conflict emerged where collective actors began to challenge the dominant ways of urban development and to demand a “right to the city.”

First Wave of Urban Opposition

The first wave of urban opposition was triggered by Fordist urban planning and the expansion of infrastructures that accelerated the zoning of urban space into residential, shopping, and industrial areas and led to massive urban renewal. Whereas in the United States these mostly defensive movements were accompanied by militant ghetto rebellions, European movements against renewal and infrastructure projects often emerged from preexisting citizen and local dignitaries’ associations. They preferred professional “planning from below” strategies but increasingly, especially where confronted with technocratic local administrations, turned to street protest and other militant repertoires.

Simultaneously with these moderate mobilizations contesting the cultural norms of the institutions of collective consumption—their price, quality, and options to participate in their design—more radical groups of the youth movement emerged out of the antiauthoritarian 1960s and fed into the urban scene. These groups sought, both in their countercultural as well as their power-oriented incarnations, to challenge the prevailing societal order. And the New Left, after its heyday in the late 1960s, discovered that class struggle had shifted from the factory to the “sphere of reproduction” and thus initiated projects to support and radicalize social and neighborhood struggles. Depending on the profile of the local Left, and on the particular contours of local conflicts, different types of movement milieus would emerge in these struggles, often with dense networks of self-managed centers and shops, alternative and feminist collectives and autonomous media. These provided the bases for a new political actor who was able and ready to intervene in urban development and politics.

While the governments of the industrialized countries began to address the crisis of Fordism, which had become manifest with the 1973–1974 recession, their measures increased the numbers of those excluded from the blessings of Fordism. The ranks of the urban opposition swelled as new and old protest groups sought to find common denominators in environmentally oriented or antigrowth coalitions as well as in demands and projects for participatory democracy. Depending on the degree of openness of the political opportunity structures,

these “green” and participatory movements developed in the direction of party politics. The closed structures of, for example, the West German political system, pushed movement groups in the direction of electoral coalitions and parties. More open structures such as those of the United States, where the federal government’s Great Society programs of the 1960s had left behind a far-flung infrastructure of community organizations, created pragmatic neighborhood movements coalescing with ethnic or progressive organizations in ways that remained more distant from party politics.

The austerity politics of the 1980s initiated the global shift toward neoliberal politics and brought the “old” social issues back on the agenda: Growing numbers of unemployed and poor people, a “new” housing need, riots in housing estates, and new waves of squattings changed the makeup of the urban movements, while local governments—confronted with intensifying fiscal constraints but growing costs—explored innovative ways to solve their problems. Increasingly they discovered the potential of community-based organizations, while movement groups became more interested in putting their alternative practice onto more stable footing. The relationship between urban movements and local states led from opposition to cooperation, and movements shifted from protest to program, urged on by a variety of territorially oriented, holistic programs for urban revitalization. Formerly confrontational groups were thus encouraged to professionalize and institutionalize their activities. This distanced them from newly mobilizing groups operating outside of these forms of routinized cooperation within and against the state.

Fragmentation

In the course of the 1990s, the various forms of movement activities became further differentiated and increasingly distinct if not antagonistic. Different kinds of movements—in defense of a neighborhood, against the new competitive urban policies, antipoverty and poor people’s movements, as well as those involved in routinized cooperation for local development—multiplied during the 1990s but were isolated from, or competed and fought with, each other. This intense fragmentation may be explained in the context of the decade’s upheavals. In fact, the collapse of East

European socialism and thus the globalization of capitalism went hand-in-hand with the triumph of neoliberal politics in Western metropolises. Local politics has become subject to the imperatives of intraurban competition. The consequences of the new urban development policies have been gentrification and displacement, congestion, and often the loss of public cultural and infrastructural amenities. These consequences have triggered defensive movements to protect threatened privileges or quality of life, as well as politicized and militant struggles over whose city it is supposed to be, as for example in the waves of antigentrification struggles that swept across New York, Paris, Amsterdam, and Berlin.

The political and economic conditions of the current decade seem to threaten established urban movements even more. Since the dot-com crash of 2001, economic growth rates have stagnated; where growth occurs, it is increasingly jobless. The resulting sharper social divides are expressed in intensifying sociospatial polarization. Restructuring of social security systems has replaced welfare with workfare orientations, “flexibilizing” and “activating” the urban underclass, and influencing the field in which urban movements operate. Many former movement organizations now reproduce themselves by implementing social and employment programs or community development initiatives, presumably as a way of combating social exclusion. They have buried their dreams of the “self-determined city,” or even liberated neighborhoods, acknowledging the erosion of resistance and limiting themselves to what seems feasible.

But new, vigorous impulses have come from the antiglobalization activism of the late 1990s that no longer privileges the global scale. Such activism has turned toward cities as the scale where global neoliberalism touches down and its negative effects are felt. Networks that are part of this transnational movement have been importing repertoires and goals from global protests and increasingly collaborate with local social justice alliances, unions, and newly emerging labor and community centers. A number of organizations have taken the message of global justice to the local level and have organized campaigns and demonstrations on issues such as welfare cuts or the rights of migrants. In many cities, media-savvy, organizationally conscious activists are connecting a broad spectrum of

political agendas of citizen initiatives, churches, social service organizations, varieties of social movements, and nongovernmental organizations in an effort to overcome segmented local patterns of protest and to build organizational continuity. They are also connecting transnationally with urban activists in Latin America, South Africa, and East Asia, who struggle against the same global interests that privatize public infrastructures, deregulate markets, and curtail labor rights across the globe.

These novel movements and their effects have barely been analyzed. The paradigms of urban social movement research that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s and continued to influence the interpretations of urban contestations cannot adequately account for the fragmentation of, and tensions within, the urban movement terrain and the rise and fall of different strands within it. Whereas early urban movements had been part of a broader social mobilization in the aftermath of the various 1960s movements and were linked to rising expectations and political openings, movement milieus since then have confronted continuously maturing neoliberal policy regimes with contradictory effects. Neoliberalism has, in many ways, created a more hostile environment for progressive urban movements. Simultaneously, though, it allows for the global articulation of urban protest.

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See also Castells, Manuel; Globalization; Lefebvre, Henri; Right to the City; Squatter Movements

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SOCIAL PRODUCTION OF SPACE

There has been a renewed interest in space among urban scholars, planners, practitioners, and activists. The watershed of such a “spatial turn” can be traced back to the publication of Henri Lefebvre’s *The Production of Space* ([1974] 1991) and his other, related writings. Inspired by Lefebvre, both his critics and followers have tried to go beyond the limited horizons of urban ecology, political economy, or postmodern urbanism in understanding the nature of urban reality. The development of a new urban sociology, a critical political economy, or a sociospatial perspective illustrates such endeavors. The legacy of Lefebvre now reaches far beyond the disciplinary boundaries of sociology, geography, anthropology, architecture, and urban planning. A growing number of theoretical, empirical, and practical projects elaborate on his ideas and apply them to emerging issues, including globalization, the state, and postmodern culture.

For Lefebvre, space is a social product that shapes and is shaped by the social practices of individual and collective agents in particular historical conditions. Urban spatial form and its contents, and urban spatial structure and its functions as well, are the outcome of sociospatial practices that take place in political, economic, and cultural spheres. However, space as a social product is inseparable from the process of its production. Knowledge, technology, and technical expertise play a part in the production of space, as do the means of production in the process of commodity production. Like any other production process, in addition, the production of space proceeds in accordance with the specific social relations dictated by political, economic, and social power.

A critical understanding of space calls for attention to the process in which space is actually produced. To capture the dynamics behind the historical transformations of space, Lefebvre develops a conceptual triad in which the three moments of space—spatial practices (perceived space), representations of space (conceived space), and spaces of representation (lived space)—are dialectically interconnected. The spatial practices of various actors structure the relationship between the representations of space and the spaces of representation.

A representation of space is constructed by capitalistic developers and utilizers with the help of knowledge and technical expertise. In contrast, a space of representation is directly experienced by community users and inhabitants through symbols and images. These two moments of social space are in tension with one another: Whereas the former is a mental, abstract space revealed in strategies, plans, or programs oriented toward exchange value, the latter is a concrete, lived space of everyday life and routine activities oriented toward use value.

Spaces of Accumulation

According to Lefebvre, the survival of capitalism depends on the production of new spaces for capital. The spatial practices of the capitalist class are primarily oriented toward the extraction and realization of surplus value, although the diverse fractions of capital (e.g., industrial capital, commercial capital, financial capital, and landed capital) are put in place differently according to their capabilities and market opportunities. Space characteristic to capitalism is where surplus value can be extracted and realized for further accumulation. Such a space of accumulation is subject to the recurrent waves of restructuring due primarily to the crisis tendencies of capitalism. The crisis-induced restructuring accompanies changes in the spatial organization of production and thus the landscape of built environments.

Under late capitalism, as Lefebvre points out, the production of space is indispensable for the reproduction of social relations of production. The shift from Fordism to a flexible regime of accumulation entails the geographical extension of capital on a global scale. The production of goods and services is now coordinated by utilizing the global production system for the global market. The global production system is made of commodity chains that connect spatially dispersed production sites and activities. Transnational corporations exploit any locational advantages by decentralizing their production processes and business functions. The global production system makes vertical disintegration and economies of scope possible, but only at the costs of labor.

With the advent of global capitalism, according to Lefebvre, the realization of surplus value is ever

more deterritorialized. The geographical extension of capitalism necessitates localized social infrastructures and institutional frameworks embedded in the built environment. Thus, reterritorialization is another aspect of spatial configurations under late capitalism. Reterritorialization means the restructuring of spatial organization as a precondition for the accelerating mobility of capital, labor, commodities, and information across national boundaries. Such worldwide circulation is expedited through the medium of social infrastructures (e.g., networks of transport and communications) and with the help of financial and state institutions. Urban space displays the ensemble of networks, linkages, and circuits that engage in the worldwide circulation of capital, labor, commodities, and information. Through the dialectical processes of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, the most remote, separate, and distinct localities are linked together into a space of capitalist accumulation.

Each mode of production has its own spatial organization and spatial configurations. Nonetheless, space is not a simple reflection of the mode of production alone. The production of space is subject to historical contingency, depending on the complex interplay between structural forces (e.g., state intervention, the second circuit of capital) and agents (e.g., growth networks, grassroots movements) operating on all spatial scales.

The Role of the State and State Intervention

Along with capital and capitalism, the state and state intervention play a central role in the production of space. Some believe that the power and role of the state are doomed to decline due to footloose activities of transnational corporations and the accelerated mobility of capital in an era of globalization. According to Lefebvre, however, the reversal is true: The state, at all levels, continues to intervene in and make use of space in order to reproduce labor power, the means of production, and the social relations of production. Through the production, management, and transformation of space, the state not only protects corporate profit making in a competitive environment but also reproduces the relations of domination for its own sake. For the state, the expansion of capital

accumulation and urban development become a source of its legitimacy. Lefebvre grasps the active role of the state in facilitating capital accumulation in terms of the “state mode of accumulation.”

The role of the state in the production of space is multifaceted and extensive. In conjunction with the movement of capital, the *modus operandi* of the state is centrifugal. The geographical expansion of capitalism, such as the organization of new spatial divisions of labor and the opening of new markets, is usually backed by the political, economic, and military power of the state. With the controlling power over global financial institutions (e.g., the International Monetary Fund), the United States forced Indonesia, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan to open their financial markets during the Asian crisis in the late 1990s.

The state intervenes in space and creates the conditions for capital accumulation in a variety of ways. The state fabricates urban space as a force of production through direct expenses and regulatory practices, including the construction of social infrastructures, the provision of public services, and the subsidization of business enterprises. In addition, the state attracts and channels investment into the built environment by providing fiscal incentives such as land grants, low interest loans, tax breaks, utility discounts, and other public subsidies. Furthermore, the state plays an entrepreneurial role in place marketing: It dramatizes the locational advantages by lifting the regulatory barriers to private profit making and by projecting a good business climate.

The production of space is most discernable in the context of the crisis tendencies of capitalism. The falling rate of profits is precipitated by the chronic problem of overaccumulation and underconsumption. Sponsored by financial and state institutions, capital has battled with the falling rate of profit by implementing new production systems and opening new markets. These spatial practices of capital and the state leave marks on space: Woven by an ensemble of exchange networks, infrastructure linkages, and institutional arrangements, the urban fabric is part of the means of production. The geographical extension of capital is not the whole story of crisis-induced restructuring, however. The switching of investment into the built environment is another aspect of what David

Harvey called the “spatio-temporal fix” as a response to the crisis tendencies of capitalism.

The Role of Real Estate

The flow of investment into the built environment is a cardinal moment in the production of space. Real estate, along with construction, is a separate source of profit: Driven by real estate interests, capitalists transform land into the exchange value of abstract space. During the economic downturns, in particular, surplus money and capital find an outlet for investment in real estate. According to Lefebvre, such a second circuit of capital in the real estate sector has become an active part of capital accumulation and has played a leading role in urban (uneven) development.

The operation of the real estate sector is orchestrated by land-based interest groups (e.g., developers, speculators, investors, government officials), financial institutions (e.g., banks, mortgage companies, insurance companies, pension funds), and government-sponsored programs (e.g., loan guarantees, subsidies, tax deferrals). These various actors are coalesced into growth networks that influence land development decisions, channel investment into certain directions, and determine land-use patterns. The actual composition of growth networks may differ from place to place, and a local area may have various competing growth networks; yet, they are deeply involved in the production of the built environment and major real estate development projects, such as the construction of industrial parks, office towers, malls, master-planned communities, and resort complexes.

The metropolitan real estate market is huge and growing. The globalization of the real estate market is an emerging trend: Land and the built environment on it are immobile but are converted into a fluid commodity like other commodities in the global market. The key to the globalization of real estate is state intervention; the liquidity of real estate has increased with the medium of state-sponsored financing mechanisms, including secondary mortgage markets, mortgage-backed security markets, and real estate investment trusts. With these mediating schemes, real estate can be tied to the global capital market, and the second circuit of capital becomes a global process. Increase in

foreign direct investment in real estate testifies to the globalization of real estate.

Contradictory Effects

For Lefebvre, the production of space is a contradictory process. The flight of capital toward the second circuit via global financial institutions may take place as a means to deter temporarily the falling rate of profit. Like the primary circuit of industrial production, however, the second circuit of real estate is subject to the boom and burst cycles. Moreover, the speculative investment in real estate may aggravate the crisis tendencies of capitalism. During the late 1990s, for example, the financial crisis in East Asia was triggered by a collapse of the speculative real estate bubble. This is not the only example of how space contains and expresses the contradictions of capitalism; rather, comparable examples are legion. The survival of capitalism depends on its ability to expand the forces of production and the relations of production across space; yet, the geographical extension of capital generates fundamental problems that challenge the current regime of accumulation.

The explosion of urban space, the production of the built environment, and the spreading of urban lifestyles are destructive to the natural environment. To use Lefebvre's phrase, the production of space under late capitalism is inseparably connected to the shortage of space. Urban space is divorced from nature, and natural space, once abundant, becomes a scarce resource. Along with the depletion of resources (e.g., oil, light, water) and the degradation of nature (e.g., deforestation, pollution, climate change), human settlement space in both developing and developed countries becomes much more vulnerable to recurrent natural disasters, including floods, earthquakes, hurricanes, and dust storms.

The production of new spaces for capital, in addition, results in the creation of uneven development. The free movement of capital in search of the higher return on investment, coupled with the recurrent sociospatial restructuring that follows (e.g., deindustrialization, decentralization, outsourcing, downsizing), generates an ever-widening gap between developed centers and marginalized peripheries, between well-off and less affluent sectors, and between declining and thriving places.

With the advent of global capitalism, regions become increasingly differentiated as they are integrated into the global marketplace. The unleashing of the same global market forces breeds growing social inequality within a region. The fates of local communities are now dependent upon the ebb and flow of capital. For the local residents, spatial disparities in life chances and opportunities are the conditions of living that mold their lived experience of everyday life.

Representations of Space

These contradictions of space are resonated or concealed in the representations of space that consist of images and symbols conveying sign value. Urban space and the built environment take on symbolic meanings constructed and circulated by means of discourse. The powerful actors engaging in the production of space, such as developers and local governments, strive to act on the representations of space and to control the production of spatial codes and direct the use of space. The dominant representations of space can be found in planning documents, official city websites, and real estate marketing brochures that are designed to promote development, attract investors, and allure clients. The discursively constructed meanings are multivocal, embodying multilayered messages: An urban representation may contain contradictory and even deceptive meanings if it veils the deep reality, such as social inequality, segregation, and violent crime.

The dominant representations of space divert and evade the contradictions gendered by the extension of capitalism in different ways. One of the prevalent strategies is to put in brackets the lived experience of everyday life and replace it with dreams and fantasies. Because surplus value produced in the production process is realized only in the market, the continued extraction of surplus value depends on consumption. Under late capitalism, consumption takes precedence over production, and the problem of surplus value realization is puzzled out through the production of themed consumption space. The space of consumption, such as shopping malls, consolidates themes in its built environment as a means to creating symbolic differences and stimulating consumer desires.

The marketing of residential space is another example of how the dominant representations of space are detached from the spaces of representation. In the United States, residential segregation is a pervasive and persistent urban experience in everyday life. Residential segregation is attributed to a number of factors, including social inequality, racism, and segmented housing markets. Fortification is now visible in urban space, which is superimposed on the previous pattern of segregation. Upscale enclaves, for example, display visible symbols of surveillance, such as walls, fences, security posts, private guards, and electronic security devices. Real estate developers sell the symbolic value of fortified enclaves (e.g., the sign of prestige, the feeling of security) by closing off the problem of social inequality, segregation, and violent crime nearby.

The representations of space are not confined to spatial arrangements and built environments already produced; instead, they can be used to guide expected spatial practices and the actual production of space. Polycentric urban form is such an example. In the United States and elsewhere, the polycentric metropolitan region is a product of deconcentration in conjunction with recurrent sociospatial restructuring. A number of urban planners and policymakers consider polycentricity a spatial planning concept that can encapsulate the ideal of regionally balanced and sustainable development. The benchmark case is a document, *European Spatial Development Perspective*, published in 1999 by the Commission of the European Communities. Polycentric development has since become a key planning guideline for regionally balanced and sustainable development at the level of the European Union as a whole.

Abstract Space and Agents of Power

According to Lefebvre, power is embedded in the production of space. The powerful actors in pursuit of real estate interests employ prevailing cultural representations to gloss over urban problems and to legitimize their actions. As a result, there is an inescapable gap between the representations of space conceived and the spaces of representation directly experienced. The spatial practices of capital and the state tend to produce abstract space bound up with commodity exchange and political control. It is a fragmented, commodified, and

hierarchical space; that is, abstract space can be divided up into lots and parcels, bought and sold, and allocated according to social class and power. Abstract space becomes more dominant and serves the interests of the powerful agents. The domination of abstract space, or what Lefebvre called the “colonization of the urban space,” is dangerous because it tends to destroy social space in and through which communal life can unfold.

Lefebvre argues that the production of space is a politically contentious process. Urban space is a terrain on which various actors, their interests, and their strategies collide. There is a long history of struggles over the use of space between fractions of capital, between businesses and local government interests, and between local residents and local governments. The most remarkable among them is perhaps the clash between powerful capitalistic utilizers (e.g., businesses and local governments) and unprivileged community users.

The production of space brings to the fore a deeply rooted ideological battle over the use of space. The production of space always proceeds through the medium of boosterism and growth ideology to legitimate actions oriented toward real estate interests. The uneven development, however, tends to exacerbate the magnitude of social costs (e.g., pollution, traffic congestion, pressures on public services, fiscal crisis). Whereas the poor minorities frequently bear the costs of uneven development, the local government may not have resources to assess and address them. Confronted with threats to their communities, local residents could develop place identity, organize around the ideal of community control, and counter pro-growth interests. Examples of grassroots movements are many, including rent strikes, squatters movements, and protests against speculative real estate development.

Lived space is more than the setting in which we live; it is also the setting of struggles over the use of space. According to Lefebvre, however, collective silence is common among community users and the expression of conflicts is not usual. The reason for lack of agency is that the rhythm of everyday life remains dominated by abstract space used for the generation of surplus value. Lived space is under the sway of capitalistic utilizers seeking the endless expansion of profitability. In the lived experience of everyday life, exchange and

exchange value outstrip use and use value. The powerful actors justify their real estate interests by propagating the representations of space. Community users, if they adopt the dominant representations of space, have difficulty articulating the contradictions of space. This is the reason why a theory of space is called for.

A thrust of Lefebvre's arguments is that a dialectical analysis of urban space and its contradictions is a prerequisite for a revolutionary movement toward the collective management and control of social space. The first step is the critical analysis of urban reality and of everyday life. Under late capitalism, space is increasingly determined by capital, dominated by the state, controlled by the ruling class, and manipulated by images and symbols. The outline of the future possibility is drawn by imagining the opposite of these current situations. A dialectical analysis of space and its contradictions is necessary for a social transformation from dominated space to its reversal via grassroots movements. The critique of space constitutes a subversive form of knowledge that enables community users to oppose strategies and programs imposed from above, to challenge power and dominant ideology, and eventually to achieve a collective management and control of social space.

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See also Gottdiener, Mark; Lefebvre, Henri; Social Space; Urban Space; Urban Theory

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SOCIAL SPACE

The notion of "social space" implies first of all some kind of interrelation between the social and space. The term and its application are not clearly defined in any social theory, social geography, or in urban studies. Within this inconsistent use, the following main threads can be distinguished: social space as the *material environment* of social groups, social space as a *relational setting of positions*, and social space as a *dialectical approach to the society–space relation*. The most radical approaches so far, the strands of *deconstructivism*, question the opposition of society and space from a poststructural perspective.

These four lines of social space are consecutive from a theory point of view without displacing each other completely. Their application in social research is often coeval within and between the different disciplines and depends to a large extent on the object of analysis.

Material Environment of Social Groups

The "common" or "traditional" usage of the term *social space* in geography, architecture, social work, or urban sociology implies, mainly descriptively,

the geographical territorial environment of individuals or groups. In this traditional view, space in general is understood as something natural, objective, and antecedent of social formations.

In classical social theory the spatial dimension is largely ignored and the social world is treated as if it existed on the head of a pin. Most of the few exceptions refer to space only as the place or the container where social processes happen. One of the few thinkers who were engaged with space from a sociological point of view was Friedrich Engels. But, also for Engels, “the great towns” were only of interest as far as they were the place to study the condition of the working class in industrializing England. The historically new degree of urbanization went hand in hand with the dissolving of traditional social ties of the former agricultural society based on origin and family. The fast growth of the industrializing towns and the concentration of people within these towns were accompanied by bad housing conditions, especially for the working class, a development that Engels and many contemporary bourgeois watched fearfully, connecting it to social and moral decay. In Engels’s whole analysis, the spatial dimension was never the center of his attention except as the background or the frame of social change and class formation. This understanding of space as container and environment is also found in early urban studies like the human ecology of the Chicago School in the 1920s, according to which town quarters were defined as “natural areas” of the social groups living therein and, therefore, the place of socialization and social integration.

So, although not always explicit and rarely at the center of analysis, classical social theory was also dealing with spatial phenomena using spatial categories but without their explicit theorization. One of the most “hidden spatialities” of the social science mainstream is to be seen in the social–territorial order of national states as the territorial manifestation of national societies, that still dominates the perception of the world.

In social geography this conception of space as the territory of social units was dominant until the 1960s: The world was understood as divided into separate territorial units associated with separate social units. The concern was to study localities, their history, and their specificity. Space, in the view of science, is understood as the earth’s surface, the

immobile and the static, that can be measured and mapped.

At present, the interventions of town planning and urban social work are still largely based on these assumptions of social space as the material environment of social groups, connected to a certain degree of spatial determinism. For example, some strands of residential segregation research see the spatial concentration of certain social groups as the cause of their disadvantageous situation. Popular examples in this tradition are the debates originating from the United States on the culture of poverty and the urban underclass. By focusing on the spatial dimension, that is, the concentration of the underprivileged social groups in the U.S. inner cities and attributing this spatial concentration with the inhabitants’ underprivileged situation, the economic and political factors are obscured and the victims are blamed for their misery.

Connected with this view and based on the same assumptions about the sociospatial relation, there is, especially in urban planning, another, more normative, understanding of social space as “good” space in the sense of socially used and appropriated spaces (e.g., lively public spaces). This understanding is closely connected with the ideal of “urbanity” as a way of life and image of the European city. Here, a certain spatial formation—the European city—is understood as the territorial material location and constitutive spatial formation of a certain behavior and a certain form of social integration. As mentioned earlier, the concentration on the material context and geographical “place” of social phenomena risks ignoring their social, cultural, economic, or political contexts and causes. Extremes of this kind of spatial determinism are the recurring attempts through history (e.g., the community visions of the utopian socialists, present forms of the new urbanism, etc.) to “build” social relations by building their anticipated physical environment.

Relational Setting of Social Positions

The second dominant thread on social space is not directly connected to the physical world but focuses on society and its order. Long before the so-called spatial turn in social theory in the 1940s, Pitrim A. Sorokin emphasized the need for social

sciences to develop a concept of “sociocultural space” in order to conceive sociocultural movement or change or the location of sociocultural phenomena. He suggested understanding sociocultural space as constituted by a system of coordinates reflecting the respective society and culture. This relational sociocultural universe is a means of human orientation in, and adaption to, the social world. Although Sorokin understood concepts of the physical spatiality also as socially imprinted, the spatiality itself appears to have a presocial existence.

The more recent structural constructivist approach on social inequality by Pierre Bourdieu also applies spatial terms for social processes when he defines social space as the societal field of social positions. The term *space* here seems feasible because Bourdieu understands the order of society not, like most analysts, as constituted unidimensionally along the line of financial income but as multidimensional. Here, like Sorokin, space is conceptualized as a reference frame, used to locate and thereby order relations among positions. Social position within social space is defined by the overall volume of capital, by its structure, and by the temporal dimension. Bourdieu extends the meaning of the term *capital* and differentiates between economical capital (financial property), cultural capital (education), and social capital (networks). Social space is constituted by an ensemble of relations of relative positions and therefore has no presocietal existence. Its “subjective” or constructivist side is constituted by the position’s specific perspective on the social world: Being socialized at a certain point within social space involves the incorporation of the power relations of this social space and results in a specific habitus as a sense of one’s place. Here, the spatial moment of Bourdieu’s understanding of social structuring appears again when he states that the perspective on the social world depends on the point of view from which it is taken. The habitus functions as a generative scheme of inherited dispositions and appreciation of practices, cognitive and evaluative structures leading to specific lifestyles and a perception of social space and the social world as “natural” and “given.”

The usage of social space by Sorokin and Bourdieu is purely metaphorical, thus sticking to the duality of society and space. Bourdieu explicitly argues that one has to differentiate between

social and physical space. Instead of extending the relational understanding of social space on to the material world (done, e.g., by Martina Löw and Doreen Massey), Bourdieu and Sorokin sustain the duality of the social and physical world, although social space tends to inscribe itself in physical space through the spatial distribution of objects and actors, adding to the naturalization of social conditions. In contrast to the already mentioned spatial determinism of past human geography, Bourdieu (more than Sorokin but together with the behavioral geography) falls into the trap of social determinism; that is, he projects the social onto the geographic–spatial dimension, thus obscuring its contingency rather than analyzing the sociopolitical constitution of the material world and the interrelations between physical and social space.

Dialectical Approach to the Society–Space Relation

There are several approaches in social theory trying to overcome the duality of society and space. Already, before the spatial turn in social theory, mainly in the French discourse, the society–space relation was reconceptualized in terms of dialectical approaches. This third usage of the term *social space* refers to the production of spatiality in a Marxist tradition, arguing that society and space are integral to one another. In this view, social space is understood as a cultural formation varying in its societal and economical conditions. Following the logic of dialectics and Karl Marx’s concept of totality, it is not possible to understand different interrelated parts of a whole without understanding how the parts relate to each other within this whole. The sociospatial dialectic contains the fundamental premise that social and spatial relations are dialectically interdependent, that social relations (of production) are space-forming and spatially formed. For example, in his book *The Production of Space* Henri Lefebvre developed a dialectical concept of social space trying to overcome the duality of what he calls physical space and mental space. By physical space Lefebvre refers to the practicosensory activity and the perception of “nature”; by mental space he means theoretical concepts of space defined by philosophy and mathematics. Space is, according to Lefebvre, to be analyzed “trialectically” on three

axes. *Le perçu*, or spatial practice, refers to everyday social life and commonsensical perception and therefore focuses on popular action often ignored in social research. *Le conçu*, or representations of space, alludes to conceptualized space, the space of scientists, planners, urbanists and is therefore the dominant space in any society. These conceptions of space, with certain exceptions, are said to tend toward a system of verbal and therefore intellectually worked out signs. The third aspect, *le vécu*, or representational space, on the other hand, is the dominated and passively experienced space of the imagination, kept alive and accessible also by arts and literature and which tends toward more or less coherent systems of nonverbal symbols and signs. Lefebvre's main argument states that space is, first of all, social space and therefore a product of society. By referring to several subsequent historical phases, he demonstrates how every society produces its space, its specific spatiality. This conception of social space also implies an unlimited multiplicity of social spaces coexisting or superimposing themselves upon one another. From this perspective, theorizing space is not just a playground for social scientists but an integral aspect of social theory, as space is the necessary condition for the real existence of social formations like gender, capitalism, and globalization and of any kind of human agency.

Lefebvre and his work on the society–space relation is one of the main reference points in social theory, and his influence on late twentieth-century Anglo-American human geography and sociological space theory is enormous. Although often (mis)interpreted by some materialists for being a spatial fetishist, his thoughts were taken up, criticized, and advanced, among others, by David Harvey, Edward Soja, Manuel Castells, and Neil Smith. For example, the leitmotif of social geographer Soja's work is the centrality of space in the constitution of society. In contrast to many postmodern theorists (e.g., Zygmunt Bauman), Soja argues that the restructured capitalist order is profoundly privileging the spatial over the temporal, and therefore the spatiality must be firmly placed at the core of social theory.

Inherent in the dialectic view—implicit in Lefebvre's writing, more explicit in Harvey's and Soja's work—there is an assumption of a presocial existence of space that, together with time, are the

objective forms of the existence of matter. Although they state that only the socially produced organization of space as a created structure comparable to other social constructions resulting from transformations is of interest in social theory, just as history represents a social transformation of time and temporality, nevertheless the frame of the argument is constituted by a dualistic distinction between society and space—understood dialectically as involving the identity of contradictions.

Deconstructing the Society–Space Duality

The trace of a presocial ontology of spacial formations, and therein the hierarchical relationship between a dominant spatially formed society and a subordinate socially formed social space, can be followed back through the history of modern Western thought. It roots in the Enlightenment antinomy between nature and society, assigning the first an objective existence that can be observed and measured by the (necessarily subjective) human scientist, who is thought of as displacedly looking from above. This “god trick” (Haraway) of modern science was fundamentally attacked by feminist theory and also led to a rethinking of the society–space relation. The ontological separation of nature and space from society sustains the possibility of a singular analytic truth, although the latter is conceived in some theoretical approaches as ineluctably opaque. Likewise, the seemingly unavoidable choice between an understanding of space as social construct, or as a reality of whatever sort, echoes the opposition between the natural and the social. Correspondingly, one strand of deconstructive feminist geography suggests, parallel to deconstructive feminist theory, questioning the spatiality by focusing on the boundaries at which difference—processes of inclusion and othering—is constituted. Space thereby loses every presociality but is understood as contingently socially constructed, constituted through iteration, as articulation of relational performance, as contested, and as part of social power struggles. For example, the concept of the modern nation and its territorialization, in the form of separate nation-states excluding each other, connected with the idea of cultural homogeneous societies contained therein, may be seen as a powerful obscuring of the contradiction between capital and labor,

weakening the class struggle. Similarly, the specific spatiality of the present global age that appears as an inevitable dynamic from outside has already been demasked by geographers like Massey as contingent, purposely occluding possible alternative spatializations by convening spatial differences into temporal sequences.

Another alternative conception, suggested by Sarah Whatmore, argues in favor of a reconfiguration of the modern emptied spaces and society as fluid sociomaterial networkings based on the actant network theory. Likewise, the idea of the modern subject as autonomous actor and antecedent to its social relations is challenged. In contrast, agency is reconceptualized as a relational effect, generated by a network of different interacting components, thus reembedding the human in the material properties and presence of diverse others and also reembodying the human life, recognizing its relational position.

These efforts at deconstructing the social–space duality try to emphasize the simultaneity of multiple and partial sociospatial configurations and the inescapable situatedness and contextuality of social life. Thus, approaching the social–space relation from a different angle, deconstruction questions the boundaries that all identities presuppose.

Paradoxically, these deconstructions of the binary conception of society and space, after the spatial turn in social theory and its postulation of mainstreaming space, imply, when taken seriously, the loss of space as an “object” of research by unveiling it as part of the social itself. Still, the perspective of the mutual condition and the indistinguishable togetherness of the social and space forms the ground for further research and theorizing on different forms of spatializations, multiple spaces of trajectories as the sphere of relations, negotiations, practices of engagement and of social power relations as well as the socially formative significance of spatialities, their contradictions, breaks, and overlappings. Thus *social space* may be approached from different angles.

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See also Gottdiener, Mark; Gendered Space; Human Ecology; Lefebvre, Henri; Social Production of Space; Soja, Edward W.; Spaces of Difference

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SOCIETY OF THE SPECTACLE

Society of the spectacle is a term deployed by Guy Debord (1931–1994) and members of the Situationist International during the 1960s to critique the alienating conditions of capitalist and state bureaucratic societies. Most fully addressed in a book with the same title, published by Debord in France in 1967, the concept was grounded in Marxist thought and was forged to confront a new stage in capitalist productive forces and the accumulation of capital in parts of social life that had come under the sway of the market and the commodity—or “colonized,” as the situationists put it—and in which subjects were increasingly rendered as passive and isolated spectators and consumers, contemplating what was presented to them, rather than active political

agents who were collectively and freely able to shape their destinies. For the situationists, the concept of the spectacle addresses an image-saturated world in which authentic life is supplanted by appearances and in which control of the image realm is of vital political significance. Their aim in coining the term was, to echo Marx's famous line about the task facing philosophers, not merely to interpret the world but to change it. For them it was a weapon with which to combat dominant social powers and to seek alternatives.

The terminology, if not the theoretical and political force of this situationist critique, has since been widely taken up by commentators. Often this has been part of descriptions or theorizations of the role of the mass media and technologies such as television and electronic communication in mediating and shaping contemporary social and cultural life. The phrase "society of the spectacle" has thus featured occasionally with, but more often without, acknowledgment of Debord and the situationists, alongside a number of other terms within postmodern cultural theory since the 1980s. Jean Baudrillard, for example, was indebted to Debord in his writings on simulation and the simulacrum while at the same time arguing that the conditions of the spectacle have been surpassed at a time of hyperreality. Supposedly evaporating with those conditions, as Baudrillard and some postmodernists suggest, is the possibility of revolutionary critique and resistance that drove the situationist project, claims that were met with withering responses from Debord during his lifetime as he never wavered from his commitment to revolution.

Writings on the society of the spectacle by Debord and the situationists have influenced urban studies in a number of ways. Most directly this has been in relation to historical and contemporary accounts of the imaging of cities and the construction of spectacular urban spaces to be looked at and contemplated, from the remaking of nineteenth-century Paris to more recent redevelopment projects, expositions, and grand events. A sense of the spectacle as a mask that entertains and diverts its audiences, while it glosses over the social divisions and problems that remain underneath, has been prominent in much critical writing in this area. So too has the idea of the spectacle's depoliticizing and passifying qualities as a powerful means of ensuring the consent, or at least

acquiescence, of the population. Many references to situationist ideas within this area of urban studies, however, neglect their radical and totalizing perspectives. To appreciate their distinctive power more fully it is necessary to acknowledge their rootedness in Marxist thought, especially in critical writings on commodity fetishism and alienation from within the Hegelian–Marxist tradition, and their inseparability from a revolutionary political project. The importance the situationists gave to urbanism within this project is of particular pertinence to those concerned with the politics of urban space today.

The Spectacle, Urbanism, and Revolution

At times the situationists employed the term *spectacle* to refer to events, scenes, and places, referring disparagingly to the construction of urban or touristic spectacles in the plural. Debord wrote at the opening of *The Society of the Spectacle*, "The whole life of those societies in which modern conditions of production prevail presents itself as an immense accumulation of *spectacles*." But as its title indicates, his book was concerned more with delineating and criticizing the spectacle as a condition. This condition entailed a prodigious expansion of the influence of the economy and the commodity over all aspects of social life, according to Debord. The mass media, advertising, and entertainment are only specific manifestations rather than determinants, he argued, emphasizing that the spectacle is "not a collection of images" but "a social relationship between people that is mediated by images." It is "the outcome and the goal of the dominant mode of production" and, as such, it is "not something *added* to the real world" but is "the very heart of society's real unreality." Alienation and separation are its central characteristics as people live out roles and gestures presented to them rather than forging their own authentic paths. This is even the case with oppositional political stances, for the situationists were acutely sensitive to the ways in which radical art and politics are co-opted, repackaged, and sold back to people to become yet more fodder for the spectacle.

Debord had no illusions about the supposedly socialist states of the Soviet Union, China, and elsewhere. His critique of the spectacle was directed at all modern societies, although he initially

distinguished between a concentrated form of the spectacle found under state bureaucracies, whose maintenance depended upon ideology condensed around a dictatorial figure and buttressed by police power, and a diffuse form that he associated with the abundance of commodities within modern capitalism. He later argued that, having emerged in the 1920s, the spectacle had become integrated by the 1980s, permeating all reality. In developing Marxist debates about commodity fetishism and alienation, Debord's approach ran counter to contemporaneous structuralist readings of Marx in France by Louis Althusser, whose influence in urban studies would be felt particularly through the work of Manuel Castells on the urban question in the early 1970s. Instead, Debord was influenced by Georg Lukács and by the critique of everyday life initiated by Henri Lefebvre, and he formed a mutually influential association with the latter for several years around the end of the 1950s.

Not only is time shaped under the rule of the commodity within the society of the spectacle, so Debord argued, but so is space. Debord and the situationists gave particular importance to the role of urbanism in this regard, arguing that the production of urban spaces within capitalist societies became a means for people to be separated, isolated, and controlled even as they were massed together through the demands of urban production. Debord defined urbanism as "the mode of appropriation of the natural and human environment by capitalism, which, true to its logical development toward absolute domination, can (and now must) refashion the totality of space into *its own peculiar décor*." It was in this spirit that he lamented the destruction of Paris and other cities, the displacement of large parts of their populations along class and ethnic lines, and the eradication of memory and senses of the past. Yet if powerful forces shape urban space into "environments of abstraction," then a key aim of revolutionary struggle is to contest those environments and to seek the transformation of both space and society. Debord described proletarian revolution as a "critique of human geography" through which people would be able to construct their own urban spaces and events in a process of emancipatory struggle, and he looked ultimately toward the dissolution of classes, the disalienation of realized democracy, and the establishment of workers' councils, whose

power "can be effective only if it transforms the totality of existing conditions."

Spectacular Politics

Debord acknowledged how easily the concept of the spectacle could lose its critical bite and become simply another empty formula of sociologico-political rhetoric. To avoid this fate he argued that its theorization must join forces "with the practical movement of negation within society" while, at the same time, revolutionary class struggle must itself develop a critique of the spectacle. To understand Debord's writings on the society of the spectacle, it is therefore necessary to situate them alongside his political critiques of events and issues around the world, including those published in the 12 issues of the journal *Internationale situationniste* between 1958 and 1969, such as his accounts of class struggle and power in Algeria and China, and of the riots in the Watts district of Los Angeles in 1965. It is also necessary to place them alongside attempts to fuel revolutionary actions and to find new modes of political organizing. Debord and the situationists strongly rejected the vanguardism of much of the Left at the time and sought to forge connections with alternative movements, some of which found expression on the streets in the revolutionary actions in Paris in May 1968.

Since that time, variations on the term *society of the spectacle* have gained increasing currency, and references to Debord in academic and art circles have become increasingly common. Such references have tended to be partial, however, and the political force that distinguishes Debord's critique has, in contrast, found its most receptive audience among radical activists and theorists seeking to oppose dominant power relations under conditions of "spectacular" commodity production and aiming to construct spaces and times beyond the social power of the spectacle. In this sense the relevance of Debord's arguments to current times is asserted with particular vigor and clarity by Anselm Jappe, who has done most to position them within the Marxist tradition. It is also used by the group Retort in their analysis of capital and spectacle in a new age of war, to make sense of the current importance of struggles over the image realm, in particular those surrounding and following

the attacks on New York City and Washington, D.C., on September 11, 2001. A contrasting attempt to reclaim the use of spectacular means for progressive ends is explored by Stephen Duncombe, who calls on the political Left to learn from Las Vegas and commercial cultures so as to build a politics that embraces people's dreams and fantasies. He coins the term *ethical spectacle* to refer to a model that encourages intervention and transformative action rather than passive contemplation and that is open, democratized, and participatory. Among his examples are collective actions in city streets and public spaces that seek to demonstrate that another world is possible.

David Pinder

See also Cinematic Urbanism; Le Corbusier; Lefebvre, Henri; Marxism and the City; Situationist City; Urban Theory

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SOJA, EDWARD W.

The American geographer Edward W. Soja has become known internationally in critical urban theory for his work on spatial analysis and the spatiality of social life. In his writings, he takes a spatial, regional, and political perspective, viewing space as an explanatory principle for social theory in which uneven spatial practices and the struggle over space are implicated in contemporary capitalism. As one of the key proponents of the spatial turn in social science, as well as an advocate for a critical postmodern approach, Soja developed a number of conceptual terms such as *exopolis*, *thirdspace*, and *synekism*. Moreover, he was one of the first, and most persistent, North American scholars to introduce Henri Lefebvre's work on space to an English-speaking audience.

Born in New York City in 1941, Soja grew up in the Bronx. He was trained as a geographer at the University of Wisconsin (MA in 1961) and Syracuse University (PhD in 1966). In 1965 he received his first academic appointment, which was in the Department of Geography at Northwestern University (Illinois), which, at that time and in his own words, "was considered the most advanced center in the country for teaching and research in the new quantitative and theoretical geography." In 1972 he joined the faculty of the Graduate School of Architecture and Urban Planning at the University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA). There, Soja replaced the positivist spatial science approach of the 1960s with a more critical approach and shifted his study areas from African and third world development to Los Angeles. Since 1999 he has also been associated with the London School of Economics and Political Science and currently holds the title of Centennial Professor of Sociology in the Cities Programme. In addition, he has been a visiting professor at the universities of Amsterdam, Cambridge, Concordia, Vienna, Nairobi, and Ibadan.

Soja started his academic career with an interest in the geography of modernization in Kenya, where he investigated the relationship between the development of transportation and communication networks and changing social relations. Further he linked this transformation to the major flows and nodes of the colonial system. This work

was critiqued as being written by a “naïve proponent” of capitalist domination of development in the third world.

Subsequently, Soja spent several years in self-criticism during which he engaged deeply with theorizing space and its role within social theory. In the early 1980s, when the realities of deindustrialization in Los Angeles forced a union-based coalition to seek advice from academics at UCLA, Soja applied his theoretical knowledge of spatial analysis to the questions of plant closures caused by large-scale economic restructuring and technological change. Soja, together with other academics at UCLA, generated a number of publications on social and spatial restructuring and laid the foundation for his book *Postmodern Geographies* (1999). In this critical spatial perspective of contemporary social theory, Soja emphasized space as an explanatory principle and called for a new ontology in which space had the same precedence as time and being. It was read widely in various social science disciplines.

Soja refers repeatedly to Henri Lefebvre’s work on space and Michel Foucault’s heterotopology as strong influences on his way of thinking. His urge to rethink and revise all established epistemologies led him to write two more books on spatial and social theory: *Thirdspace* (1996) and *Postmetropolis* (2000). These two books, together with *Postmodern Geographies*, constitute an exploration of the spatiality of human life. They share a common theoretical basis in what Soja calls a radical postmodern perspective.

Soja’s work over the past two decades is a synthesis of some of the most important writings on cities. Its goal is to introduce social analysts to the insights of “thinking spatially.” While addressing the multiple dimensions of new urban forms, this spatially based approach attends to the continuities and discontinuities of the past. Furthermore, it contributes to the theory of social justice.

A master with words, Soja introduced several new terms into human geography. As an outcome of his investigation of economic restructuring and spatial transformation in the Los Angeles region, he coined the word *exopolis* for describing what he encountered in Orange County. The term stands for an urban region that is polycentric, where the city has been turned inside-out and outside-in,

with vast new built environments and an intensified social and spatial polarization. *Thirdspace* was developed in the context of Soja’s analysis of Lefebvre’s three moments of space—conceived, perceived, and lived—and refers to fully lived space. With it, Soja challenges binary ways of thinking about space—for example, real versus imagined—with an alternative perspective, namely, the *trialectics of spatiality*. He invites the reader to apply a “both/and also logic” to gain theoretical insights from modern as well as postmodern perspectives. *Synechism* is a term he developed more recently—bringing together the works of thinkers in economic geography, archaeology, and urban studies—to describe the stimulus of urban agglomeration, with regional networks of urban settlements existing as sites of innovation and development as well as of growth. Within this concentrated density and heterogeneity, the social production and reproduction of urban space, Soja argues, are the spark for continuous innovation and creativity and therefore generates the special advantages that arise out of urban life.

Ute Lehrer

See also Exopolis; Heterotopia; Lefebvre, Henri; Los Angeles School of Urban Studies; Social Production of Space; Urban Geography; Urban Theory

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SPACES OF DIFFERENCE

The “spaces of difference” concept refers to how space is socially constructed to be different depending on who the individual is in a particular space and how that individual utilizes that space. Ideas about spaces of difference are important to academics, city planners, governments, and nongovernmental agencies in terms of understanding how Western ideologies and social construction processes create and reify inequalities in everyday environments. These processes physically and socially manifest in the urban environment affecting the everyday lived realities and practices of urban populations. These populations are not homogeneous; rather they contain a multiplicity of identities. In this ever-decreasing spatial world, thanks to globalization and the compression of temporal and spatial distances, international agencies and relations, and geopolitical rhetoric, the illusion of homogeneity is crumbling. No longer can socially bound groups, especially those groups who are in dominant positions, hide behind a clear border separating them from the “other” (i.e., everyone not like them). Nevertheless, attempts are made to maintain separate spaces based on, not difference, but sameness, such as in gated communities, social clubs, and gentrified redevelopment practices. Today, it is well acknowledged that identity, even for one individual, is of a multiple nature, making spaces of difference increasingly difficult to maintain. Spaces of difference are becoming more theoretical, constructed, and perpetuated conceptually concomitant with its physical space.

When the notion of difference is attached to the idea of space, an “othering” occurs. Edward Said has brought the idea of the other to social science through his work on the theory of Orientalism. Said’s work details how this practice of othering is communicated through an “us and them” or, in reality, an “us versus them” understanding of social order. Spaces of difference are created through discursive practices all working within the same space based upon these notions of difference. This communication allows individuals to categorize and relate to their surrounding spaces from neighborhood to national to global scales. Contemporary theoretical approaches to spaces of difference have a vast range from feminist

movements to sociological perspectives to Marxist studies to social identity arguments to queer theory about urban environments. The purpose here is not to argue one of these approaches over the other, but to see how spaces of difference are created by virtue of the existence of numerous discourses that produce an everyday lived experience of difference. Many types and forms of these spaces of difference exist in urban environments, but for this purpose the focus will be on some of the overarching categories of difference, including gender, age, class, ethnicity and religion, sexual identity, and appropriate uses of urban spaces. By creating these categories of differences, everyday inequalities and notions of appropriateness are the realities of urban experience and play key roles in how multiple layers of users and spatial practices create complex spaces of difference in the same physical space.

Gender and Feminism

Thanks to feminist studies, gender divisions and inequalities have been brought to the attention of many academics, governments, and businesses. Women no longer are “supposed” to stay at home in the realm of the private while men are free to move about the public world uninhibited. Yet, women are still facing glass ceilings in employment environments and a general classification as the “softer” sex. Linda McDowell is one of many feminist researchers investigating gender relations in the workplace, especially within corporate and high-end jobs in the United Kingdom. She has discussed how, when women are admitted into white-collar workplaces, certain gender performances are expected, either ultra-feminine or masculine, through attitudes, actions, and even dress. These types of workplaces still do not accept women as equals but often have token females to claim equal opportunity practices or to show progress toward integrating women into traditionally “masculine” employment positions. These gender performance expectations can also be imposed on men, and males in traditionally “feminine” positions may be seen as suspect, especially in child-caring roles. Within white-collar jobs, the ratio of men to women is uneven, especially in highly educated and skilled employment such as corporate executives and academics. Conversely, women highly

outnumber men in the more “sensitive” job sectors, such as childcare workers, nurses, grade school teachers, and social service positions. This creates an obvious employment divide, outlining workplace positions as either masculine or feminine in nature. Although this is surely evolving due to recognition of these spaces of difference, the change is slow.

Age and Sociology

Age differences are important indicators of the construction of spaces of difference. Sociologists have been at the forefront of understanding how age, particularly that of youth, plays into notions of deviant and delinquent behavior and how these social constructions maintain societal mores and values. Alongside individuals, spaces are also socially constructed as to where a person belongs or does not belong depending on age. Young children belong on playgrounds, but when youth in their teenage years to early 20s enter into and occupy these spaces, they are seen as troublesome and delinquent. They disrupt the idea of who can and who cannot use the playground. The work of Stanley Cohen defines age barriers in terms of the social construction of “folk devils.” Youth have been conceived as causing moral panics when they are in the wrong place or behave in an inappropriate manner, such as skateboarding on a basketball court, the wrong sport in this athletic space. These same youth are sometimes considered troublemakers when congregating in groups and can be profiled and harassed by police and business owners. Some business and market areas in the United Kingdom post signs saying “no chavs”; *chav* is a derogatory term for “youth” and is often perpetuated in the news alongside the term *yob*, another derogatory term. These youth are marked as being out of place in market districts, setting aside these places as appropriate for older consumers. Even in terms of the elderly, communities are created to cater to them while excluding younger crowds. Yet, as with gender, there is also a reversal of perception because an elderly person is not seen as belonging to the spaces of dance clubs, which cater to the aforementioned youth. Spaces of difference socially define spatial boundaries within urban areas based upon age.

Class and Marxism

Thanks to Marxist studies, class divisions are continually discussed, especially in the current neoliberal global climate. Exploitation of lower-class individuals and groups in the neoliberal environment are justified as opportunities for lower-class individuals to improve their lot in life. Yet, these systems are set up to maintain this division, therefore ensuring the maintenance of a low-wage, low-skilled working class to sustain profits for dominant classes and companies. Agencies such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have perpetuated neoliberal notions of class while drastically cutting access to social services such as education and health care for lower-class individuals. David Harvey is one of the most cited academics discussing the ways in which corporate profit motivations continue to maintain class divisions. These divisions ensure that upper-class individuals receive good education, including creative and cultural support in the arts, while lower-class individuals continue to be force-fed dominant neoliberal myths about history and propriety. This relegates lower-class individuals to the spaces of difference to which they have been assigned. For example, schoolchildren in the United States are taught that Columbus discovered America, the colonists were kind to the “Indians,” and the struggles of the civil war were only about slavery. Creative and cultural education is rare within this framework. Lower-class children are taught what to think while upper-class children are taught how to think. This carries over into creating a divide between skilled creative jobs for the upper class and service and industrial sector employment futures for lower-class children. With this divide in place, neoliberal notions of equality simply do not exist.

Ethnicity, Religion, and Social Identity

Ethnicity and religion are tense topics in these globalized times. Ethnic and religious wars and conflicts occur daily and reflect the geopolitical processes altering the nature of spatial awareness. These differences are often tied to physical locations within urban environments. In dynamic cities, there are often clearly drawn lines separating different ethnic and religious groups from others through the development of neighborhoods. Often

these areas are developed out of exclusion from other urban residential locations, but they can quickly become the only areas where many feel secure. This security stems from these social identities and allows people the ability to retain parts of their beliefs and identity construction without complete assimilation into other cultural practices. This type of bounded space, however, can make these groups targets of hate crimes when tensions are at a peak. For example, the East End of London has traditionally been, and is still today, a revolving door for immigrant populations, whether they arrive as refugees, asylum seekers, or those looking for employment opportunities. Because of this history, the East End is a target for hate crimes. Another example is the numerous Chinatowns that have been created in cities around the world. While originally these were the areas where Chinese immigrants could settle, Chinatowns have flourished into “exotic” cultural spaces for tourism and business enterprises. While these areas create ethnic enclaves, religious spaces are even more clearly demarcated within the urban fabric. The locations of churches, mosques, and temples sharply delineate spaces of difference, offering a place to practice and maintain spiritual beliefs. These religious locations are symbolic spaces that reify social identity. Kevin Hetherington affirms that shared and collective identity through social processes of neighborhoods reaffirms notions of individual identity. This then stresses the importance ethnic and religious urban neighborhoods have in maintaining a sense of self—in many cases by separating self from the other.

Sexual Identity and Queer Theory

Sexual identity is a powerful force in defining individual identity and actions. Generally, urban climates do not actively promote gay lifestyles, but often spaces are created within the urban realm to support them. Areas where gay and lesbian social interactions take place are often fringe areas—deindustrialized warehouse spaces, hidden clubs off alleyways of business districts, or locations in poor neighborhoods. “Nicer” areas openly supporting gay and lesbian lifestyles are likely exceptions to the rule. Urban areas offer more avenues for social interaction and expression of sexual

identities outside of heteronormative practices. Gill Valentine has illustrated how urban environments can work both to help create and support gay and lesbian culture by being more liberal and open than rural areas but can also become spaces of homophobia and antigay violence. Urban environments reinforce notions of heteronormativity. Walking down the street, being stuck in traffic, going to the movies, dining at a restaurant, and shopping are heteronormative actions that are taken for granted and often not noticed by passers-by. Heterosexual couples holding hands, kissing, and cuddling go constantly unnoticed or quickly dismissed. Homosexual couples practicing the same actions of intimacy become automatic targets for intolerance. Queer theory has been an active voice in bringing to light how urban environments are important places for the practice of shared sexual identities and sociability.

Appropriate Use and Deviance

Spaces of difference support dominant notions of proper expression and livelihood practices. Don Mitchell and Tim Cresswell have been prominent voices in how these dominant notions create deviance with concerns to marginalized groups and activities, especially homelessness and graffiti. Homelessness and graffiti are said to be practices that plague cities and can cause economic downfall if not dealt with by city governments. City ordinances have been constructed to keep the homeless out of urban public spaces through antiloitering laws. Especially in times of a city’s involvement in international events, such as the Olympics or Commonwealth Games, the homeless are often physically removed from the streets and placed into, often temporarily constructed, shelters. Homelessness is a deviant and transgressing act in urban environments, constructed as a problem for safety and a burden on taxpayers for shelter, medical care, and food supplies. Graffiti is another deviant activity prevalent in urban space. Graffiti is often seen as acts of vandalism, committed by delinquent youth, requiring erasure and legislation if in high traffic tourist and market areas. Yet, graffiti often exists as part of the everyday landscape of peripheral urban neighborhoods. These are border areas where immigrants and lower-class populations usually reside, where graffiti is in

place, not out of place. This shows how powerful the commodification of urban space is in the daily lives of urban dwellers. Urban environments are sanitized through erasure and silence, physically cleared of the homeless and graffiti, to support economic and development goals. These goals create appropriate uses for urban public spaces, whether explicit or implicit. These spaces of difference for expression and alternative lifestyles are increasingly being squeezed out of urban spaces.

Remarks

Urban populations negotiate everyday reality within the socially constructed nature of spaces of difference. These spaces of difference are structured with built-in inequalities but also have, embedded within them, room for negotiation. Sometimes these negotiations create spaces of social cohesion and shared identities. At other times these negotiations transform into larger social movements and protests, for example, civil rights, suffrage, environmental concerns, workers strikes, and war protests. The focus here has relied on overarching categories of difference, but to reiterate, identity, even for individuals, is multiple. Each person within these urban spaces has a gender, an age, a class status, an ethnicity and religion or some form of belief system, a sexual identity, and notions of how urban space is to be used. Amplify this person with their multiplicity of identities by the population of an entire city and urban space becomes exponentially complex and intricate.

Difference is a reality in contemporary, and past, urban environments. These spaces of difference are what create the dynamic urban spaces that host the majority of the world's populations, especially since the mass migrations of the industrial era from rural to urban locations, staging spaces of difference as an important part of contemporary decision making for social scientists, urban planners, city governments, and nongovernmental organizations.

Terri Moreau

See also Gay Space; Gendered Space; Globalization; Graffiti; Harvey, David; Homelessness; Marxism and the City; Racialization; Social Production of Space

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SPACES OF FLOWS

The phrase "space of flows," most often associated with the later work of Manuel Castells, has come to characterize claims for a spatial reconfiguration of the urban order in an era of globalization. It is argued that cities find themselves in a world where capital, information, people, and economic activities are mobile on an ever-greater spatial scale and with an increasing scope in terms of the size of flows. For cities, this means an old system of settled national hierarchies has been replaced by more fluid, horizontal interrelations. Instead of a hierarchical order of scales (local towns to regional centers to capital cities), with integration meaning going up a level, there is now a more direct set of linkages between different cities cutting across those systems.

The effects of this space of flows can be seen in many registers—from financial, to movements of

people, to new patterns of location and new organizations of economic activity. Urban studies scholars look at the role of information and communications technologies (ICTs), which allow close coordination of production activities that may now be located far from their markets and indeed disaggregated and dispersed around the planet. For instance, the insertion of ICTs into service provision via telephone call centers enables locational flexibility in provider location, and regional, national, and global distanciation via their relocation to places such as India, the Caribbean, and Southeast Asia. Castells argues that we are witnessing a society organized around informational capitalism, and this gives rise to a global space of flows, through a new spatiality driven by the ability of ICTs to reconfigure the relationships of people and places.

The apogee of the space of flows is the globalized financial system as exemplified in continuous global financial trading (as New York winds down, Los Angeles opens; as Los Angeles closes, Tokyo is opening; as Tokyo closes, Singapore and Mumbai are trading, and as they close, London and Paris open; as London and Paris close, New York has reopened). This is a paradigmatic example of the use of ICTs to first overcome the difficulties of distanciated interactions and then to actually capitalize on this. We thus develop from using ICTs to coordinate widely scattered activities, bringing information together into a central office in the financial district, to using offices in different time zones to enable around the clock working, and thus not only allowing a global reach but also using space to overcome time. At the extreme this has been seen as the supersession of space and the annihilation of time. If we explore the impact of such a space of flows, we need to look both between and within cities.

Global Nodes and Hubs

The effects of the space of flows are socially and materially uneven—thus while there has been an enormous effort to reduce barriers to flows of capital, there are rather more barriers for flows of people. Castells looks to uneven outcomes, with some people trapped in places while a “kinetic elite” of wealthy actors access the space of flows. Cities thus find themselves in a competitive order

working to attract footloose capital and economic activities. Saskia Sassen has noted that far from producing an even dispersion, the informational and human infrastructures required to coordinate widely distanciated activities are large and concentrated in specific urban milieus. For instance, there is a greater fiber optic and data cable capacity in Manhattan than on the continent of Africa. Cities strive for competitive advantage by providing facilities for corporations to locate in a reconfigured space of global flows. Cities thus strive to be connected to these flows of information and to make themselves attractive to desired flows of (elite) people. Castells sees a space of flows produced through global nodes and hubs, comprising environments conducive to the elite workers, often sealed off from the rest of the city in non-places, or what he calls real virtual spaces (such as corporate offices, hotels, and airports). These milieus become key places in the space of flows for elite knowledge workers to mingle and exchange the information and skills necessary to run global enterprises. One might then, after Sassen, distinguish flows of two types of information in the global economy: (1) data that can be reduced to transmissible forms and flow through electronic networks, and (2) evaluative knowledge that requires high-skill interactive processing, supported by networks of tacit competences. Firms seek cities whose social affordances enable interactivity among mobile elites and thus will allow the maximization of benefits from a parallel technical connectivity. The chances to acquire evaluative knowledge are enhanced in a process of cumulative causation by those very firms strategically posting staff to these global hubs.

Looking at flows of information more carefully, it is often not cities that are connected through the space of flows, but parts of cities. Thus the financial districts of London and Manhattan are so linked that some have taken to calling them a single urban entity—NYLON. Different parts of different cities may become entwined so senses of proximity are deterritorialized. Conversely proximate locations may be made more distant or less connected, as with the City of London having more data flows connecting it to Manhattan than it does to east London suburbs. The effect then is to move from container-based notions of the city (comprising a bounded space) to one where spaces

in cities are entangled with those in others. Thus some parts of the city may be connected by electronic flows to a set of remote other centers, while other parts may be connected by different flows to another set of cities. There are then networked subeconomies that link translocally.

Urban Constellations

The city breaks into urban constellations scattered through huge territorial expanses binding together technoburbs, real virtual spaces, and so forth, rather than unified cities. This urban fragmentation, Castells has suggested, produces a dual city, sharply divided between prosperous knowledge workers and those incapable of finding a place in the new economy (other than, ironically, in servicing the needs of knowledge workers for babysitting, housecleaning, and other such activities). According to Castells, the dual city is simultaneously “globally connected and locally disconnected.”

Rather than seeing a dual city outcome though, the city is decomposed in more complex ways than simply the connected and disconnected. Rather there are degrees of control over those flows. So while the vision of the dual city of digital elite and excluded others certainly has resonance, it is by no means the be-all and end-all of the story. Globalized telecommunications are altering the rhythms of urban life to produce new patterns of disjuncture and differentiation. Female employees in call centers in Bangalore are now part of a different space of flows—answering to the temporality of U.S. markets, the night shift is a time trap emphasizing their marginal employment status in the city in which they live and as a new global pink-collar labor force. This digital economy’s work regimes are far from those of a global elite. In terms of the city, these call center workers are part of the city where they live and work and the cities (usually Western ones) whose populations they service. Such global rhythms give rise to what Castells sees matching the space of flows, that is, crystallized or timeless time. He suggests a sequence of hegemonic forms of temporality, with industrial capitalism producing and produced by clock time and now informational capitalism entailing a time in which linearity is replaced by instantaneity and discontinuity rather than predictable sequence. The space of flows

dissolves time by disordering the sequence of events and making them simultaneous.

The space of flows also creates new possibilities for grassroots actors. A range of movements and nongovernmental organizations have been enabled by global networks, which are learning from each other, forming new structures of alliances, and so forth. Equally the flows of poorer workers, though often heavily policed, create new flows of ideas, remittances, and new urban cultures. Critics such as Smith point out that much of the work of Castells lends itself to seeing the overriding of emplaced politics via the global space of flows. There is a tendency to portray the flows as “out there” linking places rather than also “in here,” and to frame global and local social processes in binary opposition, as mutually exclusive and inherently antagonistic explanations for urban development that pit local cultures against globalizing economic transformations. The risk is to imply that flows are always dynamically global while stubborn resistance is the best that places can muster. Instead one might more productively see the weaving of different spaces of flows through the urban fabric.

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See also Castells, Manuel; Cyburbia; Globalization; Informational City; Non-Place Realm; Sassen, Saskia; Technoburbs; World City

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SPORTS STADIUMS

Sports stadiums have long been the cornerstone of varied urban conglomerations. Today, sports stadiums are generally conceived of as large, enclosed, and often comfortable arenas in which the public can gather to watch both professional and amateur sporting competitions. Historically, in both Greek and Roman civilizations, sports stadiums occupied prominent material and ideological positions. From the 40,000 spectators at the stadium in Olympia to watch the 200-foot “stade” race in 776 BC to the vast coliseums of ancient Rome, stadiums can be seen as important symbolic models of particular conjunctural moments. Dependent upon the dominant mode of social regulation and production, sports stadiums have played differential roles in the morphology of the city. This can be demonstrated through conceptualizing sports stadiums over time in three main stages: pre-1945, 1945 to 1990, and post-1945.

Sports Stadiums, Pre-1945

Germany laid claim to the largest stadium in the world at the turn of the twentieth century. Built for the 1916 Olympic Games—which were aborted due to World War I—the Deutsches Stadion was built by Otto March and had a capacity of 40,000. In 1933, when the Nazi party took power in Germany, Adolf Hitler realized the potential of a spectacular stadium as a centerpiece for propaganda conceived for the 1936 Olympic Games. Again employing the March family, Hitler built a new Olympic stadium on the same site, with a capacity of 110,000. The stadium became the material base from which to express the ideological ambitions and significance of Nazism.

In North America, as cities grew as a result of accelerated urbanization, immigration, and industrialization, it was not until the 1920s that sports stadiums started to have a drastic impact on the urban landscape. Bound with the emergence of early sporting economies, space in which to watch sporting activities became gradually regulated and restricted as entrepreneurs started to capitalize on the profits to be derived from charging spectators. If by the late nineteenth century any major league city was expected to have a sports team, by the

1920s local officials began building public stadiums to provide facilities for these teams, promote civic pride and boosterism, and promote tourism.

Early examples include the 1922 Rose Bowl in Pasadena, the 1923 Los Angeles Coliseum, the 1924 Soldiers Field in Chicago, and, in the same year, the Memorial Stadium, home of the University of Texas Longhorn football team in Austin. Aided by the development of infrastructure, communications, transportation, and eventually, the motor vehicle within the city, many early examples can be termed *enchanted stadiums*. Often designed to materially harmonize with the built environment, these early stadiums were often quirky environments and are the repositories of many of sports greatest historical moments. Examples include Chicago’s Wrigley Field (ivy-covered batter’s eye), Pittsburgh’s Forbes Field (upper deck sun shade), and New York’s Polo Grounds (wrought-iron row ends). Perhaps most notably, and similar to other stadiums from the early-modern era of stadium construction in North America and indeed within the designs of football stadiums in the industrial cities of England, Boston’s Fenway Park (built in 1912) can be seen as the unique product of its circumstances, as the stadium is integrated into the neighborhood alongside office buildings, residential apartments, two schools, and various retail and entertainment establishments. Indeed, the stadium has been identified as having five historic districts under National Park Service guidelines for landmarks: the playing field itself, the main grandstand, the right field grandstand, the left field grandstand, and the left field wall, which, at Fenway Park, is also known as “the Green Monster.” Built in an era long before night games, television, suburbanization, and corporate boxes, and despite multiple updates and refits, many of these enchanted sports stadiums lack many of the amenities that have become familiar to sports stadiums in late capitalist consumption environments. However, Fenway Park remains as the oldest Major League Baseball facility remaining in operation, and, despite having the smallest capacity, is the most successful, with Major League Baseball’s highest gate revenues.

Sports Stadiums, 1945–1990

The decline of industrial manufacturing, the concomitant rise of the service sectors, and the rise in

the number of knowledge workers led to the disavowal of the urban core. From the postwar-era demise of previously populated and prosperous urban cores emerged tension between increasingly decaying, evacuated, and demonized urban cores and evermore affluent and exalted suburban peripheries distinguished by material commodities that conspicuously defined lifestyles. This accelerated suburban landscape was bolstered by the massive outmigration of mainly middle-income White inhabitants from the urban cores of midwestern and northeastern cities, combined with large-scale immigration of predominantly poor African Americans from the rural South into the evacuated urban centers, disinvestment in the urban low-wage labor market in favor of service-oriented suburban employment centers, and the retrenchment of social welfare programs. The cumulative result of this concerted postwar neglect has been most visibly manifest in polarized patterns and experiences of postindustrial suburban socioeconomic growth and urban socioeconomic decline. As a result of these socioeconomic and political processes, the contemporary American city evolved into two starkly contrasting spaces: the predominantly White and affluent distending suburbs and the largely Black urban cores.

Along with the movement of homes, people, jobs, and marketplaces, city officials and sports team owners were keen to take advantage of economical land, perceived stable neighborhoods, enhanced transportation connections, and a location near middle-class consumers. As such, a large proportion of stadiums built following World War II were located in, or near, the new suburbs. Indeed, by the 1970s, one fifth of all arenas built in North America were in suburban areas. Examples include the Forum in Inglewood, Los Angeles; Brendan Byrne Arena in Meadowlands, New Jersey; and Nassau County Coliseum in Uniondale, New York. Rather than the enchanted stadiums that characterized those built prior to 1945, these domed stadiums also tended to be rationalized, multiuse stadiums containing synthetic grass (Astroturf), fixed roofs, and huge seating capacities, as owners and city officials alike looked to draw out competitive and fiscal advantages from these stadiums. In this sense, the Houston Astrodome (1965), Pittsburgh's Three River Stadium (1970), Cincinnati's Cinergy Field (1970), and the Seattle

Kingdome (1976) were built not just to house their home city's sporting teams (often more than one playing within the same venue) but also to play host to a variety of entertainment events from rock concerts to religious gatherings, political conventions to livestock and rodeo shows. In 2005 the Louisiana Superdome in New Orleans and Houston's Astrodome were utilized by the Federal Emergency Management Agency to house victims of Hurricane Katrina.

Sports Stadiums, Post-1990

Given the evacuation of the mass manufacturing economy from its traditional home in U.S. cities of the Northeast and Midwest and the concomitant decline in urban tax bases, populations, and public expenditure, many cities have expedited a shift from a managerial to an entrepreneurial style of governance. Less interested in enhancing public welfare than attracting private capital, the postindustrial cities function to attract highly mobile and flexible production, financial, and consumption flows. Within this evermore entrepreneurial climate, and with a need to address the negative preexisting perceptions of the urban environment, many cities find themselves competing against each other to attract capital investment from corporate, governmental, and retail sectors. Shorn of their traditional industrial manufacturing economies, many North American cities have become preoccupied with their replacement by commercial initiatives that engage, and seek to reconstitute, the urban environment as a multifaceted space of consumption and capital accumulation. Urban redevelopment and regeneration projects have tended to be concentrated within relatively small tourist-oriented areas or enclaves that project a reassuringly dislocated experience and perception of safety, fun, and vitality for downtown areas. Along with obligatory components and expressions of contemporary urban viability—shopping (festival marketplaces and malls); dining (theme restaurants and cafés); entertainment (theaters, sports facilities, museums, live music, casinos); and visitor infrastructure (hotels, convention centers)—these spectacular spaces of consumption are increasingly predicated on sporting investment. So, while the 1980s featured the proliferation of festival malls, in the 1990s, cities turned to sports

stadiums as anchors of urban regeneration and differentiation. Thus, since the early 1990s, there has been an unprecedented level of intercity competition for business, sporting events, and sports teams, as civic leaders have sought to revive formerly industrial cities on the back of new economies based on tourism, entertainment, and culture.

Since the 1990s, and as an amalgam of securing competitive advantage, political favor, (re)creating and projecting a city identity, attracting elite sports teams and events, and with regard to being high-profile urban spaces of consumption, new sports stadiums have begun to anchor revitalized downtown spaces. Indeed, new sports stadiums have become among the most effective vehicles for the advancement of internally and externally identifiable places. Since 1990, and in an era of shrinking fiscal and legislative support for initiatives concerned about the welfare of urban residents, city and state governments throughout the United States have spent more than \$10 billion to subsidize the construction of facilities for major league sports teams. These schemes have been justified for their urban redevelopment and reimagining potential, specifically in terms of projections of employment and wealth creation, and for their presumed ability to improve civic image and cohesion.

As civic leadership responded to deindustrialization with a series of investments that would set the stage for new residential development designed to attract older baby boomers and young professionals to urban lifestyles amid the new entertainment opportunities in downtown areas, building sports stadiums, often to attract or keep franchises, has become a central component of revitalization strategizing. An exemplar of such processes is Oriole Park at Camden Yards, in Baltimore, Maryland. To differentiate itself from other cities and ensure the freshness of a new downtown consumption environment predicated on the rejuvenated Inner Harbor area, in the late 1980s Baltimore unveiled plans for the construction of a baseball stadium at a formerly industrial warehouse site, Camden Yards. Bound with a concern over the potential relocation of the Orioles baseball team (following the 1984 departure of the National Football League's Colts to Indianapolis) and the wilting Memorial Stadium, the city was desperate to find a new home for its remaining major league franchise. By architecturally incorporating

the original Camden Yards Warehouse (a former home for the B&O railroad) within the retro-design of the ground, the stadium provided Baltimore an imageable landmark that caught the attention of baseball fans and players, professional sports owners, the general public, and architectural critics. The construction of Camden Yards was quickly followed by the development of the M&T Bank Stadium (home of the National Football League franchise, the Baltimore Ravens), the Hippodrome Theatre, the new Centerpoint retail complex, the Baltimore Convention Center, a number of newly renovated upscale apartment buildings and hotel complexes, and the University of Maryland Medical School and Hospital.

Tapping into nostalgia surrounding baseball's status as America's pastime and following the success of Camden Yards, 17 of 30 baseball teams have built retro-style ballparks reminiscent of baseball's enchanted, classic, early-twentieth-century facilities, such as Boston's Fenway Park, Chicago's Wrigley Field, Brooklyn's Ebbets Field, and Pittsburgh's Forbes Field. These new-old structures (such as Coors Field in Denver, Safeco Field in Seattle, Conseco Fieldhouse in Indianapolis, or Autozone Park in Memphis) are not only triumphant paeans to the past, but they also incorporate the amenities expected by contemporary consumers.

Some cities have experienced a number of interrelated problems associated with the commercial spectacularization of urban environments and sporting stadiums. The serial replication of these consumption environments has led to a standardized stadium experience developed by a small pool of architects, designers, and planners (such as HOK Sport), deployed by cities as part of a strategic armory to add attractions that have had success elsewhere. This has meant, within an environment predicated on the expansionist impulses of private capital, that sports stadiums have started to resemble each other as experience becomes commonplace and novelty diminishes. As a departure from these retro or enchanted stadiums, the new stadium (2008) for the Washington Nationals Baseball team incorporates glass panels, steel, and concrete to reflect the style of the city's monuments and convention center and provides a view toward the U.S. Capitol building, the National Mall, and the Washington Monument. Intended to spark development in the Anacostia neighborhood of



Comerica Park, which opened in 2000 as the Detroit Tigers' new baseball field, is built around the configuration of the playing field. The new venue is highly acclaimed, but downtown Detroit still suffers from the staggering economy.

Washington, D.C., the \$320 million stadium is set to anchor the new ballpark entertainment district.

Sports stadiums and the accompanying entertainment infrastructure are part of the attempt to transform the material and symbolic environment of downtown cores and place a city within the circuits of tourist promotion. Frequently, such investment in sports stadiums are concentrated in certain safe and sanitized areas of the city that are divorced from the lived experiences of many residents. Indeed, some stadiums, such as the new FedEx Forum in Memphis, home to the National Basketball Association's Memphis Grizzlies, are designed to provide a physical buffer between consumption-oriented spaces and those populations deemed antithetical to such space. Anchoring urban development in core components such as sports stadiums has been deployed to rebuild the urban core, yet for many cities, they present an unreal perception of city life and shield both suburbanites and tourists from continuing urban

problems. Questions also persist over the long-term impact of such investment and the relative contribution that adding spaces of (sporting) consumption will have on a region's stability. This is especially the case for downtowns who have predicated their future on spaces of sporting consumption (such as Memphis). Detroit, for example, has added two new sports stadiums and a performing arts complex in recent years, but these have not been sufficient to offset the detrimental effects of deteriorating outer neighborhoods, high property taxes, and poor schools that have resulted in a net decline in population between 2000 and 2003.

As with Berlin in 1936, sports stadiums continue to play an important role in the expression of selected national ideologies. Often used as material manifestations of particular identity projects, the construction of sports stadiums in which to host major sporting events have been used as part of a symbolic armory in the expression of multiculturalism (2000 Sydney Olympic Games), development

and economic stability (1998 Kuala Lumpur Commonwealth Games), and technological superiority (1998 Seoul Olympic Games); as sites for the demonstration of national unity in the face of disruption following the events of September 11, 2001 (Yankee Stadium, Olympic Park for the 2002 Salt Lake City Games, and the New Orleans Super Dome during the 2002 National Football League Super Bowl); and in the dramatic reconstitution of a city's skyline (the new Wembley Stadium, whose arch, the longest single-span roof structure in the world, dominates the London skyline).

Michael Silk

See also Architecture; Placemaking; Urban Planning

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automobile-dependent growth at the edge of or in the urban periphery. As such it is not an analytical concept. The concept is hardly operational, meaning something different at different periods for different users of the concept. Mostly it is regarded as a sort of critical concept, useful in suggesting an attitude rather than indicating any actual conditions, an almost always negative attitude. Without being a genuine strategic concept, it is a concept calling on action, calling on strategies against sprawl. In a substantial part of the urban studies literature it is used as a concept with programmatic ambitions, about stopping the development of sprawl by strategies emphasizing the dispersion as well as the dynamics of the urban area.

Some claim that it was not until the beginning of the 1960s that sprawl—as the occupation of previously uninhabited landscape—became an issue in the urban discourse, and it was for a long time regarded as being a uniquely American phenomenon based on the fact that in America there was plenty of cheap land on which to build single-family dream houses and an abundance of cars and roads by which to get there. Today it is more or less obvious that sprawl is a universal phenomenon, a new form of urbanism that inevitably becomes dominant when technological infrastructure concerning mobility and communication is established at a regional scale.

Sprawl is a convenient concept. Sprawl is never totally the same, as the form of its urban design or (lack of it) is continually changing. The low density as well as the dynamic in its spreading out are constantly subject to criticism regarding sustainability as well as questions concerning social segregation, indicating that the well-known dense form of urbanity is supposed to be both more sustainable and less segregated.

Dense and Dispersed Urban Territory

But in many ways, the existence of the dense and dispersed city and urban territory is not a new thing. It has been developing for a number of years, but the development has intensified dramatically during the last couple of decades. A relatively small number of people now live in the old and denser parts of the cities, the rest (the majority) in a dispersed urban territory, bound together by infrastructure and not by continuity of urban form. The new thing is perhaps the growing

SPRAWL

Sprawl is usually described as rapid, unplanned, or at least uncoordinated, scattered, low-density,

awareness that it is happening and a tendency by some to regard it in a more relaxed manner.

In some of the recent research the development of sprawl is traced in different periods throughout history and especially in the twentieth century. From the early days of sprawl through the postwar boom years to the sprawl condition of today, we have been witnessing often controversial causes of sprawl, different antisprawl campaigns initiated, and different remedies brought into play to counteract the development. It is convincingly argued and explained why most of these campaigns and remedies do not work.

A useful tool for visualizing the effects of sprawl on the urban development is the density gradient. Residential or employment density of an urban area is recorded along the vertical axis as population per square mile or kilometer, while distance from the city center in miles or kilometers is marked on the horizontal axis. If we take for instance London 1801 as a starting point, we get a very steep graph falling from the left to the right indicating a rather dense city center, quickly transforming to a distinct periphery only a few miles away from the center. Over the years London, as well as most other cities, has lost population in the center and has grown enormously in the periphery, producing a much flatter graph. This density gradient tends to become flatter for all urban areas, unless, of course, we are dealing with urban territories with a natural boundary (e.g., Hong Kong). Even Los Angeles is denser than New York if the urban territory is taken as a whole. Paris is like London: At least three-fourths of the population of the 10 million that live in the urban territory of Paris in the region Île-de-France, live outside the beltway (*le périphérique*). A job count confirms the tendency. During the 1990s the city of Paris lost 200,000 jobs, whereas the outer suburban area gained 160,000 jobs. By the end of the twentieth century it was obvious that a generalized urban sprawl had rendered the old distinctions between urban and rural obsolete in many areas of the world and created a diffuse mode of life founded on mobility and the single-family house.

It is pointed out that the density gradient tends to become flatter the more affluent the society becomes. The tendency to seek residence in the open countryside has always been the case as affluence rises in any given society. Where citizens become more affluent and enjoy basic economic and political rights, more people have access to the advantages that earlier were reserved for wealthier citizens.

The new thing about the actual situation in the urban territories is that privacy (the ability to control one's own surroundings), mobility (meaning both personal and social mobility), and choice (understood as the multichoice lifestyle, available to even the most humble middle-class family) has now turned into a mass phenomenon. This is made possible by individual ownership of cars and the increasing buildup of infrastructure, making mobility one of the most important aspects in the urban territory of today and making landscape an inseparable part of the urban territory.

Landscape and the Built Environment

In the 1970s and 1980s, when the reconstruction of the city was the main focus, there was a tendency to define the European city as something dense and fundamentally different from, for instance, the American city, which was regarded as something much more dispersed.

A closer look at the European urban reality today, based as it is on network cities and mobility, indicates a kind of abolition of some of the more fundamental dichotomies that used to form the basis of the traditional urban concept: first and foremost the dichotomy between city and landscape but also the ones between center and periphery, public and private, and so on. Traditionally the development of urban issues related only to one side of these dichotomies, but something seems to indicate that the opposition between them is no longer valid. What if central urban issues are now equally present on both sides? And what if this, more than anything else, is the specific character of the urban condition?

According to recent research, dispersion has been a persistent feature in cities since the beginning of urban history. As cities have become more economically mature and prosperous, they have tended to spread outward at decreasing densities. The only new thing about this in the twentieth century is that it is becoming more visible as it appears as a mass phenomenon—all cities are now exploding. This decrease in density in affluent cities is perhaps the single most important fact about recent urban development. This is the case everywhere. Sprawl can be seen outside all of the big Asian, Latin American, and African cities. In practically all metropolitan areas in the world, the periphery share of the population in the urban territory has

increased considerably. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, 50 percent of the U.S. population is living in the urban territory outside the city cores while less than 30 percent lives within the city core. In Europe, Berlin is the only metropolitan area with a decrease in periphery share (probably due to its situation during the cold war). In all other European cities, including Rome, Paris, London, Randstad, Copenhagen, and Stockholm, the number of people living in the periphery is increasing.

If we argue that landscape as a common feature no longer can be regarded as something opposite to, or a kind of antithesis to the city, then it must be seen as an integrated part of the total urban territory, and therefore has to be considered a central part of urban and architectural planning.

Asked directly, most people will say that they prefer to live in close connection to urban centers in open, landscape-like surroundings, with multiple lifestyle choices and mobility connections. The apparent conflict of these preferences necessarily leads to a continuous reformulation of the relations between city and landscape, leading to an unavoidable increase in mobility, primarily in the form of growth in private car usage.

The processes of urban mutations reformulate the built environment and the landscape into new urban territories. New concepts like network city, the city without limits, and “rurbia” and “rurban life” suggest that former, more or less unambiguous concepts like city, town center, suburb, periphery, farmland, and open landscape are not alone in the field anymore. Some have chosen to call this new European condition “after-sprawl.” They emphasize the new conditions by renaming them, and they also attempt to change focus from the built space and infrastructure to the so-called negative space (the new valuable agricultural, green, and water spaces) to combat negative associations with the word *sprawl*. Where most of the former investigations still are based on the understanding of the built space as more or less independent unities emerging in an empty space, this perspective is turned upside down in the after-sprawl study. One could also say that perspective is left to make it possible to see reality in totality without hierarchical structures. No intellectual picture is produced in advance. The empty space or the void is not regarded as negative from the beginning. It is no longer background for figures in

the foreground as it was in the modernist urbanite models. This is a way of thinking that results in a totally different visual and mental picture. It is an attempt to introduce an unprejudiced way of seeing that no longer takes its starting point in a given rational, established pattern of expectations from the outside, but rather in recognition of the given situation.

A smaller change in one part of an urban region could have ripple effects almost anywhere else, so trying to understand the reciprocal relationships between sprawl, inner city, suburb, and exurb would be like trying to solve complicated mazes simply by looking at them, knowing that in this case there is no privileged entry or exit in the networked urban territory.

One consequence of this fact is that landscape as a concept and metaphor, as an understanding of something “artificial,” has been used as one of the most productive starting points for formulation of models for development and transformation of the urban territories in the past few years.

One could claim also that sprawl, as other parts of the urban territory, is folding out as a manifold, fragmented, and heterogeneous picture. It is impossible to determine sprawl unambiguously and homogeneously both in relation to a city core and building typology as well as concerning social, economic, or ethnic questions. Urban sprawl is also a patchwork of different forms of urban design and architecture from different times, located next to one another, interacting or overlaying one another. All together many things indicate that sprawl as a phenomenon in the urban territory is here to stay.

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See also Edge City; Gated Community; Homeowners Associations; Metropolitan Region; New Urbanism; Suburbanization

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SQUARES, PUBLIC

See Piazza

SQUATTER MOVEMENTS

Squatters are unauthorized occupants of private or governmental land. Squatting, a global phenomenon, is often initiated by immigrants in contexts of rural depression, opportunities in urban areas by exclusionary urban real estate prices driving the urban poor into squats, or the desire for an alternative lifestyle. Squatting is particularly pronounced in the global South. As urbanization continues apace across large swaths of Africa, Asia, and South America, squatter settlements continue to urbanize at a faster rate than cities. The overwhelming majority of urbanites in countries as distinct as Afghanistan, Chad, Ethiopia, and India live within varying kinds of squatter settlements. Whereas the extent of squatter settlements has been well documented in urban studies, there is less known about the nature and extent of squatter movements.

As Porta and Diani argue, literature on squatter movements tends to track three successive stages. First, core groups are formed that provide a critique of existing institutions and produce a sense of collective identity. Second, these identities are reinforced by confrontations with opponents.

Through this, movements seek to frame the debate on urban social (in)justice, and seek—as the work of Manuel Castells so powerfully demonstrated in the early 1980s—to influence the collective urban political and cultural environment. Third, the movement then typically adapts to its institutional environment, which can act to limit or deepen conflict with the state. In addition to being a struggle for urban space and housing, squatter movements—especially in cities in the global North—are often struggles for the right to live alternative lifestyles. For example, squatter movements in Berlin or Copenhagen, often constituted largely by youth groups, have been made up of subcultures as diverse as punks, hippies, bohemians, skinheads, and various kinds of artists. This diversity acts as a reminder that, as with debates on social movements more generally, there is a tendency in accounts of squatter movements to portray squatters as unitary actors with coherent demands or as movements that necessarily emerge from desperate poverty. In Amsterdam, for instance, where there is a long history of squatter movements that have had some success in securing housing and infrastructure, the movement, according to Uitermark, is “extremely heterogeneous and decentred, which means that different segments pursue divergent goals with differing strategies and tactics.”

Equally, literature on squatter movements has traced the role of various social differentials in the nature of movements, including gender, class, race, religion, age, sexuality, and so on, demonstrating the often exclusive politics of identity at play in collectivist movements. For example, there is a literature on the role of gender within squatter movements, which has shown that in South American or South Asian cities, for instance, women often participate more than men—for example, in struggles for housing or community infrastructure—but that this takes place often at the price of gender division, where men frequently assume leadership roles. Other research has shown how the territorialization of ethnic or racial divides within squatter settlements can splinter or inhibit squatter movements.

Legal and Political Rights

One key source of agitation for squatter movements is around the issue of title deeds. The focus of debates on squatter movements in the global South

has often been around the untapped economic potential of informal housing. These debates often focus on legalization and on bringing squatter settlements into the formal market; there is less consideration of what is at stake in legalizing informality in different empirical contexts. As Neuwirth cautions, legal title deeds—individual or collective—are far from straightforward goods and can have the consequence of raising land and housing prices to the point where the original inhabitants are priced out. In making an argument for squatters' rights based on possession rather than property, he invokes the Roman notion of *usucapio* and points to specific instances where it has had some success—if slow and fractured—in part through the long history of squatter struggle, such as in its provision in the 1988 Brazilian constitution.

Legal and political rights are a key area through which squatter movements struggle. One example is the Mumbai-based Federation of Tenants Association. The work of the federation involves resistance by raising awareness of existing laws and regulations among working-class groups. For example, under Mumbai's Slum Rehabilitation Authority scheme, squatter settlements have the right to act as collective developers by establishing cooperatives. The federation's work has shown that many people in the city living in squatter settlements simply are not aware of the formal regulations. Indeed, the interaction most squatters have with the state is usually through informal means rather than formal regulations, through ad hoc assemblages of services, bribes, votes, violence, or complaints.

The explosion in the number of nongovernmental organizations in cities in the global South in recent years has had a significant impact on the nature of squatter movements. An illustration of this impact is found in Mitlin and Satterthwaitte's *Empowering Squatter Citizen* (2004), an edited collection that explores how nongovernmental organizations and community squatter groups are increasingly becoming involved in market-oriented self-determined solutions. The book's eight case studies—four of which are government initiatives and four of which are civil society initiatives—chart community-planned and managed housing or infrastructure constructions or upgrades, often with elements of cost recovery from squatters, or a market presence, whether through credit or local

developers. This debate emphasizes a specific relation between squatter movements and the state: For example, while many of the case studies argue in favor of state grants for specific purposes (such as subsidized land for housing), and while there are occasional passing calls for state safety nets, there is a general negation of state welfare provision. The suggestion here is that such forms of external funding tend to lend themselves to top-down initiatives that marginalize squatter movements and that reinforce rather than reduce their voicelessness.

Civil society forms of squatter movements work with multiple forms of deprivation—from income, infrastructure, and services to civic and political rights—and often seek to address these areas through partnership and collaboration with the state. However, this relation has not been sufficiently examined in urban studies to date. For example, to what extent does participation in civil society partnerships with the state encourage the state to consider squatters in new and more egalitarian ways? It may, rather, be an example of a kind of incorporation or co-option by the state that emerges from the international shift toward new forms of institutional pluralism, cost saving, and efficiency in urban development. More evidence and critical reflection on the capacity for civil society forms of squatter movements to influence the state or squatter settlements is required. In addition, the extent to which nongovernmental organizations—often constituted by middle-class activists—are accountable, transparent, and subordinate to the needs and priorities of squatters needs further elucidation.

Shack/Slum Dwellers International

Although squatter movements are typically localized and focused upon local governmental actors, there are occasions in which squatter movements have sought and benefited from international connections. One notable example of this is the Shack/Slum Dwellers International (SDI) movement, which focuses on housing and infrastructure issues within squatter settlements in over 20 countries in the global South, especially southern Africa and South Asia. SDI is a learning movement based around a structure of what its leaders call “horizontal exchanges.” These exchanges involve

small groups of the urban poor traveling from one urban squatter settlement to another to share knowledge in what amounts to an informal learning process. SDI espouses a range of techniques that its leaders describe as indispensable to a development process driven by the urban poor. These include daily savings schemes, exhibitions of model houses and toilet blocks, the enumeration of poor people's settlements, training programs of exchanges, and a variety of other tactics.

Operating often in the context of a failure—deliberate or otherwise—of the state to ensure collective provision of infrastructure, services, and housing to squatter settlements, SDI groups attempt to deal with the crisis of social reproduction. The movement has been extremely successful at promoting itself to donors and attracting international and sometimes national funding—it has recently been given \$10 million by the Gates Foundation, for instance. In emphasizing a pro-poor discourse of self-development, SDI reflects an entrepreneurial image of urban squatters as skilled and capable and presents a narrative of urban social change driven by the squatters themselves rather than by the state. In this sense, the movement echoes the alternative development, alternative lifestyle theme that characterizes many squatter movements globally.

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See also Advocacy Planning; *Favela*; Housing; Kolkata (Calcutta), India; Right to the City; Social Movements; Street Children

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STRANGER

In everyday usage and in dictionary definitions, the term *stranger* is given two different, though hardly incompatible, meanings: The stranger may be either someone who is unknown to someone else (the biographical stranger) or someone who is the "other," the alien (the cultural stranger). Lines of research in urban social science have tended toward a similar divergence and, also like dictionaries, have emphasized the cultural over the biographical. While both lines of research have been heavily influenced by the writings of the German sociologist, Georg Simmel, other scholars have also contributed to the foundational writings and thus have helped to shape the ways the stranger concept has been applied. In work focusing on the cultural stranger, the companion is Alfred Schutz, a German philosopher.

The Cultural Stranger

In a brief (six-page) essay originally published in 1908, Simmel proposed that we think of the stranger as a social type characterized by mobility and objectivity vis-à-vis the receiving group. In contrast to group members who are tied to the soil, to the place, the stranger may remain with the group but always has the prerogative of moving on. In contrast to group members who are enmeshed in their own belief system, the stranger stands outside that system and views it objectively. The stranger's relationship to the group is simultaneously one of distance (from its shared experiences, beliefs, customs) and closeness (to its members in space and possibly, in sympathy) and, as such, the stranger is both the recipient of secrets or the scapegoat for misfortunes and the connector between the group and the larger human family. Simmel's archetypical stranger is, occupationally, the trader or financier and ethnically, the Jew.

In contrast to Simmel, Schutz, who had come to the United States as an émigré from Nazi Germany, saw the archetypical stranger as the immigrant

approaching a new group and struggling to interpret its cultural patterns. Writing in the *American Journal of Sociology* in 1944, he sought to describe the mental experience (the phenomenology) of the person who was in this situation. For such a person, he argued, the world that the native's commonsense understandings make intelligible is unintelligible. The certainties that provide the native with comfort provide the immigrant stranger with crisis. The native's resources that furnish him or her with a decoding key is, for a stranger, just another puzzle. In concluding, Schutz echoes Simmel in suggesting that the stranger's situation leads to an attitude of objectivity toward the group, but, in contrast to Simmel's image of the scapegoated victim, Schutz proposes that such persons are, in fact, also of doubtful loyalty.

In research that draws on these two treatments, social scientists have not always acknowledged their sources or been careful to define the word *stranger*. Nonetheless, the spirit of the Simmel and Schutz tradition is evident in discussions of ethnographic methods and human migration.

Scholarly depictions of ethnographic methods, especially of the method of participant observation (widely used in both anthropology and sociology, among other disciplines), are often explicit in seeing the researcher as "stranger." Like Simmel's stranger, ethnographic researchers come and stay awhile, but with the variant that moving on is not merely a possibility but almost a certainty. Like Schutz's stranger, the task confronting them is the unraveling of the complex puzzle that is the group's taken-for-granted world. As they penetrate the puzzle and move toward intimate knowledge of the group, researchers and group members grow closer, but even then, researcher "objectivity" keeps a certain distance between them and the people they study. Following Simmel's depiction, researcher-strangers too are often the recipients of surprising confidences, but as Schutz warns, they are of "doubtful loyalty." Relative to the latter quality, not only will they eventually depart but they will write of the group in a manner that the group may not find pleasing.

While the stranger concept has proved useful in thinking about research methods, its most voluminous application appears to be in the study of human migration. The word *stranger* figures prominently in the title of many books and articles that deal with the movements of persons across

geographical-cultural space and with the often resulting group processes such as conflict, assimilation, enclave formation, and social psychological outcomes such as identity transformation or xenophobia. One of the more interesting off-shoots in human migration work is the introduction by Robert E. Park in 1928 and the extensive elaboration by Everett V. Stonequist in 1937 of the idea of the "marginal man": a cultural hybrid, a person who has one foot in one culture and one foot in another, who belongs to two worlds at once and yet truly belongs to and/or is fully accepted by neither. The idea of the marginal man has been criticized as unfaithful to Simmel's definition of stranger on the one hand and as being carelessly applied to entire groups of people rather than to individuals on the other; nonetheless, it remains a useful entry point for exploring the possibilities, inherent in cultural marginality, for consequences that have a positive character (e.g., an attitude of judicious cultural relativism, an investigative mind-set) and for those that are negative (e.g., alienation from self, a lasting sense of displacement). Schutz clearly found the Park-Stonequist idea highly useful, for he ended his essay by dubbing the stranger, a "marginal man."

In addition to the relatively straightforward adoption of the cultural stranger concept in discussions of ethnographic methods and human migration, social scientists and social commentators have sometimes used it in a more literary manner as when the cultural stranger is employed metaphorically in depictions of relationships that are commonsensically seen as intimate or at least intracultural. Examples include the relationships between husbands and wives, members of different generations in the same family, and subgroupings within the feminist movement.

The Biographical Stranger

As he did for research on the cultural stranger, Georg Simmel provided an important foundational basis for later studies of the biographical stranger; in this case, however, the influential partner was the American sociologist Erving Goffman rather than Alfred Schutz.

Simmel never identified the biographical stranger as a social type; nor in any of his writings did he address, in a sustained manner, the situation of persons who are continually surrounded by others

whom they do not know personally. What he did do, drawing on his own experience as a witness to the huge increase in both the size and number of human settlements accompanying the Industrial Revolution, was to offer some preliminary thoughts on what this urbanization and city growth meant for the cognitive and emotional milieu of newly urban residents. These thoughts are to be found (1) in the brief section of his 1908 book, *Soziologie*, borrowed by Park and Ernest W. Burgess for their 1924 *Introduction to the Science of Sociology* (and titled by them “Sociology of the Senses: Visual Interaction”), and (2) in a 1908 essay, “The Metropolis and Mental Life.” In both pieces, Simmel expressed a mostly pessimistic assessment of urban life combined with an idealization of the world of the village and small town that he believed were being obliterated; as such, his formulations may be seen as early contributions to the long-standing theme of antiurbanism so prominent in American social science and in the broader culture. But it is not the antiurbanism that students of the biographical stranger have drawn upon; rather it is Simmel’s somewhat more dispassionate observations about the necessary consequences of residence in large settlements. He noted, for example, that in the city, as contrasted with the small town, there are many more opportunities to see people than to hear them. That is, if a population is of sufficient size, individuals can personally know but a small portion of their fellow residents and thus, as they move about the city, they constantly see strange others with whom they have no reason to exchange words. In particular, he was struck by the odd situation produced by new forms of transport, such as streetcars: people in copresence for extended periods who are not expected to interact verbally. Another Simmelian observation that has proved fruitful deals with the necessity for the city dweller to develop the “blasé attitude.” Given the sheer number of highly diverse people compressed together in urban space, he argued, a kind of flattening of affect in response to the bombardment of rich stimuli becomes essential. While both Simmel and some later scholars saw this attitude as equivalent to being “apathetic to excitement as the result of overindulgence,” most students of the biographical stranger have defined *blasé* more positively, equating it with character traits such as “sophisticated” and “cosmopolitan.”

Like Simmel, Goffman never addressed the phenomenon of the biographical stranger in a pointed or sustained manner. His consuming interest was not strangers but all social interaction, regardless of the relationship among the interactants. Yet exactly because of this expansiveness of interest and because of his willingness to make use of appropriate data wherever he found them, many of the encounters he analyzed and the principles he propounded simply happened to involve people who did not know one another personally. Goffman’s myriad contributions on this topic are spread throughout the corpus of his writings, but one book of particular importance can be identified: *Behavior in Public Places*. The major topic of the volume is the social gathering and the “face engagements” that occur within it (whether in public or private), but, unusual for Goffman, one entire chapter is devoted to engagements among the unacquainted. Here numerous principles or “rules” guiding the interaction between strangers are propounded, including the principle of “civil inattention” (one gives the strange other enough attention to signal knowledge of presence but then withdraws attention so as to signal that no intrusion is intended) and the rule surrounding verbal interaction (you need a reason *not* to talk to people you know but a reason *to* talk to people you don’t). But perhaps Goffman’s most important contribution to the study of the biographical stranger was his implicit insistence that strangers do, in fact, interact and that such interaction is socially meaningful. This assertion had been rendered problematic initially by Simmel himself in his discussion of the blasé attitude and then had been elaborated by others. The end result was a commonsense understanding, at least within sociology, that city dwellers were so overloaded by stimuli that, when in streets and other public settings, they simply shut down. They no more interacted with the multitudes surrounding them than they did with the ubiquitous fire hydrants. Goffman was not alone in challenging this assumption. By mid-twentieth century, a number of social scientists (including the anthropologists Ray Birdwhistell and Edward Hall and the psychologist Robert Sommer) had, like Goffman, begun to explore the communicative power of such human minutiae as body language and body spacing and had demonstrated

that this silent “talking” occurred as much between strangers as between acquaintances.

Following the leads provided by Simmel and Goffman, researchers interested in the biographical stranger have focused on such questions as: What cues do people use to identify people they don’t know? Under what conditions do strangers initiate verbal interaction? How is it possible for people to cross crowded intersections without collision? How do people learn to make stranger encounters routine? What role do these encounters play in the creation and recreation of, or challenges to, status inequalities? How do cultural differences affect interaction between and among strangers? In addressing such questions, researchers have documented much about the patterning of city life to challenge many widespread beliefs. For example, they have found that stranger interaction is remarkably orderly and generally peaceful; that the maintenance of privacy and avoidance in stranger-filled settings does not occur “naturally” but must be interactionally achieved; and that such settings may also be sociability-rich and sources of considerable personal pleasure. In addition, through their explorations of the many relational forms that exist between strangers on the one side and acquaintances and intimates on the other, researchers have begun to challenge the validity of the dichotomy itself. A complex typology of relationships has thus emerged which identifies the fleeting relationship, the quasi-primary relationship, and the intimate-secondary relationship, among many others. However, despite the relatively benign portrait of stranger interaction they have drawn, researchers have also discovered that even after 200 years of increasing urbanization, for many people, “the stranger” is seen as a figure of menace, a criminal, a threat to self and family, and especially a threat to children. To the degree that Americans continue to express antipathy toward urban spaces, especially densely packed urban spaces, they are often expressing antipathy toward the biographical stranger.

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See also Public Realm; Simmel, Georg

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STREETCARS

From the 1880s to at least the 1930s, streetcars provided the main means of transport in cities across the world. Horse-pulled and later electrically powered railways constituted the means by which many urban centers underwent an unprecedented physical and demographic expansion. Streetcars



"Elevated car falls to street"—New York City, February 16, 1914

Source: George Grantham Bain Collection, Library of Congress.

also redefined urban political culture, as some of the most intense local political struggles revolved around this key public service. Finally, electric streetcars, or "trolleys," proved important culturally, emerging as a main signifier of urban modernity.

Horse- or mule-cars on rail, appearing by the 1850s, but especially the faster and more reliable trolleys in operation by the 1890s, greatly enlarged the area accessible on a daily basis to city residents, who previously either walked or rode horse carriages. Streetcars thus furthered residential flight toward peripheral areas, either to new suburbs or to old settlements now tied to the city. Also, networks of urban railways (which in some cases also transported freight goods) promoted the specialization of urban spaces

according to distinct functions, such that residential, commercial, industrial, and leisure activities moved physically apart. This held true especially for North and South American cities; in contrast, European cities changed less dramatically either in terms of size or functional specialization.

How this major transport innovation shaped any given city had to do with its local politics. Because the streetcar provided a crucial public service to most city residents, the question of government regulation pulled many old and new constituencies, such as business elites, civic reformers, organized labor, and residential and consumer groups, into the political fold and thus invigorated mass-participation in politics. Equivalent to debates over railroads on the national level, streetcar politics revolved around the extent of governmental regulatory powers over private service providers. In the United States these remained fairly limited, whereas European and Latin American cities imposed stringent requirements, such as fare limits and working conditions for streetcar employees, or opted, mainly in the European case, for municipalization altogether.

A visible and omnipresent vehicle in the urban landscape, the streetcar signified the impact of technology on what were then rapidly transforming cities. It figured prominently in newspaper articles and illustrations, as well as in literary accounts. Streetcars became the harbingers of progress, but also became associated with the losses and dangers (such as deadly accidents) associated with modernity. In urban literature and film, such as works by Theodore Dreiser, Henry Roth, and Luis Buñuel, streetcars figured as the means of getting to know, of physically experiencing, urban agglomerations, whose perceived vastness otherwise seemed to escape the capacity of human imagination; passengers inside the trolley, meanwhile, formed an observable microcosm of highly diverse urban societies.

The streetcar era came to an end by the 1930s, as combustion-engine vehicles, both buses and automobiles, emerged as the dominant form of urban transportation. But depending on geography (the area covered by a given city), politics (the extent of public sector intervention in an increasingly unprofitable enterprise), and culture (residents' preferences), streetcars continue, and have recently returned, to shape city life.

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See also Buses; Local Government; Transportation; Urban Morphology

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STREET CHILDREN

Street children should be understood in light of a growing global discourse on child labor and children's rights. The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child—which stipulates that children have the right to be protected from hazardous work—was drawn up in 1989 and was ratified by all UN member countries except two. Since then there has been a surge of international interest focusing on child labor in developing countries, especially in issues related to the international economy, globalization, and urbanization. Of those children who work in urban areas, many spend their time on the city streets, engaged in a variety of income-generating activities in the informal sector. It is these children who are usually given the generic label of street children. This entry includes a definition of street children, providing an explanation of who they are, why they left home, how they survive once on the streets, and the various responses to them from

governments, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and mainstream society. The entry also provides an analysis of the different types of urban spaces street children occupy in their everyday lives and a brief description of their social world.

Defining *Street Children*

A street child is any boy or girl under the age of 18 who lives, works, or does both, on the street or in any other urban public space, often without the supervision or protection of an adult. The term *street children* includes those children who live with or without their families and who make their living on the streets, or in other public spaces, full or part time. The street children phenomenon is a global one and although the continents most affected are Latin America, Africa, and Asia, there are more and more children living on the streets in Europe, North America, and Australia.

Nobody knows how many street children there are. Global estimates have ranged from 100 million to 150 million, but these figures are not proven and are impossible to confirm. One reason why street children are so hard to count is because they are often highly mobile, traveling from place to place within a city and from city to city. It is also because many street children have not been registered at birth, have no identity cards, and so officially do not exist.

Boys between the ages of 8 to 17, are the most visible children working on the streets in major cities, although there are also street girls, and their numbers are increasing globally. Street boys earn their money by shining shoes; selling bottled water, cigarettes, and other goods; washing car windows and busking with musical instruments; or by singing or begging at traffic lights, on buses, and on the streets.

Street girls are not as visible as boys, and they usually do not earn their money in the same way, due to gender divisions of labor in the informal sector and the socialization of children in the home. Although less visible and fewer in numbers, street girls often suffer discrimination on the street, because they are seen to be violating ideas of femininity by invading the street, which is considered a male space in most countries. Street girls may get money to survive from their boyfriends or other

protectors on the street, and they sometimes beg at traffic lights and in shopping areas, or work at food stalls or solicit for sex. Street boys and girls are often sexually active from a young age, either for pleasure- or income-seeking reasons. This makes them a high-risk group vulnerable to sexually transmitted diseases and HIV/AIDS.

Street children are not one homogeneous group, and it is very hard to describe a typical street child. This is because they constitute a diverse population in thousands of cities worldwide and are involved in a wide range of income- and pleasure-seeking activities. It is important, however, not to assume that all street children are homeless. UNICEF categorizes street children into different groups, usually by degree of family contact. For example, there are those children who go to school and work on the street for part of the day but who live at home and have continual family contact. There are others who are no longer in school and spend all their days on the streets, looking for money in various ways, but who still go home at night. Sometimes, however, they stay on the street at night with their friends. This may be because they are too frightened to go home as they face the possibility of violence or abuse from their parents for being unsuccessful in getting their “target” money when working. Alternatively they may become involved with the street child social world or subculture, eventually moving away from home altogether. These children are sometimes known as “real” street children as they are essentially homeless, and live, work, and spend the majority of their time on the streets and have very little if any contact with their families. There are also street children who live on the streets with their families.

Causal Factors

Street children are mostly found in urban areas, and rapid urbanization is one factor that has contributed to their prevalence. Other reasons given for the increasing numbers of street children globally are the growing gaps between rich and poor, poverty, the influence of consumerism, conflict, famine, natural disasters, family breakdowns, and the increase of domestic violence.

Although street children are not easily defined, they are often stereotyped by the press, NGOs, or the government in the countries where they live. The

stereotyping of street children is one of the biggest obstacles to understanding them. A common fallacy, for example, is that street children are those who are orphaned or who are abandoned by their neglectful parents, or that they are children who are organized or pressed by adults to beg or commit crime.

In reality children start to work and live on the streets for a variety of reasons, and there are very few children who have been orphaned, abandoned, or forced into crime. Many start working on the streets because of cultural expectations that they should contribute to the family income. It is well acknowledged that the concept of childhood is socially constructed and a culturally and historically specific institution. Changing notions of childhood relate to the global capitalist economy and the subsequent ways in which the elite of different countries have been influenced by the export of what is perceived to be a modern childhood, embedded within the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child. However, not all cultures or families adhere to this construction of what a proper childhood should be, and parents often find it necessary for their children to work on the streets to supplement the family income.

Further, economic stagnation compounded by foreign debt problems in much of the developing world has placed impossible strains on families and individuals who migrate to the cities in order to survive. These families often live in slums or shantytowns and require their children to go out and work. Other children end up on the streets by their own volition, as a result of poverty, parental neglect, physical or verbal abuse, or because of unsympathetic stepparents. Still others are attracted to the city lights and street culture. Leaving home, therefore, is often an active choice, and it is necessary to emphasize the agency of children choosing the street as home and the reasons they do so.

Responses

Because of the stereotyping of street children the response to their existence is almost universal. In the media they are almost always portrayed in overly simplistic terms, either as helpless abandoned victims who have no agency at all and need “saving” from the streets, or as social pariahs, blotting the city landscape. The reason for these extreme reactions to street children is because in

most countries their very existence challenges the ideological and moral boundary enforcement, set by the state and elite society, of what it means to be a child. As a result attempts to enforce the appropriate ways of behavior have led to overromanticized portrayals of their lives on the one hand and to the criminalization of diversity on the other.

For example, NGOs seeking funding for their street children programs may present children on the streets in a romanticized way as pitiful, exploited victims, unable to fend for themselves. Such programs have the express intention to reintegrate them back into mainstream society, often by institutionalizing them in residential care or returning them home, so that they can live “normal” childhoods, irrespective of the children’s own wishes. There are also other strategies that NGOs adopt to address the needs of street children. These programs range from rights-based advocacy agendas, aimed at governments and the police for the rights of children to be respected, to drop-in centers and outreach programs that provide basic services to children living on the street.

More often than not, public opinion is managed by the state and the media, to mobilize bias against undesirable groups, such as street children, and to generate consent for the overt use of state power and physical oppression. The dirty appearance of street children is often read as a sign of moral disorder, which frequently links them to crime, disease, and pollution. For these reasons they are feared by the public who do not want to get too close, for fear of contamination or of being robbed.

Consequently, street children are often portrayed in a derogative negative light in the media, who depict them as physically unsightly, as perpetrators of transgressive acts, and as a threat to family values and national harmony. Government rhetoric may label them as lazy, immoral, workshy, or drug-crazed criminals, and for being “out of place,” even though it is often the various processes of society that have caused them to appropriate urban spaces in the first place.

The oppression and exclusion of street children is often in the form of verbal abuse, evictions, arrests, beatings, abuse, and torture while in police custody, and other excessive infringements of the children’s basic human rights. There are numerous accounts of “cleansing operations” occurring in Asian, African, and Latin American cities, when

children have been physically cleared off the streets and dumped out of town, or worse. In Brazil and Guatemala, for example, street children are routinely assassinated by vigilante death squads.

Urban Niches

Street children are both spatially and socially oppressed, through multiple forms of social control, marginalization, and powerlessness. As a result everyday life for a street child can be like living in enemy territory. Public space, however, is a means of survival for street children, as it is where they can earn money and access resources to alleviate their needs. It is vital to their very existence that they find spaces in the city in which they can survive, even if it is a marginal space like a railway track or bus stop.

Street children contest their own exclusion geographically by appropriating specific places in the city where they live and by constructing a network of entwined spaces for their everyday survival. These chosen places reflect their social marginality and can be understood as produced urban niches in which they can earn money, obtain food, feel safe, sleep, and find enjoyment despite the hostility of outside force: the traffic lights, bus stops, the sides of roads and rail tracks, outside a public toilet or an entertainment area, under a bridge or in a city park, in tunnels and sewage systems, and in other public spaces where access is not rigidly controlled.

Typically children living and working on the street are not tied to any one place, and they have numerous niches that they use within a city in order to survive. These territories are alternative spaces and sites of interaction for establishing a collective identity. It is the fluidity of these spaces, and the flexibility of street children to shift from one place to another at a moment’s notice, that ensures their survival. If one place becomes difficult to operate in, because of the threat of a raid or the police, then they escape to another urban niche or else go somewhere new.

The shifting of street child identities between the spaces they occupy is also a vital part of street survival, and different places often result in children assuming a different identity. In their everyday lives they have an array of different social experiences, encountering others working in the informal economy, potential clients eating

at restaurants or riding on buses, students, NGO workers, police, security guards, and researchers, all of whom influence their identities in different ways. They have to learn from early on when it is necessary to be cute (to earn money), macho or streetwise when hanging out with their friends, friendly (to NGO workers), deferent (to authority or older street people), or hostile (to street enemies). Their identities are as fluid, and shift as frequently, as the spaces in which they operate, in response to their changing environments.

Street Life

To survive on the streets, a street child must be socialized to a series of norms, ideals, and group processes and a distinct code of ethics that controls behavior on the streets. The most important relationship a street child will form is with other street children, with whom they develop collective strategies as a form of resistance to the perceptions held of them by the outside world.

Studies in Canada and Indonesia have described a child's life on the street as a career, which may be understood as a solution to a child's personal troubles. Their careers provide a matrix within which they can regain feelings of belonging and self-worth, contest their marginalization, and counteract the overload of negative identities attributed to them by the state and mainstream society.

A street child's social world may be understood as a kind of a family system, which embodies other groups of the street, including ex-street kids and other street people, and which adheres to particular patterns of behavior and a discernible system of values and beliefs. These street community values often include principles of solidarity, individual survival, freedom and independence, social and work hierarchies, the understanding of slang and street codes (including macho behavior and drug use), and some unique attitudes toward life on the street. At times street children need to act on the fundamental value of individual survival, but at other times they must rely on the interdependence and solidarity within their social group of other street children. This is because peer support characterizes and underpins their daily lives and is directly tied to personal survival.

As street children reach adolescence, they often find street life gets tougher due to the changing

perceptions of them by society. Many studies have observed how as they reach puberty, street boys are no longer seen as cute but are viewed with suspicion. It is at this stage in their career when they are more likely to turn to crime to survive. Alternatively they may decide to try and go home if they are able to and to try and reintegrate back into mainstream society. Often, however, if children have been on the street for a long time, they are socialized to street life and find it difficult to live a normal life at home, and so they return to the street once more.

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See also Crime; *Favela*; Homelessness

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SUBURBANIZATION

Suburbanization can be viewed as the decentralization of the city and the town, and decentralization

has been a feature of urban life for as long as there have been towns and cities. A variety of causes explain suburbanization, but social and technological determinants are particularly significant and are emphasized in this entry.

Suburbanization creates *suburbs*, a plural noun that refers particularly to the residential zones of suburbanites beyond the city centers. Many retain an economic dependency upon city centers as places of employment or consumption, whereas other suburbs are less connected. While *suburbia* is a collective noun for suburbs, it also describes their cultural and environmental character. In many countries, however, suburbia is a pejorative term as much as a descriptive one. The adjective *suburban* has two meanings: (1) It refers to the suburb as somewhere between the poles of urban and rural, and (2) it has taken on a negative association; that is, to dismiss someone or some place as *suburban* is to imply a lack of cultured urbanity and a dearth of idealized rural characteristics. However, during the early twenty-first century, such criticisms of suburbanization and its consequences appear increasingly outmoded.

A Modern Phenomenon

The nineteenth and twentieth centuries witnessed something of an explosion of suburbanization, but suburbs existed since the first urban civilization. Excavations of Minoan settlements in ancient Crete, built some 4,000 years ago, appear to provide evidence of an urban civilization of unwalled cities, with a distinctive urban core of a palace, temple, marketplace, and town houses. Beyond the core, a merging of town with countryside, or of urban with rural characteristics, was evident in miniature in Minoan Crete. In subsequent centuries, in Europe, Asia and the Americas, walled cities tended to be more self-contained than those which were more open. The latter exhibited evidence of decentralization from a higher-density urban core to lower-density settlements in the hinterlands. To greater or lesser degrees, those hinterlands were economically and politically dependent upon the city proper.

However, among the fastest-growing and most expansive suburbanizations were those accompanying the rise of the urban-industrial towns and cities after 1850. For example, London, England,

between the mid-nineteenth and mid-twentieth centuries grew at a massive rate, increasing in population from 3 million to more than 8 million between 1850 and 1939. Its spatial growth was also enormous; for example, the capital more than quadrupled in size during this time. Other major industrial cities in Britain rapidly suburbanized, notably Manchester, in the heartland of the British Industrial Revolution. In *The Condition of the English Working Classes* (1844), Friedrich Engels emphasized the sharply different environment of the inner girdle of insanitary, overcrowded accommodation of the industrial proletariat and the expanding suburbs built alongside the thoroughfares and railways lines spreading outward from Manchester. The middle classes had moved away from the center: In the modest but clean town houses of the inner suburbs lived the middle bourgeoisie, while the upper bourgeoisie inhabited remoter villas, replete with large gardens, where the city met the countryside.

Engels's analysis is significant in at least three ways. First, he linked social conditions with spatial separation based upon class, subsequently a key tool in Marxist analyses of urbanization and inequality. Second, along with other contemporaries, Engels was fully aware of the fact that public transport drove urban expansion. Third, implicit within his analysis is an unwitting rehearsal of the social and spatial model of suburbanization devised by the Chicago School of Sociology between the wars. It consisted of the inner ring of workmen's houses and the impoverished intermediate zones in transition between the inner ring and the further-flung suburbs of commuters. In the zones in transition, the middle classes tended to move out to the suburbs as poorer groups moved into the intermediate zone. This framework for understanding the social and spatial dimensions of suburbanization has been applied to many industrial cities.

Causes of Suburban Dispersal

The expansion of population was a major factor causing suburbanization. As population grew, the spatial structure of towns increased. Not only did urbanization mean high-density city centers, but it also meant expansion. This was made possible by the growth of public transportation systems. By 1900, the expansion of road-based public transport

produced streetcar suburbs in the United States and tram and trolleybus counterparts in other technologically advanced countries around the world. The rise of the railway networks during the late nineteenth century were also major engines of suburban growth, creating railway suburbs around most major towns and cities. Intrametropolitan overground and underground railway systems—the metros or subways—dramatically increased the suburban sprawl of such major cities as London, Chicago, New York, Berlin, and Paris. Electrification after 1900 further expedited this process. In the European city, however, urban growth was more contained and regulated. In the Anglophone world, by contrast, suburbs proliferated in a more disorderly fashion. Despite this, some residential areas were carefully planned and beautifully landscaped, as in the romantic suburbs of the United States and the garden suburbs of Britain and Australia. The planned suburb was mostly a middle-class phenomenon, although a number of factory villages and suburbs for working-class households were built in many countries by philanthropic employers between 1870 and 1914.

Transport technology continued to accelerate and expand suburbanization during the twentieth century. The rise of motorization brought about suburban spread on a massive scale. The interwar years in Britain saw the development of motor car suburbs, while in the United States, the phenomenal popularity of the motor car created the automobile suburbs of the 1920s. Radburn, in New Jersey, completed in 1929, became an influential experiment in planning suburban residential housing environments around the car. During the postwar years, road building was inextricably intertwined with suburban dispersal in developed countries. Most new suburban developments in the postwar years were designed to facilitate motorization, and many became dependent on the car.

Increasing motor-car ownership was indicative of growing affluence and consumerism among larger sections of the population. Across the developed world, the postwar affluent society was an increasingly mobile society, in which the majority were inclined to enjoy larger houses where possible, and detached homes if they were affordable. It is here that a powerful social cause of suburbanization can be identified, which may be termed the *suburban aspiration*.

Pioneered by the middle classes but increasingly pursued by lower-income groups, the suburban aspiration was and remains a threefold wish list. It is comprised of antiurbanism, a rejection of high-density city center living. It is also a desire for a house within a semirural or garden setting: Sizes and values of houses and properties varied according to income, but from the upscale suburb to the modest housing development, the affection for a house with a garden remained of paramount cultural significance. Traditional styles of domestic architecture as opposed to modern designs appear to have been favored by the majority of suburbanites, whether two-story houses or single-story bungalows. The third aspect of the suburban aspiration was the suburb itself, a residential environment that privileged quietness, comfort, and safety when compared to downtown. The social composition of the suburb was preferred to be homogenous, populated by people of similar incomes, ethnicity, and status. Suburban exclusivity could lead, however, to snobbery at the very least and to racial hostility at the very most.

Urban and social policies in developed countries also stimulated suburbanization, as two examples will demonstrate. In Britain, the Housing and Town Planning Act of 1919 and subsequent legislation provided subsidies from central government to local authorities (councils) to build houses for rent from the council. This was public housing, criticized by many conservative interests as creeping socialism. By contrast, the National Housing Act of 1949 in the United States began the process of insuring the mortgages of millions of Americans who wanted to pursue the American dream of homeownership in a suburban context. Other countries followed different models of state-led suburbanization. In Europe, apartment blocks for workers were built on a massive scale, a different suburban form to the lower-rise, lower-density Anglo-American pattern.

Consequences of Suburbanization

The vast majority of people in the developed world are much better housed than a century ago, and suburbanization has been at the heart of this demographic elevation. In Australia, Canada, England, and the United States, notably, a majority of the population now lives in suburbs. Despite

this, suburbanization has been castigated by critics who would have preferred a higher-density, city-based history of urban development. The neo-Marxist critique of suburbanization points to the overdetermined nature of suburban supply by the market and the fetishization of the material world of suburbia by marketing and developer capital. Any academic defense of working-class or ethnic minority suburbanization will invite accusations of neoliberalism or of a failure to critique the *embourgeoisement* (the allegedly increasing middle-classness) of suburbanized lower-income groups. Engels was acutely aware of the nostalgia for a preindustrial past that many urban working-class people felt by the mid-nineteenth century. This did not translate into any mass movement of counterurbanization or a voluntary migration back to the countryside. However, and particularly in Anglophone countries, when poorer-income groups saw an opportunity to move to lower-density housing areas, either as a consequence of household affluence or via public housing schemes, millions took the opportunity to do so. It was less a return to the land than a proletarian embrace of the suburban aspiration. Hence did suburbanization literally create a kind of halfway house between downtown and open country. The working classes, by extension of this argument, had as much a right to aspire to and enjoy suburban living as did the middle classes.

Many poorer suburbs remained poor and segregated, largely immune to, or untouched by, middle-class values and lifestyles. A powerful criticism of suburbs attacks their often exclusive and homogeneous nature. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, suburban segregation by class was very common, but in the years since 1945 segregation along ethnic lines became increasingly apparent. Many real estate agents and their clients attempted to exclude aspirant Black households from White suburbs, leading to civil rights legislation in the United States during the 1960s, and a concomitant apparatus of “race relations” in Britain. Both attempted to provide equal access to housing.

Another criticism of suburbanization is that it bled the city centers of their economic resources and social capital. Deprived of downtown taxation, downtown rates, and middle-class cultural proclivities, residential areas in or close to the heart of the city declined, becoming, in the

terminology of the Chicago School of Sociology, *zones in transition*.

Suburban migration from the older, established urban areas to new residential housing developments was also deplored for the fracturing of the social and spatial foundations of urban communities. In their place, allegedly inferior forms of suburban associative activity came into existence. Many trenchant attacks on suburbia emerged during the 1950s. In the United States for example, William H. Whyte argued that suburbanization was creating a nation of superficial “organization men” whose domestic values were informed by the competitive corporate culture of the United States. Hence socializing and neighboring in suburbs was all about status competition and a compulsion to belong, or to “keep up with the Joneses.” In 1950s Britain, suburban working-class council estates were compared unfavorably with older, inner-city areas. Sociologists working at the Institute of Community Studies, based in the historic East End of London, argued that suburbanization compromised community with individualism, replaced a vibrant street life for the relatively empty single-use streets of a residential estate, and substituted proximity for the apparatus of upward social and outward spatial mobility: the telephone and motor car. In such circumstances, the long-established and localized three-generational extended family was weakened, and the elderly poor, in particular, were rendered potentially lonely and vulnerable. This was because most of those moving to the suburbs, as in other countries during the 1950s and 1960s, were younger households. The baby boom of the early postwar years was mostly accommodated in suburbia.

Women were also viewed as victims of suburban dispersal. During the 1930s, a condition of “suburban neurosis” was first diagnosed by medical practitioners among women in outlying health centers in England. Women were left isolated in expanding new environments where they knew few people and felt cut off from the older, familiar, busier urban world from where they had come.

Analyses of the condition were largely postponed during World War II, but the 1950s and 1960s witnessed a renewed discourse of suburban neurosis. It was closely linked to the phenomenon of the “new town blues” experienced

by women moving out of slums via official housing policies. Because young mothers were those most likely to be at home all day, they felt the limitations of a home-bound life more sharply than did their husbands who went out to work. The expert who had coined the term *suburban neurosis* during the 1930s, Dr. Stephen Taylor, renounced his earlier diagnosis, claiming by the early 1960s that there was nothing particularly pathogenic about suburbs and that similar symptoms of maladjustment could be found when women moved to other urban and rural environments. Yet Taylor was a man assessing the morale of women, and in the years after he was writing, the emergence of second-wave feminism led to further questions about the relative disempowerment of women compared to men as a consequence of suburbanization. Since the 1970s, feminists have argued that women were particularly affected by secondary access to the means of transportation (notably the car), by lesser incomes than men, and by the limiting cultural norms and values that accompanied the roles of mother and housewife.

The environmental impact of suburbanization has also long been a cause for concern. Again, to take England as a pioneer, the town and country planning movement emerged between 1900 and 1950, partly as a reaction to the rural devastation engendered by suburbanization. Much town planning legislation since World War II has dealt—to varying degrees of success in differing countries—with the restriction of suburban sprawl. Today, concern over the greenhouse gases engendered by suburban commuting is a powerful tool of the antisuburbanization argument. Indeed, the architectural movement of new urbanism gains credibility from the green critique of suburbanization. Designed with higher densities, and containing more mixed uses than older, lower-density residential developments, new urban housing estates and subdivisions are expected to encourage less dependency on the automobile and to sustain more walking and cycling.

Late-Twentieth-Century Suburbanization and Postsuburban Growth

During the late twentieth century, a newer revisionist trend in suburban studies became powerfully

evident. As a consequence of twentieth-century suburbanization, many younger academics had been born and reared in suburbs and now brought a less immediately critical perspective to them. Most significantly, however, the social character of suburbanization, on both the national and the international stages, became more diverse and multicultural, and older accusations of homogeneity appeared redundant.

In Britain and America, for example, since 1970 the suburban aspiration of some Asian groups has mirrored the earlier pattern of Jewish internal migration from city to suburb. By 1970, both London's and New York's Jewish populations were already extensively suburbanized. Sociologists also comment upon the smaller but noticeable trend of Black internal migration from inner-urban areas to outer suburbs. Hispanic migration in the United States, in the vast suburban entity of Los Angeles, emerged as a powerful trend after 1970. Poorer-income groups, however, often lay marooned in segregated public housing that was often badly served by the public transport system of the United States.

In Europe, internal migration within the European Union, and immigration to the European Union, has produced increasingly heterogeneous residential suburbs since 1980. In developing countries, notably China, South Korea, India, and Brazil, suburbanization is massive, rapid, and increasingly diverse. A spectrum of suburbanization includes the shantytowns of the poor, a range of suburbs that vary greatly in terms of density and distance to the center, and the exclusive, sometimes gated, communities of the wealthy. Industrial suburbs of working-class communities have grown up around large-scale manufacturing plants, to some extent emulating the postwar suburbanization of Japan's industrial cities. However, on the outskirts of the largest urban centers, particularly in Asia, burgeoning postindustrial residential areas have emerged. Termed *globurbia* or *globurbs* by social scientists, they appear to be a new phase of suburbanization, where the suburban locality is shaped from the outset by enhanced intercultural communications via the Internet, by service-sector places of employment, and by patterns of material consumption that are transnational or global-suburban in character. Indeed, as Robert

Bruegmann has argued, so complex has been the pace and scale of postindustrial suburban sprawl that older definitions of *suburbanization* have been called into question. Perhaps the most accurate catch-all term to understand this recent sprawl is *postsuburbanization*: Urban dispersal has moved beyond the classic city-to-suburb pattern of the urban-industrial era prior to 1970, while containing key social and environmental characteristics of suburbs, notably a distance from the urban core and a cultural preference for materially prosperous, lower-density living.

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See also Banlieue; Housing; Sprawl; Streetcars; Transportation

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and often subterranean or elevated passenger railway system operating with high frequency. Although mostly separated from other infrastructures, the subway is embedded in the urban fabric through its links with other systems of transportation (buses, airports, railway, etc.). Beyond that, no single and all-integrating definition of the subway can be given, as they differ widely in techniques, organization, form, and usage—making each subway system unique.

Historical Background

At the end of the nineteenth century, the geography of cities was drastically transformed by emergent technologies. While elevators lifted cities upward, increasing density as buildings became taller, public transportation pushed cities outward, increasing the amount of distance that commuters could travel between home and work. Trolleys, trams, and light rail had already replaced horse-drawn carriages and opened up the rural peripheries of cities to the development of satellite towns and suburbs, but subways have become arguably the dominant mode of transportation associated with urban spaces over the past century. Subways, taken as what Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari would call an assemblage comprising everything from the technical infrastructure of the systems and the governmental policies that regulate the financial and legal operations of trains, even the everyday experiences of passengers, can be understood as a first order medium of integration, an essential and important part of urban polity with a formative impact on the shape and movements of the metropolis.

Seen as monumental public works and symbols of engineering achievement, subways are large-scale structures, the construction of which demands a large amount of capital and a large workforce. Their size and usage varies greatly; while London Underground has more than 400 kilometers (about 250 miles) of track, the recently constructed Metro Del Sol Amado in Maracaibo, Venezuela, is less than four kilometers (almost two and a half miles) long. Similarly, whereas the Moscow Metro, the first in Russia, carries between 6 million and 10 million people per day, newer trains in that country have a much smaller capacity, such as the one in Kazan, which has a maximum systemwide capacity of 6,000 passengers. Most subways were realized in

SUBWAY

The *subway*, also called the *metro* or *underground*, is generally understood as an inner urban

cooperation between various private or public and private organizations, although today, the majority of the subway systems are not profitable and have to be subsidized, and most systems are owned and operated by public institutions. Because of the amount of labor required to construct and then operate subway systems, public transportation authorities are often some of the largest employers in cities and organized worker unions have historically been very influential in city politics.

The use of electrical motors in rail traffic first appeared in London in 1890 and allowed for the development of systems in other European cities like Paris (1900) and Berlin (1902), U.S. cities like Boston (1897) and New York (1904), and later to Buenos Aires (1913), Toyko (1927), and Osaka (1933), the only subways outside of Europe and North America until 1957.

After World War II, with the increasing popularity of automobile traffic, most subway systems stagnated or declined, some even dismantled tram lines to make place for cars. In the succeeding years, new technological developments like rubber tires and a returned interest in public transportation in urban planning have resulted in an exponential increase in subways implemented worldwide, with more than 160 systems in operation in the first decade of the twenty-first century.

The correlation between the development of subway systems and the prevalence of Fordist modes of capitalist production points to the importance of subways in national and global economies. In the past few decades, the majority of new subway systems have emerged in the Asian and South American cities where industrial and service economies have been growing. Even in so-called developed post-Fordist cities, such as those in Europe and the United States, the subway exists as a reminder of the always present articulation of late capitalist modes of production with their predecessors. Subways, predominantly used by the lower and middle classes especially in most major North American cities, depend greatly on Fordist infrastructures—organizing and regulating mass flows and movement and making the subway.

Cultural and Social Significance

In the context of the multiple histories of subway authorities and diverse cities, the idea of the subway,

as a semiotic signifier, is just as meaningful to everyday urban life as the material systems that the term is used to identify. The subway has become an attribute of the imaginary of metropolitan areas, entering collective imaginations and discourses. It found its way into culture through music, films, literature, and art, which turned the subway into an icon of modern urbanity. Notable examples include Ezra Pound's 1913 poem "In a Station of the Metro," the Duke Ellington Orchestra's signature 1939 song "Take the A Train," the 1974 Joseph Sargent film *The Taking of Pelham One Two Three*, and the 2003 film *Café Lumière* directed by Hou Hsiao-Hsen.

The noisiness of the city, its streets crowded with carts, pedestrians, and trolley cars quickly relaxed as traffic was displaced underground. The city became quieter and cleaner, on its surface. Subways not only change the fabric of the city and modify practices and social interactions of its dwellers, they also alter the experience and perception of the city via processes of deterritorialization and fragmentation, especially when moving underground.

Unlike other forms of urban transportation, the subway places passengers in the dark, submerged underground where visual navigation reliant on orientation toward familiar landmarks is suspended. Passengers sit in stasis, paradoxically immobile while moving quickly under the city. The city is deterritorialized, and destination points are fragmented in space, sprouting from the subway like rhizomes throughout the city. Passengers must learn to rely on other symbols of navigation, such as subway maps, as well as their other senses, whether they wish to avoid unpleasantly odorous fellow passengers or attend to service changes as announced over public address systems.

Subway passengers share an experience of crowds, a high physical density and nearness of strangers, anonymity and being exposed in a close space, all attributes that have become representative not just of the subway but of cities in general. These experiences yield practices of isolation, like reading the newspaper or listening to headphones, which provide barriers to potentially unwanted social interactions. Passengers often use personal multimedia devices and books to regulate their personal space, injecting the private sphere into the public, a manifestation of Raymond Williams's

mobile privatization, in order to gain control over their experiences of travel.

Despite the common desire of subway passengers, the subway is a site of often overwhelming influence by external stimulation, with beggars, buskers, and solicitors moving throughout systems peddling their trades, accumulating micro and niche economies that often exist under the radar of authorities. Perhaps due to the difficulty of surveillance in enclosed underground spaces, practices of subversion that undermine rules and regulations, like graffiti, scratchitti, fare beating, and petty crimes—as well as serious crimes like harassment or violence—are commonly associated with subways. Public infrastructures of transit have also become targets of terrorist attacks, as in Tokyo (1995) and London (2005). The subway has always been designed and operated in relationship to the potential dangers of city life. The subway systems in Berlin and London were used as bomb shelters and base hospitals during World War II.

All of these factors have helped promote the image of the subway as a space of fear and danger, leading to the implementation by police and security staff of countermeasures like camera surveillance and bag checks. Recently, the use of aesthetics like light and cleanness to provoke a feeling of security have become more widespread, leading to increased ridership and a greater appearance of (if not actual) safety.

Passengers' practices and perceptions are also partially constituted, often unwittingly, through administrative techniques such as the design of vehicle and station interiors, sign systems, and payment technologies. Aesthetics can also be used as a strategy of exclusion, creating spaces that are more favorable to certain groups of people and aimed for the displacement of others, such as the homeless and beggars, both of whom populate subway systems for warmth and shelter.

Whereas most subway systems use rational, purist, and functional interior designs, some systems, like in Eastern Europe or the United States, implement decorative and artistic elements, from mosaics and frescos to sound installations and sculptures. In Western Europe, the implementation of public art in the subway system has been promoted—intending to counter the gracelessness, interchangeability, and anonymity of the system's stations and vehicles.

No other urban infrastructure of transit has changed the fabric of the city as much as the subway. With now more than 25 new systems in construction and development, mainly in South America and Asia, the subway is still and will be in the future a dominant way organizing inner-urban mobility while having a high impact on the economics and politics of cities as well as on the behaviors, social relations, and practices of its inhabitants.

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See also Journey to Work; Streetcars; Transportation

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SURVEILLANCE

Surveillance, the systematic collection of information for purposes of control, is a key mode of social and spatial urban ordering. From their foundation, cities have been locations for surveillance, but it was only with the modern period that surveillance came to infiltrate many practices of urban management from factories to policing. Now, in cities dominated by neoliberal economics, risk management, and multiple fears, increasingly technologically sophisticated surveillance, from biometric closed circuit television (CCTV) to geodemographic profiling, produces new forms of urban division.

Defining *Surveillance*

Surveillance may be considered as the systematic collection, classification, and sorting of information about subject populations for the purposes of behavioral adjustment or control. As such it is crucial to our understanding of the evolution of the city and of modernity. It is essential to differentiate surveillance from simpler activities of information gathering or watching. Surveillance requires the gathering of information of some kind, from the directly sensory to the indirect or technologically mediated; however, to be surveillance, the gathering of information must be conducted systematically. Accidental or contingent acquisition of information is not surveillance; however, many activities in which surveillance is involved, like espionage, may involve the combination of contingently acquired and systematically acquired data. Surveillance must also be purposeful and directed at the altering of behavior in some way; many forms of systematic information gathering have purposes that are not surveillant.

Surveillance may also be differentiated according to the object of surveillance, and in particular between targeted and mass surveillance. Targeted surveillance specifies the object of surveillance in advance and concentrates only on that object, whereas mass surveillance provides an overview without specifying any particular object in advance. In practice, these forms are a spectrum and often interconnected. For example, an open-street video surveillance system may be used for the mass surveillance of crowds in urban streets; however, if one individual arouses the suspicion of operators or the attention of biometric or behavioral recognition software, the same system can then be used to target and track that person.

History of Urban Surveillance

The city itself exists partly as a mechanism for surveillance. The concentration of populations in an intensely territorialized space enables the counting and monitoring of people. Historically, many cities were both bounded by a city wall and internally divided. Gates provided pinch points and filters, a location for sorting people out: counting, checking goods and possessions, verification or identification, disease control, taxation, and the

enforcement of fines and punishments. For example, premodern Beijing had a series of concentric walls that separated the city on the basis of the importance of its inhabitants; individual alleys barred by wooden lattice gates were guarded and closed at night. Many city-states had special areas reserved for traders. Particular resident “others” were also spatially confined; for example, beginning in 1516 in Venice, Jews were restricted to the *ghetto nuovo* (literally “new quarter”).

Many early modern systems of order were based around generalized safety such as the hierarchical fire-wardening system and watchtowers of tinderbox Edo (Tokyo) or the Dutch polder model of community responsibility for maintaining flood dikes. Sometimes, control of natural disasters gave opportunities for ruling classes to institute wider moral controls: policies developed in city-states of northern Italy in response to the great plague of 1346–1350 combined concern about urban health and social unrest, laying the foundations for modern systems of epidemiology and census. More often, surveillance was part of a strategy of securitization, for example, the multiple informer and spies of Ottoman Istanbul or prerevolutionary Paris.

In the modern period, there was a general move toward the use of surveillance to resolve perceived moral problems associated with the rebellious, the mad, the poor, and the vagrant. Whereas such people had previously been outcast and transported or even executed by urban elites, new places of confinement, from workhouses to prisons to asylums, emerged in the early modern period to house them. Historian of ideas, Michel Foucault, famously used Jeremy Bentham’s *Panopticon* as the spatial exemplar of this shift in thinking. In this plan for an ideal reformatory prison, prisoners were expected to alter their behavior through the belief that they were constantly monitored. Although such ideals never fully materialized in any prison that was built, surveillance both as an idea and as a practice infiltrated state and private organizations, from factories to schools. Originating in arms production, in factories, new systems of rational management, which monitored and organized the time and activity of workers, were introduced along with spatial ordering techniques like the production line.

However, despite a long concern with identification and the nature of the person, surveillance remained relatively unsystematic at a state level,

and in public space, until the nineteenth century. It was a new wave of moral panic over the threat to urban order of the “dangerous classes,” the growing low-waged or unemployed proletariat. Confinement was not a moral or practical option, so new “rational” approaches to the problem of order appeared, combining classification with new visual technologies like the photographic camera, Bertillonage, Galton’s fingerprinting techniques, and composite photography that was supposed to identify the “criminal type.” The new police in Europe and America adopted many of these techniques. In many countries the police absorbed the previous systems of internal espionage to carry out the monitoring and suppressing of protest and political opposition, as well as the more everyday and extremely unpopular practices of targeting the urban poor for arbitrary searches or telling them to simply “move on.”

Rational techniques were also applied to the morphology of cities, many of which were redesigned partly to allow state military forces to parade or suppress urban uprising, and to allow an uninterrupted gaze, as well as to allow air to circulate, to prevent the presence of “miasmas” believed to carry disease, for example, Baron Haussmann’s grand plan for Paris, which forced wide boulevards through the old medieval structure. Colonizers such as the British in India also applied the new securitized planning to their subaltern domains, as in Zanzibar or Lutyens’s building of New Delhi. The wealthy recreated their own barriers: In the late nineteenth century, London had nearly a hundred such gates, often policed by private guards who monitored entrants and sometimes charged tolls. In later-nineteenth-century United States, entirely private streets in places like St. Louis and New Orleans almost came to constitute cities within cities.

The early twentieth century saw the paranoid elite imaginings of urban uprising apparently confirmed with the Russian Revolution. Throughout the twentieth century, many cities were dominated by an intense attention to personal conduct, either to preserve a revolutionary ideology or guard against it. To this was added the importance of war and preparing for war, which came to dominate the economies of many developed nations. In many cases, the profound distrust of urban authorities in their own people resulted in many needless

deaths, as for example in the World War II British government’s resistance to providing deep public air aid shelters, which it believed would allow unpatriotic views to spread. Throughout the world, states developed renewed forms of internal political policing and surveillance: from the monitoring and repression of trade union activity in the United Kingdom, through McCarthyism and internal espionage in the United States, to the extremes of the dictatorships of the Soviet Union and its thousands of miles of gulags for political prisoners and the Stasi secret police of the German Democratic Republic, whose paper files on individuals were filled by informers who constituted perhaps one sixth of the population at their nadir.

Contemporary Urban Surveillance

The sociotechnical systems employed for surveillance became more sophisticated with the advent of computing, particularly the database. French philosopher Gilles Deleuze regarded these technological changes, combined with the restructuring of the economy and the crisis of the institutions described by Michel Foucault as the basis of a “control society.” Although it signaled an intensification of surveillance, it also offered a wider distribution of the means of surveillance and an increasing variety of state and private agents involved in carrying out surveillance: Rather than one “big brother,” there are many little brothers, some of whom may even be ourselves.

Although there were many who predicted a database society, the urban consequences were first detailed in analysis of Los Angeles by urbanists like Mike Davis. Los Angeles became the archetypal neoliberal city, a dystopian suburban sprawl of *identikit* neighborhoods monitored by face-recognition technologies, and guarded and monitored steel and glass business districts, where the rich were able to afford private security and the poor only repressive policing. This neoliberal urbanism gave rise to public space video surveillance (or closed-circuit television [CCTV]), which had evolved largely in casinos and shopping malls. It contributed to the transformation of cities into a divided cityscape of homogenized theme-park centers, increasingly gated private suburbs, and exclusion in miserable ghettos and slums for the poor. Such a tendency is to be found, at its most

extreme, in the fractured cities of the newly developing world. In ex-authoritarian Brazil in cities like São Paulo, a total distrust of the police, combined with the almost total lack of welfare state, led to the rich fortifying their private enclaves with razor wire, cameras, and armies of security guards, while the poor were dominated by drug gangs in *favelas*, with neither surveillance nor safety. In the new inward investment zones of the Middle East, India, and China, entire private towns are being created, after the model of contemporary city-states like Singapore and Dubai, where there is not even the pretense of a liberal democratic state to temper the combination of greed and total surveillance.

It was the United Kingdom where CCTV initially spread most rapidly into public space. The roots were complex. First, the 1980s decline of urban centers leading to a neoliberal urban politics and the semiprivatization of urban space followed New Labour's renewed involvement of the state in urban regeneration and the moral management of cities. Second, a new actuarial model of justice was developed, based on risk management. Third, a series of trigger events and moral panics occurred, involving football hooliganism, child abduction (particularly the 1993 abduction and murder of James Bulger), and terrorist attacks on the British mainland by the Provisional Irish Republican Army. By the early twenty-first century, almost all British urban centers and many smaller communities had CCTV systems, which often combined urban management and policing roles. After the attacks in the United States on September 11, 2001, the British example of a supposedly successful urban security policy helped spread open-space CCTV throughout the world. Britain, and in particular London, has also gained notoriety as a surveillance society, which has helped ferment some limited opposition and resistance.

International security transformations have also added a new dimension. For a long time, developments in military espionage, such as the ECHELON telecommunications monitoring system or satellite surveillance for warfare, were regarded as separate from urban civil controls, but developments in military surveillance have seeped into cities. Indeed the entire contemporary political economy of surveillance could be argued to derive from the changes that occurred toward the end and immediately after

the cold war, with corporations involved in military supply seeking to find new civilian markets by exploiting the growing urban fear of crime. This helps to explain the rise of CCTV in London, with automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) systems introduced after the Provisional Irish Republican Army terrorist attacks in the early 1990s, using technologies tested in the 1991 Gulf War. This has only been further intensified by the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States and other terrorist attacks and by the War on Terrorism. New systems linked to CCTV, such as facial recognition and software for recognizing the sound of gunshots, are advocated by police and hawkish social commentators. Military systems, like unmanned aerial vehicles, have moved from the battlefields of Afghanistan and Iraq to the streets of Los Angeles and Liverpool.

Surveillance in cities is not only about repressive securitization. Increasingly, the private sector has also been involved in gathering data not only on consumption but on a whole range of lifestyle indicators and combining the data with new technologies of mapping to create geodemographic profiles of individuals, groups, and neighborhoods. These can be used to target products and services but also to organized political campaigns and in policing. In many ways such systems become self-fulfilling prophecies: Whereas many mainstream commentators have remarked on the clustering of like-minded people, few have recognized the surveillant sorting that is carried out by urban authorities, real estate agents, property developers, and so on, that helps produce such outcomes.

These semiautomated systems, along with many others, are now prompting an emerging sense of another shift in urban surveillance, once again combining social and technological development. Developments in computing and networked communications are allowing surveillance devices to be more mobile, miniaturized, and linked. There is a potential recombination of the virtual and the material, through ubiquitous (or pervasive) computing. Infiltrated into buildings, and even people and animals, a new flexible surveillance can both enable and control, based on the logic of software code, or protocol. With the absence of overt politics, there are many who have suggested that this has potentially technologically deterministic

implications for social relations and neighborhood formation and for the embedding of social exclusion in the fabric of the city.

Certainly, in a period dominated by risk and risk management, everything in the city has a tendency to be sorted by profitability and threat. This means a constant shifting between various strategies associated with urban order: the discipline of surveillance with its apparatus of visibility, the moral order of the government of conduct and its focus on welfare and responsibility, and the authoritarianism of sovereign power with its violence and territorial control. Contemporary urban surveillance is also complicated by contestation over the cultural meanings of surveillance.

Surveillance should be understood not only as control by a small number of watchers and a mass of watched, but as a complex and contradictory process of social ordering, involving processes such as *synopticism* (the many watching the few), mutual surveillance, and the pleasures and performative aspects of watching and being watched. The body retains a central place whether it is in DNA testing, in police stop-and-search procedures, or as an instrument of surveillance itself. There is a dual process of where we are asked to be alert and watch others, but acts of potential surveillance, such as photography in public places are also regarded with suspicion by urban authorities.

It is also the case that a surveillance society is not a society of total control and, as such, may perhaps be defined not by any totalizing model, whether based on the panopticon or any other exemplary mechanism, or even an amorphous surveillant assemblage, but as an oligopticon, an urban environment defined by multiple limited forms of control and surveillance, riven with visible and invisible, variously permeable borders, gaps, and blind spots. These are not simply a question of location: For some, especially “others,” like asylum seekers, borders are never really crossed but remain with them like a stretched elastic that threatens to rebound and expel them at any moment.

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See also Bunkers; Crime; Davis, Mike; Divided Cities; Landscapes of Power

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SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

Sustainable development has achieved widespread political acceptance over the course of several decades thanks largely to a series of international environmental and urban policy conferences, starting with the UN Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, through to the World (Brundtland) Commission on the Environment and Development in 1987; Rio de Janeiro’s UN Conference on Environment and Development in 1992, which established AGENDA 21 with its emphasis on sustainable land use management and the need for local decision making; and the Johannesburg Summit in 2002. Unfortunately, while Rio’s AGENDA 21 has been put into practice in more than 6,000 communities, this has been more the case in developing nations, rather than in the cities of the industrialized West.

Sustainable development is most often conceived—consistent with the Brundtland Commission report *Our Common Future*—as forms of development “that [meet] the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs.” Sustainable development should achieve a more equitable balance between human needs and those of nature, such that local

economies are able to benefit diverse social groups and create a high quality of life while not drawing down natural capital.

Key elements of the sustainable city have appeared in various forms in the past century. Ebenezer Howard's famous Garden City, for example, was an early attempt to more holistically marry the city with nature, by eliminating polluting industries and housing smaller concentrations of people surrounded by farms and countryside. The Garden City also brought social and economic considerations together with ecological ones, by creating a viable economic model for the development and useful employment for its residents. Patrick Geddes—a contemporary of Howard and considered along with him a father of modern town planning—looked back to the medieval town as the template for his “neotechnic” city, which would have ample open space (made available by decanting heavy industry to the countryside) as well as greenbelts. Frank Lloyd Wright's Broadacre City would have harmonized urbanism and nature by eliminating the city altogether by housing families on individual agricultural plots connected by speedy roadways and electronic communication.

Understanding Sustainable Development

Depending on how it is interpreted, sustainable development may either coexist with or challenge the “dominant paradigm,” or the neoclassical worldview, which posits an “empty world” that must be transformed by the human use of resources in order to have any real value. In this world lives a utility-seeking *homo economicus* (economic man), for whom resource consumption is a matter of rational decision making and self-interest. This fundamental model is reflected in two major schools of thought in sustainable development: so-called weak and strong sustainability. The first operates within the neoclassical paradigm, and the second opposes it.

For adherents of “weak” or “technological” sustainable development, continued economic growth is considered essential and indeed should be encouraged so as to raise living standards in developing nations. It also accepts that human beings as economic actors will not be able to control their habits as consumers. Therefore, unsustainability

becomes a matter of more accurate pricing, better policies, and sufficiently “green” technologies to more effectively manage consumption. A powerful element of this form of sustainable development also rests on the assumption that manufactured capital—particularly advanced green technologies—may substitute for natural capital. Such substitution, as a practical matter, makes easier the development of indicators, as it facilitates the use of existing measures of progress, such as the gross domestic product (GDP). The most basic assumption, however, is that both economies and nature may be managed and that this management is to be undertaken by existing elites—policymakers, financial institutions, scientists, and governments.

“Strong” or “ecological” sustainable development, by contrast, rejects these assumptions. Far from being a matter of adjusting prices and policies within the existing system, it is the current paradigm associated with economic growth and development that is itself seen as the problem. In this view, standard measures such as GDP cannot accurately calculate the inherent value of natural capital in terms of ecosystem services, such as purifying air and water. As such, it is not possible for elites to manage nature, any more than they are capable of managing economies—particularly not in a way that is socially equitable. Relying solely on the development of green technology will be, at best, an interim measure. A fleet of electric cars, for example, while less polluting in use would still require the consumption of vast resources to produce and generate undesirable social consequences in terms of urban form, quality of life, congestion, and so on. Finally, rather than depending on top-down processes utilizing existing structures and elites to manage the transition to a green economy, strong sustainable development advocates a bottom-up perspective: increasing ecological literacy so as to develop an informed, revitalized citizenry.

As “strongly” defined, then, sustainable development integrates a number of concepts significant in their own right, such as the intrinsic value of nature, the development of social capital and the strengthening of citizenship, and the need to reexamine general assumptions concerning what constitutes “progress” and how to measure it. It posits a fundamentally ethical posture toward the natural world and compels society to respect other species and ecosystems.

Institutionalizing Sustainable Development

In the urban context, sustainable development is closely related to other mainstream urban planning concepts. Chief among these is “smart growth,” which has become the de facto model for the promulgation of sustainable cities in planning and policy circles. Institutionalized under the banner of a formal Smart Growth Network, which includes the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency as a member, smart growth discourages sprawl by promoting urban infill, growth boundaries, walkable and bikeable neighborhoods, and an emphasis on public transportation.

Closely related is the urban design school known as new urbanism, the tenets of which are institutionalized through the not-for-profit Congress for the New Urbanism. New urbanism emphasizes essentially the same principles of Smart Growth but attaches to them specific design principles intended to support “placemaking.” Among these are the creation of town centers, the building of distinct civic buildings, and, in general, architectural styles that respect historical precedents.

Sustainable development is further institutionalized within a wide range of governmental and international bodies. In the United States its principles are integrated within a number of departments, including the Environmental Protection Agency and the Bureau of Oceans, Environment, and Science. In Canada the National Roundtable of the Environment and the Economy provides research and policy advice on sustainable development, while international research is conducted through Canada’s International Institute for Sustainable Development, headquartered in Winnipeg, Manitoba. In Britain it is promoted through the Department of Environment Food and Rural Affairs, and the European Union has its own Sustainable Development Strategy, first adopted in 2005. As well, the United Nations has a Division for Sustainable Development within its Department of Economic and Social Affairs.

Through these and other organizations and bodies, sustainable development goals and objectives are monitored and evaluated through the use of appropriate indicators. While many existing and conventional indicators are compatible with weak

sustainability targets, strong sustainability demands measuring unconventional factors. Commonly referred to as “full cost accounting,” such measures are geared toward taking into account formerly neglected so-called externalities, or the full range of costs to society imposed by development, such as loss of habitats, pollution, social inequities, and so on.

Implementing Sustainable Development

As a policy goal, sustainable development has become fully integrated into urban planning and policy discourse, if not into actual urban outcomes. Despite being conceptualized and operationalized in terms of some generally recognized criteria as part of a vast literature, sustainable development resists universally accepted interpretations. In fact, the term’s very ubiquity may be owed at least in part to this flexibility. Given its normative rather than empirical orientation, the term has also been criticized for being both uncritically reified in theory and inordinately parochial in practice.

Performance indicators are needed to account for various substantive dimensions of sustainable development, such as minimized energy consumption and use of renewable energy; compact development minimizing the consumption of land; a reduced need for transportation; preserved agricultural lands and habitats; minimized waste streams and the use of wastes for other processes through what is called an “industrial ecology” model; the conservation of water and utilization of natural hydrologic cycles; and the preservation of biological diversity. These goals are key not just to the ecological viability of a sustainable community but also to ensuring a high quality of life for its residents.

Of the three main components of sustainable development, perhaps the most difficult to realize is social sustainability. This dimension recognizes the importance of social equity in planning decisions, so that efforts to improve the sustainability of the physical and economic functioning of the city do not harm or diminish the quality of life of its most vulnerable populations. It emphasizes the creation of a high quality of life for all by ensuring that the benefits of development are shared equally by everyone. Socially sustainable development creates opportunities for citizens to fulfill their

potential and to be more self-reliant, both as individuals and as a society.

Meeting the demands of the three major dimensions of sustainable development presents many challenges. One of the most problematic themes discussed in the literature is that the profession of urban planning, which finds itself with mandates for addressing sustainable development, has not proven able to ameliorate laissez-faire capitalism's disinclination to appropriately value either ecological services or social relationships. Furthermore, urban planning has, in fact, been more consistently allied with forces of development than with ecological preservation.

Planners also find sustainable development problematic. Debate in the literature around the term's usefulness, measurability, and achievability has continued for the past two decades. There is concern that its value may be strictly rhetorical, with little transference into real-world outcomes. For example, one study conducted by Berke and Conroy at the turn of the new century found that, in a selection of more than 30 comprehensive plans, none appeared more or less able to promote sustainability, regardless of the extent to which those plans espoused such goals.

Whereas there have been criticisms leveled against sustainable development for parochialism—for tending to describe it purely in local terms—there is also a recognition that it is simply easier to implement sustainable plans within a particular community than across regions or nations. Yet there are also concerns that a focus in the literature on city-specific technocratic outputs positions sustainable development as simply a matter of using the right technologies, restructuring institutions or implementing the right policies, rather than fundamentally questioning the nature of society—again, a dichotomy between weak and strong approaches.

Debating Sustainable Development

Classical liberal political philosophy promotes the pursuit of individual liberty, and so insofar as such depends on the consumption of resources, the ownership of land, and the ability to move about freely, there are limits to what a democratic state may or should do to impose limits to such pursuits.

In practice, then, attempts to institutionalize sustainable development have been countered by some social and fiscal conservatives and libertarians, who fear unwarranted limitations on personal freedom and economic growth. Centralized planning has long been viewed with suspicion in some quarters, but as homeownership and automobility are so bound up with popular conceptions of “the American dream,” attempts by planners to regulate these forces have been met with fierce opposition.

This leads to a key point: that no discussion of sustainable development can fail to account for the political economy of city building. This is because as centers of capital accumulation, cities are subject to the influence of various social and financial actors with varying levels of political interests in and power over decision making, as they affect everything from neighborhood revitalization to office construction to freeway building.

Development decisions are also ideally based on the best available scientific assessments of issues and solutions. Yet, as Thomas Kuhn demonstrated, science is never value-free; there are always underlying assumptions that can affect both problem formulation and the range of solutions offered. This gets to the very heart of the sustainability discourse, as most of the foundational literature and policy statements concerning sustainable development have all emerged from Western science, law, and economics.

This has fundamental implications for the human ethics of development: What constitutes “good” development in “underdeveloped” countries? Northern conceptions of sustainability are criticized by some for assuming conflict-free solutions, when in fact there is no guarantee that an environmentally sustainable solution will also be a socially just one. Even the notion of “sustaining” present conditions, when they are so manifestly unjust and inequitable, is unsupportable to many.

Nowhere is the need to critically reassess sustainable development more urgent than in the world's burgeoning megacities, or those urban areas with more than 5 million people, many of which are located in the global South. These cities are characterized by rapid population growth fueled by rural-urban migration, great wealth disparities, and vast informal settlements beset by poor sanitation and a lack of social and economic opportunity. Current estimates project that there will 60 such megacities

by 2015, holding between them some 600 million people. Given the difficulties inherent in governing such enormous and fragmented areas, some argue for the need for reinvigorated grassroots organization and democratic processes, such as were emphasized in AGENDA 21.

Yet, at the same time, sustainable development concerns transcend the local: Ecological, economic, and social unsustainability cannot be isolated within a particular jurisdiction but cross political boundaries and thus levels of institutionalized decision making.

Envisioning the Future of Sustainable Development

Many are now advocating regional approaches to sustainability, ones that can account for natural regions such as watersheds, as well as marshal the resources of multiple political jurisdictions. What is advocated in this so-called new regionalism is not new levels of government but rather new forms and processes of *governance*, in which coalitions of interest groups (public, private, and nonprofit) collaborate, share resources, and develop regulatory frameworks that can address mutual concerns. Interestingly, studies show that such regional coalitions are most likely to form around shared ecological concerns. Regional approaches are also more readily able to address social inequities that are exacerbated by uneven development.

What seems incontrovertible, however, is that for all it has contributed to the discourses on social, economic, and environmental progress and justice, sustainable development has yielded almost no real improvements in the actual sustainability of human societies. Western models of development and growth predominate, and energy consumption continues to increase, even in the face of inevitable resource depletion.

Critics of mainstream conceptualizations of sustainable development argue that most of the common practices under this rubric may be incompatible with its actual demands, which would include an end to fossil fuel use, a drastic reduction in the use of resources, a return to local small-scale agriculture, and—in effect—the end of the industrial era.

It remains to be seen how the current global economic crisis will affect both the unsustainability of present urban systems and the theory and practice of sustainable development.

Michael Dudley

See also Broadacre City; Geddes, Patrick; New Urbanism; Sprawl; Urban Planning

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TECHNOBURBS

The term *technoburb* is one in a long line of terms used in urban studies to describe metropolitan sprawl and the emergence of exurban landscapes. The *techmo-* prefix is mobilized to describe the rise of these new socioeconomic units due to two primary reasons. First, the basis for urban decentralization over the last several decades has been the expansion of advanced information communications technologies, which have partly substituted for the face-to-face contact and physical movement of traditional cities. For example, the growing use of such technologies in tandem with the expansion of telecommunications infrastructure has led to the deliberate dispersal of economic activity and a new spatial division of labor, as work processes have become increasingly mediated technologically.

Second, the prefix refers to the fact that technoburbs can be characterized by the presence of high-technology industries and specific information technology-facilitated corporate business functions that created a new geographical pattern, as often seemingly placeless business functions have been relocated to, and physically clustered in, purpose-built business districts such as technology and science parks. These developments contain concentrations of related businesses lured out of the city by an attractive corporate campus environment characterized by landscape uniformity, control, and securitization. Therefore, a dual spatial restructuring process has resulted in, on the one

hand, the technologically facilitated movement of economic activities out of the city, and on the other, the subsequent clustering of activities in specific exurban milieu.

Historical Evolution

One of the most important features of urban development in the global North in the period following World War II has been the rise of urban sprawl and expanding suburbanization leading to the extension of urban regions. While traditional central business districts retain high-level command-and-control service functions, the city has experienced the decentralization of residential, industrial, commercial, and specialized service functions to its suburbs and beyond. The subsequent shift of these functions to an urban periphery has led not just to suburbanization but to the creation of new peripheral cities without the traditional traits of cityness. Within these cities, residents increasingly look to their immediate surroundings rather than the city for their employment needs.

For example, beyond the boundary of the traditional urban core, shopping malls, industrial parks, business estates, university campuses, corporate office complexes, back-office centers, and logistics hubs are interspersed with residential areas and open green spaces, forming new decentered spatial units where conventional notions of city and suburb blur into one another. As a consequence, notions of the city based on an established geometry of bounded sectors and zones has become obsolete.

The urban historian Robert Fishman coined the term *technoburb* to describe the breakaway of the urban periphery from a city it no longer needs and the emergence of specific types of decentered urban forms that retain the economic and technological dynamism associated with the city. As a consequence, these peripheral zones have emerged as viable socioeconomic units. Other terms for similar phenomena include *edge cities*, *outer city*, *satellite city*, *posturban city*, *centerless city*, *exopolis*, and *exurbia*.

Urban scholars have often looked to North American case studies to examine the emergence of a polycentric metropolis that defies a traditional urban geography classification of core versus periphery. Los Angeles has frequently been cited as the paradigmatic exemplar of “a city turned inside out” with central functions of the central business district dispersed to its surrounding hinterland. Any universal claims drawing on specific urban case studies interpreted as offering lessons for all other urban areas is problematic.

Historicizing Technoburbs

A growing theme within contemporary urban studies has been to examine the impact of transportation and information communications technologies on the urban form. There has been an ongoing debate over whether the rise in communications technologies will lead to a concentration of economic, social, political, and cultural functions in ever more powerful global cities or whether information technology will lead to the geographical dispersal of the population.

Predicted scenarios of urban change over the last 50 years have frequently displayed an inherent ambivalence about the city. There has been widespread speculation that the growth of transport and telecommunications technologies would lead to the death of geographical distance and the growth of posturban cities. In America, the proliferation of the telephone and automobile was predicted to lead to the mass decentralization of urban metropolises like New York and Chicago. An imagined pastoral retreat to rural America was to create dispersed cities in which people would be isolated but connected to one another via modern telecommunications, giving rise to a new kind of antispatial community based on individualism and

self-reliance away from urban centers. A number of urban futurists speculated a rise in suburbia could allow citizens to reembrace “the American way of life” and tackle problems of crime, poverty, and loss of community, which had eroded social ties and beset traditional urban centers through American history. The establishment of rural communities at the edge of urban civilization was interpreted as a solution to the uneven development and social conflict that has characterized urban development since the birth of the industrial city.

Anti-urban visions of technologized futures remained popular throughout the latter half of the twentieth century as the capacity of telecommunications technologies was expanded. With the growth of the Internet, a number of media theorists predicted that digital forms of living via new communications technologies would supersede the functional need for territorial-based physical proximity within cities. Connection to an anytime-anywhere global communications network was technologically determined to result in the disappearance of the traditional urban core and a mass shift outward to decentralized technoburbs. Anti-urban ideas have genealogies in modern and utopian urban planning histories that are supportive of a pastoral ideal based on a belief that modern technology can restore social order.

Despite these anti-urban predictions, contemporary urbanism is characterized by a simultaneous dispersal and concentration of specific economic, social, cultural, and political functions both within and outside strategic urban centers. While global cities like London, New York, and Tokyo remain the most powerful financial centers, other business-corporate functions have been decentralized to technoburbs that are emerging as new sites where suburbs are serving both the city and the global market.

Technoburbs as New Industrial Complexes

Robert Fishman identified archetypal technoburbs as Silicon Valley in northern California and Route 128 in Massachusetts. Both have emerged in the periphery of large metropolises to become global centers for research and development activities in high-technology industries. These developments can be characterized by the presence of advanced

technological laboratories and high-tech production facilities lured from the urban core to the periphery. The physical form of these technoburbs often consists of futuristic looking, low-rise office buildings dispersed in a secured campus-style layout set in sylvan landscapes physically separated from the rest of the city. These developments are not considered suburbia in the traditional sense because they mix corporate offices with residential neighborhoods and different service functions. Such projects appear in a variety of forms and under numerous names including technology parks, science cities, and technopoles. These developments often contain the divisions of multinational companies that rely on specific transport and telecommunications infrastructure linkages to facilitate economic relationships between geographically dispersed areas. Technoburbs are, therefore, highly packaged landscapes constructed with special network infrastructures including fiber-optic connections to overcome the physical separation from the city.

A number of new industrial spaces can be identified around cities of the global North: the quintessential Silicon Valley, Route 128 in Cambridge, and Sophia Antipolis in France. These innovative milieus have emerged due to a synergy between venture capital, world-class labor supplies from local universities, an entrepreneurial climate, infrastructural links, and fiscal incentives that attract research and development operations of companies and make them reluctant to leave. They have been interpreted as the drivers of a new economy in which economic competitiveness is seen to be determined by the capacity for technological innovation in high-technology industries.

At the urban scale, technology parks aim to stimulate industrial growth through attracting high-technology firms to a privileged enclave within or just outside the city. It is expected that once these firms relocate to the technology park, they will create jobs; a critical mass of innovative firms can spur regional economic development. To attract firms, policymakers offer a range of fiscal incentives and customized transport and telecommunications links; in some cases, they have tailored technology parks to the requirements of would-be firms. Technology parks have become a prominent feature of local and regional economic development policy, especially in old

industrial regions searching for a means for socio-economic regeneration. Examples include Sophia Antipolis in France, Hsinchu Science Park in Taiwan, and Cambridge Science Park in the United Kingdom.

Science cities are new developments, often planned and built by governments, aimed at creating the conditions for innovative research and development activities by concentrating a critical mass of research organizations and scientists within a high-quality suburban space. Science cities differ from technology parks because they focus on science and research goals rather than productive output. Often, they are based on the spatial logic of campus architecture whereby isolating a community of researchers from the rest of society is seen to produce a potentially more creative environment. In addition to a green landscaped campus setting, they often contain specialist universities or technical institutes whose presence is designed to foster a culture of innovation. Science cities create privileged, physically excluded (often gated) spaces that imagine themselves as spatial vacuums separated from the potentially disruptive influences of societal engagement. The isolation has the purpose of creating links between a community of firms and scientists and the production of an environment conducive for research and development activities. Prominent examples include the Akademgorodok Science City in Russia, Taedok Science Town in South Korea, and Tsukuba Science City in Japan.

Increasingly entrepreneurial state and regional policymakers have sought to construct technoburbs as innovative milieus to emulate the success of Silicon Valley. For example, policymakers have tried to attract and cluster together high-tech firms in close proximity to local universities in a business park setting to create an entrepreneurial research and development culture. Silicon Valley is one of the most successful high-tech innovation clusters in the world, stretching from Palo Alto to the southern suburbs of San Jose in California. It contains large corporate office complexes of many preeminent information technology companies, including IBM, Hewlett-Packard, Yahoo, and Google. Policymakers see in Silicon Valley a general formula for technoburb development that can be replicated in any context, regardless of diverging national contexts. Well-known imitators include

Silicon Alley, a new media district in New York City; Silicon Glen in Livingstone, Scotland; and Silicon Hills in Austin, Texas.

A number of technoburbs have used the *silicon* and *cyber* prefixes as entrepreneurial place-marketing and urban boosterism strategies. Although many of these places have jumped on the Silicon Valley bandwagon, very few can lay claim to becoming genuine innovative milieus. Often, the presence of a loose cluster of a few information technology-related companies, a small technology park, or one flagship tenant is basis enough for local and regional development agencies to (re)brand it as a Silicon Valley of sorts. In many cases, planned technoburbs can be more prosaically read as real estate projects geared toward symbolically and physically positioning cities as more attractive for inward investment. For instance, the association of high-technology place marketing with new office and business park developments often results in increased rental yield and land profits for developers.

Beneath the Siliconization boosterism, these customized business parks have become ideal locations for the back-office functions of multinational companies connected to dedicated fiber-optics grids and offering high-security environments protected by CCTV monitoring and security guards. The growth of technoburb back-office parks has been influenced by the reshaping of the production cost map of (1) firms seeking low-cost labor and work environments; (2) public-sector enhancement of infrastructure quality and capacity at strategic locations within the nation-state; and (3) the feminization of back-office work practices and the rise of trapped pink-collar labor markets in the urban periphery. Improvements in telecommunications have enabled the spatial separation of front-office and back-office activities, with the latter being unbundled and moved to lower-cost locations in the urban periphery, or offshore, because they require little direct interaction with other parts of the firm.

This type of corporate function radically differs from the high value-added work found in the aforementioned research and development centers, focusing instead on business process outsourcing in the service of multinational corporations and global markets. Back offices consist of routinized work practices that are often seen as being of a low

technological order: low skilled, low paid, and low value-added. Examples include managing business accounts, servicing customers in call centers, and processing data on a round-the-clock basis for major multinational companies. Often, these back-office operations have been relocated to low-cost, politically stable countries (e.g., India, the Philippines, Malaysia) in deregulated, privatized high-tech enclaves underwritten by national governments. Therefore, the scale of business-processing activities has shifted from the suburb serving the city to the suburb in service of the global marketplace.

Conclusion

Technoburbs have been critiqued for their wasteful urban sprawl and the lack of coherent form in their intermixing of residential, industrial, and commercial uses. Perhaps more significantly, the growth of technology parks, shopping malls, and gated communities in the urban periphery signals the emergence of highly produced, exclusive spaces of consumption and the increasing fragmentation of the urban form. These developments can be seen to splinter away from their proximate urban landscapes and create privatized spaces for multinational corporations and exclusive suburban spaces for habitation by affluent groups. In this light, technoburbs create fortified urban spaces that are privatized, enclosed, and monitored spaces for residence, consumption, leisure, and work. They produce a homogenized urban environment seeking to elude locality through the creation of spaces that lack an authentic consciousness of place and time.

Technoburbs appear physically similar throughout the world, with office buildings located in a green campus-style setting designed to promote innovation. However, technoburb development policies have been misconstrued as panacea for urban and regional development. Instead, they have created new industrial spaces where trapped labor markets process information in service of the global economy within a new uneven spatial division of labor.

Daniel Morgan Brooker

See also Cyburbia; Edge City; Exopolis; Suburbanization; Technopoles

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TECHNOPOLES

Technopoles are generally planned complexes of advanced technology firms, linked to research laboratories and developed to foster regional economic growth. The concept is based on the role that globalization and the rise of information- or knowledge-based economies play in regional development. Technopoles are designed to promote interactions among high-tech firms, research centers, and often universities to create synergy that generates knowledge, innovation, products, firms, and thus regional growth and development. Through these synergistic effects and the agglomeration economies produced by innovative advanced technology firms, spinoffs and development occur in the region where the complex is located.

Technopoles usually are established in new industrial areas, outside core manufacturing centers, with the goal of attracting companies to locate at the site. Some technopoles are formed of new companies, some of branches of existing companies. Local governments, often through public-private partnerships, are the main promoters of technopoles as regional development policy.

The term *technopole* gained prominence in the 1990s, with the publication of Manuel Castells and Peter Hall's book *Technopoles of the World: The Making of 21st Century Industrial Complexes*. Their definition describes a technopole as a planned place to promote innovation and advanced technology production. Technopoles do not simply emerge in a capitalist economy; they are a form of regional planning through deliberate attempts to promote innovation and advanced technology and, thus, regional development and economic expansion in specific places. Technopoles are typically spatially defined places such as science parks and advanced technology business parks. The physical place encourages mutual cooperation among firms, which then may attract more firms to the location. The region where the technopole is located captures the broader benefits of economic growth and development.

The technopole is derived from the idea of the innovative milieu—a set of social, economic, institutional, and organizational structures that creates a place that engenders innovation and development. Innovative milieu is most often associated with the French economist Philippe Auydalot, whose ideas were taken up extensively by regional economists and regional planners in the 1980s and 1990s. Indeed, a whole research network was established to bring these ideas to light and refinement, the Groupe de Recherche Européen sur les Milieux Innovateurs (GREMI). GREMI's focus was the territorial implications of the relation between innovation and regional development, mainly in Europe and North America.

The bases of these theories were observations of unprecedented changes in regional development. In the 1970s and 1980s, a diverse set of regions emerged as places of investment, innovation, and growth, largely spatially removed from traditional manufacturing centers and their attendant sociopolitical and labor environments. Silicon Valley in Santa Clara County, California, became the model of an innovative industrial space through its lead role in the electronics and information revolution, with specialization in advanced technologies such as semiconductors, computers, the Internet, and the life sciences. More than products emerged in these innovative regions; new ways to conduct research and make products contributed to important process and management innovations

as well. Management styles became less hierarchical, and a different model of industrial organization emerged. This represented a shift from the Fordist mass production to more flexible production systems. Thus, process and management innovations became another hallmark of advanced technology industries. Innovative networks of firms developed through formal and increasingly informal arrangements among entrepreneurs and institutions such as universities, research centers, and support organizations. In the language of the innovative milieu, these are all important parts of the local environment—the milieu—that fuels innovation.

The emergence of technopoles—as well as other spatially articulated forms of the new economic geography, including innovative milieus—depended on major and interrelated historical shifts in the organization of social and economic life. First was the expansion of what came to be called the global economy, with its changes in production and consumption and increasingly interwoven national economies. This was driven by changes in national policies, such as the rise of deregulation in the advanced economies beginning in the 1970s, the pace of European integration, and reduction in trade barriers among other countries, along with advances in technology.

Advanced technology, specifically, information technologies such as microelectronics, telecommunications, and increasingly biotechnology, created a technological revolution of new products and new processes. These forces combined to form a third economic revolution according to Castells and Hall—a different organization of economic production and management termed the informational economy, where knowledge and information are the basis for competitive and comparative advantage. This has also resulted in a shift from a vertical model of innovation activity to network models of innovation.

While Silicon Valley in California became the most famous model of a technopole through its innovative firms in advanced technology industries, other places attempted various forms of technopoles, often relying on attracting existing firms to their locations. Although outside firms established branch operations in the Silicon Valley in the 1950s, its fame and development stemmed from its start-ups and entrepreneurship.

Another early technopole project was the Research Triangle Park in North Carolina. It differs from the Silicon Valley model, although both are based in a university-established science park. Research Triangle Park was established in the late 1950s to bring together the resources and knowledge from the three universities tied to the park: University of North Carolina, North Carolina State, and Duke University. Outside firms were encouraged to start branch operations and laboratories there. In the intervening decades, Research Triangle Park has become one of the most famous examples of science parks in the United States and beyond.

In Europe, Pierre Lafitte, then deputy director of the *École des Mines* in Paris, created and founded Sophia Antipolis in the south of France. The Sophia-Antipolis Science Park was conceived in the late 1960s and opened in the early 1970s on the Côte d'Azur in the south of France. Evaluations of it as an innovative milieu were mixed over the next decades. Nonetheless, Sophia Antipolis became the home of more than 1,000 companies by 2000. Another early and famous technopole project was Tsukuba in Japan, established as a science city in the late 1950s. Later on, in the 1980s, Japan developed an extensive technopolis program, which established 26 technopoles outside the major Tokyo industrial region.

Today, technopoles in various forms—science parks, science cities, innovation centers, technopolis programs—are found virtually across the globe. The international trade association for technopoles and science parks, the International Association of Science Parks, boasts of developments in more than 54 countries. Although research on individual cases reveals important differences among technopoles, the strategy remains a popular regional development strategy.

Sabina Deitrick

See also Cyburbia; Growth Poles; Informational City; Suburbanization; Technoburbs; Urban Economics

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TENEMENT

In the nineteenth century, the governments of Great Britain and the United States officially defined a tenement house as any structure housing three or more families above the second story, with each family living separately and having its own cooking facilities. Each individual unit, or apartment, was called a tenement; thus, a tenement house was a structure holding multiple tenements. Legally, this definition included all multifamily housing, no matter the type of structure or its inhabitants. The term existed before this legal definition, however, and came to be associated with urban, working-class rental housing.

In England and America, the term was also associated with housing for the poor found primarily in city slums. This negative connotation persisted into the twentieth century, when the use of *apartment* or *flat* became more commonly used to refer to multifamily housing, regardless of the quality of the building. Scotland has a longer history of building tenements, and there, the term never acquired this same stigma and is still used to refer to multifamily, multistory urban housing.

Historical Evolution

English and American tenement houses developed as a building type during the Industrial Revolution of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries in response to the rapid urbanization and industrialization that brought many workers into cities. Lack of affordable transportation in this period meant the working classes needed to reside within walking distance of employment. As cities grew and industries expanded, cities became increasingly congested, and real estate prices rose accordingly. Land for housing, especially affordable working-class housing, became scarce while

working-class populations continued to grow, creating a severe housing shortage and leading many profit-seeking builders to erect inexpensive speculative housing.

While all European cities were faced with housing shortages for the working classes through the nineteenth century, the problem was exacerbated in England and the United States, where there was no existing tradition of building multistory apartment houses. As the urban working class grew, more of the middle and upper classes moved to the periphery, leaving their existing single-family houses to be converted into multifamily tenement housing. There was little demolition and reconstruction; more often landlords adapted existing structures to house as many families as possible. Every available corner became space to rent, including attics and cellars. In New York and Boston, tides caused regular flooding of cellars, but cellars were still popular spaces to let because they were cool in summer and warm in winter.

As demand continued, speculative builders erected purpose-built multifamily housing on all available scraps of land, including the back yards of existing structures. Desire for profits drove these first tenement designs. Each building often filled 90 percent or more of the lot with as many stories as legally possible. Individual units were small to create the greatest number of rentals. The neighborhoods containing these tenements quickly became congested, especially as families rented two or three rooms and sublet one of them to others.

Tenement Legislation

Before 1850, building legislation was limited, if not nonexistent, in British, European, and American cities. Laws that were enacted were rarely enforced. By the mid-nineteenth century, the effects of population growth and the overcrowded tenement houses created slums, forcing reformers to grapple with legislation as a way to exert control over the rapidly decaying built environment. Demands for improved housing arose from concerns for public safety, fire, and disease, threats that were particularly associated with the poor living conditions in overcrowded neighborhoods. Building codes, because they imposed restrictions that most often increased construction costs or reduced building size, diminished the potential profits for developers. They,

therefore, met with resistance and were often “watered down” and easily avoided. An inadequate number of inspectors and their inability to assign significant fines further diminished their effectiveness. Consequently, construction of poor-quality housing continued over several decades.

Legislation began with minimal restrictions at mid-century and became increasingly restrictive as growth and overcrowding continued. Fireproofing legislation, for example, at first mandated the use of stone, brick, or iron for common walls only, then fireproof stairwells, then complete fireproof construction at the end of the century. Each increasingly restrictive law met with resistance, as these materials were more expensive than wood. Fire escapes were also introduced in the second half of the nineteenth century; their use as additional storage space by tenants, especially for bedding during the day, reduced their effectiveness for escape as they were frequently blocked.

Public health and sanitation legislation introduced codes regulating ventilation and building scale. These laws sought to prevent the growth and spread of disease as understood by nineteenth-century medical science, which relied on a miasmatic theory of disease. The theory argued that disease originated from chemical ferments produced by dirt and decay and could generate spontaneously under the right atmospheric conditions, especially wherever sunlight and fresh air were lacking. The crowded, dirty city slums were a prime source and breeding ground. Increasing the amount of light and air, considered to be natural disinfectants, was thought to improve the health of the city overall. Building codes, therefore, attempted to produce new buildings with improved ventilation and more windows.

Even with the introduction of germ theory at the end of the nineteenth century, tenement neighborhoods were still considered to be unhealthy. Physicians as well as the general public continued to believe in the spontaneous generation of disease; the knowledge that germs could spread disease just further emphasized the threat caused by tenement houses. Clothing sold in the new department stores of the nineteenth century was often manufactured in tenement homes. Many people believed that disease could be carried by these clothes to stores and then to middle- and upper-class homes; servants residing in tenements also brought these germs with them to the homes of their employers.

These concerns led to legislation addressing sewers, drains, windows, building heights, and the size of yards and courts. New York, for example, allowed building heights to reach six stories. Boston, however, adamantly opposed tall buildings, and most of its neighborhoods maintained three- to four-story structures, the exception being the crowded immigrant neighborhoods of the North and West Ends where five- and six-story tenements were built.

Although building codes became more stringent by the start of the twentieth century, they did little to address existing structures, and enforcement, in any case, was difficult. Appropriation and demolition of private property was rare in Great Britain and the United States and, when undertaken by local governments, removed only individual properties. By contrast, Haussmann in Paris removed large areas of working-class neighborhoods. New housing for the displaced working class was not built, and this created overcrowding in other areas of the city.

Tenement House Reform Movement

Tenement house reform originated in London in the 1830s and in New York and Boston in the 1840s. By mid-century, concerns for public health encouraged philanthropic reform activities in many European cities as well. Leaders of this movement came from the private sector, including physicians, philanthropists, and businessmen. They took two paths. One emphasized the reform of tenants and their homes; the other focused on rental housing and sought to change management practice as well as multifamily housing design. The first approach, pioneered by London’s Octavia Hill, developed into the more scientific social work approach by the late nineteenth century. The second approach promoted “5 percent philanthropy,” which urged rental owners to limit financial returns to 5 or 6 percent and to invest more in maintenance while keeping rents affordable.

Actual improvement of tenement house design began to occur in the 1890s, when trained architects tackled the design problem of affordable multifamily housing. Early twentieth-century multifamily reform housing featured increased ventilation, with most projects emphasizing cross-ventilation through apartments. To accomplish this, architects built



Yard of a tenement at Park Avenue and 107th Street, New York, circa 1900

Source: Library of Congress.

large housing blocks around courtyards or set back from the street to increase garden space around them. Designers angled buildings from the street along diagonal lines to increase exposure to air and light.

New York City

New York's rapid population growth, along with the availability of undeveloped land, makes this city particularly important in the study of the tenement house as a building type. An 1864 survey counted 15,309 tenements that housed 61 percent of the city's population. New York's gridiron plan shaped the development and evolution of the tenement building. It divided the city into 200-by-800-foot blocks, with the long sides facing north and

south; these blocks in turn were subdivided into 25-by-100-foot individual building lots.

Nineteenth-century speculative builders seeking rental profits typically constructed single tenement houses on individual lots. The earliest such structures often filled 90 percent or more of the lot and spanned the full width. Houses rose five or six stories. In general, each floor held four three- or four-room apartments, with two units facing the street and two facing the back. Rooms were organized two across and six or eight deep in two straight rows, with the stairwell in the center of the building. Called "pre-law" tenements because they were built prior to any tenement legislation, they were also referred to as "railroad flats" because the rooms ran straight back in a row, like train cars. Only the two rooms at the front and the two

rooms at the back had windows, and thus, each unit had only one room with direct ventilation and sunlight. For units in the back of the house, fresh air and natural light were compromised by the proximity of the house behind. Because city blocks were organized north–south, only those facing south actually received direct sun.

Front rooms with the window were typically used as the parlor or living room; the kitchen was in the middle, with a small bedroom opening off of it; if there was an additional bedroom, it would be accessed by going through the first bedroom. No water, heat, or lighting was provided, although there were sometimes sinks in the public hallways. Privies were located in the yard, if there was one, and shared by all tenants. Stairs and hallways had no windows; they were dark and therefore dangerous. Parlors often included fireplaces, but when not used for cooking or heating, these were often covered over. Tenants supplied their own stoves for cooking and heating.

Needless to say, living conditions were grim. Many tenement residents had no direct access to light and fresh air. Construction was primarily of wood, so fire was a constant threat. Privies were shared and rarely cleaned out; access to water for bathing, laundry, and cooking was limited.

New York City's Tenement House Act of 1879 addressed these conditions by mandating that new tenement houses could not occupy more than 65 percent of the lot. Enforcement of this provision was, however, not upheld. Instead, developers compromised by introducing the “dumbbell” tenement plan, which typically filled at least 80 percent of the lot.

Dumbbell tenements, also referred to as “old law” tenements, derived from a plan submitted by the architect James E. Ware to a tenement house design competition sponsored by the journal *Plumber and Sanitary Engineer*, in 1878. The competition called for a plan that conformed to New York's 25-by-100-foot gridiron lots, provided affordable rentals for tenants, yielded a viable return for landowners, and increased ventilation, light, and fireproofing. Ware's entry kept the overall organization of the railroad flat but added a light well (also called an air shaft) in the center of each long wall that would, when two dumbbell tenements were built adjacent to one another, combine with its neighboring light well to form a

small court. The light well also gave the plan its dumbbell shape, narrow in the center but still filling the full 25-foot width of the lot at the front and rear. The rooms adjacent to it were now smaller. The center room of a three-room unit was still windowless.

The shafts were usually only 20 to 30 inches in width. Aside from the rooms on the top floor, these shafts, therefore, did not provide much illumination or ventilation. Instead, they often became garbage dumps as tenants threw kitchen scraps and other waste into them. Building inspectors reported that trash hung from window sills and the walls inside the shaft. In the event of fire, the air shaft rapidly spread the blaze up and down floors and from building to building.

Speculative builders in other American cities began using the dumbbell plan shortly after its introduction in New York. The plan's appearance in Boston led to changes in that city's building code to reduce the size of tenements and prevent Boston's built environment from becoming like New York's. Overall, local governments and housing reformers disliked the dumbbell plan; its prevalence in New York led to more competitions for improved tenement house plans and contributed to ongoing updates in building legislation. Existing tenement houses, whether railroad or dumbbell, were rarely torn down unless their structural conditions became imminently dangerous. Thus, many nineteenth-century tenement houses still stand in New York and other cities and are still used as rental housing.

New York's Tenement House Act of 1901, called the “new law,” continues to be the basis for the city's regulation of low-rise housing construction today and influenced housing legislation across the United States. It mandated a maximum lot coverage of 70 percent; most significantly, it created a new Tenement House Department to ensure its enforcement. New-law tenements eliminated air shafts and instead required a minimum 12-by-24-foot courtyard and minimum 12-foot rear yard, both to be larger for structures more than 60 feet high. Buildings could not be taller than one and one-third the width of the adjacent street. The new law also required every room to have a window opening onto the outdoors; each apartment also had to have running water and a water closet. Many new-law tenements were built

in the early twentieth century, especially in upper Manhattan and the Bronx.

Amy Elizabeth Johnson

See also Housing; New York City, New York; Riis, Jacob; Social Housing

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THEMED ENVIRONMENTS

In May 2008, media around the globe reported a story titled “Beatlemania Comes to the Chelsea Flower Show with George Harrison-themed Garden.” Widely regarded as the ultimate horticultural event worldwide, the show offered visitors an impressive array of gardening products, exhibits, and fantasies. Codesigned by his widow, Olivia, the Harrison garden was meant to evoke both the spirit of the 1960s and the personal philosophy of one of its most famous pop musicians, who himself had been a keen amateur gardener. Titled “From Life to Life, a Garden for George,” the installation employed 76 species and varieties of flowers, some in psychedelic colors, to celebrate Harrison’s life in four stages: childhood, his Beatles’ fame, inner self, and spiritual life. In the second section, the quiet Beatle was feted by a six-foot-wide glass sun with the inscription “Sun, sun, sun, here it comes,” reminding viewers of his song “Here Comes the Sun.” Lest the spirit of the garden be overlooked, Beatles drummer Ringo Starr inaugurated the exhibit, driving up in a vintage Mini decorated with Hindu symbols calling to mind Harrison’s spiritual journey to India.

The George Harrison garden at the Chelsea Flower Show is emblematic both of the ubiquitous presence of themed environments in contemporary society and their intimate connection with popular culture. By definition, a themed environment is a place whose spatial organization and meaning system are organized according to an overarching concept or narrative. A central purpose in creating these narrative spaces is to impose coherence on a disparate array of images or attractions. Shaw and Williams have identified themed environments as a subset of themed spaces (the others are theme parks and themed landscapes). According to their typology, themed environments are the spaces of everyday life that use theming concepts and technologies and become visitor attractions appealing to the consumer experience. This includes such familiar urban hangouts as Starbucks and other similar coffee shops, which deliberately evoke the *brio* of an Italian *espresso* bar, as well as the romance and exoticism of the mountainous coffee plantations of Guatemala and Panama. Private spaces such as this are carefully and deliberately constructed, themed, and regulated.

Themed environments can vary in size from a leisure venue as large as Disney World to a child’s bedroom decorated to look like Harry Potter’s dormitory room. Among the most commonly studied themed environments are amusement parks, casinos, restaurants and diners, airports, interactive museums, department stores, shopping malls, sports bars, and cruise ships. In recent years, researchers have extended the concept to include such disparate environments as Wall Street, a Star Trek-themed dentist office in Florida, the lobby of a bank branch, touring rock concerts, and virtual gaming. For the most part, themed environments are explicitly directed toward promoting tourism and commercial consumption. However, some organizations have employed the principles of theming to create immersive, entertaining environments wherein their moral and spiritual messages can be delivered. For example, a group of Swiss evangelical Christians recently announced plans for a biblical-themed attraction in Germany to be known as Genesis Park. Among the premier attractions will be an “original size” Noah’s ark, a heaven-and-hell-themed roller coaster, and a Tower of Babel panorama restaurant.

Theming has also found its way into the health care sector. As Brian Lonsway discovered, in the late 1990s, the Disney Institute in Florida began to train health professionals in a new service approach that emulates the thematic model of the entertainment industry. Disney itself brought this model to Celebration Health, the hospital in its town in central Florida. Thus, Seaside Imaging, the hospital's medical imaging center has been rebranded as "A Day at the Beach." Housed in a building designed to resemble a sand castle, the center offers a theatrical patient experience that includes a boardwalk floor, barium drinks served with paper umbrellas, Adirondack chairs in the waiting room, and Hawaiian shirts in lieu of gowns.

It is generally acknowledged that themed environments are not unique to the present era. In his seminal work, *The Theming of America*, Mark Gottdiener traces theming back as far as classical Athens, Rome, and Beijing. Traditional and ancient cities, he notes, were completely organized by cosmological and religious meanings whose purposes were to enhance fertility, to celebrate empire, to glorify rulers and gods, to achieve harmony with nature, and to promote good fortune. In medieval Europe, the symbolic content of city spaces pertained to the Catholic cathedral and, in some cases, Jerusalem and the Holy Land.

With the growth of the modern industrial city in the nineteenth century, functionalism removed the symbolic canopy from most urban spaces. By the turn of the century, a new vision of planning and architecture had begun to emerge, celebrating progress and technological efficiency while downplaying thematic representations of leisure, fantasy, and traditional cultures. As the century proceeded, however, fantasy-themed environments began to emerge in concert with the new consumer society. Progenitors of contemporary themed environments include turn-of-the-(twentieth)-century amusement parks such as Coney Island's Luna Park and Dreamland, expositions and world fairs, and roadside diners, restaurants, and motels.

According to Gottdiener, themed development has come into its own since World War II due to an important shift in marketing to segmentation and its reliance on themes. That is, marketers in the United States went from appealing to a largely homogenous population to targeting a more diverse demographic arrayed according to consumer types

based on income, education, stage in the life course, family status, urban-suburban location, ethnicity, race, and preferred lifestyle. This shift to market segmentation permitted advertisers to construct and exploit a much wider range of thematic motifs that tapped into consumer fantasies.

Another important contributing factor has been described as the de-differentiation of consumption—a general trend whereby the forms of consumption associated with each other become interlocked and increasingly difficult to identify separately. This is embodied in the eroding distinctions between casinos, hotels, restaurants, shopping, and theme parks in Las Vegas. Most recently, John Hannigan identified the emergence of the casino city as a global model of urban development and consumer culture. Casino cities thrive at the intersection of three complementary commercial spheres: the luxury goods and services industry, the corporate gaming (gambling) sector, and the international tourist trade. In aggressively themed environments such as the new generation of casino-hotels in Macau, the lines between shopping and entertainment are deliberately blurred in the interests of hyperconsumption.

Gottdiener argues that the increasing use of theming is a corporate strategy for coping with an escalating competition for consumer dollars during the present period of highly mobile shoppers, alternate consumption locations, and increasingly diverse lifestyle choices. Along with branding, this is seen as a way of cutting through a marketplace that is saturated with signs and symbols. Furthermore, themed environments are conceived in the context of increasing spatial competition. Whereas initially this was among individual retail destinations such as shopping malls, it has now been extended to a global competition between cities and regions.

Theming and Branding

Some discussions of theming link it with the allied concept of branding. Within this context, theming is treated as a method of sharpening brand awareness and strengthening its core identity and value. Thus, Australian (Aussie) and Irish-themed bars and pubs, ubiquitous in entertainment districts across the globe, enhance not only the brand of the local establishment but also that of the brewery

that owns and operates them (e.g., Guinness Corporation, Scottish and Newcastle) and the nation (Ireland, Australia) itself. These themed pubs and bars are decorated with kitsch that evokes national stereotypes, most of which no longer accurately describe the contemporary situation. For example, some Aussie pubs play up the crocodile theme, which is also aggressively promoted in national branding campaigns that feature such iconic characters, real and fictional, as the cinema's Crocodile Dundee and crocodile hunter Steve Irwin (and, since his death, his young daughter Bindi Sue).

One recent trend has been the use of themed environments to enhance urban brands and facilitate place marketing. As David Grazian shows in his ethnography, *Blue Chicago*, that city's invented status as the blues capital of the world was the result of promotional strategies employed by governments, newspapers, downtown hotels, club owners, and other local city boosters, designed to transform the Chicago blues experience into a commercialized tourist attraction. Official initiatives here include promotional brochures, free concerts at the Chicago Cultural Center, guided half-day bus excursions from downtown to the Bronzeville neighborhood, and, especially, the Chicago Blues Festival, which Grazian calls the Disneyland of the blues. In addition to the main bandshell, the festival features three smaller stages, each of which is designed visually and musically according to a specific theme or image associated with American blues music.

Theming and Authenticity

One of the dimensions of themed environments that have occasioned a great deal of comment is that of authenticity. Authenticity, Grazian tells us, has two separate but related attributes: the ability to conform to an idealized set of expectations and the ability to seem natural and effortless, rather than deliberately manufactured. Once considered an objective category, authenticity is now generally acknowledged to be a product of social construction. Typically, discussions of theming and authenticity begin with seminal observations on the nature of American society by the Italian semiologist Umberto Eco and the French sociologist Jean Baudrillard. With the Disney theme parks in

mind, Eco and Baudrillard both depict America as a hyper-real realm in which the simulacra or "real fake" predominates. One striking manifestation of this is the theme town. In one memorable empirical case study, Stephen Frenkel and Judy Walton apply this to the recent history of Leavenworth, Washington, a Pacific Northwestern community in economic decline that successfully reinvented itself in the 1960s as an authentic Bavarian town. As the authors point out, achieving an authentic look here extends beyond building design to the creation of a full sensory experience that includes a dress code and Bavarian music. In the early 1990s, a committee of the City Planning Commission announced that the majority of Leavenworth's commercial buildings did not embody a genuine Bavarian-Alpine style; subsequently, stricter requirements were put in place. Leavenworth and Walton note how ironic this is, given that Leavenworth is an authentic Bavarian village only insofar as it constitutes "an authentic fake."

Another striking example of this is Tiki, a faux, themed Polynesian subculture that enjoyed a period of popularity in the 1950s and 1960s, especially in southern California. Tiki boasted an impressive menu of artifacts, design elements, and leisure activities: themed bars and restaurants, backyard luau parties festooned with torches, exotica music, South Seas-inspired vernacular architecture (motels, apartment buildings, bowling alleys, roadside stands), invented tropical rum drinks, amusement parks, and a long shopping list of Tiki artifacts—mugs, souvenir menus, matchbooks, swizzle sticks, postcards, and carved idols. Even as Tiki incorporated such modernist elements as A-frame architecture and cool jazz, it offered up an invented and largely fictional religious mythology featuring primitive deities and rituals associated with Tiki idols.

For the most part, academic commentators have decried the artificial or inauthentic nature of themed environments. In particular, Disneyland and Disney World have been summarily dismissed on the grounds that they are contrived, utopian, and fake, offering up a distorted and ideologically conservative view of history. The Disney imaginers (designers) are criticized for parsing out anything that even hints at inequality, dissent, or conflict. Other national cultures are reduced to stereotypes and constitute little more than theme

parks in their own right. Furthermore, these simulated geographical and historical terrains are essentially sophisticated marketplaces for corporately branded products and services. Architectural historian Christine Boyer argues that the overriding problem with the Disney theme parks, as well as with public spaces such as New York's South Street Seaport that have been converted into maritime themed environments, is not so much that they are falsified but rather that they are landscapes of consumption posing as landscapes of leisure.

An ancillary question here is whether consumers are even aware that themed environments are inherently inauthentic (and whether they care). In this regard, Alan Beardsworth and Alan Bryman have introduced a quasification approach, which, they claim, represents the opposite of Gottdiener's characterization of consumers in themed environments as being unwilling and unaware dupes. In contrast, Beardsworth and Bryman argue that visitors to Disney theme parks and themed restaurants know full well that they are being presented with fabricated and fantasized images and settings that are underpinned by a corporate ethic. Desperate to escape the tedium of everyday life, consumers revel in the staged nature of themed experiences, as long as these are technically convincing and they feel that the contrived atmosphere and environment is out in the open.

Where this quasification interpretation falters is in overlooking those dimensions of theming that are less visible. As Scott Lukas has noted, theming operates at multiple levels of the authentic. Based on extensive, ethnographic research at various themed environments (casinos, theme parks), Lukas concludes that the technologies and effects of theming are varied and complex. Along the Las Vegas Strip, casino designers and operators have increasingly employed a sensory-based microtheming and performative theming. The former refers to the specific and nuanced ways in which theming is developed on a minute level, while the latter denotes the use of performance to motivate employees and mount a sensory assault on the customer. These can range from the aggressive, multisensory bombardment at the Treasure Island casino pirate show, to the more subtle theming strategies at the Bellagio, which are intended to market what Bourdieu has termed *habitus*. During a stint as a

corporate trainer at the now-defunct theme park, AstroWorld, Lukas observed that some employees readily bought into their roles as cast members in themed performances, while some others struggled with the necessity of surrendering their individual identities.

Lukas's thesis is underscored by "Touch the Magic," Susan Davis's ethnographic study of Sea World in San Diego. Davis found that Busch Entertainment and its parent company, brewing giant Anheuser Busch, carefully orchestrated a consistent themed narrative through its overlapping commercials, marketing and publicity materials, and day-to-day theme park operations. In unison, this transforms nature into an overwhelmingly visual and emotional experience, the centerpiece of which is the possibility of physical contact with marine animals, notably Shamu, the killer whale. Sea World, Davis concludes, decontextualizes nature by eliminating any reference to human (and corporate) environmental despoilers and then recasts it as a powerful carrier of human emotions. In this idealized natural world, communicating with whales and dolphins helps visitors to have real feelings and become someone different and more desirable.

Academic commentators have also criticized contemporary themed environments on the grounds that they are totalitarian and totally scripted, allowing no space for any measure of spontaneity or creative expression. For example, architect and cultural critic Michael Sorkin has described Disneyland as being "a concentration camp for pleasure" that produces no new experiences, only the opportunity for the compulsive repetition of a rigorously programmed repertoire of magic moments. Visitors to venues such as the Disney amusement parks are discouraged from following their own itinerary. Doing so increases the chances that they may think about things in a way that deviates from the scripted theme. Among the devices used to ensure guest compliance are landscape architecture, technology, and scheduling (e.g., timed tickets to special events and performances).

However, some researchers have questioned the extent to which themed environments are pervasive and totalizing. For example, Dennis Judd argues that enclave-like tourist spaces, which incorporate a high degree of surveillance and control, constitute only one component of the city. Elsewhere, notably in edgy urban neighborhoods,

city visitors are free to wander about at their own speed and draw their own conclusions. Furthermore, the postmodern tourist possesses a significant capacity to escape from the close surveillance and control that characterize such space and to deviate from a dominant corporate script. By strategically adopting an ironic stance, posttourists are empowered and able to actively seek their own experiences. Indeed, Richard Florida's creative class, the target of numerous contemporary urban revitalization plans, is said to reject themed environments such as megamalls, sports stadiums, and flagship museums in favor of more diverse, bohemian settings such as neighborhood art galleries, performance spaces and theaters, small jazz and music clubs and "cool" cafés.

John Hannigan

See also Gottdiener, Mark; Las Vegas, Nevada; Society of the Spectacle; Tourism; Urban Entertainment Destination

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TIEBOUT HYPOTHESIS

A 1956 article by Charles Tiebout proposed a two-part hypothesis about a system of local governments. The first part is that households decide where to live based in part on communities' service-tax packages. The second part is that community selection results in efficient levels of local public services, in the sense that each household ends up with the service-tax package it prefers.

Interest in the first part of the Tiebout Hypothesis was magnified by Wallace Oates's 1969 article, which provided strong empirical evidence that public service levels and property tax rates are reflected, or capitalized, in housing prices. This finding supports the view that people care about the service-tax package in their community.

Since then, a large empirical literature has confirmed the existence of capitalization. Moreover, a large conceptual literature has explored the nature of federal systems, with many local governments and mobile households. The consensus is that capitalization reflects household bids for entry into communities with different fiscal characteristics. In addition, this literature concludes that higher-income households are likely to win the competition for entry into the most desirable communities, a phenomenon known as sorting.

The second part of the Tiebout Hypothesis has attracted attention because it provides an alternative to the view that voters have an incentive to understate their preferences for public services

(the so-called free-rider problem), resulting in inefficient levels of public services. The Tiebout alternative flows from an analogy between shopping for a community and shopping for an ordinary good. As is well known, competitive markets lead to efficient outcomes under certain assumptions, and Tiebout provided a set of assumptions under which the same reasoning could be applied to shopping for a community.

This set includes the assumptions that consumer-voters are mobile and well informed, that a region has many communities with fixed service levels and tax rates, that local public services have no spillovers from one community to the next, and that all communities can maintain the population that minimizes per-capita public service costs. Tiebout recognized that his assumptions are extreme. They rule out a housing market and a property tax, for example, and require communities to maintain unchanging service levels while having an unrealistic degree of control over the size of their population.

A 1975 article by Bruce Hamilton adds a housing market and a property tax and provides the associated set of assumptions required to achieve efficiency. One assumption is that every community sets a zoning requirement at exactly the optimal level of housing for its residents. This is unrealistic both because zoning is imprecise and because the residents of a community have an incentive to cut their own property taxes by requiring new houses to be more expensive than their own. Moreover, the Hamilton model predicts that capitalization will disappear; after all, no household will bid up the price of housing in another community if its members already have the housing and service-tax package they prefer. This prediction is contradicted by the evidence.

The consensus model of bidding and sorting, which predicts capitalization, concurs with Tiebout that an urban area is more efficient with many local governments than with one, but it rejects the Tiebout conclusion of perfect efficiency. In particular, this model implies that household choices are distorted by the property tax, even with many local governments. This conclusion is not altered in models that integrate households' community-choice and voting decisions. There is no consensus, however, about the magnitude of the resulting welfare losses or the best public policies for eliminating this inefficiency.

Sorting also leads to higher-quality public services in rich than in poor communities. Although this equity issue is not considered by Tiebout, it flows out of the models he helped to inspire, and it plays an important role in the American federal system. In the case of education, for example, many state supreme courts have found that, because of wealth variation across communities, an education funding system that relies heavily on property taxes does not satisfy the equity standards established by their state constitutions. Thus, a full treatment of the normative issues raised by models descended from Tiebout's must compare policies on both efficiency and equity grounds.

John Yinger

See also Local Government; Suburbanization; Urban Economics

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TIME GEOGRAPHY

Time geography represents both a theory and method of tracing daily routines as coordinates of time and space. Its origins reside in the pioneering work of Torsten Hägerstrand (1916-2004) and the Lund School, from which questions of time and temporality emerged in the 1970s as neglected

dimensions of human geography. Time geography remains influential in urban geography as a means of mapping and measuring location-accessibility problems, but it has lost favor among urban anthropologists who criticize the use of space and time as empty abstractions of distance and duration.

In much the same way that Georg Simmel viewed the spontaneous movements of urban dwellers as webs of social interaction, Hägerstrand sought to capture the “choreography of existence.” He viewed the most mundane projects of daily life, such as chaperoning a young child to school on the way to work, as a function of multiple “pockets of local order,” the path or trajectory of which is governed by three simple but fundamental contextual limitations. The first of these, the capability constraint, concerns physical limits to movement including the inability to be in two places at once. Second, a coupling constraint describes situations that compel people to come together at certain times and locations such as for face-to-face service delivery, family celebrations, medical appointments, and the like. Third, authority constraints exist in the form of legal sanctions and regulations such as those restricting entry to places selling alcohol. The most arresting image associated with this choreography is a three-dimensional prism, mapping an individual’s path in space (annotated movements across the x–y axes of a morphological map) and relating this to a time budget (the 24-hour day) recorded on the z-axis.

The prism renders complex situated behavior with a simplicity that is appealing but heavily criticized for the tendency to reduce webs of interaction to quantified nodes or intersections. Sweeping structures appear to displace individual agency and erase the significance of cultural practices and local knowledge. Feminist scholars point out that time is not a gender-neutral, quantity-based resource, which is equally available to everyone as a measure of the calendar or clock. The passage of time and pace of life will vary, just as people’s experience of space and place is shaped by subjectivity: power, fear, and physical capability.

Despite this criticism, there are ample examples in contemporary research of the constructive application of time geography to questions of work–life balance. Moreover, it is now possible to redeploy Hägerstrand’s principles to combined GIS-ethnography initiatives, with the aid of

sophisticated satellite tracking devices. For example, researchers have exploited advanced tracking technologies to study pedestrian spatial behavior in which it is possible to incorporate a log of perceptual experience (fear, discomfort, intimidation, landscape aesthetic, and the like). Future time-geography research calls for a more integrated, materially embedded theory of everyday coordination.

Helen Jarvis

See also Journey to Work; Urban Geography; Urban Theory; Women and the City

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TOILETS

This entry is concerned with “away from home” toilets, also known as restrooms, bathrooms, lavatories, and public conveniences. Away-from-home toilets may be divided into two categories: those provided off the street to serve the occupants of offices, stores, factories, sports stadia, entertainment venues, and so forth and “on street” municipal public toilets for the needs of pedestrians, cyclists, public transport users, shoppers, workers, tourists, and commuters. Public toilets are essential to creating efficient, accessible, sustainable, healthy, and equitable modern cities because everyone needs to use the bathroom several times a day.

The industrialization, urbanization, and population growth of the nineteenth century led to toilet provision, alongside the installation of sewers, drains, and water supply. Toilet installation was undertaken for public health reasons, to reduce street fouling and the prevalence of water-borne diseases such as cholera, and from a sense of civic pride and philanthropy. The first major phase of public-toilet building in Britain took place under the 1875 Public Health Act, which also introduced a rudimentary town planning system. Early town planning was strongly linked to public health.

Both women and men were involved in the early town planning reform movement. In the twentieth century, planning underwent professionalization and became a male-dominated, governmental function. As urban policy became more ambitious and academically sophisticated, planning became separated from its public health roots. Public-toilet provision became relegated to low-status technical departments responsible for waste collection and street cleaning. The 1936 Public Health Act gave local authorities permissive, rather than mandatory powers to provide public toilets. No reference was made to public-toilet provision in the British Planning Acts or in other Western planning systems.

Toilet provision was for everyone, but in the beginning, women's needs were given far less priority. In 1900 London, the Leicester Square toilets provided 27 urinals and 13 cubicles (stalls) for men and 7 women's cubicles. Vienna, London, Turin, and Paris were amply provided with embarrassingly open wrought iron, male street urinals, demarcating the city as male space. Whereas men were "entitled to overflow on the public highway," respectable women were not meant to need toilets. Inadequate provision for women may be seen as a way of controlling women's mobility within the public realm. Public toilets in London were built underground for reasons of propriety and for easy access to adjacent sewers and could only be accessed by steps, restricting access for those with baby buggies, luggage, or disability.

Nevertheless, well-intentioned local authorities continued to build public toilets, and up to the late 1960s, no one seemed to question their importance. Public toilets were even offered by private property developers as an additional sweetener or planning gain (zoning bonus) when seeking planning permission. By the 1970s, attitudes began to

change. Increased car ownership led policymakers (wrongly) to imagine there was less need for toilet provision than when everyone travelled by public transport. Privatization of state enterprises and cost-cutting led to the sale of public buildings and reduced provision of public services. This accelerated under New Right governments of the 1980s and continues today. Public toilets were a soft target when savings had to be made because there is no mandatory legal requirement for provision. The principles of sewers and drains socialism have been forgotten, with aggressive privatization of water and sewerage services taking place throughout the world.

In Britain, the New Labor government from the 1990s prioritized environmental sustainability policy, encouraging people to use public transport by restricting car use, but with little consideration of the support facilities needed. If the government wants people to get out of their cars and to use public transport, then public toilet provision is a necessity, particularly at transport termini, because people cannot simply jump into their car and drive to the nearest service station to find a toilet. But there is no reference to toilet provision in any central-government spatial planning policy documents. Rather, toilet closure is legitimated as a way of solving the problem of antisocial behavior. Public toilets are heavily contested public spaces, attracting all sorts of people, including the homeless, vandals, and drug addicts, and they are popular locations for male homosexual activity. The solution is not to close the toilets but to provide attendants and more investment to meet the toilet needs of the general public, while separately addressing the related social issues.

Major new access requirements have been introduced under the Disability Discrimination Acts of 1995 and 2005, along with building regulations and standards reforms, which are comparable in content to the Americans with Disabilities Acts and the accessibility codes introduced in many other countries. Great emphasis is put on the provision and design of toilets that are accessible for people with disabilities within different types of buildings. Because there is no spatial policy guidance, development plan requirement, or legislation specifying the location and distribution of public toilets within urban space, large sections of the population are severely disadvantaged, and

dis-enabled, by a lack of certainty that toilet provision will be available in city centers, local centers, or the transportation network. People's freedom to travel, shop, and work is constrained by the bladder's leash. Those affected include the registered disabled as well as many women, elderly people, and people with children and babies; in fact, everyone still needs public toilets. An urban spatial toilet strategy needs to be developed based on a hierarchy of levels of provision. An urban spatial toilet strategy needs to be developed based on a hierarchy of levels of provision.

Where no public toilets exist, people cannot necessarily use off-street toilets in cafés and bars as was customary in continental Europe. Access may be strictly controlled for customers' use only and unavailable after closing time. New toilet facilities are usually minimal such as the much-feared Automatic Public Toilet. While traditional toilets are being closed in many cities, street urinals catering solely to the nighttime needs of the young male drinker are proliferating within the 24-hour city and bar-based evening economy.

All this is a particularly Western problem. A restroom revolution is under way in the Far East, where public-toilet policy is recognized as an important component of urban policy making. City planning authorities are required to show the location, distribution, and availability of public toilets in all development plans and spatial policy documents. Toilet ratios of 2:1 or even 3:1 female-to-male are to be found in China, South Korea, and Japan.

Inadequate toilet provision militates against achieving equality and diversity policy objectives. Whereas women are the majority of public-toilet users, men are the providers and designers of toilets, manifesting little understanding of women's needs. The U.K. government, as a result of European Union regulation, has recently introduced a demand that local government incorporate gender considerations into all aspects of spatial policy making, resource allocation, and management objectives. These measures need to be applied to toilet provision as men have twice as many public toilet facilities as women. Typically, even if there are equal numbers of cubicles (stalls) for women and men, men usually have extensive urinal provision, too. In spite of years of feminism, the true position of women may be measured by the length of the

queue for the female toilets. In contrast, moves towards "potty parity" in Western cities, such as New York, must be treated with caution. The standards generally relate to new-toilet construction which is relatively rare, while closures continue. While women are the majority of public toilet users, men have been the designers and providers of public facilities. It is important that urban planners, with their concerns for social inclusion, sustainability, and spatial policy, ensure the provision of toilets for women and those with disabilities.

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TOKYO, JAPAN

This entry introduces Tokyo's urban development in the historical and institutional framework. Tokyo has had a history of more than 400 years as Japan's capital, since the feudal Tokugawa Shogunate government moved the capital from Kyoto to Edo (Tokyo) in the early seventeenth

century. State-led capitalism, which followed in the middle of the nineteenth century, made Tokyo a modern city as Japan's late industrial development and international relations began in the midst of Western colonialism in Asia. Tokyo has long since played the central role in the economy and culture in Japan as well as in geopolitics in East Asia. History, the state, geography, and international relations have intrinsically influenced and shaped Tokyo's urban development.

Tokyo and the State

Tokyo is first and foremost capital of the Japanese state. Defeated in World War II, the state continued to lead the postwar society and economy through developmentalism, which advocated state-managed markets in the national interest and guided the economy through public policies and market incentives by coordinating capital, labor, and government. The stable political-bureaucratic elite ran the state and deterred interest groups from intervening in public policies. The developmental state emphasized the high-productivity growth industry sector, while depressing public consumption and investment in the urban centers. It engaged in managed globalization with national comparative advantage in mind.

Tokyo embodied the policies and practices of the developmental state. The centralized state policy-making process attracted the nation's major corporate head offices, financial institutions, and nongovernment organizations (such as labor and business federations) to Tokyo to be closer to the state. Higher education and public and private research institutes were concentrated in Tokyo to train the bureaucratic elite and serve the state. State planning and industrial policies contributed to the transformation of Tokyo's spatial structure and landscape. State-managed trade with the world made Tokyo the basing point for Japanese corporations' global operations. As a result, Tokyo's urban development was well supported by Japan's postwar developmentalism, which generated high economic growth, higher wages, a relatively egalitarian society, and stable national security.

But Japan's developmental regime has weakened considerably since the 1980s. The wildly speculative and inflated bubble economy in the 1980s, and the long deflationary period following

its collapse in the 1990s, led to the crisis of developmentalism and catalyzed Japan's transition toward a postdevelopmental regime. The ultimate cause of the regime shift, however, was domestic politics. Urban voters came to prefer consumption to production and began to see the developmental state as obsolete and unresponsive to their needs. They made a political choice for a consumption-based public policy over production and elected city administrations that would respond to their demand for increased public services and an improved quality of life. Public discontent with the developmental state grew as income inequality and unemployment rates rose in the 1980s and 1990s, and it was compounded by new concerns about the aging society and the environment. Out of touch, the political party (LDP), which had ruled Japan for more than half a century, lost its momentum and its majority in the early 1990s. The Japanese state is in the transition to a postdevelopmental state. So is Tokyo.

The Economy

Tokyo has a versatile metropolitan economy covering manufacturing, services, wholesale and retail trades, and cultural industries, without skewing toward finance, insurance, and real estate like other global cities. Tokyo's core economy is manufacturing technology. Tokyo's labor force is overwhelmingly in the service industry, similar to the situation in other global cities, and only 10 percent is in manufacturing. This is the result not of deindustrialization but of state industrial policy. State policy led the staged move from heavy industry in the 1950s and 1960s to innovative industry in the 1990s and 2000s. Rather than going through the usual postindustrial society, Tokyo's economy has evolved around the dynamic manufacturing technology industry sector. Services and cultural industries are highly interconnected to the manufacturing technology dynamics.

The Tokyo economy is rooted in place-based industry clusters, which include networks of Japanese transnational corporations, small supplier firms, and R&D institutes. The versatile economy includes many different industries, not a specialized few, and a crafts culture that emphasizes art and skill. Tokyo's less turbulent economy owes much to place-based industry clusters in publication and

printing, electronics, steel and metal, general machinery, automobiles, precision instruments, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, information technology, video games, digital animation, fashion, and design and architecture. Publications and printing and information industries are concentrated in central Tokyo; general machinery, electronics, precision instruments, and transport are in the southern waterfront on the east and the edge of western Tokyo; chemical and pharmaceutical industries are in western suburban Tokyo. Some of these industry clusters have traditionally been in Tokyo.

New industry clusters such as information technology, video games, and digital animation have developed out of traditional industry clusters in the 1990s. Information technology clusters that have emerged in downtown Tokyo are typically clustered around the major stations of train and subway lines in central Tokyo. Tokyo is now creating new international R&D for life science clusters in western suburban Tokyo and the bay area under the state-industry cluster plan. About 90 percent of Tokyo firms have fewer than 20 employees. A high degree of place-based industry clusters protects small firms from being swallowed by large corporations and enables them to play a dynamic role in technology innovation, the consumer market, and the versatile economy. The Tokyo Metropolitan Government (TMG) protects small businesses through various policies along with national policies.

Industry clusters are the vital component of Tokyo's economic base and the driving force of Tokyo's technological and market changes as well. New products and technologies come out of a powerful network of relationships—among headquarters, R&D centers, small firms engaged in prototype production, and mother plants for testing and pilot production that are all located in geographical proximity. When they prove successful in Tokyo's demanding test markets like Ginza, Shinjuku, Shibuya, and Akihabara, higher-volume production for domestic and global markets is usually turned over to plants located elsewhere in Japan, East Asia, and other parts of the world. The Tokyo economy is sustained by the simultaneous development of the greater metropolitan region and East Asia.

Tokyo's relationship to the world is not driven by global market logic but by the Japanese state's strategic concern to preserve national autonomy in the world order. Because of state-led globalization,

Tokyo is mainly a national base for the global operations of Japanese transnational companies. Japan's managed-trade policy keeps foreign investment in Japan minuscule (less than 5 percent of GDP, even in 2008).

Innovation and Culture

Reflecting its old culture and history, Tokyo has long survived periodic innovation that renewed the city. Tokyo's innovation is not based on creative destruction in the neoclassical economic sense but continuity with the past. It is evolutionary, not breakthrough. Historically, Tokyo kept traditional arts and cultures but simultaneously attracted new and international arts and cultures, mingling both traditional and new and creating something else.

Tokyo's innovation starts with the creation of new ideas and knowledge. Tokyo has historically been Japan's nexus for the global conversion of knowledge from outside the company to inside and then outside again as the principal mechanism by which the Japanese economy creates new products and services. Tokyo's transnational corporations take their services and products outside Tokyo and Japan and try them out globally. Testing these innovations out in Tokyo's test markets and getting inspiration from consumer reactions, they then incorporate the new ideas into new services and products. Consumer markets that function as test markets are located in spatial agglomerations of commercial activity and culture, located near transportation hubs where several millions of passengers come and go. They are often linked to specific industries, products, and services; companies and consumers test out the newest product ideas and set fashion trends.

Tokyo's high-quality transport and communication infrastructure speeds the flow of information among nodes in the network. Tokyo's agglomeration of financial institutions and business services provides network actors with capital and specialized expertise. Tokyo's wide range of industries facilitates prototype production and market experimentation. Tokyo's vast number of bars, restaurants, and nightclubs facilitate informal face-to-face communications. Tokyo's concentration of universities turns out a highly educated workforce.

The egalitarian and participatory culture of the Tokyo consuming public is also visible in animation

and video games. Techniques of story making and ways of expression trace back to twelfth-century picture scrolls and to nineteenth-century *ukiyo-e* woodcut prints. These were not upper-class arts but expressions of the common people. The notion that everyone draws pictures and tells stories has been cultivated throughout much of Japanese history. There are no sharp distinctions between elite and mass culture. Creators of commercially successful animation films and comics are regarded as established artists in Tokyo.

Social and Spatial Organization

Neighborhoods and communities in the Tokyo metropolitan area are relatively egalitarian. Tokyo is a relatively homogeneous city with only 7 percent of its population registered as foreigners among 12 million people. According to the 2005 population census, 83 percent of the registered foreigners lived in Tokyo's 23 wards and the rest in suburbs. About 12 percent of them lived in the four central wards, and the rest were spread almost evenly in the rest of the central city. The social and ethnic mix comes from a historical and ideological legacy of the developmental state. Classes don't play a segregating role in Tokyo. The rich and the poor tend to share the urban space in Tokyo.

Tokyo was a socially unequal city before World War II, but postwar economic growth and the compressed corporate wage structure led Tokyo to become a relatively egalitarian society. Tokyo's spatial inequality trend has been cyclical: Inequality fell in the 1970s, rose in the 1980s, fell in the 1990s, and rose again between 2000 and 2005 in a wavelike pattern. Spatial income inequality has been higher in Tokyo's central city than in Tokyo's 26 suburban cities. A small number of Tokyo's wealthy central wards have historically established the income stratification pattern for the entire central city and Tokyo. The fluctuating fortunes of the four wealthy wards (Chiyoda, Chuo, Minato, and Shibuya) largely have determined the rise and fall of spatial inequality in Tokyo as a whole. Dropping the four central wards from the analysis nearly eliminates the increase in inequality among wards between 1971 and 2005. Tokyo's cyclical trend in place inequality is rooted in the city's real estate cycle. Land prices, housing cost, and income levels correlate highly in Tokyo. Land and housing costs

are highest in the central core and taper away according to distance from the central core. Stock and property values ballooned in the 1980s, burst and collapsed in the early 1990s, and turned upward again in the past few years. The recent upward trend has been caused by increases in land values and land transactions through newly securitized real estate investment trusts and a redevelopment boom of central business districts. The rise and fall in land values and per capita income is disproportionately concentrated in the four wealthy wards, as are the dwelling places of the owners, brokers, builders, bankers, and ancillary services providers most involved in playing the real estate game.

Class-based segregation has been almost absent, let alone an extreme class polarization. The spatial diversity of Tokyo's economy, in this case, the more balanced spatial mix between finance, insurance and real estate and manufacturing, reduces inequality in Tokyo, as does the more balanced spatial mix among professional, managerial, and production workers. Spatial integration by industry and occupational groups condenses Tokyo's place stratification, while spatial segregation by industry and occupational groups expands other global cities' place stratification. Tokyo has an even distribution of income among places.

Cultural, institutional, and policy factors have reduced income inequality and contribute to Tokyo's integrated neighborhoods. Because the education system is centralized, school quality does not depend on residential choices. Teachers' salaries in primary and junior high schools are paid by the central state and by TMG. School teachers' salaries are almost uniform throughout the central city and suburban cities from primary through senior high schools. As the dwelling place for high-income people and big corporations, Tokyo's central core is a tax-rich place, but Japan's tax system doesn't allow wealthy ward governments to keep their tax wealth and use it for their own purpose. TMG collects taxes from the central core and redistributes them back according to public services. Public investment projects are relatively evenly distributed throughout Tokyo. TMG allocates its public housing throughout Tokyo. All public housing complexes have a combination of low- and middle-income family housing, and some include shops, offices, craft workshops, and community centers at the ground level.

Tokyo's spatial distribution of innovative activity, employment, and income contrasts strikingly with the Western cities modeled by the global city theory. In the Western world city, manufacturing innovation takes place in the peripheral suburban rings of metropolitan areas, not the urban cores; income is polarized between wealthy outer districts and impoverished inner-city areas; and the disparities in development between innovative city regions and other areas are large and growing. In Tokyo, by contrast, innovative activity takes place in the city core as well as the suburbs, and there are no large disparities in income and opportunity among the city's districts.

Politics

With a population of about 12 million, Tokyo is run by the TMG, which consists of the central city (23 wards) and suburbs (26 cities and 13 towns and villages). The local units elect their mayors, collect taxes, and make policy decisions, however, the TMG collects taxes for the 23 wards and allocates them according to their public services. TMG, like other local governments, exercises functions delegated to the city by national agencies, and the city must conform to the regulations set by the state. Simultaneously, TMG is responsible for local demands and needs. Its policy initiatives are often backed by grassroots pressures and urban social movements, leading to conflicting relations with the central state. There have been several cases in which grassroots pressures helped change political courses.

Electoral politics in Tokyo during the 1960s and 1970s was dominated by demands for a better environment. Tokyo politics directly confronted the state's economic growth policy, which led to environmental deterioration and social problems including air and water pollution, population and traffic congestion, and housing and school shortages. Tokyo became a front-runner of progressive local governments and a national precedent-setter on environmental and social issues, establishing a leadership role that has continued to the present day. TMG's current policy efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and use alternative and green energy sources to improve Tokyo's air quality resulted from a grassroots movement.

Tokyo's electoral patterns fluctuate, however, between state and local policies. Voter preferences

correlate with ups and downs in the city's economy and corresponding alterations in state policies. Tax retrenchment in the 1990s made it difficult for TMG to fund environmental and local welfare programs. Tokyoites voted in a populist governor who had campaigned against the world-city project. Most recently, Tokyo voters have turned to a former member of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party who advocated decentralizing power from central to local governments. During his first election campaign in 1999, Governor Ishihara proposed "to change Japan by changing Tokyo." Ishihara's slogan reflects a typical tension between local and central power that has existed in the past half a century in Japan. That is changing today as the state goes through the regime shift to postdevelopmentalism. The state has provided more public social services like universal health care and turned to a better quality-of-life politics. It has also started an urban renaissance policy that intends to provide better-quality public services and a new industrial policy that emphasizes new technology development to improve society and individual life. Yet, a fundamental tension between Tokyo and the central state remains as the state is more concerned with the national economy and security as a whole, and TMG is more subject to urban voters' concerns and grassroots politics.

Tokyo's politics now turn to regionalism and regional planning, with issues like the aging population, low birth rates, and population decline; global warming; and the environment taking center stage. Tokyo's population is predicted to reach 12.26 million in 2010 and then begin to decline to 12.22 million in the next decade. Demographic, social, and environment issues particularly compel the TMG to develop a regional growth policy, as seen in the Tokyo megalopolis ring that covers the Tokyo region's population of 33 million, the world's largest metropolis.

Tokyo's new direction will, however, continue to be shaped by the postdevelopmental state. The case of Tokyo also shows that challenged by new and global problems, cities of the world are searching for new directions as they are nested in heterogeneous national, institutional, spatial, and cultural configurations.

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See also Globalization; Regional Planning; World City

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TOURISM

Over the past half-century, tourism has become one of the world's most important economic sectors. It is one of the leading industries in the world. In 2003, \$525 billion in international tourism receipts accounted for 6 percent of world exports and 30 percent of service exports. With an annual growth rate of 4.6 percent, for decades, tourism has grown faster than world trade as a whole. Combined international and domestic travel contributes about \$1.5 trillion to the world economy annually.

Since World War II, rising affluence and the growth of a middle class with leisure time vastly expanded the market for travel. For millions of people, advertising, public relations, television, and the Internet have made travel as important to the quality of life as the goods they consume, such as cars, clothes, and household appliances. The importance of travel is reflected in the rapidly rising volume of international arrivals over the past

half-century. In 1950, only 25 million international arrivals were recorded, but by 2004, this number had increased to 763 million—an annual growth rate of 6.5 percent. These figures greatly underestimate tourism flows, however, because domestic tourism trips outnumber international trips by a factor of 10. No longer considered a luxury, travel has become a necessity, both for work and for personal fulfillment.

Tourism is often statistically invisible because it has been defined by specialists as a consumption activity; thus, tourism spending is calculated by estimating the amount that tourists spend on travel services, hotels, recreational facilities, tourist attractions, restaurants and shops, and a variety of local services. But despite the inherent difficulties of precisely estimating its economic contributions, tourism has clearly become essential to the economies of nations, regions, and localities everywhere. Many places rely solely on tourists and the money they spend, but even in locations with complex economies, tourism is nearly always an important economic sector. Tourism exerts an enormous cultural impact as well; it changes the places where it occurs, often substantially.

A Brief History

Cities have long held a special status as travel destinations. In the fifteenth through the eighteenth centuries, young men of the British upper class were expected to make a grand tour of ancient cities, mainly Paris, Geneva, Rome, Florence, Venice, and Naples, as part of the rites of coming of age. Travelers were willing to endure weeks of discomfort to negotiate rutted roads and nearly impassable mountains, if necessary, to get to the grand-tour cities.

The hazards and inconvenience of travel helped shape a widely shared disdain for nature and the natural. Mountains were considered ugly and forbidding, seacoasts generally inaccessible and dangerous. By the mid-eighteenth century, however, such attitudes began to change. Nature was discovered as a vast repository of sublime views and vistas. The Romantic poets reinterpreted nature as a tamed backdrop of formal gardens, stately trees, and placid lakes. With the rise of the industrial cities of the nineteenth century, nature, as interpreted through Thoreau, Wordsworth, and their contemporaries, was the repository of the

human spirit, as opposed to the meanness and gloom of the cities.

The American grand tour of the post-Civil War years provided a sharp contrast with its earlier European counterpart. Wealthy Europeans wanted to see the frontier, but they were equally interested in visiting such places as St. Louis, Cincinnati, and Chicago to see for themselves the dramatic evidence of American progress in industry, technology, and culture. Local civic elites were convinced that visitors' perceptions might determine a city's economic prospects, and thus, they engaged in vigorous advertising campaigns extolling local economic and cultural attainments.

The rise of mass tourism is generally traced to the 1850s, when an English entrepreneur, Thomas Cook, began leading package tours to the European continent. These tours revolved around visits to the museums and architectural and cultural reminders of classical antiquity in the cities that had once comprised the grand tour. Cities promoted themselves as well, but as centers of industry more than of culture. The glorification of technology and progress supplied the common thread running through the fairs and exhibitions of the nineteenth and first decades of the twentieth centuries: London's Crystal Palace exposition of 1851 and the Paris Exhibition of 1867; across the ocean, the World's Fair of Chicago in 1893, St. Louis in 1904, and New York in 1938.

As tourism matured, it became divided up into well-defined circuits. Millions of tourists visit cities each year. Some of them go to resort cities created expressly for consumption by visitors. Others visit historic cities that possess unique historic and cultural identity. Still others visit older cities that have become attractive to tourists through the construction of a specialized tourism infrastructure and the marketing of events and cultural activities. Ecotourism, in which people visit natural environments and remote places, has also emerged as a specialized circuit of its own. Tourism has also branched off into specialized areas such as sports (such as Formula 1 auto racing and soccer), well-defined leisure activities (such as fly fishing and skiing), and even extreme sports (such as mountain climbing).

Tourism has always been signposted; visitors are essentially coached about what they should see and do. In the nineteenth century, when nature travel

became popular, tourists studied photographs and illustrations to learn how to distinguish picturesque from ordinary landscapes. At the beginning of the twentieth century, urban tourism became increasingly popular. Guidebooks, urban sketches, drawings, and photographs coached visitors about how to interpret the cities they visited. World's fairs and exhibitions accustomed people to seeing cities through stylized images of skylines and monumental architecture. In the age of mass media and the Internet, prospective travelers have the ability to imagine themselves in a countless variety of settings, no matter how remote or inaccessible. As a result, even when not traveling, people know a great deal about the places they plan to visit and the sights they wish to see, even before they arrive.

Contemporary Tourism

The numerous options available to tourists place a premium on marketing. Tourist destinations of every sort advertise in airline magazines, newspapers, and a variety of other sources. Except for the United States, nations spend significant amounts on promotional efforts and also build or offer subsidies for new tourist development. For example, beginning in the 1970s, Mexico's tourism agency built several resorts, beginning with Cancun, and devoted considerable effort to marketing these sites. In Australia, the Gold Coast City Council, using funds from all levels of government, has built extensive tourism infrastructure to support tourism development on the Gold Coast and has marketed it globally.

Cities all over the world engage in active tourism marketing. In the United States, states and localities are the main venue for marketing. New York launched one of the most successful marketing campaigns ever undertaken by a city in 1977, when the state government increased its tourism budget twenty-one-fold to fund the "I Love New York" advertising campaign. Since then, city slogans (such as "I left my heart in San Francisco") have become commonplace. Cities promote themselves in print, on television, and on the Internet. Every large city has created a website and developed a slogan (such as Portland, Oregon's "The City that Works") for prospective visitors.

Resorts and some cities have been created expressly for consumption by visitors. The metropolitan areas

of Cancun, Las Vegas, and Disney World and much of the area surrounding it are devoted mainly to lodging, dining, entertainment, and shopping. Many cities and localities close to national parks, mountains, seashores, forests, and archeological and historical sites have evolved into what some people derisively call "tourist traps." Key West, Florida; Estes Park, Colorado; the Gold Coast, Australia; the French Riviera, and countless other places fit this category.

Tourist bubbles are smaller examples of this phenomenon. In most cities and regions, most tourists use a specialized infrastructure of hotels, sports venues, malls, and entertainment facilities, and they tend to visit particular sites. In places considered risky or dangerous, tourists may avoid the local environment entirely. Package tours, cruise ships, and resorts virtually seal tourists off from nontourists, except in very controlled circumstances. In cities, tourist bubbles composed of a cluster of facilities and amenities (new waterfronts, atrium hotels, festival malls, convention centers, sports stadiums, and entertainment districts) may also separate tourists by creating a space or series of spaces segregated from the remainder of the city. By building fortress spaces, even the most crime-ridden cities have been able to carve out islands that can comfortably be inhabited by tourists and middle-class city residents.

In most, places, however, tourists spill beyond the confines of the tourism quarter. A tourist economy has rippled outward from Cancun in such a way that the official tourist space has increasingly become a base from which tourists begin trips ranging beyond the self-contained and isolated resort. Tourism also may stimulate other economic sectors. Las Vegas's extraordinary growth has long been dependent on gaming, but the city is now home to one of the fastest-growing U.S. universities.

Tourist bubbles exist in most cities, but visitors commonly move freely outside the area designed to serve them. Boston, Massachusetts, for example, is a walking city for residents and visitors alike, even though a festival mall on the waterfront and an interconnected mall and hotel complex in the city center draw large numbers of visitors. The streets outside these enclosures are crowded with local residents and visitors, and visitors freely spill over into business and residential areas. The Boston example has become the norm. Tourist enclaves are generally incorporated into an urban

texture, which has itself become an object of fascination and consumption.

In most cities, tourism has become increasingly integrated into the local geography and economy. Urban amenities have become essential not only for attracting tourists but also for meeting the demands of local residents. Visitors and local residents tend to share the spaces that offer culture, nightlife, diversity, and a sense of authenticity. In cities everywhere, local residents have demanded a high level of urban amenities, both public and private, in the downtowns and neighborhoods they frequent. The result is a revival of the downtown and of inner-city neighborhoods after decades of decline.

Tourism has also become less separated from other economic sectors. In most large cities, tourism has become woven into a complex economy made up of several interdependent sectors. Tourism is extremely important to Chicago, Illinois, which attracted 33 million visitors in 2005. A half-million tourism-related jobs were created in the city between 1990 and 2005. Much of the success of the shopping district known as the Miracle Mile is accounted for by visitor spending. Even so, tourism is only one component of the economy of this global city, which also relies on corporate headquarters; high-level services in finance, insurance, law, real estate, and other service sectors; a commodities exchange; and manufacturing.

For some tourist destinations, the flow of visitors has become overwhelming. In Florence and Venice, Italy, the number of visitors far exceeds the number of local residents. For such places, managing the impact of tourism has become more important than promotion. Venice, for example, requires visitors to buy a daily pass to major attractions, and the number of passes issued is strictly regulated. National parks and eco-tourist sites in several countries have installed bus systems and created designated tourist areas in an attempt to protect the natural environment. In the Galapagos Islands, tourists are not allowed to leave tour groups.

Tourism will continue to increase because more people have the means and desire to travel and a complex industry has evolved to promote, finance, organize, and manage travel. Tour operators; airlines; the corporations that run hotels, resorts, and cruise lines; and government agencies are only a few entries in a long list of tourism providers. In effect, tourism providers are the gatekeepers of tourism;

they do not leave the tourists' experience to chance. New reservation systems, computer technology, international quality standards, and coordinated investment by financial institutions and corporations have vastly expanded the reach of tourism providers. They market destinations and tour packages, provide information and advice, and coordinate different modes of travel and lodging, dining, sightseeing, and cultural activities.

Many people have expressed concerns about the quality of the jobs created by the growth of the tourism industry. Although the jobs associated with tourism tend to be low-wage, tourism is also labor-intensive, and thus it creates a large number of jobs, especially entry-level opportunities for new immigrants and people with few skills. However, the employment profile of tourism varies enormously from place to place. In New York City, for example, hotel maids are paid far above the national minimum wage. In Las Vegas, many workers in the gaming industry consider their jobs to be careers with good opportunities. In places without unions, however, tourism tends to produce a large proportion of seasonal and minimum-wage jobs.

Adventure and eco-tourism now penetrates every part of the globe; any place can now be visited, for a fee. Repressive regimes, war, and terrorism now seem to be the only effective deterrents to intrepid travelers. Tourism is vulnerable to social disorder because it relies on the unimpeded movement of large numbers of people; tourists stand out garishly in many circumstances, and so they are obvious targets; and tourists are extremely risk-averse.

The Future

The attacks of September 11, 2001, dealt a devastating blow to the travel industry all over the world. All airlines in the United States were grounded for two days following the attacks, and air travel declined sharply. It took several months for air travel to return to previous levels in much of the world. In the United States, it took much longer for tourism to rebound. Globally, the places affected most adversely by the attacks were those highly dependent on industries connected to travel and tourism. The experience of U.S. cities illustrates this fact. The cities most deeply affected were Las Vegas, followed by Myrtle Beach, South Carolina, a beach resort more dependent on

restaurant jobs than any other city in the nation and with a clustering of nearby theme parks.

The 1990 Irish Republican Army bombing in the center city of Birmingham, the sarin gas attack in the Tokyo metro by Aum Shinrikyo in 1995, and the 9/11 attacks make security a high priority for tourist destinations everywhere. Airlines have been forced to pay special attention to security and surveillance, and similar vigilance is exercised by tourism providers such as hotels. Because they are uniquely vulnerable, because they hold targets of high symbolic value to terrorists, and because they are centers of international media networks, global cities are especially vulnerable.

The vulnerability of the travel-related industries to social disorder and terrorism may make it appear that tourism is less stable and more subject to sudden downturns than other economic sectors. There is little evidence for this assumption, however. Tourism has become so embedded in the lives of ordinary people that though they may change their travel habits, they are not likely to stop being tourists. A huge worldwide tourism industry has become an essential feature of economies everywhere. Tourism is here to stay.

Dennis R. Judd

See also Las Vegas, Nevada; Resort; Themed Environments; Tourism; Venice, Italy

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TRAIN STATION

See Railroad Station

TRANSIT-ORIENTED DEVELOPMENT

In cities around the world, stations and their surroundings are increasingly the focus of integrated transport and land use development efforts, whether under the label *transit-oriented development* as in North America and Australia, or more plainly, as (re)development of and around railway stations and other public transport interchanges as in Europe, Latin America, East Asia, and elsewhere. A combination of heterogeneous interrelated factors converges in determining this upsurge of station-related urban projects.

A first factor triggering station area projects is the new development opportunities provided by transport innovations, such as high-speed railway systems (particularly in Europe and East Asia) or new urban and regional rail-based systems (in most contexts) or bus-based systems (most notably in South America). A second factor is the generalized transfer of distribution and manufacturing activities away from station areas and toward more peripheral urban locations or new dedicated freight interchanges. Space is thus freed up for new

activities around stations. A third factor is the privatization or at least the shift toward greater market orientation of transportation and, most notably, railway companies. One consequence of privatization is that transportation infrastructure and service providers are increasingly seeking ways to recapture the accessibility advantage they help to create.

Characteristically, this implies the development of commercial activities within stations and redevelopment of land above or around stations. Many East Asian cities have a long tradition in this respect, but the trend has been expanding in Europe and North America as well. Fourth is a wish to boost the competitive position of cities as places to live, work, and consume through new large-scale urban projects. Many of these projects, typically showing a dense mix of office, retail, leisure, and housing, are located around highly accessible places such as main railway stations. High-speed railway station areas in European cities in particular have been the theaters of many such initiatives in recent years.




Figure 1 Basic Transport and Land Use Correlations: Transit-Oriented Development Pursues a Combination of Transit and Walking and Cycling Environments

Source: Bertolini, Luca, and Frank le Clercq. "Urban development without more mobility by car? Lessons from Amsterdam, a multimodal urban region." *Environment and Planning A* 35 (2003): 575–89. Reprinted with permission.

A last but not least factor, and most notably in North America and Australia, is mounting concern about the sustainability of sprawling and car-dependent urbanization patterns. The integrated development of railway networks and land around the nodes of those networks is seen as a way toward a more public transport and nonmotorized modes-oriented, concentrated urbanization pattern. The arguments for this shift are not merely environmental (reduction of pollution, greenhouse emissions, land consumption, etc.); many local governments and citizens also see it as a condition for the development of a much needed mobility alternative for metropolises rapidly approaching total traffic gridlock.

A Spatial Challenge

Basic characteristics of the transport and land use systems determine the competitive position of transit respective to the car, and thus set the backdrop to the spatial challenge of transit-oriented development. There are two basic correlations (Figure 1). The first is between the speed of a transportation system and the scale at which an urban system works (or its reach), for instance, expressed in terms of distances between places of residence and places of work. The second basic correlation is that between the capacity and flexibility of a transportation system and the degree of spatial concentration of activities, as for instance identified by residential and employment densities. The car—a low-capacity (but high-flexibility), high-speed transportation means—is best fit to high-reach, low-density urban environments. Transit matches the speed of the car but has higher capacity (and lower flexibility). Nonmotorized modes combine high capacity and high flexibility but miss speed. To provide a competitive alternative to the car (i.e., both fast and flexible transport), the strengths of transit and slow modes need to be combined. However, this combination can be successful only in the presence of short-distance and/or high-density spatial patterns. This is the central idea of transit-oriented development.

This brief discussion points at the fundamental aspects of the spatial challenge of transit-oriented development. In terms of land use change, it is above all a matter of increasing densities and functional mix, particularly around stations. In terms of transport change, it is a matter of improving the competitiveness of alternatives to the car by increasing




Figure 2 Schematic Representation of a Spatial Development Strategy Exploiting the Synergy Between Transport and Land Use Features

Source: Adapted from Bertolini, Luca, and Frank le Clercq. “Urban development without more mobility by car? Lessons from Amsterdam, a multimodal urban region.” *Environment and Planning A* 35 (2003): 575–89. Reprinted with permission.

their flexibility (most notably of transit) and their effective door-to-door speed (especially of nonmotorized modes). This need not be the case in absolute terms but relative to the car, implying that policies aimed at either reducing the flexibility of the car (think carpool-only lanes or parking restrictions) or its speed (think speed limits) are also favorable. A more general conclusion is that coordination between transport and land use choices and conditions is essential for transit-oriented development to be successful. Figure 2 schematically visualizes the spatial implications of these conclusions.

A Governance Challenge

For all of its perceived potential, the integration of transport and urban development at stations is also a very complex undertaking. The growing flows of people passing through stations are a

direct result of the increasingly open nature of the urban system: (1) of people living in one place, working in a second, and spending their free time in yet a third; (2) of business relationships requiring exchanges of people based in distant locations; or (3) of equally extensive spatial patterns of movement generated by different types of consumption. The coincidence of different spatial scales (in the most extreme case from the global scale of high-speed train destinations to the locale of the station neighborhood) is mirrored by the presence of a broad range of users (from the cosmopolitan businessperson to the drifting homeless).

Station areas are, ambivalently, both nodes and places. They are (or may become) important nodes in both transport and nontransport (e.g., business, consumption) networks. Conversely, station areas also identify a place, a permanently and temporarily inhabited area of the city, a dense and diverse conglomeration of uses and forms accumulated over time, which may or may not share in the life of the node. Accordingly, a multifarious array of both node- and place-based actors crowd station area development processes, of which the local government and the railway company are two characteristic ones. Depending on the local context, other actors will also have a decisive role. These include different levels of public administration, different transportation companies, and market actors: developers, investors, and end users.

Furthermore, and particularly at station areas set in dense, historically stratified urban districts, local residents and businesses also have a significant stake in the transformation. The objectives of this heterogeneous array of actors are often conflicting and at best uncoordinated. Realizing the opportunities for synergy and managing the threats of conflict among all these actors and domains is the essence of the governance challenge of transit-oriented development.

Can Transit-Oriented Development Deliver?

The complexities of both the spatial and the governance challenges are also a reminder of all that transit-oriented development might *not* be able to achieve. Especially in countries like the United States or Australia, where the dominance of car environments is extreme, transit-oriented development might be limited to a marginal impact on overall land use and

transport development patterns. In the short term, this will almost certainly be the case. The implication is that addressing the pressing sustainability issues to which transit-oriented development is expected to respond will inevitably require also a focus on other solutions, aimed at making existing car environments more sustainable rather than at eliminating them (e.g., through improvements in car technology and transport demand management measures). The complexity of the governance challenge is high in all contexts: because of the intricate tangle of actors and interests sketched above, but in many instances also because of its relative novelty and still extraordinary nature. It means that transit-oriented development can easily become a very resource-intensive endeavor, both in financial and organizational terms.

The potential rewards are also high, but the implication is that the affordability and innovativeness of property in transit-oriented development might become limited, as investors opt for goals that are financially rewarding in the short term and for low-risk functions, activities, and users. It is not just an equity issue. The very ambition of making transit-oriented development into lively, diverse urban centers would be thus jeopardized, as a handful of uses and users would dominate.

Luca Bertolini

See also Railroad Station; Transportation; Urban Planning

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TRANSPORTATION

Transportation facilities support and shape patterns of urban development and change. Prior to the nineteenth century, animal-drawn carriages were the only form of vehicular transportation on land. Maritime shipping was the main means of moving goods and people over long distances and among the cities located adjacent to major rivers, lakes, and oceans. The flow of international trade remained relatively small and was generally limited to high value–low weight goods such as spices and silk.

Within cities, walking was the primary means of mobility. This had a distinctive impact on early urban form. Constrained by how far city dwellers were reasonably able to walk in a day, pre-Industrial Revolution cities remained quite compact. Major centers such as Rome, Venice, and Beijing never grew larger than about 20 square kilometers in area.

The Golden Railway Age

In the first half of the nineteenth century, railway travel revolutionized patterns of human mobility and settlement. The construction of steam-powered railways between cities, beginning in the United Kingdom in the 1830s and subsequently developed in many other countries, created vast territories over which goods and people could be rapidly moved. Constructed and operated largely by private companies, the opening of the railways stimulated the growth and interconnectivity of existing cities and spurred the emergence of new cities that were strategically located along the main long-distance railway lines.

Rail technology was also applied to intraurban transportation. In the mid-1800s, private entrepreneurs began operating horse-drawn trams on fixed rail routes. By the early 1900s, the rail trams, also known as streetcars, had been electrified and were in operation in cities across North America, Europe, Asia, Australia, the Middle East, and South America. In 1863, London won the race to become the first city in the world to have a functional underground railway; it was followed closely by subways in Paris, Glasgow, Berlin, Boston, and New York.

Urban rail systems were built not only to move people but also to convey symbolic meanings with respect to the competitiveness, vitality, innovativeness, and affluence of the cities in which they were constructed. To this end, the great cities of the world built underground railways with emblematically designed stations and vehicles, each suggesting the power and wealth of their jurisdiction as well as catalyzing further economic development.

The electrification of the streetcars and underground railways led to a first wave of urban deconcentration. These early suburbs were built to capitalize on increased land values adjacent to transit facilities and create captive markets for rail services that provided access to jobs in the city center. These suburbs often had shops along the main street adjacent to the rail line and were built in a fairly compact form to maximize the number of people who could conveniently walk to a nearby station.

Beginning in the 1920s, the tramways began to falter under the weight of high investment and maintenance costs, depreciating service quality, and sometimes poor safety records. As a result, trolley and combustion engine buses, with lower initial capital costs, replaced streetcars. By the 1960s, trams had been removed from the streets of most cities.

Mass Motorization

However, mass transit was being challenged by a stronger competitive force that was largely beyond their provider's immediate control. Although there are records of steam-powered cars dating back to the late seventeenth century and Henry Ford began mass-producing the Model T in 1908, in the first decades of the twentieth century, relatively few cars were on the roads of most cities. By the end of World War II, however, car ownership had expanded, and the era of mass motorization had begun in developed countries.

The adoption of the private automobile as the primary mode of urban transportation was the strongest in the United States, but it was also prevalent in developed countries such as Canada and Australia and in Western Europe. More recently, automobile ownership has skyrocketed in developing countries such as China and India. Just like its urban rail predecessors, car travel embodied ideas of individual freedom, personal convenience, and financial success.

Growth in automobile ownership and usage has been closely connected with shifting patterns of transportation infrastructure investment and land use development. To accommodate car use, limited access motorways were constructed to provide direct access into a growing number of city centers. As highways expanded further into the hinterland of cities, they catalyzed the development of lower-density housing and commercial developments. Peripheral areas now became accessible and affordable for a larger share of the population. Suburbanization was under way.

The spread of residential development and employment into increasingly dispersed locations adjacent to highway interchanges solidified the supremacy of the automobile over other alternative modes of transportation, such as walking, cycling, and public transit. Trucks also began to gain in prominence as a key mode of goods movement between and within cities.

Backlash to the Automobile

In the mid-1960s, despite the many benefits that the automobile provided in terms of personal convenience and its foundation for a high material quality of life, the costs of excess car usage and of a planning framework geared toward supporting the automobile became a public concern. City dwellers who lacked access to automobiles or were unable to drive, including the poor, the young, some elderly people, and the physically disabled, increasingly faced difficulties accessing employment and recreational activities as well as public services such as medical clinics and day care facilities.

Road congestion was dampening economic productivity and efficiency. In many cities, as car usage increased, road transportation became one of the largest sources of localized air pollution, leading to a rise in respiratory illnesses. Traffic accidents were claiming a growing number of fatalities and injuries. Dependence on foreign oil became common in the many countries that do not produce an ample supply domestically. This vulnerability was highlighted in 1973 by the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil shock, which sent fuel costs skyrocketing and crippled economies around the world.

Finally, there was growing concern about the degree to which highway construction was

destroying the stability and vitality of communities through which they passed, primarily in the urban core. In cities across North America such as New York, San Francisco, Toronto, and Vancouver, local protest movements emerged to combat a spate of proposals for new inner-city highways. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, the tide had shifted against major inner-city projects, and many proposals were halted or truncated.

Return to the Rails

The response to the experience with building urban freeways was a renewed interest in public transit, particularly large rail projects. In the 1970s, 23 new subway systems were built worldwide, 13 outside of Western Europe and North America, while only five light-rail systems were constructed. Between 1980 and 2000, by contrast, some 70 surface-running light-rail lines were built compared with 38 subways, with most projects still being constructed in jurisdictions outside of Western Europe and North America. The majority of these rail lines were publicly planned, financed, and operated and integrated into larger regional transit networks.

The renewed interest in urban rail projects was linked to efforts to stem the low-density, car-oriented land use development that was occurring at the periphery of cities. The goal was to catalyze the construction of more compact communities around transit facilities. Encouraging communities with a mix of residential, employment, and recreational facilities adjacent to transit facilities would limit the need for long-distance commuting and make transit and nonmotorized modes of transportation viable travel options. The earlier challenges posed by the overdependence on the automobile, including road congestion, environmental degradation, and social exclusion, would be redressed. Beyond the movement of people, rail projects also gained symbolic resonance as progressive investments that demonstrated visionary leadership to support urban sustainability.

Balanced Transportation: Mega Projects

Despite the investment in urban rail lines in a growing number of jurisdictions, between 1980 and 2000, public budgets for transit came under

immense pressure. Transit ridership per capita declined in many cities. In this context, there was increasing evidence that urban rail projects were not achieving their forecasted benefits with respect to congestion alleviation, environmental amelioration, or improved social inclusion for those without other travel options. Despite some success in concentrating growth around new transit facilities and attracting new residential developments to urban cores, low-density suburbs around the periphery of cities remained the fastest-growing areas in many jurisdictions.

As cities have become more dispersed, investments in public-transit projects alone are less likely to attract sufficient numbers of new riders to reduce road traffic in the most congested locations, which are often at bottleneck points on suburban highways and roads. As such, since the turn of the twenty-first century, cities around the world are investing in new rapid-transit facilities, and this has contributed to a period of overall ridership growth in many jurisdictions. At the same time, there has also been a renewed wave of major urban highway construction. This has taken place in both developed countries such as the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom and developing countries such as China, where car ownership is rising rapidly.

A Focus on Supply and Demand

As cities face an array of transport-related challenges with respect to economic efficiency, environmental sustainability and social equity, planners have developed policies that prioritize the use of a hierarchy of transportation modes: nonmotorized modes of transportation such as walking and cycling, public transit, and car pooling. The renewed emphasis on highway development since 2000 has the potential to undermine these efforts and further entrench automobile usage and low-density development patterns.

However, since the late 1980s, transportation planners have also focused on managing the demand for urban transportation. This



Increased road congestion, especially on freeways, has led to greater interest in rail projects.

Source: Tracy Buyan.

demand-oriented approach has become more widespread since 2000 and includes a variety of context-specific policy measures. These are aimed at providing financial, convenience, and time incentives and disincentives that will encourage car users to shift to alternative modes of transportation. To this end, a range of incentive programs have been implemented: discounted transit passes; the installation of lockers and showers at workplaces for cyclists, to complement new cycle lanes; dedicated lanes on highways reserved exclusively for cars with more than one occupant, public-transit vehicles, and freight trucks; and the designation of prime parking spaces for car-pool vehicles, with lower fees.

Conversely, planning organizations and politicians around the world are becoming bolder in implementing disincentive programs to discourage car usage. For instance, in Europe, there are high fuel and vehicle registration tax levels, making owning and operating a car expensive. In North American cities, car commuting to employment facilities has been reduced by charging users for parking. In Singapore, there is a vehicle quota system in addition to high annual car taxes. These measures, in combination with high-quality public transit, have limited car usage. In London, the implementation of a congestion charge to enter the city center during peak daytime hours has resulted in reduced car commuting and improved local air quality.

This blending of emphasis on transportation supply and demand is in recognition of the critical role

that transportation has in cities, both as a means of moving people and goods with attendant economic, environmental, and social impacts and as a powerful catalyst driving urban transformation and change.

Matti Siemiatycki

See also City Planning; Suburbanization; Transit-Oriented Development; Transportation Planning

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TRANSPORTATION PLANNING

Transportation planning is concerned with the movement of people and goods. The discipline has gained international prominence due to the identification of rising levels of road congestion in cities around the world and a growing recognition that transportation is connected to a wide variety of urban aspirations including economic vitality, environmental sustainability, social equity, and personal health.

Transportation planning in cities covers a range of different scales and investment types, including roads and bridges, public transit, cycling, and pedestrian facilities. It also encompasses the drafting of local and regional plans to integrate varied transportation investments into the surrounding urban landscape.

Transportation Planning Process (1950–1976)

Traditionally, the transportation sector has followed a highly structured, rational comprehensive model of project evaluation and planning. The

rational comprehensive model of decision making is characterized by the search for optimal solutions to predefined problems, the commitment to problem solving using a sequence of logical steps, the separation of analysts and decision makers, and the availability of full information about the consequences of each alternative as well as the values and interests of the general public. Analysts are seen as rational actors who systematically measure the various costs of an initiative against its potential benefits to determine whether a project would benefit the citizenry and should therefore be approved.

The framework for developing urban area transportation plans has its origins in studies produced in Detroit and Chicago in the 1950s. Subsequent variations of the process have been applied to plan making in cities around the world, including London, Istanbul, Kuala Lumpur, Calcutta, Bogotá, Tehran, Lagos, and Cairo. The process generally involves six stages:

1. *Inventory*: To provide a foundation of evidence on which to draw conclusions, extensive data are collected to measure current travel patterns, land uses, and existing transportation facilities and their usage.
2. *Simulation*: The data are used to develop mathematical models that describe current travel patterns and facility usage and the way that these patterns might change over time as a result of shifting demographics and land uses. The latter are called simulations. Simulations are generally carried out through a two-step process. First, historical trends are examined to make aggregate projections about the future number of people and jobs that will exist in an entire metropolitan area. Then the aggregate totals are distributed to locations within the metropolitan area, and predictions are made about how these changes will impact travel flows.
3. *Goals*: Once simulations of the current and future transportation landscape are produced, then problems are identified, and goals and objectives are defined. The goals and objectives are the criteria against which the merits of the plan are measured.
4. *Proposed Changes*: Proposed changes to the transportation system are identified to meet the

goals and objectives for the plan. Proposals emphasize systemwide improvements to roads and public transit, cycling networks, and pedestrian facilities and are meant to deliver benefits over the entire region. Strategic regional transportation plans typically cover a 20- to 25-year time horizon, with more detailed local area plans covering 5- and 10-year periods.

5. *Evaluation:* The proposed changes are tested in the simulation models to measure how outcomes differ, depending on whether the proposals are implemented. The outcomes of the simulations are then evaluated against the goals and objectives set for the plans. If the proposed changes to the transportation system will not deliver the desired benefits, then new infrastructure proposals are put forward to better achieve the stated goals and objectives for the plan.
6. *Decision and Implementation:* At the conclusion of the planning process, and based on the evaluation, a strategic plan is produced that recommends the general location and phasing for new transportation facilities. The planned investments are intended to maximize the efficiency of the entire regional transportation network.

Critique of Traditional Transportation Planning Process

Beginning in the 1960s, the highly structured, rational comprehensive model of transportation planning came under considerable academic and community criticism. In some academic circles, there were criticisms that planners were not merely dispassionate, rational analysts who systematically weighed the costs and benefits of an initiative; rather, their rationality was bounded by their context, in particular the social and political organizations in which they worked. Moreover, transportation problems were not always well defined, and planners did not necessarily have access to full information or the time needed to weigh all the options fully. Ultimately, it was argued that far from being impartial rational analysts, transportation planners faced nontechnical pressures that shaped their studies.

Some academics and community groups expressed wider discontent with the way that the opinions of experts and government bureaucrats

were given precedence over the views of the general public, often resulting in the approval of projects that did not meet the interests of diverse community stakeholders. There were claims that the highly structured planning framework emphasized the supply of new infrastructure, and in particular new highways, to address identified transportation problems, rather than examining options to manage the regional demand for transportation services. In many instances, marginalized populations were seen to be disproportionately affected by the negative environmental and social exclusion externalities of new transportation investments, without realizing many of the benefits from being connected to new facilities. Finally, it was argued that transportation planning was an inherently political process, and the projects that were ultimately selected for construction were not necessarily those that were most highly prioritized in the technical studies.

Across North America in the 1960s, protests were mounted against urban highway proposals in New York, San Francisco, Toronto, and Vancouver. Opponents focused on the way that decisions were being made, particularly the lack of public involvement in the decision-making process, and on the negative impacts experienced by local communities. Many of these planned highways were cancelled, and these protests shifted the methods for doing transportation planning.

Fragmented Directions (1976–Present)

Since the mid-1970s, no dominant framework has replaced the traditional model of transportation planning. Rather, there has been considerable fragmentation in the methods and approaches used to produce strategic transportation plans. Technically, increasingly powerful computers have made it possible to move from aggregate regional forecasting models to disaggregated simulations of travel behavior. Using extensive household surveys and personal trip diaries, planners collect extensive demographic, socioeconomic, and travel data, which are then used to more accurately predict daily traffic flow volumes on local facilities. In many contexts, long-range, regionwide strategic planning has given way to a greater focus on the production of short-term plans, which more specifically emphasize the

realization of particular bridges, roads, transit, cycling, and walkway projects.

Procedurally, public participation has become a common feature of the transportation planning process, although the degree to which public input has shaped the resultant decisions has varied based on the local situation. In the twenty-first century, while transportation planning and decision making remain infused by technical modeling of outcomes, public consultation and engagement have become a standard feature of the process. Public consultation has informed a variety of stages of plan formulation, including the definition of problems, the goals and objectives, and the identification of viable alternatives.

In many countries, legislation mandates the application and design of public consultations, and legal recourse is provided to groups who feel their voice has not been appropriately heard. Environmental assessments of the impacts of transportation projects are also legally required in many jurisdictions, and plans for new facilities can be halted if they are found to adversely affect air and water quality, rare plants, and animal species.

Transportation Megaprojects

At the same time as the traditional process of urban transportation planning has given way to more fragmented planning approaches, a growing emphasis has been placed on the planning and delivery of urban transportation megaprojects—new roads, bridges, tunnels, mass transit systems, and airports—costing a billion dollars or more. These projects are intended to deliver many diverse benefits: reduce road congestion; stimulate economic development and urban regeneration; ameliorate harmful air emissions from the transport sector; and enhance social inclusion by improving accessibility to transportation services.

Despite their proposed benefits, international evidence suggests that transportation megaprojects have systematically failed to meet their initially identified objectives, a trend that has remained consistent for more than 70 years. While development costs and completion times are typically vastly underestimated, the benefits of megaprojects are often overestimated. For example, patronage on urban railway systems is usually below what is initially forecast, leading to minimal impacts on

road congestion and reduced air pollution. And the realization of economic development and regeneration adjacent to railway stations has been mixed, occurring in some locations but not others. By contrast, new roads, tunnels, and bridges often experience greater traffic than forecasted, leading to congestion earlier than expected. The congestion is exacerbated by the development of residential and automobile-oriented commercial developments near access points, which encourage greater road travel.

Financing and Delivery of Transportation Infrastructure

In attempting to redress the persistent pattern of underestimated costs and development times and overestimated benefits, policymakers have experimented with transformations in the way that new transportation facilities are financed and delivered. The conventional model of urban transportation infrastructure delivery, known as design-bid-build, is largely public sector-led. In this model, public-sector agencies determine the transportation needs of the community in which they have jurisdiction, select a technology to address the identified problem, and hire a company to carry out the detailed design of the facility. The project is paid for entirely from public-sector sources and, once completed, operated by public-sector employees.

Faced with increasingly constrained public-sector budgets and evidence of large cost overruns and time delays combined with poor performance levels, new models of project delivery have focused on partnerships between the public and private sector. These partnerships can take different forms, which vary based on the amount of private-sector involvement.

Typically, the role of the public sector remains to determine the transportation needs of the community. However, rather than project delivery being led by the public sector, a single private-sector concessionaire is selected to provide a bundle of services associated with the delivery of new transportation infrastructure, which can include a combination of various features such as system design, construction, financing, and long-term operation of the new facility. While the types of services included in a private-public partnership concession can vary, the motivations are similar:

to shift the role of government from a provider of public services to a purchaser of public services, thereby transferring the risks associated with building and operating the system from the public to the private sector.

Between 1985 and 2004, nearly 1,000 transportation projects worldwide worth \$424 billion have been delivered and financed through private-public partnerships. The United Kingdom and Australia are among the international leaders, while such partnerships are also popular in Asia and South America. By contrast, North America is a relative latecomer to the application of private-public partnerships in the transportation megaproject sector. Despite their growing popularity, there is mixed evidence about whether private-public partnerships in the transportation sector have reduced the cost overruns and performance shortfalls that typically plague projects delivered through the conventional model.

Sustainable Transportation

Transportation has key impacts on the environmental, social, and economic sustainability of cities. Around the world, transportation planners have sought to increase the use of the most sustainable modes of transportation. These are prioritized as nonmotorized modes such as walking and cycling, then high-occupancy public-transit services and automobiles with multiple passengers, followed by single-occupancy vehicles.

National and local public policy to support more sustainable urban transportation has taken four directions. First are policies to encourage technological advancements in the reliability and efficiency of transportation systems, as well as innovations to reduce the total demand for transportation. The search for and implementation of cleaner and renewable vehicle fuels has been encouraged through the enactment of targets for reductions in permissible vehicle emissions in jurisdictions such as California and the European Union. Intelligent transportation systems have been designed, which use communication technologies to enhance overall efficiency through real-time traffic management, public-transit scheduling, and goods vehicle routing to avoid congestion. Advancements in digital and communications technology have been supported by public policies

to encourage telecommuting and working from home, which can reduce the need for some travel journeys.

Second, investments in infrastructure have been used to make nonmotorized modes of transportation, public transit, and car pooling more convenient, reliable, and attractive. These have included national and local programs to invest in new public-transit infrastructure, dedicated cycle lanes and bicycle storage lockers, and high-occupancy vehicle and bus lanes on existing highways and arterial roads.

Third, economic and fiscal policies have provided incentives and disincentives to use different types of transportation modes. This reflects an emerging emphasis on balancing increases in the supply of transportation facilities with the management of demand for transportation services. National governments in Europe have employed high levels of fuel tax to manage demand for road travel and encourage the ownership of smaller, more fuel-efficient vehicles. In countries such as the United Kingdom, registration fees are higher for more polluting vehicles, providing further financial incentive to own smaller, less-polluting vehicles. Conversely, to encourage transit usage, countries such as Canada and the United States provide tax deductions for the cost of transit passes, and many universities provide their students with discounted transit passes. In some jurisdictions, sales taxes are not applied to the purchase of bicycles or their repair, thereby reducing the cost of using this mode of transportation.

At the urban scale, road pricing schemes have been developed in cities such as London, with the revenue used to improve public-transit facilities and subsidize public-transit fares. Local governments have also instituted parking management strategies such as converting free parking to pay parking to discourage driving to certain areas within cities.

Fourth, regional and local land use policies have been devised to support the use of more sustainable modes of transportation. Many regions have sought to encourage public-transit use by creating plans to build high-density residential and commercial developments surrounding urban rail stations and by intensifying the population density of existing communities through in-fill developments. Master plans for urban development and regeneration

schemes have sought to support walking, cycling, and public-transit use by designing compact communities composed of a mix of residential, retail, office, and recreational facilities. In the downtown of many cities in Europe, cars have been removed from busy shopping streets, creating pedestrian boulevards.

Overall, considerable barriers exist to the widespread implementation and success of public policies that support sustainable transportation. These include challenges to do with coordination between different levels of government, the social acceptability of plans that require significant changes in individual travel behavior, lobbying from ingrained interest groups to maintain the status quo emphasis on motor vehicle travel, and the potential for adverse impacts that sustainable transportation policies can have on a wide range of constituencies, including motorists, people with low incomes, the goods movement industry and emergency vehicles. Despite the challenges, achieving more sustainable urban transportation

systems remains a key goal of transportation planning and public policy.

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See also City Planning; Suburbanization; Transit-Oriented Development; Transportation; Urban Planning

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UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT

The concept of uneven development provides a dialectical understanding of the evolution of society across space. It has been applied both in broad descriptive senses and as an analytical toolkit, and in this lies much of its explanatory power. It offers a way of conceptualizing the interpenetration of general social processes and structural conditions with immediate local events and experiences, producing a characteristic and shifting pattern of development and inequality. In analyzing cities as sites of uneven development, we are drawn to understand observable urban phenomena and trends as global–local problems at the nexus between general processes of change (flows of capital, economic restructuring, technological change, etc.), state interventions and local experiences, values and resistances. For this reason, theories of uneven development have become important in some approaches to urban studies in recent decades, particularly with reference to questions about global economic restructuring and urban change, urban land markets and gentrification, and the relationships between capital, state, and citizens. This entry first explores the evolution of the concept in classical social theory before summarizing some of the most recent theoretical advances of recent decades. It concludes by summarizing some of the strengths of this approach and its implications for research methodology.

Classical Origins: The Political Economy of Capitalist Development

The concept of uneven development has its origins in classical Marxist thought, and much of its later development has been in the work of various neo-Marxist scholars and critical social theorists. Though the precise phrase is not central to Karl Marx's work, the questions it raises are an important component of, for example, Volume 1 of *Capital*. In the analysis of changing English society from 1846 to 1866 (chapter 25), a striking historical period for the study of capitalist accumulation, the detailed local patterns of economic and social change are situated within the context of an emergent world economy and free trade system. The observed changes are remarkable for the extraordinary concentration and centralization of wealth and capital alongside the relative immiseration of the direct agents of this industry and the producers of this wealth, the working class. Thus, the accumulation of wealth has as its necessary counterpart the accumulation of misery, and this is the basis for the characteristic pattern of unevenness associated with the emergent industrial economy.

This contradictory process underpins the political arguments of *The Communist Manifesto*, as the antagonisms between oppressing and oppressed classes are identified as the historical conditions for revolutionary change. This becomes more intense with the uneven development of modern industry with its exploitative logic and increasing tendency to concentrate wealth in the hands of the

few while impoverishing and alienating the many. Hence, we get the well-known observation from the end of Part I of *The Communist Manifesto* that the bourgeoisie has produced its own gravediggers in the shape of the international proletariat. That is, the contradictions of uneven development provide the basis for social struggle leading to social change, ultimately revolutionary in character.

Later, deployment of the precise term *uneven development* was similarly political in the beginning. For example, in Leon Trotsky's analysis in the early twentieth century, the process of uneven and combined development is seen as the basis for permanent revolution leading to the eventual creation of a new society. In this formulation, the geopolitical dynamics of capitalism are understood in relation to noncapitalist factors (e.g., ecological and natural variations, primitive social formations, etc.) as well as the general historical fact of uneven social development at every scale, including global, national, urban, and local. Again the general process (capitalist development) and local expression (unevenness) act one upon the other as a result of the inherent contradictions and tensions attendant to unequal social formations, an observable historical fact.

Recent Theoretical Advances: Respatializing Critical Social Theory

The most important contributions to the contemporary understanding and analysis of uneven development have come since the 1970s, especially within the fields of critical geography and sociology. This has included recent efforts to respatialize social theory and to achieve more convincing understandings of the geographies of capital accumulation and social inequality. It is also over these recent decades that the theory has been deployed more explicitly and fruitfully in urban studies as well as related fields of economic geography and international geopolitics.

David Harvey's approach, which highlights the social construction of places in the flux and flow of capital circulation, encapsulates many of the advances. Capitalism requires continual economic growth and is subject to periodic crises of overaccumulation (idle productive capacity and labor power). One solution to both problems is what Harvey terms a *spatial fix*, that is, geographical

expansion. Excess capital may flow to alternate geographic places (e.g., the deepening incorporation of East Asia and Southeast Asia into the industrial production system consequent to the 1970s crises and the simultaneous deindustrialization of Western cities). Capital can also be "switched" overseas in property development or other speculative investments. This results in the creative destruction of places, which are reembedded in a restructured global spatial division of labor. Importantly, this new landscape is highly differentiated, each place being affected differently by an uneven process of capital investment and disinvestment, while maintaining (and sometimes winning or losing out because of) a unique historical-cultural identity. Geographic difference and otherness are thus produced in the process of uneven development, though there are also many tensions, uncertainties, setbacks, and advances linked to the possibility of class struggle and resistance and the vagaries of state intervention and political philosophies. Such an analysis provides a powerful tool for understanding something of the dynamics of international economic restructuring and local patterns of urban social change. Richard Walker covers some similar territory in his explorations of the dynamics of convergence and geographic unevenness, which he connects to spatial differentiation and capital mobility. This leads to issues such as labor disempowerment, dependency, boom-slump cycles in urban development and the creation of stagnant places.

Elsewhere, Harvey has emphasized what he calls the three circuits of capital. The primary circuit involves commodity production (manufacturing or services); the second circuit involves investment in the built environment; the tertiary circuit involves scientific knowledge and investments in the reproduction of labor power (health, education, etc.). Put simply, the point is that capital can be switched between these circuits (as well as geographically) in response to crises of overaccumulation. In this way, the processes of urban development can be connected to broader processes of uneven development and economic restructuring. Investment in suburbanization or the redevelopment and revalorization of older inner-city environments can be understood within this general theory of the circulation of capital through different sectors and across space.

Some of these ideas connect with the world systems theory of Immanuel Wallerstein and the theory of the new international division of labor propounded by Folker Fröbel, Jürgen Heinrichs, and Otto Kreye in 1980, which explained the radical globalization of industrial production in the postwar era with reference to the deindustrialization of older urban-industrial centers and the emergence of newly industrializing countries. The process was facilitated by extraordinary technological advances (transport and telecommunications), which allowed capital to migrate in a mobile fashion that was impossible in earlier historical periods. This saw the reorganization of production across regional and national boundaries, decentralizing more labor-intensive functions to exploit geographic differences in regulation and labor power. Although these commentators focused more on a global scale, these ideas have obvious implications for understanding urban economies, something that Harvey has taken up explicitly.

Doreen Massey's seminal work on uneven development and spatial structure draws attention to how social relations are inextricably spatial and geographic patterns need to be understood in terms of social processes. This is offered as a corrective to much urban and regional economic geography, which tended to understand patterns of employment, production, and investment in a two-dimensional manner, mapping distributions of various activities. The alternative approach requires an interpretation of (changing) geographical patterns in terms of the structures and processes that underpin such patterns. The geography of jobs and job loss is understood with reference to the social structures and processes that underpin it, that is, on the way that production is socially organized over space and how spatial structures of capitalist production are unevenly developed across territories over many years and decades. The analysis has important political ramifications for how urban and regional inequality are understood and for the appropriateness of traditional policies meant to combat such inequalities and respond to problems such as the decay of the inner cities.

Neil Smith has made connections between uneven development, urban processes of gentrification, and social struggles focused on the built environment. In Smith's view, the process of uneven development can be understood as one of

equalization and differentiation. Capital flows into and out of the built environment in a search for higher land rent, a general process impacting more or less everywhere (equalization), but it does so across a highly varied existing surface of historical investment and capital formation and with highly variable social and spatial implications, disrupting existing life places and creating new use values (differentiation). Local areas may go through long periods of urban decay as capital flows toward more lucrative locations or into other productive sectors. This generates a rent gap, which is an increasing divergence between the actual and potential land rent realizable. This sets the stage for later rounds of profitable reinvestment leading to gentrification (the displacement of lower-class by higher-class residents) or commercial redevelopment (change of uses). In effect, the rundown of urban areas (degeneration) sets the stage for their eventual regeneration through speculative investment, class clearance, and the upgrading of uses. Urban degeneration and regeneration are thus dialectically intertwined in the uneven development of the built environment. Again, the whole process is contradictory and conflict-riven, often generating intense urban struggles, which ensures that the precise outcomes are unpredictable and likely to differ within various social contexts. As Roger Lee has pointed out, economic processes are situated in, and disrupted by, the geographies through which they operate, practice, and place matter.

Theoretical Strengths and Implications for Research Methodology

Part of the strength of the concept of uneven development is that it does not reduce one level of analysis to an epiphenomenon of the other. Rather, the global-local dialectic is seen as a two-way street: The restructuring of economic space produces local patterns of development and inequality, but it is also conditioned upon and disrupted by the specificity of place and subject to (sometimes surprising) disruption by alternative or oppositional movements or residual or emergent economic systems and practices. The broad conditions of uneven capitalist development determine (in the weak sense of setting limits) the broad contours of the field of play, but within this historically given context, the precise pattern of change is

dynamic and contradictory, constantly becoming open to variable and uncertain outcomes depending on the interpenetration of global and local forces (space and place, capital, state and citizen, etc.). Thus apparently local problems like job loss, poverty, class tensions around gentrification and displacement, and other urban struggles and social tensions are understood in the framework of the broader structural organization of society and space, its dialectical interpenetration with locality and agency, and its uneven development over time.

Finally, some implications of this concept for an urban research agenda are worth reflecting on. First it requires careful attention both to local patterns of change and contestation in, for example, housing markets, built-environment investment and disinvestment, employment, and the like, and global processes (capital circulation) and spatial structures (the class system of capitalism). The final research challenge is to attend also to the role of the state in regulating cities and localities in order to underpin the process of capital accumulation, assuage social conflict, and ensure the reproduction of labor power. These questions about governance bring us further into questions of political ideology and regulation and how such things also interconnect with the global and local dimensions of uneven development. The theory also has political importance insofar as its central and defining concern is focused on the contradictions and inequalities of capitalist development and their implications for localities and communities. As such it is a useful approach for any program of action research driven by some kind of emancipatory interest.

Michael Punch

See also Disinvestment; Gentrification; Globalization; Governance; Harvey, David; Revanchist City; Social Movements; Social Production of Space; Social Space

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URBAN

Urban comes from the Latin *urbs*, meaning "city" and most often is used as an adjective, referring to the characteristics of a town or city: urban life or urban sprawl, for example. Various derivatives of urban include *urbanism* and *urbanization*. In the United States, in particular, urban has become identified with negative characteristics of contemporary life—urban crime and urban poverty—but it also has been used to market urban lifestyles that stand out from the mainstream.

While the use of urban to describe the modern condition is ubiquitous (a 2003 report from the United Nations noted that half of the world's population now lives in urban areas, with a projected 60 percent of the population expected to live in urban areas by 2030), there is little agreement as to what threshold should be met to qualify a place for being "urban." The United States defines urban as places with a population of 2,500 or more (50,000 persons are required for an urban area), while the United Kingdom includes places with a population as low as 1,000 if the land use of the village can be identified as "irreversibly" urban in character. In Greenland and Iceland, urban includes localities of just 200 persons. A compendium of definitions used around the world (published in the *Yearbook of the United Nations*) shows that in many countries urban is defined simply by the official "municipalities," while in some cases the political definition is merged with a population threshold: In Austria, communes of 5,000 or more persons are considered urban, and in Switzerland the number is 10,000. Clearly the range of definitions makes

comparisons of “urbanized areas” and “urban population” problematic, not simply around the world but even within political units. For example, there are important differences in living in an urban locality of 2,500 persons in Mexico, and in the capital, Mexico City, with a population of some 20 million persons.

There is a long-standing distrust of cities and of urban life in the United States. In the novel *Redburn*, Herman Melville described incredible poverty and the death of a woman and her two children from starvation in the slums of Liverpool. Thomas Jefferson and others looked for an industrial policy that would allow development to take place without the great urban concentrations in Europe. By 1860 railroad commuting was well established in American cities (there were 83 commuter stations within a 15-mile radius of the city of Boston at mid-century). The first planned suburban community in the United States was developed in Llewellyn Park, New Jersey, in 1857, and the introduction of the street car in the 1880s produced even more extensive suburban growth. This pattern of development is very different from many European countries, where urban populations tended to remain in the urban center, and urban growth was often limited by earlier city walls. If Americans had a distrust of the city and apprehensions about living in urban areas, for Europeans the city represented a secure and civilized place separated from the untamed and, during periods of warfare, unsafe countryside. Today the European suburb bears much resemblance to the inner city in the United States with high rates of unemployment, poverty, and social exclusion among immigrant and minority youth—in the world of European politics, the third world begins with the suburbs.

The American distrust of cities means that the urban has long had negative meanings in the United States: Urban crime has come to stand for the drugs economy and related homicide rates (among the highest in the world) associated with inner-city populations; urban education has focused on the study of the problems of minority youth in inner-city schools; and urban psychology has developed around the study of various urban pathologies (anomie and isolation, crowding and aggression). Mark Girouard suggests that the United States and England share a popular view of

the city as Babylon—a wild and wicked place, where mobs ruled in a violent underworld—against that of the city as Jerusalem, where freedom and progress would give rise to democracy. But there is no comparable discussion of an urban psychology or urban education in the European literature; although there is concern with many of the same social issues (crime, education, social exclusion), these are not usually characterized as urban problems. Indeed, the common college or university course titled “Urban Problems” or “Urban Social Problems,” in which urban cultures are made exotic and urban populations are marginalized within the university curricula, is not to be found in universities outside the United States.

In popular culture as well, urban is often associated with minority populations and the inner city. *Urban music* (the term was coined by the New York City disk jockey Frankie Crocker) is a musical genre associated with hip hop, rap, and Caribbean- and African-related popular music; in the United Kingdom, *The Guardian* includes urban music as a genre featuring ethnic artists from the United Kingdom. Urban Decay is a cosmetic company that offers “trend-setting” cosmetics, including lip gloss, heavy metal glitter eyeliner, lip plumper, and “highly-pigmented glitter, matte, and shimmer eyeshadow.” Lipstick is sold in purple metal bullet-shaped tubes, with color schemes said to be inspired by the beautiful hues of America’s urban landscape: They are labeled Oilslick, Apocalypse, Garbage, Mildew, Roach, Smog, Rust, and Acid Rain (in addition to Gash, Jailbait, and Buzzkill). Urban has also emerged as a marketing image for new and trendy clothing, featuring supposedly urban scenes, including graffiti and hip hop imagery. Urban Outfitters is a “lifestyle merchandising company” that operates specialty retail stores in North America and Europe, including Urban Outfitters, Anthropologie, and Free People. The Urban Outfitters website blog offers personal profiles, music reviews, links to music videos, and other materials geared to a young adult audience. While bleached and destroyed denim makes up one product line for women’s jeans, there is little else exceptional about the goods sold. The only thing that might set the store apart from any number of other outlets is the link to customer images of what might be found in a visit to urban spaces.

Lewis Mumford argued that the city represented the greatest achievement of humankind; not only did it contain the highest achievements in art and architecture, but it provided spaces and opportunities for social interaction and involvement not found elsewhere. In this sense, to be urban is to be cultured—to have knowledge about and to have experienced the city. This also is the meaning of *cosmopolitan*—to have knowledge about and experience of the broader world around us. To be urban is to be cosmopolitan, and from this is derived yet another meaning and referent for urban: urbane.

Ray Hutchison

See also Mumford, Lewis; Urban Crisis; Urban Life; Urbanism; Urbanization

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URBAN AGGLOMERATION

The United Nations defines an *urban agglomeration* as “a contiguous territory inhabited at urban levels of residential density, without regard to administrative boundaries.” Included in this definition is the idea that urban agglomerations contain a variety of places ranging from large cities to small villages with much lower density, even rural, areas interspersed among them. Commonly, one central place anchors this continuous built-up area; the other places are functionally related to it and to each other.

On average, an urban agglomeration has population concentrations that exceed rural levels and which can be classified as urban densities. Second, it contains one or more large cities and a number of smaller cities and towns; it is polycentric or

multinucleated. Third, the various places within the urban agglomeration are connected to each other such that the agglomeration as a whole forms a functional urban region, one which provides a full range of goods and services consummate with the level of development of the country in which it is located. These functional relations involve trade, commuting, internal migration, and communication (e.g., television, newspapers) linkages. To this extent, an urban agglomeration is an elaborate version of a single city and its hinterland, the surrounding area that supplies the city with food, products for export, and raw materials for manufacture. Lastly, to the extent that an urban agglomeration contains rural areas in the interstices of dense concentrations, it might or might not have viable agricultural or resource extraction activities.

Using a baseline of 5 million inhabitants, there were 39 urban agglomerations in the world in the year 2000. They included such places as Paris, Istanbul, and Moscow. The six largest were Tokyo, Mexico City, Mumbai (previously Bombay), São Paulo, New York City, and Lagos, in that order. Tokyo’s population was approximately 35 million, followed by Mexico City at 19 million and Mumbai at 17 million. Just over one-half of these urban agglomerations were located in Asia (the most populous region of the world), and the rest were split between Latin America and Africa on the one hand and North America and Europe on the other.

The UN projects that by 2015 the number of urban agglomerations will grow to 59, with most of that growth concentrated in Asia. Of particular note is China, which is expected to add two more urban agglomerations (Chongqing and Shenyang) to the four (Shanghai, Beijing, Tianjin, and Wuhan) that it already has. In addition, almost all of the expansion of urban agglomerations is projected to occur in middle-income and low-income countries rather than in high-income countries. From the high-income countries, only London and Toronto are slated to join the ranks of the world’s largest urban areas.

Identifying the world’s urban agglomerations is not a simple task; more difficult yet is ranking them definitively from the largest to the smallest. To begin, definitions of what constitutes an urban area are a major challenge. What is considered

urban—more precisely, reported as such in official statistics—varies from one country to the next. Some countries focus on population density (often using dissimilar minimum levels to establish the difference between rural and urban areas), whereas others measure the presence of urban functions (e.g., the percentage of workers in nonagricultural jobs) or public utilities such as paved roads and water treatment plants. In addition, countries report their population data differently depending on the types of administrative areas they use for census taking. In addition, because population data have to be aggregated by territorial unit to determine the geographical scope of an urban agglomeration, those differences weaken cross-national comparisons. Variations in data collection procedures and data quality contribute to additional unreliability in determining what is, and is not, an urban agglomeration, and in ranking them.

Comparability and ranking are furthered muddled by the constant growth experienced by urban agglomerations. Urbanization is a dynamic process, with towns becoming cities and cities merging physically and functionally with surrounding satellite communities, often quite rapidly. This is particularly true in developing countries, and specifically in Asia, where rural-to-urban migration is creating vast urban regions. For all of these reasons, any ranking of the world's urban agglomerations is only an approximation and should be treated with caution. Nonetheless, researchers and scholars generally agree on which places deserve the label and which urban agglomerations are the largest.

The term *urban agglomeration* has a number of apparent synonyms. City-region, megacity, urbanized area, functional urban region, and urban field are similar in intent if not content. Each is concerned with the geographical concentration of population and socioeconomic activities and with the spatial clustering in built-up areas of large and small cities, towns, and villages. In the United States, *metropolitan area* is the term of choice. It began as a designation for an urban area functionally anchored by a central city and including surrounding suburban development. Thus, a metropolitan area was initially considered monocentric. However, as metropolitan areas became larger and spawned edge cities, they came to resemble the

polycentric urban agglomeration. The terms have converged.

The most commonly recognized synonyms for urban agglomeration are *conurbation* and *megalopolis*. The concept of conurbation was coined by Scottish sociologist and biologist Patrick Geddes in the early twentieth century. He used it to label what seemed to him to be an emerging phenomenon: the physical encompassing of once-isolated places by growing cities. As large cities expanded outward, he believed, they would surround and incorporate existing settlements (towns and villages) and, through physical merging, create a continuous network of communities, that is, a city-region or town-aggregate. To the extent that a conurbation has a polycentric pattern, it qualifies as an urban agglomeration.

The other term frequently associated with urban agglomeration is *megalopolis*. Geographer Jean Gottmann deployed this term in the late 1950s in recognition of the potential for metropolitan areas in the United States to grow so large that they join physically with adjacent metropolitan areas. Gottmann believed that he was witnessing the formation of a new type of urban area, one that was both sprawling and polycentric. As an example, he pointed to the incipient “BosWash” megalopolis that included Boston, Providence, New Haven, New York City, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington, D.C. Other megalopolis, he believed, would form around Cleveland, Gary, Detroit, Chicago, and Milwaukee in the upper Midwest and Los Angeles and San Diego in the Southwest. In the popular media of the time, the megalopolis became known as a “strip city.”

The various terms—*urban agglomeration*, *conurbation*, and *megalopolis*, among others—commonly used to discuss large, built-up, polycentric urban areas make for terminological confusion. Some researchers claim that a conurbation is a polycentric form of urban agglomeration, thus reducing the latter to a monocentric form. Other researchers argue that the metropolitan area as defined in the United States is too confined to administrative boundaries and too focused on a central city to be considered the equivalent of an urban agglomeration. *Megalopolis* is a more acceptable synonym. *City-region*, a term that emerged with the globalization debate of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, seems

designed to subsume all of the other terms, though more through a lack of precision than theoretical inclusiveness.

An urban agglomeration should not be confused with agglomeration economies. Urban agglomeration is a demographic concept based on population densities and functional relations that bind together various places. Those functional relations, moreover, are not solely economic but rather can be social, cultural, and political. Consequently, even though urban agglomeration requires spatial clustering, it has no definitional relationship to the kinds of economies and diseconomies that economists associate with the spatial agglomeration of businesses and labor. Agglomeration economies occur in urban agglomerations and draw on the density of activities that characterize the latter, but the two concepts refer to different phenomena. In fact, the former has a distinct normative dimension—absent in the latter—grounded, as it is, in a concern with economic growth.

Because urban places take a variety of spatial forms, differing not only in size but also in how they are organized, scholars, researchers, and policymakers have developed numerous terms to capture these differences. Such terms as *city*, *suburb*, *town*, *village*, *edge city*, and *satellite community* enable us to distinguish among urban places. As societies became highly urbanized in the last half of the nineteenth century, a need existed for terms that could identify and represent the geographical spread of urban places and their resultant physical and functional connections to each other. *Urban agglomeration* is one of those terms. Widely used by demographers and urban researchers, this term identifies the large built-up areas in which more and more people live.

Robert A. Beauregard

See also Megalopolis; Metropolitan Region; Urban; Urbanization

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URBAN ANTHROPOLOGY

The term *urban anthropology* came to designate a subfield of cultural anthropology in the 1960s, even though anthropologists have been conducting research in cities since the 1930s. While *ethnography*, the core methodological tradition of anthropology, derives from in-depth studies of rural and village life, the development of urban anthropology also reflects broader conceptual debates within the discipline. New conceptualizations of the city have influenced how anthropologists think about culture and social change. However, the particular methods and perspectives deployed by anthropologists generate new ways to understand the dynamics of urban life, as well.

One of the most productive tensions within urban anthropology is whether it construes itself as study *of* the city or *in* the city. With notable exceptions, anthropologists have generally treated the city as a context for research rather than as their object of study. Nonetheless, this has proved fruitful ground for debate. Anthropology of the city analyzes how urban form and processes are shaped by diverse political, economic, and cultural forces. Study in the city provides descriptive accounts and involves refinement of social scientific concepts to bring them closer to the daily entanglements of urban life. The methodological choices and research topics anthropologists adopt are often informed by how they negotiate this tension.

Historical Origins and Trajectories

Until the latter half of the twentieth century, the very notion of urban anthropology appeared somewhat an oxymoron. Its historical foundations are in fact manifold and rest on sociological as well as anthropological grounds. Anthropology's traditional

emphasis on “primitive” peoples and peasants in the colonial periphery corresponded to a theoretical division between Western civilization and its others that permeated social thought at the turn of the twentieth century. Henry Sumner Maine’s mid-eighteenth-century investigation of the origins of law located this distinction in a historical shift from status to contract. According to Maine, the former social order type was dictated by personal ties, particularly kin relations, the latter by the association of individuals. In a similar vein, Ferdinand Tönnies would develop the concepts of *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft* to differentiate the communal bonds of family, village, guild, or religion from those built on commercial and contractual ties, such as between employer and employee, creditor and debtor, or merchant and client.

The work of Émile Durkheim in the late eighteenth-century introduced a new rigor by proceeding from the premise that the degree of specialization in the division of labor profoundly shapes social life. He posited that members of simple clan and sect communities were maintained by *organic solidarity*, social cohesion through a shared set of norms, moral values, beliefs, and worldviews. By contrast, a different form of social integration, called *organic solidarity*, held together industrial societies. Here the complex differentiation and mutual interdependence of social roles give rise to the modern individual, who cultivates a personality, lifestyle, opinions, and affiliations through these relations. This is a liberating yet isolating experience for the individual.

This conceptual divide, with folk culture on one side and urban society on the other, effectively defined the boundary between sociology and cultural anthropology. Sociologists were to study Western urban industrial societies, while anthropologists would specialize in analyzing the life of villagers and peasants at the fringes of the colonial, and later capitalist, world. The early work of anthropologists on “primitive culture” provided a counterpoint to the dynamic, progressive, and often destructive forces of modernization, technological innovation, bureaucratization, and individualization occurring in Western society. Research is based on *participant-observation*: up-close, long-term fieldwork experiences and involvement in locals’ daily life. Anthropologists often supplement field notes from these experiences with other

evidence such as interview material, collected artifacts and documents, maps, and surveys. Such fieldwork methods, along with the descriptive and interpretive analytical writing that results from it, are collectively known as *ethnography*.

Urban anthropology also draws upon other sources from outside its discipline. The earliest urban ethnographies were produced not by anthropologists but by social reformers and revolutionaries outraged by the miserable plight of the working class in urban industrial centers. Friedrich Engels’s (1845) account of Victorian-era Manchester and other rapidly industrializing English cities turns on riveting descriptions of dismal conditions of disease, hunger, overcrowding, and exploitation to construct a scathing critique of class power and spatial form under the capitalist system. Charles Booth produced extensive maps of wealth distribution in turn-of-the-century London (1969) in an attempt to influence policy toward working-class poverty alleviation and avert socialist revolution in Britain. W. E. B. Du Bois, the first African American to earn a PhD from Harvard University, combined Booth’s method of statistical analysis and extensive interviews with historical perspective in his study of race relations in Philadelphia (1899). Jacob Riis’s pioneering photojournalist studies of squalid slum conditions (1890) helped the introduction of tenement reform in New York. And as head resident of Hull House, Jane Addams (1910) wrote of the impact of social services for poverty alleviation among ethnic immigrants in Chicago. Such works prefigured the political and moral implications, if not imperatives, of research among vulnerable urban populations.

The Chicago School and the Human Ecological Perspective

Many early-twentieth-century conceptualizations of the city sought to define it as a distinct ecological domain. Theory and empirical research conducted in this vein thus concerned itself with how humans adapted to the urban environment, echoing Darwinist and Durkheimian ideas about populations and increasing specialization. Georg Simmel’s classic essay, “The Metropolis and Mental Life” (1903), took the experience of sensory bombardment, the money economy, and coordinated time schedules as the basis for a

sweeping psychological portrait of the urban dweller and urban social relations. Overstimulation, coupled with an active intellect, produced certain traits in the individual: a necessary indifference, even aversion, to others (which Simmel termed the *blasé attitude*) that serves a self-protective purpose, or *reserve*. Antipathy, distrust, rationalization, and calculation represented social and psychological traits mediating the spatially dense, touch-and-go relationships of everyday urban life.

These ideas became influential at the University of Chicago's Department of Sociology, which emerged as a major center for urban theory and research in the 1920s and 1930s. Robert E. Park, who had studied philosophy under Simmel in Berlin, and Louis Wirth became central figures of the so-called Chicago School. For Park, the city was quintessentially the locus of civilization, a melting pot in which tribal and ethnic affiliations would fade and human potential be realized. Echoing Durkheim, Park asserted the city as the place par excellence where individuals could pursue their place in the division of labor yet remain subordinated to the collective consciousness of society. Within the city, Park discerned, was a constant oscillation between the breakdown of traditional moral constraints and new modes of social control. Wirth, in his influential essay "Urbanism as a Way of Life" (1938), proposed that the city could be defined by three variables: size, density, and heterogeneity. From this formulation, and following Simmel, he deduced that urban social relations are characterized by their impersonal, instrumental, and segmental nature.

Chicago-brand urbanism understood the city as a special kind of environment that exerts influence over society and individuals. Moreover, its foundational principles rested on ideas of primitive and peasant life as, by contrast, static and undifferentiated. Anthropologist Robert Redfield, a pupil (and son-in-law) of Park, formalized this duality between rural and urban societies based on extensive fieldwork in the Mexican village of Tepoztlán, in different settlement types on the Yucatán Peninsula, and in early Mexican immigrant communities in Chicago. Redfield's folk-urban continuum model (1930) posited rural and urban society at opposite poles of a spectrum. At the rural extreme, social life is characterized by tradition, harmony, homogeneity, and isolation. These traits become eroded

by increasing urbanization. In Redfield's scheme, rural cultures become fragmented and disorganized as they enter into urban domains. Critics maintained that Chicago scholars had advanced a thoroughly anti-urban theory of urbanism.

Anthropologists in Cities

Cultural anthropology thus developed primarily in context of small-scale, nonindustrialized societies. But over the course of a twentieth century that witnessed mass urbanization worldwide, more anthropologists' attention became drawn to cities. In many cases this shift was a direct result of ethnographers following their informants from rural to urban areas. In the 1960s and 1970s in particular, much urban anthropological research focused on the migration experience, ethnic enclaves, and peri-urban informal settlements. The arrival of anthropologists in cities presented challenges to the research tradition, however. Having developed a methodological tool kit centered on simple societies, anthropologists confronted questions of how urbanization affected their traditional objects of interest.

Despite its formalism and generalizing claims, the Chicago urbanist tradition also encouraged and supported a vast body of empirical research. Moreover, the conceptual framework of the Chicago School prefigured how and what anthropologists would study in cities, but many scholars tested those assumptions and generated critiques. W. Lloyd Warner brought the traditional anthropological methods he crafted in dissertation work on Australian Aborigine society to the context of the urban America. His five-volume work, *Yankee City* (1963), stands as perhaps the most ambitious and exhaustive attempt to investigate American urban life. He and his research team conducted interviews and surveys in the small industrial town of Newburyport, Massachusetts, in a nearly decade-long endeavor to document race relations, class distinction, religion, and social mobility. Warner's previous field experience with tribal villages appeared a direct analog for urban communities, but this assumption meant inadequate treatment of the broader context of U.S. politics and history.

The notion of "traditional" cultures' adaptation to urbanization, the hallmark principle of Redfield's

folk–urban continuum, came under scrutiny from different locales. A broad interest in migrants, slum dwellers, and other “peasants in cities” drew upon the hypothesis that such groups faced the disintegration of traditional familial, religious, and ethnic ties. William Foote Whyte lived for an extended period with a family in “Cornerville,” a poor Italian neighborhood in Boston. His *Street Corner Society* (1943) is not only an up-close portrait of the everyday struggles of immigrants in a U.S. city but also a chronicle of the ethical confrontations and emotional investments of the fieldwork experience. Years later, Herbert Gans treaded much the same urban ground as Whyte in his ethnography of Italian Americans in Boston’s West End, *The Urban Villagers* (1962). The circumstances of the neighborhood, in the midst of demolition to make way for high-rise apartments, impelled Gans to expand his scope from an ethnic group’s cultural adaptation to urban life to critical reflection on market-led urban renewal. This work revealed one of the principal shortcomings of community studies: that treating neighborhoods as isolated worlds tends to miss how power operates across city areas.

A direct critique of the continuum model came from a 1943 restudy of Tepoztlán by Oscar Lewis. Redfield’s depiction of village life as harmonious and homogeneous collided with Lewis’s evidence of violence, discord, cruelty, disease, suffering, and poverty. The latter suggested that urbanization was not a uniform process but assumes different forms and meanings according to historical, economic, and cultural conditions. He criticized Redfield for explaining social behavior as a result of culture, instead of the inverse.

Lewis’s subsequent research in Mexico and Puerto Rico garnered both public policy attention and vigorous rebukes from fellow anthropologists, ironically along the same lines as his own critique of Redfield. His notion of a “culture of poverty” sought to describe poverty not as lack of material resources but as sustained by a set of values largely shaping social life. He identified behavioral traits among slum dwellers—such as disorganization, fatalism, helplessness, dependency, promiscuity, gregariousness, sense of inferiority, and lack of participation in social institutions—and attributed these to a self-sustaining cycle of poverty. Lewis believed that a robust welfare system or socialist

revolution would eliminate the culture of poverty, and his theory undergirded the 1960s federal War on Poverty program. Nevertheless, critics pointed out that the theory essentially blames the victim while ignoring the political and economic conditions contributing to poverty. They maintained that the culture of poverty further treats the poor as a distinct category of people and slums as a world unto themselves, separated from the rest of the urban system.

Another focal point of new research was at the Rhodes-Livingstone Institute in the Copperbelt region of Northern Rhodesia, where a generation of social anthropologists from Manchester University received training in the ethnographic method. Many became interested in the question of detribalization of native Africans in colonial cities. They found that migration and adaptation was not a linear process and that tribal affiliations, far from disappearing in cities, became articulated in new ways, such as in dance, joking relations, and other cultural forms. Ethnicity, they argued, was not a preurban or anti-urban sentiment, but one constitutive of the city. Paradoxically, modernity and tradition coevolved in African cities. They further developed sophisticated methodologies centered on situational analysis and shifted focus from localized communities to more encompassing urban regional systems.

Multisited Ethnographic Research

The changing global political and economic landscape from the 1970s onward corresponded with new perspectives in urban anthropology emphasizing political economic perspectives and more mobile cultural forms. Anthony Leeds issued a critique and reorientation of the subfield by directing attention to the role of state power in the urban process. This intervention compelled researchers to look beyond their immediate localities at systems of, for example, taxation, land tenure, labor markets, food production, commodity exchange, education, credit, information, and military force. Many anthropologists became receptive to Marxian analyses of how post-Fordist forms of capital accumulation were reshaping understandings of time and space while exacerbating class inequalities. More bottom-up approaches suggested the continuous

involvement of urban dwellers across different situational contexts and social networks. Anthropologists had begun crafting ways to cross-cut the seeming gap between local experience and global systems and termed this new kind of fieldwork *multisited ethnography*. There emerged a broad challenge to the long-held assumption that culture was always confined to specific places in favor of an idea of culture as a flow circulating through geographically extensive urban systems. They conceived the city not as a mere context or environment but rather as a node within extensive networks of capital, commodities, social ties, images, and ideologies.

Ethnographers at the turn of the twenty-first century became more sensitive to the fact that cities were increasingly at the intersection of myriad global connections. Whereas their predecessors sought out communities they took to be culturally intact wholes, this generation operated on, and helped develop, a notion of culture as open, diffuse, mobile, and hybrid. Many urban researchers renewed an ecological focus on space and place, but treated them as socially constructed rather than as empty vessels or mere contexts in which culture unfolds. Approaches to, for instance, race, gender, or kinship emphasized how they shape urban form and processes, instead of perceiving the city as a neutral stage where these social categories could be examined. Social theorist Michel Foucault's analyses of disciplining power and surveillance also inspired anthropological work on new forms of governance, the militarization of public spaces, gated communities, and the prison-industrial complex. Other ethnographic research draws upon the reflections of Walter Benjamin and Michel de Certeau on the experience of walking the city as a way of knowing it.

As urbanization becomes a more ubiquitous phenomenon, the limits of the city are blurring, and ethnographic research is reflecting the permeability of those boundaries. If early urban anthropological research was often concerned with a perceived opposition between city and country, civilization and tradition, more recent analyses dispense with this notion of primitivism. This outlook has been largely replaced with a focus on how urbanites are enmeshed in far-reaching webs and indeed how people construct and maintain connections across space. Ethnographic

fieldwork affords an awareness of the complexities of everyday life, the very messiness of how urban reality is lived. Anthropologists are keen to recognize that all knowledge of the city is both partial and situated. Their impulse toward methodological and theoretical innovation is an intellectual safeguard against overreduction and tidiness.

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See also Chicago School of Urban Sociology; Ethnic Enclave; *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*; Globalization; Human Ecology; Urban Culture; Urbanism; Urban Village

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URBAN ARCHAEOLOGY

Urban archaeology, in this entry, refers to the archaeology of cities created by European expansion, as well as later early-modern phases of European cities. This entry does not cover the archaeology of ancient and classical cities in Greece, Rome, and elsewhere.

Early modern and modern eras refer to periods from the time of European expansion in the mid-fifteenth century. The use of the terms *early modern* and *modern* implies that the world as we know it has its beginnings in Europe around 1450 when Europeans began exploring, colonizing, and ultimately pulling the world under their cultural influence. This colonizing process defines the substance of urban historical archaeology and, more significantly, the key problem in it: the study, not of Renaissance and Baroque eras and arts of Europe, but rather of Europe's most compelling and notorious creation: capitalism and how it works.

Urban archaeologists study the remains of urban or city life from 1450 on, everywhere, and of the expansion and working of colonialism and its economic system, capitalism. This is frequently the history of destruction, and in this sense urban archaeology is also the revealed story of peoples extinguished, native habitats eliminated, and of intact archaeological and geological deposits pillaged. The positive side of urban archaeology is that this process involved the actual founding of the historically oriented earth sciences: archaeology, geology, hydrology, anthropology, ethnography, and geography. These sciences and the new empiricism were coupled with democratic nationalism in eighteenth-century Europe and North America to produce an antidote to the colonialistic and destructive processes of capitalism to create one of the political goals of historical archaeology. All archaeologists, urban or otherwise, attempt to recover the histories or missing pasts of peoples altered by the Europeanization of the globe. These peoples include native or indigenous peoples, such as Native Americans, Australians, Africans, Pacific Islanders, and Indonesians, and virtually anyone subject to the colonial process of producing workers, peasants, miners, and Christian converts. Recovering them is the self-defined object of urban archaeology.

Urbanism in the ancient world probably saw the beginning of slavery in human society. European expansion has slavery inside its definition because trade in people for profit is a way of making humans into commodities, which is the essence of capitalism. Europeans did not invent slavery, but they created the transatlantic slave trade and capitalized on the East African slave trade around the Indian Ocean to the southern Pacific Rim in Indonesia. Urban historical archaeology is therefore the study of African diasporas to the Americas and from the Indonesian Archipelago to European colonies in South Africa as well.

Slavery is the most extreme form of profit making in that it extinguishes all human value and imposes on human life only a definition of labor, replaceability, and thus no responsibility for death and the processes that produce it. Archaeologists devoted to this process study every aspect of slavery from the beginning of enslavement to slave life, escape, and death. Plantation archaeology has been carried out throughout the Caribbean, Brazil, and the southern United States. The archaeology of slave ports and trading centers in West and East Africa has focused on the collection and export stations in Africa where the enslavement process was initiated between local powers and Europeans.

There are two reasons to define urban archaeology as the archaeology of European colonialism and capitalism. The first is that the results of such an approach create historical literacy. With this, people at different levels of living societies who were often previously excluded can participate in democratic society. Historical literacy, which is an understanding of the role of knowledge about the past, both enables and requires greater democratic involvement. Historical literacy speaks to the powerful and the powerless about conditions that facilitate democracy. This definition assumes that participation in democracy is good.

The second reason for this fairly standard definition is the fact that capitalism and two of its vehicles, colonialism and nationalism, are not gone. Recovering from colonialism is an ongoing problem across the world. Frequently, since the end of World War II, findings of prehistoric and historic archaeology studies have led to governments in newly independent countries celebrating and correcting forgotten, hidden, or reviled past epochs.

Nation Building and the Exclusion of Minority Groups

Archaeology has been used for nation building, and two of the most famous illustrations are Mexico and modern Israel. However, nationalism is not a past phenomenon. Nationalism often involves taking one group in an old set of provinces, now a new nation, and making it dominant in many ways, often by comparing it to “inferior” groups. Particular groups became new colonial entities, such as Jews through newly nationalist Europe, Communists, Gypsies, immigrants, American Chinese in the late nineteenth century, and Japanese Americans during World War II. These groups, often urban, were defined as seditious and were sometimes watched as a new, potential danger to the state. This watching often occurred in camps, which were guarded enclaves or enclosures, leading sometimes to the wholesale death of newly defined minorities. Urban archaeologists study this process.

The newest initiative in urban archaeology is the exploration of the internment camp. Built in the name of national security, these are places that contain groups of people excluded, by the state, from their rights and citizenship. This category includes South African townships under Apartheid, German concentration camps, and the more recent examples of isolation and imprisonment by Pol Pot in Cambodia, Pinochet in Chile, and the United States at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.

Urban Archaeology in the United States

Virtually all of the properties of urban archaeology can be illustrated by the post-World War II excavations of New York City. Recovered remains include virtually all prehistoric eras and cover the ecological relationships developed in each. Hunter gatherers and agriculturalists lived in the area that is now New York City for 10,000 years before Europeans arrived. Because of the attention to climatological and ecological relationships, archaeologists show stable resources, a growing population, and shifting uses of available foods, but little destruction of land or living species, aside from what happened during the terminal Pleistocene. The remains of the Dutch, English, and Americans have been explored in the archaeology of New York. There

are substantial remains representing each culture and period. The archaeology from the mid-sixteenth century to today shows European populations have increased in number, land has been built up, and social relations have stratified. The archaeology also shows environmental degradation, the deliberate creation of slum housing, dangerous living conditions, and widespread use of slave labor in the city.

Rebecca Yamin’s analysis of the archaeology of Philadelphia is organized around city founder William Penn’s idea of equality, or “Brotherly Love.” The city’s original squares, the area around Independence Hall, the African American neighborhoods, slavery, and the famous panoptic prison (the Eastern State Penitentiary) are all about equality, its failures, and the efforts to restore the local Quaker-inspired idea of Brotherly Love. More than a hundred separate excavations have been conducted in Philadelphia over the past 60 years, and through them, the city’s founding ideals and failures to live up to those ideals have been linked through popular interpretation. One excavation in Philadelphia revealed a home for women who were to be reintegrated into society, the Magdalene Society Asylum. While working near Independence Hall, archaeologists exposed evidence of slaveholding and impoverished free African Americans. Excavated escape routes from the Bentham-inspired prison made a commentary on the failure of these equalizing and reforming institutions whose aim was good citizenship within a democracy.

Urban archaeology in America has started to develop in many cities, primarily in the form of cultural resource management projects. These projects are most frequently defined as a necessary legal step in the development of a given area, as opposed to being research driven. However, in the past 25 years or so, programs with a scholarly emphasis have been gaining support within certain urban communities. An example of this is Archaeology in Annapolis, a program started in 1981. Fieldwork uncovered streets that predate the written records of the city. Despite references to Annapolis being designed in the baroque style, little geometric physical evidence survived. Archaeologists discovered how irregular and non-parallel street lines were due to their focused vistas on sites of power. In addition, there have been multiple discoveries that speak to cultural and

religious practices beyond those of Europeans, particularly African American spirit “bundles,” which contain materials significant to the existence of an African supernatural.

Discoveries such as these have helped archaeologists and historians reconstruct a more accurate idea of how the city was built and who lived in it. Archaeology within a segregated urban environment can focus on the historical creation and development of African American neighborhoods, racialized conflict at the margins of these neighborhoods, and the mechanisms of gentrification and urban renewal that resulted in the displacement of long-term minority residents. Urban archaeology can accompany a commitment to public education and the presentation of archaeological discoveries, thus challenging the inevitability of a city’s demographic makeup.

London

The city of London offers a case study of the accomplishments of urban archaeology, which began intensively after World War II. Located within the Thames Valley, the London metropolitan region encompasses roughly 600 square miles and had approximately 13 million residents in 2008. Recognized as one of the largest cities in the world, London has a cultural history that dates to circa 400,000 BC and includes prehistoric archaeological sites that trace much of the history of human cultural development there. Prehistoric archaeological sites within the region range from the Paleolithic (including *Homo heidelbergensis* sites dating to 400,000 BC) to Iron Age Celtic sites dating to the first century AD. The conventional history of the city of London dates to the founding of the Roman City of *Londinium* in the mid-first century AD, as a center for commerce and trade at the western fringe of the Roman Empire. With nearly 2,000 years of recorded history, the city of London can be read as a microcosm of the development of capitalism.

Modern construction projects within the city necessitate archaeological excavations by cultural resource management firms. The city of London funded archaeological research to mitigate the growth of an ever-changing cityscape. The Museum of London Archaeology (formerly Museum of London Archaeological Services) conducts cultural

resource management and research-oriented archaeological studies. Centered at the Museum of London, the premier urban history museum within the city, the Museum of London Archaeology has undertaken research projects over the past 35 years that, in the aggregate, have traced the history of the city.

Archaeologists from the Museum of London Archaeology have excavated a number of famous sites within the city, including the Spitalfields Roman cemetery, St. Paul’s Cathedral, Shakespeare’s Globe and Rose theaters south of the Thames River, and most recently Shakespeare’s earliest theater, the Theater, north of the Thames River in Shoreditch.

London archaeological sites related to the spread of modern capitalism include many industrial archaeological sites directly tied to commerce, trade, and varying colonial enterprises from the sixteenth century onward. Excavations have included a range of sites from glass and pottery works to tobacco wharves and docks directly tied to colonial export markets. One recent excavation demonstrates the global impact of urban archaeology within the city of London.

In 2005, Museum of London Archaeological Services excavated a seventeenth-century brick furnace, south of the Thames in Hammersmith, that had been within the private grounds owned by Sir Nicholas Crisp. In addition to evidence of brick making, glass beads and wasters associated with a bead-making industry were found. During the first half of the seventeenth century, Crisp held a monopoly on slave trading from Guinea in West Africa to the West Indies. Similar beads have been recovered archaeologically at Plymouth Plantation in Massachusetts and in an archaeological site in Ghana. Museum of London archaeologists believe that the small red and white striped beads were used by Crisp as trade items within the early transatlantic slave trade. The discovery of the point of origin of these trade beads demonstrates the global reach of early European capitalism and its impact on indigenous cultures.

London has long been recognized as the epicenter of English colonial expansion. As a city, it can be seen as both the origin and product of colonialism. Artifacts from its many craft and mercantile industries are found on every English colonial site from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries.

Urban archaeology is practiced around the world. Many of the world's great cities sponsor excavations, provide interpretations of them to the public, and even open excavations to the public. Well-known urban archaeological excavations are currently under way in Saint Augustine, Florida; Sacramento, California; Rome, Italy; and Buenos Aires, Argentina.

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modifications to all the main elements that comprise our weather and climate: temperature, radiation, wind flow, humidity, atmospheric composition, clouds, and precipitation. These changes come about because urbanization creates significant modifications to the land surface and these modifications affect how energy and mass are exchanged between the surface and the atmosphere. Urban climates now affect nearly half of the world's population. Most residents of developed nations live in cities while less-developed nations have experienced recent rapid rates of urbanization and the emergence of megacities.

Urban climates represent an unintentional or inadvertent change to climates. Urban climates are superposed on both the background climate of a location as well as any regional climate effects due to the landscape such as a coastal or valley location of a city. Modified urban climates influence the energy and water use in cities, have health implications for urban inhabitants, affect biological activity, and modify the weather downwind of cities. Whereas most impacts of urban climates are confined largely to urban areas themselves, some aspects of urban climate can affect the environment downwind of cities, influencing the atmosphere and climates on scales much larger than the city itself, thus providing a link between global environmental change and urbanization.

Scales of Urban Climates

Urban climates refer to climates over surfaces as small as a few square meters (micro-scale variability between, e.g., a front garden and a paved driveway), up to several tens of kilometers that encompass an entire metropolitan area. An important scale distinction for urban climate is that of the *urban canopy layer* and the *urban boundary layer*. The urban canopy layer refers to the layer of air extending from the surface up to approximately the mean height of the canopy elements—the buildings, trees, and other objects that make up the surface of the city. The surface of the city has a distinct three-dimensional form to it, which plays an important role in determining the nature of urban climates. The urban boundary layer lies above the urban canopy layer and extends upward in the atmosphere to where the influence of the surface is no longer felt on a daily basis. This

URBAN CLIMATE

Urban climates are climates modified by the presence of urbanized areas. Urban climates include




Figure 1 Scales of Urban Climate Showing the Urban Boundary Layer and Urban Canopy Layer and Some of the Processes and Effects of Urban Climate

Source: Adapted from Oke, T. R. 1997. "Urban Environments." Pp. 303–27 in *Surface Climates of Canada*, edited by W. G. Bailey, T. R. Oke, and W. R. Rouse. Montreal, QC, Canada: Queen's University Press.

height shows significant variability between day and night and under different weather conditions. Under daytime, fair weather conditions it may be 1 to 2 kilometers above the city; at night it may be a few hundred meters. (See Figure 1.)

Physical Basis for Urban Climates

Urbanization significantly changes the characteristics of the land surface and the atmosphere. These changes affect how energy and mass are exchanged between the surface and the atmosphere and lead to the creation of urban climates.

Urban Surface. The urban surface characteristics, including its geometric configuration; how well it absorbs sunlight, emits radiative energy, and stores heat; and the presence and amount of moisture are important determinants of urban climates and help explain how urban climates differ from the climates of other natural systems.

Surface Geometry. Urban surfaces have complex three-dimensional configurations and are said to be "rough." Rough urban surfaces exert more drag on winds, resulting in a slowing of air flow over urban areas and increased amounts of turbulence

(three-dimensional motion of the flow of air). Rough surfaces are also slightly better absorbers of sunlight compared to flat surfaces with equivalent surface properties.

Surface Reflectance. Overall, urban areas tend to be slightly better absorbers of sunlight; that is, the reflectance of urban areas is slightly less than that of their surroundings. Within urban areas, there is large variability in the solar reflectance for urban materials, ranging from dark asphalt roads to whitewashed walls. Variations in surface reflectance, combined with shading from buildings and trees, means that there is a large variability in the amount of sunlight received and absorbed by individual components of urban surfaces and, consequently, in their temperature.

Urban Thermal Properties. The materials used in urban construction for the most part are good at storing and retaining heat. Individual urban materials exhibit a wide variety of thermal properties, ranging from well-insulated roofs with a poor ability to conduct or retain heat to massive amounts of concrete that can store large amounts of heat by day and release their store of heat slowly at night.

Moisture. Most materials used in urban construction are impervious, so that precipitation quickly runs off, meaning that many urban surfaces are dry except during or immediately after precipitation. Overall, cities tend to be drier than their surroundings. However, cities may also be home to irrigated parks, lawns, and gardens, so that in some cases, cities may contain areas where moisture is present even when the prevailing climate has little precipitation.

Urban Atmosphere. Additions of pollutants, heat, and humidity from combustion processes within the city (such as from space heating, human activities, and traffic) modify the urban atmosphere directly and contribute to urban climate modifications. Polluted urban atmospheres reduce the transmission of solar radiation, leading to slightly less radiation being received by the urban surface, and change the character of the received sunlight: It is usually depleted in ultraviolet wavelengths and more radiation is scattered by pollutants, leading to more indirect or diffuse sunlight received by urban surfaces. Absorption of sunlight by pollutants

warms the urban boundary layer. Additions of humidity and other gases also affect transfer of infrared radiation and serve to make the urban atmosphere warmer.

Urban Surroundings. Finally, the nature of urban climates, and in particular their difference from the climate of their surroundings, depends on the nature of their surroundings. For example, in the winter season of cities in mid to high latitudes, strong contrasts in surface reflectance may occur after snowfalls; while rural areas are mostly snow-covered, urban areas exhibit a large fraction of snow-free surfaces. Desert cities may exhibit higher humidities than their surroundings due to irrigation. Cities on small islands surrounded by ocean have nonurban surroundings with much different thermal characteristics than those of cities in continental interiors.

Surface Radiation and Energy Balances. The surface radiation and energy balances provide the energetic basis for understanding urban climates. The radiation balance describes the input of radiation energy to the surface from both the sun and the atmosphere and how much of this energy is reflected, absorbed, and emitted. The energy balance describes how the net absorbed radiation is partitioned into heating the air, evaporating water, or stored as heat in urban materials. Researchers use instrumentation mounted on tall towers to directly measure and study urban radiation and energy balances. Numerical representation of the surface radiation and energy balances are also our primary means of modeling urban climates. Several nations are currently working to implement urban surface radiation and energy balance models as part of the standard numerical weather forecasting models used for weather prediction with the hope of ultimately providing urban residents with better forecasts.

Urban Heat Island

The most studied urban climate effect is that of the *urban heat island*. The urban heat island represents the difference in temperature between urban areas and their nonurbanized surroundings. Urban heat islands exist in both the air temperature of the urban atmosphere (urban canopy layer and urban

boundary layer) and in the urban surface temperatures. The urban heat island may be detected by networks of thermometers or, in the case of the surface heat island, by remote sensing from aircraft or satellites. The urban heat island arises because cities warm and cool at different rates than their surroundings. The differences in the warming and cooling rates are related to the changes in surface and atmospheric characteristics of urban areas described earlier: Cities, consisting of rough, dry surfaces, are good absorbers and storers of heat, and they release this heat more slowly than their rural surroundings at night. The urban heat island (in air temperatures) is maximized at night under clear and calm conditions, when differences of up to 12° C may occur on an hourly basis (Table 1). During the daytime, atmospheric urban heat islands are typically weaker or sometimes even cooler than their surroundings. Surface temperatures in urban areas are usually warmer than their rural surroundings. A complete

explanation of the urban heat island requires application of the surface radiation and energy balance frameworks but some generalizations can be made (Table 2).

Impacts of Urban Climates

Urban climates impact the nature of the urban atmosphere through the climate effects described in Table 1. These alterations arise through direct modification of atmospheric properties or through surface–atmosphere interactions. Other implications for urban activities and functions also arise from these changes as outlined in Table 3.

Intentional Modification of Urban Climates

Understanding the physical basis of urban climates and the impacts arising from the unintentional modifications to urban atmospheres

Table 1 Urban Climate Effects

<i>Climate Variable</i>	<i>Change in Urban Environment</i>
Air temperature	Warmer (1–3° C on an annual basis, up to 12° C on an hourly basis)
Surface temperature	Warmer: large variability depending on surface conditions, but may be 20° C or more for individual surface types
Wind speed	Reduced (5–30 percent at 10 meters) except for weather associated with calm or very light winds when a slight increase in urban airflow may occur
Wind direction	Turning (anti-clockwise in northern hemisphere, clockwise in southern hemisphere) of 1–10 percent
Turbulence	Increased (10–50 percent)
Humidity	Drier (summer daytime) More moist (summer nighttime, winter all day)
Evaporation	Less
Soil moisture	Less
Solar radiation	Less
Visibility	Reduced
Pollutant concentrations	Increased
Clouds	More, downwind of city
Precipitation	Less snow Rainfall may be increased downwind of the city
Thunderstorms	More (but fewer tornadoes)

Source: Adapted from Oke, T. R. 1997. “Urban Climates and Global Environmental Change.” Table 21.2, p. 275 in *Applied Climatology*, edited by R. D. Thompson and A. Perry. London: Routledge. Reprinted with permission of Taylor and Francis Books UK.

Table 2 Factors That Lead to the Formation and/or Influence of the Magnitude of Urban Heat Islands

<i>Heat Island Influence</i>	<i>Effect on Urban Heat Island (UHI) Intensity</i>
Surface geometry	UHI intensity increases as building height to street width ratio increases and view of the nighttime sky is obstructed.
Surface thermal properties	UHI intensity increases as urban thermal admittance increases relative to rural thermal admittance (city being a better storer of heat).
Anthropogenic heat input	UHI intensity increases as anthropogenic heat increases. There can be large seasonal variations in this heat input as well as intraurban spatial variability related to the density of development and intensity of energy use.
City size	UHI intensity tends to increase as city size increases.
Wind speed	UHI intensity decreases rapidly as wind speed increases.
Cloud cover	UHI intensity decreases as cloud cover increases.
Season	UHI intensity is typically largest in the warm season in mid-latitudes. In high latitudes, the UHI is largest in the winter due to anthropogenic heat input. In tropical cities with distinct wet and dry seasons, the UHI is typically largest in the dry season.
Time of day	UHI intensity is largest at night (air temperatures). The surface urban heat island intensity is larger during the day (clear, sunny conditions).

Source: Oke, 1997a.

Table 3 Impacts of Urban Climates

<i>Impacts of Urban Climate</i>	<i>Description</i>
Altered urban water balance	Faster runoff, higher peak flows, and potentially higher concentrations of contaminants due to the increased amount of impervious surfaces.
Increased urban air pollution	Increased rates of air pollution formation (e.g., ground-level ozone) and precursor emissions due to warmer urban atmospheres).
Human health	Increased summer urban heat stress. Improved cold season thermal comfort. Safety and comfort of pedestrians in local wind climates influenced by tall buildings.
Changes in energy demand	Increased demand for summer cooling and reduced demand for winter heating. Feedbacks in demands on pollutant and greenhouse gas emissions arising from fossil fuel combustion used to supply energy needs, especially for cooling.
Increased water demand	Demand for urban irrigation needs.
Urban biological activity	Increased rates of urban biological activity due to longer growing seasons and warmer temperatures.

Source: Oke, 1997b.

provides a basis for intentional efforts to alter urban climates. Intentional modifications to urban climate usually are focused on treatments to the surface, because of the importance of the urban surface in controlling the exchange of energy between it and the overlying atmosphere.

Strategies to intentionally modify urban climates are generally related to modifications to the built surface, especially roofs and other impervious surfaces, the use of trees and vegetation within urban areas, and design strategies for urban areas.

Roofs may be altered to increase their reflectance of solar radiation (cool roof approach) so that they absorb less heat and remain cooler during the day, or they may use a layer of vegetation (green roof approach) to provide shading and evaporative cooling. In either case the cooler roof reduces the contribution of heat to the urban atmosphere during the day, and reduces the demand for energy to cool individual buildings. Green roofs incur additional benefits related to the runoff of precipitation—the vegetation and soil layer delay and reduce the amount of runoff, thus reducing some pressure on the storm sewer infrastructure of urban areas.

Cool pavement treatments typically involve the use of more highly reflective materials to reduce the energy absorbed from the sun or changes to thermal properties or porosity in order to modify the surface temperature of roads, parking areas, or sidewalks within the urban area.

Strategic planting programs involving trees and other vegetation can provide shade for surfaces that typically become hot, such as roofs or parking lots, with the caveat that conditions suitable for tree growth must be maintained to provide continuous benefits. Vegetation also provides for increased evapotranspiration, which reduces the amount of energy being stored in the urban surface or being used to directly heat the urban atmosphere.

Urban Climates and Large-Scale Climate Change

Cities play a role in large-scale climates and climate change because cities are an important source of pollutants and greenhouse gas emissions. These emissions link urban activities to environmental change at a large scale, so that, despite the fact that cities cover only a tiny fraction (0.25 percent) of the earth's surface, they can exert a significant influence on large-scale climates. Urban climate is also important in the detection of large-scale climate change because identification of large-scale climate change requires that any effects due to urbanization be avoided or removed from the temperature record. This is a difficult task because climate records often come from stations in the vicinity of cities and which have seen an increase in urbanization over time.

In general, we may expect that large-scale climate change will add to the environmental stresses in cities already present due to local scale urban climates. Modelers are currently working to incorporate urban climate processes into large-scale climate change models, because the feedbacks that exist between urban areas and the atmosphere are important and may influence the climate change that will be experienced by urban areas. Looking to the future, understanding urban climate will be very important in the design and implementation of sustainable cities that will be a critical component in our response to large-scale climate change.

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See also Parks; Sustainable Development; Urban Planning

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URBAN CRISIS

The term *urban crisis* refers to a sense prevalent from the 1950s to the 1970s that American cities faced imminent catastrophe. The most visible evidence of the crisis was rioting in African American neighborhoods between 1964 and 1968, but problems of government finance, infrastructure, housing conditions, and employment opportunities, as well as demographic shifts, all contributed to this perception. The urban crisis is best understood not as a single phenomenon but as a variety of problems that affected urban dwellers differently but occurred within a relatively short period.

Outbreaks of rioting in Black neighborhoods in the 1960s made it appear that American cities faced catastrophe. Cities that experienced major riots included Los Angeles in 1965, Newark and Detroit in 1967, and Chicago and Washington, D.C., in 1968, but small cities such as Waterloo, Iowa, were not immune to such violence. Most of these riots took place during the heat of summer and were precipitated by contacts with police, whom African Americans charged with brutal conduct. The 1968 riots, the last major cataclysm of the decade, were a direct response to the assassination of the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr., in Memphis on April 4. These riots were characterized by mobbing and attacks on property, most notably breaking storefront windows and arson. In general, they did not include the kind of bloody interracial fighting that occurred in the riots of the early twentieth century. Nonetheless, some of the riots resulted in several dozen deaths, mostly from bullets shot by snipers and law enforcement authorities. President Lyndon B. Johnson responded to the multiple riots of 1967 by establishing an investigative commission headed by Illinois Governor Otto Kerner. In reviewing the sources of violence, the Kerner Commission Report famously found that “our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal.” Although the riots were largely confined to neighborhoods inhabited by African Americans, White urbanites followed them closely in newspapers and on television and viewed them as a sign that cities might no longer be tenable.

The obstacles African Americans encountered in the postwar city were the source of these riots.

The “second great migration” of the years after World War II brought hundreds of thousands of Blacks from the rural South to the urban North and West in search of employment and a more hospitable racial climate. Although migrants found less overt racism than they had known in the Jim Crow South, their fondest hopes were often disappointed. Many jobs were closed to Black migrants, who arrived just as large corporations began to shift work to suburbs and smaller cities, where African Americans were rarely welcome. Discriminatory practices in real estate effectively locked Blacks out of White residential neighborhoods, even after the passage of the 1968 Federal Fair Housing Act. The neighborhoods where they were able to make homes were characterized by high rates of absentee landlords, crowding, and decaying properties and infrastructure, and low levels of city services like street cleaning and desks in public schools. In some cases, property owners cut their losses on deteriorating buildings by setting fire to them in order to collect insurance money. This practice contributed to the appearance of abandonment in neighborhoods like the South Bronx and Chicago’s Woodlawn. Thus, for Black Americans, the urban crisis consisted of deindustrialization, residential segregation, inadequate provision of city services, and a deteriorating physical environment. In the 1970s, African Americans’ experience of cities split. As a significant segment gained footholds in the middle class and the restrictions on residential segregation eased, many moved out of troubled neighborhoods and cities. Those who remained suffered from the deleterious consequences of hypersegregation and the concentration of poverty.

The problems that constituted Blacks’ urban crisis were not the ones that were central to Whites’ experiences of the postwar city. Whites did not have to worry about the transfer of industrial employment to the suburbs, for example, because their race did not hinder their ability to follow the jobs out of the city. Many Whites, however, were worried about the deteriorating local environment. The financially difficult years of the Great Depression and the material shortages associated with World War II had left many urban neighborhoods in poor physical condition. Urban observers and officials condemned large swathes of cities as “slums” and “blighted.” New Deal public works programs permitted the refurbishment of some

public facilities, but much of the private housing supply remained poor. The initiation of conservation and urban renewal programs made some public monies available for improvements, but this funding was not spread out evenly across the urban environment, leaving some neighborhoods to wallow in decay. In addition, for many Whites the very presence of African Americans constituted part of the urban crisis. Although by the postwar period many Whites were comfortable living among people from different European ethnic groups, this tolerance did not extend to African Americans. Many Whites viewed African Americans through racist lenses that interpreted the presence of Blacks as a threat to the welfare of their children. They feared Blacks as criminal and dirty and Black men, in particular, as sexually voracious for White women. Even many of those who did not object to Blacks per se shared the belief of real estate professionals that African Americans lowered property values. So Whites moved out of neighborhoods where Blacks successfully acquired housing. Some moved more than once in an effort to escape residential integration. Some of these Whites felt frustrated with the deaf ear with which city government responded to their complaints about decay and the real estate practices that enabled Black in-migration and moved beyond city limits to the suburbs.

As cities lost their White population and businesses took their capital elsewhere, urban governments strained to supply essential services to residents, and blocks of abandoned properties dotted the landscape. The most severe example of the crisis in urban finance occurred in New York City, whose expenses for welfare, health, and education rose as its population fell in the 1970s. In an effort to forestall bankruptcy, Mayor John Lindsay imposed new taxes. The new monies, however, did not match expenses; in early 1975, New York City's debt was so high that banks refused to provide further loans. State and federal aid kept attenuated services going until the city was able to borrow again in 1979. Other cities in the Northeast and Midwest, most notably Cleveland and Detroit, suffered from similar financial woes in the same period. The staffing of libraries, schools, and police departments, and services such as street cleaning and repair were all curtailed to balance city budgets.

Responses to the multiple urban crises varied. The federal Housing Acts of 1949, 1954, 1959, and 1961 made money available for conservation and urban renewal projects. In some cases, however, urban renewal—also called bitterly “Negro removal”—resulted in the disruption of established communities whose residents did not wish to move. The Department of Housing and Urban Development, created in 1965, afforded cities a representative in the president's cabinet. The War on Poverty, conceived during the presidency of John F. Kennedy in response to rural poverty, forged direct connections between residents of urban neighborhoods and the federal government. Its Office of Economic Opportunity funded small initiatives to improve neighborhoods and, at the same time, involved poor urbanites in solving local problems. Big city mayors, angered at how the War on Poverty bypassed their traditional patronage powers, lobbied to undermine this relationship. The Model Cities program similarly funded development efforts in urban areas. The sole War on Poverty program routinely embraced was Head Start, which provided early childhood education in poor communities. For their part, White urbanites continued their outmigration to the suburbs and the American Southwest and West, a process begun as early as the 1920s but exacerbated by their perception of postwar urban problems.

To most observers in the 1980s, new investments in downtown construction and the vitality of neighborhoods peopled by recent immigrants from Asia and Latin America suggested that the urban crisis was easing. But in inner cities, where the conditions that underpinned the rioting of the 1960s were exacerbated by the wide availability of illicit drugs and guns, the crisis turned chronic.

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See also Deindustrialization; Fair Housing; Ghetto; Governance; Nuclear War; Racialization; Social Exclusion; Urban

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URBAN CULTURE

The term *urban culture* refers to the meanings, ways of life, and social practices associated with the modern city. Urban culture is made at the interface of society, community, and the built environment. It is not a term, however, for which a clear, unequivocal definition exists even though the urban increasingly is the defining experience for most people in the contemporary world. It is, nevertheless, possible to identify two broad traditions in the study of urban culture. The first encompasses those approaches that have sought to identify what it is about urban life that is specific to the city and from this to develop a generic, universally applicable definition of urban culture. This theorizing is usually done first by assuming a causal link between industrialization, urbanization, modernity, and urban life. From there it is suggested that urbanism is inferior to life in the country and that the built environment somehow determines social life. The second broad approach rejects the existence of a single urban culture and emphasizes instead the diversity and complexity of cities and the multiplicity of urban cultures. The urban is not contrasted with the country, and it is not suggested that urban culture is determined by objective features of the environment. Rather, according to this approach, urban cultures are actively created by city dwellers through their engagements with, and in, city space. Within this broad tradition there are those who are interested in the diversity of urban cultures in the cities of the Western world and those who argue for a comparative approach to urbanism that challenges the divide that prevails within urban studies between life in

the “modern” Western city and that experienced in the rest of the world’s cities.

Whereas for most of the twentieth century the first perspective prevailed within urban studies, it increasingly is the case that fully developed analyses of urban culture(s) are those that draw on the ideas and insights of both traditions, considering regularities and commonalities while at the same time engaging with the specificities and rhythms that mark a particular city and its cultures as unique.

An Urban Way of Life

The Industrial Revolution of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries prompted urbanization in Europe and North America on an unprecedented scale. It was in the modern city that the social consequences and contradictions of industrialization were most evident and profoundly experienced. As a result, cities were the objects of sociological attention from the beginning of the discipline with each of the “founding fathers” of sociology, including Karl Marx, Friedrich Engels, Émile Durkheim, and Max Weber in different ways being concerned not only with the development of industrial capitalism but with urbanization and the environmental and social conditions of the city. More specifically, though, the processes of industrialization and urbanization led directly to the development of urban sociology as a subfield of sociology and informed many of its underpinning theoretical assumptions.

The concerns of urban sociologists have been varied, focusing on such issues as defining and quantifying urbanism, exploring the relationship between the city and society, and investigating the role of the state in framing urban development. In addressing such concerns, early sociologists tended to contrast life in the emerging city with life in the country, and there was a tacit belief that the rural way of life was not only intrinsically better than urban life but that it was under threat from rapid urbanization. Where the country was regarded as natural, safe, and wholesome (a place of intimate and enduring relationships with family and close friends), life in the industrial city was seen as degrading, alienating, and superficial. Influential in framing this position was Louis Wirth’s 1938 article titled “Urbanism as a Way of Life,” which set out to identify the defining features of the

urban condition. Wirth, a member of the Chicago School of Urban Sociology, argued that urbanism was a direct outcome of three fundamental features of the urban environment: heterogeneity, density, and size. He went on to claim that where rural relationships involved homogeneous populations and entrenched group solidarity, those found in the city had resulted from a heterogeneous population living in large, anonymous, and densely populated spaces. Wirth further suggested that settlements and the quality of life they produced could be ranked on a continuum with simple rural societies at one end and complex urban settlements at the other. In developing his theory, Wirth drew on a typology that had been formulated in the nineteenth century by Ferdinand Tönnies who had argued that social relationships could be classified as either *Gemeinschaft* (intimate and enduring) or *Gesellschaft* (impersonal and often contractual). *Gemeinschaft* is usually translated as “community” and *Gesellschaft* as “association.”

Predating the work of Wirth and the Chicago School was the explanation of urban culture put forward by German sociologist Georg Simmel. Simmel’s starting point, however, was not the city and urban life per se, but the culture of modernity. He focused on the city almost incidentally because urbanism was in his view the core experience of modernity. Simmel was interested in understanding “metropolitan individuality” and identifying the external and internal factors that shape it. Like Wirth, Simmel argued that while the mental life (culture) of city dwellers was created by the need to cope with the lived realities of difference, the outcome was not necessarily negative. Rather as a result of being the site of encounters with difference, the city, according to Simmel, was a place (and source) of both isolation *and* freedom with the factors that isolate and alienate urban dwellers being the very factors that made freedom possible. Simmel further claimed that urban dwellers approach life in highly intellectualized and detached ways and that their reserved and blasé dispositions were rational responses to the relentless bombardment of stimuli that was their everyday urban experience.

Though Simmel’s assessment of urban culture is different from that developed by Wirth, he nevertheless also sought to identify its essential features and to generalize these to all cities. This was a

universalizing theory of the city and modern urban culture. As critics have noted, the linking of the theories of urbanism and urban culture with urban modernity and the processes of Western industrialization privileges the cities of the West. Excluded or marginalized are not only rural populations in the West but urban dwellers in non-Western societies. These are the “others” of urban modernity, the people who either do not live in cities or who live in cities that have developed according to different “logics.” The work of Wirth, Simmel, and the Chicago School has little to contribute to the understanding of life in the cities of Africa, Asia, and the Indian subcontinent. The experience of anonymity or difference, for instance, in a Western city will almost certainly be very different from the experience in a city in China, South America, or India. And they in turn will be different from each other.

Although some, including Ulf Hannerz, within urban anthropology have long been interested in the diversity of urban life, it was not until the 1980s and as a result of the influences of emerging perspectives and fields of study (including cultural studies, poststructuralism, postcolonialism, and feminism) that a reappraisal of the features and causes of urban culture was prompted. The starting point for this reappraisal and for developing a framework for understanding urbanism was to break down the categories of urban hierarchies and to develop theories that engage with the complexity of life both within and between Western cities and those categorized by traditional urban studies as “developing.”

A Multiplicity of Urban Cultures

In emphasizing the importance of difference and diversity to the formation of urban cultures, a new wave of urban scholars rejected the existence of a generic urbanism or way of life and argued, instead, that every city is different, having its own histories, landscapes, and cultural forms. According to this view, it is important to examine and understand each city as it is lived rather than to focus on overarching (and supposedly universal) structures and patterns, suggesting that within every city there are many ways of experiencing and identifying with space and making sense of urban life. These dispositions and practices are said to produce urban cultures that are multiple and idiosyncratic.

Attention has also focused on observing urban life and identifying the specific cultural forms through which urban culture is defined and expressed, including popular culture forms. It was in this context that some urban theorists highlighted the importance of movement, public space, and the street to constructing and negotiating urban cultures. The work of cultural theorist Michel de Certeau has been particularly influential in this respect.

According to de Certeau, people write and rewrite urban space as their own through the varied and unplanned ways in which they use the city. The interplay of movement and “placefulness” gives form to the city and its cultures, and while it is possible to trace someone’s journey through the city on a map or to record it in a photograph, representations do not capture the quality of the urban experience or reveal the ways in which spaces are claimed and constructed as meaningful. People use, experience, and relate to urban space in a variety of ways with any given space routinely being used differently and often at the same time by different people for different reasons. For example, an urban park can be a place for families to picnic, its toilet block may be an active gay beat, its benches home to the homeless, and its lawn a place for office workers to meet for lunch. It will be a different place during the day than it is at night and daytime use on the weekend may not be the same as daytime use on a weekday. Urban cultures thus have many rhythms and the use of city space changes over time. One space, different uses, many meanings. For the city dweller, the invention of place through use and movement also involves the making and remembering of stories associated with particular places. Many urban researchers have been keen to document and highlight the significance to urban culture of these spatial narratives. Also significant is the analysis of urban cultures through the study of urban space as text.

Within cultural studies the text is interpreted as a combination of signs (e.g., a photograph, room, or item of clothing), which reveal embedded cultural meanings and social relations. Following this approach, an *urban* text is regarded variously as a physical structure (an individual building, monument, or building façade), a specific lived space (a public street, park, or shopping mall), or any of the various official and unofficial documents that

represent the city, including architectural drawings, maps, and real estate publications. By reading urban texts singularly and in combination, analysts seek to expose aspects of urban culture and social relations that might not otherwise be evident.

The examination of urbanism through the study of texts has two dimensions. First, there are those who seek to identify and describe the experiences, stories, and meanings that different users attach to the city. These readings can be idiosyncratic and frequently biographical. The other approach sets out to analyze the urban text as a method for identifying and exploring the broader social, political, economic, and ideological factors that shape urban environments and the experience of the urban. The underpinning premise is that this method can disclose how and why cities hold the specific meanings they do and provide insights into the processes that construct these landscapes as culturally significant. It is argued that when explored in the context of changing social relations, including those associated with gender, class, and ethnicity, examining city space as text can reveal many underpinning and unchallenged aspects of urban power. For instance, early feminist readings of urban landscapes, such as shopping malls exposed embedded masculine codes and prompted the development of alternative geographies that highlighted the everyday lives and cultures of women in the city.

By studying urban texts, theorists are interested in the lived complexity of urban life as well as in the ways in which cultural identities and power relationships are inscribed in the landscape. Hence, the city is not regarded as a monolith, which produces a single urban culture, sensibility, or way of life. Rather, it is many places, and its diverse cultures are made through the active engagements of people with these places. Recognition of the existence of a diversity of urbanisms has led to calls for reframing what is meant by urban culture and by the field of urban studies itself.

Conclusion

Cities inform and shape particular ways of being in space and the meanings urban dwellers attach to these spaces. Urban cultures are thus constructed through use and imagination. Louis Wirth’s basic premise was that urbanism is the way of life of people who live in cities irrespective of the city in

which they live and factors such as age, class, gender, race, and ethnicity. For Wirth, urbanism is the result of three objective features that are common to all cities: size, density, and heterogeneity. It is, however, now generally accepted that there is no single urban way of life or culture. Although density, size, and heterogeneity are important features of every city and contribute to the structuring and experience of urban life, they do not determine a specific urban culture. Rather, urban culture is formed through a complex range of competing, reinforcing, contradictory, and intersecting urbanisms. It is dynamic and multiple, relating to people's uses of, and identifications with, the city and its spaces as well as to their cultural identities and biographies. Urban cultures are thus developed in the context of a range of social and political influences; most importantly, they encompass the everyday experiences of all citizens in the spaces of their cities.

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See also Chicago School of Urban Sociology; Simmel, Georg; Urban; Urban Anthropology; Urban Culture; Urbanism; Urban Life

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URBAN DESIGN

Urban design concerns the physical form of urban space at the scale of a city or a precinct; it may be conceived as the art of shaping cities and their public realm while producing livable urban space. Deriving from this, urban design has to draw together many constituents of *placemaking*—such as architectural forms, urban landscaping, functions and uses of space, economic viability, social equity, environmental sensitivity and responsibility—into the creation of places of amenities, beauty, and identity.

The evolution of urban forms over at least two millennia exhibits a variety of schools of thought, approaches, and methodologies of urban design. However, the end of the twentieth century has marked a major turning point in the significance, complexity, and task of urban design. This is associated with dramatic and universal changes and developments concerning contemporary economy, society, and space: Economic globalization, new urban networks, and new flexible hierarchies of cities; volatility of capital and intercity competition; the rise of postindustrial urban economies with cultural, leisure, and consumption economies ranking top; new technologies, informational societies, high mobility of individuals, and time–space compression; mass migrations and the generation of multiethnic urban societies; cultural diversity and individualization and the creation of multicultural postmodern societies; the deterioration of the natural environment and the new environmental ethics and consciousness.

Competition of Urban Design

Examining the impacts of global changes and developments, it may be said that under the condition of economic globalization, traditional factors (e.g., geographical location, physical infrastructure) that once affected the location of new business to a specific place appear to matter less than ever. Due to the capacity of capital to switch locations, all cities—perhaps with the exception of global cities having sufficient power to mastermind the volatility of capital—have become interchangeable entities to be played off one against another, forced to compete from positions of comparative

weakness for the capital investment. In the new milieu of intercity competition, cities have more than ever to offer inducements to capital investments and businesses either by a refashioning of their economic attractiveness (e.g., tax abatements, property, transport facilities) or/and by amendments in their soft infrastructure. The latter mainly involves (1) the development of cultural and leisure amenities and (2) the enhancement of the city's image and place identity through landscape transformations.

These spatial amendments or prerequisites for bidding intercity competition first entail a shift in urban politics and governance: from the traditional managerial forms before the 1990s and the entrepreneurial forms in the 1990s, to contemporary radical new models focused on amenity urban growth, both economic and demographic. Because such a model of urban politics and governance appears to fit well into the profile of postmodern societies, which are characterized by high mobility of an increasing middle class of young professionals and high-tech staff courted mainly by cities competing for them with cultural and leisure amenities and quality of urban space. Second, the intercity competition produces a new paradigm concerning the relationship between urban design and urban economic growth. While for centuries the quality of urban space and urban design innovations have been the outcome of economic growth of cities (see, e.g., the Greek and Roman cities in classical antiquity, the Italian cities in the Renaissance period), in the era of globalization and intercity competition they have become prerequisites for the economic development of cities, and urban design has undertaken an enhanced new task as a means of economic development.

This new use of urban design is combined with the efforts of cities to encourage the clustering of flourishing postindustrial economic activities (technology-intensive and knowledge-rich enterprises; high-level intermediary financial services; creative, cultural, and leisure activities). The phenomenon of cluster-led redevelopment and renewal of inner-city areas, mingling built heritage and innovative design schemes, generates a new species of landscape collage dominated by two extremities: (1) that of built heritage and tradition with rather local spatial references and (2) that of spatial innovation having more universal or global spatial references. In this

respect, the emerging new landscapes of the twenty-first-century city may be termed as *glocalized*. This kind of urban landscape develops around clusters of postindustrial economies, which represent the city's new epicenters of prestige, power, and symbolism that hard-brand the built environment and add to its competitive edge. Examples of such epicenters include the following:

1. *Entrepreneurial epicenters*, constituted by clusters of advanced financial intermediary services and technology-intensive and knowledge-rich firms (e.g., Potsdamer Platz, Berlin; Citylife, Milan; One North, Singapore)
2. *High-culture epicenters*, constituted by clusters of museums, galleries, theaters, operas, concert halls, and the like (e.g., the Museums Quarter in Vienna, Rotterdam, and The Hague)
3. *Popular leisure epicenters*, constituted by clusters of cafés, bars, restaurants, popular-music clubs (e.g., Temple Bar, Dublin; Baglacity, Brick Lane, London; Westergasfabriek, Amsterdam; Witte de Withstraat Rotterdam)
4. *Culture and leisure waterfront epicenters*, constituted by clusters of culture and leisure activities such as museums, convention halls, galleries, concert halls, theaters, theme parks and promenades (e.g., the South Bank, London; the Forum of the Cultures, Barcelona; Abandoibarra, Bilbao; Port Melbourne, Melbourne; West Kowloon, Hong Kong)

The production of new epicenters and the use of innovative urban design schemes as a tool of urban economic development involves all classes and groups of cities—global cities, large cities, small cities, core cities and peripheral cities in large urban systems (e.g., the European urban system, the U.S. system). In global cities, epicenters can support, maintain, and enhance the city's metropolitan status (see, e.g., London's Docklands, Berlin's Potsdamer Platz). In large cities, they can upgrade the city's rank in the hierarchies of the global urban systems as a new service pole (see, e.g., Barcelona, Milan, Seattle, Hong Kong). In small peripheral cities without adequate indigenous resources to address intercity competition, they become critical, controlling the city's future.

They can handle problems of peripherality and decline through the restructuring of local economy and the transformation of urban morphology itself into a tourism resource. Bilbao in Spain has set a significant example. Bilbao's economy, mainly based on traditional industrial units, was in decline during the 1980s. The redevelopment of the old industrial area along Nervion's riverside in the inner city and the creation of a high-culture and leisure waterfront epicenter with an innovative design was a redefining point for local economy—shifted toward urban tourism, cultural production, and consumption. In particular, Frank O. Gehry's design scheme of the Guggenheim Museum and its surrounding open spaces reinforces a new international paradigm gradually emerging in the past decade and concerning the relationship among urban design, urban morphology, and urban tourism: Irrespective of the particular functions and activities accommodated in space, it is the avant-garde design of both buildings and open spaces that can make urban morphology in and of itself a tourist attraction.

Complexity of Urban Design

In the past two decades or so, a series of new technological developments has strongly affected the everyday life of individuals in developed regions of the globe: first, new developments in information and communication technology, multimedia, and telecommunications provide excessive information to individuals generating a growing flow of events in time, or a kind of acceleration of history, and giving rise to information societies. Second, the development and increasing use of mobile telecommunications (mobile cells, mobile Internet connections), as combined with the development of high-speed transportation means and infrastructure, such as high-speed trains and closed high-speed motorways in urban, suburban, and regional networks, offer individuals the potential to make use of almost all office facilities in terms of communication and work, while traveling. This has resulted in the high mobility of individuals on all territorial scales (metropolitan, regional, continental) and the rise of the phenomenon of time-space compression that characterizes the era of new modernity. Third, the Internet and its products have exhibited a rapid increase in the number of

users worldwide. This offers the potential of distance participation—or electronic access—of individuals in various social activities such as education, work, shopping, banking, recreation, leisure, and tourism. These new modes of communication and social participation (e.g., tele-education, teleworking, teleshopping, telebanking) tend to blur the limits among social activities which, in the past, were well distinguished in terms of both time and space. Nowadays, by means of Internet products and facilities like e-mail, online access, and teleconference, social activities such as work, education, creativity, and leisure may simultaneously occur in the same space. Such spaces are neither home nor office; they have no clear functional identity; therefore, they tend to represent non-places (*non-lieux*) to use a term introduced by Mark Augé as early as 1992. In this respect, new technologies and their products appear to rearrange spaces, their form and function, at all levels of spatial organization—from buildings to building complexes, to urban areas and cities—yet allowing cities to have a dispersed physical development. In this framework, urban design has to incorporate, in its processes and outcome, the new conditions of informational societies, acceleration of mobility, and time-space compression.

Following economic globalization, mass migrations from the developing regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin America are transforming the economically mature cities of Europe and North America into heterogeneous, multiethnic, and multicultural societies. An important sociospatial aspect of this transformation of cities is the spatial segregation of different cultures and social groups—voluntarily or involuntarily. Cultural pluralism is also reinforced by the ideas of diversity and individualization, which characterize the spirit of postmodern urban societies. Old forms of social behavior and classification (e.g., customs, ideological codes) do not function in contemporary societies as they used to do in the past. In many social activities, the diversity and individualization of the individual's references and choices express the idea of the world of otherness—that is, the ways different and coexisting fields may define their own rights of being and reproduce themselves. In this context, urban design has to expand, to become richer, to produce spaces that simultaneously reflect all culturally divergent

trends while integrating the city's different ethnic, cultural, and social groups.

Finally, the gradual deterioration of the natural environment in many regions of the world has increased the environmental consciousness and sensitivity of societies and generated the necessity of assessing the environmental impacts of urban design projects. Sustainable urban design was established as a dominant school of thought in the 1990s. The "green" design schemes attempt to safeguard air, water, and earth by choosing eco-friendly building materials and construction practices. These designs incorporate many of the following virtues: green spaces for maximizing the natural cooling of buildings and the quality of air, passive solar energy, ventilation systems designed for efficient heating and cooling, alternate power sources such as solar power or wind power, energy-efficient lighting and appliances, water-saving plumbing fixtures; nonsynthetic and nontoxic materials locally obtained, responsibly harvested woods, and use of recycled architectural salvage.

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See also Architecture; Sustainable Development; Urban Planning

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URBAN ECOLOGY (CHICAGO SCHOOL)

Ecology in its broadest sense is a science concerned with the relationships between members of the same species and also the interdependency that develops among members of different species that share the same habitat. In that sense, urban ecology is the study of the spatial and temporal organization of a population resulting from the adjustment to the urban environment. Urban ecologists are concerned with the antecedents and consequences of the differential distribution of land use and population groups in the urban community, a perspective that was developed by Robert Park and his colleagues at Chicago School of Sociology at the beginning of the twentieth century.

Upon joining the department of sociology at the University of Chicago in 1914, Park began to formulate a program of study of the city of Chicago from an ecological perspective. Park believed that the general approach of plant and animal ecology could be used to study human societies although the biological model should be used with caution and modifications. The central assumption of the Chicago school was that the natural environment, which a population inhabits, is a major factor in shaping human behavior, and the city is a microcosm of society.

Biotic and Cultural Aspects

To make ecological principles relevant to the study of human society, Park formulated a theory of society as composed of two basic elements: the biotic and cultural.

The *biotic level* is the most basic layer of society and consists of the basic requirements of life, such as access to water and soil. These factors determine

the size of a population and the patterns of adaptation to the environment. According to this perspective, at the biotic level the principle of *competition* operates. In their attempt to adjust to the environment, individuals and social groups compete for the environment's scarce resources and develop a social division of labor. The competition involves some degree of cooperation, as it reflects the social division of labor, differentiation, and specialization of different functions in society.

In cities, the principle of competition is central to the understanding of the differential spatial distribution of different social groups in different areas. Urban ecologists used the term *natural areas* to describe the resulting social homogeneous areas of the city. The natural area came into existence, not as the result of planning efforts of the government or real state agents but from unplanned competition of social groups. Natural areas were believed to come into existence through the competition of individuals and groups for space. Once established, these areas provided homes and services for their inhabitants and carried out functions that contributed to the survival of the entire community.

The *cultural level* of society is built upon the biotic level. The cultural level is that part of society based on customs, norms, and institutions. It involves rules of social behavior, mutual social expectations, and social interaction.

Following this conceptualization, urban ecology has been concerned with a number of central questions that dominated the research program through the years. Urban ecology is concerned with the sources and patterns of city growth, the relationship between the spatial distribution of the city population and the social and economic resources of residents, the association between the distribution of the city population and land values, and the association between the distribution of the city population and delinquency and deviance.

In the effort to provide answers to these questions, urban ecology developed a number of important concepts that were used to describe central urban processes.

Urban Spatial Distribution and Growth

A central concern of urban ecology is the spatial pattern and structure of the urban community. The

central topics of interest are how different groups are distributed in the metropolis; why the distribution took a particular shape; and where households of different socioeconomic, ethnic, and racial composition were located, including the determinants of residential segregation. The central postulate of urban ecology is that processes of competition regulate the overall spatial pattern of the community, including the location of specific natural areas. Industries and commercial institutions compete for strategic locations, which once occupied, enable them to exercise control over the functional use of land in other parts of the community. The most strategic position is found at the point of highest accessibility, usually the center of the community. It was here, in the industrial city, that the largest number of people converged in their daily journey to work, shop, and be entertained. Consequently, land values were found to be higher in the central business district than in the surrounding area. On the basis of this observation Burgess developed the concentric model of urban structure and growth. In this model, it is assumed that the main source of city growth is the increase in population and that the city develops from the center to the periphery. According to the model, the spatial organization of the city can be described as a series of concentric zones, emanating from the central business district. Each zone includes natural areas in which reside relatively homogeneous groups according to socioeconomic status, ethnicity, and racial composition. Adjacent to the central business district is the transition zone, with a deteriorating housing stock in which recent immigrants reside. The transition zone is being invaded by business and light manufacturing. The workers in industries who have escaped from the area of deterioration but who desire to live within easy access to their work inhabit a third area. Beyond this zone is the residential area of high-class apartment buildings or districts of single-family dwellings. Still farther out, beyond the city limits, is the commuters' zone in which reside high-class individuals.

The basic argument of the concentric model was that accessibility is the most important factor in the location of employment and residential activities. Competition for accessibility leads to differential land values in the city. The central business district was, at the beginning of the twentieth century, the urban transportation center. As

the most accessible site in the city, the central business district became the most expensive land, and land values decreased as a function of distance from the center. Furthermore, the most valuable land attracted those activities with the greatest demand and the greatest cost. As the population increases, the demand for central land intensifies, and the areas of the city became more differentiated. As population increases, the demand for services increases and the price of the land located at the center rises in order to accommodate the increased demand. As the central commercial district begins to expand outward, property owners hold their residential property for resale to potential employment users at a higher price that can be obtained from residential users. Because commercial users are paying for the land, the owners allow their residential structure to deteriorate, creating the zone of transition. Over time, the concentric distributions start expanding to the fringes, and natural areas experience a process of invasion, competition, and succession.

Natural Areas

A major research effort of urban ecology is to understand the process of formation and change in natural areas. A natural area involves a geographic area physically distinguishable from other adjacent areas, a population with a unique social, demographic, or ethnic composition and a social system of rules, norms, and recurring patterns of social interaction that function as mechanisms of social control. Natural areas result from the different kinds of land use and the varied populations that occupy the city and are distinguishable areas of the city with a particular culture and patterns of behavior. Some common examples of these specialized areas include the central business district, exclusive residential areas, and areas of heavy or light industry, immigrant communities, and poor neighborhoods. These natural areas are the products of ecological forces that work to distribute the city population. Those who can afford the price of land sort themselves away from functions or elements that they regard as different. Each area, whatever its function and population, is characterized by its own moral code, which corresponds to the interests and tastes of those who use it and what they use, whether for residential, commercial, or recreational

purposes. Specific cultural values, social norms, and codes of behavior can be identified in each natural area.

The concept of neighborhood as a “natural area” is a basic contribution of urban ecology and the Chicago School to the sociological study of the city and society. Change in the local population composition is a major mechanism by which natural areas change. The terms *invasion* and *succession* were taken from plant and animal ecology, and used to describe the process of neighborhood population change. Competition, conflict, and accommodation are viewed as natural processes that characterize the relationships among different populations. From this perspective the invasion of a natural area by socially or racially different individuals is met with resistance. Competition for housing may be turned into conflict, as the locals and the newcomers attempt to devise strategies to best each other. If some accommodation between the two populations is not reached, one of the two groups will withdraw. If the newcomers withdraw, the invasion has been halted. If the established population withdraws, their departure, coupled with the continued arrival of the new groups, will result in succession, both of population and social institutions.

Urban Spatial Structure and Social Problems

Urban ecologists used the framework of population distribution and change to study social problems. They attempted to discover the processes by which the biotic balance and the social equilibrium are maintained once they are achieved and the processes by which the biotic balance and the social equilibrium are disturbed. Theories of urban ecology were used as the basis for the study of the distribution of delinquency and mental health in the city, that is, the interrelationship between population spatial distribution and the distribution of social problems. Shaw analyzed the characteristics of natural areas that, according to the police and court records, had the most delinquents. In these studies, a series of spot maps, which pinpointed the residences of those juveniles involved in various stages of the criminal justice system, were presented. (Other spot maps showed various other community characteristics, such as

the location of demolished buildings or the incidence of tuberculosis.) These maps showed the percentage of the total juvenile population of the area who were involved in the criminal justice system. The main conclusion was that neighborhoods with the highest delinquency rates were found to be located within or immediately adjacent to areas of heavy industry and commerce, areas of rapid population decrease, and areas of population with low economic status, and areas of high concentrations of immigrants and minorities. According to this view, delinquency and other social problems are closely related to the processes of invasion, dominance, and succession that determine the concentric growth patterns of the city. When new residents invade a particular location of the city, the established social relationships and the natural organization of the area are severely impaired. The formal social organizations that existed tend to disintegrate as the original population retreats, the residents no longer identify with it, and the ability of people in the neighborhood to control their youth decreases. The area tends to become a battleground between the invading and retreating cultures. In other words, the social disorganization of the neighborhood is the main factor associated with rates of juvenile delinquency.

Urban ecology has gone through a series of critiques through the years. Some rejected the ecological theory of urban form, asserting that forces other than economic competition for central location may produce the city's land use gradients. Sentiments and symbolism can create land use values differences as well. An additional line of critique was directed to the argument that population competition results in unplanned natural areas. Scholars associated with the new urban sociology paradigm directed attention to the role of the government, land owners, and real state agents, who are powerful actors operating in the sociospatial shaping of urban form. Finally, a further critique was to the lack of consideration of the global context of urban development and the place of cities in the strategic investment decisions of large international corporations in the real state market. Yet, urban ecology is still an important framework in the study of residential segregation and urban social problems.

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See also Chicago School of Urban Sociology; Human Ecology; Urban Sociology; Urban Theory

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URBAN ECONOMICS

Economics is the study of decision making when resources are limited and can be used in different ways. In an economic model, a household makes choices to maximize its utility or satisfaction, whereas a firm makes choices to maximize its profit. Geographers study how things are arranged across space in order to answer the question of where human activity occurs. Urban economics puts economics and geography together, exploring the geographical or location choices of utility-maximizing households and profit-maximizing firms. These location decisions generate cities of varying size, scope, and spatial structure. Urban economics also applies economic analysis to some of the problems that occur in cities, including poverty, crime, dysfunctional neighborhoods, and congestion, and explores the role of local government as a part of the federal system of government.

An urban place contains a large number of people in a relatively small area; that is, it has a population density that is high relative to the

density of the surrounding region. This definition accommodates urban areas of vastly different sizes, from a small town to a large metropolitan area. It assumes population density to be an essential feature of an urban economy because it generates frequent contact between different economic activities, something that is feasible only if firms and households are spatially concentrated.

Location Decisions and the Development of Cities

A fundamental question of urban economics is why cities exist. Why do people tolerate the obvious negative consequences—congestion, pollution, noise, and crime—of living in cities? The answer is that cities exist because labor specialization and centralized production make people more prosperous. Cities offer a higher standard of living, and roughly three-fourths of people in developed countries choose to live in urban areas. Worldwide, about one-half of the population lives in cities, and the urban share is increasing. Urban economists have identified three conditions necessary for the development of cities: (1) agricultural surplus—people outside cities must produce enough food to feed themselves and city dwellers; (2) urban production—city dwellers must produce goods or services to exchange for food grown by rural workers; and (3) transportation for exchange—there must be an efficient transportation system to facilitate the exchange of food and urban products.

At the heart of urban production is the notion that centralized production is efficient for some products but not others. If there are economies of scale in production or in exchange (if unit cost decreases as the quantity produced increases), large-scale production is more efficient, and a city develops because workers live near production facilities. The resulting competition for land bids up its price, causing an increase in population density and thus producing a city.

Large cities develop when firms find it advantageous to locate close to one another rather than spreading out and carving out individual market areas. In some cases, agglomeration occurs as firms cluster around a source of raw materials or near a transportation node such as a natural harbor. In other cases, firms benefit from locating close to other firms, including their competitors in

input and output markets. For example, firms producing the same output (e.g., high-fashion dresses) share a supplier of an intermediate good (e.g., buttons) and locate close to one another to access the supplier efficiently. Similarly, firms cluster to utilize a common labor pool. In a modern economy with its rapid technological change, clustering allows firms to benefit from knowledge spillovers, that is, from ideas and technological innovation that flow from one firm to another.

Urban Spatial Structure

Urban economics explores the intraurban location decisions of firms, workers, and households. Their location choices cause variation in the demand for land within a metropolitan area, thereby causing spatial variation in the prices of land, housing, and commercial space. This variation leads land users to economize on expensive land, resulting in a spatial variation in the density of population and employment. Urban economists estimate density functions and track them over time. Across the past century, economic activity within cities has become less centralized.

In modern metropolitan areas, jobs are divided between central business districts, suburban subcenters, and “everywhere else.” It turns out that most jobs are elsewhere—widely dispersed throughout the metropolitan area—and most people work and live far from the center. In the heyday of the monocentric city about 100 years ago, between two-thirds and three-fourths of jobs were near the center. Among the reasons for the dramatic transformation of the spatial structure of cities was the development of the truck, which replaced the horse-drawn wagon for intracity freight and replaced ships and trains for intercity freight. Other reasons include the automobile as an alternative to streetcars, the switch from multistory to single-story factory production, and innovations in telecommunication that allowed information-processing activities to move away from the central core area.

When a household chooses a house or apartment, it chooses much more than a dwelling. It also chooses a set of local public goods (e.g., schools, parks, and public safety), taxes to finance the public goods, and neighbors who provide opportunities for social interactions and schoolmates for their children. Urban economics

incorporates neighborhood choice as part of the household's location choice. Many cities are highly segregated with respect to income and race, and urban economics explores the reasons for segregation.

Local governments use zoning and other land-use policies to limit the choices of households and firms. Urban economics explores the consequences of policies that restrict residential lot size and density and commercial land use. It also considers the efficiency effects and distributional consequences of growth-control policies such as growth boundaries and limits on building permits.

Urban Transportation

One of the advantages of an urban location is its proximity to the many activities within a metropolitan area. The advantages depend on the design and pricing of transportation systems—the automobile-highway system and the mass-transit system. The automobile generates two types of external costs that one driver imposes on another. The congestion externality occurs because each additional driver slows traffic and increases the time cost of other drivers. Environmental externalities include air pollution, which causes health problems and degrades views, and carbon dioxide emissions, which contribute to global warming. The economic approach to these externalities is to force drivers to bear the full cost of driving, meaning that a driver would pay a congestion tax during the periods of peak demand and a pollution tax for all driving.

For an individual traveler, the choice between alternative travel modes is determined by monetary and time costs. Urban economists have estimated the responsiveness of transit ridership to changes in fares, access time, and in-vehicle time. In general, time costs dominate monetary costs, and most commuters choose automobiles for their greater convenience and shorter commute times.

From the metropolitan perspective, the choice between different transit modes is determined by population and employment density as well as the spatial structure of the city. In many U.S. cities, density is not high enough to support fixed-rail systems, so the most economical transit mode is the bus, not light rail. For the few cities with relatively high population and employment density, fixed-rail systems are the most economical.

Urban Problems: Poverty and Crime

Although poverty rates in the United States are higher in rural areas than in cities, poverty rates are highest in the central areas of cities. Urban economics explores the reasons for these relatively high poverty rates and evaluates the merits of various antipoverty policies, including nonspatial policies such as transfer payments, payments in kind, education, and training. One insight is that space matters: Households with inferior access to employment opportunities are more likely to be poor. As a result, spatially oriented policies such as relaxing density restrictions in suburban housing and decentralizing public housing might reduce poverty. Another insight is that education matters: College graduates earn nearly twice as much as high school dropouts. A third insight is that racial segregation increases poverty by reducing educational attainment and increasing idleness.

Urban crime generates large costs to victims and to society as a whole and affects the location decisions of households and firms. Urban economics uses the model of the rational, utility-maximizing criminal to explore the causes of urban crime and evaluate the merits of various anticrime policies. A wealth of empirical work has confirmed the validity of the model and measured the responsiveness of criminals to changes in the certainty of punishment (e.g., the probability of arrest and conviction) and the severity of punishment (e.g., the length of time in prison).

Local Government

In the federal system of government, the purpose of local government is to accommodate diversity in demand for local public services such as public safety, education, and recreation. A household in a metropolitan area votes “with its feet” by shopping for a municipality that provides the best mix of public services and taxes. Urban economics explores the trade-offs associated with our fragmented system of local government and identifies the circumstances under which the system generates inefficient outcomes.

On the revenue side of local government, the two largest revenue sources are the property tax and intergovernmental grants. A person who pays the property tax in a legal sense may shift the tax onto other people, so the economic burden is

different from the legal burden. In addition, local governments respond to intergovernmental grants by cutting taxes and shifting resources to other programs. This response is consistent with voter preferences and means that part of a grant is spent on other public and private goods.

Urban Housing

Urban economics explores the unique features of the urban housing market and evaluates the merits of various housing policies. Housing is different from other products because it is heterogeneous (i.e., dwellings differ in size, age, design, and location) and durable. Moreover, a household faces substantial costs in moving from one house to another. The hedonic approach is based on the notion that given the heterogeneity of housing, the price of a particular dwelling can be decomposed into implicit prices for attributes such as size, age, and accessibility to urban activities such as schools, parks, and churches. Hedonic studies estimate these implicit prices, for example, the change in house value for an additional bedroom or a one-block move closer to a park or a noxious facility.

The filtering model of the housing market explores the economic forces that cause dwellings to move down the quality ladder to households with progressively lower income. This has important implications for housing policy because it is typically more economical to accommodate low-income households in existing housing than in new construction. Urban economics explores the trade-offs associated with housing policies designed to help low-income households, including public housing, subsidies for private housing, and housing vouchers issued to low-income households.

Conclusion

Urban economics lies at the intersection of geography and economics, addressing the question of where economic activity occurs. It shows how the decisions of utility-maximizing households and profit-maximizing firms lead to the development of cities of varying size, scope, and spatial structure. The field also applies economic analysis to urban problems, such as poverty, crime, congestion, and dysfunctional

neighborhoods, and explores the role of local government in a federal system of government.

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See also Disinvestment; Housing; Local Government; Urban Policy; Urban Theory

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URBAN ENTERTAINMENT DESTINATION

During the mid-to-late 1990s, the urban entertainment destination was widely promoted in the commercial real estate industry as the next big thing. The term was introduced in 1994–1995 in *Urban Land*, the flagship publication of the Urban Land Institute, a lobby and educational group supportive of the land development industry. Urban entertainment destinations are defined as mixed-use projects that feature megaplex cinemas, sports arenas and stadiums, casinos, themed restaurants, high-tech video arcades, and the like, as anchors for massive retail–leisure complexes. As such, they constitute the building blocks of the theme park or fantasy city.

Urban entertainment destinations are typically conceived as public–private partnerships of a



Chicago's Near North neighborhood. In the space of about a dozen square blocks, there are a number of theatres, bars, restaurants, hotels, an urban mall, a grocery store, an assortment of shops and stores, and live music venues. Visible in this photo is a Bloomingdale's Home store, a banner for the Chicago Shakespeare Theatre, two restaurants, a Harley-Davidson store, and a movie theatre. Across the street, just outside the range of the photo, are a furniture store, three hotels, three other restaurants, and two clothing stores.

Source: Eric Mathiasen.

media or entertainment firm, a property developer, and a local municipality or agency. Media firms bring to the table a recognizable, global brand presence and a finely honed marketing expertise. Their participation is often crucial in securing support both from large institutional lenders who are characteristically nervous about underwriting projects that seem to deviate from well-established retail models, and from other prospective tenants who don't want to go it alone. This was very much the case with the Times Square redevelopment in New York City, which only coalesced after decades of false starts when the Walt Disney Corporation agreed to renovate the landmark New Amsterdam Theater on Forty-Second Street. Real estate companies, most of whom are veteran shopping mall developers and managers, have a great deal of knowledge about and experience with the intricacies of commercial lease agreements, planning permissions, zoning

regulations, traffic plans, and other specific aspects of the land development process. Public partners are expected to provide financial assistance (subsidies, tax breaks, and holidays), infrastructure improvements (sewage and water lines, parking garages, and highway interchanges and exits), and ancillary services (security).

Emergence of the Urban Entertainment Destination in the 1990s

The urban entertainment destination emerged as an industry trend for three primary reasons. First, development firms successfully presented it as a way of reinvigorating a shopping environment that had increasingly become homogeneous and boring. This new "entertaining retail" was guaranteed both to encourage repeat visits and to increase the total amount of time that consumers spent on-site. A particular selling point was the

sophisticated creation and staging of guest-centered experiences that not only entertained but also significantly engaged visitors. Second, city politicians and planners readily embraced the notion that the urban entertainment destination represented a shortcut to revitalizing downtown urban centers that had become tired and blighted. As such, they were successors to the festival marketplaces that briefly flourished in the 1970s and 1980s before financially faltering. Not only was it expected that the urban entertainment destination would lure middle-class Americans back to the central city from whence they had fled for the safety and cheap housing of the suburbs in the 1950s and 1960s, but these projects were also touted as an effective means of reinvigorating small businesses in economically depressed neighborhoods. Third, media and entertainment companies signed on as major development partners, convinced that branded developments such as Universal City Walk (Los Angeles) and the Sony Center (Berlin) could be the locus of powerful synergies between urban commerce, television and motion pictures, and global brands. Not only did this offer media corporations a means for linking their leisure and consumption products to the geographic spaces where they are produced and consumed, but, additionally, cities themselves could become branded commodities in their own right. As one *Urban Land* article in 1997 proclaimed, the city was becoming nothing less than a stage where “Disney Meets Dior.”

As cities became more uniform, generic, and mundane in their streetscapes, shopping facilities, and tourist attractions, middle-class consumers demanded new, more inventive, and sensational urban experiences. At the same time, they expressed a deeply rooted reluctance to take risks, especially those associated with the lower social classes. That is to say, the proliferation of entertainment districts in North America addressed a desire to sample diversity without risking contact with genuine difference. For day visitors, urban entertainment destinations seemed to offer the perfect solution to this thorny social contradiction. Numerous exotic and cosmopolitan landscapes and experiences (or, at least a faux version) were on offer, encased in a protective tourist bubble. These simulated urban environments were thus suffused with what can be called a “safe” or “riskless” risk.

Recent Patterns of Decline and Growth

After a much-hyped start, the construction of urban entertainment destinations has stalled, at least in North America and Europe. There are several reasons for this. First, the urban entertainment destination has turned out to be a difficult concept for institutional lenders to grasp. In particular, projects wherein the proportion represented by entertainment outweighs that devoted to retail are viewed as too risky and cannot obtain sufficient financing. It doesn't help that such developments carry with them significantly higher costs than traditional retail developments, even though they have the potential to generate significantly higher per square foot sales and revenues. Second, there has been a growing awareness that urban entertainment projects that seem exciting in Las Vegas and Orlando are more prone to fail in the heartland. In particular, themed restaurants (Planet Hollywood, Rainforest Cafe) and shops (Disney Store) lose their luster when located in regional cities and suburban malls. Furthermore, the market for urban entertainment venues has quickly become saturated. For example, megaplex cinemas have only prospered by cannibalizing existing theaters of an older vintage, often within the same ownership chain. Third, the “creative city” model of urban growth and prosperity has effectively displaced the urban entertainment approach in urban planning and political circles. Most closely associated with the work of Richard Florida, the former eschews the development of large entertainment projects in favor of bohemian neighborhoods that are densely packed with juice bars, small avant-garde galleries, jazz and blues clubs, gay and lesbian bookstores, and the like. These are celebrated not just for their inherent aesthetic value but, more significantly, as attractors for knowledge workers, especially from the microchip industry, who allegedly choose urban communities that are edgy, diverse, and tolerant. According to Florida, “creatives” don't like the themed and branded entertainment megaprojects associated with the fantasy city, which they actively avoid.

Urban entertainment destinations are no more popular with most academic researchers and social critics. Solutions for revitalizing urban centers that feature shopping and entertainment have been castigated for increasing, rather than reducing,

economic inequality and social exclusion. This conclusion is strongly supported by Mark Levine's quarter century of empirical research in Baltimore, Maryland, which extends from the opening in 1980 of Harborplace, a festival marketplace, to more recent urban entertainment projects. Levine's data demonstrate three things. First, the positive spillover effects predicted by operators of Baltimore's urban entertainment machine have not materialized. Rather, the urban renaissance remains concentrated primarily around the waterfront, with poverty, housing decay, and crime continuing to predominate in the inner city. Second, better-paying management and administrative jobs have disproportionately gone to White suburbanites, while the city's Black community has been left with low-paying service jobs such as waitresses, housekeepers, and kitchen workers. Third, these urban entertainment projects have siphoned off money that might have gone to other community uses, notably neighborhood development projects.

Most recently, urban entertainment development has reemerged offshore, notably in Asia and the Middle East. The former Portuguese colony of Macau (Macao), now a special administrative region of China, has been transformed into the Las Vegas of Asia. With the decision of the Chinese government to liberalize Macau's gaming market in 2002, the floodgates have opened to the construction of mammoth replicas of iconic Vegas Strip casinos, such as the Sands and the Venetian. More of the same can be found (minus the gambling) in Dubai, the second largest of the seven emirates that constitute the United Arab Emirates. Characterized by some as being a "fantasy city on steroids," Dubai has become an international tourist and retail center with foreign direct investment of \$18.7 billion (2006 figure). Among its attractions, present and future, are the Burj Dubai tower, set to be the world's tallest skyscraper when completed in 2009; the Mall of the Emirates, with its year-round indoor ski slope; and the Palm, three artificially created islands in the shape of a palm tree, anchored by a Trump luxury hotel and visible from space.

Whereas this new generation of urban entertainment developments has garnered considerable positive coverage in the business and travel media, architectural and urban planning critics have been less enchanted. For example, in assessing the

growth of Dubai, commentators complain that its urbanism is largely of a cookie cutter nature, with few truly original architectural gems or inspired new types of leisure experiences. Furthermore, these projects are criticized on the grounds that they are open primarily to affluent international tourists and segregated from most of the local populace. Finally, Dubai has been castigated for permitting the temporary workers from South Asian countries who build these new themed and branded entertainment destinations to be housed in substandard facilities and to be victimized by unscrupulous employers.

John Hannigan

See also Gottdiener, Mark; Las Vegas, Nevada; Public-Private Partnerships; Society of the Spectacle; Themed Environments; Tourism

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URBAN GEOGRAPHY

As a subfield of human geography, urban geography addresses a range of issues related to cities and metropolitan areas while emphasizing such geographic concerns as space, place, location, distance, territoriality, and the physical environment. Along with urban studies scholars, geographers share an interest in the processes of urbanization, the social differentiation of urban space, urban

economies, environmental challenges, and the spatial expression of everyday life. Arguably, urban geography is geography's most eclectic subfield and, until recently, urban studies' least acknowledged one. The eclecticism of urban geography reflects the tendency of geography to absorb each successive decade's new discoveries in theory and methodology as well as changing urban conditions. Inclined to borrow theoretical insight from other disciplines within urban studies, geography's newly found prominence rests on its unique spatial perspective on the important questions of contemporary urban life.

Analytical Urban Geography

Although rich case studies documenting the development of particular cities and various urban traditions (such as the form of German towns) existed prior to the 1950s, that decade is generally associated with urban geography's systematic study of cities and urban networks. Influenced by cultural and historical geography's interest in the human-environment relationship, early urban work focused on the issues of site (i.e., characteristics of a particular location) and situation (i.e., relative location) in the development of individual cities. The emphasis was on a theme—urban morphology or the physical patterns of the urban environment—that has been long-standing in geography, particularly in Europe where analysis of townscapes and morphological regions was common. Arguing for the need to move beyond mere description, U.S. urban geographers drew from a mix of traditional geography, neoclassical economics, the Chicago School of Sociology, and contemporary concerns in city planning.

These urban geographers adopted the modernist goals of the social sciences and sought to uncover regularities in spatial organization so as to specify general laws of spatial structure and urban processes. Their primary interest was locational analysis, a project facilitated after World War II by the introduction of computers and the proliferation of urban data. Such geographic analysis relied on inferential statistics and theoretical models such as central place theory, industrial location theory, urban factorial ecology, and the rank-size rule. Many in the first generation of American and British urban geographers point to Harold

Mayer and Clyde Kohn's *Readings in Urban Geography*, published in 1959, as the new field's definitive text.

Also important was the seminal article "The Nature of Cities," published by geographers Chauncy Harris and Edward Ullman in 1945. Harris and Ullman distinguished between research related to the internal structure of the city (i.e., the question of urban form) and that related to external structure (i.e., urban systems and hierarchies of settlements). These two aspects of the spatial science defined the discipline's basic urban curriculum for an extended period and still characterize the approach valued in many geography departments in the United States and in A level and GCSE (General Certificate of Secondary Education) work in Britain.

Internal Structure of the City

The theoretical framework for much of the early work in urban geography borrowed from the urban spatial theory associated with the early-twentieth-century University of Chicago. To this day, urban geography texts often initiate discussion of urban form, growth, and neighborhood change by reference to sociologist Ernest Burgess's concentric zone model and land economist Homer Hoyt's sector model. Introduced in 1925, Burgess's concentric zone model emphasized the urban center's organizing influence on the city, creating rings radiating out from the central business district with each successive residential ring representing greater economic and social status. Hoyt's model, introduced in 1939, critiqued the Burgess model. Hoyt theorized urban growth as a star-shaped pattern of development with land use radiating out from the urban center along transportation corridors. These models of sociospatial differentiation were challenged later by the impact of the automobile on urban form. Harris and Ullman's multiple-nuclei model represented a metropolitan area that no longer was defined by distance from the central business district but instead consisted of multiple land-use centers. Its fragmentation emphasized the decentralization and land-use differentiation allowed by increasing automobile. All of these models achieved iconic status in urban geography, and successive generations have produced variations for heuristic use and occasionally for theoretical debate.

While geographers treat these models as an expression of the physical patterns of urban growth and neighborhood differentiation, the Chicago School of Sociology's language of human ecology was also influential. Urban ecology explores the social and demographic composition of city districts and neighborhoods, assuming that the allocation of urban land is determined through competition among various groups. Research on residential areas, particularly by British geographers, expanded on the sociologists' social area analysis as a method for identifying urban subareas based on three general categories: socioeconomic status, family status or life-cycle characteristics, and segregation by ethnic status. Factorial ecology, a technique related to social area analysis, was developed during the 1960s as researchers examined a battery of socioeconomic and demographic data to measure the internal structure of contemporary cities. Ron Johnston's writings in the mid-1970s outlined the methods employed in analyzing residential markets through social area analysis and factorial ecology particularly well. Brian Berry and Phillip Rees's analysis of Calcutta provides an example of such work and one effort to explain urban form, growth, and change in the developing world. Although factorial ecology does not have the same prominence in urban geography today, current interest in geographical information systems (GIS) and modeling urban form and processes continues the tradition.

External Structure of the City

Edward Ullman, one of most influential geographers working during the development of urban geography, brought the German economist Walter Christaller's work on central place theory to the attention of English-speaking geographers. Christaller's work on the system of service centers in southern Germany suggested the extent to which a geographic structure among cities could be identified by considering the range and threshold of various retail goods or services. Ullman compared the significance of this examination of the urban hierarchy (and the spatial relationships that resulted) to the concentric zone model's study of land use within cities. The hexagon pattern of central place theory became as recognizable to urban geographers as Burgess's concentric

zones. Location theory and locational analysis grew further in stature with the rise of the quantitative revolution during the 1960s. Urban geographers recognize the limits of central place theory today not only because of changing retail patterns and ease of transportation but because contemporary concerns for the external structure of the city suggest less interest in the relationship between a city and its hinterland and greater interest in the linkages among cities in the global economy.

Mapping Behavior

Formal spatial analysis is only one way in which urban geographers investigate the city. Urban geography also contains a robust behavioral approach that is more individualistic in its search for generalized, objective knowledge about spatial processes affecting the city's internal structure. Drawing upon psychology, urban geographers working in this way have focused attention on behavioral and perceptual aspects of spatial decision making. One of their major tools is "mental maps." These maps are meant to capture the extent to which perception enables and constrains choices of where to live or walk. A variant of mental mapping, and a classic in urban geography, Kevin Lynch's 1960s work on the image of the city provided another means of exploring individual's perceptions of the built environment. Lynch emphasized the need to correct the consequences of modernist development by making American cities more "legible," more "readable," and consequently more "liveable." His technique for analyzing city dwellers' mental maps continues to be influential in architects' and planners' efforts to improve cities for residents and visitors. Although categorized as behavioral geography, Lynch's work shares with the humanist critique that followed a focus on values, meanings, and individuals' experience of space.

In contrast to behavioral geography's commitment to unmediated perceptions, humanistic geography embraces social and cultural studies that emphasize *Verstehen*, or understanding of the particular relationship between people and place. Resisting a definition of urban geography as a spatial science concerned with generalizations, or as a documentation of individual perceptions, humanistic

geography has focused instead on the active role of human agency in shaping the urban environment. Place and sense of place, key concepts in humanistic geography, reentered the geographic vocabulary as, once again, acceptable and worthy of theorizing. Rather eclectic in the variety of humanistic philosophies associated with it, humanistic geography's influence in urban geography might best be understood as drawing together perspectives from the humanities and the social sciences. Studies such as Yi-Fu Tuan's work on *topophilia* (love of places) and Edward Relph's concern for "authentic" landscapes influenced the examination of both urban design and individual experience.

In the 1970s, contemporary urban conditions reinvigorated geographers' interest in the conceptual framework associated with the early twentieth-century sociologists of the Chicago School as well. Their practical concerns regarding urban populations appeared to have contemporary relevance, and their tradition of ethnographic research offered a methodology capable of sustaining the various perspectives associated with humanistic geography. A battery of qualitative methods such as participant observation, in-depth interviewing, and analysis of documents are associated with this effort to uncover meaning and understand the "taken-for-granted" qualities of everyday life in a specific place.

Political Economy and Structuralist Theory

Inspiration for an alternative theoretical framework came from Marxist theory as well. David Harvey's major contribution to the discipline was reflected in his own shift from the promise of a positivist science, as addressed in *Explanations in Geography* (1969), to a radical perspective gained through the rediscovery of the writings of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. *Social Justice and the City* (1973) represents Harvey's personal and perceptible progress from liberal to radical geographer with essays focused on inequality in the housing market. Political economy as a framework of analysis shifted attention from urbanization to capitalism and, specifically, to the extent to which the logic of capitalism influences the processes of urbanization. In contrast to humanistic geographers' attention to agency, Marxist geographers

engaged in the macro-scale analysis of economic, political, and social changes—referred to as *structure*—reflected in the visible, conscious, and unconscious decisions of active human agents.

During the 1980s several cross-currents closed the divide between political economy and humanistic geography perspectives. Numerous geographers sought to theorize place as manifesting specificity within the context of general processes. Doreen Massey and John Allen's *Geography Matters!* (1984) and John Agnew's *Place and Politics* (1987) gave "place" theoretical credibility beyond humanistic geography's interest in "sense of place." Attention to the historical geography of class also brought humanist Marxists and humanistic geographers closer together in a shared interest in the struggle of people. Finally, the structuration theory of sociologist Anthony Giddens attempted to bridge the divide between the Marxists' privileging of social and economic systems and structures and the humanistic geographers privileging of knowledgeable human agents.

Feminist Urban Research

Feminism entered geography as a political movement and theoretical perspective as a consequence of the women's movement of the 1970s. Bringing women explicitly into the study of urban geographies enabled researchers to question how urban spatial organization affected women's lives and how urban development reflected and reinforced society's assumptions about women. Early research sought to modify the dominant approaches to include gender as a concept for and of analysis. For instance, study of such commonplace decisions as journey to work and housing choices now recognized the potentially different perspective of women and men based on gendered roles. This effort created a geography primarily focused on gender inequality. A second strand of feminist research explored the relationship between capitalism and patriarchy with particular attention to the spatial separation of women and men. In combining these two perspectives, socialist feminists sought to understand the social reproduction in the family and the implications of traditionally home-based "women's work."

In the 1980s, substantive issues in urban geography, such as gentrification, engaged feminist

geographers in a discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of changing urban housing markets. In addition, theoretical developments in the social sciences and humanities raised the issue of difference based on the construction of gendered identities. In turn, poststructuralist critique in the 1980s created a strand of feminist research that moved away from a primary focus on gender and class systems to acknowledge the parameters around which identity is formed and the city experienced.

Postmodernist and Poststructuralist Influences

Among the first geographers to engage in the debates surrounding postmodernism, Michael Dear encouraged geographers to acknowledge its significance as style, epoch, and method. Postmodernism's critique of style, particularly of architecture and urban design, thus entered urban geography. Assessment of its impacts varies from David Ley's early analysis of postmodern styles as potentially progressive and Paul Knox's conclusion that any radical potential had been lost in its adoption as a contemporary conventional style.

Harvey's use of postmodernity in the title of his book *Conditions of Postmodernity* (1989) underscores the extent to which postmodernism is tied to an epoch for many urban scholars. Whether it is a phase of the modern or a break from it has been a matter of dispute. Harvey argues that postmodernity must be understood in terms of the restructuring of the capitalist global economy since 1973 and the social and cultural forms that flowed from consequent changes. Particular attention is given to the changing role of government in an era of neoliberalism and the public-private partnerships that resulted. Other theorists emphasize the radical break in urbanization and the emergence of the postmodern metropolis with its fragmented spatialities. Dear offers Los Angeles as the proper exemplar of the city in a postmodern era, when—unlike the Chicago School's city that is organized by its central core—urban peripheries organize what remains of the center. Despite the offer to move urban theory from Chicago to Los Angeles, the Los Angeles School of Urbanism has not gained the stature its proponents desired. Work by a number of Los Angeles-based urban geographers,

however, suggests that if Los Angeles is not—as Allen Scott and Ed Soja claim—the capital of the twentieth century, it certainly invigorates analysis of urban population and politics and offers new ecological perspectives.

The third aspect of postmodernism—method—draws together the influence of postcolonialism and poststructuralism as well as feminist theory. Each issues a challenge to foundational knowledge by acknowledging multiple voices and situated knowledge. Poststructuralist theory—a body of work associated with a diverse group of French theorists that dates from the 1970s—questions the transparent relationship between material reality and the language used to represent them. Michel Foucault's studies of the relationship between knowledge, discourse, representations, and power influenced geographic research to such an extent that discourse has become part of a standard vocabulary for many urban geographers.

Directions in Urban Geography

Although the overall health of urban geography has been questioned in the recent decades, geographers remain interested in the integrated nature of social, cultural, economic, and political aspects of contemporary life. Ironically, one assessment of the difficulties faced by urban geography is described as the “urban problematic,” that is, that everything is now urban and thus any empirical analysis of space or society must touch upon the urban. No longer discrete, “urban” as a category has lost its meaning. This critique comes primarily from the political economy perspective and replaced the examination of urban patterns with a general engagement with issues of urbanization and urban systems as underpinned by global capitalism. Within a relatively short period of time, geographers shifted from debating the “urban problematic” to participating in scholarly studies based on claims to the “rediscovery of the city”—within contemporary society as well as in academe—and the “spatial turn” in the social sciences. Whereas the 1989 entry for urban geography in the American Association of Geography publication *Geography in America* expressed doubt as to urban geography's future, the entry for urban geography in *Geography in America at the Dawn of the 21st Century* (2001) expressed certainty as to the

significant contributions of geographers to theoretical development.

Urban geography offers specific models for urban theory such as the Los Angeles School of Urbanism along with frameworks of analysis such as world cities theory, which examines the hierarchy of cities operating as command and control centers of the global economy. Other voices argue that greater appreciation must be given to the complexity of the city. Jennifer Robinson, in her *Ordinary Cities* (2006), critiques the hierarchical approach to the global cities literature. She argues for the examination of differences among cities (ordinary cities) without resort to a binary of core versus periphery. Her articulation of a postcolonial urban theory acknowledges these differences as diversity rather than hierarchical divisions defined by a Western modernity. Reacting to a tendency within urban research to overgeneralize from a handful of specific cities, Ash Amin and Stephen Graham, in "The Ordinary City," also call for an examination of ordinary cities, emphasizing the importance of capturing a sense of the contemporary city as a variegated and multidimensional entity. They distill several elements of this multiplicity, including the ways in which cities combine intense face-to-face interaction and technologically mediated communication with the world beyond the city. Complex networks of urban governance correspond to the increasingly complex institutional base of cities and established patterns of urban government. Theorization of these shifts has drawn attention to issues of public space and citizenship, changing housing markets, and urban political ecology.

The changing theoretical frameworks influencing research in urban geography has produced an eclectic body of work. Nevertheless, while debates within urban geography can appear intractable and research themes multiply, recent intellectual history suggests that geographers are addressing the complexity and messiness of today's urban conditions in such ways to benefit our understanding of the role of space and place in the constitution of contemporary life.

Judith T. Kenny

See also Los Angeles School of Urban Studies; Soja, Edward W.; Urban Studies; Urban Theory

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URBAN HEALTH

Urban health is a multidisciplinary field that encompasses a wide array of social, built, and physical factors of cities that influence individual and community health. Among these are secure and affordable housing and neighborhoods, affordable and culturally appropriate health services, food security, economic opportunity, adequate transportation, and a healthful physical environment. The roots of urban health as a field of study extend back to the mid-nineteenth century.

The dire living and working conditions in newly industrializing cities in Europe and the United States contributed to rates of disease and death in urban areas that often exceeded those in rural areas. These conditions also served to mobilize social and health reformers of the mid-nineteenth and early twentieth century. Unventilated and overcrowded housing, the absence of building and sanitary code, sewage-contaminated drinking water, and dangerous industrial workplaces precipitated the major epidemics and injuries of the day. These same conditions are endemic

in the rapidly urbanizing developing world, where the rural poor are migrating to cities for jobs and live in self-built and public housing, with compromised sanitary conditions, overcrowding, and poor air quality.

The work of early urban health reformers helped institutionalize land use zoning, housing codes, and drinking water and wastewater treatment. It also generated the professions of urban planning, public health, and sanitary engineering, the precursor of environmental engineering and science. Once these reforms had been achieved, however, interest in urban health waned in public and professional consciousness through much of the twentieth century. As the fields of public health, urban planning, and environmental protection modernized and professionalized, they grew apart from each other, particularly during the latter half of the twentieth century, and would increasingly function in separate professional domains.

A recent resurgence of research, policy, and action focused on urban neighborhoods and people is evident across disciplines and within diverse sectors, and it offers the promise of new interdisciplinary approaches to urban health. Among these are the recent healthy cities initiatives pursued by U.S. mayors; the growing focus within municipal health departments on reducing racial and ethnic health disparities by improving health services for minority residents; a national healthy housing movement that includes focus on affordability, neighborhood safety, the links between the indoor environment and health, and housing code reform; growing attention to nutrition and exercise programs in public schools to address the epidemic of childhood obesity; and the revival of farmers' markets, community gardens, and farms in cities to promote improved nutrition and food security. The link between poor health and the inequalities of housing, income, and social status has been most strongly established by British social science and social epidemiology researchers in studying council housing and myriad hierarchical income and occupational settings in cities.

The environmental justice movement has redefined environment as the place where people live, work, play, and pray. This reconception of environment has generated urban environmental health initiatives with a focus on issues most relevant for low-income and minority populations, such as lead poisoning, asthma, obesity, nutrition

and exercise, healthy housing and access to green-space, studies of toxic waste and race in metropolitan areas throughout the United States, the restoration of brownfields for economic redevelopment, and green technologies.

Public Health and Urban Health: The Nexus

Modern public health agencies have their roots in newly industrializing cities of England and the United States. Local government regulation of industry did not keep pace with the scale of human, animal, and factory waste generated in the immediate living environment, which contaminated local wells, rivers, and harbors, or with the infectious and contagious disease rampant in overcrowded slum housing. Public health measures that separated waste and drinking water and ventilated housing and workplaces paralleled those of the early urban planning profession. Housing code and zoning reform, sanitary engineering, and urban planning solved, in great part, the epidemics of infectious and waterborne diseases in nineteenth century cities. For example, cholera epidemics in British and U.S. cities ended with the separation and treatment of drinking water and locally disposed waste.

The germ theory of disease, which posits that microorganisms can cause disease and resulted in the advances of antibiotics and hygiene, added a scientific basis and prestige to public health and contributed to its professionalization. However, it also promoted a biomedical model of health that resulted in a decline in the status of community-oriented public health through much of the twentieth century. Mortality and morbidity indices became the primary measures of individual and population health, and clinical treatment of the diseased individual overshadowed the primary focus of public health, namely, disease prevention and health promotion at the community level. Recent concern over the epidemic in obesity among adults and children and recent research on the neighborhood-level effects on health, the social factors involved in health disparities, and the links between poor housing and health have begun to rejoin clinical medicine with public health, particularly in urban medical centers where these issues are especially salient.

The Built Environment of Cities

Urban planning underwent a shift in perception within the planning field, not unlike the shift in focus from community health to individual health within the health field. In the United States, the professional perception of the city as a living organism in which neighborhood was the central unit of life morphed into the city as the *built environment* whose brick and mortar were interchangeable with concrete and steel. As a result urban planning professionals and city planners replaced older, viable working-class neighborhoods with high-rise housing, civic centers, and multilane highways for commuter traffic, under the banner of urban renewal and suburban development. Under the massively financed government program generated by the U.S. Housing Act of 1949, the majority of neighborhoods eliminated by urban renewal were African American. With the loss of neighborhood, urban African Americans also lost their business base and their social and civic organizations. Some trace the race riots of the civil rights era in American cities to the erosion of African American communities, culture, and assets as a result of urban renewal. In Great Britain, similar patterns and issues developed in the postwar period, with the redevelopment of older urban areas and the development of minority neighborhoods populated by immigrants from the former colonies.

In the early-twentieth-century cities, ethnic groups and various economic classes lived, worked, and shopped in proximity to each other, while rarely crossing barriers of class and race. By contrast, urban redevelopment and suburban development in the 1950s and 1960s left the poor in cities and opened the suburbs to the middle class. By 1990, more than two-thirds of all central city poor people lived in neighborhoods of concentrated poverty. The result has been to segregate the urban poor and render them almost invisible to the rest of U.S. society. In the same period, the racial and ethnic makeup of many major cities grew, while Whites moved to suburbs and also to newer, Whiter regions of the country. At the onset of the twenty-first century, nearly 50 percent of the 100 largest U.S. cities have a majority of people of color.

Public health and urban planning intersect in the consequences of segregating and isolating the poor

and minority populations in cities. Recent research on the neighborhood-level effects of poverty have found greater infant mortality, high avoidable death rates associated with crime and violence, and increased environmental pollution in neighborhoods with higher percentages of poor people. These findings suggest that, not only individual poverty but also the poorer social, built, and physical environment conditions of people in cities must be addressed by urban planners and public health officials together to achieve urban health.

The Natural Environment of Cities

Nature in nineteenth-century cities was both seriously contaminated by industrial waste and eliminated for the sake of industrialization and economic growth. Industrialists sited factories on the banks of rivers from which they drew water for manufacturing and into which they discharged their factory wastes. In a natural assets trade-off, whereby urban rivers were sacrificed for industrial growth and rural ones protected, industrialists used their wealth to preserve remote wild and scenic rivers and upstream rural stretches of urban rivers for recreation and sports fishing. With the exception of grand central parks in cities, the first nature preservation efforts focused on wilderness remote from cities to counteract the urban pathologies of pollution, noise, and crime. Early developers of suburbs contrasted the grit of cities with the pastoral environment of suburban countryside in their marketing of suburbs.

In contrast to early U.S. suburbs, the Garden City movement in England envisaged the proliferation of moderate-size cities with employment, housing, cultural facilities, and perimeter farms. Although the concept held appeal to some American planners, homogeneous suburbs ultimately trumped garden cities in the United States. The rapid industrial growth after World War II and the development of the interstate highway, linking suburbs with cities, abetted automobile use and caused widespread air, water, and soil pollution. This spurred, in turn, a new wave of environmental analysis, advocacy, and government initiative. More recently, interdisciplinary collaborations on new pedestrian- and environment-friendly urban designs combining dense, multiuse development with preserved greenspace have flourished.

Key events that prompted the post-World War II rise of environmental awareness and legislation include the publication of Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring*, the first Earth Day public mobilization, the creation of a federal environmental agency followed by the state counterpart agencies, and the rapid, successive passage of federal environmental legislation throughout the 1970s. *Silent Spring* was published in 1962 and warned that chemical pesticides in agriculture and weed control constitute a "peacetime" war on nature which would endanger life along the ecological pathways of air, water, soil, plants, and organisms throughout the food chain. Twenty million people participated in Earth Day, April 22, 1970, by joining in urban river cleanups, recycling campaigns, and environmental teach-ins. In the same year, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency was created. A ferment of legislative interest and activity over the next decade resulted in the enactment of environmental laws and amendments governing air, rivers and wetlands, pesticide registration, toxic industrial substances, and solid and hazardous waste. The effect of these laws and their subsequent regulations was to partition the natural environment into the media of air, water, and soil with measurable physical, biological, and chemical properties. The identification of contamination of these environmental media was a catalyst for a growing set of new environmental remediation technologies.

The paradigms of nature and the natural environment that shaped much of the twentieth-century environmental consciousness need to be reexamined in the light of global urbanization. The majority of the world's population now lives in cities, and migration to cities and metropolitan areas is increasing in developing countries in the same pattern that occurred a century earlier in the industrial countries. As the world continues to urbanize, the complex living environment of urban people and urban environmental protection are not adequately addressed by either the archetype of nature as wilderness remote from people or by the regulatory model of the physical environment as the media of air, water, and soil.

Cities and their metropolitan areas account for the largest human ecological footprint on the planet. In the industrialized countries and in urbanizing developing countries, most national

economy is generated in metropolitan areas. Yet, cities have not been the focus of past environmental protection initiatives. The potential impact of cities and their metropolitan areas on global warming, waste generation, nonrenewable raw material use, and so on—because of their economic power and economies of scale—must become a central focus of environmental health initiatives. These problems take on added importance with the growth of megacities in the developing nations, which now experience, on a greater scale, many of the environmental health risks found in the early industrial era in the United States and Great Britain. Among these are squatter and slum housing, heavily polluted indoor and ambient air, contaminated drinking water, proximity to dangerous industries, and increased risk of accident and injury. At the same time, some cities in newly industrializing countries are touchstones for sound environmental development. For example, Curitiba, Brazil, has an efficient and widely accessible public transportation system that has been studied by urban transportation planners in the United States. According to the Mega-Cities Project, many programs initiated in third world cities, such as food distribution, recycling, and ecological restoration of wasteland, serve as models for New York City, Los Angeles, and London. In many of these programs, local women have emerged as community leaders, creating a social model of leadership for poor women.

Conclusion

Urban health, as an area of research, practice, and policy, has arisen at the intersection of (1) demographic trends, specifically, the migration of people to cities; (2) the impetus and findings of recent research on social factors and neighborhood-level effects on health; and (3) the new paradigm of environment as the *lived* environment where people reside, work, play, and pray. It offers the potential of interdisciplinary approaches, from fields such as public and community health, urban planning, and environmental protection, which are needed to address the interrelated and multifactorial effects of urbanization on human and ecological health.

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See also Sustainable Development; Urban Climate; Urban Planning

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URBAN HISTORY

Urban history examines the development of cities, towns, and other urban settlements, as well as the processes of urbanization, from a historical perspective. The interest in urban history has not only developed from the study of history, but has been influenced by other disciplines dealing with cities and towns, such as geography, sociology, architecture, economics, politics, planning, art, anthropology, ethnography, and others.

Urban history normally follows the main trends of the historical discipline and includes concepts, perspectives, questions, theories, and methods from the social sciences. A system approach is used for describing the hierarchical relations between cities manifested in city-size distributions such as rank-size models and central place theory, but also for identifying and analyzing networks of cities. Urban historians have incorporated geographical

models for spatial analyses and research on inner-urban structures. Political theories have been borrowed from political science for research on urban governance and local politics. The history of urban building and town planning has made use of ideas from architecture and social sciences. In recent times disciplines within the humanities, such as linguistics and literature, have inspired new historical research on urban culture.

There is at present no coherent theoretical definition of a city or a town. Most scholars emphasize legal definitions, which means that there are substantial variations in definitions between nations. Other variables for identifying cities and towns include population size, population density, physical form, economic functions, way of life, and place of exchange. The absence of precise urban definitions has been a central problem for urban history research everywhere.

Urban history differs from urban studies mainly in its focus on past times and long-term urban development. All periods of time—antiquity, medieval, early modern, modern, and contemporary—are of vital interest in urban history. In relative terms, topics such as town planning, urban housing, urban building, architecture, and infrastructure are often emphasized more in urban studies, even if they also are very important in urban history. There are also many similarities between urban studies and contemporary urban history, particularly research on urban development in recent decades. The distinction between urban history and urban studies is far from clear-cut.

The writing of urban history experienced a universal upswing in the 1960s and the 1970s when new research centers were set up, urban history groups were formed, and the editing of new journals, yearbooks, and newsletters began. Since then the volume of urban history research has steadily increased. New centers for urban history have emerged, more chairs in urban history have been founded, a European association for urban history has been established, international cooperation has increased, and transnational projects for teaching and research have been launched.

The breakthrough in the 1960s and the 1970s included increased efforts for research on urban development in modern times, that is, cities and urbanization of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. By that time the city had been recognized as

a phenomenon of central importance for the whole society and that urbanization represented one of the most essential processes in the development of the modern and contemporary world. To some extent there was a shift of focus in urban history from the Middle Ages and the early modern period to the study of the modern and industrial city.

The study of urban history has often been more rich and advanced in countries where urbanization started at a rather early stage and has generated large cities and marked urbanization tendencies. In the United States, for example, the origins of urban history can be dated back to the 1930s. The American Urban History Group was founded in the early 1950s and published a newsletter, but this organization proved unable to contain the divergent strands of the field and faded away. A renewal of urban history in the United States followed in the 1960s and the 1970s. One of the best-known trends from that period adopted the label "The New Urban History" and emphasized research on social mobility in urban settings. Even if this approach was short-lived, and its claims to be "urban" questionable, it had a significant influence on the future course of urban history.

The relationship between urban history research and the level of urbanization is not as direct as it might appear at first sight. In the Netherlands, for centuries a highly urbanized country, the study of urban history was weakly developed until the final decades of the twentieth century. In Sweden, on the other hand, a small and by that time agrarian European country without large cities, the Institute for Urban History was set up in Stockholm as early as 1919, and it is still in operation.

The field of urban history can be divided into subfields: urbanization, urban biographies, and thematic urban history. Another important area is the writing of comprehensive generalizations and syntheses, which have to integrate aspects and results from all the major subfields and relate them to the development of society in general in a long-term perspective. The writing of syntheses has a long tradition in urban history, going back to at least the 1930s.

Urbanization

The concept of urbanization refers to the shift from a rural to an urban society. The urban world

increases at the expense of the rural world. Urbanization is generally seen as a process that can be defined in at least three ways: demographic urbanization, structural urbanization, and behavioral urbanization.

Demographic urbanization is about the processes of population concentration. It refers to a rise of the proportion of the population living in towns, cities, or any other urban site. This can be done either by a multiplication of urban points or by a faster population growth in urban settings than in rural districts. Structural urbanization has its focus on the concentration of economic activities to certain places, irrespective of population development. Structural urbanization is often but not always correlated to demographic urbanization, and the city is imagined as an economic organization.

Urban behaviors are not place bound, and they can be observed in sparsely as well as densely populated areas. Behavioral urbanization refers to the process where behaviors, cultural norms, attitudes, belief, thoughts, and other customs that are supposed to characterize the lifestyles of urban people are spread to an even larger proportion of the total population of a nation or a region. The city is seen as a social system—people acting within a coherent domain of social norms—and not primarily as an economic organization.

During periods of strong population growth (e.g., during industrialization), cities will sooner or later grow outside their administrative borders and suburbs will emerge. Suburbanization and urban sprawl are concepts used to describe and analyze the spread of urban settlements over rural land at the outskirts of an urban area. Together a city and its suburbs make up an urban region or a metropolitan area.

A net of places more or less strongly dependent on the principal center surrounds modern cities. Sets of zones with diminishing dependence on growing distances can be identified. These zones have been given different labels, for example, inner suburbs, outer suburbs, inner fringe area, and outer fringe area. The steadily ongoing urbanization process and the growth of urban populations has, thus, resulted in the rise of more complex urban settlements than a single city, and new concepts such as metropolis, metropolitan area, urban region, city region,

conurbation, and megalopolis have been introduced. Urban agglomerations inhabited by 10 million people or more have been titled megacities and megaurban regions.

The term *metropolis* is often used as a designation for a great city in general and in contrast to small cities. The original meaning of metropolis seems to have been a greater city surrounded by a net of urban sites more or less dependent of the main city.

Metropolitan area, as well as urban region and city region, refers to a rather wide geographical area of continuous urban settlements surrounded by smaller places more or less dependent on the center. No coherent norms exist among urban historians for deciding when a city turns into a metropolis or how to functionally delimit a metropolitan area. For urban historians the delineation of an urban region (or equivalent) is strongly dependent on how travel patterns (such as commuting) and other relevant variables have been estimated and recorded. Metropolitan area is sometimes used even as an administrative concept and is assigned with formal boundaries like a city.

Conurbation has been defined as a wider area of continuous settlements. It is characterized by previously being divided into several urban sites of varying size, which successively have grown together and constituted one urban area. The concentration has often taken place through the construction of sweeps of buildings along the main roads.

The concept of megalopolis has been used to describe huge areas of continuous urban settlements of varying size, from large metropolises to small suburbs and interspersed with rural landscapes. In Europe, the German Ruhr area, the Dutch Randstad and the Milan region in northern Italy, are good examples. Urban change can sometimes be very rapid in the zones immediately outside the administrative city or the official metropolitan area, as for example in present-day East Asia.

In modern and contemporary urban history it is often necessary to include not only the administrative cities and towns but also the wider agglomerations consisting of a number of cities and urban sites of various size, function, and administrative status. Inevitably, urban regions change their shapes over time and have to be redelimited from one occasion to another.

Urban Biography

Urban biography is the history of one particular city or town. It is a form of synthesis, or total history, with the wider object to explain and understand the historical development of the particular city, how the city has become what it is today. This long-term perspective is central to an urban biography. Many aspects of local development—such as municipal government, local politics, housing, planning, physical expansion, demographic development, economic development, infrastructures, and voluntary organizations—may be included in an urban biography. The city is given a distinct character and becomes more than just a site for historical research. It is seen as an independent variable of research in its own right. Urban biographies might include a comparative perspective, which relates the city to other cities as well as to regional and national development.

Urban biographies may not always include every single aspect of a city's history. It can instead be given a thematic outline focusing on a restricted number of facets considered as crucial for understanding the historical development of the particular city. Such key features will normally not be constant over time; in the long run considerable variations are to be expected. This approach to urban history can be labeled urban biography as long as the particular city remains an object of research in its own right and is not used as a means for the study of some kind of general process or phenomenon.

The professional writing of urban biographies or town histories has been a vigorous academic branch. In some countries a substantial share of all urban history publications has belonged to this category, and periodically urban history has almost been equal to urban biographies.

Closely connected to urban biography is local history, which embraces the study of the history of one particular local community, urban or rural. It is like urban biography: a sort of total history with the ambition to include most aspects of the local development of a single community. Local history has developed as a leisure activity for people born in or living in the community under study, as well as an academic discipline. Some local historians have argued that a local community should be studied on its own premises irrespective of changes in the wider region or

nation to which it belongs. The advantages of a comparative method have been questioned and denied. This tradition has been called “true” local history or local history *per se*.

Thematic Urban History

Thematic urban history is a form of case study within an urban context. A general historical theme or process—such as economic, social, demographic, political, cultural, architectural, or law and order—is analyzed in depth by examining one city or by comparing two or more cities with each other. However, the city or town is not, as in urban biography, seen as an independent variable of research in its own right. The city only provides the physical frame for the analysis. The city is used as one example of many to shed light on an overall process of development.

Thematic urban history got its breakthrough in the 1960s and 1970s and quickly constituted a substantial part of all urban history research. By that time demographic, social, and economic issues dominated in urban historical research, and they were frequently examined through quantitative methods and statistical techniques. The theoretical perspectives were often emanating from the social sciences, not least sociology and geography.

While focus has shifted in favor of a cultural approach, inspired by the humanities, the study of the culture of cities and the lifestyles of urban people has long traditions in urban history. There is richness of urban institutional histories—such as schools, churches, museums, and voluntary organizations—often narrative in character. From the 1960s and beyond, a rising interest in urban popular culture can be noted, and much more attention was at the same time given to the role of local culture in city-to-city variations in politics and governance.

The more recent development of urban culture research provides new ways of exploring and understanding cities and towns. Focus is on the discursive level of society: symbols, texts, experiences, and conceptions of urban life, as well as how realities are communicated through the sources. The theoretical basis of this new approach is, to a great extent, postmodern theory. The cultural approach has also provided impulses for an increasing interest among urban historians for

monuments, museums, preservation of industrial remains, and reconstruction of town quarters, as well as for cultural heritage in general.

A renewed interest for urban symbol making and the image of the city can also be observed. The city stands for positive values like power, richness, creativity, and opportunities, but at the same moment the city is identified with negative beliefs like helplessness, poverty, danger, and destruction. Thus, the urban milieu has been depicted as both paradise and hell. Current matters such as climate changes, environmental issues, ethnicity, gender, globalization, urban networking, innovations, and city branding are also reflected in urban history. Such topics have received increased attention and share of research even from an urban historical perspective.

In past times the issue of royal charters and trading privileges as well as the building of walls around the cities made the distinction between city and country clear. Town privileges also meant a special form of local administration and local governing. Even later, cities and towns had their own kind of local authorities and a more complex administration than rural municipalities. Such variations in local governing are further examples of important specific urban features.

Many themes researched by urban historians can be studied in any locality, urban or rural. The issues are not necessarily specific to cities, towns, or other urban settlements. They become urban themes when the geographical research area is made up of an urban site. A continuous debate in urban history and urban studies has been if there exist any urban specific characteristics at all besides the built-up environment, the population density, the population size, and the economic functions. The question has also been if such specific urban features are of any significance for understanding human behaviors and other aspects of urban development.

Themes that urban historians should be addressing more intensively, as we know little about the urban history of these localities, are the development of cities in India, Southeast Asia, Africa, Australia, Japan, South America, and Latin America. Australian urban and planning history has been flourishing during the past few decades. Currently, Indian and Southeast Asian cities are facing rapid economic growth and dramatic physical, social,

and cultural transformation processes. Asia holds more than half of the world's cities with more than 10 million people, and that number is rapidly rising; yet Southeast Asia is one of the world's least urbanized regions. Towns and cities of eastern Africa have also experienced very quick growth over the past 100 years, but urbanization as a historical phenomenon has only recently begun to receive scholarly attention.

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See also Ancient Cities; Renaissance City; Urban Archaeology; Urban Studies

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URBANISM

Urbanism refers to the characteristics of, and quality of life in, cities and, for urban studies, the question of how human interaction and social organization has been altered by urban life. Early urban theorists, observing the overwhelming social changes brought about by industrialization and the rapid pace of urbanization, thought that the city would lead to personal disorganization (persons living in cities would not be able to cope with the rapid pace and stimuli of the urban environment) and social disorganization (families and social norms would break down). Debate surrounding these questions continues to inform the urban disciplines, and urban studies more generally, as new urban formations and growing megacities in the developing world further stress urban populations. This entry summarizes some of the classic statements about urbanism, surveys the resulting discussion in the European and U.S. traditions, and offers a guide to further reading in the encyclopedia.

Classic Statements

European countries experienced rapid industrialization in the first half of the nineteenth century. The city of Manchester, England, would come to symbolize the early industrial city, due in part to Friedrich Engels's description of life and labor in the city in *The Condition of the English Working Class*. An engraving of the town of Manchester from 1809 shows a rural landscape with village church spires rising through the trees; an oil painting by William Wyld of the industrial city from the same perspective in 1830 shows dozens of smokestacks and clouds of industrial pollution; the church spires can barely be made out. Early social theorists lived through these changes and confronted questions of what life in the industrial city would be like.

Ferdinand Tönnies, the German social philosopher, described the transition from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*, from the small-scale rural society that tightly encircled the individual and family within the local community to the large-scale urban society where the city dweller confronts a "strange community" lacking traditional bonds,

where “there exists a condition of tension against all others.” Georg Simmel, viewing urban life in Berlin in the last half of the nineteenth century, wrote more directly about the experience of urban life. First was the overwhelming intensity of nervous stimuli in the city—the crush of people, the noise of the streetcars, the smell of the street. To take all of this in would overwhelm the sensory foundations of psychic life, and so the city dweller develops a blasé attitude to surrounding persons and events. Second was the pervasive influence of the market on urban relations: Social life becomes conditioned by rational calculation as individuals encounter one another in partial roles, as consumers or store clerks, employees or managers, no longer as persons sharing common interests and activities within a localized community. Not only people’s work lives but the very basis of everyday social interaction becomes subject to the same sorts of rational calculation that people might employ when making decisions of what to purchase at the corner market.

The classic statement on urban life is that of Louis Wirth, an American sociologist who studied under Robert Park and Ernest Burgess at the University of Chicago and who would later become an important member of the faculty. Wirth’s *Urbanism as a Way of Life*, published in 1938, is considered a summary of the perspectives of the Chicago School of Urban Sociology. Wirth set out to establish a theory of urbanism and began by suggesting that urban life is characterized by three variables: size, density, and heterogeneity. Compared to nonurban communities, the city had a larger and more heterogeneous population concentrated within urban space, and these variables interacted with one another to produce a distinctive urban way of life found only in the city. Increased population size resulted in a division of labor and specialization, while increased density would speed social interaction and competition among urban populations. Larger population size was in part the result of immigration, and cities would bring together persons of different cultures (just as the division of labor would mean the concentration of persons would increase urban heterogeneity by bringing together persons with different skills and backgrounds within urban space). Urbanism would create greater opportunities for the individual for self-fulfillment with others who shared common

interests, but the overall effect was negative: Urban life was characterized by social disorganization, as personal interactions within the primary group were replaced by voluntary associations among secondary groups. The impersonal nature of social relations in the city would result in anomie (a sense of isolation) despite the number of persons one encountered in daily life. The social disorganization of urban life was a pervasive trope in the early Chicago School studies, with studies of homeless men, street gangs, and slums.

There has emerged an important critique of European tradition, represented by Tönnies, Simmel, and others, based upon the observation that what they (Simmel, in particular) were describing was not the effect of urbanization on urban life per se, but instead the powerful forces of modernity. The changes in daily life described in these studies are not the result of urbanization but instead are the consequence of societal change brought about by industrial capitalism: It was industrial employment that brought persons from rural communities to the large cities and into competitive and alienating relationships with one another, which resulted in the breakdown of the family, decline in other primary group relationships, alienation, and the like.

In the United States, the critique took on a completely different focus: The focus was not on the European tradition represented by Tönnies and Simmel, but on Wirth. In an essay titled “Suburbanization as a Way of Life,” Silvia Fava argued that if urban life is characterized by increased size, density, and heterogeneity, suburban life is characterized by the opposite: Suburbs are smaller in size, less dense, and more homogeneous than the city. Moreover, while urbanism might result in a decline in primary group relationships and increased anomie, suburbanism was oriented around primary group relations and familial interaction. In “Urbanism and Suburbanism as Ways of Life,” Herbert Gans argued that particular ways of life are not determined by physical location (in a city or suburb or small town) but by compositional factors, including such things as age, family status, and ethnic background. Gans goes on to suggest that whereas some groups may experience the characteristics of urban life described by Wirth (e.g., the elderly who are left behind in urban neighborhoods that have experienced racial

transition, or the urban poor who are unable to leave the inner city), there are other groups who have very different lifestyles (ethnic communities in the city where primary group relationships are important, young families in the suburbs where family obligations determine everyday activities).

It is important to note this is a peculiarly American debate, determined in large part by the mass suburbanization following World War II, when young families left the city for single-family homes in the suburbs, leaving established ethnic communities in the city behind; when the migration of African American households from the South would transform the inner city; and when high levels of poverty and unemployment among these groups would lead to the concentration of the urban poor. There was no similar debate of Wirth's model in the European literature. Generalizations about urban and suburban life in the United States are cast further into doubt by more recent changes in the American city, where many suburbs have higher levels of population density than are found in the city (due to the concentration of apartment buildings in working-class suburbs), where a majority of immigrants move into suburban enclaves, and poverty in the older industrial suburbs often is comparable to that in the central city.

In the United States, *Urbanism as a Way of Life* stimulated another important area of study and research. Claude Fischer's essay "Toward a Subculture of Urbanism" directly confronted Gans's assertion that there are no particularly significant social effects that can be attributed to urbanism and focused on Wirth's discussion of size and density to argue that population concentration produces a diversity of subcultures, strengthens them, and promotes diffusion among them, accounting for the "urban unconventionality" that is often so apparent to outsiders (although sometimes not so apparent to others in the city, due perhaps to their own blasé attitude and greater tolerance for diversity and heterogeneity). This discussion of subcultures is very different from that found in the United Kingdom, which locates subcultures within the class structural and cultural milieu of English society, rather than in the ecological structure of particular urban areas.

Urbanism has proved to be a vital construct within urban studies, provoking important discussion about

the character and quality of life brought about by industrial capitalism and about the emergence of subcultures within contemporary society. These are fundamental debates within urban sociology, but they further determine the research focus of other disciplines, such as urban psychology (with a focus on urban pathologies). Several entries in this encyclopedia provide important discussion of the work of Simmel and of Tönnies, while the entry on urban life discusses their work and urbanism more generally.

Ray Hutchison

See also Chicago School of Urban Sociology; *Gemeinschaft* and *Gesellschaft*; Manchester, United Kingdom; Simmel, Georg; Urban Anthropology; Urban Life; Urban Psychology; Urban Sociology

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URBANIZATION

Urban studies is commonly divided into two subject areas: urbanism (the study of urban life, or the

impact of cities upon human behavior) and urbanization (the study of the growth of cities). Urbanization further includes the process of population concentration within human settlements (the city), as well as the expansion of cities into surrounding communities (suburbanization) and regions. The study of urbanization has employed several types of empirical approaches, including the “rank size rule” (when cities were thought to be distributed in orderly fashion according to a Pareto distribution), the typological classification of cities assigned to levels within a hierarchy of places, and functional correlates according to city size. These classifications reflect developments in social science disciplines more generally; for example, in the 1960s there were efforts to explain urbanization following general systems theory, while from the 1980s forward it has become more common to refer to cities within a network of global cities. This entry presents a brief overview of the origins of cities and urban life, with a focus on urbanization of the past 200 years, and then discusses the emergence of the megacity as a current emphasis in the study of urbanization.

Origins of Cities

The first permanent human settlements usually are estimated to have begun some 10,000 years ago (8000 BC). Urban life appears to have developed independently some 7,000 years ago in Egypt, Mesopotamia, India, and China. The early cities in Sumer have been the focus of much attention, such as in V. Gordon Childe’s well-known and often-reprinted essay “The Urban Revolution,” as it was here that humans first developed writing, mathematics, and other sciences, as well as a complex division of labor, class-based social structure, and governmental systems. And it was in ancient Sumer, in Ur, the city of Abraham, that the religious ideas that gave rise to the three Old Testament religions (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) were born. These cities were the site of the Great Traditions that would spread to civilizations in the Middle East, Europe, and north Africa; similar developments in China have been less well studied, although the written records of the Chinese state are superior to those of the West.

Recorded human history begins with Herodotus of Halicarnassus’s *Histories* (written ca. 330 BC),

an account of the Greek and Persian wars and description of travels across the Greek world. Athens emerged as the dominant power in the Greek world and is often considered the beginning point of Western culture. While many Greek city states established colonies throughout the Mediterranean and the Black Sea, the first urban civilization was that of Rome, where cities were linked by roads that connected the farthest reaches of the empire and Egyptian territories produced wheat that was imported to feed the population of the capital city. Roman cities were considerably larger than the earlier Greek city-states, with the population of Rome reaching as much as a million persons at the height of the empire, and administrative and trading centers such as Palmyra (in modern-day Syria) reaching populations of around 200,000 persons.

Following the collapse of the Roman Empire, urban centers in the West declined while urban institutions and learning were kept alive in the Islamic cities of the Middle East, North Africa, and Spain. The urban renaissance (with respect to Italy) began in the fourteenth century, when cities in Italy supplanted those of the Islamic world, followed a century later by the emergence of trading centers and early industrialization in the North. The Italian cities of the Renaissance were relatively small (Florence had a population estimated at fewer than 100,000 persons), and the early merchant cities of the North were not much larger. (See Table 1.)

The Industrial Revolution brought about a major change in world urbanization. During the Middle Ages the largest cities were in the Islamic world, and during the Renaissance the world’s largest cities were in China. But as industrialization brought increasing numbers of persons from the countryside into the cities, first London (1800s) and then New York (1900s) took their place as the largest cities in the world. This was followed in the postwar period by the emergence of increasingly large urban concentrations in the developing world (Mexico City was for many years considered to be the world’s largest urban agglomeration, but this is followed by Lagos, Mumbai, Kolkata [Calcutta], São Paulo, and many others). In the new century, research has focused as well on the emergent industrial cities and regional urban systems in China.

Although urbanization has had a substantial impact on human societies throughout history,

Table 1 Largest Cities in Europe, 1050–1800

	1050		1200		1330		1500		1650		1800
Córdoba	150,000	Palermo	150,000	Granada	150,000	Paris	225,000	Paris	400,000	London	948,000
Palermo	120,000	Paris	110,000	Paris	150,000	Naples	125,000	London	350,000	Paris	550,000
Seville	90,000	Seville	80,000	Venice	110,000	Milan	100,000	Naples	300,000	Naples	430,000
Salerno	50,000	Venice	70,000	Genoa	100,000	Venice	100,000	Lisbon	150,000	Vienna	247,000
Venice	45,000	Florence	60,000	Milan	100,000	Granada	70,000	Venice	140,000	Amsterdam	217,000
Regensburg	40,000	Granada	60,000	Florence	95,000	Prague	70,000	Milan	120,000	Dublin	200,000
Toledo	37,000	Córdoba	60,000	Seville	90,000	Lisbon	65,000	Amsterdam	120,000	Lisbon	195,000
Rome	35,000	Cologne	50,000	Córdoba	60,000	Tours	60,000	Rome	110,000	Berlin	172,000
Barbastro	35,000	Leon	40,000	Naples	60,000	Genoa	50,000	Madrid	100,000	Madrid	168,000
Cartagena	33,000	Ypres	40,000	Cologne	54,000	Ghent	55,000	Palermo	100,000	Rome	153,000

Source: Adapted from Gottdiener and Hutchison, 2005.

and cities have dominated artistic, cultural, and scientific achievement since the Italian Renaissance if not before, relatively few persons lived in cities until recent years. In 1900 just 12 percent of the world's population lived in urban areas, and the 10 largest cities were located in Europe, the United States, and Japan. No city had had a population of 10 million persons (New York City would be the first to reach this level by mid-century). In 2000, just under half (47 percent) of the world's population lived in urban areas, and 19 cities had populations of 10 million or more—only 4 of the 19 were in industrialized countries. During the past decade, and for the first time in human history, more than half of the world's population lived in urban areas, and the United Nations estimates that the world's urban population will increase from some 5 billion to more than 7 billion persons in the next two decades; by the year 2030, in other words, 60 percent of the world's population will live in urban areas. Most of this increase will take place in urban agglomerations in the developing world. The origin of cities and urban life in Mesopotamia is often described as the first urban revolution and the emergence of large cities in the West following the Industrial Revolution as the second urban revolution. The emergence of the megacity in the last decades of the twentieth century will mark the third urban revolution.

The Megacity

Megacities are big cities, defined as metropolitan areas with populations of 10 million or more persons. At the turn of the century there were some 20

megacities (see Table 2), and the number is expected to double by 2030. There are several things that make the megacity of the twenty-first

Table 2 Population of the World's Megacities, 2006

Rank	City/Urban Area	Country	Population in 2006 (millions)
1	Tokyo	Japan	35.53
2	Mexico City	Mexico	19.24
3	Mumbai (Bombay)	India	18.84
4	New York	USA	18.65
5	São Paulo	Brazil	18.61
6	Delhi	India	16
7	Calcutta	India	14.57
8	Jakarta	Indonesia	13.67
9	Buenos Aires	Argentina	13.52
10	Dhaka	Bangladesh	13.09
11	Shanghai	China	12.63
12	Los Angeles	USA	12.22
13	Karachi	Pakistan	12.2
14	Lagos	Nigeria	11.7
15	Rio de Janeiro	Brazil	11.62
16	Osaka, Kobe	Japan	11.32
17	Cairo	Egypt	11.29
18	Beijing	China	10.85
19	Moscow	Russia	10.82
20	Metro Manila	Philippines	10.8
21	Istanbul	Turkey	10

Source: City Mayors. 2009. "Urban Statistics." Retrieved July 24, 2009 (http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/urban_2006_1.html).

century different from the industrial cities of the twentieth century. Most are located in developing countries, and many are found in some of the poorest countries in the world, including Dhaka (Bangladesh) and Lagos (Nigeria). The processes that generate urban growth in the contemporary period are substantially different from earlier periods, and this difference has been described as “urbanization without industrialization.” For much of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the growth of cities was the result of migration (from the countryside) and immigration (from other countries) to the industrial cities; the urban population found employment in the new industrial sector, cities collected taxes to support public transportation and utilities, developers built housing for the expanding working and (later) middle classes, and cities developed into metropolitan areas with regional subsystems of employment, commercial activity, and the like.

The development of the megacity in much of the world has followed a different path, as the growth of cities is fueled by high birth rates in the developing world and continued movement from depleted rural areas to large metropolitan centers. This migration continues despite a lack of housing, services, or employment opportunities, and as a result the megacities of the third world are characterized by extensive poverty, shantytowns and slums, and an expanding informal economy. It is estimated that half of the urban population in the developing world live in slums, currently 1 billion persons; this number is expected to increase to 2 billion persons in the next two decades.

The emergence of the megacity in developing nations raises many concerns about the conditions of urban life. Although cities have often held greater opportunity and promise than other areas, this may not be the case for persons in the megacity, where poverty and unemployment lead to crime and social unrest and the lack of adequate housing and public services leads to disease and increased mortality. It is often said that cities reflect the best of human society; the megacity challenges this belief in urban progress by displaying a vast array of problems that accompany unplanned urban growth. These problems call for new approaches toward managing urban life in the twenty-first century.

In 1958 the Social Science Research Council convened an interdisciplinary conference to explore the

need for a committee on research on urbanization. The committee concluded that the gaps in knowledge about urbanization were more impressive than the available research findings and that many generalizations about urbanization lacked empirical justification and were based upon limited observations over time and space and based largely upon the Western experience. Since the 1965 publication of *The Study of Urbanization*, hundreds of books and thousands of articles have been published on urbanization, suburbanization, and related topics. Yet the rise of megacities in what were at one time referred to as the developing nations, the emergence of new industrial regions in China, and similar developments once again challenge our understanding of urbanization and call for a program of study of urban life in the cities of the twenty-first century. By 2030, the towns and cities of the developing world will account for more than 80 percent of the world's urban population, but still our research and theory on cities and urban life are based upon limited observations over time and space and based largely upon the Western experience.

Ray Hutchison

See also Lagos, Nigeria; Megalopolis; Mumbai (Bombay), India; Urban Agglomeration; Urban Life

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URBAN LANDSCAPE

See Urban Morphology

URBAN LEAGUE

The National Urban League (NUL) is a nonprofit, civil rights, and community-based organization that promotes economic opportunity and advancement for Black Americans. With more than 100 local affiliates, the NUL provides direct services and programs to an estimated 2 million people nationwide.

Founded in 1910 as the Committee on Urban Conditions among Negroes, it began as an experiment in interracial cooperation between Ruth Standish Baldwin, social philanthropist and cofounder of the National League for the Protection of Colored Women, and Dr. George Edmund Haynes, social work visionary and the first African American to earn a social science doctorate from Columbia University. Its original mission was to train social workers, conduct research, and create job opportunities for Black Americans through vocational guidance and policy advocacy. In October 1911, Haynes brought together the National League for the Protection of Colored Women, the Committee on Urban Conditions among Negroes, and a third organization that also focused on Negro migrants called the Committee on Improving the Industrial Conditions of Negroes in New York, unifying all three organizations under a new name, the National League on Urban Conditions among Negroes.

In its early years, empirical research and the training of Black social workers were key organizational goals. Influenced by both the Tuskegee

Institute and Du Bois's notion of trained leadership, the league worked to prepare workers for industrial employment and train a generation of professional social workers. The league continued to be driven by research and has conducted hundreds of surveys on the conditions of various Black communities. Robert E. Park was the first president of the interracial board of the Chicago Urban League, founded in 1916 as an affiliate of the National Urban League. In 1920 the National League on Urban Conditions Among Negroes shortened its name to the National Urban League and began publishing the magazine *Opportunity, Journal of Negro Life*. In the 1960s the NUL expanded its scope to include the social, cultural, and economic advancement of Black Americans and their communities and began publishing a yearly report on the demographic conditions of the Black community, titled *The State of Black America*. In addition to expanding the social service component, it became a conduit for funneling government antipoverty funds to initiatives on housing, health, education, and minority business. In the early 1980s NUL expanded its focus to teen pregnancy and urban crime.

In 2003 Marc H. Morial became the newest president and chief executive officer of NUL, initiating the first legislative policy conference and securing \$10 million in new funding, Morial has developed a "five-point empowerment agenda" that focuses on the equality gap in education, economics, health and quality of life, civic engagement, and civil rights and racial justice. Today, the NUL continues to chronicle the status of African American and urban communities nationwide through their publications the *State of Black America* and *Opportunity Journal*.

Bruce D. Haynes

See also Du Bois, W. E. B.

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URBAN LIFE

Urban life might most easily be defined as life lived in a built-up area. Although the term itself has little analytical definition, the question of the central characteristics that define urban life has been a major preoccupation of urban theorists throughout the history of urban studies. Classical nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century urban theorists such as Ferdinand Tönnies, Max Weber, Georg Simmel, Robert Park, and Louis Wirth argued that urban life was distinctive because the size and scale of life in modern industrial cities demanded specific individual and societal adaptations. Subsequent writers have questioned this claim. Some argued that many of the relationships that seemed to define urban life were in fact characteristic of modern life in all its forms. Others argued that in all sorts of ways, life in cities still retained much of the intimate character of nonurban ways of life. Nonetheless, few contemporary analysts would claim that there is nothing distinctive about urban living. Urban life tends not to be seen as being distinctive because of just one or two isolatable characteristics. Rather, it is in the complex ecology of relationships that urban systems pull together that urban life gains its definition. Whereas previously urban life was contrasted to rural or traditional modes of life, increasingly the relevant contrast is understood as being between urban life and suburbia or urban life and exurbia.

Modern Life and the Industrial City

The first systematic social scientific analysis of the contrast between urban and rural life was Ferdinand Tönnies's *Community and Society*, published in 1887. Seeking to understand the social and economic transformations then sweeping through his

native Germany, Tönnies argued that industrialization was fundamentally transforming the nature of social bonds between people. Where previously social relations were defined by their *Gemeinschaftlich* (or, loosely translated, communal) character—relations were organized through custom, obligation, and paternalism—in modern, industrial societies social relationships were primarily *Gesellschaftlich* in orientation. Under the term *Gesellschaftlich* Tönnies described a society (not a community) defined by contractual market relations, rationality, and individual autonomy. Crucially Tönnies also argued that *Gesellschaftlich* relationships were defined by their urban nature. The rise of modern, commercial society was also simultaneously the rise of an urbanized society. For Tönnies, as for many subsequent thinkers, modern society equated with urban society, modern life with urban life.

This idea—that to understand modern society it was necessary to understand urban society and that to understand urban life was to understand what was to be modern—dominated urban thought through much of the twentieth century. Georg Simmel in his 1903 essay “The Metropolis and Mental Life,” for example, argued not only that urban life was fundamentally different from rural life but also that city life demanded a higher level of intellectual faculty than did rural life. The offshoot of this was the urban dweller's famous blasé attitude, which was not so much a sign of indifference as of an elevated degree of mental capacity. In a similar manner, Robert Park, the founder of the Chicago School of Urban Sociology, saw the city as “the natural habitat of civilized man”; although simultaneously Park also stressed that in its dependence on secondary relationships, the city with its “intensity of stimulations, tends . . . to confuse and demoralise the person.” Louis Wirth, in his essay “Urbanism as a Way of Life,” which in many ways marked the apogee of this line of thinking, argued that “the beginning of what is distinctly modern in our civilisation is best signaled by the growth of great cities. . . . The distinctive feature of mode of man living in the modern age is his concentration into gigantic aggregations.” Equally the writings of the great modernist architects such as Le Corbusier, Walter Gropius, and Ludwig Mies van der Rohe, along with those of Garden City advocates such as Ebenezer Howard, Lewis Mumford, and

the Regional Planning Association of America, were infused with the idea that in reorganizing urban life, in building cities that were rational and ordered—"machines for living," according to Le Corbusier—the whole of society itself could be transformed.

The notion that the contemporary industrial city, and thus urban life, should be regarded as definitive of the contemporary moment had a certain visceral logic. Cities often seem to represent the crystallization of a particular society's defining attributes. And, indeed, many neo-Marxist and neo-Marxist theorists influenced by the writing of the French urbanist Henri Lefebvre still cleave tightly to this argument. Other theorists, however, see little analytic value in emphasizing the connection between urban life and a particular notion of the modern or the contemporary. Writers such as Ray Pahl, David Pocock, and Peter Saunders argued that to focus on the urban as somehow the engine of social change is to misplace the arrow of causality. It may be true that many of the characteristics that define modern life predominate in cities. But this is not the result of urban life per se. It is the consequence of living in a highly specialized, technologically advanced, capitalist society. Most—if not all—of the social traits that are attributed to the nature of urban life by writers like Wirth are in fact found in equal measure in contemporary small towns or rural areas. Making a similar point, but retaining a focus on the city as a specific theater of social interaction, community studies specialists, starting with William Foot Whyte in the 1940s, have demonstrated the importance of all sorts of *Gemeinschaftlich* bonds within contemporary cities. Herbert Gans, in his study of Boston's West Side, *The Urban Villagers* (1962), described an urban world that was—paradoxically—villagelike in its feel. This sense of an intensely interconnected and socially stable world was not simply a carryover from earlier rural or village folkways. These forms of social bonds are a necessary and pervasive characteristic of a great deal of urban life. Indeed, for immigrant and working-class city dwellers, these kinds of communal bonds are absolutely essential to their economic security.

The key point is that writers like Wirth, Park, and Simmel were not straightforwardly wrong when they claimed that primary relationships in cities

were "impersonal, transitory, and segmental." Some urban social relations *are* of that nature. Rather they were wrong to claim that such obviously urban relationships were *the* most important, and thus *the* defining type of relationship in urban life. The cultural historian Raymond Williams has argued that modern writers have been obsessed with the individual figure of "man walking through" urban space rather than with the notion of people inhabiting urban places. Thinking beyond this individual figure, and focusing on cities as vast theaters of connection, it is evident that modern urban life has in fact generated a great variety of novel forms of communal association.

Forms of Association

Focusing on the idea that urban life as generative of ways of living with others—rather than seeing it as a distinctive way of being, in and of itself—has shifted the focus of much contemporary research into urban life onto the quite concrete question of how different people navigate a life in the city. As in the work of Gans on Boston's West Side neighborhood, a great deal of this writing has focused on the ways that certain areas offer a sense of communal emplacement for specific communities and the kinds of social networks and interactions that allow that emplacement to happen. However, there is a wealth of different perspectives. Feminist writers have written about the ways urban life has offered women all sorts of possibilities for emancipation and personal freedom. Erika Rappaport, for example, has explored the intricate connections between the rise of department stores, their associated retail districts, and the feminization of the public realm of late-nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century cities. Liz Bondi and Loretta Lees have demonstrated how contemporary processes of inner-city gentrification in North American and European cities are intimately associated with the rise of a self-confident, urban, professional feminized middle class. In a somewhat different key, social historians, urban sociologists, and geographers have demonstrated how cities have often allowed the establishment and flourishing of distinctive sexual subcultures. In particular, they have examined in detail the ways certain parts of cities—often the older, less prosperous, inner-city neighborhoods—played a crucial role in

the establishment of an assertive and self-confident gay rights movement.

By no means has all work on forms of association in urban areas focused on minority or discriminated-against social groups. A great deal of attention has also been paid to the concrete networks of social relations that characterize urban dwellers as a whole. Much of this work has run counter to the neighborhood, or subcultural studies, research outlined earlier. Rather than stressing the importance of particular neighborhoods and the intensity of ties within a particular local area, urban sociologists and anthropologists in Europe and North America have shown the degree to which, for many urban dwellers, their personal ties spread across their city in a spider-like manner. Technologies like the telephone and the automobile have disembedded many people's social lives from the narrow confines of a walkable neighborhood. Of course as researchers such as Claude Fischer and Barry Wellman have stressed, the kinds of socially rich neighborhoods described by many community study authors do exist. But in many North American and European urban areas, this kind of neighborhood is more the exception than the rule. It is also worth stressing that the analysis of personal networks reveals a great deal of variation in form and spatial density depending on the age, sex, occupation, social class, and marital status of the individual being studied. This variation is often manifested within individual households. The male head of the household often leads a much more mobile, spatially distanced life than that of his spouse, while the spatial horizon of his children are even more circumscribed. Whereas there is a tendency within both the academic and the popular literature to place a high value on tightly knit neighborhood social networks, often this pattern of spatial concentration of personal social networks is as much a barrier to social advancement as it is a valuable source of social support. Douglas Massey, for example, in his work on the contemporary inner-city African American ghetto has demonstrated how the spatially concentrated social networks that define many ghetto dwellers' lives effectively imprison them within the inner city.

As a final point on urban forms of association, it is important to stress that for many urban dwellers much of urban life involves interactions and

relationships that are defined by, and often valued for, their lack of temporal and emotional depth. The collective life of a city is defined in all sorts of ways by what Ash Amin and Nigel Thrift (2002) call "light sociality"—the interactions with everyday strangers required as individuals go about their business in a city: rituals of standing in line, greeting the supermarket cashier, talking small talk at a bar or café, or thanking the bus driver.

Ecologies of Urban Life

Beyond the question of the forms of social association and the types of social networks that characterize different social groups within cities, urban researchers have also repeatedly returned to the idea that urban life *as a whole* in some sense exists as a distinctive ecology of human existence. To a significant extent this is to revisit a theme that concerned earlier writers like Simmel and Wirth. Wirth had argued in his 1938 essay "Urbanism as a Way of Life" that the three defining characteristics of urban life were density of population, its size, and its heterogeneity. These three elements remain constants in much of the discussion about the ecology of urban life—although how they each should be measured or defined is the focus of a great deal of debate.

There are four principal ways that urban scholars have examined the notion of an urban ecology. The first focuses on the generative capacity of the urban environment. In essence this is to ask why it is that populations agglomerate together in the first place. The answer offered by thinkers from Jane Jacobs in the early 1960s, through to Edward Soja in his *Postmetropolis* (2000) and contemporary economic geographers such as Allen J. Scott and Michael Storper, is that through the specialization, the unexpected mixtures, the concentration of resources, and the challenges of living in a dense, heterogeneous environment, urban life creates a productive dynamic that transcends the sum of its parts. A second body of literature has focused on the related question of how cities manage to generate order despite their size and heterogeneity. This has led both to detailed ethnographically based accounts of how trust is produced and maintained among strangers, and work drawing on systems and complexity theory that seeks to understand cities as emergent, self-ordering

systems. A third body of work has focused on the ways many cities organize their heterogeneity through all sorts of spatial divisions. Indeed, in America many urban critics argue that urban development—even in the central areas of cities—is increasingly suburban in character. Urban historians like Kenneth T. Jackson and Robert Fishman have shown that this process of suburbanization is driven by a desire to escape the diversity and density of the traditional industrial city. So, if more and more people are living in urban environments, in many cases life in these environments is defined by scenes that bear little relationship to earlier patterns of urban life: These are environments defined by the automobile, the motorway, the shopping mall, and the private home. The fourth set of writings on the ecology of cities and of urban life, opens up the idea of what counts as life within the urban environment. Considering the role that all sorts of nonhuman actants—from software systems, to electricity grids, to plants, bacteria, and viruses, to the weather—play in the unfolding of urban environments, writers such as Jennifer Wolch, Sarah Whatmore, Steven Hinchliffe, Matthew Gandy, Nigel Thrift, and Ash Amin have begun developing ecological accounts of urban life that displace the idea of humans as the singular defining element of the urban. This is a radically novel ontology of urban life that suggests an entirely new perspective through which to think about the liveliness or otherwise of cities.

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See also Chicago School of Urban Sociology; Simmel, Georg; Urban Culture; Urbanism; Zoöpolis

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URBAN MORPHOLOGY

Urban morphology is the study of the form, physical structure, plan and layout, elements of townscapes, and functional areas of towns and cities. Traditionally, it focused on the development and the phases of growth of urban areas with different approaches, including physical, socioeconomic, and cultural aspects of urban form. More recent research has focused on the relationship between urban morphology and planning and thus principles of sustainability, landscape management and conservation planning, and the recent regeneration of urban areas. These themes have changed the nature of urban morphological investigation to concentrate more on the roles of urban actors like architects, planners, and urban managers in the production of the form and design of urban areas.

The origins of urban morphology can be traced to the turn of nineteenth and twentieth centuries,

especially to the early work of Otto Schlüter and the German morphogenetic research tradition. Schlüter's writings presented a morphological analysis of settlement and cultural landscapes (*Kulturlandschaft*) as the counterpart to geomorphology in physical geography and supported, at the same time, the strong tradition of German landscape research. The urban landscape (*Stadtlandschaft*) was one of the major research topics in German universities in the early twentieth century. It was primarily a descriptive research including comprehensive classifications of the sites, town plans, and building types of German towns. Using evidence of the size and shape of plots of land and the layout of streets, this early morphogenetic research aimed to classify urban areas according to their phases of growth; even the historical periods of town planning and sociocultural ideals were not a vital part of the research.

Besides its presence in German-speaking countries in Central Europe, the majority of research in urban morphology has come from Great Britain and North America. In the English-speaking world, German émigré M. R. G. Conzen laid the foundations for urban morphogenetics and the Conzenian school of thought. Conzen's major work in the English language was his Alnwick study (first published in 1960), in which he introduced a conceptual and cartographic analysis of the town plan. In this study, he developed a framework of principles for urban morphology. Individual plots were the fundamental units of his town plan analysis, along with the detailed cartographic analysis connecting planning documents with field surveys. Conzen's significant contribution was the conceptualization of townscapes and of the way in which urban forms evolve. This was important for the future development of urban morphological research in which morphogenesis refers to the processes that create and reshape the physical fabric of the city. Over time, physical qualities of the urban environment change, not only as new urban fabric is added but also as existing fabric is modified.

American urban morphology had itself been characterized by two different perspectives, one dealing with cultural aspects, especially in rural settlements, and the other one with socioeconomic aspects emphasizing the changing patterns of urban land use. The latter of these perspectives had a great impact on the research of city structure and

connected the concentric zone model of Ernest Burgess (1925), the sector model of Homer Hoyt (1939), and the multiple-nuclei model of Chauncey Harris and Edward Ullman (1945) to urban morphology. Its concern was the socioeconomic perspective of land-use patterns and not so much the historicogeographical view of town plan and building form.

The development of urban morphological studies has been strongly influenced by Conzen's tripartite division of the townscape into town plan, building forms, and land use. Approaches that have focused on the dynamics of urban structure have shown an important link between Conzenian town plan analysis and cyclical land-use patterns. In early urban morphological studies the concept of fringe belt was used to describe the cyclical movement in the outward extension of the built-up area. As part of the development of the internal structure of the city, fringe belts tend to be used initially for functions requiring large sites and having little or no need for accessibility to the commercial core (like public park, sports fields, gardens, cemeteries, industrial sites, and public utilities). In many cities, especially in continental Europe, the physical character of fringe belts can also be a result of the military defenses where early fortification zones are now greenbelts surrounding the city.

The fringe belt concept was taken up more widely in the 1970s. A series of papers by J. W. R. Whitehand developed some of the implications of Conzenian principles. In particular, Whitehand demonstrated the links between building cycles and the fringe belt concept. He argued that the initial attempt to develop links between rent theory and cycles of urban growth was only indirectly concerned with fringe belts. Concentrating on the spatial pattern of land uses at the urban fringe, he focused attention on the broad, heterogeneous category of institutional land uses that had been largely ignored by land economists. Whitehand sees that in urban development, the repeated cycles of booms and slumps are likely to result in a series of alternating zones in a city's structure, characterized by different proportions of institutions and housing. Institutions originally located at some distance from the edge of the built-up area may be surrounded by new housing areas by the end of housing boom. Originally these areas have not been of interest to house builders. After Whitehand

we must envisage a situation in which, by the end of boom period, a zone of housing will have been added to the built-up area, but, scattered beyond it and sometimes lying within it, will be the sites of institutions. This means that during a housing slump, institutions will develop a majority of the most accessible sites and will form a zone with a strongly institutional character.

In this fashion, Whitehand offered a theoretical explanation based on the increases that tended to take place in the rents bid by institutions for their own and adjacent sites relative to those of house builders. At the same time as institutions grew, they tended to relocate those parts of their activities having weak linkages to the urban area to less-accessible, cheaper land at the urban fringe.

Whitehand's cyclical approach to urban fringe is significant because the investigation of urban morphology via the fringe belt is integral, for example, to suburban development and urban sprawl. Discussions about urban forms have often been connected to suburban development and its morphological consequences. Because of the different nature and pace of suburbanization, moreover, there is no single representative model of land use for the modern city. James Vance, Jr., has suggested that the overall framework can best be thought of as a series of urban realms surrounding a core. Urban realms are the product of suburban infill and freeway sprawl along with more recent developments. Morphologically, this means that the city will disintegrate into a system of areas and nodes bound together by a strong system of communication. Within a metropolitan framework, the general dispersion of functions throughout the metropolis has caused the morphogenetic evolution of the geographical unit of daily living (the urban realm) to emerge in cities large enough to have several realms. General evidence would suggest that populations of more than 250,000 within a physically extensive metropolitan area would be required for the emergence of realms. In (sub)urban development, new modern or post-modern urban realities are finding their concrete counterparts in new suburban centers, which are attractive locations for networking firms and where the huge growth in jobs and other truly urban functions is likely to be concentrated. The new urban realms are developing around various kinds of suburban-downtown areas, for example,

existing regional centers in the city region, regional shopping centers or shopping malls, and around multipurpose office and speciality concentrations like edge cities.

Morphogenesis, the creation and subsequent transformation of city form, operates more radically at some times than others, with intervening periods of conditional equilibrium. In his book *The Continuing City*, Vance has divided urban morphogenesis into different general processes. The process of land assignment is essentially the first dynamic at work in the city. It operates in two ways, serving as the major determinant of the design of the place during the period of initiation and as the major determinant of the processes of adaptation during the period of transformation. The second process in the morphogenesis of cities is that of connection. Different kinds of journeys—to work, to shop—have dealt with the morphogenetic contribution of repeating movements internal to the city. Within this context, the impact of transportation innovations are of particular importance because they exert a direct influence on the overall physical structure of urban areas. The process of capital accumulation and investment thus has an important role in the construction of the physical forms of the city. After Vance, historical processes and the repeated reconstruction of towns result from a sort of economic ratchet that makes do with existing provisions until the resources are available for enlargement, modernization, and the greater show of prosperity and probity. It is also possible to follow the process of capital accumulation from ancient times of urban history to the building of modern cities, including land speculation. In Vance's divisions of urban morphogenesis, planning has been a contributing factor from the earliest times. To his mind, planning and the market mechanisms are necessary components of a single overall process shaping urban form. As the market is reduced in contribution, planning must be increased; if one is in complete control, serious deficiencies and conflicts in the development of urban structure might result.

The fundamental processes of morphological change within the city have dealt with both outward extension and internal reorganization. The process of reorganization is part of the development of internal structure and differentiation of

cities (cf. intraurban physiognomy). Depending on research interests, such reorganization can involve a variety of processes of change that operate at different spatial scales, from individual buildings to morphological transformations of city blocks, neighborhoods, and quarters. The internal differentiation of cities traditionally shows morphological elements of residential, commercial, and industrial functions. In inner-city areas and especially close to central city core, the pressure to reorganize the interior space of the city has been a continuous process; the result is that a distinctive morphological element is created that contains a mixture of residential, commercial, and industrial functions. This transformation of urban space has been considerable since the mid-1970s. The vitality of the central city core has been reemphasized. Themes such as the quality of urban living (gentrification, consumption palaces, and sophisticated entertainment) and enhanced social control over both public and private spaces have assumed widespread importance to the internal structure of the city and to urban landscapes.

The study of urban landscapes has been closely linked to the urban morphological frame. Especially in British urban morphological studies, three of the most important research lines are the nature and amounts of urban landscape change, the agents involved in the processes of change, and the management of that change. The traditional research line has connected the analysis of the town plan to the development of the urban landscape. Here the Conzenian townscape is full of layers of past urban development indicating how cities as entities have developed as physical configurations of streets, spaces, and many types of physical structures, and how urban societies have worked out their lives following the experiments of their predecessors. According to Conzen, the historical layers of urban landscapes represent accumulated experience and are thus a precious asset and valuable tool for conservation planning. This asset is threefold. First, different landscape features and physical structures of the various parts of cities help people to identify with places. Preferences for particular cities or parts of cities (like parks, commercial cores, or entertainment areas) are especially bound up with the physical appearance of buildings and other landscape features. Second, it helps the individual and society to orient themselves in time, in the

sense that the urban landscape provides strong visual experience of the history of an urban area and makes concrete the different experiences of time. Third, the combination of forms created by different elements in old, established urban landscapes and by the spatially oriented networks of social relations have aesthetic value.

In the second line of research, the study of urban landscapes has been linked to the types of agents and the specific organizations and individuals responsible for their creation. The object of study within the morphogenetic tradition has not been the agents themselves as much as it has been the form and places created by the agents. More current research since the 1990s has addressed the planning and management issues of the urban landscape. Historical and culturally sustainable values and reactions against modern architecture and large-scale redevelopment processes have provided favorable starting points of such investigations. Urban morphological research, though, has continued to delimit urban landscape units and their significance for urban landscape management and conservation planning. This research has been successfully carried out on commercial cores, industrial waterfronts, and residential areas.

Urban morphological approaches have been an important root of urban studies. The study of physical qualities of the urban structure is one of the oldest branches of urban geography, especially in Europe, where the research on townscapes and morphological regions has occupied a permanent place. Most of these studies have been highly descriptive, and this led to criticism in 1960s and 1970s against the urban morphological approach at a time when different approaches, such as structuralistic and humanistic approaches, appeared in urban geography and many urban geographers found more interesting themes to attract their research activities. In spite of this, urban morphology research has expanded in the 1980s and 1990s, with its main concern being urban landscapes.

The growth of research on the physical form of urban areas has occurred in several disciplines simultaneously—in (urban) geography, planning and planning history, urban design, (landscape) architecture, and urban history. In urban geography, critical and humanistic approaches have

connected urban form and landscape to economic restructuring via globalization, to postmodern architecture, and to qualitative techniques that interpret urban space. Whitehand suggests that within geography alone, three distinct types of advances in urban morphological research have been apparent: (1) the computer-aided analysis and representation of urban physical form, (2) urban morphogenetics, and (3) the exploration of the social significance of urban landscapes. The first research advance is quite prominent in geoinformatics and the use of global information system (GIS) tools in geography. Although geoinformatic methods are used more often to analyze physical features of the environment, the spatial data and the GIS-based modeling expand the possibilities for quantitatively analyzing the urban form and the landscape of the built-up urban environment.

In light of the dynamics of urban geography during the past decades, which includes successive approaches from positivist to structuralist and humanistic, it is necessary to reevaluate the philosophical and methodological bases of contemporary urban morphology. The most prominent and longest-established research themes concern the transformation of city form and urban spaces and the development and management of urban landscapes. Today urban morphological studies are more interested than before in the agents of change. Current research is probing the influence of land and property owners, architects, developers, and individual residents on urban landscape. Studies of a variety of individuals and organizations involved in land-use development are similar to the institutional approach where urban form is a result of interests of different agents and of division of power in local conflicts. Those researchers who have focused attention on the agents of change see conflicts endemic to the processes of development, particularly those occurring within existing urban areas. In this context, future urban morphological analyses should aim to understand the values and ideologies of different kinds of institutions (agents), and the decision-making processes of these institutions, concerning urban space and life.

Dealing with the concept of the urban landscape, urban morphology is closely related to those research practices that, in many sciences, have

adopted qualitative methodologies to understand the social meaning of urban landscapes and to interpret symbolic qualities of urban space. Utilizing linguistic and semiological methods any city can be read as texts, a narrative of signs and symbols. Such interpretations are different from the idea of landscape as a mathematical or statistical construct. Instead the focus of interest has often been the ideological basis or power relations (cf. landscapes of power) of creations in the landscape. Consequently, architecture and urban design, key elements of the visible townscape, have developed significant relationships with urban political economy and with producers, consumers, and exchangers of urban space.

Urban morphology has a long history of models, concepts, and approaches created to understand the development of urban form and urban landscape. Moreover, it has maintained some of its main themes of research for a century and processed those themes according to the current needs of research. At the same time, urban morphological studies have engaged in practices in other urban disciplines and continue to pursue an elusive leading paradigm for morphological urban analysis.

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See also Land Development; Social Production of Space; Urban Agglomeration; Urban Design; Urban Geography; Urban Planning

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URBAN NOVEL

The study of the urban novel is one of the key disciplines in the history of urban studies. To circumscribe their topic, the first urban sociologists and philosophers had to fall back on the literary reconstructions of what Henri Lefebvre, in *The Production of Space*, called “lived space.” Georg Simmel and Walter Benjamin studied urban fiction to get a purchase on the heterogeneous experiences produced by modern cities. In fictional texts, such experiences tend to assume a coherent, containable, somewhat simplified form. Literary representations of lived space also allow for the greatest possible nuance and individualization in joining empirical observation with abstracting representation. As a result, references to the urban novel have continued to play an important role in urban studies.

In current academic parlance, the *urban novel* or *city novel* holds the middle between a thematic category in literary criticism and a genre or sub-genre within fiction. Used most loosely, the term points to a thematic interest that is regarded as dominant in a particular work of fiction. This is the sense in which literary journalists, reviewers, and publishers have frequently used it and sometimes continue to do so. The term has acquired greater semantic density in an academic context, where it designates something close to a separate genre within fiction. As such, the designation is quite flexible: The genre conventions of the urban novel are not nearly as fixed as those of the fairy tale, detective, or western.

Because the object of analysis in the case of urban novels may not be determined with empirical objectivity, it is important to distinguish from the outset between two levels of intentionality that inform usage of the term: the writer’s intention and the reader’s interest. It will be clear that a work of fiction is most readily labeled an urban novel when it has been composed as such by a writer and is being read in this light by a reader. In the case of the most canonized urban novels from Western literary history, there tends to be widespread agreement between writers and academic readers about the aptness of the label. Such agreement, however, needs to be sufficiently historicized.

The Heydays of the Urban Novel: 1850–1930

Historically speaking, the urban novel was a strong discursive reality in both the production and reception of nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century fiction in Europe and North America. This implies that the phenomenon has sometimes been treated as a monolith. For a while, it tended to be discussed in tandem with generalizing and universalizing narratives on the “metropolis” and “metropolitan life” by such early sociologists and urban theorists as Georg Simmel, Max Weber, Louis Wirth, and Lewis Mumford. The urban novel, as it was construed first by writers themselves (most famously by Charles Dickens, George Eliot, Émile Zola, Theodore Dreiser, Alfred Döblin, James Joyce, and John Dos Passos) and then by critics, thus usually stood for a confrontation with the processes and symptoms of “modernity” overall—a confrontation that was easily taken to transcend a series of other identity-constituting particularities that have come to refine academic discourse in recent decades.

The synthetic and homogenizing tendencies of traditional perspectives on the urban novel are no cause for surprise: Literary representations of urban worlds in nineteenth- and early-twentieth-century fiction were themselves often inspired by a synecdochical motivation. The modern industrial city was viewed by many writers as a privileged environment, a space in which the most important social and historical processes came to the surface. Urban space was widely regarded as the modernization process turned flesh. For this reason, literary representations of the city (and subsequent studies of them) dealt with much more than documentary descriptions of urban space. They were always also about a microcosm that synecdochically evoked major evolutions in society at large, such as bureaucratization and industrialization processes, the rationalization and fragmentation of moral discourses, and the commodification and individualization of lifestyles. Such social phenomena have been analyzed extensively by urban sociologists, but the most important observers of them have often been the great urban novelists of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Shifts in Academic Response to the Urban Novel

The urban novel written between 1850 and 1930 has received a lot of academic attention. Classics in the field include Burton Pike's *The Image of the City in Modern Literature*, non-English studies by Pierre Sansot, Volker Klotz, and Karlheinz Stierle, as well as more recent books by Priscilla Ferguson, Ann Douglas, and Christof Forderer describing parts of the literary histories of Paris, New York, and Berlin.

When we survey studies of the urban novel from the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, by contrast, scholarly attention proves to be either lacking or appears to have been refocused. A panoramic study like Richard Lehan's *The City in Literature* devotes no more than a brief supplementary chapter to the postwar era. Carlo Rotella's *October Cities: The Redevelopment of Urban Literature* typically chooses to stick to the early stages of urban crisis in the 1950s to mid-1960s and zooms in on three exemplary neighborhoods in Chicago, Philadelphia, and New York only. Thus, Rotella's study is also preoccupied mainly with particular strands of ethnic urban fiction whose localized understanding the author does not want to sacrifice to more inclusive, tabulating overviews.

Apart from such monographs, there have been comparative studies (by Peter Barta, Bernard Donald, Ben Highmore, and Hanah Wirth-Nesher) in which the emphasis lies on meticulous readings of modernist city images. Conspicuously, however, all such works avoid a more synthetic discussion of the twentieth-century history of urbanization that might attribute to contemporary urban fiction a similarly central or synecdochical role as had their immediate predecessors. It is probably two studies by Peter Brooker that come closest to offering a comparative modern–postmodern survey of urban fiction, but also these are ultimately more concerned with the self-positioning of a critic within the fields of contemporary literary criticism and cultural theory, or with the salvaging of literary forms of political commitment, than with offering an extended, text-oriented literary-critical survey. In other words, almost no studies seem to be produced anymore that still take the urban novel as a point of departure for a broadly synthetic and theoretically underpinned study of recent literary

developments within the realm of mainstream, “high” literature. This poses something of a paradox: Whereas on a global scale we have been witnessing massive urbanization, academic discussions of the contemporary urban novel have dissipated almost entirely.

A lot of the diminished synthetic attention to the urban novel has to do not with a paucity of recent fiction whose principal setting is urban—there is indeed an overabundance of such writings—but with shifts in academic perspectives. Various strands of poststructuralism have cast doubt on the ideological underpinnings of traditional monolithic syntheses that attempt to make sweeping statements about modernity, the metropolis, and metropolitan life. Instead, they have shifted the debate toward cultural theories about the social production of space (irrespectively of urban settings) as well as toward a more diversified and politicized sociological analysis that treats literary representations as informed by a multiplicity of identity-constituting notions, including place, class, race/ethnicity, gender, sexuality, age, and national origin.

Shifts as a Result of Sociogeographic Transformations

More has changed, however, since the late twentieth century than just academic perspectives on urban-based fiction: The phenomenon itself has undergone something of a transformation. It is doubtful whether the urban reality represented in fiction today still intends or manages to function as a synecdoche for wider social evolutions. Both with respect to sociogeographic realities and narrative representations, some clear shifts may be perceived.

Two sociogeographic transformations in particular have contributed to the changing nature of urban-based fiction in most Western (and increasingly non-Western) literatures: the material metamorphosis of cities through a dispersal and hybridization of the urban landscape and the sociological diversification of city life through the empowerment and autonomization of traditionally oppressed or silenced groups. Together, these transformations have made the urban referent ever more complex and heterogeneous.

The physiognomy of cityscapes in Western countries has undergone such a sea change that

cities have lost much of their circumscribability and visible conspicuousness. The contemporary network metropolis is no longer a relatively clear spatial entity with a nucleus characterized by density and congestion. It has sprawled and merged with its former hinterland. Suburban peripheries have frequently come to accommodate all of the central city's classic functions and morphed into unmappable, hybrid conurbations scholars now call *posturban* or *postsuburban*. Under these circumstances, the heroic fight of individuals against the industrial and commercial mainstays of modernity—a classic scenario proposed by the older urban novel—has become irrelevant in the eyes of many urbanized writers and readers.

Just as the Melvillean seafarer's novel died a slow death after the arrival of the steamboat and nonmaritime transportation systems, the city novel, as a distinct category addressing the totality of life and society in the modern world, has been overtaken by its increasingly sprawling and disseminating subject. This dissipation of a circumscribable urban *topos*—in both senses of the word—ties in with the phenomenon that many writers today are urban-based and have never experienced the culture shock of country-to-city migration that usually inspired the historic urban novel. This in turn has made the urban environment seem more banal than to their novelistic predecessors: It has become the default experience. In some cases, the central or downtown metropolis has even come to be regarded by writers as a realm of nostalgia in contrast to the newer, confusing forms of posturban, cybernetic, or global chaos.

The second sociogeographic transformation with a major impact on the writing and reading of urban-based fiction is sociological. More than ever before, urban lifestyles and urban locales have been uncoupled. With the dispersal of urban functions to suburbia and of urban images and lifestyles through the audiovisual media, behavioral patterns formerly deemed inseparable from big cities (like dandyism, the formation of subcultural groups, or interpersonal relationships based on rationality and reserve) have spread over a much wider part of the population. And just as the Western city in its spatial components has come to resist representation in traditional cartographic terms, social networks in today's *city à la carte* have become more extended, mobile, and resistant

to synthetic analysis. The rise in individualism and the multiplication of lifestyles run parallel to changes in fiction generally and urban fiction in particular. What tends to remain in such a context is a highly personal, often decentered perspective. The mooring of individuals in a more collective locale (as opposed to very specific neighborhoods) is no longer what takes precedence in the world-views of fictional protagonists. This is one reason why more recent studies of urban fiction tend to be more culture-sociological than literary-critical.

Shifts in Representational Strategies

Transformations in the representational strategies of cultural producers, whether at the level of narrative media, literary aesthetics, or the social background of text producers, have further strengthened the aforesaid processes. The first thing to note here is how the documentary function of literary prose appears to have been taken over largely by the audiovisual media and written journalism, in which urban settings predominate. The success of new audiovisual media is crucial to this process. The demonstrative and immersive qualities of the visual and acoustic senses are such that literary descriptions cannot match them for sheer experiential impact and immediacy.

Within the field of written descriptions of urban environments, the revelatory documentary role of novels has arguably also declined. In today's information society, the synthetic documentary role that could still be assumed by a nineteenth-century writer such as Dickens has been taken over largely by academics (sociologists, geographers, ethnographers, anthropologists, historians). This shift in written representations of city life is further strengthened by the blooming postwar industry of urban magazines, which offer their own mix of visually enhanced investigative journalism, short stories, sketches, columns, and semi-sociological lifestyle analyses that frequently offer the same ingredients as the earlier writings of novelists. The only major kind of literature to preserve its documentary relevance about urban environments is that of popular fiction—in particular, crime fiction.

Simultaneously, it would appear that the ambition of nineteenth-century realist writers to represent the city in a totalizing manner as the embodiment of

modernity has both waned and been displaced. We can observe a shift in the course of the twentieth century toward a more selective representation of urban culture. Thus, the novels of Hanif Kureishi, Salman Rushdie, Iain Sinclair, and Sarah Schulman—the main literary case studies in Brooker's *Modernity and Metropolis*—all suggest that local communities and restricted areas are the material contemporary writers most like to work with. In the works of Zola, Dreiser, Joyce, Döblin, or Dos Passos, by contrast, would-be heroic attempts were still made to describe the city as a historic totality.

The antitotalizing tendency is also in evidence when we scan contemporary fiction set in non-Western cities. Many Asian, Latin American, and African novels confirm how the heydays of the modernist urban novel are over. Such works, too, frequently focus on everyday social realities in the city and the resulting cultural identities of urbanites. In so doing, moreover, they often stage an interesting tension between the sense of the city imported from the West and more local traditions. Urban representations in the works of Yukio Mishima, Kazuo Ishiguro, and especially Yoshikichi Furui combine Western liberal sentiments about the city with themes almost exclusively connected to Japanese culture. In recent Chinese literature, the confrontation often assumes the guise of a skeptical problematization or even downright condemnation of urban living conditions. And in contemporary Hispanic American fiction, the city regularly appears as a derailing, overpopulated, violent environment that leaves its characters struggling with the forces of globalization.

Apart from the changing treatment of setting and characters, some further aesthetic transformations seem to have killed off the monolithic urban novel. A lot of mainstream Western novels depict today's urban world as, above all, a textual realm of signs, a world dominated by the simulacra of information and communication technologies and by objects of conspicuous consumption. Such texts suggest that, to many writers, the distinctive characteristic of city life is no longer its modernity but its postmodernity. Typically, postmodern authors concentrate on the artificial and fabricated quality of their personal confrontations with the social world. Their city is first and foremost an abstract, semiotic world, not the empirical city as such appears to be the challenge for the average postmodern author, but the

fictional constructs which we use in trying to comprehend the urban world of simulacra and the mediatized global village arising from our urban condition.

In many ways, the ideological soil of the classic urban novel appears to have dried up since the interbellum. While realism in its documentary and historiographic modes was the dominant literary trend between 1850 and 1930, it has become less hegemonic since the success of the great modernist writers. Western postwar fiction is no longer principally interested in the opposition between utopian and dystopian perspectives on the modern industrial city but rather in issues like the hyperreality of our postmodern condition, the representation of a decentered subjectivity, and various forms of epistemological and linguistic skepticism.

Much of the skepticism toward universalizing scenarios has to do with the way in which the literary field has become more democratically representative as a result of social emancipation and education processes. For writers and readers alike, membership in specific social groups has come to seem more important for their self-identification than the coincidental metropolitan locale in which life stories happen to be set. The White middle-class heterosexual male author whose totalizing vantage point tended to monopolize earlier urban fiction has been effectively contested. Both writers and readers have become more aware that perspectives on metropolitan life are always gendered and inflected by class, race/ethnicity, age, sexuality, and country of origin. This enhanced sensitivity has produced a greater variety of urban narratives, sometimes explicitly tailored to different "niches" in the market. It is also responsible for the more selective, politically self-conscious approach taken to fictional representations of the contemporary city by scholars like John Clement Ball and Carlo Rotella, or for retrospective corrections on our understanding of modernist urban fiction in the studies of Barta, Donald, Highmore, and Wirth-Nesher. To such critics (a majority today), the encompassing intellectual and literary project that was out to condense modernity in the form of the city has come to seem suspiciously reductive and should be supplanted by more localized, theorized, and political forms of knowledge.

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See also Dickens, Charles; *Flâneur*; Social Production of Space; Urban Culture; Urban Life

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itself is a result of different levels and conceptions of urban planning that have developed over the last half-century. Even the prefix “urban” (or “urban and rural”) is one of several that have been employed to describe this activity. Thus, 50 years ago, the term *town and country planning* would have been more common, although even then the term *city planning*, or *city and regional planning*, was preferred in the United States and some other countries. Sometimes the term *land-use planning* (or *land-use and transportation planning*) has been used to describe the same activity, as has the term *environmental planning* or, more recently, *spatial planning*. In contrast to many other, better-established disciplines, this proliferation of terms to describe the discipline of urban planning is symptomatic of a certain lack of focus, or agreement, as to what exactly this discipline is about. A helpful way of getting a grip on the nature of urban planning is therefore to recount the different conceptions of it that have developed over the past half-century.

Urban Planning as Urban Design

Some 50 years ago, urban planning—or “town” planning as it was then more usually called—was seen largely in physical terms, that is, in terms of the layout and design of urban form—its buildings and other physical structures, and its spaces, including roads and other lines of communication. To be sure, urban planners of this time acknowledged that the buildings and spaces of urban areas were themselves centers of activities in urban areas and thus of different kinds of land uses and the interconnections between them; hence the occasional use of the term *urban land-use planning*.

Yet, in spite of this, the overwhelming emphasis was on the physical layout and design of urban areas. Urban planning was thus virtually synonymous with urban design, and the making of “master plans” showing the disposition of main land uses and the layout of built form was the main instrument of urban planning and therefore the main focus of an urban planner’s training. Given this emphasis on physical planning and urban design, the people who seemed most qualified to undertake urban planning at this time were assumed to be architects, or civil engineers, for they were already trained in the design of the artifacts of the

URBAN PLANNING

Urban planning has become a difficult discipline to define precisely because of its eclecticism, which

built environment. Accordingly, 50 years ago, most urban planners were architect-planners or civil-engineer planners, and, in Britain, the bodies representing the professions of architecture and civil engineering resisted the recognition of a separate professional body for urban planning on the grounds that their own professions already dealt with this activity.

This “architectural” conception of urban planning has been largely superseded or, at least, come to be seen as just one part of urban planning. Yet the physical design view of urban planning still lives on in some countries of the world, and it also persists in much of the public’s perception of urban planning, as is shown by the fact that, when programs on urban problems and planning are broadcast on television or radio, it is usually leading architects, rather than people directly trained in urban planning, who are called upon to pronounce on the issues.

Systems Analysis and Rational Action

It was precisely the emphasis on the physicality and design of cities that contributed to much of the insensitive urban planning that took place in the post-World War II era in Europe and North America. Faced with large industrial cities containing a large legacy of poor, working-class housing, often mixed up with heavy polluting industries, and lacking green open spaces for recreation and visual relief from the gray monotony of uninterrupted built form, urban planners embarked upon the drastic redevelopment and renewal of urban areas by demolishing huge swathes of working-class housing and inner-city industrial areas, and replacing them with massive modern architectural schemes of high-rise housing, new office and shopping developments, and new urban motorways to accommodate the rising use of the motor vehicle as the main means of urban transport. What was lacking in this “clean-sweep” approach to urban planning was sensitivity to the existing social and economic life of old industrial cities, so that, in sweeping away the physical slums, urban planning simultaneously swept away vibrant communities too, with their richly faceted cultural and economic life. By the early 1960s, the disastrous effects of this kind of urban planning came to be recognized and criticized, nowhere more trenchantly

than in Jane Jacobs’s seminal book *The Death and Life of Great American Cities*, published in 1961. Echoing many other critics of contemporary urban planning, Jacobs’s main charge was that urban planners did not properly understand the cities that they were so dramatically replanning, precisely because they had not first studied or understood the life of real cities but were, instead, guided primarily by modern architectural visions of “the city of the future,” such as those of Le Corbusier, which advocated a radically new physical layout and form for the city. In other words, it was the very emphasis on the physical form and design of cities that was central to the physical design conception of urban planning that had led the rich social and economic life of cities to be overlooked.

It was against this background that, in the 1960s, two alternative conceptions of urban planning emerged. One of these—the systems view of planning—focused on the very thing that urban planners were accused of having ignored or inadequately understood, namely, the environment that they were engaged in planning. According to urban systems theorists, cities should be viewed as functioning systems of interconnected people and activities, from which it followed that urban planning should be viewed as a form of systems analysis and control—that is, an activity that should, first of all, seek to understand how urban systems are functioning and then intervene to improve, and ideally optimize, their functioning. Here, then, the emphasis was on understanding cities prior to interventions to plan them, and the kind of understanding required was primarily of the social and economic life of cities that had hitherto been lacking in urban planning thought and practice.

The second innovation in urban planning thought in the 1960s was to view urban planning as a continuous, ongoing process of intervention in the control of urban systems, rather than as a one-off exercise in producing “end-state” master plans. This “process” view of urban planning was coupled with a model of planning, borrowed from decision theory in management science, that viewed urban planning as a methodical step-by-step process of rational decision-making and action, involving the identification of urban problems (and hence urban planning goals), the identification and evaluation of alternative plans or policies to

address these problems, the implementation of preferred plans or policies, and then the ongoing monitoring of the effectiveness of implemented plans or policies and, if necessary, subsequent repetitions of this process to refine or revise the original plans or policies, or to address newly emergent problems.

Together, the systems and rational process views of planning marked a radical departure in urban planning thought from the traditional physical design conception of urban planning, and this shift was marked by a recognition that, now, what was required for good planning was, above all, a rational analysis of urban problems and strategies to address them, grounded in a social scientific understanding of cities and their regions. Accordingly, by the end of the 1960s, urban planning was being viewed more as a science than an art, and this implied, in turn, that the most appropriate qualification for urban planning was a training in the social sciences, or in social and economic geography, rather than in architecture or civil engineering. Consequently, from this time onward, urban planning professionals were increasingly recruited from, and qualified in, disciplines such as sociology, economics, and geography. As a result of more recent concerns about the impact of human action on the natural environment and the aspiration to promote environmentally sustainable development, to these have been added the disciplines of environmental science and ecology. To be sure, the old model of urban planning as master planning and urban design retains a place within this now-enlarged conception of planning, but it is now largely confined to “action areas” within cities where wholesale physical reconfiguration and development are imminent or deemed appropriate. Here, in what often become high-profile sites of urban planning, the master planning and urban design aspects of urban planning assume their rightful and still important place.

Urban Planning as a Political Activity

The mistakes of post-World War II urban planning not only provided the seed-bed for the emergence of the systems and rational process views of urban planning but also to urban protest campaigns and movements opposing the drastic and unsettling destruction of urban localities to make way for

high-rise housing developments, noisy urban motorways, faceless office and shopping centers, and so on. It was from such protests that another view of urban planning emerged, which saw urban planning as a form of social and political action, governed by particular value judgments about the ideal urban environment, rather than a purely technical exercise in rational and scientific analysis.

With its emphasis on the scientific understanding of the environments to be planned, the systems view of urban planning had implied that “solutions” to urban problems were a matter of correct scientific and rational analysis. The frequently expressed aspiration of urban systems theorists to optimize the functioning of cities was telling, for it implied that cities could assume a single ideal functioning state and that the purpose of urban planning was to identify this optimal ideal and then propose interventions to reach it. Thus, in spite of their radically contrasting conceptions of urban planning, the systems theorists shared an essentially technical view of urban planning with the architect master planners of old. The only difference was that, by the 1960s, views about the required technical expertise had shifted to the terrain of social-scientific (and later, also ecological and environmental) understanding rather than architecture and urban design. The view that urban planning is necessarily a value-driven political activity thus challenged both of these earlier conceptions of urban planning. Indeed, it brought into question the idea that urban planning is an activity requiring some technical expertise, and thus it also challenged the idea that urban planning is, or could be, a “profession.”

The perception that gave rise to this political view of urban planning can be summarized as follows. First, what counts as a good urban environment—and hence what counts as good urban planning to achieve this environment—is a matter of value rather than fact. Second, environmental values are not matters of professional expertise, for an ordinary member of the public’s view of what constitutes a good environment is as legitimate as any professional planner’s view of the same matter. Third, environmental values may vary from group to group in society, according to their varying attitudes, beliefs, preferences, and interests. Accordingly, fourth, in assessing plans or proposals for urban environmental change, what

values should be given priority, or how different values should be balanced against each other, is a matter that—in a democratic society at least—should be openly debated and resolved politically rather than left to professional experts. Ergo, fifth, urban planning decisions, either about general urban plans or about specific development proposals, are matters of value and political choices, not matters of technical expertise.

Urban Planning in a Liberal Market Society

In liberal capitalist societies, in which there is private property ownership, exchange, and development (whether by individual homeowners or large-scale property developers), the ability of government, through public sector urban planning, to achieve publicly agreed upon goals depends not just on plans for and statements of those goals by government planning authorities but also on the willingness of private property owners and developers to undertake the necessary development to realize those goals. For, in liberal capitalist societies, the economic power and resources required to undertake the development needed to realize publicly agreed upon goals lie largely in the hands of private property owners and developers, not with government planning authorities.

These facts about the socioeconomic context within which state urban planning operates came to be more sharply realized in the 1970s when, alongside the unpopular urban development plans and proposals that *had* been realized, it also became apparent that many desirable government plans and policies often *failed* to be effectively realized, and not just because of deficiencies in the public resources required to make good those plans, but also because of a lack of development initiatives from private sector developers. As two American writers, Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, pointed out in their seminal text *Implementation*, published in 1973, many public sector plans and policies failed simply because they failed to be implemented. Urban planners in the Western capitalist world were thereby reminded that the urban planning systems that had been established in most Western liberal democracies after World War II had not *replaced* the liberal

market system of property ownership, exchange, and development (by, e.g., the nationalization of land and development companies) but had, rather, been given only the power to influence and *regulate* this market system through being granted the power to make urban development plans and then control development proposals through granting or refusing planning permission. To be sure, these powers are not to be underestimated. But equally, where public sector plans and policies depend for their realization on the compliance of other private sector actors and agencies, and that compliance is not forthcoming because the development required to realize the plans is not profitable to those actors, then—as Pressman and Wildavsky showed—those publicly endorsed plans and policies could go unimplemented, or be implemented in ways that disappointed the lofty aspirations contained in them.

It was against this background that urban planning theorists and practitioners in the 1970s came to realize that, to achieve more effective implementation of public plans and policies, urban planners had to work cooperatively *with* the prevailing market system and private sector developers rather than against them. And this, in turn, required urban planners who possessed not only an understanding of private sector developers and development economics but also the interpersonal skills needed to contact, communicate, negotiate, and form cooperative partnerships with developers and other relevant actors in order to secure the best urban development “deals” for the public.

All this brought yet a further perspective on the nature of urban planning, for now the effective urban planner was seen, increasingly, not only as a professional planner and policymaker, but also, and equally, as a person whose job it was to manage and negotiate the realization of plans. In other words, he or she had to be someone who could initiate and take effective action, just as much as someone who could make good plans. So, from the late 1970s onward, the activity of urban planning came increasingly to be seen as an exercise in the effective management of urban change, rather than the centralized direction of it through grand plans and policies. And hence the key skills of the urban planner came to be seen as ones of good management, communication, and negotiation, as

well as (or even rather than) the creative skills of planning and policy making. The old idea of the town planner as someone who literally plans towns by making urban master plans had thus given way to a view of the urban planner as someone who possesses the skills to manage and facilitate the process of arriving at agreements and decisions to bring about urban change and development in ways that are simultaneously publicly desirable and privately feasible to those possessing the power to undertake urban development. In the language of one of the dominant planning theories of the past 25 years, urban planning had come to be seen increasingly as a form of “communicative action.”

Urban Planning: A Complex Practice

This review of changing conceptions of urban planning over the past 50 years has shown that urban planning is a complex and multifaceted activity comprising, as it does, an attempt to understand and manage the complex and ever-changing world of cities in ways that gain the approval of both elected politicians (and through them, the public) and those who hold the power to build and thereby effect urban change and development. Some 50 years ago, to say of someone that he or she was an urban planner (or more usually, then, a “town” or “city” planner) suggested a person who literally planned cities or, at least, large areas within cities, and did so by creating master plans for their future development. Now, although master planning and urban design have again found their place within urban planning in areas where new urban development is taking place, the overall activity of urban planning is such that few urban planners literally plan cities themselves. Rather, as this review has made clear, urban planners seek, at best, to manage the development of cities in ways that balance competing (and often conflicting) demands and interests. Additionally, urban planners are nowadays increasingly responding to a further pressing concern, namely, to ensure that cities develop in ways that will not, in the long term, irrevocably harm the earth’s natural ecology on which humanity depends for its continued survival.

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See also Sustainable Development; Urban Design; Urban Theory

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URBAN POLICY

Urban policy is the cluster of initiatives that are intended by public authorities (government, partnerships, single-purpose agencies, nongovernmental organizations, foundations, and others) to have an impact on how people live in urban areas. What counts as urban policy has varied over time, the definition of urban areas has changed, and what makes urban policy distinctive (i.e., separate from architecture, urban planning, and housing policy) has also been in flux. Urban policy has a long history and has played a significant part both in defining how urban areas and cities are viewed by governments and in the remaking of social and welfare policy over the past half-century.

Some commentators have been inclusive, suggesting that every initiative that affects urban areas should be understood as urban policy. This is helpful in confirming that a range of policies may have (sometimes unintended) consequences for urban

areas, and it reinforces the need to take a comprehensive view. However, it also makes it impossible to identify any distinctive area for analysis because, in practice, almost every aspect of public policy has an impact on urban areas. In other words, instead of offering a workable definition of urban policy as a policy practice, such an approach leaves us to analyze all public policy in terms of its impact on those who live in cities.

Other commentators have sought to delimit the scope of urban policy. One approach defines the urban through collective consumption, that is, state spending on social reproduction (the development and maintenance of the labor force). This approach stresses the vital role of urban areas in providing for everyday life and the necessary social infrastructure—housing, social services, public transport, education, health services—to support it. However, it excludes aspects of what are generally understood as urban policy initiatives, such as those that relate to urban and neighborhood regeneration, and includes others that are not specifically urban. There is also a danger that by effectively defining the urban through state policy, the process becomes circular. Again, there is no distinctive space of urban policy, because all policy associated with social reproduction is taken to be urban.

Urban policy can also be defined through the role of cities as growth machines. Such an approach emphasizes the extent to which urban policy is focused on generating value from property development and can be extended to the drive to build urban competitiveness through a range of initiatives, including place marketing and the attempt to support particular targets of economic development from factory units to creative and knowledge industries. Whereas this approach highlights important aspects of urban policy, it downplays the significance of collective consumption or community-based initiatives.

The only shared distinguishing feature of urban policy is that it is area based. In other words, whereas other forms of social policy focus attention on particular client groups (e.g., the poor, children, tenants, patients), urban policy focuses attention on particular areas (even if they are associated with particular groups, e.g., African Americans, minority groups, or migrant populations). The size and nature of the areas, however, have varied significantly depending on the time

period and national policy context. So, for example, urban policy has at times been focused on inner cities and at other times on public housing on the edge of cities. Sometimes the concern has been with the slums, sometimes with the management of the suburbs. Sometimes areas have been narrowly defined in terms of neighborhoods or delimited zones, and sometimes emphasis has been placed on whole cities and even city regions. In each of these policy moments, the nature of urban policy has varied. At different times, urban policy has included housing, incorporated forms of urban planning and design, focused on community, involved area management, emphasized the management of crime and disorder, and fostered economic and property development.

Although it is easy enough to develop a working definition of urban policy, it is more difficult to authoritatively determine what is in and what is outside this policy arena. This uncertainty or flexibility is what makes urban policy such an interesting if elusive object of study. Because of its marginality to mainstream social policy, it is possible to use it as a prism through which to view the changing nature of social policy. The changing priorities and emphases of existing urban policy also reflect the various ways in which cities are understood at different times and in particular places.

Urban Policy and the Remaking of Social Policy

The complex lineage of urban policy can be traced back to nineteenth-century concerns about the cities and their development, which also fed into the wider development of welfare states and into the profession of urban planning. However, urban policy emerged as an identifiable trend within social policy in the mid-1960s, in the context of the War on Poverty, and in the wake of the civil rights movement in the United States. Its contemporary identity was framed by the urban riots or rebellions that spread through U.S. cities later in the same decade.

At that time, U.S. urban policy had an ambiguous status. It offered formal recognition to the African American populations in the cities, bypassing existing structures of welfare and government bureaucracy and encouraging the development of community-based organizations. But the recognition

remained provisional, as the new urban policies were grafted onto existing welfare arrangements and bureaucracies. The initial spread of urban policy beyond the borders of the United States clearly picked up on this origin, so that, for example, in Britain the Urban Programme explicitly drew on the U.S. experience to the extent that its initial emphasis and justification involved migrant communities in Britain's inner cities.

In this early phase, urban policy was an attempt to extend the benefits of postwar welfare settlements to previously excluded populations (albeit with secondary status) at a moment when those settlements were already under serious challenge. Some of the ways in which the rise of urban policy would help to give shape to those challenges were already becoming clear.

The promise of urban policy is that it will move dramatically beyond the limitations of traditional social welfare and reach those who might otherwise be excluded. Those engaged in urban policy are expected to transcend the narrow professional and bureaucratic boundaries associated with traditional welfare provision. New professionals drawn from nontraditional backgrounds, whether rooted in community activism or other disciplines, it is claimed, will transform existing (state-based) relations of welfare. Equally important is the expectation that urban policy is (of necessity) holistic, in the sense that its focus is on all the factors that affect those living in a particular area rather than on one particular issue. From this perspective, practitioners need to be able to work with communities, businesses, and nongovernmental organizations. Strong community empowerment rhetoric, less about the delivery of services and more about enabling people to look after themselves, has always existed within urban policy.

The rise of urban policy, therefore, incorporated an implicit (and often explicit) critique of traditional welfare states. Aspects of this critique were often quite radical, drawing on traditions of community action. Urban policy also increasingly came to be inflected with and, in some ways, defined by neoliberal approaches to welfare after the welfare state. This found an expression in the shift through the 1970s and into the 1980s toward an economic definition of social well-being. The problem of the cities, particularly the older industrial cities and the industrial quarters of cities like

London, was viewed as the result of state regulation and planning controls that acted as major obstacles to development. Successful development often, if not always, property-led, was deemed to offer both new sources of profitability for business and a way out of marginalization for local populations. This was the era of enterprise zones, waterfront development, urban development corporations, and special employment zones.

Some of the features associated with the "economizing" of urban policy remain familiar today. But the economic turn has not simply usurped the previous emphasis on communities. On the contrary, although the role of communities may have been reinvented, visions of community retain a significant role in contemporary urban policy. Through a community focus, issues of moral authority and behavior are brought to the agenda. Crime, for example, is reframed so that the problem is the management of daily incivilities or anti-social behavior. Famously, it was suggested that an apparently minor failure to fix broken windows in a timely manner may prevent various forms of antisocial behavior because those broken windows imply to the criminally inclined that the area is not being cared for. In this context, a renewed emphasis on self-help and self-discipline, in which neighborhood organizations deliver the necessary improvement, has emerged. Through the notion of social capital, community has also become an economic issue involving trust and the casting of safe places as dependent on the right kind of people being attracted to them, so that economic, social, and individual prosperity may be delivered through forms of place marketing and real estate development.

In contrast to the ambitions of postwar planning projects that appeared to promise the rational reordering of cities in various ways, urban policy is rooted in an understanding of the world that stresses the need for more incremental (or organic) change. This has also been reflected in a range of settlement policies, that is, policies concerned with where and how people live in cities. As well as looking for ways of fostering or rebuilding existing communities, urban policy has increasingly looked for ways of building new communities, particularly associated with the rise of the new urbanism and what have been identified as sustainable communities. In some areas this process has effectively been privatized, albeit often with state endorsement, through the

creation of gated communities of one sort or another.

If the origins of contemporary urban policy are to be found in the trials and tribulations of welfare states and the urban spaces of the global North, then its present state is much more globally framed. This is reflected in what has come to be called the new conventional wisdom. According to this increasingly dominant policy understanding, the driving force of individual and collective welfare for those living in urban areas is to be found in the competitive success of the cities. Such success relies on the existence of good governance and an inclusive social and economic environment. In policy, this is translated into a clear set of understandings (expressed, e.g., in the publications of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development), which make it clear to the cities of the global North that unless they improve their competitiveness, they will be overtaken by the megacities of the global South, particularly those of India and China. Meanwhile in the global South, the World Bank and related institutions emphasize the need to draw on the entrepreneurial skills of slum residents.

In its contemporary formulation, urban policy highlights the way in which economic and social policy have become entangled so that they are considered mutually dependent.

The Urban in Urban Policy

The changing form of urban policy confirms the increasing centrality of space and place to the postwelfare world. Even if urban (social) initiatives continue to attract significant state funding, a focus on urban competitiveness redefines traditional services (such as education), which become aspects of the competitive process (e.g., by delivering the right sort of skilled workers), and also points to a particular way of understanding the urban.

Urban policy's origins lie in a fundamental understanding of the urban as a problem, whether as a site of racial conflict, inner-city decline, slums, industrial pollution, deindustrialization, crime, disorder, and threat, or as a symbol of alienation and lack of neighborliness. Some of these factors continue to resonate today. For example, in the United States an appeal to the urban agenda is often an attempt to return to policies focused on the needs of

the urban disadvantaged rather than the priorities of the suburbs. But the emphasis of urban policy in practice has shifted. In this context, cities are seen as cultural centers defined through iconic architecture and are expected to be centers of the creative and knowledge industries and the "drivers" of competitiveness. Instead of pulling down the slums and replacing them with modernist projects, it is slum upgrading that attracts attention.

Throughout the history of urban policy, the "urban" has been regularly interpreted and reinterpreted. Cities have been imagined and experienced as threatening dystopias in which the threat of crime, the end of community, the experience of division, and the symptoms of industrial decline come together in increasingly unpleasant ways. Those visions have been reflected and reinforced in urban policy. At the same time, cities have been seen in utopian terms, bringing together culture, interaction, and new forms of community, creativity, and investment to generate a new world of competitive success. Those visions, too, have been reflected and reinforced in urban policy. The ability to call on different ways of imagining the city has enabled urban policy to adapt to the ever-changing political, economic, and social qualities of cities.

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See also City Planning; Governance; Local Government; Metropolitan Governance; Urban Planning

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URBAN POLITICS

The study of urban politics brings together several disciplines to understand the governance and political development of urban areas. Although U.S. and European scholars have often drawn upon different perspectives and intellectual traditions, in recent years they have converged in response to an interest in the comparative study of urban politics.

Theoretical Approaches

Until the 1950s most scholarship on U.S. city politics was dominated by institutional analysis. This approach focused on formal administrative organization and the charters and laws pertaining to local governance. This perspective paralleled the teachings of the early-twentieth-century urban reform movement in the United States. The latter viewed city governance as primarily an administrative activity rather than a political matter. Although some political scientists took exception to this approach, most scholars assumed there was a broad consensus on political fundamentals in running cities and local governments. This conclusion led them to study ways of making government more efficient.

The behavioral movement in political science reoriented the study of urban politics during the 1950s and 1960s. This movement emphasized looking at groups and other informal influences on local government rather than legal institutions. Its key assumption was that politics and administration could never be separated and that the proper focus of investigation was power and political conflict. This led to community power studies in which investigators searched for methods and theories that could best explain who governed urban areas and how power was distributed. Elite theorists, such as Floyd Hunter, relied on social surveys and sociological models to study how power was concentrated despite the presence of formal democratic institutions. Robert A. Dahl and other pluralist theorists disputed this approach. Focusing on decision making as evidence, they contended that power was more decentralized than elitists claimed. Further, they argued that democratic institutions ensured sufficient organized

political competition to keep public officials accountable to the citizenry most of the time. Still other critics asserted that neither elite nor pluralist theories took into account “nondecision” activities whereby anticipated political pressures, cultural norms, ideologies, and other means that are not part of the overt decision-making process could restrict the political agendas that came up for debate.

Although the debate over community power was never resolved, it demonstrated that many kinds of social and political influences needed to be understood in order to adequately explain urban politics. Since the community power controversy, scholars have been intent on describing these diverse forces in a parsimonious way in order to shed insight on the nature of local politics. Critical of earlier researchers for their focus on only internal political influences in local politics, contemporary analysts seek to develop theories that treat the entire political economy of local government.

The Contemporary Debate

Paul Peterson, with his landmark study of 1981, *City Limits*, precipitated the political economy view. Peterson argued that cities must, at all costs, avoid redistributive services, provide basic services at an adequate level, and place the greatest possible emphasis upon policies that stimulate economic growth. Even the social health of a city, he claimed, depends on its economic prosperity: When the economy is growing, tax revenues increase, city services can be improved, donations to charitable organization become more generous, and the social and cultural life of the city is enhanced.

In Peterson’s view, local civic leaders cannot leave economic growth to chance. Unlike the national government, cities lack the authority to regulate immigration, currency, and the importation or exportation of goods and services. Cities occupy a specific space; if the local business environment is not pleasing to them, investors and businesses can go elsewhere. This drives cities to compete with each other to minimize taxes, avoid expensive regulations, and offer a variety of subsidies to businesses. Put simply, Peterson’s argument is that issues of growth and development are

severely constrained by the pressures of the marketplace.

This theory ignited a controversy among urban scholars that has not yet died down completely. Many took Peterson to task for his assertion that growth benefits everyone. Others accused him of ignoring the complexities of urban politics. The importance of local prosperity is likely to always be on the agenda, but politicians must also mobilize sufficient political support to remain in office; in other words, they must win elections.

In reaction, a literature on “urban regimes” offered a way of understanding the specific mechanisms by which the tensions between the marketplace and local democracy are managed. It argued that the two most powerful components of urban regimes include city hall—the officials who are most motivated by electoral concerns—and the city’s business elites. Governmental officials lack the resources to do much on their own. Likewise, the business community requires government to create and maintain the city as an environment for both investment and political stability. In this view, regime participants learn to work together to accomplish mutual goals; all are empowered in the sense that each of them can accomplish things that none of them working alone can accomplish. Nonetheless, business interests remain so important that many public policies are biased in their favor.

Many urban political theorists have now embraced the premise that urban politics and policy making involve a close cooperation between governmental and nongovernmental actors. Some critics, though, believe the regime notion lacks explanatory power and is not even a theory but simply a restatement of U.S. pluralism. The claim that a city hall–business coalition normally constitutes the core of urban governance also has been questioned. Critics point to matters of race, ethnicity, and immigration as crucial features of urban politics in America. They fracture cities and metropolitan areas, altering political conflict. Others have observed that the culture wars over social issues that have become important in national politics also have penetrated local communities. Local governments can sometimes become just as preoccupied with the task of maintaining social order as with economic priorities and the building of business cooperation.

Comparative Perspectives

Comparative perspectives now assume greater importance in the study of urban politics. This was not always the case. European urban scholars usually developed approaches to local politics that were quite detached from the work of U.S. researchers, whose models of local politics often made assumptions that could not be easily extended beyond the North American political environment. For instance, the greater centralization of government and the large size of the public sectors found in Western Europe have little parallel in the U.S. political order where federalism and a more limited government reign.

European students of urban politics also have been more informed by sociological and political theories of great multidisciplinary scope compared to their U.S. counterparts. Some leading perspectives include those derived from neo-Marxist and other radical traditions, such as postmodernism and neo-Weberian analysis (related to the German sociologist Max Weber). Other approaches are based on organization theory, urban geography, communications theory, as well as applied traditions, such as planning and public administration. These approaches generally have had limited influence on the study of U.S. urban politics, which remain more bound to behavioral traditions.

Since the 1990s, however, comparative study has grown in response to an awareness of global influences on local politics. Economic globalization and the emergence of interconnected cities playing specialized roles in the world economy have been of particular significance. So far, most comparative studies of U.S. and Western European cities have been fairly limited in number, scope, and theoretical rigor, however. They frequently involved only Anglo-American comparisons. Yet in recent years more ambitious and systematic comparative analysis is evident, including U.S. studies reaching to the non-English-speaking world. One study by H. V. Savitch and Paul Kantor of cities in North America and Western Europe proposes a comparative theory of urban development policy. It describes how cities draw upon particular bargaining advantages and disadvantages—some derived from economic circumstances, others from political and social resources—to influence the capital investment process. It concludes that local politics is a key factor in determining where a city is headed economically.

Historical Perspectives

The governance of U.S. cities has always required urban leaders to nurture and promote local prosperity and at the same time to manage the conflicts that inevitably arise from the racial, ethnic, and social diversity. These two imperatives have always constituted the mainsprings of U.S. politics, and they explain why certain issues are so enduring in U.S. urban history. The logic of the marketplace treats cities as locations for private economic activity—commerce, industry, finance, land investment, and jobs. By contrast, the political logic of democratic institutions motivates public officials to maintain and expand political support for what they do; otherwise, they do not remain in office for long. Elected officials must pay attention not only to issues of prosperity but also to *governance*. How economic and political logic interact in urban governance has changed during the course of U.S. history.

Mercantile Politics (1787–1860)

From the founding of the United States until the 1860s (and in many cities much longer), patricians and commercial elites governed the cities with essentially one transcendent purpose in mind: to promote local economic growth. During this mercantile era the coalitions that governed cities regarded them mostly as instruments to promote private opportunity. Lacking a significant economic base for undertaking social programs, or even many ordinary public services, also discouraged wider political agendas. The fate of individual cities—and the prospects of the individuals within them—depended upon their ability to tie into a regional or national (and sometimes international) system of trade and commerce. As a consequence, urban elites engaged in an intense interurban competition; in addition to extolling their alleged economic and cultural advantages, they invested heavily in canals, railroads, and an infrastructure to support local commerce. Because federal officials were too divided by sectional interests to play a large role in urban development, this function fell to local and state officials. Local governments spearheaded the financing and building of transportation infrastructure that enabled a capitalist economy to develop in the United States by the mid-nineteenth century.

The Industrial City (1860–1940)

By the late nineteenth century the imperative of governance began to supplant the imperative of growth. Because a stable urban hierarchy of cities emerged in the industrial age, the mad scramble for economic supremacy gave way to the much different task of managing the political tensions of the industrial city. After the Civil War in the United States, industrialization led to explosive urban growth. Lured by the jobs in the factories, foreign immigrants poured into the cities by the millions. Universal suffrage for White males meant that the immigrants possessed a significant resource that could be used to transform politics. The immigrants' entry into politics ignited divisive political struggles for power.

A new generation of politicians mobilized the Irish and other ethnic voters by distributing petty favors to needy constituents and by manipulating the symbols of ethnic solidarity. City hall typically became the forum for making deals, large and small. This style of politics eventually became organized into boss-ridden political machines in many of the major cities. Machine politics prompted a reaction by upper- and middle-class interests which objected to the free-wheeling, often corrupt, practices of the immigrant politicians. Often led by Progressives drawn from professional and business classes, these groups launched an urban reform movement that achieved much influence by the turn of the century. Reformers pressed for election reforms and frequently succeeded with reforms in voting registration, secret balloting, at-large elections, and nonpartisan elections. In part they sought to make elections honest, but many of their proposals also were designed to reduce the influence of immigrant voters.

The Contemporary City

In the twentieth century, racial and social class division between central cities and suburbs became a defining feature of metropolitan areas. Throughout the twentieth century, the cities continued to serve as magnets for people escaping oppression and poverty and searching for jobs and opportunity. During and after the Great Depression and World War II, African Americans left the South by the millions and poured into the cities of the North.

Between 1940 and 1970, 5 million Blacks moved from the South to northern cities. At the same time, White middle-class families fled the cities to low-density, single-family homes in suburban subdivisions. By the 1970 census, for the first time, more Americans lived in suburbs than either in cities or in small towns and rural areas. During the 1980s and 1990s, population continued to sprawl in ever-widening suburban arcs around the core cities.

Postindustrial economic changes also decisively redefined the historic role of cities. Technological innovations in communications, the use of lighter materials, and greater ease of transportation, especially by automobile and truck, precipitated dispersal of people and jobs. In particular, businesses could seek lower-cost locations far from traditional industrial centers. These developments exerted a tremendously negative impact on the fortunes of older central cities. In the past the cities had been the engines of the national economy; now they were losing economic vitality and becoming the repository for the nation's social problems. This further precipitated attempts by suburban residents to insulate themselves from the problems of the cities.

Contemporary urban political leaders struggle for economic survival in a world where the global marketplace provides many advantages to foot-loose businesses. Although world capitals of finance such as New York City, attractive service centers like Boston, and newer cities in the Sunbelt region have prospered, many older urban centers have not. Rustbelt cities, such as Detroit and St. Louis, have failed to replace many declining older industries and they are losing population. Because businesses and investors often can go wherever they please, cities must compete vigorously for their jobs and dollars. As in the mercantile era, the urban public sector is again closely engaged with the private sector to draw private investment. Remaking the city as a place attractive to corporations, tourists, suburbanites, and people who work in cities is high on the political agenda.

The imperative of governance compels urban political leaders to seek popular consent while confronting complex social problems. Immigration again is altering the dominant issues and the political conflicts of central cities and even the suburbs.

Since the mid-1960s, the United States has been experiencing one of the heaviest periods of immigration in the nation's history. New ethnic groups from Asia, Latin America, the Caribbean, and Eastern and Central Europe now constitute a substantial and growing proportion of the residents of U.S. cities, and they are also moving to suburban areas. As the demographic character of metropolitan areas changes, local political agendas are also changing. New immigrant groups have distinct priorities and are beginning to mobilize in support of strategies that will give them a share of power. Much as in earlier times, new political agendas and conflicts are arising as public officials seek viable governing coalitions.

Paul Kantor

See also Community Organizing; Local Government; Regime Theory; Social Movements

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URBAN PSYCHOLOGY

What impact has city living had on its individual residents—one's inner personality, outer behavior, values, relationships? This is the central question of the relatively new specialty within social psychology since the 1970s, *urban psychology*.

Aristotle called humans the "political animal," innately drawn into a gregarious life within a *polis*, or city. Urban psychology empirically studies the

causes and effects of this little-understood force that draws humans together into cities. The entire history of *Homo sapiens sapiens*, across time and region, is urban migration—the ineffable shift from villages and towns into cities. Most recently, the twentieth century saw not only a near-quadrupling of the world’s population (from 1.5 billion in 1900 to 6 billion in 2008), but almost all of this flowed into cities populated by 100,000 or more residents. These cities grew in four ways: in number, size, density, and the percentage of population they contained. Technological advances in building materials and transportation now let cities grow vertically as well as horizontally, so cities can now attain unprecedented densities.

Impact of Cities on People

Each species has a naturally hard-wired size of its communities, usually numbering in the dozens or hundreds—packs of rats, gaggles of geese, prides of lions, herds of elephant. Only in some instances do social insects like ants or bees number in the tens of thousands. Similarly, for the first 98.8 percent of our 100,000 years on earth, humans’ primary community size was clans or tribes of a few hundred. Yet since the first city (London) topped the 1-million mark in 1800, we now see megacities of over 10 million as the likely future of humanity—far larger habitations than any other species. What impact has this shift from the “old” natural of 300 to the “new” natural of 10 million have on individual humans, as well as our species?

Impact of Growth of Cities on People

In the past century, an isolated handful of noted classics have offered concepts about the impact of city life on the individual. These include philosopher Ferdinand Tönnies’s book *Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft* in 1887, sociologist Georg Simmel’s lecture on “nervous energy” in 1903, sociologist Louis Wirth’s “anomic man” in 1938, and psychologist Stanley Milgram’s “stimulus overload” in 1970. In the 1880s in Prussia, Tönnies was witnessing the flood of migrants from villages into cities as isolated Prussian fiefdoms coalesced into the new nation of Germany. For Tönnies, villagers were sacrificing the warm familiarity of friends and neighbors for the cold unfamiliarity of city

life, moving from a personal “community of spirit” into an impersonal “community of reason.” In Berlin one generation later, Simmel’s lecture on the metropolis and the mental life introduced many new concepts to describe how large population size naturally accelerated the pace of life in cities, which led to all sorts of intrapsychic adjustments in urbanites: a blasé attitude, reserve, cosmopolitanism, and an objective spirit. In Chicago in 1938, sociologist Louis Wirth’s classic article titled “Urbanism as a Way of Life” portrayed city dwellers as high in *anomie*, a loss of individual identity, which superficialized all their relationships with strangers, friends, and even family.

But as a field, urban psychology originated in an eight-page manifesto by psychologist Stanley Milgram (1933–1984) titled “The Experience of Living in Cities,” which was published in the journal *Science* in 1970. This manifesto was distinct in several ways:

1. *Internal.* It saw a need to link external facts of city life (population size, density, diversity) with people’s inner psychological state, by proposing the novel concept of urban “stimulus overload.”
2. *Empirical.* Milgram went beyond anecdotes to propose an array of novel methods to empirically assess urban behavior; these methods included field and lab experiments, norm violation, observation, and surveys.
3. *Variable, not place.* Past psychologists saw the inner city as a *place* full of problems (e.g., poverty, filth, ignorance, violence, and homelessness); thus urban psychology was a synonym for social problems. In contrast, Milgram defined the city as a neutral *variable* that could impact individuals positively as well as negatively, so that the city is more than simply a cloaca of inner-city problems.
4. *Social.* The new specialty of environmental psychology also originated in 1968 in the same school where Milgram taught (City University of New York), but environmental psychology came to focus squarely on the physical environs—architecture, space, noise, lighting, and congestion. In contrast, Milgram’s focus remained exclusively on social factors—people’s relationships, cognitions, and interactions.

Contrast With Other Social Sciences

Within urban studies, urban psychology has an odd position among the other social sciences of urban anthropology, urban economics, urban history, urban politics, and urban sociology. Each of these is an established specialty, with its own college courses, textbooks, journals, and organizations of theorists and practitioners. Meanwhile, in the United States and elsewhere, psychology is in most ways the largest of the social sciences by far—in its number of students, faculty, organizations, even licensing of its practitioners—yet urban psychology in the year 2009 barely exists as a discipline, with no journal, organization, or degree program.

Though Milgram's 1970 manifesto on urban psychology quickly became a citation classic (cited more than 1,000 times by other authors), why did its impact seem to diffuse rather than expand? A few reasons seem clear.

1. *Milgram*. Urban psychology was only one of Milgram's many creative contributions to his field. When he died at age 51 in 1984, he had been teaching small doctoral classes averaging only 10 students, so he had few alumni to continue his distinct approach to urban social psychology.

2. *American Psychological Association (APA)*. Since half of the 84,000 psychologists in the APA were trained as clinical practitioners more than researchers, Milgram's own field of psychology did not adopt his approach. The APA commissioned a task force on urban initiatives in 1994, which issued in 2005 a report titled *Towards an Urban Psychology: Research, Action, and Policy*. This 100-page report contains just one sentence (on p. 15) citing Milgram's essay and focuses instead on cumulating research-based solutions to familiar inner-city issues: aging, socioeconomic status, poverty, violence, homelessness, drugs, HIV/AIDS,

mental disorders, and associated career opportunities for psychologists.

3. *Micro versus macro*. Not least of all, it appears that psychology's focus on the individual has caused it to eschew the mega-issues that attract other social sciences—such as climate change, globalization, urbanization, and political change. The APA Division 34, Population and Environment, has always been one of the smallest, with 351 (or 0.4 percent) of APA members. Like urban psychology, environmental psychology has ruminated about its dissipation in the 1990s—why more architects and urban planners are not seeking its research-based expertise on crowding, environmental design, and person–environment fit.

Theories of Urban Behavior

Urban psychologists have tested five very different theories to explain urban behavior: adaptation, situation, selection, S-O-R (Stimulus-Organism-Response), and subcultural (Table 1). For instance, compared with villages, the typically higher per-capita crime rate in cities can be explained in different ways, for example, that cities (1) cause residents to develop criminal tendencies (adaptation); (2) simply present more immediate opportunities for crime (situation); (3) attract more criminals to move from villages, while repelling noncriminals (selection); (4) push some toward criminality and others away from it (S-O-R); and (5) cause the formation of criminal subcultures that, in turn, promote criminal behavior in individuals.

Each of the five competing theories has research support.

1. Adaptation theory is supported by the field experiments of Milgram, David Glass, and others, documenting how the city's stimulus

Table 1 Five Theories of Urban Behavior

1. Adaptation:	The city environment produces long-term, internal changes within the individual.
2. Situation:	Urban behavior is a response to one's immediate, external environment.
3. Selection:	It is a certain type of individual who chooses to live in the city.
4. S-O-R:	The impact of the city environment on behavior depends on the type of individual involved. (Stimulus-Organism-Response)
5. Subcultural:	The city environment affects individuals only indirectly, through the formation of subcultures.

overload causes long-term adaptations within the individual.

2. Situational theory is supported by lab experimenters like Bibb Latane and John Darley, who identified a purely external explanation for bystander inaction during urban emergencies—that “diffusion of responsibility” naturally increases with the size of any group that witnesses an emergency, be it in a village or a city.
3. Selection theory is supported by archival demographers like Marshall Clinard and Leo Srole, who study the “selective migration” of people in and out of cities.
4. S-O-R, the least researched theory, is exemplified by the laboratory research of Chalsa Loo, who documented how the effects of crowding vary with gender: Women tend to become more withdrawn, whereas men tend to become more agitated.
5. Subcultural theory is supported by the research of its originator, Claude Fischer. His book, *The Urban Experience* (1984), documents how the size of cities allows a “critical mass” for the formation of all sorts of diverse subcultures and lifestyles which, in turn, impact individual behaviors. For example, the city does not directly cause people to collect postage stamps, but the city’s large size naturally increases the chance that its stamp collectors will find each other, form a club, and thereby promote their philatelic behavior.

Topics in Urban Psychology

Urban psychology uses empirical methods to better understand a wide range of topics, listed in Table 2. Examples of empirical research on these topics abounds.

1. About attitudes, survey research by Claude Fischer and others documents high rates of urban malaise and anonymity, more so in Western than non-Western megalopolises.
2. About behaviors, field experimental comparisons between cities and villages by Milgram, Robert V. Levine, and others document clear regional differences in behavior.

Table 2 Some Specific Topics Within Urban Psychology

- | |
|---|
| 1. Attitudes: malaise, anonymity, overload, stress, creativity |
| 2. Behaviors: prosocial, antisocial |
| 3. Values: faith, secularism, unconventionality, deviance, manipulation, pace, happiness |
| 4. Interpersonal relationships: with strangers, neighbors, friends, family |
| 5. Physical environs: noise, climate, architecture, land use, sanitation |
| 6. Social environs: crowding, density, congestion, privacy, mobility |
| 7. Health: physical, mental, spiritual |
-
3. About values, archival and survey research by Edward Banfield on “the unheavenly city” profiles the shift from faith toward secularism in cities.
 4. About relationships, survey research by Thomas C. Wilson documents the complex impact of urbanization on family relationships.
 5. and 6. About the physical and social environment, environmental psychology research in such journals as *Environment and Behavior* examines the impacts of crowding, noise, and environment on individual behavior and cognition.
 7. About health, survey and archival research by Barbara Dohrewend and Bruce Dohrewend documents how rates of mental disorder vary by city and town.

Paradox

A key theme permeating urban psychology is the striking inconsistency between people’s attitudes and behaviors. On one hand, Western culture continues to express a strong “anti-urban bias” that predates even Sodom and Gomorrah in the Holy Bible—that cities are crowded, polluted, crime-ridden, and unhealthy for body, mind, and spirit. At the same time, people “vote with their feet,” by continuously pouring from villages into cities worldwide, to the point of creating problems in both the overflowing cities they enter and the emptied villages and farms they leave.

Do non-Western and Western cities impact individuals the same way? This question of

culture is an unknown variable, because urban psychology is based so squarely in the United States. In 1997 the APA established a new division, International Psychology, which seeks to promote cross-cultural research by encouraging more behavioral research outside the United States. As the cities of East Asia and Africa grow faster than any others today, such a cross-cultural urban psychology can test this balance—how much individual urban behavior is universal across cultures versus specific within a culture?

Urban psychology research sometimes confirms popular wisdom about urban behavior—its faster pace, greater unhelpfulness, and stress. Yet it may also refute the common wisdom. For example, since the first surveys by Sutcliffe and Crabbe in 1963, researchers find friendships in the city are not fewer or more superficial than rural friendships but actually prove to be higher in quality as well as in quantity. Are cities of 10 million in the past 50 years a failed experiment or the inevitable wave of the future? It is now the task of urban psychology to test how such cities impact their individuals and, perhaps, are quietly creating a new type of human being in the twenty-first century.

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See also Simmel, Georg; Urban; Urban Life; Urban Sociology; Urban Theory

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URBAN SEMIOTICS

Urban space lends itself well to semiotic analysis. When we speak, for example, of a city's tone, its tenor and ambience, its discernible character, its distinguishing qualities, its skyline, its iconic buildings, or its history, we are making appeals to its semantic power. In other words, it has come to *mean* something. That this meaning is socially, culturally, and materially produced suggests that it is open to interpretation and analysis. As the codes and conventions generating meaning are the foundation of any semiotic analysis, scholars interested in exploring the city as a set of signs have put forward a robust set of analyses of the many signifying practices that make up urban space.

This configuration of the city-as-sign, as a text and context to be read, offers a range of different perspectives on the nature of urban space and practice. In this capacity, urban semiotics brings together different approaches to the study of signs in the city, drawing from film studies, media and cultural studies, geography, literary theory, urban planning, environmental psychology, architecture, art history, sociology, anthropology, and communication studies. Although urban semiotics does not exist as a well-defined subfield of semiotics, its varied expression in other disciplines suggests it deserves consideration as a useful approach to meaning making in the city in at least two distinct ways: (1) As a concept that can better frame the many aspects of the city-as-sign and signs in the city, urban semiotics can be used to examine the built environment as well as the multifarious nature of social life in the city. (2) As a critical tool, the study of urban signs can trouble naturalized readings of city spaces, to reveal ideological underpinnings of various sites and practices, as well as highlight the social production of meaning in and through city spaces. As a medium in which meaning is communicated in a variety of ways, from the more mundane wayfinding mechanisms of street signage to the powerful symbols attached to its history, the micro and macro scales at which

semiotic analysis can be applied to the city are as diverse as cities themselves.

Origins

The term *urban semiotics* was originally coined as the title of an anthology edited by Mark Gottdiener and Alexandros Lagopoulos. This collection offered an insightful statement regarding the study of signs in the city, but it periodized urban semiotics within a relatively narrow time frame. While it gathered together the writings of Roland Barthes, Umberto Eco, and Raymond Ledrut, among others, urban semiotics can be expanded to encompass a broader history. It gains some of its theoretical purchase from historical antecedents found in the work of Walter Benjamin who, for example, drew upon the writings of Charles Baudelaire and his experience of a changing Paris in the nineteenth century. The demolition and reconstruction of Paris under the auspices of Baron Georges-Eugène Haussmann highlighted the ways in which new meaning, and in particular urban governance, civil discipline, orderliness, and control, could be concretized through the use of statuary, the introduction of grand boulevards, parks, new building façades, and other potent symbols that this renovation was meant to signify. Ideology and power could be embedded in the structure of the city, it was hoped, through the imposition of a new kind of symbolic and material ordering of its streets and buildings.

The transformed face of Paris during the latter half of the nineteenth century provided Baudelaire the opportunity to begin reading the city as a text and context, where people, places, and images were charged with ever more intensity and complexity. The fixity and flow of urban life as he saw it engendered a number of responses, some positive and others negative. It was through his keen observations that the character of the city, and the characters in the city, could be made visible, the finer gradations of the social and spatial meaning of the transformed city made more palpable. As Baudelaire, and later Benjamin, noted, the desire to resemanticize urban space during this period was neither as totalizing nor as one-dimensional as those in power might have wished. New urban textures and figures begin to surface, while others were being erased or obscured. During this era of

massive urban renovation, for example, the street-level characters of the *flâneur* and the detective emerge. They become two iconic readers of metropolitan space and social life that appear with increasing regularity in real and literary form in the nineteenth century. Their attempts at understanding the inscrutability of the city lent it credence as a worthy object of knowledge. In both cases, the desire was to render it more legible, where the city was subject to their studied, detached gaze, a context newly enriched with meaningful signs that needed to be read and deciphered.

This new set of reading practices would be extended throughout the twentieth century, with new media forms underlining a deepening fascination with framing the city as a text, a material object, and a set of social practices. Film would provide a new forum, a nonliterary, visual medium where the city would take on new sets of connotations and associations. Through films such as *Berlin: Symphony of a Great City*, for which fragments of city life were reassembled into a montage of images and icons of the city as both a paean and critique of metropolitan life, new layers of meaning accrued to the image of the city. Other genres, such as expressionist cinema and film noir, came to look at the city as a place of menace and mystery, further adding to urban mythologies. Films focused on city life added a semiotic gloss to the urban mosaic and underpinned an understanding and imagining of urban space, stylizing the city in such an effective and affective way that new layers of meaning slowly accrued to it. The result was that the cinematic city became a dominant frame of reference for the city as sign. As a popular form of representation, it added, and continues to add, to the deep repository of images associated with city life.

Misreading the City

As the example of Haussmann's Paris demonstrated, the city can be a site in which spatial order is imposed, but one in which that ordering is never entirely complete. There are interstices (spaces between), which offer up challenges to the totalizing desires of those in power. More importantly, as a communication medium, the city offers a range of possible and deliberate misreadings. If, to borrow from Roland Barthes, the city has been predominately understood as a "readerly" text,

throughout the twentieth century there were numerous attempts to intervene in the semiotics of urban space in making it a “writerly” text. A salient example can be found in the mid-twentieth century. Inspired heavily by the Dadaists, in the late 1950s and 1960s the politicized aesthetic politics of the situationists made its presence manifest in a number of European cities. Using techniques such as psychogeography and *dérive* (“drift”), the situationists designed ways to lend the city new kinds of meaning. In their view, the city, through its spatial ordering and commercial privatization, had become a disempowering spectacle that alienated citizens from public space. For the situationists, disruptions of naturalized urban space were part of their everyday practice, fusing art and politics in a strategy meant to reenchant the city by lending it a new significance and meaning as a potentially liberating space.

In the contemporary city, many of these strategies have found new forms of expression. Street art, graffiti, and similar forms of urban intervention, for example, afford opportunities to consider ways in which resistance persists in the city. As a symbolic struggle over city space, street art serves a number of different purposes and can be read as part of a spectrum that includes territorial markings (tagging) and political commentary (graffiti or stencil art). Urban semiotics can be used to recognize this kind of deliberate subcultural sign making as a form of active interference directed at challenging the hegemony of certain representational practices in the city. Signs of contestation found in some street art offer challenges to an imposed and taken-for-granted social and spatial order. Its ability to interfere and undermine attempts to maintain the visual orderliness of the city appears more acute, for example, when city authorities attempt to contain or erase street art and graffiti. As semiotic gesture, street art offers an always in-flux, living commentary on public and private space in the city, an invitation to read the city differently, as an aesthetic as well as an overtly political space. That symbolic resistance, however, may be short-lived or muted. Cities such as Melbourne, Australia, for example, have recently recognized the value of street art and have allowed it flourish. It signals a turn toward revitalization of the city center through the added semiotic value of a lively subcultural life.

As cities such as Melbourne and others turn to marketing their (sub)cultural life, the image of the city gains another semiotic valence. The city as a site for scenes and subcultures such as these are often read as an index of a city’s ability to tolerate (or not) alternative practices. From gay scenes, to theater scenes, film scenes, music, club and bar scenes, scenes are used by everybody from fans to the media to city promoters as indicators of a city’s cultural value and diversity, what Doreen Massey has called its “cityness.” In describing the role of images such as these in terms of city life, Rob Shields has referred to both myths and place images as part of a city’s signifying power. Myths are the stories and narratives that are told as a way of lending meaning to a place, giving it a history through fostering the accumulation of images that act as a binding mechanism for locals and nonlocals alike. Place images are part of this process of mythmaking but can be used in different kinds of ways. Scenes, as examples of place images, are one register used to pit cities against one another in terms of their cultural significance. In this respect, place images play a significant role in establishing and maintaining regional, national, and global urban hierarchies.

The Trademarked City

Scenes, subcultures, and culture more generally, are useful ways to link certain signifying practices to the political economies of cities. In this capacity, the semiotics of cities can be expanded to include a reading of the economic factors underlying city marketing, as branded cities present another type of sign. If the city in the nineteenth and to mid-twentieth centuries epitomized the modern city as a center of production, which generated a different type of sign (e.g., of progress), the contemporary, or what is often called the “postmodern city,” as a site of consumption, brings with it a different order of signifier. As a number of cities have moved away from industrial economies and toward culturalized economies, there has been an emphasis placed on the lifestyle qualities of select cities, marshaling together urban stereotypes as a form of promotional shorthand. The selling of places frames cities as sites of consumption, relying heavily upon the semantic power of select signs, symbols, and their connotations as a means for

marketing. The postindustrial city has thus become characterized by a dense cluster of signs meant to signal its unique features, as a register of its cultural and symbolic capital. The commodity sign of the city is used to draw in tourists, artists, well-heeled immigrants, and investors: the city as sign for sale. As part of a strategy drawing upon history in the form of heritage myths, as well as making use of contemporary signifiers of innovation and creativity, the symbol making associated with the city-as-brand has come to serve as an important vehicle in a competitive global market that trades in urban distinction and differentiation.

Rhythm and Sound in the City

Recent work on signifying practices in the city has suggested that the analysis of time can be another approach to reading urban spaces. It is possible, using a semiotic framework, to chart the different temporal arrangements operating in urban space, bound up as they are in the meanings attached to places, people, things, and images in the city. The multilayered nature of time in the city, from personal biographies to the larger sweep of history, creates overlapping patterns and competing and complementary rhythms. Henri Lefebvre, in his writing on cities, introduced the notion of *rhythmanalysis* as a way of reading these different kinds of temporalities. Other scholars have made use of this concept to read the rhythms of urban mediascapes. Notable among these is research done on advertising in the city, which examines the ways in which the signs of advertising are organized according to the different temporal frameworks, what in advertising parlance is often called *dwell-time*, in the city. Ads found on commuting routes, for example, are structured differently than those found in advertising in public squares. The representational codes of advertising are attuned to the different temporal contours of the city and are to be read accordingly.

The rhythm of city life as understood by advertisers points to another way in which signs shape the experience of urban space: sound. As a counterpoint to the dominance of the visual in city design and living, the sonic aspects of urban life provide a significant array of meanings. Architects, urban planners, artists, and environmental

psychologists have explored the nature of the acoustic environment and framed it as an important aspect of how the city is understood and experienced. Soundscape studies illustrate how the city can be read, or rather heard, as bearing another kind of semiotic shape. This sound-based sign system is made up of a range of sonic signifiers, from unwanted sound in the shape of noise (traffic, construction), to ambient sounds (wind rustling in the trees), to the role of music as an instrument shaping encounters in the city (its use as a tool to attract or repel people).

Scholars working with sound in the city speak of listening to the city as a way of orienting one's self to space and to others. Sound, in all its forms, is used as a means for mapping out individual, as well as social, relationships in time and space. Numerous soundscape studies have also demonstrated the complexity of sound as a device put to different uses in the city, both affectively and ideologically. In this respect, the many sonic profiles of a given city provide multifaceted signs that need to be understood personally, socially, historically, and politically.

Sounds and images lend semiotic contours to city life. Their signifying power is important to the manner by which people make sense of cities in both intimate and profound ways. Urban semiotics, as these multiple approaches demonstrate, is not simply about reading the surface of the city to get at its depth. Rather, a semiotic approach to urban contexts offers varied considerations of the city as a communicative phenomenon. As these different perspectives also make clear, the manner in which meaning circulates, the spaces through which it flows and to which it becomes affixed, provide ample opportunities for rich semiotic analyses.

Geoff Stahl

See also Benjamin, Walter; Capitalist City; Cultural Heritage; *Flâneur*; Gottdiener, Mark; Lynch, Kevin; Other Global Cities; Society of the Spectacle; Social Production of Space; Urban Theory

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URBAN SOCIOLOGY

Urban sociology emerged in the nineteenth century in response to the unprecedented degree of population concentration produced by the Industrial Revolution. This subfield of sociology is distinguished within the body of general sociology by its focus on social phenomena that are identified with a particular spatial arena of action, that is, the city. The assumption that population concentration, in and of itself, had consequences for behavior and experience, gave urban sociology its unique character and eventually provided the basis for a series of critical challenges. Contemporary urban sociology embraces both constituents, what may be called the *ecological premise*, and the critical questions that have been raised regarding the adequacy of the urban form as an independent causal factor.

The City and Social Organization

The central assumption of the urban sociological tradition is that the size and density of urban populations exert an independent effect on social organization, with consequences for human experience and behavior. Premised as it is on the effects of the physical environment, the core of urban sociology is essentially a body of studies in human ecology. The work of Émile Durkheim and Max Weber illustrates the ecological premise.

Durkheim proposed that a certain level of local population density demanded a specialization of economic activity, a division of labor, in which each narrowly occupied specialist was dependent on all other narrowly occupied specialists to provide, in the aggregate, for the full range of human material needs. Citing Darwin, Durkheim reasoned that the same principle of specialization found in densely populated natural ecologies applied to human populations. The population concentrations that characterized the industrial order provided a new form of social integration, an *organic solidarity*. The organic form of economic interdependence replaced the *mechanical solidarity* of rural life, where the bond of the common shared experience of the peasantry had held community together (through what Durkheim termed *collective consciousness*). Thus, the urban form replaced

shared meaning with functional interdependence as the force that caused society to cohere, a transformation demanded by the social ecology of the new environment. Similarly, Weber devised a theoretical model of the city where the marketplace, an economic structure that provided a diversity of goods and services upon which inhabitants were dependent for a majority of their needs, was the central, defining factor of city life. In addition, his model included features of self-defense, political autonomy, and characteristically urban forms of association. Taken together, these distinguished the “true city” from other types of settlements. Whereas Durkheim and Weber associated cities with the potential for the material improvement of society, many nineteenth-century writers predicted that the urban future would bring about a weakening of the social fabric. These include the social philosophers Ferdinand Tönnies (*Gesellschaft* reflected the condition of isolated individualism) and Henry Maine (family *honor* was replaced by impersonal and individualized legal *contract* as the governing mechanism of social control).

Themes of urban social isolation and alienation were carried forward into twentieth-century urban sociology and were prominent in its most important works. Central among these were the arguments developed by Georg Simmel and Louis Wirth. Simmel made explicit the threat that the urban environment posed for psychological well-being. He argued that city people, habituated to the intensity of nervous stimuli that characterized life in the city, would have to withdraw emotionally from public life, a feature which he found reflected in the characteristic reserve and detached demeanor of the urban population. Additionally, the “money economy” attached particularly to urban forms of interaction, reinforced what he saw as a calculating hardness in urbanites. Wirth took many of the negative attributes that his predecessors attached to urban existence and developed a comprehensive cause-and-effect theory of what he called *urbanism*. The combined characteristics of the urban environment, which he identified as the size, density, and heterogeneity of urban populations, produced anonymity, withdrawal, confusion, aversion, and a sense of isolation and relative powerlessness. The entire complex, the elements of the environment and their social and emotional consequences, made up urbanism, a distinctive

way of life. The consistent theme within the tradition of urban sociology is that the urban condition is a powerful determining factor that gives rise to an identifiable set of social consequences.

One implication of urbanism was thought to be the loss of a highly idealized preexisting state of collective social integration, described in its ultimate form in Durkheim’s *mechanical solidarity* model of rural or village existence, a condition of mutual identity and common worldview. In the twentieth-century city, the cost of urbanism translated as the loss of community. However, soon after Wirth had developed his definitive pronouncement on the conditions of urban life, urban researchers employing participant methodologies were surprised to find that some districts in large cities were characterized by strong interpersonal ties and an equally strong emotional attachment to local space, that is, neighborhood, or community.

Challenging the ecological premise, researchers such as Whyte, Young and Willmott, and Gans demonstrated that a sense of community and strong ties among neighbors and extended family prevailed in such large cities as Boston and London, particularly under the modest economic circumstances experienced by the working class. Subsequently, Gans questioned the basis of the urbanism thesis, arguing that a variety of social patterns and conditions were evident among urban populations. In his view, if some categories of people living in cities suffered relative isolation and alienation, these had to do with their economic circumstances rather than some urban ecological variable.

From the mid-twentieth century through the present era the evidence for various types of communities within cities has continued to accumulate, revealing the many ways in which strong social ties may be forged and maintained there. Whereas many of these forms can be seen as defying overly deterministic claims that urbanism undermines the possibility for a rich localized social life, another argument maintains that urbanism (again, an ecological phenomenon) actually gives rise to a uniquely urban potential for the enrichment of interpersonal connection and social support. The argument finds its fullest development in Fischer’s subcultural theory of urbanism. This view emphasizes the potential for the sheer size of urban populations to provide sufficient critical mass to support a diversity of

interests and lifestyles, including those that are unusual, avant garde, and socially deviant. The dynamism of the combined diversities in the social environment of large cities provides encouragement that allows intellect, offbeat ideas, and subcultures to flourish, develop, and promote innovations that eventually diffuse and bring about cultural changes across society. To the extent that the concept “community” can be stretched to accommodate such groupings, this provides an example of what has been called, by Wellman and Leighton, “liberated” community, that is, a form of aspatial community freed from such concepts as “neighborhood.” The subcultural thesis appears to rescue the traditional ecological premise while standing the social isolation argument on its head: Instead, the larger the metropolitan population is, the greater is the potential for subcultures to flourish.

Spatial Organization of Cities

Although the evolution of ideas so far described may be said to be based on an essentially social-ecological premise (and responses to it), *urban ecology* has taken on another, narrower meaning within urban sociology. This narrower tradition has to do with analyzing the development of the spatial distribution of land uses within the urban environment. The assumption that provided the basis for the development of urban spatial ecology as a distinct subfield of inquiry is that urban environments are essentially arenas within which competitive forces work out a balanced distribution of land uses. The key characteristics of urban ecology include tendencies toward localized area specialization within cities, the central location of services and activities most in demand, the spatial influence of prevailing forms of transportation technology, and the dynamic process of change—invasion and succession—where the agents of one use take a district from another segment of the population in an ordered process of rational evolution. The underlying force that creates this natural order is an economic competition where interests with different levels of resources bid for land parcels based on compatible adjacent uses and other strategic factors (e.g., transportation facilities or markets). Heavy industries, financial districts, entertainment districts, the residential clusters of different social classes, and so forth, tend to take on, in city after

city, a rational spatial distribution vis-à-vis one another and the city’s center.

The most ambitious efforts to develop a universally applicable predictive model of land-use patterning are found in early twentieth-century work such as that of Burgess (concentric patterns of urban expansion) and Hoyt (radiating linear patterns of residential growth). The quest to discover a universal pattern lasted only a decade or two. The landmark work, generally recognized as terminating the search for a single predictive model, is that of Harris and Ullman. They concluded early in the period of metropolitan expansion in the United States that no general overall pattern was discernable. Cities sprawled outward, producing “multiple nuclei” of similar land uses in different places, influenced overall by unique features of local geography. Notwithstanding, there have been some continued efforts to define broadly generalizable metropolitan patterns along the lines of structural functionalist principles. Hawley, attempting to salvage something of the predictive principle of urban ecology, argued that researchers should remain alert to convergent spatial patterns that indicate an optimizing similarity among metropolitan areas. The study of urban spatial ecology has remained a specialized presence in urban sociology, more recently exploring relationships of regional domination and specialization among cities, raising questions of whether metropolitan sprawl adheres to some overall generalizable pattern (consistent with Hawley’s recommendation), and examining whether the *gentrification* (a form of invasion and succession) of old residential areas can be subject to generalized modeling. Overall, spatial ecology has a diminishing profile within contemporary urban sociology.

Contemporary Urban Sociology

The contemporary sociology of cities remains distinct in its traditional focus but shares an interest in nearly the full range of concerns addressed within general sociology. Social inequality, majority–minority relations, economic sociology, political sociology, and criminology are among the major issue areas that figure prominently within the subdiscipline. As these topics merge with urban sociology, they bring with them their own traditions, in terms of theories and debates, which sometimes have more

(and other times less) to do with urban environmental effects. To the extent that the subject in question—for example, differences in crime rates—can be shown to have an urban link (in this case there is a remarkably stable positive correlation between crime rates and city size in the United States), the accommodation of subject matter with the ecological principle is apparent. Connections between crime and the urban environment can be explored and articulated, potentially contributing to the legitimacy of the consideration of ecological principles for understanding behavior and at the same time contributing to the understanding of criminal behavior, in particular. In other areas of sociology, systematic connections between behavioral or organization phenomena and the urban arena may not be easily discernable, and modes of analysis may even be fundamentally opposed to the ecological premise.

Such a collision of paradigms occurred when political economists (particularly Marxists) turned their critical attention toward urban sociology in the 1970s. Led by Castells, critics alleged that it was a mistake to look to the ecological forces of cities to understand the fundamental features of contemporary life. For Marxists, the real structural basis of social arrangements and human experience are capital accumulation and class conflict. Capitalism is the dynamic force that created contemporary urban environments and that continually builds and rebuilds them according to strategies for capital accumulation. In the process, the cost of urban space is bid upward by the power of capital seeking to maximize profits. At the same time, households bid for urban space as a consumer good. Where classical spatial ecologists like Burgess looked for a harmony of interests in the working out of an ideal spatial arrangement, Marxists see the two great classes, capitalists and labor, as fundamentally opposed in the struggle for urban space. The conflict between capital and workers as consumers extends the endemic class conflict of capitalism to the city as an arena of class struggle. From this perspective, the fundamental premise of traditional urban sociology, its ecological premise, is called into question. The urban environment, with its features of stress and alienation in particular, is not a cause of these experiences. Instead, the city is at best an intervening variable, a particular form of “built environment,”

produced by the optimizing demands of efficient capital circulation during a particular historic phase of capitalist development. The real cause of stress and alienation is the structure of the underlying economy, not the environment it has produced.

Although the Marxist challenge to the ecological premise drew considerable attention in its time, it was most important for reinforcing a growing critical awareness within urban sociology that structural factors beyond the urban environment had to be considered for a complete understanding of events and conditions. As a consequence, a general critical perspective became incorporated into urban sociology: that of a diffuse (in most instances not Marxist) political economy, focused on broad market forces and policy making. Much of the emphasis in urban sociology today involves raising questions about the impact of society-wide and global processes on cities, whereas other work remains generally oriented to the impact of the urban environment as an independent causal factor, closer to the traditional perspective. The difference in these orientations carries powerful background assumptions that produce different analytical outcomes. For example, an effort to study growing inequality and poverty that is rooted in the study of deindustrialization in wealthy nations would produce an understanding of unemployment and poverty in old industrial cities based on worldwide economic change, the reconstituted international division of labor. It might point incidentally to expressions of futility and despair and day-to-day coping strategies among long-term unemployed workers in particular cities. On the other hand, a localized study of “way of life” or “moral community” in impoverished neighborhoods that had experienced a severe decline in industrial jobs in decades past could be drawn toward culture of poverty themes and might attend to the historical decline of local opportunities for employment as an exacerbating condition.

In an investigation of criminal activity, a work in political economy might be expected to emphasize the abandonment of high-poverty inner-city areas by all of the dimensions of the global economy except for the drug trade, leading to high rates of property crime and violence. A local investigation of high poverty–high crime areas might tend toward a social disorder or “broken

windows” line of analysis. Localized studies focusing on urban political power in the United States may well emphasize the emergence of minority political cultures that have produced gains in minority leadership in urban elected and appointed offices. A broader political perspective would emphasize the crisis of dwindling resources for these older central municipalities struggling to deal with problems of job loss, homelessness, crime, and education, at the same time that they are surrounded by affluent independent suburban political entities.

This comparison describes tendencies—there is nothing to prevent an ecologically oriented analysis from beginning with a broader political and economic context, or for a study of national or global patterns of the redistribution of opportunities to consider how problems are intensified by the local urban environment. But the contrasting tendencies arise from the initial impulse that orients the different modes of study, from natural analytical affinities that are produced by local versus global premises. The ecological premise of traditional sociology is inherently interested in locally produced ways of life, meanings, and behaviors. Some will continue to seek the answers to questions of social consequences within the urban environment; others will emphasize the effects that broader structural factors, particularly the forces of globalization, have on creating the conditions in those environments. Contemporary urban sociology combines both perspectives.

In an earlier era, the theme of “urbanism” was called into question as overly deterministic, not allowing for the variations in style and comfort level found among diverse urban populations. More recently, assumptions about globalization as an inexorable restructuring market force, with its attendant features of deindustrialization and economic decline for cities in wealthy nations, have faced the same charge of overdetermination. Critics argue that the globalization premise cannot account for why trends have not had the same impact in every city, or even adjacent cities with similar infrastructures and industrial profiles. Some cities follow the predicted pattern of industrial decline; others resist and prosper. This has led to a call for more empirical studies focused on local variables that might explain the observed differences. Giddens, in particular, has been effective in urging

social scientists to abandon theories of change that assume that human beings are powerless to resist the impact of structural transformation. He has posited the idea that the human capacity to understand and modify the impact of such forces, *human agency*, has been underestimated by social scientists. During the 1990s the response to this call for correction took the form of a reemphasis on local studies, the effectiveness of social movements, and the potential power of urban elites to resist and alter the effects of global forces. Meanwhile, the continuing massive restructuring of urban economies in tune with global change became ever clearer within social science, just as the rhetoric and policies of national and international political bodies reflected an attitude of inevitability that a new global division of labor was emerging. There was little that anyone, including those living in cities, could do about it—other than to adjust on its terms.

One of the major implications for urban sociology is that its object of study no longer represents an emerging frontier of social organization and human experience. It is even questionable whether the city can be considered an adequate unit of spatial analysis for a full understanding of changes taking place there. Early in the twentieth century Robert Park said that the “big story” of change that marked his time was to be found in the growing cities. Surrounding Park, a generation of urban sociologists sought to write the story of the city by following the ecological premise, a localist orientation. Today, urban sociology has developed into a much more diffuse body of study that includes an effort to understand the interaction between social processes occurring within the urban arena and much more broadly rooted political and economic forces. The ecological premise remains discernable as just one orientation within urban sociology.

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See also Chicago School of Urban Sociology; New Urban Sociology; Urban Ecology (Chicago School); Urban Geography; Urban Theory

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URBAN SPACE

The term *urban space* refers to the physical and social location of a metropolitan region, the properties of that location, and the spatial organization of the entities within it. It is, therefore, a broad and inclusive concept that has been addressed from a range of viewpoints. Many investigations of urban space, however, are primarily aimed at answering three interrelated questions: What does urban space look like? Why does it look that way? How is it navigated in everyday life?

The first question—what does urban space look like—seeks to understand the form of the city, that is, its shape and physical embodiment. Here, the focus can range from large-scale issues like expressway patterns to nuanced issues like the appearance of a streetscape. Often consideration of this question also turns to normative issues of how an urban space *should* look to yield a more efficient, attractive, or sustainable city. The second question—why does the urban space look the way it does—seeks to uncover the forces that are responsible for producing an urban space with a particular form. Answers range from the naturalistic, which emphasize ecological and market-based mechanisms, to the social, which highlight the roles of power and domination. The third question—how is urban space navigated in everyday life—considers the meanings and symbols that people attach to segments of urban space in order to make sense out of it. These might range from a highly individualistic sentimental attachment to a particular café to a widely agreed-upon neighborhood boundary.

The Form of Urban Space

In some ways, nearly all cities have a similar spatial form. For example, they tend to be denser at the center than at the edges, and similar people and businesses tend to cluster together into neighborhoods and commercial districts. But in many ways, different cities exhibit very different spatial forms. Renaissance cities like Florence, colonial cities like Adelaide, and planned cities like Washington, D.C., are walkable, whereas a car is a practical necessity in many newer American cities like Phoenix and Houston that flourished during the

automobile age. Cities like Chicago (e.g., the Loop), Moscow (e.g., the Kremlin), or London (e.g., the City) have a clearly defined center, whereas some metropolitan areas, like Los Angeles, have a more diffuse spatial organization. Others, like the Dutch Randstad, comprise multiple centers (e.g., Amsterdam, Rotterdam). Within cities, some streets have wide, tree-lined sidewalks with small shops and cafés, while others are uninviting corridors of brick and concrete. The form of large urban spaces like expressways and downtowns, as well as small urban spaces like streets and neighborhoods, play a key role in how a city works and how it is experienced.

For several millennia both the location and form of urban space were constrained by nature and technology. For example, early cities were located near water and productive land and were limited in size and shape by the practical dimensions of a defensive city wall or by the practical provision of food to their population. With improvements in production, transportation, and communication technologies, the form of urban space was incrementally liberated from these constraints and cities grew in a variety of ways. Ancient cities like Rome evolved a radial network of streets to connect existing, symbolic structures (e.g., the Coliseum and the Forum). Mexico City (e.g., Zócalo) and Bogotá (e.g., Bolivar Square), and later medieval European cities like Venice (e.g., St. Mark's Square) and Prague (e.g., Staroměstské Náměstí), developed around central plazas and piazzas that served as civic gathering spaces. Finally, planned or rebuilt cities like Chicago and Paris developed within more rigid grids and networks of streets. Most often, these elements of urban form blurred together to give particular cities their unique character. For example, while Lower Manhattan is the obvious center of New York City, Brooklyn and Newark also serve as centers within the same urban space. Similarly, while Manhattan is defined within a careful grid of east–west streets and north–south avenues, Broadway cuts across this grid as a vestige of a much earlier Native American urban form.

The design and management of these formal elements of urban space to maximize their efficiency is the primary concern of urban planners. Political and natural disasters occasionally present opportunities for prominent urban planners to

radically transform an urban space, as with Baron Haussmann's plan for Paris in the 1860s or Daniel Burnham's 1909 plan for Chicago. However, more often urban planners adapt the existing form of urban space to meet changing conditions. Zoning and transportation infrastructure are among the most significant tools available to planners to influence the form an urban space takes. Zoning allows the location of specific types of structures (e.g., residential vs. commercial) and activities (e.g., production vs. consumption) to be controlled, while transportation systems allow individuals and goods to flow smoothly through the city. Increasingly, attention has turned to using these tools to discourage low-density development at the edge of the urban space (i.e., urban sprawl) and to promote sustainability through high-density development and the repurposing of existing structures in the center.

In addition to efficiency and sustainability as key concerns in the form of urban space, aesthetic and quality-of-life issues are also significant. Landscape architect Frederick Law Olmsted recognized the importance of having parkland and other natural features incorporated into urban space, to provide city dwellers with opportunities for recreation and to serve as a counterpoint to the surrounding built environment. Others, including Jane Jacobs and William Whyte, discussed how even the built environment can provide an alternative to the impersonal and individualistic city when urban space takes a specific form. They emphasized the importance of small plazas and other public spaces where people can freely gather and socialize, and they stressed the role of diversity not simply among the residents but especially among the structures and activities of the city, which promote interactions among individuals and foster a more robust civic life. Thus, under the label of “new urbanism,” some have advocated a form of urban space characterized by small, walkable neighborhoods with both residential and commercial components.

The Production of Urban Space

Because urban space can take many different forms, much attention has been focused on the forces and mechanisms that govern the specific form it does take. Theories of how urban space is

produced have emerged from several different disciplines, with each taking a unique approach to the question. Economic explanations often focus on why cities so often look the same and seek to identify the common forces that lead them to have similar forms. The ecological approach, in contrast, emphasizes the differences among cities that result from competition for resources in a Darwinian framework. More recently, critical geography or new urban sociology suggests that these earlier perspectives neglect structures of power and dominance.

The economic view of urban space considers cities the equilibrium between two competing forces. Centripetal forces draw businesses toward the center as they seek economies of scale associated with proximity, and they draw people in as they seek greater access to the goods and services available in the city. At the same time, centrifugal forces push people and businesses away from the center as they seek cheaper land and less congestion. These ideas originated in the nineteenth-century work of Johann Heinrich von Thünen and culminated in William Alonso's bid-rent function, which suggests that the use of a particular location in urban space will be defined by its distance from the center of the space. Similarly, Walter Christaller's central place theory suggested that the characteristics of a city are a function of its size and its distance from other cities.

The ecological view also sees (the form of) urban space as the result of competing forces but relies on a biological metaphor that draws parallels between cities and organisms and emphasizes the role of competition and differentiation. Herbert Spencer and Émile Durkheim first adapted Darwinian thinking about the natural world to the social context, but in the urban context Robert Park, Ernest Burgess, and Roderick McKenzie formalized these ideas as the Chicago School of Urban Sociology. This approach suggests that the development of transportation and communication technologies bring individuals into more frequent and intense interactions in ever-denser urban spaces, thereby spurring a competition for limited resources such as land and jobs. This competition forces individuals to differentiate and specialize in narrower activities, leading to a finer-grained division of labor and land use. A similar process of competition and differentiation also occurs for

entire urban spaces, when cities specialize in specific activities to avoid competing with other cities. For example, the Silicon Valley region specializes in the manufacture of computer chips but not in the manufacture of potato chips, which must be imported from other cities specialized in agriculture and food processing. Of particular importance here is the notion that all cities occupy a system of cities within which they interact with, and are interdependent upon, one another.

Critical geography and the new urban sociology emerged as a response to the economic and ecological approaches, which were viewed as deterministic and not accounting for structures of power. Mark Gottdiener, Harvey Molotch, and Sharon Zukin have focused on the role of local political and business elites and, more generally, the role of local power structures in allowing specific individuals to maintain disproportionate control over the development of urban space. Others, like Saskia Sassen, have examined how the features of urban space are the result of a capitalist mode of production that stratifies individuals into ownership and labor classes with differing amounts of power, focusing especially on how globalization and the new international division of labor has had differential effects on major cities in developed (e.g., New York, Tokyo, London) and developing countries (e.g., Mumbai, Jakarta, São Paulo).

The Meaning of Urban Space

The complexities of urban space, its form and production, beg the question: How is urban space navigated in everyday life? Answering this question requires distinguishing the closely related concepts of "space" and "place." Space refers abstractly to a physical location and its contents, with urban space being simply a special case where the location is densely populated. Spaces become places when individuals assign them meaning and social significance. A city and a street are examples of spaces, existing only as material locations in the physical world, but New York City and Wall Street are examples of places, conjuring specific histories and identities. Thus, urban space is navigated by assigning it meaning and transforming the abstract aggregate into a mosaic of places.

The concept of "sense of place" refers to the character or essence of a place that results from the

meanings ascribed to it by individuals and groups. A neighborhood tavern where everyone knows your name might have a sense of place characterized by warmth or friendliness. Senses of place are not necessarily positive, however; an industrial district's sense of place may be characterized by isolation or even fear. Place attachment occurs when an individual's or group's identity becomes bound up in the meaning of the place, as when one identifies as a New Yorker or a Berliner. Spaces that are inauthentic reproductions of real or imagined places (e.g., Disneyland in California, Dracula's Castle in Romania) or that are indistinguishable from one another (e.g., shopping malls, airports) are often said to lack a sense of place, or to exhibit characteristics of placelessness.

Having a sense of place can also refer to being oriented to one's surroundings, not in terms of physical coordinates, but in social and cultural terms. Maintaining this sort of orientation requires the construction of mental maps of urban space, which organize places primarily by their roles in individuals' lives and only secondarily by their spatial locations. Thus, a city dweller's mental map of the areas around his home might include the produce market, bank, and coffee shop because they are part of a daily routine, but might ignore the location of the fire station or factory because they bear little relevance. Such a mental map of the area allows the efficient navigation of a highly complex urban space by focusing attention only on selected components and, at the same time, creates nuanced and idiosyncratic understandings of the urban space itself.

Although each individual's mental map of a particular urban space is unique, shared and collectively agreed-upon meanings can emerge that serve to define microgeographies, that is, segments of urban space that have recognizable identities of their own. Neighborhoods, for example, often have specific names and reputations among locals; they serve to organize patterns of social, cultural, and political activity in urban space. As an analogue to the ecological habitat of a species, such microgeographies serve as the fundamental unit in the ecological approach to urban space, with the most notable example being the definition of 75 community areas in Chicago by researchers at the University of Chicago. In some instances, neighborhoods become so closely associated with a particular

group, product, or activity that their identity is elevated to the status of a "brand," recognizable even to nonlocals. The meaning of such urban spaces as Paris's eighteenth arrondissement and the Castro District in San Francisco are irrevocably tied to the bohemian lifestyle and the gay community, while Hollywood and London's West End depend on the film and theater industries, respectively. As such spaces become more commercialized or are reproduced elsewhere, their authenticity is often challenged, raising postmodern questions of what constitutes a real urban place.

Zachary Neal

See also Growth Machine; Land Development; Lefebvre, Henri; New Urbanism; Racialization; Social Production of Space; Urban Design; Walking City

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URBAN STUDIES

Within the social sciences, the city is imagined as an object of society rather than a fact of nature (though scholars are increasingly blurring this distinction) and, in that vein, is conceived as a material space of functional and social relationships

involving such physical objects as office towers, neighborhoods, and plazas. As a subfield of the social sciences, though, urban studies is awkwardly positioned in relationship to economics, sociology, political science, history, geography, and anthropology. It is neither a full-fledged addition to this list nor an alternative. Rather, it exists as a parallel, and marginalized, institutional and intellectual space.

With the passing of the societal upheavals that marked the transition from agricultural to urban-industrial societies, the issue of the city as a source of intellectual and practical discomfort had seemingly been settled. In the 1960s, however, and particularly in the United States, the cities became increasingly unavoidable as a matter of public concern. The contradictions of capitalist society returned, and they were manifested in the cities. Industrial restructuring after World War II transformed the older manufacturing centers that had defined modernity. Combined with an enduring racial problem in the United States, this created a national trauma. Poverty and racism seemed endemic to the large, central cities. White households fled to the suburbs in the 1950s and 1960s, further dividing the country racially and geographically and reinforcing disparities of income and opportunity. (Similar conditions of urban decline occurred in other industrialized, capitalist countries such as England, France, and Canada, but not at the same time or with the same severity.) The city and its problems cried out to be addressed and the United States mobilized for social reform, an effort concentrated mainly in the legislative initiatives that occurred as part of the presidency of Lyndon Johnson (1963–1969). Funding for research into urban problems rapidly expanded.

The federal government, city governments, and philanthropic bodies such as the Russell Sage Foundation allocated significant funds to urban research. In the late 1950s and 1960s, for example, the Ford Foundation distributed grants to universities to develop urban research centers that would explore solutions to the problems of the inner cities. These centers included the Urban Studies Center established in 1959 at Rutgers University and the Harvard–MIT Joint Center for Urban Studies that in the same year merged urban studies programs from the two universities. The University of Pennsylvania, Yale University, and Columbia

University, among others, were part of a growing interest in engaging the surrounding communities, often in conjunction with governmental urban renewal activities but also in support of the university's civic responsibility.

Yet, the sheer complexity of the city overwhelmed researchers and scholars. Limiting one's attention was a necessity, and yet, willful disregard of one or another facet of the urban condition seemed irresponsible. Complexity had to be eliminated for focused studies to take place, but doing so stripped these studies of the realism that made them relevant. What was clear was that the traditional disciplines were unhelpful. Sociology (despite its roots in the University of Chicago's Department of Sociology in the 1920s and that department's interest in the city) had set aside its urban concerns just as political science had abandoned its Progressive era focus on city governments. Space was wholly absent from economics and in both history and anthropology, space functioned passively and as mere background. Moreover, these disciplines—with the exception of history—found complexity to be a threat to their well-crafted consensus regarding the appropriate object of disciplinary concern. Sensitivity to the intricacies of people and places—history and anthropology being exceptions—weakened the quest for theoretical principles and thus had to be reputed. Even geography—that spatial discipline—was fixated on regionalism and awash in the particularities of the natural environment, only engaging in a sociospatial dialectic in the 1980s. Urban studies, however, has never exploited these differences to mount special theoretical claims. At the same time, the social science disciplines have never accepted it as an equal partner in the pursuit of knowledge.

Urban “sections” were established in a number of professional organizations. The urban anthropology section (now SUNTA, the Society for Urban, National, and Transnational/Global Anthropology) was established in the American Anthropology Association in 1972. In 1973 the American Sociology Association allowed members to declare their interest in developing a Community and Urban Sociology section. Urban Politics became a section of the American Political Science Association in 1986. And while historians of the city were active in the American Historical Association prior to 1988, only in that year did

they set up the Urban History Association. A few years later, the Urban History Association met separately for the first time from the parent organization, a move that has yet to occur in anthropology, sociology, or political science.

Urban journals within the traditional social science disciplines began to appear in the 1960s. The first was the *Urban Affairs Quarterly* (later renamed *Urban Affairs Review*), published in 1965. It was followed by *Urban Anthropology* in 1972 (a journal whose title was subsequently changed in 1985 to *Urban Anthropology & Studies of Cultural Systems & World Economic Development*), the *Journal of Urban Economics* in 1974, the *Journal of Urban History* in 1975, and *Urban Geography* in 1980. Within sociology, a specifically urban journal, *City & Community*, was not launched until 2002. Even the professions took notice: The *Journal of Urban Analysis and Public Management* first appeared in 1972. (Of course, social work had a long history of involvement with the city, extending back to the settlement house movement of the early twentieth century. Its major journal, *Social Science Review*, was first published in 1927.)

Through sections and specialty journals, groups within the social science disciplines negotiated their intellectual marginality, the multidimensional (and thus multidisciplinary) qualities of the city, and the enduring pull of their home discipline. In particular, researchers, educators, and scholars attracted to urban issues recognized the political wisdom of maintaining a disciplinary base with its already-existing affiliations and status. Consequently, they brought to urban studies their disciplinary perspectives and methodologies. Having made a bold move to declare themselves urbanists, they were reluctant to throw aside the theoretical and methodological skills that kept them attached to their disciplines. The rhetorical fix was to declare oneself *interdisciplinary*, a pivotal watchword in urban studies. Urban researchers and scholars acknowledged the city as multifaceted but not the contradictions involved in subordinating those facets to a disciplinary essentialism. They were not about to commit academic suicide.

For these reasons, the urban research centers and urban studies “minors” and academic programs that were set up within many colleges and

universities were staffed by researchers or faculty who retained their ties to their home disciplines. Faculty members were “released” from course and administrative obligations by their departments to support an urban studies (and university) agenda. Much like African American studies and women’s studies programs, urban studies programs were maintained as an appendage to the traditional social sciences. (Urban studies as a stand-alone undergraduate major can be found in fewer than a dozen universities in the United States.) Only later did it become possible to obtain a PhD in urban studies and thus for urban research centers and programs to be staffed by people outside the traditional disciplines. (Portland State University, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and Cleveland State University are three of the major PhD programs in the field.) Urban studies programs also benefited from the rise of public policy schools in the 1960s and 1970s, with many of them offering courses and training researchers and scholars to address urban problems.

Indicative of the ambivalent intellectual status of urban studies is the lack of a canon of literature and of texts that epitomize the field. Almost all of the writings normally deemed the field’s major works were written by scholars from social science disciplines. Robert Park’s famous essay “The City” (1925) and Herbert Gans’s *The Urban Villagers* (1962) came out of sociology, David Harvey’s *Social Justice and the City* (1973) out of geography, and Robert Dahl’s *Who Governs?* (1961) from political science. Arguably the most widely known text in the historiography of urban studies in the United States is Jane Jacobs’s *The Death and Life of Great American Cities* (1961). Jacobs was a journalist rather than an academic, and the book is most often associated with urban planning—the object of her wrath—rather than with the traditional social sciences. Noteworthy is that these texts all appeared in the early years of urban studies and have not been supplemented, or supplanted, as the field has expanded and evolved.

The growing interest in urban studies in the United States in the 1960s led a group of researchers and educators in 1969 to establish the Council of University Institutes for Urban Affairs. (The use of the word *affairs* rather than *studies* is a subtle reference to the group’s interest in public problems.) Meeting in Boston, these directors of university

programs hoped to raise the stature of the field and provide a forum for sharing ideas. Over the years, the group expanded and mounted annual conferences; the first was held in Washington, D.C., in 1971. By the late 1970s, an estimated 100 urban studies programs were in operation in colleges and universities in the United States with at least 50 universities granting master's degrees and a smaller number conferring PhDs. In 1980, the council published the first issue of the *Journal of Urban Affairs*, a journal seemingly without disciplinary affiliations and thus significantly unlike those mentioned earlier. A year later, the council changed its name to the Urban Affairs Association. By 2008 the Urban Affairs Association had more than 60 institutional members and more than 500 individual members and had become a key forum for urban scholars in the United States and Canada.

Whereas the locus of urban studies has been primarily within the United States, concerns with the city were not as geographically confined. The *Journal of Urban Affairs*, in fact, was preceded by two other non-discipline-based publications: *Urban Studies* in 1964 and the *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* in 1977, both of which have become premier journals in the field. *Urban Studies: An International Journal of Research in Urban Studies* was founded in 1964 at the University of Glasgow to provide an international forum of social and economic contributions to the fields of urban and regional planning. The journal has expanded to include the increasing range of disciplines and approaches that have been brought to bear on urban and regional issues. The *International Journal of Urban and Regional Research* was the outgrowth of an effort by a handful of urban political economists from England, France, and Italy to create a journal with a "radical approach to urban problems" and one that was macrosociological, empirical, comparative, and interdisciplinary.

Not until the late 1990s did a counterpart to the Urban Affairs Association appear outside the United States. In 1997, the European Urban Research Association was launched with institutional and individual members from Finland, Bulgaria, New Zealand, Turkey, the United Kingdom, Germany, Israel, and other countries. It holds annual conferences and in 2008 launched a journal titled *Urban Research and Practice Journal*.

The European Urban Research Association built on the interest of the European Union in urban issues, specifically the European Urban Knowledge Network established in 2004 and the Junior Network for International Urban Studies (an informal network for young scholars) established in 2005. Providing political support is Eurocities, a network of mayors from the local governments of more than 120 large cities in the European Union, a counterpart to the U.S. Conference of Mayors, was established in 1932.

The International Network for Urban Research and Action (INURA) was founded in Switzerland in 1991 to develop and promote the interaction of social and environmental urban movements with research and theoretical analysis. INURA brings together theorists and practitioners sharing a common critical approach toward contemporary urban development. Members are involved in urban renewal projects, the urban periphery, community-led environmental projects, inner-city labor markets, social housing provision, and other initiatives. Research is closely tied to, and is a product of, local action and initiative; the association hosts semi-annual meetings and has a regular series of publications.

Although the journal *Urban Studies* is published from the Department of Urban Studies at the University of Glasgow, academic urban studies programs are rare outside the United States. Urban researchers and scholars reside mainly in social science disciplines or in architecture, where city and regional planning is often taught. Research centers may be found at Birmingham, Bristol, Cambridge, and elsewhere, but urban studies as a stand-alone program of study is uncommon; despite this, urban research and scholarship, occurring either at the margins or outside the traditional social sciences, are found in many countries and on all continents. The self-identification of urban researchers and scholars in different countries occurred at different times. In France, 1968 was a crucial year (as described by Henri Lefebvre in numerous interviews). The Amsterdam Study Centre for the Metropolitan Environment was founded in 1993, the Cities Programme was established within the London School of Economics in 1998, and the Center for Metropolitan Studies at the Technical University in Berlin was established in 2004.

CEDDU (El Centro de Estudios Demográficos, Urbanos y Ambientales) was founded at the El Colegio de México in 1964 to study population and urbanization in Mexico and Latin America. In Chile, the Centro Interdisciplinario de Desarrollo Urbano was founded in 1968 at the Pontificia Universidad Católica (this followed establishment of the Comité Interdisciplinario de Investigación y Enseñanza del Planeamiento y del Desarrollo Urbano with the support of the Ford Foundation in 1964). The Instituto de Estudios Urbanos was established in Colombia in 1997.

The case of Finland is particularly interesting. The Centre for Urban and Regional Studies was launched in 1968 as a joint venture of Finnish universities and as a multidisciplinary research and educational unit. Not until 1998, however, did the University of Helsinki devote professorships to urban studies. These professors were financed jointly by the university, the City of Helsinki, and the Ministry of Education. Initially, only six were funded, though later the number was expanded. This did not lead to the establishment of urban studies programs, however; the professorships were located in already-existing academic departments such as history, geography, and social policy.

Outside the United States, then, urban studies is mainly blended into the social sciences and architecture. It lacks a separate identity and to the extent that it is relatively distinct from other fields of knowledge, it bears the influence of U.S. urban studies.

Empirical research and theoretical explanation common to social science research in the United States has long dominated the field. Although the empirical bias of urban studies was challenged in the 1990s by a renewed interest from the humanities in things urban, the commitment to explanation was not abandoned. Within the new cultural studies and older American studies programs, scholars turned to the city to explore such topical issues as popular culture, race and ethnicity, consumption, and immigration. Much of this work revolved around the interaction of place and identity and the nature of the urban experience, particularly as it occurred on the street. Indicative of this cultural turn was the emergence of the Los Angeles School of Urban Studies. Mainly a project of geographers, it cast Los Angeles as the

emblematic urban region of twenty-first century urbanism. Moreover, it de-emphasized the political economy approach of the new urban sociology and an earlier urban studies and substituted in its place postmodern representational and cultural perspectives. The Los Angeles School's interest in the built environment coincided with a renewed interest in architecture and urban design among urban scholars. In fact, urban design programs became more prevalent in the United States in the 1990s, and this reinforced and broadened academic interest in cities and their potential for renewal. These endeavors, though, were appendages to the urban studies field, sitting on its margins but not derailing the basic thrust established when it emerged in the 1960s.

The dominant motivating interest then—as it is now—was urban problems, what initially was captured by the call to “be relevant.” This puts urban studies in another light. Not just an alternative to the traditional social science disciplines, urban studies simultaneously has been a platform for launching research forays into the realm of public policy, thereby bringing urban studies closer to the public professions of city planning, policy analysis, public management, and social welfare. Many articles in urban studies and related journals and most presentations at Urban Affairs Association conferences have an explicit policy dimension; their intent is to explore an urban problem (e.g., residential segregation) or intervention (community-development corporations) and offer advice as to how that problem can be ameliorated or the intervention improved. Because the traditional social science disciplines (with the exception of economics) have conferred little value on policy research, urban studies offers a place to pursue policy interests. In short, and in this guise, urban studies is a continuation of the middle-class reformism of the early twentieth century.

Urban studies, though, has not escaped the orbit of the social sciences and this has hindered its development. It retains the theoretical inclinations and methodological predilections of the social sciences. Consequently, its adherents have given little attention to the identity of their field. Unlike the disciplines where labels matter, “urban studies” is rarely used as a professional marker. Instead, its practitioners are content to remain different from, but always in touch with and never antagonistic

to, their home disciplines. Of course, such an observation might be challenged. Defenders of the status quo could convincingly argue that urban studies is not meant to replace the disciplines but rather to offer researchers and scholars a place where they can apply their disciplinary skills to an object of mutual concern. Not widely appreciated within their home disciplines, there they can exercise an interdisciplinary approach to the city. Neither the former nor the latter requires specification of a distinct identity; theory can be borrowed and methods mixed.

The counterresponse is that such an attitude suppresses the promise of urban studies by giving insufficient attention to the complexity and reality of cities. If urban studies is ultimately about what happens in particular places and about setting a foundation for governmental or collective action, then it needs to reject the theoretical pretensions of the social sciences: global pronouncements, decontextualized propositions, value neutrality, and quantitative assessments. In short, theoretical aspirations and methodological techniques that mimic the natural sciences in their (false) objectivity and rigor need to be abandoned. An approach that embraces the particular, the local, common sense, case methods, and collective action is more likely to bring forth the “promise” of urban studies to solve the problems of the city. In this way, urban studies can be more than an appendage to the twentieth-century edifice of the academic social science disciplines.

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See also Los Angeles School of Urban Studies; New Urban Sociology; Urban Theory

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URBAN SYSTEM

Cities are not isolated entities; rather, they are related to other cities through multiple connections and exchanges. These relationships create spatial interdependencies, functional differentiation, and growth and thereby generate persistent structural features that become generic properties of urban systems. The theory of urban systems has been progressively enriched from static explanations to dynamic ones and through model building and comparison with observations.

Historical Background

Historians and archaeologists have confirmed the emergence of urban systems in four or five regions of the world (Mesopotamia–Middle East, Indus Valley, South China, and Middle America) between 8000 and 3000 BC. In all cases, the emergence occurred about 3,000 years after agriculture had been invented in the region. Urban settlements have a specific societal functionality: Whereas villages rely on local resources and do not develop beyond the ecological limits of their site, cities, many of which had once been villages, use resources from distant sites to reduce the local limitations

and uncertainties. Early cities also were places where the profits from selling agricultural surplus were reinvested in other kinds of activities, leading to innovations stimulated by the competition in trade with other cities and giving rise to a more and more complex social organization. Cities exploit, then, not only a local site but a nodal geographical situation and develop as long as the networks they control are expanding. Archaeologists have demonstrated that ancient settlement systems possessed the same structural properties as the urban systems observed later in history or even today.

The earliest mention of urban system (*“le système général des villes”*) is found in the article “Villes” in a French encyclopedia; the article was written by a Saint-Simonian engineer, Jean Reynaud, who enunciated the main principles of central place theory in 1841. But the classical formulation of this theory belongs to German geographer Walter Christaller. His thesis was inspired by a general concern of the time about the role of towns as marketplaces in rural regions. However, in Christaller’s work, a systemic conception remains implicit. Not until the 1960s was the multilevel organization of urban systems first formalized in systemic terms by American geographer Brian Berry, who coined the famous phrase “cities as systems within systems of cities.”

Central Place Systems

Central place theory intends to explain the size, number, and spacing of cities. It defines centrality as the property of cities to act as central places retailing goods and services to surrounding areas (the “complementary region” in Christaller’s words). The theory includes behavioral hypotheses about consumers, who try to minimize the travel costs for acquiring goods and services, and suppliers, who enter the market as long as they can make profit. A postulate is that establishments supplying central goods group, according to their own spatial ranges and viability threshold, in centers of different sizes and form six to seven hierarchical levels of central places. Under these constraints, Christaller derives three types of spatial models of urban hierarchies, which optimize either the accessibility to markets for consumers or the length of required transportation networks and obey an administrative principle

of noncompetitiveness. Each of these spatial models is characterized by a fixed ratio between the size of market areas of two successive levels: This ratio is $K = 3$ for the model following a market principle, 4 in the case of the transport principle, and 7 for the administrative one.

The theory has been exemplified by many case studies and tested in many regions of the world and for various historical periods. Whereas the hierarchical organization of retail functions was generally observed, exhibiting a strong correlation with city size, the regularity in K values was more difficult to establish. Central place theory also was applied to seasonal markets and to the spatial organization of commercial activities inside cities. In this latter case, however, the spatial regularities had to be understood not within the framework of topographical space but in reference to a time-space, as defined by temporal measures of accessibility.

Central place theory was criticized from various points of view. Inconsistencies in derivation of geometric models were noticed, especially because the local effects of population concentration are not considered by Christaller as altering the hypothesis of spatial homogeneity that is required for drawing hexagons around each center. Lack of coincidence with observations were also reported, namely, violations of the hypothesis allocating consumers to the nearest retail center for every purchase: At least in highly mobile societies, consumers make multi-purpose travels that short-circuit the smallest shopping centers and increase the contrasts in the hierarchical organization. In parallel, an increase in income trivializes previously rare services. Moreover, it becomes less and less relevant to build a theory of urban systems on the relationship between cities and countryside, when three quarters of the total population is urban. But the main weakness is that central place theory is incomplete for two reasons: (1) It does not consider other specialized functions that cities are performing and which do not serve a regional population (as manufacturing activities or tourism), and (2) Christaller’s theory is mainly a static one.

Urban Hierarchy as a Statistical Distribution

A second type of interpretation of the hierarchical differentiation in urban systems has followed a

different path from central place theory. Many authors noticed the strong differentiation in the sizes of cities belonging to any system of cities (usually today from 10^3 inhabitants to 10^6 for medium-sized countries, up to 10^7 in the most populated countries). Friedrich Auerbach, in 1913, first suggested a model of the regular shape of hierarchies in urban systems, which was formalized by George Kingsley Zipf in 1941 under the expression “rank size-rule”: The number of cities above a given size (equivalent to the rank) is an inverse geometric progression of this size. Zipf explained this statistical regularity as an equilibrium generated by counteracting forces of concentration (for the efficiency of markets) and dispersion (of natural resources). The first formalization of a growth process generating the hierarchy of city sizes (as a lognormal distribution) was proposed by the French statistician Robert Gibrat in 1931. He demonstrated that this distribution is produced by increases in population that are, on every short time interval, proportional to the initial size of cities, with stochastic fluctuations. Tests of growth processes in urban systems have shown that Gibrat’s model holds in a first approximation only and that systematic correlations of growth rates with city sizes and temporal autocorrelation of growth rates have to be explained by modeling the interactions between cities.

Functional Diversity, Specialization, and Economic Cycles

Urban growth rates are linked with innovation cycles involving a changing relationship with city size: At the beginning of a cycle, larger cities tend to grow faster, growth rates equalize, and then small towns tend to grow faster. This process was described by Torsten Hägerstrand as the hierarchical diffusion of innovations. The consequence of the early adoption of innovation by large cities is that they draw greater benefit from the innovation (the initial advantage), and this is translated into growth rates slightly above the average of towns and cities overall. Contemporary studies of “metropolization” rediscovered a process that has long constituted the dynamics of systems of cities at a time when the globalization trends and the general conversion to the “information society” are creating new cycles of innovation. This *hierarchical*

selection is reinforced by the tendency of smaller towns to have growth rates below the mean, either because they adopt innovation when the associated benefits are becoming smaller or because they are never reached by innovation. The latter is especially the case when rapid transportation modes or infrastructures are considered. The historical trend toward greater speed of communications, known as *space-time convergence*, has certainly contributed to reinforcing the inequalities in city size, while on a lower scale it has widened the perimeter of urban areas.

Besides the effects of hierarchical selection, there is a second type of asymmetry that is created in urban systems by the innovation process. Sometimes, the resources for exploitation of an innovation are not available in every location. The result is *urban specialization* because the related economic activities can develop in only a few urban sites. Usually, the development of a new urban specialization produces exceptionally high growth rates as the booming cities attract migrants as well as profit-oriented investments. This was the case when certain mineral resources became exploitable, such as coal mines in the British Midlands or Belgian Wallonia, gold in California, or diamonds at Kimberley in South Africa. But several location factors that explain the emergence and success of many towns and cities are also geographical “accidents” of another kind—for example, those influencing the layout of long-distance trade routes, such as wide valleys or topographic corridors, estuaries and bays for maritime routes, major crossroads, or contact points between different regions. Among the more recently exploited spatially concentrated resources are mountain slopes for skiing or coastlines for tourism. Places where public funds have been injected to create a local concentration of skill and knowledge can also be considered as nodes of possible concentration of investment and urban specialization, for instance, the large universities that have generated “technopoles.”

Thus innovation is an essential driving force in urban dynamics. Knowledge and information, reflexivity, and the ability to learn and invent provide the impetus for urban development. The crucial role that cities have played in generating innovations—intellectual and material, cultural and political, institutional and organizational—is

well documented. The role of cities as centers for the integration of human capital and as incubators of invention was rediscovered by the “new” economic growth theory, which posits that knowledge spillovers among individuals and firms are the necessary underpinnings of growth. Moreover the creation and repositioning of knowledge in cities increases their attractive pull for educated, highly skilled, entrepreneurial, and creative individuals who, by locating in urban centers, generate further knowledge spillovers

The two processes of innovation and specialization have consequences for the dynamics of systems of cities. The activities that can diffuse widely through the system tend to reinforce the relative weight of the large cities, because of their growth advantage and attraction from the earlier stages of innovation, whereas the activities that focus on a few specialized towns, because of some specific location factors, after boosting development, with sometimes spectacular growth rates, hamper further development by weakening their ability to adapt.

These differential evolutions likely will continue and do so not at the scale of national systems but in global urban networks. The colonial era already had introduced durable asymmetries in urban growth and perturbed the organization of urban systems in colonized countries. Foreign investments and the redistribution of economic activities that characterize the globalization of economies will reproduce or reinforce these effects.

Coevolving Cities Through Spatial Interaction

Over time, urban systems have changed in size and form. Even if they ensure the same social functionality, which is to control territories or networks, the nature of control has evolved, from politics to economics. Political control at first coincided with the envelope of one city but then shifted to kingdoms or empires and then to national territories that associate several cities. Economic control, as expressed first by local entrepreneurs, has broadened to national and then multinational firms. Individual cities that once controlled their development by building networks to exploit distant resources have become instruments for the control of wider territories and networks ensured by

national or supranational actors using the networks that cities have built through their interactions. Systems of cities are evolutionary objects that may include subsets of cities connected by long-distance networks or cities belonging to unified political territories. The general trend is toward historical enlargement of the number of cities that are integrated through more intense and frequent interactions, but political events or economic crisis can block such growth. The changing nature of interactions and the fluctuations of their spatial extension make it difficult to identify systems of cities.

That is why urban systems are now conceptualized as evolutionary systems, which are self-adapting to the change generated by human societies and also contribute to that change. The urban system is an invention, the technical nature of which is usually not apparent in collective representations. Urban systems are admirable territorial adaptors to social change. Like other social systems, urban systems are the product of historical self-organizing processes that mix deliberate actions and involuntary outcomes of social interactions. Their dynamics are driven by a general expansive trend rooted in social practices aiming to increase symbolic power, available resources, and the space for action; in cities, this trend is converted into invention intended to reduce the local uncertainties that constrain the development of a site and to search further afield for complementary resources, either in the surrounding territory or in more distant networks. It follows that interurban interactions contribute, by emulation, to hastening the process of globalization through urban networks and to enhancing the complexity of human activities through the division of labor and specialization. This trend has already generated a major bifurcation, known as the *urban transition*, which has transformed the way we inhabit the planet by converting a set of settlements whose original function was the agricultural use of a territory into a much more concentrated, hierarchical, and qualitatively differentiated system of towns and cities. The resulting regular urban hierarchies that emerge from the interactions between cities are not produced by conscious design. Their structure is, however, constrained by the competitive process of growth, which explains their form, similar to the size distribution of elements in other complex

systems, and by the available technological means for connecting human activities in geographical space.

Denise Pumain

See also Globalization; Location Theory; Metropolitan; Urban Agglomeration; Urban Theory; World-Systems Perspective

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urban reality. In this definition, urban theories specify both causal relations between variables (including models that indicate how causal factors are interrelated) and causal mechanisms responsible for producing these relations. A third meaning of urban theory starts from a critical-normative foundation and views theory as a set of concepts and explanatory tools to examine the operation of urban power structures, identify the causes and consequences of urban inequalities, and clarify the bases of social conflict and struggle in cities. This critical urban theory is problem centered, embraces a strong social justice and equity component, and aims for urban *praxis*—a fusion of urban knowledge and practice. In this later meaning, urban theorizing is undergirded by a utopian impulse that attempts to illuminate the mechanisms of domination and subordination in cities, and provide a prescription for ameliorative social action and revolutionary change.

There are no timeless, static, or immutable urban theories. Just as urban theories are products of particular times and historical conditions, urban theories change as social movements, social processes, and individuals transform cities and metropolitan areas. Accordingly, urban theories are diverse, complex, and multidimensional. This entry addresses five major building blocks of urban theory: ontology, epistemology, concepts, levels of analysis, and agency–structure relationships. In conclusion the present status of urban theory is discussed.

Urban Ontology

All urban theories contain an inventory or set of assumptions about what can and does exist in the urban world. The central ontological category for most urban theories is the *urban*, a term that has no standard or agreed-upon meaning for scholars. Urban theories frequently employ a variety of terms, including *scale*, *space*, and *place*, as frameworks for understanding what cities look like, how they are organized, how they grow and change, and what they might look like in the future. Yet it is important to note that urban theorists disagree on whether urban space or scale is external and pre-given, closed or open, a coherent actor, or a complex structure that shapes and frames action. Theoretical variants of urban ecology tend to view urban space as a setting, backdrop, or container in

URBAN THEORY

Several meanings and definitions of urban theory dominate contemporary empirical research on cities and metropolitan life. One definition is broad and views urban theory as a heuristic or sensitizing device to help scholars understand the nature of urban order, change, and stability. In this meaning, urban theories are interpretive tools that address questions such as what is "urban" about urban life, how are cities organized, and how do they change over time? Another more analytical approach defines urban theory as a set of interrelated propositions that allow for the systematization of knowledge, explanation, and prediction of

which social action occurs. Some theories within the urban political economy paradigm conceptualize urban space as a product of large-scale societal processes. Other theories in the field of urban geography equate space with scale and draw upon spatial metaphors to explain social action and group behavior. For the most part, urban theorists tend to position themselves somewhere along a continuum that ranges from space as an objective and a priori force and space as a medium of social relations and a material product (e.g., the “built environment”) that can affect social relations. A theory’s ontological assumptions about urban phenomena suggest a definition of the city. Early Chicago School theories viewed cities as organic wholes made up of interdependent and differentiated parts. Whereas some theories argue that cities are clearly bounded spatial and social objects of analysis, others define the city by its openness and amorphous character. Recent theorizing suggests that the multilayered urban spaces that people inhabit are best represented not by the image of bounded physical spaces but rather by the overlapping and shifting boundaries of group conflict and solidarity.

Urban Epistemology

Epistemology is a set of beliefs or assumptions about knowledge. Whereas ontology deals with the properties that cities possess, epistemologies tell us how these properties become possible objects of knowledge. Thus, all urban theories embrace certain epistemological assumptions concerning what is knowledge, who can be a knower, and what are legitimate ways of knowing. Currently, four epistemologies dominate contemporary theorizing in urban studies: positivism, social constructionism, standpoint, and postmodernism.

Positivist epistemologies view knowledge as cumulative, coherent, and rational. By using the scientific method and hypothesis testing, positivist urban study pursues generalization, context independence, and attachment to causality and predictability. Positivists see their analyses as offering factual statements, objective and verifiable explanations, and scientific progress toward understanding urban reality and solving empirical and theoretical problems.

A social constructionist epistemology eschews the notion of an a priori, objective urban world

and emphasizes the ways in which urban processes, urban identities and cultures, and classes and racial groups are negotiated, defined, and produced by individuals and groups. Central to constructionist epistemology is the idea that urban reality is emergent, mutable, a product of social ascriptions, and a reflexive process involving internal and external forces and actors.

Standpoint epistemologies claim to represent the urban world from a particular socially situated perspective or standpoint based on class, race, or gender subordination. A feminist or women’s standpoint epistemology proposes to make women’s experiences the point of departure for urban study. A Marxian standpoint epistemology studies the ways in which class exploitation influences workers’ conceptions of knowledge, the knowing subject, and practices of urban inquiry and explanation.

Among the variants of postmodern urban theory, there are three common epistemological assumptions that unite the postmodern: (1) a rejection of unifying, totalizing, and universal schemes in favor of an emphasis on plurality, difference, and complexity; (2) an abandonment of closed structures and fixed meanings and an adoption of uncertainty, contingency, ambiguity, and irony; and (3) a replacement with objectivity and truth seeking with perspectivism, hermeneutics, and cultural relativism.

Urban Concepts

A theory’s ontological and epistemological assumptions insinuate a repertoire of sensitizing concepts to guide empirical analysis, including the identification of data sources and means of interpreting evidence. Urban concepts are terminological means by which researchers analyze urban reality and define and interpret urban conditions. All urban theories contain a set of concepts to classify and categorize knowledge. Concepts are the building blocks of urban theories and frame urban reality, setting boundaries for analysis, and are fundamental to the historical and material constitution of cities and urban life.

Concepts take on meaning only in relation to one another. Class and capitalism, for example, represent a unity of complex ideas and urban conditions that have utility in the world, according to

Marxism urban theorists. Urban politics, political power, and urban economic growth are major concepts in urban growth machine theory and urban regime theory. Concepts have tremendous malleability, and different theories can use the same concept in radically different ways. Feminist theories, for example, may view gender as a social construction, whereas positivist-oriented theories may operationalize gender as an explanatory variable to test hypotheses and predict urban change.

Depending on the theory, concepts can be descriptive, analytical, explanatory, or evaluative. Different concepts provide a framework or orientation for identifying and explaining social processes including, for example, exploitation, alienation, and discrimination. Thus, scholars may use the concept of race to develop theories of the causes, consequences, and persistence of racial residential segregation and uneven metropolitan development. In turn, scholars have employed different theories of segregation to clarify how meanings of race and manifestations of racial discrimination have changed historically. More recent urban theorizing rejects notions of class, race, and gender as distinct and separate variables and emphasizes the interlocking nature of these structures and inequalities in shaping urban development. Despite their different analytical focus and assumptions, the sociospatial perspective and the growth machine approach use similar concepts to illustrate the role of powerful economic actors, especially those in the real estate industry in building and redeveloping cities; the role of growth-assisted government actors in city development; and the importance of symbols, meanings, and culture in the shaping of cities.

Levels of Analysis

Most urban theories begin their study of cities and urban life at a particular level of analysis and make assumptions about how different levels are theoretically important and relate to one another. Levels of analysis range on a continuum from the macro level of global society to the micro level of everyday life and individual consciousness. Specifically, the different levels of analysis can include global, national, regional, metropolitan, city, neighborhood, small group, and individual levels. There are no clear dividing lines between

global or macro social units and local or micro units.

Like concepts, levels of analysis become transparent and meaningful only in relation to each other. Thus, scholars position their analysis to specify the interconnectedness and mutually constitutive character of levels of analysis. Macro-oriented urban theories typically situate urbanization in a global context and narrow the analytical focus to the internal dynamics of and external relations faced by city-regions. In this deductive theorizing, analysts will begin at the global level and make generalizations to lower levels to explain how macro structures and societal processes affect urban reality and life. Micro theories typically (but not always) embrace inductive theorizing and orient their analyses to explain how and under what conditions macro units emerge from micro- or local-level conditions.

Most urban scholars reject the arguments of methodological individualism that facts about cities and urban phenomena generally are to be explained solely in terms of facts about individuals living in cities. That is, methodological individualism reduces urban society to individuals or groups in which the explanation of urban events and processes are deduced from behavior of the participating individuals and the description of their situation. As suggested by the terms *local-global interplay*, *local-global nexus*, *glocalization*, and the expression “think globally, act locally,” urban researchers are developing new conceptual tools to capture the complex relationship between global-level changes and their diverse effects and consequences on locally lived realities. Many scholars refer to these socioeconomic processes and patterns of change but disagree over their form, impact, and periodization.

Agency and Structure in Urban Theory

No relationship is perhaps more important in urban theory than the relationship between human agency and social structure. On the one hand, almost all urban theories recognize that individuals are products of urban structures and environments and that individuals have the capacity to act on and transform the built environment of the city. On the other hand, urban theories

embrace very different assumptions and modes of analysis for explaining and understanding how individuals act in groups to create cities, how urban structures shape and constrain consciousness and behavior, and how people unite to change urban reality.

A variety of definitions of agency and structure and their relationship dominate urban scholarship. *Structure* can be defined as manners of thinking, acting, and feeling that are external to and coercive of individual and group action. Informal structures include norms, values, beliefs, and rules. Formal structures include laws, regulations, organizations, bureaucracies, institutions, and large-scale processes such as capitalism and globalization. Conceptualizations of *agency* can vary according to one's theoretical intent and orientation. On the one hand, agency can range on a continuum from nonreflective, habitual, or repetitive actions or adaptation to existing conditions. On the other hand, agency can refer to intentional and resistant actions, planned strategies and methodical organizing for change, and oppositional mobilization to transform cities. Urban theories provide different answers to questions such as what is action and why is it significant? How do groups act? How do macro structures and global processes suppress individuality while engendering new forms of urban identity?

Despite much heterogeneity, recent urban work theorizes structure and agency as a spatial phenomenon—with spatial attributes and spatial influences—and examines how different spatial meanings and locations can enable or constrain particular forms of social action and behavior. Major theoretical strands of globalization research, for example, have been permeated by geographical concepts—for example, time-space compression, space of flows, space of places, deterritorialization, translocalities, and scapes. Meanwhile, globalization researchers have employed a variety of distinctively geographical prefixes (for example, *sub-*, *supra-*, *trans-*, and *inter-*) to explain various emergent social processes that appear to operate below, above, beyond, or between spatial structures and geopolitical boundaries. In addition, urban poverty research has focused attention on the role of spatial location and “neighborhood effects” in socially isolating the urban poor from education and employment opportunities, restricting avenues

for pursuing upward mobility, and reinforcing antisocial behavior. Acknowledging that neighborhood context shapes poverty reflects the increasing use of geographic units of analysis and spatial metaphors—“concentration effects,” “spatial isolation,” “ghettoized poor,” “super poverty areas”—to delineate the causes and consequences of urban poverty. This flourishing research dovetails with recent theorizing that views urban space as an object of political struggle, a constitutive component of human agency and identity, and a facilitator of as well as a constraint upon action. Urban spaces shape and condition how individuals and groups think and conceive of themselves, cultivate and develop personal and collective identities, and contest as well as reinforce prevailing structures of race, class, gender, sexual orientation, and other social inequalities.

Current Status of Urban Theory

The contemporary urban world is under major transformations, and a plethora of theories call attention to the changes and novelties of the present moment. A growing diversity of theories and modes of theorizing has resulted from the increasing influence of feminist theories, critical race theories, and postmodern theories. The open and variegated theoretical landscape is transforming urban studies from a field dominated by a few paradigms and their delimited theories to one in which inclusion, diversity, and ambiguity are the watchwords. As a result, today's urban scholars have many more theoretical options and tools, and there is less need to choose a single perspective as one's own. The recent cultural turn and linguistic turn, combined with the popularity of discursive analyses and textual deconstruction, have sparked lively debate within urban studies and across scholarly disciplines. On the one hand, the idea that scholars deal with “facts” and analyses reflect an objective urban reality has begun to crumble under the assault of postmodernism, poststructuralism, and variants of feminism. On the other hand, econometric theories and research continue to orient urban analysis based on the axiomatic assumption that it is possible to represent (“mirror”) urban reality through the use of specific methodological techniques, concepts, and theories without making assumptions about the nature of

the phenomenon under investigation (i.e., presuppositionless representation). Thus, many urban scholars working within large government agencies continue to adhere to the long-standing positivist notion that it is possible to produce universally valid conceptions of cities without taking into account the multiplicity of people's subject positions defined by race, class, gender, sexual orientation, or religious status. In contrast, most critical urban scholars reject presuppositionless representation, arguing explicitly that such representation is politically and philosophically impossible.

What we have, in short, is a brave new world of urban theorizing that is contested, open, and fragmented. Several trends are apparent. First, middle-range variants of general theories are increasingly supplanting broad-based paradigms as scholars attempt to move toward constructive dialogue and common ground in the direction of synthesized theory building. This movement suggests that future theorizing will not be about "adopting" and "applying" a theory to "advance" a particular paradigm or perspective. Such a notion is based on the dubious ideas that there exist well-defined theories and that theories actually make "progress" toward an ultimate goal of complete knowledge in understanding designated urban processes and resolving empirical problems. Thus, the future portends a decline in the popularity and influence of broad paradigms such as urban political economy, urban ecology, and the new urban sociology. In the case of the new urban sociology, it is not clear what is "new," as many of the theoretical assumptions were formulated in the 1980s and before. On the other hand, middle-range theoretical variants of these broad paradigms will continue to guide empirical research and stimulate intense debate as the urban world changes.

Second, theorizing is becoming redefined as a practice that does not provide urban scholars with statements to be tested but with questions. Theoretical development consists of asking more refined and provocative questions and revising them in terms of what emerges in the process of research.

Finally, theoretical development consists in being eclectic and using different theoretical ideas, concepts, and heuristic devices to examine previously unanalyzed aspects of the urban world, or theorizing cities in novel and original ways. Here

the merit of urban scholarship is not to be assessed in terms of the factual authenticity or "truth content" of statements but rather in terms of the richness of descriptions, the depth of the analysis, and the range of the interpretive probe. The measure of urban theory today is the creation of new insights and new ideas rather than the advancement of a specific theoretical perspective or paradigm. These new and different ideas may be theoretically and analytically useful for a time and ultimately altered or discarded for new and more useful ideas and insights in the future.

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See also Chicago School of Urban Sociology; New Urban Sociology; Planning Theory; Regime Theory; Urban; Urban Geography; Urban Sociology; Urban Studies

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URBAN VILLAGE

The term *urban villagers* is most commonly associated with the work of Herbert Gans, whose book of the same name examined the social lives

of Italian American immigrants in the West End of Boston in 1957 and 1958. This anthropological and sociological work challenged the assumptions of planners about the nature of life within areas designated as slums. Gans defined the area as an urban village, as he found new groups of residents trying to adapt their “village like” institutions and cultures to the distinctly urban milieu.

Adopting a more idealistic position, A. Magnaghi adopted the term in the translation of his “*Il progetto locale*,” which discusses the importance of very localized forms of governance in the delivery of more sustainable forms of urban development.

However, the term *urban village* was promoted most vigorously in the United Kingdom by the Urban Villages Group in the late 1980s and 1990s. This group used it to describe development that was guided by a set of principles that called for well-designed, mixed use, and sustainable urban areas that created a sense of place and community commitment. The concept was derived not only from the legitimacy established by the Urban Villages Group (later renamed the Urban Villages Forum) but also from its initial endorsement by the U.K. government in national planning policy guidance for the planning and design of housing. Subsequently, however, it was superseded in government discourse by different concepts, notably with regard to *urban renaissance* and *millennium villages*.

The context was one of increasing concern with the quality of modern urban development, especially when compared with older, more traditional areas. In addition, the property recession of the late 1980s and early 1990s also meant that development professionals were willing to reconsider their approaches. The promotion of the concept was achieved by a small group of developers, investors, architects, and planners brought together by the Prince of Wales to form the Urban Villages Group, a nonprofit advocacy group. In 1992 the group’s manifesto was published, in the form of a book, titled *Urban Villages: A Concept for Creating Mixed-Use Urban Developments on a Sustainable Scale*. The Prince, driven by his widely publicized thinking on architecture, human values, and community, led the call for a return to more human scale and aesthetic development based on an analysis of how “good” places were designed.

In addition, legitimacy for the concept was derived through adoption of a variety of discourses that resonated with both old and new planning and design orthodoxies. Ideas such as proximity and locality, which were central to the urban village, reflected neighborhood planning ideals originating in the 1920s. Promoters emphasized the village-like characteristics found in certain parts of some cities which have been discussed for decades in urban geography and sociology. Particularly important to any proponents of the urban village has been the work of Jane Jacobs with her concerns for diversity and mixing uses. The concept drew attention to the need for community involvement so that communities are given a stake in their neighborhoods. This thinking was already popular in the fields of community architecture and urban design, and promoters of the urban village also therefore found a receptive audience for this aspect of their approach. A commitment to urban design also dovetailed with the U.K. government’s contemporary agenda, which was being explored through its Quality in Town and Country Initiative and subsequent Urban Design Campaign. These were related initiatives to promote greater awareness of urban design and both interdisciplinary working and public and private sector partnerships in the development of significant sites within established urban areas. The work drew on the experiences of a number of specific case studies that were promoted in the United Kingdom. Similar development concepts were also being endorsed at the time in the United States; for example, transit-oriented development, pedestrian pockets, new urbanism, and traditional neighborhood development, and the international nature of the thinking, struck a cord within U.K. urban policy, planning, and development circles. Finally, during the late 1980s and early 1990s there emerged an increased interest in sustainable forms of development; the urban village concept drew on this, albeit within a relatively narrow definition. In the early 1990s, work to identify key principles and to refine the urban village development concept was on the model of new building schemes such as urban extensions on green field sites. Publications indicated that major new residential developments within the United Kingdom should take the form of urban villages with 3,000 to 5,000 people, a focal village square, everything

within walking distance, a mix of house types and tenures, the provision of local retailing and a mix of other uses, a connected street network, a primary school, and good urban design. Early literature also indicated that designs should include such adjoining land as would be needed for the maximum protection of the community and to encourage the maximum possible self-sufficiency, although what this might mean was not really made clear.

A number of factors, however, led to a shift in approach, including the difficulty of finding new building sites, changes in personnel in the Urban Villages Forum, and an increasing recognition that public money would be required to deliver certain aspects of any genuine scheme. English Partnerships, an English regeneration organization, offered funding to urban renewal designs that conformed to the principles and supported the work of the organization in facilitating appropriate developments on brownfield land. Between the mid-1990s and the late 1990s the focus shifted to promoting the urban village as a regeneration tool, with the Urban Villages Forum advising on and endorsing developments that adequately reflected its principles. However, the Urban Villages Forum found it difficult to control the application of the name *urban village*, with many developments little more than ordinary housing estates.

Significant examples of schemes that influenced the development of the concept include Poundbury, Dorchester; the renewal of Hulme and Ancoats in Manchester, the urban extension of Upton, Northampton; and the development of Coed Darcy (formerly Llandarcy) near Neath, South Wales. Internationally the term *urban village* is used in a variety of contexts to describe patterns of development that also conform to new urbanist development principles.

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See also Ethnic Enclave; Gans, Herbert; Jacobs, Jane; Neighborhood Revitalization; New Urbanism

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UTOPIA

Utopia usually refers to an imaginative projection of an ideal society. In distinction to current conditions, this is typically located in another time or space. The term's geographical roots are apparent in its original coinage by Thomas More in his book *Utopia*, of 1516, which played upon the Greek words for good place (*eu-topos*) and no place (*ou-topos*). That book inaugurated a literary genre in the West concerned with depicting, often in considerable detail, "the best state of a commonwealth" achieved through human actions. The genre has continued, with fluctuating fortunes, into the present. So, too, has More's narrative device of projecting his ideal as a geographically distinct land, discovered through a process of exploration and travel, where current problems and ills have been surpassed.

Despite the presence of this foundational text, however, there is no agreed-upon definition of utopia that fixes it to a particular place, time, and form. Much recent debate suggests that, as attempts to imagine better worlds, utopias have a longer history that finds different modes of expression in different geographical settings. They are also not confined to literature and include depictions in other media. They further involve social and political visions of and theories about better ways of

living, from formal plans for building new spaces and societies to more open expressions of desire for radical change. In addition, despite common assumptions that utopias are intrinsically impractical or impossible, utopias are associated with experiments to construct alternative communities and settlements in the present. Some commentators go further and, following the lead of the philosopher Ernst Bloch in particular, suggest that utopian impulses may be discerned in a whole range of everyday activities and practices that embody desires for a transformed existence and hence that reach toward different futures.

For all their diversity, utopias have had a long and close association with urban communities. Many commentators trace the association back at least as far as the ancient Greeks, who conceived of the body politic in terms of the *polis* or city-state. Utopian thought since then abounds with images of new sparkling cities, as attested by such titles as the City of the Sun, the Garden City, and the Radiant City. The German saying “city air makes one free,” derived from a medieval legal principle about the freedom from serfdom granted to city dwellers, is similarly suggestive of how cities have often been viewed in utopian fashion as potential sites of enlightenment, democracy, and freedom against countervailing views of them as sites of alienation and oppression. Cities have been viewed not only as favored spatial settings for projections of ideal societies but also as instruments for bringing them about. They have been the subject of numerous utopian plans, schemes, and proposals that have aimed to confront current problems and radically transform their spaces as well as wider society. The considerable influence of utopian thought on how cities have been physically constructed as well as imagined, conceived, and lived is one reason why utopias are of critical interest within urban studies. Yet the importance of the question of utopia for urban studies extends further, for it invites consideration of the normative commitments and understandings of the good society that underpin different approaches to cities and urbanization in general, including in cases where these are not explicit.

Histories of Urban Utopias

If utopias have a long association with cities, then in recent decades that idea seems to have become

frayed and even broken as urban utopias have been subject to widespread skepticism, disillusionment, or even outright hostility. As with utopias in general, urban utopias are frequently dismissed for being supposedly escapist or irrelevant to current realities. They are also often rejected on the grounds of being dangerously authoritarian for seeking to prescribe solutions to present-day problems through fixed and dogmatic schemes. The contrast between this recent situation and that of earlier periods, especially around the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries when there occurred a surge in utopian visions and designs for cities, is striking. Strands of utopianism then became a major force in confronting problems of the time associated with poverty, ill health, overcrowding, poor sanitation, and high mortality rates. They helped to shape debate about urban imaginaries, policies, and potential interventions as cities became a target for critique and a focus for visions of radical transformation. The dreadfulness of urban conditions became, for many utopian thinkers, a spur for action to remake them for the better. Among the most influential urban utopias from that time was Ebenezer Howard’s Garden City, originally proposed in 1898 and promoted through the movement he established shortly afterward. Howard was in turn strongly influenced by, among other sources, the great literary utopias of Edward Bellamy’s *Looking Backward* (1888) and William Morris’s *News from Nowhere* (1890).

The early decades of the twentieth century were marked by an extraordinary array of utopian urban experiments from within modernist and avant-garde movements. These were often characterized by an ambivalent reaction toward existing cities, involving opposition and even revulsion toward their current forms, combined with a sense of possibility and hope that new urban spaces and ways of living were within reach. Many artists, architects, and planners took inspiration from new technologies and processes of industrialization as they plunged into the maelstrom of modern urban life with the intention of producing new spaces for a new human subject. In the process they sought to confront and to find ways of riding the social, economic, and cultural changes of the times, notably the upheavals associated with World War I and the Russian Revolution. Groups such as the futurists, the expressionists, the constructivists, the surrealists, and members of the

Bauhaus School issued challenging and, in some cases, revolutionary conceptions of urban space and architecture. Of particular influence on conceptions of urbanism were visions developed within the so-called modern movement of architects and planners, most prominently Le Corbusier, who proposed a series of utopian plans through the 1920s and 1930s, and who played a significant role in the Congrès International d'Architecture Moderne (CIAM), which was founded in 1928 to promote new perspectives. Such thinking gained increasing currency after World War II, when CIAM's attempts to break with the past and announce the new through comprehensive schemes for the remaking of urban environments found favor with governments seeking to rebuild shattered infrastructures and with those searching for dramatic means of state-sponsored processes of modernization.

Common to many urban utopias since ancient times has been their emphasis on ordered spatial forms. These spatial forms are meant to provide the settings for ordered and harmonious societies. For figures such as Howard and Le Corbusier, questions of space and urbanism were therefore privileged as a means of changing society, by "saving" it from revolutionary threat and ushering in a more rational and ordered future. The significance of such utopias lies not only in the grand projects they have inspired but also in the more diffuse and partial ways in which they have informed, shaped, and been in dialogue with wider urban debates and practices, hence their prominent place in many historical accounts of urban planning and design.

As David Pinder, Leonie Sandercock, and other critics argue, however, an important task of critical studies is to deconstruct the ideals, desires, dreams, and fears that utopias embody so as to demonstrate how, far from being the neutral or objective products of disembodied rationalist inquiry as they are often held to be, they are bound up with particular material class, gender, and ethnic interests. It is to consider from whose perspectives their claims about order and disorder are constructed and in what ways their visions of ordering depend upon forms of spatial and bodily regulation, exclusion, and control with differential effects. It is also to reflect on how they articulate wider assumptions, desires, and anxieties, for all utopias reflect—in part—the circumstances and places from which

they are projected. In that regard what thinkers are *unable* to imagine—the failures of their efforts to conceive cities otherwise—can be as revealing as the content of their projections.

Beyond the Ends of Utopia: Critical Perspectives

The apparently postutopian or anti-utopian climate of more recent decades seems to be indicative of a declining faith in the possibilities of radical socio-spatial change that drove earlier utopian thinkers. It is also connected with a perception among many critics that the urban utopias of the twentieth century fundamentally failed in their promise to build better worlds and that their utopian ambitions led to dystopian results. Much has been made of the disastrous consequences of trying to remold spaces and societies according to ideal blueprints. Opposition has come from varied quarters since the 1960s, from popular mobilizations against the alienating products of modernist urban projects to criticisms internal to the planning and architectural fields, including those under the sign of the postmodern. When considering charges of failure, however, it is worth noting how the materialization of any utopian project depends not simply upon its form but also on its ability to mobilize social processes appropriate to produce it. As David Harvey points out, the requirement to compromise and work with restrictive social processes, most often involving capital accumulation and the state, poses acute challenges to utopias based on spatial forms and raises questions as to the precise cause of their failure. The rhetoric of the "end of utopia" should also be questioned because, despite the obituaries, currents of utopianism remain significant in approaches to cities and processes of urbanization. This is not least in relation to the free market and neoliberal capitalism, described by Harvey as being based on a "utopianism of process." Through the utopianism of process, Harvey highlights the class interests and values that they aggressively assert. But he also emphasizes their necessary failure and indeed impossibility as they operate in "no place," detached from the spatialization that is required when they come to ground and that disrupts the purity of their assumptions and operations in practice.

This indicates the need to distinguish between different kinds of urban utopia and utopian thought. The criticism and condemnation of certain forms of utopias should not lead to blanket dismissals of utopianism as such, for urban utopias are diverse and can serve different functions. Not confined to the realms of urban planning, design, and architecture, they are connected to multiple constituencies, movements, and struggles. Recent years have indeed seen increasing interest in recovering different urban utopias and currents of utopianism that have previously been marginalized or neglected in mainstream historical accounts. They include utopias stemming from opposition to sexism, racism, homophobia, disabilism, and ecological degradation and from attempts to imagine and, in some cases, construct alternative urban spaces and cities. They range from artistic, architectural, literary, and theoretical projects to practical planning initiatives and intentional communities. Some find their roots within mobilizations that were critical of modernist utopias yet can be regarded as utopian themselves in their desire for radical alternatives. Significant in this regard is the utopianism of twentieth-century Marxist theorists such as Henri Lefebvre and avant-gardes such as the situationists. The latter critiqued modernist orthodoxies and capitalist urban development during the 1950s and 1960s while still insisting on the need to revolutionize urban landscapes and everyday life. Through their ideas and practices of the constructed situation and unitary urbanism, they sought to undermine the pacifying qualities of the society of the spectacle and to transform spatial and social conditions in their totality. Constant's New Babylon project, for example, developed during the late 1950s and 1960s initially within and subsequently beyond the Situationist International, was never meant as a planning scheme but was, rather, an attempt to challenge existing conceptions of cities and to provoke new perspectives by giving material shape to a revolutionary understanding of urban space, one that was meant ultimately to be created by the inhabitants themselves through a process of sociospatial revolution.

Part of the interest in returning to such projects today is to open up understandings about the potential critical functions of utopias and utopianism beyond the commonly assumed "blueprint"

model. This is significant for resisting wholesale rejections of utopianism and for confronting currently dominant urban orders constituted through neoliberal capitalism. Harvey is among a number of critics who have recently been seeking grounds for a revived utopianism to provide a means of countering claims that there is no alternative. In his own case he calls for a dialectical or spatiotemporal utopianism that avoids the pitfalls he associates with utopias of spatial form, on the one hand, and of utopias of social process, on the other. This aims to open up radically different paths for urbanization and urban life from a basis in the unrealized possibilities of the present. Many other current writers have found inspiration for developing utopian perspectives from the actions and mobilizations of radical social movements. Among them are those aligned with feminist movements that have been important for reconceptualizing utopianism in fluid, dynamic, and oppositional terms, based not on a fixed goal to be realized but on an approach toward, a sense of what could be and is not yet. Also significant are forms of radical environmentalism as well as global justice movements whose diverse elements are offering new perspectives for critical utopias based on the insistence that another world is possible. At a time of multiple urban and economic crises, what really seems utopian today, in the colloquial sense of impossible or unrealistic, is the continuation of neoliberal capitalism as it is currently constituted. The prospects for other kinds of utopias gathering force thus currently seem strong.

David Pinder

See also Lefebvre, Henri; Marxism and the City; Society of the Spectacle; Urban Planning

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V

VENICE, ITALY

Venice provides an exemplar of several urban phenomena, while also being a truly unique city. It has a rich history of artistic and cultural life that can occupy volumes, its architectural evolution is the subject of whole books, and its political history and development chart some of the great debates of the second millennium. This entry, after briefly outlining the history and unique political organization of the city, is going to focus on four key aspects of its urban structure and organization. Starting from Venice's role as a city-state at the head of a trading system and empire, it will (1) address the background of the city; (2) look at the symbolic landscape and iconography of the renaissance city; (3) examine the social divisions and segregations during the Republic; and (4) look at the emergence of Venice as a tourist historic city in modern times.

Background and Structure

The foundation of Venice is disputed, but most accounts look to refugees from other cities during post-Roman Germanic invasions settling the islands of what was to become the Venetian lagoon. The traditional date given for the founding of the city Republic is AD 697, but more significant for the city was when the ducal seat of the Byzantine governor and the seat of the bishop moved to what is now the site of Venice in the early ninth century AD, locating on the *rivoalto*,

literally high land, that became the Rialto in the city. The city's rise to power came through the twelfth century and was cemented by the crucial role of its fleet in supporting the fourth crusade in 1204; in return, it demanded that the crusaders sack Constantinople, enabling Venice to capitalize on the power vacuum in the eastern Mediterranean left by the seriously weakened Byzantine empire.

Through the next two centuries, Venice built an empire that extended through and beyond the Adriatic, the Dalmatian coast, the Ionian islands, through to Crete and Cyprus. In the late thirteenth century, Venice could claim to be the wealthiest city in Europe, credited with a fleet of 3,300 ships. Venice was one of the first preeminent world cities organizing, enabling, and profiting from an economy linking Occident and Orient. As such, it offers an example of both Pirenne's argument that cities play a key role in the emergence of nonfeudal forms through trading links and Braudel's analysis of their place in the emergence of a world economy.

From the later sixteenth century, this empire came under pressure from the Ottoman empire, rival cities and realms in Italy, and French interests. Cyprus was lost in the later sixteenth century, and Venetian power and wealth declined through the eighteenth century while the Austrian Hapsburg empire expanded. By the end of the eighteenth century, its merchant fleet had declined to a tenth of its peak size; it possessed less than a dozen warships in 1796. The following year, it fell to Napoleon and in the ensuing peace treaty lost its independence and became an Austrian dominion.

The Republic (often referred to as *La Serenissima*, from the Venetian title of Most Serene Republic) operated a unique system of urban governance—often romanticized as showing a spirit of urban democracy. The head of state was the doge, who was an aristocrat elected by the great council, which included most aristocratic families. The doge ruled in conjunction with subgroups of the council that formed the *signoria* and a senate of 60 members of the great council, along with the Council of Ten, which formed the main governing group, and the Council of Three, which was responsible for security.

Venice claimed that these elements thus combined monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements of governance and promoted itself as embodying urban democracy. The careful division of roles and politics relied on a finely grained set of rights and hierarchies. Thus, aristocrats were forbidden from competing in commerce but could vote in the elections and were legally obliged to dress as befitted their station in silk garments. This led some poorer aristocratic families, denied alternate opportunities, to subsist by selling their votes; it also created the astonished misunderstanding of visitors, who reported the city was so fabulously wealthy that even the beggars wore silk. Meanwhile, the lower orders were barred from such display through sumptuary laws. These limits are revealed in the gorgeous scenes depicted in Canaletto's painting, *The Reception of the French Ambassador in Venice*, where in 1459 the Senate lifted the restrictions especially to impress the visiting dignitaries.

Venice was one of the maritime republics that flourished as trading centers in medieval Italy (along with Amalfi, Pisa, and Genoa); they dominated trade in the Mediterranean and echoed the power of northern trading cities such as Amsterdam and the Hanseatic cities. Of Venice's own products, silk and glassware were probably the most prominent, but its wealth came as much through linking other areas as its own products. Venice has to be understood as a mercantile city organized through the scale of these trading networks and its pivotal role in connecting European and Asian trading systems. It was from Venice that Marco Polo followed the silk route back to China, and its position at the exchange between cultures marked its culture and architecture. The building style often included elements drawn from Byzantine and other

non-European cultures. Unlike the walled hill towns of Italy, it was never a closed entity but has to be seen in Burke's sense as an information center for trade and commerce between east and west—an open, porous city composed of flows moving through it. It pioneered technologies of exchange and money forms to enable long-distance trade and became a financial center, with banks to this day named after the *banco* on which money exchangers sat.

Like many medieval cities, Venice was characterized by a division into quarters, or in Venice's case the six *sestieri* (being Cannaregio, San Polo, Dorsoduro, Santa Croce, San Marco, and Castello), each of which comprised several parishes. Venice's parish structure reflects the most obvious fact of its organization around canals as the major traffic ways. Streets are generally only a few feet wide and often meander and indeed even go under and through buildings (the so-called *soto porto*). Parishes and neighborhoods tended to originate as islands, which were gradually in-filled by development, while the channels between islands became canals. The squares in these parishes are unusual in not being called *piazza* (a designation reserved for Piazza San Marco in front of the doge's palace and the basilica) and instead are known as *campo*, literally fields, from the originally grassed areas in the middle of islands that formerly offered grazing and horticultural areas. These *campi* became the focal point for community activities and buildings such as churches and later shops.

Gradually, the canals between islands became linked by a network of bridges. The boundary line between parishes thus tended to run down the middle of canals. Parishes themselves were thus known as *entro i ponti* (inside the bridges), with bridges that crossed from one parish to another as liminal zones forming a kind of social no-man's land associated with marginal inhabitants and activities. A number of bridges became the sites for ritualized intercommunal violence, the so-called "battle of the fists," where rival neighborhoods staged fights over the control of bridges, with thousands of spectators watching from rooftops, balconies, and canal boats.

Symbolic Landscape

This urban morphology was connected with spatial and social structures. It came to symbolize and

encode specific relations and notions of the Venetian city and state. Looking at the Piazza San Marco as an example of an early planned Renaissance setting, Denis Cosgrove argues one can see the elements of the republican polity mapped out in the urban fabric. There are axes of the sacred (the basilica) and secular (the flanking arcades of the procuratie), the monarchical (the doge's palace), the aristocratic and republican, as well as oppositions of sea and land—the last articulated most obviously in the annual ritual wedding of Venice with the sea. This constellation of symbolic sites was itself cast within a wider triangular pattern of locations surrounding the doge's palace and the basilica that contrasted San Marco as the site of order and ritual with the Arsenal as a place of technology and the Rialto as dominated by a commercial logic.

The Venetian symbolic landscape created sites of heightened charge and significance for different people and occasions. For example, the gendering of social and spatial worlds is illustrated in Venetian legal judgments. The work of Dennis Romano suggests that legal space involved both managing the moral distance of good and bad and also the use of locations whose symbolic meaning addressed the crime or the victim. Punishment might involve the exclusion of offenders from both direct and indirect access to political power by excluding them physically from the places around San Marco where that power was exercised, as in a judgment by the Council of Ten dated 1323, which forbade three noblemen from going to San Marco and Rialto and further prohibited them from using the main commercial street, the Mercerie, or any of the other main thoroughfares leading to San Marco and Rialto. Alternately, a cheating merchant would be denounced in the Rialto, as when in 1349, for example, the Council of Forty passed judgment on a goldsmith who had defrauded a client. His dishonesty was announced in the street of the goldsmiths and at the public scales at Rialto. When the courts sought to rescue a defamed woman's honor, it had the slanderer taken and castigated during Mass in her own and neighboring parish churches. These judgments then reveal the authorities' tacit map of different communities and audiences associated with different parts of the city.

Social Divisions

Space was thus used to express social differences but also to sustain and enforce social segregation. One can see this social division in the separate scale of a female geography of parish, neighborhood, and home that was enforced by the double veiling of women beyond those confines—women could meet in the *campo* to see neighbors, do the shopping, visit the local church, and perform any other domestic errands, but beyond the parish, they had to be under the double veiling of costume and *felze* (an awning on a gondola).

This regulation and marking of space by gender can also be seen in concerns over gossip, with the city authorities concerned over the movement of the word on the street. The symbolic geography of Venice located public speech in San Marco and the information of commerce in the Rialto; it confined feminized gossip to the neighborhoods. In practice, however, this division is less clear because male gossip was a crucial, if sometimes destabilizing part of politics, especially around the *broglio* and elections—to the extent that the state regulated speech at these times in key locations. Moreover, as a commercial center, the exchange of information was crucial to the functioning of the city as a market.

The gendering of the use of spaces in the city is also expressed in the control of female sexuality. Thus, respectable women would not be seen on the Rialto because it was morally hazardous: Money-changing conducted there bordered on the usurious, although this was religiously disallowed, and the *insula Rivoalti* had a semiofficial designation as the center of prostitution. The state's presumption was that women in known areas were prostitutes, and prostitution was often policed by being socially and spatially confined and controlled—trying to spatially separate reputable and disreputable women.

Rather than banning prostitution, the city had always found ways to accommodate it as part of the trade and traffic in the city, to the extent that, in 1358, the Grand Council of Venice declared that prostitution was “absolutely indispensable to the world.” The registers of 1490 record more than 11,000 prostitutes in the city, and an estimate from the patrician Marin Sanudo in the early sixteenth century was that 10 percent of women were

prostitutes. Even if an exaggeration, this suggests the level of concern about and visibility of prostitution, and certainly in the eighteenth century, Venice acquired a reputation as a center of prostitution and gambling throughout Europe. Attempts to control and demarcate respectable and disreputable women were ongoing, and their recurrence suggests they were not especially successful.

Thus, prostitutes had regulations demanding a yellow veil, and controls were placed on their clothing to set them apart from other women. While a Sumptuary Law of 1606 enacted that

it was a public shame that prostitutes were to be seen in the streets and churches, and elsewhere, so much bejewelled and well-dressed, that very often noble ladies and women citizens, because there is no difference in their attire from that of the above-said women, are confused with them; not only by foreigners, but by the inhabitants, who are unable to tell the good from the bad . . . therefore it is proclaimed that no prostitute may wear, nor have on any part of her person, gold, silver or silk, nor wear necklaces, pearls or jewelled or plain rings, either in their ears or on their hands.

Equally specific spaces served to mark out virtue, with convents created that again spatially defined female virtue and where virginity was conjoined with public honor. Rather than being centers of religious calling, these segregated spaces offered a place where daughters of noble families might be ensconced so that they did not dilute family inheritances and their sexual conduct attracted approbation rather than shame. Houses for the salvation of poor women were endowed by rich patrons; the inhabitants were abjured from leaving for fear over their spiritual health. These all formed spatial strategies for confining, placing, and managing women whose sexuality was seen as a threat to the social order.

If this segregation was on gender lines, perhaps the most famous segregation was by ethnicity. Venice had a large Jewish population throughout the Republic, partly associated with the money lending and currency operations on the Rialto—from which Christians were excluded by religious injunctions against usury. The hypocritical and murky situation is used by Shakespeare in his *Merchant of Venice*.

The regulation of the Jewish population involved the creation of the world's first ghetto when in 1516 the Council of Ten confined the Jews in the Nuovo (New), then Vecchio (Old, 1541), then Novissimo (Newest, 1633) ghettos in Canareggio. These three courts housed up to 5,000 people and had buildings up to nine floors in height—making it the most densely populated part of a densely populated city. When outside the ghetto, Jews were required to wear a yellow *bareta* (hat), like prostitutes, and were further subject to a curfew after dark, save for doctors of medicine (whose liberty was later revoked). The ghetto was locked and guarded by Christian doorkeepers for which the city made the residents of the ghetto pay.

There were further ordinances that made sex between Christians and Jews a crime of the flesh alongside prostitution, and in both cases, the state had a pattern of social and spatial containment of figures seen as marginal or threatening to the social order.

Emergence as a Tourist City

The celebrity of the thus policed vice industries, principally, prostitution and gambling, began to turn Venice into a tourist center by the eighteenth century. Its development of the Lido cemented this in the nineteenth century, and Venice has become one of the archetypal tourist historic cities. It now makes a living from visitors who consume the legacy of the *serenissima*. Although in the early Renaissance, the population of Venice had reached 120,000, this has now fallen to 60,000 (actually living in the city), of whom more than 25 percent are older than 65. Against this, are annual visitor numbers of around 8 million, of whom two-thirds are day trippers, the so-called *Turisti mordi e fuggi* (“eat and run” tourists), and the majority of visitor activity is confined to a triangle formed by the Piazza San Marco, the Rialto, and the Accademia bridge. The negotiation of crowds of (lost) visitors in the tangle of pedestrian streets has become a major issue for residents, as has the strain on other elements of the infrastructure and complaints about tourists behaving inappropriately—playing Frisbee and the like on the San Marco “beach.”

Meanwhile, street vendors (of often dubious legality), selling souvenirs and goods (of often dubious

legality), through many main thoroughfares adding to the congestion. The imbalances mean there are questions as to whether the city is now more of a theme park than a living entity, where locals perform the role of Venetians. The replacement of services catering to locals with those targeted at tourists has been driven by an inexorable financial logic and connects with the decline of the resident population. The *campi* are now often devoted to open-air cafés and tourist establishments rather than being the focus of community life.

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See also Ghetto; Heritage City; Historic Cities; Medieval Town Design; Mediterranean Cities; Racialization; Renaissance City; Tourism

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VERANDA

The veranda can be found across a range of geographies and time periods. It is an exterior, semi-open building element constructed as an extension to or as a separate object attached to a more substantial structure. Found in domestic and public buildings, it can encircle a building or occupy part of its facade. Several other terms have been used to describe the same or similar building elements, including *porch*, *portico*, *piazza*, and *gallery*. This range of terminology corresponds to a range of hypotheses about the origins of the veranda.

Veranda first occurs in a record of Vasco da Gama's 1498 trip to India. From this and other sources, it is clear that the word was used in fifteenth-century architecture in Portugal. Portuguese speakers in India may have applied veranda to an Indian building element that seemed familiar. Indians used similar words that originated in Sanskrit and Persian. British administrators appropriated the form as they developed the bungalow into a specialized residence for Europeans in the tropics. Verandas offered an ideal site for the enactment of power and for activities that enabled social exclusion on racial and cultural grounds. The term, first documented in England in 1800 and Australia in 1805, was diffused as Europeans moved around the world to further their interests.

Drawing on histories of migration, Jay Edwards has summarized the main theories of origin for the veranda. Before the fifteenth century, buildings raised on plinths, with open sides supported on posts, were common in West Africa. Similar forms were found in areas of central and southern Africa. In eastern Africa, the Swahili *baraza* served comparable functions.

Locals used these veranda-like spaces for socializing, sleeping, and working. Slaves took this form to the New World, where it was firmly established by the seventeenth century.

Sixteenth-century Italian villas included open loggias and pedimented porticos, borrowed from classical antiquity. In contrast to West African verandas, loggias and porticos served primarily representational purposes. They became popular throughout Europe and may have influenced the emergence of verandas in the colonies. Similarly, projecting roofs and galleries occurred in Portugal

and Normandy, from where they reached the Americas, offering ready references for existing forms. With the processes of exchange characteristic of cultural contact zones, new veranda forms found their way back to Africa, South Asia, and Europe.

The current influence of the veranda is perhaps most discernible in the southern United States where the porch still exerts a strong influence on the cultural imagination and built environment. Its significance in everyday life engages questions of race, gender, and class because of its unique physical and psychological liminality.

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See also Bungalow; Colonial City

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W

WALKING CITY

The relationship between walking and the city has been conceptualized in numerous different ways. An examination of urban, social, and cultural theoretical writings begins to reveal the multiplicity and complexity of how urban pedestrian movement is both written about and practiced. Of these multiple engagements with urban walking, three significant themes emerge, which include urban pedestrian movement as a means of apprehending the city or self, pedestrian movement in the context of debates concerning the demise of the public sphere and urban social encounters, and walking being understood in relation to the multiple spatiotemporal rhythms of everyday urban practices.

Flânerie in Contemporary Urbanism

Recent urban theory and research has increasingly drawn on walking, or the tradition of *flânerie*, as a means of understanding the urban. The concept of the *flâneur* originated in the work of the French poet Charles Baudelaire and revolves around the concept of a gazing, male individual wandering through the public spaces of the city in a detached, ironic manner. For example, in his writings, Walter Benjamin develops his own urban consciousness via the meanderings of the nineteenth-century flâneur.

The male flâneur can be argued to illustrate the emancipatory potential of walking as he moved

freely through the different spaces of the city and observed its many activities. For some, focusing on these peripatetic movements makes it possible to read and increase our understanding of cities. For example, walking has been a medium for various writers and artists to engage with the city. These artistic engagements have drawn on the practice of walking as a means of refining their knowledge of the city. Such instances might include walking the streets to study the city's everyday rituals and habits or to emphasize the sensory and sensual dimensions of urban life. David Pinder has examined how many contemporary artists and writers have used the practice of walking to explore and uncover different routes, paths, and spaces in the city. In so doing, he seeks to explore the connection between art and urban walking and engaging with new and emergent geographies of the city.

Yet a series of critiques can be leveled at flânerie as a mode of apprehending the urban. The first relates to what has been described as a reverse privileging whereby the walker's street-level perspective neglects the broader contexts of politics and power (see Macauley 2000). A second concern is the heavily theoretical nature of the concept of the flâneur as a method of engaging with the city. Furthermore, the extent to which this method is in fact an emancipation away from the supposed confines of urban theory is questionable as the flâneur's wanderings have been considered highly reflexive and a theoretical approach in, and of, themselves. Third are issues relating to gender. The figure of the flâneur is characterized, shaped, and mediated through a male gaze that creates a gender

bias and neglect of how women engage with their urban environments.

The Democratic Possibilities of Walking

Urban walking has often been situated within discussions concerning the democratic and civilizing possibilities of city spaces. It has been linked with urban citizenship and noted for its emancipatory potential as people move on foot with and among strangers. For example, in the 1960s, Jane Jacobs wrote the hugely influential book *The Death and Life of the Great American Cities*, which stresses the importance of streets and sidewalks to the unplanned interaction of strangers, and the role these interactions play in maintaining safe urban areas. It is argued that a well-used street is a safe street, and successful city neighborhoods are those that use the presence of strangers as a safety measure in increasing the number of eyes on the street.

Furthermore, in the 1970s, Richard Sennett wrote about the nature of encounters between strangers when walking and negotiating public space in the city. He proposes that the social heterogeneity of public urban spaces offers unpredictable encounters that are democratic and civilizing. The work of French social theorist Michel de Certeau also frames walking as a form of urban emancipation that opens up a range of democratic possibilities. Within this context, walking can be understood as a distinctly political act. De Certeau rejects the notion that pedestrians are shaped by urban space and control and explores walking as a mode of political resistance. He distinguishes between the strategies of the powerful in their production of space and the tactics of pedestrians who disrupt the rational plan of the city.

Engaging with movement as a form of political resistance was also drawn on by Guy Debord in the notion of the *dérive*. Like the flâneur's walk, the *dérive* constituted a drifting motion around and through the city, a movement that represented a political statement against the rational, ordered, capitalist city. Events such as Reclaim the Night are more contemporary examples of these pedestrian acts of resistance, whereby walking on the street at night constitutes resistance to the dominant view that women cannot walk at night without the presence of men.

However, the emancipatory potential and democratic possibilities of urban walking are far from straightforward and unproblematic. For example, much of the literature on walking in the city is imbued with a degree of romanticism; walking is often considered, without question, as a positive urban practice. This romanticism is also a theme that runs through urban and pedestrian policy, particularly in relation to promoting healthy cities and walking-to-school and -work campaigns. Once the physical environment is considered to be pedestrian friendly, the negative aspects of walking in the city are rarely called into question.

The fear often experienced by the urban pedestrian illustrates some of the limitations in considering walking as an emancipatory practice. There is no doubt that fear of crime is a phenomenon that shapes cities and has a great impact on the practice of walking in terms of how, where, and if people walk. Research has started to reveal the complexities of geographies of fear overlooked by policy, including work by Rachel Pain and Gill Valentine. However, there is little in the way in which geographies of fear influence and limit the emancipatory potential of urban walking.

The contradictions and complexities surrounding the practice of walking and its emancipatory potential are perhaps best exemplified by some of the academic writings on women's experiences in urban public spaces. For example, Elizabeth Wilson draws specific attention to how the city is a place of excitement and opportunity for women and not just a place to be feared. Thus, it is possible for women not only to experience fear as they negotiate urban public space but also to find freedom when roaming the streets. This freedom and fear associated with pedestrian activity in the urban environment illustrate the ambivalence that surrounds the practice of walking in the city.

Mobilities, Time, Space, Rhythm

However, walking in the city needs to be situated within the multiple spatiotemporal rhythms of everyday urban practices to understand how the time-space routines of pedestrian movements and the city emerge out of and shape individual and collective urban walking patterns. Concerns with mobility have become increasingly established in providing critiques of place-based accounts of social

and cultural landscapes, practices, and materialities. This mobility turn is positioned as a challenge to “a-mobile” social science research. For example, geographers such as Tim Cresswell emphasize the importance of engaging with what actually happens between A and B and how mobility is experienced and practiced. However, there have been criticisms leveled at current work on mobilities as focusing too much on transnational and elite forms of movement such as air travel and neglecting more everyday mobilities such as walking.

A key feature of this mobility turn has been a move away from abstract notions of time, space, and place such as those that emerged from the work of Torsten Hägerstrand in the 1960s on time geography. Hägerstrand and his colleagues’ primary concern was the movement of individuals through time and space. These movements were mapped onto time–space graphs. For example, in considering urban rhythms, Mike Crang critiques linear understandings of time and the everyday that frame the work of time geographers such as Hägerstrand. Crang is concerned with the actual experience of time–space and how these are created through time–space practices as opposed to time–space measurements/representations of activity that featured in early work on time geography.

Kirsten Simonsen also proposes that the city should be approached in relation to multiple temporalities and spatialities as opposed to abstract concepts of time–space. She draws attention to Henri Lefebvre’s project of rhythm analysis and suggests notions of rhythm as a means of developing these alternative understandings of the city. Lefebvre argued that rhythms emerge from the interactions of place, time, and an outlay of energy. Although Lefebvre’s project was criticized for being incomplete and elusive, the notion of rhythm is a productive means for engaging with the interrelatedness of time and space in the context of urban pedestrian movement.

Jennie Middleton

See also Benjamin, Walter; de Certeau, Michel; *Flâneur*; Jacobs, Jane; Lefebvre, Henri; Public Realm; Time Geography

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WASTE

Urban settlements produce waste of multifarious kinds through their very functioning. The management of and failure to manage such wastes have often been taken as indexes of civilization—that is the spirit of *civitas*, and urban citizenship. Modern technologies have emphasized the hiding of waste and its removal far from the city as speedily and unobtrusively as possible. This distancing reflects the moral coding of waste—as both wasteful, shameful even, and thus symbolically

contaminating those near it. The disappearance of waste may be said to lead to both a popular and academic oversight of waste in urban studies as a literally invisible issue. Wastes of various sorts reflect the human, animal, industrial, and social processes of urban life, and they have been intrinsic to the economies, cultures and societies of all cities. This entry will think through urban wastes in four ways. It will examine its spatial, then symbolic, then economic dimensions and conclude with a look at current shifts in governance of waste. This entry will focus on solid wastes rather than that carried in sewer systems or wastes of energy or intangible wastes of, say, time or talent.

Thinking about cities through waste is both necessary and revealing. Waste is a commonsensical term, but closer scrutiny reveals that it is freighted with implications. Thus, it has general negative connotations about a loss of resource or a loss of opportunity. It has also implied a temporality and spatiality about something leaving a bounded system—coming to the end of its life or being moved outside the system. In both cases, it is often connected conceptually and materially to wastelands, as environments laid waste or contaminated. Underneath most of this, there is also the traditional sense, then, that waste is whatever is left from a given process to be disposed of later. However, this linear narrative overlooks that what is a waste from one process may be a resource to another. Equally, there may be a fuzzy line between what is a waste and a stock of material awaiting processing. This entry thus uses conceptualizations from different traditions to unpack waste.

Waste at the Margins

Waste is central to urban processes—while at the same time being economically, symbolically, and geographically marginalized. Thus, there have been waste dumps and waste sites for as long as there have been cities because a concentration of people inevitably produces refuse and issues of disposal. The biblical images of the fires of hell were inspired by the burning of refuse at dumps in Gehenna, the valley of Hinnom at the southwest of ancient Jerusalem. This also became the site, ritually contaminated by association with human sacrifice and wastes, which was then used for the disposal of bodies of animals and criminals—who

had been spatially and symbolically ejected from the city.

The continued presence of peripheral waste dumps as wastelands can be found in many urban writings such as Charles Dickens's *Our Mutual Friend*, with his account of “a tract of suburban Sahara, where tiles and bricks were burnt, bones were boiled, carpets were beat, rubbish was shot, dogs were fought, and dust was heaped by contractors.”

Wastes have typically been removed to the margins of urban areas. Thus, medieval cities located tanneries and dyeing works, with the obnoxious wastes they produced, at the edge of urban areas. Continuing that tradition, much urban policy has organized the physical removal of waste and then its containment. Much attention focuses on municipal solid waste—what is conventionally thought of as domestic garbage (although in the United Kingdom, household waste makes up as little as 7 percent of the national total). Significant increases in the amounts of household waste have gone hand in hand with both increasing quantities but also changing types of consumption (for instance, falling amounts of ash from domestic heating but rising amounts of packaging waste). Over time, most countries have moved to systems where, if solid waste is to be dumped, it is done in managed, sealed waste dumps as opposed to open dumps. Managed dumps are designed to contain wastes and prevent contamination of groundwater through sealing waste in cells that are progressively opened and closed over the life of the landfill site.

Unsurprisingly, municipal politics often means such sites are located on the boundaries of municipal authority control—both away from most people and where some of any adverse effects (smell, noise, or loss of amenity) are borne by those outside the municipality. Large conurbations have often faced serious issues in finding sites in neighboring jurisdictions for disposal of waste. Emissions of air pollution and water-borne pollution have also been subject to attempts to both marginalize and distance wastes from urban life—with wealthy areas traditionally located upwind, according to prevailing currents, of aerial pollution sources, and measures to increase chimney heights of sources, including waste incinerators, to both disperse and distance airborne wastes.

The spatial politics of waste, especially toxic wastes, inspired the environmental justice movement

in the United States. The cause célèbre that started the movement was when African American homeowners in Houston fought to keep the Whispering Pines landfill out of their suburban middle-income neighborhood. Studies showed that the location of waste sites was often proximate to areas with high numbers of people of color. The 1979 lawsuit, *Bean v. Southwestern Waste Management, Inc.*, was the first to challenge the locating of waste facilities using civil rights laws to prevent discrimination. The Commission for Racial Justice conducted a broad survey, resulting in its report *Toxic Waste and Race*, which correlated waste-processing sites with the demographic characteristics of their locations. That study found race to be the most significant variable in predicting where these waste-processing facilities were located—rather than land values, home ownership types, or income levels.

Waste as Symbol

The connection of waste with marginal groups is then clear in both historic and contemporary societies. In anthropological terms, contact with or proximity to waste creates a reputational hazard. Societies have been both physically but also symbolically working to distance themselves from dirt. In her 1984 book, the anthropologist Mary Douglas famously connected the ideas of dirt and pollution with the spatial enactment of society—that dirt was matter out of place and thus was a function of social categories and definitions of what belonged where: “Where there is dirt there is always a system. Dirt is the by-product of a systematic ordering and classification of matter, in so far as ordering involves rejecting inappropriate elements” (p. 35).

From this flows two points: first, that categories and social orders are bound to materials but not determined by those materials. What is polluting waste in one society may not be treated so in another time and place. The rejection of wastes as polluting is always conditional and not always successful. The psychoanalytic tradition calls this abjection—where the disavowed and dirty secret nonetheless remains present or marks us by the sign of its disposal. Second, wastes are constitutive of certain social activities and categories. Thus, for instance, there are social processes of divestment of objects that match those more often studied

processes of purchasing and consumption in creating and maintaining social categories. These processes may be linked to the values attributed to goods, their relative longevity, or people’s social biographies. Thus, a household may divest itself of cots, buggies, and prams to acquire bicycles, uniforms, and skateboards. The elements to be discarded may then be turned into waste—or they may be passed on for use by others.

Alternately, some objects acquired as gifts may not be declared wastes due to the symbolic relations they embody. People have both an ethics and aesthetics of waste—defining which objects are disposed of through different channels: passed on to others entering the category, serving to cement social relations, adapted for new uses or status, or discarded. Processes of acquisition, utilization, and divestment move hand in hand and are part of reproducing social order and categories. These different practices of disposal connect with values remaining or found in the objects.

Waste and Value

Objects deemed waste by some may have value for others. Indeed, the trope of waste salvage has been used to illustrate the intimate entanglement of value and waste. Dickens had the Big Heap in *Our Mutual Friend*, where the mounds of rubbish that lay behind the wealth of the Golden Dustman symbolized a speculative economy in the novel. Walter Benjamin, writing on Paris in 1976, used the *chiffonnier* (or ragpicker) as one of the figures to illustrate the contradictions and inequities of modernity:

When the new industrial processes had given refuse a certain value, ragpickers appeared in the cities in larger numbers . . . The ragpicker fascinated his epoch. The eyes of the first investigators of pauperism were fixed on him with the mute question as to where the limits of human misery lay. (p. 19)

Benjamin here positions the social fascination with the poorest elements in society as the fascination with the persistence of what seem medieval conditions in the heart of modernity. An example of both the possibilities of recovering value in urban societies and the fine-grained processing of wastes involved can be found in Mayhew’s nineteenth-century

account of *London Labour and the London Poor*. He suggested this specialization and capacity to recycle waste was especially common in a large city with extreme poverty; also, the scale and division of labor were not to be found in small towns. The possibilities of finding value in the most remarkable wastes are clear in his study of one poor lodging house where he reveals,

at one time there were as many as 9 persons lodging in this house who subsisted by picking up dogs' dung out of the streets, getting about 5s. for every basketful . . . There are generally lodging in the house a few bone-grubbers, who pick up bones, rags, iron, Sic., out of the streets. Their average earnings are about 1s per day. There are several mud-larks, or youths who go down to the water-side when the tide is out, to see whether any article of value has been left upon the bank of the river. (p. 315)

The dog excrement was called "pure" and used in leather tanning yards. Indeed, there was even, Mayhew recorded, a hierarchy of kinds of dog excrement with the "dry limy sort" attracting the highest price—and even a criminal subindustry that adulterated dog feces with mortar to increase its weight. The presence of the figure of the rag collector in social studies illustrates both the value of waste and the abject status of workers—in the senses of both wretched life—and material—that we wish to forget yet are unable to fully banish.

Issues of reclamation and ragpicking continue in the contemporary world. In developing countries especially, open dumps can still be the sites of labor for the urban poor seeking recoverable materials and values, and this is often a highly organized and structured activity with divisions of responsibility, resellers, and traders. In other circumstances, towns have made a specialty of processing wastes imported especially. In developed countries, the residual value in waste consumer products has led to the development of urban mining, extracting metals from former waste dumps; a ton of ore from a gold mine produces an average of 5 grams of gold, whereas a ton of discarded mobile phones can yield 150 grams and also contains around 100 kilograms of copper and 3 kilograms of silver, among other metals.

The recoverable values and transformations of wastes have been highlighted by industrial metabolism approaches to city economies, which emphasize how economic activity entails flows and exchanges of energies and materials in a system. Here, wastes tend to be seen not just as products at the end of their lives but also losses between transformations. The tracing of material transformations points to waste as more than simply an "end of pipe" issue, but one endemic to economic production. The urban system is then seen as a system of stocks, flows, and transformations. Waste, then, includes valueless by-products that may be disposed of or stockpiled. However, such products may cease to be waste if a use is found for them, and they can be turned into co-products. An example might be combined heat and power plants that use the waste hot water from power generation to heat neighborhoods. This example is even more telling if the plant is fueled by burning waste. It serves both to dispose of waste by incineration and to turn that waste into a resource for producing heat and light.

Waste Regimes

If the treatment of waste is thus multifaceted and variable, so are the structures governing it. Across nations, there are different sets of priorities reflecting different and evolving circumstances leading to different policy environments for cities. Thus, Denmark has emphasized combined heat and power plants based on incineration and a pattern of small-scale power production but also coordinated planning of residential development and power infrastructure. In Britain, technologies of incineration met large-scale popular resistance, and planning structures inhibited urban authorities from developing local heating systems, so landfill has been the predominant strategy. Historically, demands of hygiene have led to an emphasis on disposal while periods of wartime scarcity led to regimes focusing on recycling.

Looking at communist Hungary, Zsuzsa Gilles talks of different waste regimes as characterizing phases of economic development. For instance, one predominating in the early years of state socialism was organized around lessons learned from the metal industries about the reuse of by-products, which became a mode of organizing the economy

around efficiency and waste minimization but which then failed to make provision for toxic by-products, which ended up stockpiled and unprocessed.

Currently, many Western countries are adopting governance regimes that problematize disposal and instead emphasize diversion for reuse and move to seeing waste as a resource. These governance regimes affect different state actors at different scales in different ways. For cities, the implementation of this may affect whether they segregate waste at collection, which is expensive but creates higher potential resource values, or whether households have obligations to segregate waste streams. For urban governments, segregating waste can involve issues of housing stock—with large multi-dwelling units being physically less amenable to segregated waste stream collection if, for example, they use communal waste disposal chutes.

These different systems of governing waste make visible new forms of rationalities and rely on their being encoded in the urban fabric in different ways. As seen in the case of Hungary, these rationalities render certain kinds of practices and materials as models and some as problematic. They also increasingly form means of governing the behavior of urban citizens, with new schemes being suggested (such as Pay-as-You-Throw charges for waste disposal) designed to alter conduct and senses of waste.

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See also Benjamin, Walter; Environmental Policy; Governance; Sewer; Sustainable Development; Toilets

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WOMEN AND THE CITY

As long as there have been cities, women have lived in them. The ways that cities shape women's lives, however, and the ways women shape cities have changed over time. Urban life initially had a liberating effect on women's lives. In the city, women could become anonymous, and that freed them from restrictions and the public view in more rural communities. In the context of industrialization and more recent history, the fate of women in cities changed drastically. Issues of safety, housing, economics, and the environment have become central to women's survival in cities. In response to increased poverty, deteriorating infrastructure and environments, and increased gender-based violence, women have organized and used their community resources to challenge the urban form of cities and the social and political policies and processes that impact their lives.

One of the important factors in understanding shifts in cities and the agency of women are the transnational and cultural changes that have occurred in cities. During the great migration from

the southern states of large numbers of African Americans in the 1930s to 1960s, cities changed. African American women were newly incorporated in sectors of the economy previously reserved for men or white women. The growth of the Latino population since 1980, as a result of both birth rates and migration, has also helped to shape urbanization processes. The magnitude of social inequality in terms of economic development opportunities, environmental degradation, limited housing choices, and safety for women, especially women of color, has fostered important community activism, often led by women.

Economic Development Opportunities

Women have been increasingly important in the growth and competitiveness of cities in the global market, yet their contributions are unrecognized, and they still earn less money than men. In the United States, Latina women earn 56 cents, African American women 62 cents, and White women 72 cents for every dollar White men earn. The glass ceiling for women and opportunities in cities are higher and better than in rural areas by virtue of density and diversity, but factors still stymie the way women can advance to economic self-sufficiency. These inequalities have impacted the daily life of women in cities, and women have responded by organizing and influencing cities. Through education programs, through informal work in small businesses or home-based income-generating activities, women have been creating opportunities for themselves and their families. They have done this often while performing full-time unpaid work in the home, such as housework and child and elder care.

One of the ways that women have organized around economic development has focused on green jobs in the context of environmental racism in urban areas. Women organizing in cities to promote environmental justice have proven to be important. Women for Economic Justice is a group in Chicago that works to support economic independence for women of color, who may also be survivors of violence. The organization supports small businesses, social purpose business, and cooperative development through a series of workshops on financial literacy, domestic violence, co-op development, and economic analysis. The women in these groups have formed co-ops that

use recycled material to make bags, a Mexican catering service using organic ingredients, and plants for green roofs.

Madres del Este de Los Angeles Santa Isabel (MELA) in Los Angeles was founded in response to the proposed construction of a state prison in Boyle Heights, an East Los Angeles neighborhood. Members became active in a series of outreach projects and programs concerning their community, including the Lanser Project, in which MELA participated in halting a proposed municipal waste incinerator in East Los Angeles. In addition, the group organized against the building of an oil pipeline that would have gone three feet under an East Los Angeles Junior High School. They also have a mentor task force and a scholarship program, which help students attain higher education, preparing them for better economic opportunities in the workforce.

Majora Carter in the South Bronx of New York has raised millions of dollars to support redevelopment from below. Her focus has been environmental justice and how to use the environment to “green the ghetto” with green jobs and green spaces. She has been an incredible force tying economic and environmental development together.

Housing Policy and the Feminization of Poverty

At the turn of the nineteenth century, housing was unregulated, which led to congestion and substandard housing as cities expanded with industrialization. Women championed issues of housing for the poor and set up settlement housing. From 1929 to 1949, during the growing influence of the automobile and zoning, which separated industrial, retail, and residential land uses, suburbanization quickened. The result was poor economically isolated women in the urban cores and middle-class women physically isolated in the suburbs—the feminization of poverty.

From 1949 to 1981, urban renewal policies and projects had a negative impact on poorer communities, with the result that the poor were warehoused in public housing, contributing to their increasing isolation physically, economically, and socially. A majority of public housing tenants were single women with children; they had no opportunity to be financially independent.

Then from 1981 to 2004, poverty deconcentration programs in public housing nationally provided tenants with Section 8 vouchers that allowed them to rent housing in other neighborhoods. In this process, many units of public housing were removed through HOPE VI programs to create mixed-income development. HOPE VI and Section 8 programs offer higher quality housing for public housing tenants, but at the cost of the overall quantity of subsidized units. Instead of giving the lowest-income tenants priority for subsidized units, the late 1990s and 2000s saw an increase in subsidies that do not calculate a household's rent based on income but instead charge a below-market rate for moderate-income households. The Low Income Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) for example, subsidizes households earning between 80 and 110 percent of Area Median Income (AMI). Essentially, through such discounted programs, localities can satisfy housing affordability quotas without providing decent affordable housing to those who need subsidized housing the most.

Since 2000, the dominant affordable housing policy has been the push for low-income homeownership. Simultaneously during this past decade, there has been a steep rise in predatory subprime loans to low-income households. The result has been a record number of foreclosures and owner-occupied vacancies. Middle- and low-income homeowners and renters are both hit hard from owner-occupied and rental housing evictions. Demand for rental housing has increased because homeowners and would-be homeowners turn to the rental market for housing needs at the same time foreclosed rental properties remain vacant, cutting into the supply of rental housing. The credit crunch also prevents development of affordable housing, and otherwise qualified buyers cannot get financing.

These three housing policies over the past century—high-rise public housing, rental vouchers, and low-income homeownership—have failed because nothing was done to address the underlying problem of a lack of affordable housing or to create successful economic and workforce development programs. Homeownership is not the end goal and is not appropriate for all households. Decent affordable housing (as stated in the 1939 housing act) should be a right for all households and can be a reality with a housing

policy that creates choice in tenure and decommodifies shelter.

Safety Issues for Women

In the second part of the twentieth century, urban efforts on crime prevention have focused on the public sphere through traditional responses such as policing, surveillance systems, or the proliferation of gated communities. Since the 1980s, the “broken windows” theory, which asserts that stopping small crimes will reduce major crime, has influenced policing strategies across the United States. The problem of these initiatives is that they have focused on crime, not on violence, and do not include a gender perspective. Crime refers to acts that are illegal; what constitutes a crime depends on the definition, context, and nation where the activity takes place. Many strategies have focused on preventing crime such as drug dealing, homicide, prostitution, robbery, and youth gangs, among others. Crime prevention in the public space excludes other types of violence, and above all, violence within the private space.

Since the 1970s, feminist initiatives have worked to make gender violence a public issue and to make public and private spaces safer. Also in the 1980s, new approaches to women's safety in the city started to take place in countries such as Canada and the United Kingdom and later in other countries of Europe and in Latin America and Africa. These approaches focus on community safety and violence prevention, preventing all forms of crime, violence, and insecurity. Incorporating a gender analysis in community safety recognizes that women and men often have different definitions of violence and what can be done about it. In different cities of Canada, women's organizations and local governments have conducted women's safety audits. The goal of these audits was to organize a group of women to identify unsafe places in the city and give recommendations to improve these places (e.g., METRAC, Femmes et Villes, South Africa, Bogotá).

Feminists have advocated for including violence against women issues in municipal agendas. Local governments can prevent and respond to violence against women in different ways. Municipalities can integrate women's safety concerns into the physical design of cities, parks, and recreation

planning, as well as promote economic development initiatives for women, improve access to affordable housing, and promote gender-violence prevention in health care facilities

When planning safer communities, cities should also give priority to public transportation because women rely on it much more often than men and promote mixed uses through zoning because the diversification of activities can prevent empty streets after dark. Cities can create spaces of refuge, healing, and empowerment, for example, community centers where women can talk about and redefine what safer spaces mean to them.

The link between general crime prevention activities and those relating specifically to women has been made in a number of ways by emphasizing the particular vulnerability of women and the extent to which research indicates that women curtail their activities for fear of attack or harassment. There is, therefore, both a needs and a rights argument about the importance of looking at safety issues in terms of a gendered analysis and therefore of integrating violence against women into ongoing municipal activity on crime prevention.

In the city, the question of violence is multifaceted, although the issue of primary importance is that of the suitability of public areas for women. Whether threats, intimidation, harassment, sexual attacks, or rape, all aggression or aggressive threats considerably inhibit women from moving around the city. They are targets of violence due to their vulnerability, as are young people, the elderly, the handicapped, and ethnic or sexual minorities, and this vulnerability perpetuates their position in society. Finally, violence is not impartial and expresses itself differently according to the age, social group, and ethnic origin of its victim. This violence creates feelings of fear, helplessness, and insecurity. As women do not wish to be exposed to possible violence, these feelings end up controlling women, restricting their social activities. Many women living in large cities do not feel safe in their own city, and this feeling of insecurity limits the freedom they should rightly enjoy and their fundamental right to frequent public places. As Soraya Smaoun has noted, although the city belongs to those men and women who live there, women's access is limited due to the levels of violence and unsuitability of public places. Planning and development within the city, and in urban life more generally, are often carried out without the consultation or

consent of women, thereby preventing them from exercising their fundamental right to full citizenship.

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See also *Béguinage*; Crime; Gendered Space; Gender Equity Planning; Non-Sexist City; Social Space

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WORLD CITY

The term *world city* was used first by Patrick Geddes in *Cities in Evolution* (1915) to illustrate urban growth and conurbations in city-regions outside of Great Britain. In this book, Paris, Berlin, and New York were mentioned for their growing suburbs, and other cities, such as Dusseldorf and Pittsburgh, also drew his interest.

The term was reintroduced and given a new meaning in Peter Hall's *The World Cities* (1966). Hall identified seven world cities or regions—namely,

London, Paris, Randstad (Holland), Rhine-Ruhr, Moscow, New York, and Tokyo—where a disproportionate share of the world's most important business was conducted. Hall pointed to political power and trade, including transportation, banking, and finance, as factors that separated the world cities from other great centers of population and wealth. Given that the formation and evolution of national urban systems was a paramount research topic in urban studies during the 1960s, Hall's work was seminal for identifying the world's most politically and economically powerful metropolitan regions. However, he focused more on their growth and urban problems than on the connections or competition among them.

Academic attention to the concept of world cities literally exploded after John Friedmann's (1986) now-classical essay titled "The World City Hypothesis." Friedmann's argument was built on ideas formulated by R. B. Cohen and John Friedmann and Goetz Wolff that situated major cities within the international division of labor. While arguing for a new research framework in which urbanization processes are linked to global economic forces, Friedmann defined world cities as basing points for global capital in the spatial organization and articulation of production and markets; sites with expanding sectors attached to corporate headquarters, international finance, global transport and communications, and high-level business services; major sites for the concentration and accumulation of international capital; and points of destination for large numbers of both domestic and international migrants. Based on these criteria, he identified 30 world cities and classified them into four hierarchical categories. His list of world cities of the first rank included London and Paris in Western Europe; New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles in North America; and Tokyo in Asia.

In a subsequent article, "Where We Stand: A Decade of World City Research" (1995), Friedmann proposed a slightly changed global urban hierarchy with only London, New York, and Tokyo at the top. Below these top global financial articulations, multinational articulations (e.g., Miami, Los Angeles, Frankfurt, Amsterdam, and Singapore), important national articulations (e.g., Paris, Zurich, Mexico City, Seoul, and Sydney), and subnational/regional articulations (e.g., Osaka-Kobe, Seattle,

Chicago, Vancouver, Hong Kong, Milan, and the Rhine-Ruhr region) were identified in accordance with the economic power they were alleged to command.

Friedmann's definition of world cities has been widely accepted in urban studies. Nonetheless, modifications have been suggested. For example, some scholars have added cosmopolitan cultures and immigrant communities as distinctive features of world cities. Yet, few major changes have been made. While his definition and list of world cities have survived academic scrutiny, the research methods that Friedmann and his followers, called collectively the World City School, used in identifying and ranking cities have been questioned extensively.

World Cities Research

For the last 20 years, Friedmann's world city hypothesis has been the point of reference for both empirical and theoretical studies of cities in a globalizing world economy. His suggestion that urban change can be explained with reference to a worldwide process has inspired many students of urban studies to take a global perspective on cities. Even though third world urbanization was repeatedly contextualized in international political and economic processes in the 1970s and 1980s, prior to Friedmann's work, the global framework was rarely used to investigate the form and function of major cities in the developed world, particularly North America. Most earlier studies on intercity relations, including analyses of central place, urban systems, spatial diffusion, and transportation networks, set urban centers at the national or even subnational scale.

Friedmann's notion of a world city system has contributed immensely to a better understanding of large metropolises and connections among them by setting its object of analysis at a global scale. More and more cities today are tightly embedded within various global networks, such as multinational firms' global production/marketing networks, international labor migration flows, and the worldwide web of information resources. Accordingly, the geographical scale of the causes, processes, and outcomes of urban changes is much more transnational than ever before. Certain cities, for example, Dubai and Miami, stand out for their role in facilitating transnational flows of people,

capital, and cultures rather than for their domestic presence.

Building on Friedmann's pioneering effort to rank-order major cities of the world, many world cities researchers have attempted to identify a global urban hierarchy that would be indicative, or at least suggestive, of individual cities' influence in the current world economy. However, a lack of data for measuring and comparing cities' economic command at the international level has hampered world cities research. Some success has been achieved in establishing a more empirically grounded, if not sound, hierarchy of world cities through data on the location of business services and multinational firms and the network of international air services, yet the world cities literature is still very vulnerable to criticism that its propositions lack strong evidentiary support. Indeed, many global/regional urban networks, such as the evolving urban system in the Pacific Asia and the global economic hierarchy of cities, have been proposed and asserted without specifying the indicators used. Arbitrary claims made by local/national politicians and media of their city's world city-ness have added confusion to the already controversial debate over which cities should be included in the top tier of world cities.

Alongside the endeavor to map out a more convincing hierarchy of world cities, a great deal of scholarship has focused on the economic, social, and spatial restructuring taking place inside leading world cities, notably London, New York, and Tokyo. These global cities house, according to Saskia Sassen, a disproportionate share of command-and-control functions of the capitalist world economy, such as corporate headquarters and advanced business services, that have facilitated the process of globalization. Globalization and urban change in these global cities are mutually constitutive, instead of the latter being a mere outcome of the former. Globalization is not only a major source of physical and socioeconomic changes but also a process that has been facilitated, or even enabled, by such change. In the meantime, a growing concentration of the most powerful individuals and the highest-paying jobs in global cities has occurred simultaneously with an expansion of low-paying jobs and income inequality. A high degree of socioeconomic polarization is another attribute of leading world cities.

Critique and New Directions

Serious concerns have been raised that world cities research has been geographically biased toward exceptionally large metropolises in the developed world, leading to a lack of understanding of other world cities. Indeed, both smaller cities in developed countries and almost all cities in developing countries have been neglected, even though many of these cities are integrated into a global economy. The call to diversify case-study cities has cast greater attention on the distinctive experiences of globalization in cities beyond the top three in the global urban hierarchy. The fact that urban places undergo changes in different, but comparable ways promotes comparative studies as well as case studies of urban change under various circumstances.

Another criticism of world cities research has been directed at its methodological bias toward the hierarchical categorization of cities. While scholars have attended to the attributes separating the leading world cities from the second- or lower-tier cities, few have addressed the nature and form of linkages between world cities. In an effort to demonstrate changing intercity relations on a global scale, the Globalization and World Cities Study Group and Network (GaWC) was created in 1998 by Peter Taylor and Jon Beaverstock at Loughborough University. It has established a large data matrix, named the GaWC 100, of headquarter and subsidiary locations of the world's top 100 business service firms, including accountancy, advertising, banking/finance, insurance, law, and management consultancy firms. Acknowledging that these advanced service firms have played a key role in globalizing the current world economy and connecting major cities around the world, GaWC researchers turned these locational data into a matrix of global service connectivities for 315 world cities.

The data matrix has been an essential element in mapping a world city network, not a hierarchy, in which world cities function as the nodes in transnational economic flows. It is debatable whether GaWC's network analyses have demonstrated global network connectivities, yet the research group has contributed to our understanding of world cities by heightening the importance of relations between cities on a global scale.

A wide range of ongoing efforts have been and continue to be made to address the aforementioned

concerns, fill gaps in the scholarship on world cities, and document the interface of globalization and urbanization. Identifying a definitive list of world cities is now viewed as much less intellectually challenging than it once was. Criticizing the narrowly defined notion of world cities based on a limited number of large cities' experiences with globalization, a growing number of case studies are being conducted in smaller cities, former socialist and colonial cities, and ethnic neighborhoods in emergent world cities. It is more and more obvious that the notion of world cities can embrace a broader range of urban experiences and intercity relations across economies, cultures, and political systems.

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See also Global City; Globalization; Urban Agglomeration; Urban System; World-Systems Perspective

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WORLD'S FAIR

See New York World's Fair, 1939–1940

WORLD-SYSTEMS PERSPECTIVE

The world-systems perspective (WSP) emerged in the early to mid-1970s with the publication of the first volume of Immanuel Wallerstein's *The*

Modern World-System. The paradigm comprises not a set of theories but rather a set of perspectives on how to study macrolevel social change under capitalism over long periods of historical time. The WSP was launched against modernization theory and put forward modern capitalism at the center of its analysis. A large-scale, long-term, and relational perspective on the study of the reproduction of structural inequality under capitalism characterizes the WSP.

First, the WSP emphasizes the large scale and takes the world-systems of nation-states as the unit of analysis. Instead of a series of parallel national processes, as suggested by modernization theory, the WSP posits that capitalist accumulation has always been a world process simultaneously involving all countries and regions in the world. Second, the WSP emphasizes historical continuity and the importance of studying capitalist cycles of expansion and contraction over the long term. For example, Wallerstein traces the origin of modern capitalism to the sixteenth century and examines its development over the next 500 years. Third, building on dependency theory, which stresses interdependency between core and periphery countries, the WSP adopts the relational thinking of uneven capitalist development and posits that the extraction of economic surplus from the periphery is crucial for understanding the development at the core.

This entry examines the development of the WSP from the mid-1970s to the present, introducing its main originators and institutions, areas of focus, and key concepts. Then, it reviews some major critiques of the WSP—including academic debates on some of the original formulations by Wallerstein and the new conditions in the world economy after the 1990s that require a rethinking of the WSP's articulation of hierarchical determinants and core–periphery relations. The last section relates the WSP to urban studies, examines why the two fields have taken parallel paths with little interaction between them, and suggests what aspects of the WSP are relevant for advancing urban studies.

The Development of the World-Systems Perspective

The main originators of the WSP include a group of scholars working in the tradition of historical and comparative sociology, such as Immanuel

Wallerstein, Giovanni Arrighi, Samir Amin, Andre Gunder Frank, and a few others. The three volumes of *The Modern World-System* by Wallerstein, published in 1974, 1980, and 1989, laid out a firm foundation for the development of the field by outlining a number of key concepts and formulations. The Fernand Braudel Center at Binghamton University, State University of New York, where Wallerstein was based from 1976 to 2005, has been instrumental for the development of world-systems studies along with its journal *Review* (1977–present). In 1977, Wallerstein helped to found a new section under the American Sociological Association: the Political Economy of the World System (PEWS), which organizes an annual meeting on world-systems studies and has attracted researchers across academic disciplines. The Institute for Research on World-Systems, founded by Christopher Chase-Dunn at the University of California, Riverside, is another key institution in the field. The *Journal of World-Systems Research* (1995–present) is the official publication for the PEWS section, and it regularly organizes theme issues featuring current debates in the field.

The main areas of focus for world-systems studies include world economic relations and inequality, trends and cycles of capitalist expansion and contraction, interstate relations and the rise and fall of hegemony, prehistoric and premodern world-systems, and third-world development. Since the 1990s, facing new empirical conditions of the world economy, the WSP has incorporated a few new research areas, such as transnational social movements; global economic restructuring of manufacturing and services; climate change and environmental activism; transnational capitalist class and corporate networks; global food problems such as commodification of food, land rights, and displacement of peasants; and grassroots movements against food insecurity. What unifies these different research areas is the common assumption that political and socioeconomic processes should be studied in their world-historical context and from a relational perspective focusing on uneven development.

The key concepts laid out by Wallerstein include totality, world economies, world empires, and core, semiperiphery, and periphery relations. Wallerstein is interested in social change over a long historical period, and he takes the capitalist world economy

as the basic unit of analysis. He identifies three types of totality or historical modes—minisystems, world economies, and world empires. *Minisystems* are tribal economies based on a single culture, and most of them have been swallowed up by modernization and capitalist development. *World economies* and *world empires* are world systems based on multiple cultures. Both seek the extraction of economic surplus, but they employ a different mode of extraction, with the world economy based on unequal division of labor and market exchange and the world empire based on state-sponsored tributary systems such as colonies and empires.

To use the sixteenth century as an example, China was a world empire organized around one political center and ruled by mandarins who could enforce policies over its vast territory, whereas Europe was a world economy organized as a set of competing states with different strengths, where financial capital had great influence over state policies. There is a high degree of interdependence between world economies and world empires because surplus extraction characterizes both market exchange and interstate relations.

Corresponding to the distinction between world economies and world empires, world-systems scholars have investigated, respectively, the political and economic dimensions of the world-systems. With regard to the political dimension, researchers focus on interstate systems such as imperialism and hegemony. According to Wallerstein, *imperialism* refers to the domination of weak states or regions by strong states, whereas *hegemony* refers to the temporary domination of one core state over all other states. World-systems scholars have examined hegemonic cycles, conflicts, and stability within the hierarchy of nation-states, as well as the key determinants of interstate relations. They view capitalist economic systems and individual countries' ability to extract economic surplus as the primary determinants of the interstate hierarchy, with military–political capacity as a secondary support for hegemonic assertions. Holland, Britain, and the United States are examples of hegemonic powers throughout the modern history, and each of them rose to a dominant position based on a different mode of surplus extraction.

With regard to the economic dimension, the key formulation is core, semiperiphery, and periphery relations. According to the WSP, capitalism is a

world economy comprised of core, semiperiphery, and periphery zones integrated by market exchanges. Core regions specialize in capital-intensive production and periphery regions in labor-intensive production. Semiperiphery regions are an intermediate zone between the core and periphery in terms of capital intensity, labor skills, and wage levels. Whether production is capital-intensive or labor-intensive is relative, and the definitions change over historical periods of time. For example, textile manufacturing was a corelike, capital-intensive process by the eighteenth century, a semiperipheral process by the early twentieth century, and has become a labor-intensive peripheral process by the early twenty-first century.

The central relation of world systems is that between core and periphery, and the key hierarchical determinant of structural inequality is the extraction of agrarian and other resources in unequal exchange for manufactured goods. Semiperiphery regions trade with both core and periphery, exporting raw materials to the core and simple manufactures to the periphery. The formulation of the three zones is dynamic, and the model allows for movement into and out of each zone. In the twentieth century, the United States and Western Europe are examples of core regions; West Africa has been a peripheral region; and postindependent Latin America, Korea, China, and India are examples of semiperipheral regions. A number of countries have moved upward over the second half of the twentieth century, such as Japan in the 1960s, the four East Asian tigers (Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea) in the 1980s, and China and India after the 1990s.

The Critiques

Major critiques of Wallerstein's work target his periodization of modern history and his overemphasis on external factors and economic relations for explaining social change. For world-systems studies as a whole, two major critiques can be summarized: the first is regarding the WSP's articulation of agrarian extraction as the key hierarchical determinant of structural inequality, and the second is regarding its formulation of core, semiperiphery, and periphery relations, which is inadequate to explain uneven development and internal variations within countries and regions.

For the periodization of modern history, Wallerstein sees the sixteenth century as the transition to capitalism, and he argues that agricultural capitalism is as critical as industrial capitalism. But some historians trace the origin of capitalism to long-distance trades in premodern times or to innovative commercial practices in the medieval period, and they do not see the sixteenth century as a breaking point in the development of capitalism. In regard to his relational thinking, some argue that Wallerstein has focused only on external relations between countries and has neglected internal relations and structures within countries when explaining social change. From the Marxist perspective, some notice the lack of attention to class struggles from below in Wallerstein's work, whereas others, often from a Weberian perspective, criticize his overemphasis on economic relations and disregard of cultural explanations for social change under capitalism.

The WSP articulates core and periphery relations as structurally determined by agrarian extraction, that is, the unequal exchange with raw materials from periphery countries for manufactured goods produced in core countries. However, this articulation does not capture the new conditions of the world economy after the 1970s, such as the global expansion of manufacturing, the new flexible international division of labor, the rise of service industries, and the recentralization of command functions in global cities in core countries. It is clear that agrarian extraction is no longer the key hierarchical determinant defining core and periphery relations in the global economy of the twenty-first century.

The focus on the national scale in the WSP has made the field inadequate for explaining internal variations within countries, such as uneven development among industries, regions, and cities in a particular country, as well as fragmentation along racial and gender dimensions. For example, the three-zone articulation of core, semiperiphery, and periphery can't explain why the semiconductor industry in Korea is leading the world while other industries in the country lag behind; it cannot capture regional disparity between west and east, rural and urban China; and it cannot articulate the structural inequality between top-tier global cities and the vast majority of ordinary cities.

The WSP's singular focus on the national scale therefore can't address fragmentations of national economic spaces and issues such as peripheralization at the core (e.g., pockets of poverty and exclusion in global cities in core countries). These issues can be better addressed from a multiscale perspective by paying attention to both supranational and subnational processes, and in this respect, urban studies have offered a far more flexible approach to studying internal variations and fragmentations.

In addition to the critiques reviewed above, a yet more powerful attack on the WSP came from the rise of globalization studies in the 1990s. Social sciences and humanities have accepted globalization—both as an analytical perspective and as a discourse—and have adopted a global and relational perspective to study social change, which used to be the hallmark feature that distinguished the WSP from other perspectives. The WSP has thus lost its distinctiveness as an independent paradigm with the wide acceptance and promotion of the concept of globalization. With its historical approach, the WSP still distinguishes itself from the largely ahistorical globalization studies, which overemphasize the newness of the current world economic configurations. However, without a clearly defined set of research areas and theoretical frameworks, the WSP is increasingly enmeshed with other fields in the age of globalization.

The World-Systems Perspective and Urban Studies

World-systems studies and urban studies share a relational perspective on studying uneven capitalist development, but the two fields have developed in a parallel fashion with little communication. Whereas urban scholars focus on the city, most world-systems scholars choose the national as the primary scale at which to study social change. The rise of global urban studies in the 1990s was partly launched against this state-centrist claim.

In spite of the key difference in the scale of analyses, there are a number of ways in which the WSP can be reintroduced to global urban studies. First, with a few exceptions, most global urban studies emphasize historical discontinuity over continuity and claim the newness of contemporary

urban processes. Global city studies need to adopt a historical lens as seen in the WSP and situate contemporary urban processes in their historical contexts.

Second, global urban studies have mostly focused either on the large cities at the top of the global urban hierarchy, such as New York, London, and Tokyo, or those up-and-coming global cities from emerging economies, such as Shanghai and Mumbai. Much has been learned about the socio-spatial inequality, poverty, and exclusion in these global and rapidly globalizing cities. By contrast, there is not enough research focus on second-tier cities, small cities, declining cities, or other marginal cities. In this regard, global urban studies can learn from the WSP in its systematic effort in studying third-world development and marginalization on the periphery.

Third, the role of the state is not sufficiently addressed in global urban studies, and further work needs to be done to specify the articulation between world systems and the world city network. The mode of integration of world cities into the global economy is largely dependent on and influenced by national-level policies and development. Although urban studies are more flexible because of their adoption of a multiscale perspective, urban scholars have yet to articulate the interaction between the national scale and other subnational and supranational scales. These key formulations of world-systems studies, such as the emphasis on historical continuity, periphery, and the state, can correct certain problems facing global urban studies and reconfirm the assumption underlying research on urban political economy, that is, uneven urban development is a worldwide multiscale capitalist process that has evolved over long periods of historical time.

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See also Capitalist City; Global City; Globalization; Uneven Development; World City

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WORLD TRADE CENTER (9/11)

The twin towers at the World Trade Center (WTC) in New York City were a landmark on the city skyline for more than three decades. Their destruction on September 11, 2001, by terrorists was a defining moment for the future of lower Manhattan, the city's second-largest office district, where they were located. In response to the tragedy, the state government undertook a massive urban redevelopment project on the site.

The World Trade Center was initiated in the early 1960s by David Rockefeller, the grandson of John D. Rockefeller, Sr., founder of Standard Oil. In 1955, Rockefeller had acquired significant properties in lower Manhattan for his employer, the Chase Manhattan Bank. These properties became the bank's new world headquarters. To solidify the surrounding commercial real estate market, he needed additional investment nearby. Pulling together the area's business elite from finance and industry, Rockefeller established the Downtown-Lower Manhattan Association and charged them with creating a larger vision for change, something he called the World Trade Center.

The concept of a world center of trade was not new, having been the dream of William Aldrich (David Rockefeller's father-in-law) since the late 1930s. Aldrich envisioned the center as promoting world peace through trade, but early attempts at

implementation had failed. The critics charged that the Aldrich plan had severely overestimated demand for such a use, claiming that the majority of the country's largest exporting businesses would need to rent space in order to secure the financial health of the project. Rockefeller's vision was more concrete, offering what he felt was a sense of renewal for an area he saw as lagging behind in the broader regional economy. More important, Rockefeller convinced the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, a bi-state agency, to undertake its development.

The Port Authority presence added considerable dimension to the World Trade Center project. Specifically, it provided financial security. In addition, the Port Authority had condemnation powers enabling it to clear land for construction. Yet, its actions also proved highly controversial. The port transferred the location from the east side of lower Manhattan (what is now known as the South Street Seaport) to a small but important local business community on the west side. The west side location was selected to court favor with the state of New Jersey. The site provided the connections for the ailing Hudson & Manhattan (H & M) railway, which was a burden on the New Jersey state government. Austin Tobin, the authority's executive director, saw the location as his opportunity to offer New Jersey a way out of its financial difficulties. The Port Authority would buy the H & M in exchange for its support for the world trade center project. Subsequently, the Port Authority refurbished the line, and it is now the PATH commuter rail service.

As for the site, it was a thriving commercial neighborhood. The local business owners mounted a campaign to fight the project, taking their case all the way to the Supreme Court of the State of New York. They eventually lost. Beyond the land use disputes, controversy arose over the architect Minoru Yamasaki's now-famous design to build a set of towers destined to be the world's tallest at 110 stories (1,368 feet). Despite the public outcry over destruction of the neighborhood and perceived architectural arrogance in the name of world commerce, the twin towers were built and became an icon on the New York City skyline.

The World Trade Center had been struck by terrorists once before—in 1993. Then, a car bomb was detonated in the basement parking garage

between the twin towers, killing six and injuring more than 1,000 people. That attack was linked to an Islamic extremist terrorist organization. While the structures survived this initial assault, eight years later, on September 11, 2001, the towers came under attack again. This time, terrorists flew a commercial jet plane into each tower, causing the collapse of both buildings, killing nearly 3,000 people, and injuring many more. The physical devastation left a gaping hole in the 16-acre site.

The two towers that were the World Trade Center represented almost 30 percent of the total office space in lower Manhattan and the fifth-largest indoor retail mall in the United States. Together, the buildings housed more than 50,000 jobs. In 2007, nearly six years after the destruction, decisions were still being made over what to build on the site and where. One signature building, the Freedom Tower, was approved and will dominate the skyline at 1,776 feet to the top of its antenna. Three additional towers are planned for the site, together offering nearly 10 million square feet in Class A commercial office space and 600,000 square feet in retail space, replacing all of the office and retail space that was lost. Additional planned construction includes a memorial to those who died, a hotel and conference center, a major transit facility, and a cultural and performing arts facility. The intent is to use the redevelopment to maintain lower Manhattan as an office market and transportation hub for the city.

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See also Global City; New York City, New York; World City

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WREN, SIR CHRISTOPHER

Although his 1666 plan for London after the Great Fire is famous, Sir Christopher Wren's (1632–1723) place in history is first as a scientist, and then, most prominently, as an architect. In both capacities, however, Wren did contribute significantly to the shaping of the early modern city.

Born into a conservative English family of high churchmen in 1632, Wren was famous as a child for his “marvelous gifts” in mathematics and mechanics. He pursued these subjects, as well as astronomy and experimental philosophy, at Oxford University as an undergraduate at Wadham College and then as fellow at All Soul's. At 25, he became professor of astronomy at Gresham College in London. Three years later, with the Restoration of the Stuart monarchy in 1660, he was part of a small group that founded the Royal Society for Natural and Experimental Philosophy. By the age of 30, now back in Oxford as Savilian professor of astronomy, Wren had made significant achievements in science. At this moment however he began to involve himself in architecture, giving advice on repairs, designing buildings, and making his 1666 plan for London. Wren's new career was secured when he was made surveyor general in 1669. For the next 40 years, as the king's architect, but also through private commissions, he designed palaces, hospitals, collegiate buildings, and churches.

During the 1660s, while making his transition to architecture, Wren joined a group of friends at the Royal Society to address problems in London that had been recognized since Elizabethan times—congestion, decay, filth, and uncontrolled growth, as well as the threats of fire, disease, and civil disorder. Wren may have been a member of the royal commission appointed on May 14, 1662, “for reforming the buildings, ways, streets, and incumbances, and regulating the hackney coaches in the City of London,” which included his close friend John Evelyn, diarist, virtuoso, and founding member of the society. Evelyn had already written about the deplorable effects of pollution from burning coal, proposing remedies modeled after Paris, Rome, and other cities he visited during 10 years of travel on the continent.

The Crown's interest in reforming London was driven by fears of catastrophes that did come to pass—widespread plague and fire in 1665 and 1666, respectively. Equally important, however, was its desire to create a new symbol for the restored Stuart monarchy. Paralleling the Rome of Augustus, London would be “from Brick made Stone and Marble” by the restored king. After the fire, the Royal Society declared its support of Charles II's proposals to build “a *New City*,” employing better materials and designs.

Wren and Evelyn were among the three society members who produced new plans for London immediately after the fire, plans that addressed these ongoing concerns. The other was Wren's friend Robert Hooke, the society's curator of experiments and professor of geometry at Gresham College. Together, Wren and Hooke played the largest role in guiding the rebuilding of the city. Both served on the royal commission, created a few weeks after the fire, that formulated the regulations, which appeared in the Rebuilding Act, for wider streets, brick and stone construction, and safer house designs. On its passage in late March

1667, Hooke began his more than five-year long survey of the city. Over the next few decades, Wren built the new custom house, the new St. Paul's, and about 50 churches, many in collaboration with Hooke, as was the case for the monument to the Great Fire. Thus, although London was returned more or less to its original layout, Wren ultimately, more than any other contemporary, helped establish new, more modern standards for the urban environment.

Lydia M. Soo

See also Christopher Wren, Plan of London; City Planning; London, United Kingdom

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Z

ZOÖPOLIS

Zoöpolis refers to a city in which relations between humans, other animals, and nature are characterized by coexistence. Development of the zoöpolis model represents a major move forward in the opening of urban theory and research to considerations of animal lives, meanings, and agency in the city, in response to problematically anthropocentric urban theories and practices. This entry introduces the zoöpolis model and the related transspecies urban theoretical framework and also discusses some of the perspectives on animals and cities that research along these lines lends.

Zoöpolis: Origins, Model, and Theory

The broad context of the development of the zoöpolis concept is characterized by considerable changes in recent thought about the relationships among humans, other animals, and the environment, both on the global stage and in the academy. Growing awareness of animal suffering in factory farms and research laboratories, species endangerment due to land development and extractive economic activities, and the environmental impacts of toxic waste and pollutants began to generate substantial alarm several decades ago about particular modes of animal treatment and environmental management, galvanizing highly visible activist movements and legal battles. These concerns, along with developments in social

theory, led scholars to rethink the boundaries between culture and nature, humans and animals, and the urban and the natural and to question the sidelining of the “animal question” in academic projects. Thus began the profusion of research and theory on the relationship between humans and nonhuman animals, in both contemporary and historical contexts.

The zoöpolis model engages with the animal question from an explicitly urban perspective. Its origins lie in critiques of capitalist urbanization and contemporary urban theory, which impugned the former for proceeding with little regard for nonhuman life and the latter for tending toward anthropocentric accounts of urbanization. Jennifer Wolch has pointed to the lexicon of mainstream urban theory, which describes the transformation of “empty” or “wasted” land into “improved” land (in fact, land no longer able to sustain the diversity of life that once inhabited it) and also to the absence of nonhuman animals from feminist, Marxist, and neoclassical urban theories. She alleges that disastrous effects have followed from these practices and conceptualizations of urbanization, including threats to species and entire ecosystems from the advancing urban edge and from the expanding agro-industrial system that feeds urban populations, as well as the horrific treatment of factory-farmed animals. Displaced wild animals and unwanted strays eke out urban existences in the “subaltern animal town” that emerges where it can within cities built to accommodate humans.

Wolch has also criticized urban environmentalism for focusing on urban environmental problems

as they impact humans. To the degree that environmental thought has engaged with animals, it has objectified them as resources or parts of a system, or in the case of approaches that emphasize ecological holism, it has backgrounded them by minimizing differences between human and non-human animals and animate and inanimate nature. Such perspectives leave little room for understanding nonhuman animals as subjective beings, as entities that construct and experience their worlds.

The recovery of animal subjectivity is central to zoöpolis, for it suggests that humans are obligated to move toward urban praxis that accounts for animals as experiential beings. This may be facilitated by (re)seating animals and humans in intersubjective relationships, wherein realizations of difference and similarities, and even kinship, can be made, which would in turn foster ethical relations based on respect and caring. This web of beings recalls humans' historical ontological dependency on animals—the fundamentality of animals to the development of the human species—and the interspecies ethic of caring and friendship that this may have created. Wolch notes that for much of human history, people had simultaneous relationships of dominance over animals and respect for them, valuing both animal differences from and similarities with humans; not coincidentally, most wild animal habitats were also sustained. The place where such relations can be reconstituted is in a reanimated, renaturalized city called zoöpolis.

The zoöpolis model poses harmonious human–animal–nature relations as the key to greener and more just urban futures. By bringing animals (wild and productive) and nature into the urban sphere, humans could gain a situated understanding of animal life, which would engender an ethic, practice, and politics of caring for animals and nature. These new relationships may come to alter both personal beliefs about the human–animal/human–nature divide and deeply embedded political–economic structures, social relations, and institutions, which currently alienate humans from animals and the natural world and perpetuate violence and destruction unto nonhuman entities.

Integral to zoöpolis is the development of a transspecies urban theory that would expand understandings of human–animal relations to inform an agenda for bringing animals back into

urban society and space. In particular, Jennifer Wolch, Kathleen West, and Thomas Gaines state that a transspecies urban theory, based in social theory, would enable scholars to address questions about how and why urban residents react to the presence of wild animals and what this means for animals; how urbanization impacts wild animals; how urbanization practices, human attitudes and behaviors, and animal needs intersect to create urban wildlife ecologies; and how planning, policy-making, and political struggles have arisen to protect wild animals. The proposed conceptual framework indicates a relationship between human–wildlife interactions and the process of urbanization, each of which affects urban wildlife ecology; ecological changes stimulate transspecies urban practices (often corrective measures), which in turn impact human–wildlife interactions and the urbanization process. This theory, as Alice Hovorka has pointed out, holds human–animal relationships as fundamental to understanding urban form, function, and dynamics.

Perspectives on Animals and Cities

Research on animals and cities has covered many topics and time periods, exploring themes significant to urban development, urban culture and society, and urban ecology. Cumulatively, this work evinces animals to be an integral part of the urban. Although not all of this work is informed by the concept of zoöpolis or objectives of transspecies urban theory, this framework provides a useful organizational structure for research on animals in urban landscapes.

Social constructions of animals and role of animals in shaping human and cultural identities have been dominant concerns in human–animal interaction work. Historical scholarship has examined how wild animals—particularly exotic animals—became symbols of status and wealth in urban societies of the sixteenth century and onward, as well as representations of rulers' power over national and international affairs. Given as diplomatic gifts along with vases and diamonds, and kept in private menageries and at court, rare and curious exotic animals amused as they reminded viewers of the collector's prestige and their nation's place in world affairs. Exotic animals also became popular as household pets and objects of naturalistic

inquiry and were increasingly available in urban centers and port cities. Exotic animals brought from trading and military expeditions in the classical period had stimulated similar curiosity, filling menageries and the gladiatorial ring after the rise of urbanization in antiquity rendered encounters with wild animals a novelty.

In the nineteenth century, the urban public in Europe and New World societies such as Australia began to encounter wild and exotic animals in zoological gardens. The modern urban zoo, evolved from rationalist Enlightenment era ideals of scientific understandings of nature, facilitated the study of animals and expanded access beyond a purely scientific audience. The institution has been subjected to critical inquiry over the ideas about and relations with animals that it has communicated to its legions of urban visitors. The representation of zoo animals is implicated in informing incomplete or inaccurate understandings about animal behaviors, biological needs, and emotional lives, and scholars have read the act of displaying animals as communicating human difference from and power over the displayed animals and their wild counterparts as well.

In increasingly multicultural, multiethnic urban regions, human relations with both wild and domestic animals are defined by diverse and sometimes controversial cultural animal attitudes and practices. Recent studies of immigrant and minority ethnic groups have concluded that culture and immigrant experiences inform attitudes about animals; that ideas about appropriate uses of particular animals as food, in sport, in ritual, and as pets differ across culture groups; and that particular animals act as ties to countries and cultures of origin for some immigrant groups. Some ethnic groups experience racialization through their animal practices, as controversial practices are used to “other” and denigrate that group.

Urbanization practices have effected sweeping changes in animal geographies, and conversely, movements to exclude or incorporate certain groups of animals into cities sometimes precipitate significant changes in urban form and society. The encircling of classical and medieval cities with walls offered protection from invading armies, but it also assuaged the fear of wild animals and wilderness that dominated medieval mentalities. As towns (re)fortified—and as land cultivation, hunting, and

the persecution of predators decimated wildlife in Europe—urban animal encounters became characterized by domestic animals. Centuries later, with movements to exclude productive animals from Western cities, urban functions and environments again changed. The nineteenth-century urban landscape was sterilized of animal bodies and beastly encounters, as livestock and animal product industries were displaced to the countryside. Contemporary urban industrial–agricultural sectors and the move toward keeping productive animals in urban households throughout the world represent another animal-based reconstitution of urban spaces and economies. Land rezoning, the appearance of structures for animal keeping, and changes in the numbers of workers or households sustained by the production of animal bodies and products comprise some of the palpable changes to urban form and life. Urban conservation practices intended to rectify the effects of capitalist urbanization on wildlife species and ecosystem processes—such as maintaining wildlife corridors and restoring native vegetation—represent other urban landscape changes that demonstrate the role of human–animal relations in changing urban form and function.

The rethinking of human–animal–environment relations within the academy has stimulated the development of new methodological approaches to the study of urban wildlife ecology. A conservation biology paradigm has characterized most urban wildlife research since the recognition of human-dominated landscapes as important sites for conservation. Recently, the development of novel and nonpositivist methodologies to improve understandings of urban wildlife ecologies has been the goal of some research on both common urban animals and species of conservation concern. Perspectives on the co-constitution of avian foraging ecology by avian and human actants reveal how bird–bird and human–bird interactions create urban opportunities for single birds and entire species, suggesting that human–animal relational geographies are an important component of wildlife ecologies in urban landscapes. Other research includes experimental forays into different ways of sensing and knowing urban wildlife, to inform a politics for urban wilds that is more true to wild inhabitants than current conservation practices and laws, which do not contemplate the

ephemeral nature of some species, nor behavioral and ecological differences within species.

In some cases, urban planning and policy are also undergoing a shift toward reconsiderations of urban animals and environmental well-being. Scholarship on animals, ecology, and urban design has evaluated communities that appear to be making animal-oriented efforts, examining policy and place in light of zoöpolitan and sustainability principles and toward the end of reflecting on means and obstacles to moving towns and cities toward more harmonious and equitable human–animal–nature relations. Studies of the transspecies urban practices of conservation communities, or communities founded on objectives of environmental, social, and economic sustainability, suggest that stated commitments to animals are enacted through a privileging of wild or companion animals, without challenging normative relationships with productive animals. Ecological goals are sometimes compromised by market directives, advertised to create a green-community image but not adequately implemented or abandoned in favor of incorporating the type of landscaped nature the target demographic is projected to prefer.

Burgeoning interest in urban human–animal relations indicate that research and professional communities increasingly view animals as an integral part of urban societies past and present. Some of the body of work on animals and urban environments also suggests a growing interest in socio-ecological urban planning, informed by the conviction that harmonious relations among humans, nonhuman animals, and nature are key to the well-being, health, and survival of the inhabitants of urban regions and to the sustainability of

natural processes and systems into which cities have been imposed.

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See also Parks; Sustainable Development; Urban Life

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